

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20036

**Anthony H. Cordesman**  
Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Email: [acordesman@gmail.com](mailto:acordesman@gmail.com)

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# Security Transition in Afghanistan

**By: Anthony H. Cordesman**

**CSIS**

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Burke Chair  
In Strategy

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# Introduction

Creating an effective transition for the ANSF is only one of the major challenges that Afghanistan, the US, and Afghanistan's other allies face during 2014-2015 and beyond. The five other key challenges include:

- Going from an uncertain election to effective leadership and political cohesion and unity.
- Creating an effective and popular structure governance, with suitable reforms, from the local to central government, reducing corruption to acceptable levels, and making suitable progress in planning, budgeting, and budget execution.
- Coping with the coming major cuts in outside aid and military spending in Afghanistan, adapting to a largely self-financed economy, developing renewal world economic development plans, carrying out the reforms pledged at the Tokyo Conference, and reducing the many barriers to doing business.
- Establishing relations with Pakistan and other neighbors that will limit outside pressures and threats, and insurgent sanctuaries on Afghanistan's border.
- Persuading the US, other donors, NGCO, and nations will to provide advisors to furnish the needed aid effort through at least 2018, and probably well beyond.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot succeed unless the ANSF meets the wide range of security challenges which are the subject of this briefing. Many of these challenges are ones that all governments face in shaping an effective security response to major extremist and insurgent threats. Others are unique to Afghanistan.

It should be clear from this list and the briefing that follows that the ANSF faces problems that make a successful Transition a high risk effort even if the ANSF is the *only* factor considered in supporting an effective Transition. This risk is highlighted in much of the data that follow, and in virtually all of the narratives describing the current state of the ANSF.

At the same time, the briefing shows that there are positive as well as negative trends. The ANSF may be able to succeed if it receive suitable outside support, and particularly if it has a substantial advisory and enable presence from the US, if other key ISAF states like Germany and Italy provide a presence in in key areas, and if the donors provide the funds necessary for the ANSF to develop, operate, and mature.

# A Long List of Key Uncertainties


- When will a new President take office?
- Can the new President win popular support... and lead?
- How long will it take to form a functional government at all levels – national, provincial, district?
- How will the mix of power brokers change?
- What security challenges will emerge and when? How will the MoD and Mol function and respond?
- Who will take charge of budgeting, economic planning, and use of international aid?
- What will be mix of corruption versus relative honesty?
- What will be the mix of capabilities – e.g., war-fighting versus security? How will Afghan leaders reshape the rule of law?
- How will layered defense actually interact with governance?
- Accommodation? Search for peace?
- Role of neighboring powers?

# The Afghan Government Can Be as Serious a “Threat” as the Insurgents: The *Other* Challenges of Transition

- Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government
- Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions
- Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption
- Fully replacing NATO/ISAF with the ANSF and “layered defense”
- Creating a new structure of security forces, advisors, and aid funds, to include addressing the presence of US and other nations’ personnel
- Acting on the Tokyo Conference: Creating effective flow and use of aid, economic reform, and limits to corruption and waste
- Stabilizing a market economy driven by military spending and moving towards development: Brain drain and capital flight
- Coping with weather and other challenges to agricultural structure and with pressures to increase the narco-economy
- Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and  
6 Russia

# World Bank Rankings of Governance Shows Very Uncertain Trends

Afghanistan



# The Post-Election Challenges of Transition

- Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government
- Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions
- Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption
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# Key Military Challenges

- Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
- Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply, and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
- Top Down Leadership: New President, MoI, MoD.
- Evolution of effective overall command structure.
- Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
- Redefining force structure and force plans.
- Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R.
- Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law.
- Promotion, enlistment, pay, medical, food, housing, security, retirement.
- Leave and recovery, AWOL and attrition.
- National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
- Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
- Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”

# Economic Challenges

- “New Silk Road” is dead, and “Ring Road” is uncertain; mineral wealth is no miracle solution to economic challenges. Very little real growth other than aid and military spending driven – cyclical impact of rainfall.
- Still at war and highly aid dependent.
- Unclear who will plan and manage aid and revenues in government.
- No clear aid structure, revenue flows, outside plans and focus.
- The goal of 50% Afghan control ignores the roll back of aid/NGO presence; government ability to use and manage is insufficient.
- Failure of UNAMA, uncertain role of World Bank.
- Service sector may leave, export capital, collapse.
- Major barriers to private development.
- **At least some risk of major recession and collapse of the market-driven sector.**

# **The President's Transition “Plan” of May 27, 2014**

# The Obama Transition “Plan:” May 27, 2014

... Our objectives are clear: Disrupting threats posed by al Qaeda; supporting Afghan security forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own.

Here’s how we will pursue those objectives. First, America’s combat mission will be over by the end of this year. Starting next year, Afghans will be fully responsible for securing their country. American personnel will be in an advisory role. We will no longer patrol Afghan cities or towns, mountains or valleys. That is a task for the Afghan people.

Second, I’ve made it clear that we’re open to cooperating with Afghans on two narrow missions after 2014: training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda.

Today, I want to be clear about how the United States is prepared to advance those missions. At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 98,000 U.S. -- let me start that over, just because I want to make sure we don’t get this written wrong. At the beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we will have reduced that presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, just as we’ve done in Iraq.

Now, even as our troops come home, the international community will continue to support Afghans as they build their country for years to come. But our relationship will not be defined by war -- it will be shaped by our financial and development assistance, as well as our diplomatic support. Our commitment to Afghanistan is rooted in the strategic partnership that we agreed to in 2012. And this plan remains consistent with discussions we’ve had with our NATO allies. Just as our allies have been with us every step of the way in Afghanistan, we expect that our allies will be with us going forward.

Third, we will only sustain this military presence after 2014 if the Afghan government signs the Bilateral Security Agreement that our two governments have already negotiated. This Agreement is essential to give our troops the authorities they need to fulfill their mission, while respecting Afghan sovereignty. The two final Afghan candidates in the run-off election for President have each indicated that they would sign this agreement promptly after taking office. So I’m hopeful that we can get this done.

# The White House Transition “Fact” Sheet: May 27, 2014 - I

## Afghans Taking the Security Lead

At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Afghanistan and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations agreed to transfer full responsibility for Afghanistan’s security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014. This transition process has allowed the international community to responsibly draw down our forces in Afghanistan, while preserving hard-won gains and setting the stage to achieve our core objectives -- disrupting threats posed by al-Qa’ida; supporting Afghan Security Forces; and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own.

At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, Afghanistan and ISAF nations reaffirmed this framework for transition and agreed on a milestone in mid-2013 when the ISAF mission would begin to shift from combat to support. Last June, the Afghans reached that milestone as the ANSF assumed the lead for security across the whole of Afghanistan and our coalition forces shifted their focus to the training, advising, and assisting of Afghan forces.

Today, Afghan forces provide security for their people and plan and lead the fight against the insurgency. The most recent example of this transition was the effective security provided by the ANSF to enable the April presidential and provincial elections. The ANSF will maintain its current surge strength of 352,000 to reinforce this progress and provide for a secure environment in Afghanistan.

## Commitment to the U.S.-Afghanistan Partnership

In May 2012, the President signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan that defined a future in which Afghans are responsible for the security of their nation. The two countries pledged to build an equal partnership between two sovereign states premised on mutual respect and shared interests. U.S. commitments to support Afghanistan’s social and economic development, security, and institutions and to promote regional cooperation are matched by Afghan commitments to strengthen accountability, transparency, and oversight and to protect the human rights of all Afghans -- men and women. The Strategic Partnership Agreement includes mutual commitments in the areas of: protecting and promoting shared democratic values; advancing long-term security; reinforcing regional security and cooperation; social and economic development; and strengthening Afghan institutions and governance.

The United States continues to support a sovereign, stable, unified, and democratic Afghanistan and will continue our partnership based on the principles of mutual respect and mutual accountability. We remain fully supportive of our partners in the Afghan security forces, and we continue to proudly work side-by-side with the many Afghans who work to ensure the stability and prosperity of their fellow citizens.

## International Support for Afghanistan

The United States’ support is part of an international effort to assist Afghanistan as it enters the “Transformation Decade” of 2015-2024. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, Afghanistan and NATO reaffirmed its commitment to further develop an enduring partnership that would last beyond the transition of full security responsibility for Afghanistan from ISAF to Afghan forces by the end of 2014. This commitment is a clear message to the Afghan people that they will not stand alone as they take responsibility for their security. At the 2012 Tokyo Conference, Afghanistan and the international community also committed to support the sustainable growth and development of Afghanistan. The international community pledged financial support, through 2017, at or near levels of the past decade, to respond to Afghanistan’s projected budget shortfalls.

# The White House Transition “Fact” Sheet: May 27, 2014 - II

## Political Transition

As the Afghans took control for their security, they also worked to usher in a historic transfer of power in Afghanistan. We congratulate the millions of Afghans who voted in the presidential elections in April, and we look forward to the inauguration of their next president later this summer. The United States affirms its support for a fair, credible, and Afghan-led election process and does not support any candidate in the elections -- the choice of who leads Afghanistan is for Afghans alone.

The United States also believes that an Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process is the surest way to end violence and ensure lasting stability for Afghanistan and the region. As the President has said, the United States will support initiatives that bring Afghans together with other Afghans to discuss the future of their country. The United States and the Afghan government have called upon on the Taliban to join a political process. We have been clear that the outcomes of any peace and reconciliation process must be for the Taliban and other armed opposition groups to end violence, break ties with al-Qa’ida, and accept Afghanistan’s constitution, including its protections for the rights of all Afghan citizens, both men and women.

We believe that a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can only be possible in a stable and prosperous region. We endorse Afghanistan’s vision for building strong, sustainable bilateral and multilateral relationships with its neighbors and regional partners. We encourage Afghanistan’s further economic integration into the region and support the principles of good-neighborly relations, which include non-interference and respect for sovereignty.

## Economic Transition

- Afghanistan has experienced rapid economic growth and remarkable improvements in key social indicators:
- Afghanistan’s gross domestic product has grown an average of 9.4 percent per year from 2003 to 2012.
- In the last decade, life expectancy at birth has increased by 20 years to over 62 years.
- In 2002, an estimated 900,000 boys were in school and virtually no girls. Now there are 8 million students enrolled in school, more than a third of whom are girls.
- In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to reliable electricity. Today, 28 percent of the population has access to reliable electricity, including more than 2 million people in Kabul who now benefit from electric power 24 hours a day.

However, challenges remain, and Afghanistan will require continued international assistance to sustain its gains and further meet its development goals. In January 2013, the President reaffirmed the conclusions of the Tokyo Conference, including that the U.S. commitment to align 80 percent of our aid with Afghan priorities and channel at least 50 percent of development assistance through the national budget of the Afghan government as part of the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.

# **The Challenge of Coping Without a Credible Plan and Budget, and Public Support**

***The first section in this report focuses on the lack of adequate leadership planning, budgeting, and public support.***

**It lists the areas where the US government – as well as the Afghan government and other powers – have failed to provide leadership, planning, and transparency, and create the institutions necessary for success.**

**It warns that past failures to sustain successful transitions have been the rule and not the exception.**

**It shows the need for leadership that can win congressional and popular US support, and that goes far beyond empty rhetoric about terrorism. That provides a clear strategic justification for US action, and provides a credible path forward**

**It shows the rate at which US spending has already been cut, and the lacking of any meaningful budget planning and details in the President's FY2015 budget request.**







# The BSA is Only One Aspect of Transition

- Leadership and transparency to win public and Congressional support
- Integrated civil-military plan for post-2014 US presence and aid
  - A clear US and allied plan for an on-going advisory presence and aid funding of ANSF
  - A clear US and allied plan for governance and economic assistance and aid funding.
- A clear plan for setting conditions for Afghan reforms and other actions
- A plan for US relations with – and aid to – Pakistan and Central Asia nations, as well as other key transit and neighboring states
- US leadership in creating replacements for ISAF, NTM-A, UNSCOM
- Follow-ons to Tokyo and Chicago conferences

# History is a Warning: Declare Victory and Leave?


## Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions



Following the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.

## Loss of US Public Support - I

*Next, I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. What is your overall opinion of Afghanistan? Is it very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?*




GALLUP

# Loss of US Public Support - II

*Thinking now about U.S. military action in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not?*

■ % Yes, made a mistake    ■ % No, did not



GALLUP

# Loss of US Public Support - III

## Negative Views of U.S. Efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan

*In achieving its goals in Iraq/Afghanistan, U.S. has ...*

■ Mostly failed ■ Mostly succeeded




Survey conducted Jan. 15-19, 2014.  
Don't know responses not shown.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER/USA TODAY

## Views of Decisions to Use Military Force in Afghanistan, Iraq

*Decision to use military force in Afghanistan ...*



*Decision to use military force in Iraq ...*



Survey conducted Jan. 15-19, 2014.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER/USA TODAY

# Overview of Recent US Polls - I

**NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll** conducted by Hart Research Associates (D) and Public Opinion Strategies (R). June 11-15, 2014. N=1,000 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.1.

**"When it comes to Afghanistan, do you think the war was worth it or not worth it?"**

	<b>Worth it</b> %	<b>Not worth it</b> %	<b>Depends (vol.)</b> %	<b>Unsure</b> %
6/11-15/14	27	65	2	6
1/12-15/13	40	51	2	7

**ABC News/Washington Post Poll.** May 29-June 1, 2014. N=1,002 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.5.

**"Obama has said he will reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan to 9,800 by the end of this year, half of that next year and near zero by 2016. Do you support or oppose this troop-reduction plan?"**

	<b>Support</b> %	<b>Oppose</b> %	<b>Unsure</b> %
5/29 - 6/1/14	77	19	4

**CBS News Poll.** March 20-23, 2014. N=1,097 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.

**"Most U.S. troops are expected to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. From what you know, how likely do you think it is that Afghanistan will be a stable country after U.S. troops leave: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not at all likely?"**

	<b>Very likely</b> %	<b>Somewhat likely</b> %	<b>Not very likely</b> %	<b>Not at all likely</b> %	<b>Unsure</b> %
3/20-23/14	5	24	38	30	3

**Gallup Poll.** Feb. 6-9, 2014. N=1,023 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  4.

**"Looking back, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Afghanistan in 2001?"**

	<b>Yes</b> %	<b>No</b> %	<b>Unsure</b> %
2/6-9/14	49	48	3
3/7-10/13	44	51	5

**CNN/ORC Poll.** Sept. 6-8, 2013. N=1,022 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.

**"In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Afghanistan, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Afghanistan, or not?"**

	<b>Yes</b> %	<b>No</b> %	<b>Unsure</b> %
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# Overview of Recent US Polls - II

**Pew Research Center/USA Today.** Jan. 15-19, 2014. N=739 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  4.2.  
5/2/11: Co-sponsored by The Washington Post.

**"Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan?"**

	<b>Right decision</b>	<b>Wrong decision</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%
1/15-19/14	51	41	8
10/30 - 11/6/13	56	37	8

**CBS News Poll.** March 20-23, 2014. N=1,097 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.

**"Most U.S. troops are expected to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. From what you know, how likely do you think it is that Afghanistan will be a stable country after U.S. troops leave: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not at all likely?"**

	<b>Very likely</b>	<b>Somewhat likely</b>	<b>Not very likely</b>	<b>Not at all likely</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%	%	%
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	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%
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	<b>Right decision</b>	<b>Wrong decision</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%
1/15-19/14	51	41	8
10/30 - 11/6/13	56	37	8
6/15-19/11	57	35	8
8/25 - 9/6/10	52	38	10
1/7-11/09	64	25	11
2/20-24/08	65	24	11
12/6-10/06	61	29	10
1/4-8/06	69	20	11

**"Overall, do you think the United States has mostly succeeded or mostly failed in achieving its goals in Afghanistan?"**

	<b>Mostly succeeded</b>	<b>Mostly failed</b>	<b>Unsure/Refused</b>
	%	%	%
1/15-19/14	38	52	10

# Overview of Recent US Polls - III

CBS News Poll. March 20-23, 2014. N=1,097 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.

**"Most U.S. troops are expected to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. From what you know, how likely do you think it is that Afghanistan will be a stable country after U.S. troops leave: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not at all likely?"**

	<b>Very likely</b>	<b>Somewhat likely</b>	<b>Not very likely</b>	<b>Not at all likely</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%	%	%
3/20-23/14	5	24	38	30	3

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CBS News Poll. March 20-23, 2014. N=1,097 adults nationwide. Margin of error  $\pm$  3.

**"Most U.S. troops are expected to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014. From what you know, how likely do you think it is that Afghanistan will be a stable country after U.S. troops leave: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not at all likely?"**

	<b>Very likely</b>	<b>Somewhat likely</b>	<b>Not very likely</b>	<b>Not at all likely</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%	%	%
3/20-23/14	5	24	38	30	3

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**"All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not?"**

10/09: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan was / has been worth fighting, or not?" -- "was" and "has been" each asked of half the sample.

9/09 & earlier: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan WAS worth fighting, or not?"


	<b>Worth fighting</b>	<b>Not worth fighting</b>	<b>Unsure</b>
	%	%	%
12/12-15/13	30	66	4

Source: <http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm>




# Massive Past Impact: \$104 billion in US Aid – Largely Security Aid – as of June 30, 2014 – versus \$103.4 B for Entire Marshall Plan

CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF JUNE 30, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)



# Ongoing Cuts in US Aid

## - \$14.7B in FY2012: \$9.7B in FY2013, \$7.6B in FY2014, \$5.8B in FY2015




**FY 2014 APPROPRIATIONS COMPARED TO THE FY 2015 BUDGET REQUEST (\$ MILLIONS)**

	FY 2014	FY 2015 Req
ASFF	\$4,726	\$4,109
CERP	30	15
AIF	199	0
TFBSO	64	5
DOD CN	321	148
ESF	852	1,225
INCLE	225	325
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$6,417</b>	<b>\$5,827</b>

# Aid Needs International Coordination that UNAMA Has Not Provided

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR FY 1393 BY DONOR, AS OF JUNE 21, 2014 (\$ MILLIONS)




- From 2002 to June 21, 2014, the World Bank reported that 33 donors had pledged nearly \$7.86 billion, of which more than \$7.24 billion had been paid in.


- According to the World Bank, donors had pledged approximately \$954.16 million to the ARTF for Afghan fiscal year 1393, which runs from December 21, 2013, to December 20, 2014.

# ASFF Disbursements for the ANA & ANP by Category

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA  
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,  
FY 2005-MAR 31, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)



ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP  
BY SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP,  
FY 2005-MAR 31, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers have been rounded.

Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 4/15/2014.

# No US DoD Plan and Hollow Placeholder OCO Budget

(Current Dollars in Billions)

**\$75B in FY2015 to \$30B in FY2016**



\* Reflects FY13 Enacted level excluding Sequestration

\* Placeholders only

**Focus Only On Base Budget For Remainder Of Briefing  
No FY 2015 OCO Budget Yet**

# **State FY2015 Budget Request Down to \$2.1 Billion with no Clear Plan for Transition**

- **\$2.6 billion of the State Department FY2015 budget request is allocated to Afghanistan under conditions where State cautions that “the Administration has not yet determined the size and scope of any post-2014 US presence.”**
- **State indicates that the United States will sustain “our diplomatic platform and security operations in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Herat, while assuming selective reductions in personnel in preparation for transition.”**
- **The budget prioritizes technical assistance and channels more aid through Afghan institutions, while holding the Government of Afghanistan accountable for undertaking concrete reforms and improving efficiency and sustainability.**
- **FY2015 funds will sustain gains in health and education, economic self-sufficiency through improved agricultural production, good governance, rule of law, and women’s rights as laid out in the strategic Partnership agreement.**

# **President Makes OCO Budget Recommendation for State and DoD on June 27, 2014 - I**

**Reduces Totals with No Break Out for Afghanistan: \$58.6 billion for DOD OCO activities, which is \$20.9 billion less than the \$79.4 billion placeholder for DOD OCO in the FY 2015 Budget. It would also provide \$1.4 billion for State/OIP OCO activities, which is in addition to the \$5.9 billion for State/OIP included in the FY 2015 Budget. Overall, these amendments would decrease the total OCO funding requested for FY 2015 by \$19.5 billion.**

The United States' goals in Afghanistan beyond 2014 are to continue to support the Afghan National Security Forces, support economic development and governance efforts, and pursue U.S. counterterrorism goals against al Qaeda and its affiliated groups. As you announced in May, the United States will conclude combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of this calendar year. The United States will draw down to approximately 9,800 U.S. servicemembers in Afghanistan by early 2015, which, together with NATO allies and other partners, will allow the United States to continue advising key Afghan forces and to sustain counterterrorism operations. By the end of 2015 the United States will have reduced that presence by roughly half and consolidated its military and diplomatic presence to Kabul and Bagram Airfield. By the end of 2016, DOD will draw down to a more conventional embassy-based security assistance presence in Kabul.

In support of OEF and related follow-on activities, DOD OCO funding would support several key efforts, including:



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In support of OEF and related follow-on activities, DOD OCO funding would support several key efforts, including:

- concluding the combat mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 and positioning U.S. military and intelligence forces in Afghanistan for their post-2014 mission;
- drawing down to approximately 9,800 U.S. servicemembers in the country by early 2015 from an average of 38,000 in FY 2014;
- continuing to support the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as they assume full responsibility for security in Afghanistan after December 2014;



# President Makes OCO Budget Recommendation for State and DoD on June 27, 2014 - II

- sustaining the fight against transnational terrorists who seek to undermine the United States and its allies;
- providing warfighters with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support that has proven essential for mission success in Afghanistan and around the region;
- providing support to Coalition allies in Afghanistan and the surrounding region;
- disposing of unexploded ordnance in Afghanistan and continuing to support Coalition and partner efforts to counter improvised explosive devices;
- returning thousands of cargo containers and pieces of equipment from Afghanistan to their home stations;
- replenishing or replacing expended munitions and ammunition as well as combat-damaged equipment, including helicopters, ground vehicles, and unmanned aerial systems; and
- supporting a portion of temporary Army and Marine Corps end strength that currently supports OEF, but will not be required under the defense strategy articulated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Although the FY 2015 OCO request reflects a transition as the United States concludes combat operations in Afghanistan partway into the fiscal year, most costs will not decline precipitously. For example, DOD will still incur significant costs to transport personnel, supplies, and equipment back to their home stations. Funding to sustain the ANSF will continue to be needed to ensure that Afghan forces can provide sufficient security. There will be continued costs to repair and replace equipment and munitions as DOD resets the force over the next few years.

# OCO Funding for ANSF: June 27, 2014 - II

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (Overseas contingency operations) FY 2015 Budget Appendix Page: 264

FY 2015

Proposed Amendment: \$4,109,333,000

Revised Request: \$4,109,333,000

For the "Afghanistan Security Forces Fund", \$4,109,333,000, to remain available until September 30, 2016: Provided, That such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, or the Secretary's designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan, including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction, and funding:

- Provided further, That the authority to provide assistance under this heading is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign nations: Provided further, That contributions of funds for the purposes provided herein from any person, foreign government, or international organization may be credited to this Fund, to remain available until expended, and used for such purposes:
- Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing upon the receipt and upon the transfer of any contribution, delineating the sources and amounts of the funds received and the specific use of such contributions: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall, not fewer than 15 days prior to obligating from this appropriation account, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of any such obligations: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any proposed new projects or transfer of funds between budget sub-activity groups in excess of \$25,000,000:
- Provided further, That equipment procured using funds provided under this heading in this or prior acts, and not yet transferred to the security forces of Afghanistan or transferred to the security forces of Afghanistan and returned by such forces to the United States, may be treated as stocks of the Department of Defense upon notification to the congressional defense committees:
- Provided further, That such amount is designated by the Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided further, That such amount shall be available only if the President designates such amount for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A).

This amendment would provide the funding and authorities needed to adequately sustain the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It continues the shift from growth to the professionalization of the This funding and the associated authorities are essential to support the ANSF as they work toward self-sufficiency. This funding and the associated authorities are essential to support the ANSF as they work toward self-sufficiency.

**Facing a Continuing War Zone  
Without Eliminating Pakistani  
Sanctuaries or Major Progress  
in Security**

# The Uncertain Structure of Security


- Conflicting polls and US intel estimates of on Taliban support and influence
- NATO/ISAF has stopped all meaningful reporting on security trends after EIA fiasco.
- No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited mapping of 10 worst areas of tactical encounters.
- No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support.
- Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up.
- No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.

# The Need to Deal with an Ongoing War

- Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.
- No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.
- Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.
- US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.
- ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.
- Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.
- Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below \$4 billion annually uncertain. May need \$6-7 billion.

# World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative and Rising

Afghanistan



# **The Failure of the US Surge in Afghanistan**



# United Nations Department of Safety and Security Estimate of Security Incidents Per Month




Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; PRESS RELEASE; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf>, p. 33.



# Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq



# Enemy-Initiated Attacks Recovered Before ISAF Ceased to Report



# Shift from Tactical clashes to High Profile Attacks in 2012-2014

April 1 – September 15, 2012 vs. April 1 – Sept 15, 2013.

Metric	EIAs	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
<b>% YoY Change</b>	-6%	1%	-1%	-22%	-5%	5%	-18%

October 1, 2012 – March 13, 2013 vs. October 1, 2013 – March 13, 2014.


Metric	EIA	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
<b>% YoY Change</b>	-2%	43%	5%	-24%	-11%	-8%	-15%

**The US/ISAF Focus on 10  
Most Violent Districts Does  
Not Provide an Honest  
Picture of a Steadily More  
Intensifying Conflict**

# Top 10 Most Violent Districts 1/4/13 to 9/15/13

(Most Recent US Report issued in 4/2014)


Top 10 Districts (01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013)				
Top 10 Districts in EIA	Province	RC	% of Total Population	% of National EIA in Date Range
1 Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	RC-SW	0.4%	4%
2 Sangin	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	4%
3 Nad 'Ali	Helmand	RC-SW	0.3%	4%
4 Musa Qal'ah	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	4%
5 Panjwaī	Kandahar	RC-S	0.3%	3%
6 Sayyidabad	Wardak	RC-E	0.4%	3%
7 Now Zad	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	2%
8 Maiwand	Kandahar	RC-S	0.2%	2%
9 Pul-e 'Alam	Logar	RC-E	0.4%	2%
10 Darah-ye Pech	Kunar	RC-E	0.2%	2%
Date range: 01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013			Total: 3.1%	31%



“But, This was irrelevant”

- Long war
- War for control of space and population, not tactical outcomes
- Taliban can pick and choose area and method of attack. Strike weakest link.
- Win if dominate people and/or allies and NGOs leave.
- Value of Pakistani sanctuary/ISI support
- Morale, public support, leadership critical.
- Peace negotiations can be war by other means

# State Department Estimate of Trend in Number of Terrorist Incidents in Afghanistan



Global Terrorism Database

Afghanistan – Incidents Over Time, 1970 – 2013

<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=afghanistan&sa.x=0&sa.y=0>

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# Taliban and Insurgent Tactics Have Actually Become Lethal and More Challenging

- ISAF/US reporting on cover tactical events, not outcomes and is essentially meaningless, if not dishonest, in showing relative areas of government and insurgent presence and influence.
- UNAMA reporting shows casualty levels never dropped significantly as a result of the surge and got far worse in the first six months of 2014 as ISAF forces withdrew.
- UNAMA reports that targeted attacks by Anti-Government Elements against mullahs (religious leaders) they accused of supporting the Government and in mosques tripled in 2013 and rose again in the first six months of 2014.
- In the first half of 2014, the armed conflict in Afghanistan took a dangerous new turn for civilians. For the first time since 2009 when UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian casualties in Afghanistan, more civilians were found to have been killed and injured in ground engagements and crossfire between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces than any other tactic. In previous years, the majority of civilians were killed and injured by improvised explosive devices.
- Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured) recording a 17 per cent increase in civilian deaths, and a 28 per cent increase in civilians injured for a 24 per cent overall increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.
- UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party.
- UNAMA attributed four per cent of civilian casualties to explosive remnants of war, and the remaining one per cent to cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
- Compared with the first six months of 2009, when UNAMA began to monitor civilian casualties, the number of civilians killed by Anti-Government Elements doubled in 2014 (from 599 to 1,208), while the number of civilians killed by Pro-Government forces has been cut by half (from 302 to 158), almost entirely due to reduced civilian casualties from aerial operations of international military forces.

Source: UNAMA/UNHCR, **Afghanistan Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:**


2014 [http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m\\_XyrUQDKZg%3d&tabid=12254&mid=15756&language=en-US](http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m_XyrUQDKZg%3d&tabid=12254&mid=15756&language=en-US), July 2014, pp. 1-2.



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# In spite of "Surge," Civilian Killed and Wounded Rose Through End 2013

**UN Estimate of Civilian deaths and Injuries:  
January to December 2009-2013**



- UNAMA documented 8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 civilian deaths and 5,656 injured) in 2013, marking a seven per cent increase in deaths and a 17 per cent increase in injuries compared to 2012.


- The rise in civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan's armed conflict in 2013 reverses the decline reported in 2012 and is similar to record high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2011. Since 2009, the armed conflict has claimed the lives of 14, 064 Afghan civilians and injured thousands more.

- While improvised explosive devices used by Anti-Government Elements remained the biggest killer of civilians in 2013, increased ground engagements between Pro-Government Forces and Anti-Government Elements emerged as the number-two cause of civilian casualties with rising numbers of Afghan civilians killed and injured in cross-fire. Both factors drove the escalation of civilian casualties in 2013.



# Taliban and Insurgent Killing Power Has Been Rising

UN Estimate of Civilian deaths by Parties to the Conflict: January to December 2009-2013



- UNAMA's report found that Anti-Government Elements continued to deliberately target civilians across the country and carried out attacks without regard for civilian life, causing 6,374 civilian casualties (2,311 civilian deaths and 4,063 injured), up four per cent from 2012.

- Indiscriminate use of IEDs by Anti-Government Elements increased in 2013 and remained the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. UNAMA recorded 2,890 civilian casualties (962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injured) from IEDs, up 14 per cent from 2012.


- Within civilian casualties from IEDs, UNAMA noted an 84 per cent rise in civilian deaths and injuries from radio-controlled IEDs and a 39 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from indiscriminate victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs. Anti-Government Elements continued to detonate IEDs in public areas used by civilians such as roads, markets, Government offices, bazaars, in and around schools, and bus stations

- Suicide and complex attacks caused 1,236 civilian casualties (255 killed and 981 injured) in 73 incidents in 2013. While the number of attacks was similar to 2012, an 18 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from these attacks was noted

Source: UNAMA, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN AFGHAN CONFLICT RISE BY 14 PER CENT IN 2013, [http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb\\_8\\_2014\\_PoC-report\\_2013-PR-ENG-final.pdf](http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-PR-ENG-final.pdf), February 8, 2014, pp. 1-2, 7

# Violence Reaches Major New Peak in 2014

## UN Estimate of Civilian deaths by Parties to the Conflict: January to June 2009-2014




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
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# Increase in Number of Wounded Much Sharper than in Civilian Deaths (January- End June 2009-2014)




# Steadily Increasing Impact of Taliban and Insurgents with 24% Rise in 2014

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Anti-Government Elements  
January to June: 2009 - 2014




# Expanding National Coverage of Taliban Attacks Goes Far Beyond 10 Districts

## Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by region January to June 2009 - 2014



# Increasing Lethality of Targeted Attacks

## Civilian Deaths and Injuries by AGE Targeted and Wilful Killings January to June: 2009 - 2014




Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties in the first half of 2014. UNAMA documented 263 civilian deaths and 165 injured (428 civilian casualties) from targeted killings, a 10 per cent drop from the same period in 2013.

Of the 428 civilian casualties from targeted killings, 95 per cent – 405 civilian casualties (247 deaths and 158 injured) – were attributed to Anti-Government Elements. These included killings of tribal elders, civilian Government officials, mullahs and civilian justice officials.

Of the 428 civilian casualties from targeted killings, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 39 separate incidents of targeted killings which resulted in 82 civilian casualties (54 civilian deaths and 28 injured), more than doubling the civilian casualties claimed by the Taliban in 2013.

# Ground Combat Continues to Intensify - I

## Civilian deaths and injuries by tactic and incident type January to June 2014



The sharp increase in civilian deaths and injuries in 2014 resulted from escalating ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces particularly in civilian-populated areas. In the first half of 2014, increasing numbers of Afghan civilians were killed and injured in ground combat. For example, civilian deaths from mortars, rockets and grenades more than doubled from the same six-month period in 2013.

UNAMA documented 1,901 civilian casualties (474 civilian deaths and 1,427 injured) from ground engagements alone, up 89 per cent from 2013.9 Ground combat was the leading cause of civilian casualties in the first half of 2014, accounting for 39 per cent of all civilian deaths and injuries. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Anti-Government Elements – the second highest cause of civilian casualties – also killed and injured Afghan civilians at unprecedented levels.

Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 1,463 civilian casualties (463 civilian deaths and 1,000 injured) a seven per cent. In the first six months of 2014, suicide and complex attacks caused 583 civilian casualties which killed 156 civilians and injured 427, a seven per cent decrease in civilian casualties from such attacks compared to the first six months of 2013. Suicide and complex attacks were the third leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries in the first half of 2014, after ground engagements and IEDs.



Together, ground engagements and IED tactics, which included suicide and complex attacks, accounted for 81 per cent of all civilian casualties in the first six months of 2014. Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 428 civilian casualties (263 civilian deaths and 165 injured) from targeted and willful killings (or attempts to kill), a 10 per cent decrease from the same period in 2013.20 These included killings of tribal elders, civilian Government officials, mullahs and civilian justice officials.



# Ground Combat Continues to Intensify - II

## Civilian Deaths and Injuries: All Ground Engagements by region January to June 2009 - 2014

## Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagements by Party to the Conflict January - June 2014






# **Pressure from the Deteriorating Situation in Pakistan**

## State Department Ranking of Ten Most Violent States in Terms of Terrorism in 2012

Country	Total Attacks	Total Killed	Total Wounded	Average Number Killed per Attack	Average Number Wounded per Attack
Pakistan	1404	1848	3643	1.32	2.59
Iraq	1271	2436	6641	1.92	5.23
Afghanistan	1023	2632	3715	2.57	3.63
India	557	231	559	0.41	1.00
Nigeria	546	1386	1019	2.54	1.87
Thailand	222	174	897	0.78	4.04
Yemen	203	365	427	1.80	2.10
Somalia	185	323	397	1.75	2.15
Philippines	141	109	270	0.77	1.91
Syria <sup>[2]</sup>	133	657	1787	4.94	13.44


Source: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Statistical Annex, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012*, US State Department, April 2013, pp. 16-17. For trend graph through 2013, see <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan>.

# State Department Estimate of Trend in Number of Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan



Source: GTD, Global terrorism Data Base, "Pakistan,"  
[http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan.](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan)

# USIP Map of Widening Areas in Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan




Source: [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW93-Mapping\\_Conflict\\_Trends\\_in\\_Pakistan.pdf](http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW93-Mapping_Conflict_Trends_in_Pakistan.pdf)


# World Bank Estimate of Weak Governance and Lack of Security in Pakistan

Income Group, Region, or Country: Pakistan


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption



# **Layered Defense and the Growing Challenge of Post- 2014 Security**

# Key Warfighting Challenges

- **Acceptance that as long as Taliban and others have sanctuary in Pakistan, war will last as long as it lasts.**
- **End focus on tactical clashes, focus on political-military control and protection of key populated areas and LoCs.**
- **Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.**
  - **Tests of 2015 campaign season: “Coming out of the sanctuary closet.”**
  - **Threat ability to choose time and place, intensity and persistence of operations.**
  - **New forms of high profile attacks, political-military structures at urban and district level, focus on ANSF, officials, advisors, and NGOs.**
  - **LOC and commercial threats.**
  - **New role of narcotics, power brokers, corruption in poorer economy**
- **Ensuring popular support of government and ANSF is critical. Deal with Security vs. hearts and minds dilemmas on Afghan terms.**
  - **Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers” to win popular support.**

**There is some hope that an adequately resourced ANSF layered defense and US “four quarter” advisory strategy could succeed in provide the necessary security in key populated areas and for key lines of communication, even if Pakistan continues to provide Taliban sanctuaries and comes to dominate less populated areas in the east and South.**

***Afghanistan is, however, very much a nation at war and success is extremely uncertain given the limited size and duration of the US advisory effort.***

**ISAF and the US government have stopped all detailed reporting on actual success in war for more than a year. ISAF no longer reports maps or metrics, and the semi-annual Department of Defense 1230 report stopped such reporting in late 2012 and has not been updated since July 2013.**

**It is clear from a wide range of media reporting, however, that the transition to Afghan forces in 2013 gradually extended ANSF responsibility to many areas still dominated by the Taliban and other insurgents**

**There has been no meaningful net assessment of the success of Afghan government/ANSF efforts versus those of the Taliban and other threats.**

**The ANSF will have to cover a large country with a highly dispersed population and 18 major population clusters. Some do not face major threats, but many do face serious risks.**



**Protecting key lines of communication will be a major challenge – both in terms of available forces, force quality and loyalty, and the ability to maintain key routes.**

**Both security and post-transition trade patterns present serious uncertainties.**

**The World Bank already ranks Afghanistan as having some of the worst challenges in terms of violence and rule of law of any country in the world.**

**The ANSF must start with none of the internal resources Iraq had from its oil revenues, and with nothing like the success the surge in Iraq presented before Transition.**

**Even the ISAF's carefully chosen metric – enemy initiated attacks – failed to reflect significant success before ISAF ceased to report all metrics on the success of the fighting.**

**The ANSF has, however, increased significantly in total force strength, and began to bear the brunt of enemy attacks and casualties by October 2012.**

**Past reports show that the ANSF still faces key problems in the MoD and MoI, sustainment, and with corruption. It is also important to note that only roughly half of the 352,000 personnel often cited as the force goal are actual military and serious paramilitary forces. Force composition and force quality present far more critical problems than the issue of total manning.**

**The ANSF also suffers from rapidly changing force goals, rapid turnover in advisors, overambitious efforts to force it to “do it our way,” a force-rush to meet the transition deadline of end-2014, and sudden peaks and cuts in funding.**

**The only meaningful recent reporting on the ANSF has been by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR). That reporting is too complex to summarize, but has identified many continuing weaknesses first identified in past public ISAF and DoD reporting. A key example of critical shortfalls in reliable reporting on actual manning makes this clear.**

**The Afghan police present critical problems in leadership, force quality, corruption, actual manning, and turnover.**

**Surveys do, however, indicate that the elements of the ANSF are winning far more support in most areas than the Taliban and other insurgents.**

# **General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission**

- **In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.**
- **This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.**
- **In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.**
- **Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.**
- **Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.**

# **Layered Defense: A Concept that May Work with Adequate US and Allied support**

- **Concentrate ANSF in layered elements to defend population and key lines of communication.**
- **ANA defends, deters, defeats active Taliban and insurgent forces; ANP plays paramilitary role, with ALP forward in key sensitive areas.**
- **Accept Taliban and insurgent presence and control in less populated parts of East and South,**
- **Continued Pakistani sanctuaries unless Pakistan fundamentally changes tactics.**
- **Support with US advisory presence down to at least level of each of six Afghan corps, key enablers, limited COIN element plus drone and air support.**
- **German and Italian presence in populated but less threatened areas in the North.**
- **Support with governance and economic aid.**



# **Layered Defense: Afghanistan is Still Very Much at War**

- **Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.**
- **No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.**
- **Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.**
- **US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.**
- **ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.**
- **Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.**
- **Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below \$4 billion annually uncertain. May need \$6-7 billion.**

# Afghanistan's Divisive Demographics

- **Total population: 31,822,848 (July 2014 est.)**
  - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
  - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- **Population 0-14 years: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)**
- **Urban population: 23.5% of total population (2011)**
- **Rate of urbanization: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)**
- **Young men and women reaching employment age annually: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008**
- **Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?**
- **Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP?**





# “Layered Defense” – Where is the Population for the ANA, ANP, and ALP to Protect?

AFGHANISTAN Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2012-2013


The Population Estimation has been done on the basis of the data obtained from the 1381-1384 (2003-05) Household Listing (HHL).

ESTIMATED POPULATION BY DISTRICT



The settled population of the country, by civil divisions, urban, rural and sex is estimated which covers 34 provinces and 398 districts. The total population of the country in 1391 (2012-13) is estimated to be about 27 million. Around 13.8 million of the said figure are men and 13.2 million women. The settled population of the country (excluding nomads) is estimated at 25.5 million, of which, 12.4 million (49%) are females and 13.1 million (51%) males. Similarly, out of 25.5 million settled population, 19.4 million (76.1%) live in rural areas and 6.7 million (23.9%) in urban areas.

ESTIMATED POPULATION BY PROVINCE




Data Source: Estimated Population Data  
 Provided by: Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Afghanistan

The accuracy of the data represented in this map remains solely with the source. IMMAP or USAID/OFDA do not accept any responsibility for the accuracy of these figures.  
 The boundaries used in this map do not imply any endorsement by IMMAP or USAID/OFDA.  
 Date Created: 28 March, 2013  
 Datum/Projection: WGS 84/Geographic  
 For copies or questions contact "afghanistan@immap.org"






# Layered Defense : Ethnicity and Population





# “Layered Defense” – From “New Silk Road” to LOC Survival




# **The Impact of ISAF Cuts and Shifting the Burden to the ANSF Through Spring 2014**

# **General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission**


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# ANSF Goes Up as US/ISAF Goes Down: Jan 2010-March 2013





















































# Cuts in US Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq: White House View




The troop surge that the President announced at West Point in December 2009 set the conditions that allowed us to push back the Taliban and build up Afghan forces. In June 2011, the President announced that we had completed the surge and would begin drawing down our forces from Afghanistan from a peak of 100,000 troops. He directed that troop reductions continue at a steady pace and in a planned, coordinated, and responsible manner. As a result, 10,000 troops came home by the end of that year, and 33,000 came home by the summer of 2012. In February 2013, in his State of the Union address, the President announced that the United States would withdraw another 34,000 American troops from Afghanistan within a year -- which we have done.

Today the President announced a plan whereby another 22,000 troops will come home by the end of the year, ending the U.S. combat mission in December 2014. At the beginning of 2015, and contingent upon the Afghans signing a Bilateral Security Agreement and a status of forces agreement with NATO, we will have 9,800 U.S. service members in different parts of the country, together with our NATO allies and other partners. By the end of 2015, we would reduce that presence by roughly half, consolidating our troops in Kabul and on Bagram Airfield. One year later, by the end of 2016, we will draw down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, as we have done in Iraq. Beyond 2014, the mission of our troops will be training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qa'ida.

# ISAF Forces as of June 1, 2014

	Albania	72		Germany	2,695		Poland	968
	Armenia	121		Greece	10		Portugal	66
	Australia	356		Hungary	100		Romania	1,002
	Austria	3		Iceland	3		Slovakia	275
	Azerbaijan	94		Ireland	7		Slovenia	4
	Bahrain	0		Italy	2,000		Spain	247
	Belgium	147		Jordan	1,069		Sweden	219
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	53		Republic of Korea	50		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia *	152
	Bulgaria	378		Latvia	31		Tonga	55
	Croatia	146		Lithuania	83		Turkey	457
	Czech Republic	250		Luxembourg	1		Ukraine	27
	Denmark	165		Malaysia	2		United Arab Emirates	35
	El Salvador	0		Mongolia	40		United Kingdom	5,200
	Estonia	20		Montenegro	25		United States	32,800
	Finland	95		Netherlands	200		Total	49,902
	France	177		New Zealand	2			
	Georgia	805		Norway	67			


# The Burden of Fighting and Casualties Has Shifted to the ANSF *(But High Casualties are not a Measure of Merit)*



Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, pp. 10-11.



# Percentage of Security Incidents Involving ANSF and ISAF Forces



Enemy-initiated attacks (EIAs) involving ISAF and EIAs involving the ANSF, Jan 2011 – Feb 2014

# Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2010-2014 Airpower Statistics

As of 30 Apr 2014

## OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM/International Security Assistance Force

### Close Air Support

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release	
2010	33,707	2010	2,517
2011	34,514	2011	2,678
2012	28,768	2012	1,975
2013	21,785	2013	1,407
2014	6,042	2014	220

### Number of Weapon Releases

Less Activity  More Activity

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2010	156	154	175	197	300	457	325	416	739	1,043	866	272	5,100
2011	405	341	337	339	426	610	695	516	597	663	308	174	5,411
2012	170	116	229	252	406	521	504	588	385	414	297	202	4,084
2013	193	297	248	284	368	337	256	158	232	189	118	76	2,756
2014	92	114	93	115									414

- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification


	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	28,747	38,198	34,937	31,049	8,628
Airlift Sorties	63,000	57,000	39,000	32,000	6,000
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)	295,000	241,000	265,000	201,000	57,000
Airlift Passengers	1,368,000	1,233,000	749,000	506,000	93,000
OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	60,461,000	80,199,000	41,952,000	10,883,000	12,000
Tanker Sorties	17,296	19,469	16,007	12,319	3,544
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	1,050	1,095	980	723	217
Aircraft Refuelings	82,603	90,476	67,020	53,266	15,076
Casualty Evacuation Sorties	3,712	2,959	2,171	576	70
Saves	1,888	1,611	1,187	219	18
Assists	2,964	2,121	1,646	477	57

United States Air Forces Central Command  
Combined Air and Space Operations Center

Afghanistan


Combined Data

# Sorties with Weapons Release




# Steadily Dropping Impact of Airpower on Civilian Casualties

## Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Aerial Operations 1 January to 30 June 2009 - 2014



# ISAF Assessment of Transition Stages, March- December 2013



Stage 1:  
Local Support

Stage 2:  
Tactical Support

Stage 3: Operational Support

Stage 4:  
Strategic Support



# Uncertain Future CIA Support for US Military

- Press reports indicate CIA will withdraw operational elements in Afghanistan by end 2014. Quotes US officials as saying,

**“CIA Director John Brennan informed U.S. military commanders in March that his agency would start to shutter Afghan operations outside Kabul, the capital, removing CIA clandestine officers and analysts as well as National Security Agency specialists responsible for intercepting insurgents' communications, which have been a rich source of daily intelligence, the officials said. ...Pentagon officials warn that the CIA drawdown is coming at a time when insurgent attacks normally intensify, after a winter lull. As a result, the plan has strained relations between the agency and military commanders in Kabul...**

**"The CIA footprint is entirely dependent on the military's," a senior U.S. official said Thursday. "There is no stomach in the building for going out there on our own," said a former CIA operator who has spoken to current officers about the pullback. "We are not putting our people out there without U.S. forces."**

**John Maguire, who retired from the CIA in 2005 after 23 years as a case officer, noted that CIA officers on horseback were the first U.S. forces into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. He criticized the spy service for the current drawdown. "There is ample evidence and a long historical record of the agency working alone in any number of difficult and dangerous places, and if they can't do it by themselves without the military, then they should close the organization," he said.**

**The CIA also plans this summer to stop paying the salaries of Afghan paramilitary forces that it has armed and trained for more than a decade to help fight the Taliban-led insurgency in the country's east, near the Pakistani border. It is unclear what will happen to the militias. The Pentagon is trying to persuade the CIA to slow its withdrawal, arguing that keeping CIA and NSA operators in the field as long as possible would help prevent a surge in militant attacks before the end of the year, when most U.S. troops are due to leave.**

**...The spy service already has sharply cut the pace of lethal drone strikes in Pakistan, flown from airfields in Afghanistan. One official said the agency was making plans to continue operating the armed drones on a much smaller scale, from Bagram.**

# **The Challenge of Shifting the Burden to the ANSF**

# Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized in **Page 37**.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that **Pages 38 and 39** show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in **Pages 40-43**.



# **General Dunford on Key Challenges to ANSF**

**ISAF forces are in the process of re-orienting from combat advising at the unit level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors are focusing on tasks that will build the ANSF's long-term sustainability to make the progress that has been made to date enduring.**

**At the security ministries, advisors are focusing on building ministerial capacity in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors are also working to improve integration between the different security pillars— army, police, and intelligence service – at all levels.**

**In the fielded force, advisors will focus on capability gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and reduce casualties and overall attrition. In total, our shift to functionally-based advising is putting the ANSF on a path to sustainment.**

**Despite our advisory efforts in 2014, four capability gaps will remain after the ISAF mission ends. I assess that without the Resolute Support mission, the progress made to date will not be sustainable. A limited number of advisors will be required in 2015 to continue the train, advise, and assist mission. These advisors will address gaps in 1) the aviation enterprise, 2) the intelligence enterprise, 3) special operations, and 4) the security ministries' capacity to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can provide tactical units the support they require to function. These advisors will put the Afghans on the path to sustainment that the Afghans can further develop after Resolute Support concludes.**

# UNAMA Warning that Reductions in ISAF Forces Are Not Compensated for by ANSF

UNAMA observed that the stark rise in civilian deaths and injuries in crossfire and ground engagements in the first six months of 2014 was mainly attributed to the changing dynamics of the conflict. Women and children casualties rose significantly as ground fighting between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan security forces in 2014 increasingly concentrated in civilian-populated areas.

The closure and transfer of more than 86 ISAF bases in the last half of 2013 also had an impact on civilian protection. In the first half of 2014, UNAMA observed a direct correlation between closures and a rise in civilian casualties in some areas – particularly from ground engagements. In previous years, the robust and well-armed presence of hundreds of ISAF Forward Operating Bases and Command Outposts often prevented the movement of Anti-Government Elements into the more populated areas of districts.

In response to an increased presence of Anti-Government Elements in some districts, Afghan forces initiated their own operations to protect territory, notably increasing check points and patrols, as well as responding to attacks launched against them. This resulted in an increase in fighting in civilian-populated areas, which often led to civilian casualties.

UNAMA also noted that the closure of international military bases and subsequent heavy demands placed on Afghan security forces, exacerbated by an environment of political uncertainty – pending electoral results and an unsigned Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and the Government of Afghanistan – opened up space for Anti-Government Elements in some areas to challenge Afghan forces for control of key routes and terrain. In some areas the perceived lack of control by Afghan security forces appeared to encourage Anti-Government Elements to bring together larger attack groups which resulted in higher civilian casualties. In other areas, Afghan forces were able – for a range of reasons – to hold territory after the closure of ISAF bases which resulted in fewer civilian casualties in those areas.

Both conflicting parties also increasingly relied on stand-off tactics such as mortars and rockets to avoid their own losses and repel the opposite side, which also resulted in civilian casualties.

# Weapons & Equipment Summary Part I

ANA Weapon: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ ARZVP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
NATO Individual Weapons	221,072	1,788	212,492	(10,368)	202,205	11,147	(9,508)
NATO Crew Served Weapons	12,667	493	10,563	(2,597)	10,488	441	(2,231)
NATO Indirect Fire Weapons	140	921	1,168	107	1,168	20	127
Non-NATO Standard Weapons	7,453	13	54,518	47,052	54,518	57,975	105,027
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>241,332</b>	<b>3,215</b>	<b>278,741</b>	<b>34,194</b>	<b>268,379</b>	<b>69,583</b>	<b>93,415</b>

Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered			LOCATION OF VEHICLES DELIVERED			
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ ARZVP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)	US PORT READY TO BE CALLED FWD	JAX PORT	IN TRANSIT	AUTL
Light Tactical Vehicle	17,834	70	18,781	877	17,463	(369)	(810)	0	0	1318	336
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles	0	623	623	0	476	0	(147)	57	0	97	0
Medium Tactical Vehicle	6,310	218	7,447	919	7,288	(326)	434	62	62	71	63
HMMWV Variants	9,021	270	11,191	1,900	9,854	(407)	156	1260	1260	401	67
Heavy Vehicles & Fire Equipment	894	1	869	(26)	869	40	14	0	0	0	15
Engineer Equipment	1,424	150	1,783	209	1,293	(2)	(283)	0	0	241	2
Trailers	5,301	25	6,065	739	6,021	(74)	621	0	0	181	28
Material Handling Equipment	819	2	859	38	757	39	(25)	0	0	0	29
People Haulers	1,184	4	1,351	163	918	142	(128)	0	0	377	11
Other	1,161	45	2,175	969	1,743	(830)	(293)	1	1	1	46
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43,948</b>	<b>1,408</b>	<b>51,144</b>	<b>5,788</b>	<b>46,682</b>	<b>(1,787)</b>	<b>(461)</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>2687</b>	<b>597</b>

## Weapons Status Summary Part II

ANA Comm: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
HF Radios	11,615	2,334	12,268	(1,681)	12,101	9	(1,839)
VHF Radios	72,082	121	71,538	(665)	71,337	1,567	701
VHF/UHF Radios	2,231	250	3,318	837	3,318	0	837
Night Vision Device	9,896	443	12,497	2,158	10,830	252	743
Other Comm	269	12	283	2	283	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96,093</b>	<b>3,160</b>	<b>99,904</b>	<b>651</b>	<b>97,869</b>	<b>1,828</b>	<b>444</b>

ANA EOD: Status Summary							
ANA EOD Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Binoculars	15,430	0	15,430	0	15,430	0	0
Blasting Machine M34	373	0	470	97	470	0	97
EOD Bomb Suit (SM + MED) w/Helmet	528	0	676	148	669	0	141
Firing Cable & Reel	543	0	2,631	2,088	2,631	0	2,088
M2 Crimper	268	0	298	30	237	0	(31)
Mine Detector (Vallon & CEIA)	5,748	552	6,300	0	6,300	0	0
Pigstick w/ Stand	528	0	696	168	634	0	106
MMP-30 Robot	528	0	707	179	503	0	(25)
Symphony Jammer	1,286	0	1,261	(25)	1,261	0	(25)
Test Set, M51 Blasting Cap	378	0	635	257	333	0	(45)
Hook & Line Kit PT 1&2	264	0	400	136	400	0	136
EOD Tripod	264	0	343	79	318	0	54
PIPPERS	7,202	0	7,202	0	7,202	0	0
Mine Rollers	526	0	526	0	526	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33,866</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>37,575</b>	<b>3,157</b>	<b>36,914</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,496</b>




# Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR)


Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)	Corps/ Div HQ	IN Bde	Corps ENG KDK	Corps SIG KDK	Corps/ DIV MI KDK	OCC-R	AUP Type-A HQ	ABP Zone HQ	ANCOP Bde HQ	MSF KDK+	Total RASR Assessed Units
Fully Capable	1	10	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	17
Capable	6	13	3	2	2	6	3	5	2	2	44
Partially Capable	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	9
Developing	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Established	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	10
Awaiting Fielding	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	7	24	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	85

OCC-R: Operational Coordination Center- Regional  
 MSF: Mobile Strike Force  
 ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police


\* IJC RASR assigns "Awaiting Fielding" status to units who have completed CFC but have not yet graduated from ABS, thus have 3 MSF KDKs waiting. ISAF defines fielding IAW Tashkil 1392 as all units who completed CFC, thus assigns only 2 MSF KDKs "Awaiting Fielding" status.



# ISAF and ANSF Unilateral Operations




# ISAF and ANSF Led Operations



	Sep 13	Oct 13	Nov 13	Dec 13	Jan 14	Feb 14
ISAF Led Partnered (ANA)	75	70	87	80	97	39
ANA Led Partnered	189	182	153	12	9	22
ANA Led Enabled	274	490	121	40	64	88
ANP Led Enabled	67	220	93	38	38	0
ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)	530	892	367	90	111	110

# Total ISAF and ANSF Led Operations





# Shifting Pattern of Partnership


## 3/2013-9/2013

Operational Category	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops	2,345	2,494	2,632	2,192	1,303	1,458
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>2,345</b>	<b>2,494</b>	<b>2,632</b>	<b>2,192</b>	<b>1,303</b>	<b>1,458</b>
ANA Unilateral	13,492	23,601	16,798	13,059	23,432	28,006
ANP Unilateral	16,391	25,025	22,275	18,440	25,565	20,496
<b>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</b>	<b>29,883</b>	<b>48,626</b>	<b>39,073</b>	<b>31,499</b>	<b>48,997</b>	<b>48,502</b>
ISAF Led Combined (ANA)	394	198	254	232	177	75
ISAF Led Combined (ANP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>75</b>
ANA Led Combined	624	565	641	591	248	189
ANA Led Enabled	382	226	245	340	279	274
<b>ANA Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,006</b>	<b>791</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>931</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>463</b>
ANP Led Combined	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANP Led Enabled	427	442	384	272	251	67
<b>ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,433</b>	<b>1,233</b>	<b>1,270</b>	<b>1,203</b>	<b>778</b>	<b>530</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>34,055</b>	<b>52,551</b>	<b>43,229</b>	<b>35,126</b>	<b>51,255</b>	<b>50,565</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>2,739</b>	<b>2,692</b>	<b>2,886</b>	<b>2,424</b>	<b>1,480</b>	<b>1,533</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>31,316</b>	<b>49,859</b>	<b>40,343</b>	<b>32,702</b>	<b>49,775</b>	<b>49,032</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>3%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</b>	<b>92%</b>	<b>95%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>97%</b>
	<b>Apr-13</b>	<b>May-13</b>	<b>Jun-13</b>	<b>Jul-13</b>	<b>Aug-13</b>	<b>Sep-13</b>

# Shifting Pattern of Partnership 9/2013-2/2014

Operational Category	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14*
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops	1,458	1,341	1,122	654	496	261
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,458</b>	<b>1,341</b>	<b>1,122</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>261</b>
ANA Unilateral	28,006	22,167	34,606	29,446	35,458	29,707
ANP Unilateral	20,496	19,375	18,868	22,209	19,691	12,834
<b>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</b>	<b>48,502</b>	<b>41,542</b>	<b>53,474</b>	<b>51,655</b>	<b>55,149</b>	<b>42,541</b>
ISAF Led Partnered (ANA)	75	70	87	80	97	39
ISAF Led Partnered (ANP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Partnered Ops (Total)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>39</b>
ANA Led Partnered	189	182	153	12	9	22
ANA Led Enabled	274	490	121	40	64	88
<i>ANA Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</i>	<i>463</i>	<i>672</i>	<i>274</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>110</i>
ANP Led Partnered	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANP Led Enabled	67	220	93	38	38	0
<i>ANP Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>0</i>
<b>ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>892</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>50,565</b>	<b>43,845</b>	<b>55,050</b>	<b>52,479</b>	<b>55,853</b>	<b>42,951</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>1,533</b>	<b>1,411</b>	<b>1,209</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>300</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>49,032</b>	<b>42,434</b>	<b>53,841</b>	<b>51,745</b>	<b>55,260</b>	<b>42,651</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>99%</b>
	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14*

# But, Only Half of ANSF is a Fighting Force



Force Element	Manpower Goal End 2012	% of Total
MOD	NA	NA
ANA	172,055	49%
AAF	7,639	2%
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>195,000</b>	<b>51%</b>
MOI	NA	NA
ANCOP	14,451?	4%
AUP	110,279	31%
ABP	23,090	7%
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>157,000</b>	<b>45%</b>
CNPA	2,986?	0.8%
ALP-		
Militias	30,000-40,000	NA
APPF	11,000-23,000	NA

# ANSF: Overall Lack of Weapons Accountability


- ...missing information concerning when 50,304 weapons were shipped out of the U.S. or when they were received by CSTC-A in Afghanistan. ...had serial numbers for 2,461 weapons that were entered into the database two or more times, which resulted in duplicative records.
- 14,822 serial numbers that were required to be documented in ...did not have corresponding records ...
- Of the 474,823 total serial numbers recorded ..., 203,888 weapons (43 percent) were missing information and/or were duplicative.
- SCIP contained 59,938 serial numbers with no shipping or receiving dates.<sup>11</sup>
- 22,806 serial numbers in SCIP and 24,520 serial numbers in were repeated two or three times.
- 410,911 (87percent) of the 474,823 data entries we reviewed in ...did not contain a title transfer date.
- Does not include substantial unaccountability for vehicles, ammunition, and wide range of other equipment.

# Ongoing Cuts in US Aid to ANSF – No Clear Plan for FY2015 and Beyond

**ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR**  
(\$ BILLIONS)




**ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON**  
(\$ BILLIONS)




# DoD Funding: ANA vs. ANP

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANA  
 BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP,  
 FY 2005-JUNE 30, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)



ASFF DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ANP  
 BY SUBACTIVITY GROUP,  
 FY 2005-JUNE 30, 2014 (\$ BILLIONS)



Note: Numbers have been rounded.  
 Source: DOD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/17/2014.

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2014, <http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-07-30qr.pdf>, p. 77.







# Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.

Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in other charts in this section.

# Key Force-wide Challenges

- Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
- Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
- New Top Down Leadership: New President, MoI, MoD to District level.
- Evolution of effective overall command structure.
- Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
- Redefining force structure and force plans.
- Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R, ensuring force cohesion and responsiveness
- Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law
- Promotion, enlistment
- Leave and recovery. AWOL and attrition.
- National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
- Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
- Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”

# **The Challenge of the ANA**


# Key ANA Transition Challenges

- **Set real-world Afghan limits to corruption and waste. Effective pay, contracting, fiscal management**
- **Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Converting from force generation mode to war fighting capability mode.**
  - **Combat effectiveness and order of battle vs. resource measures**
  - **Top down strategic focus as well as bottom up tactical forces.**
  - **Intelligence-based, civil-military operations. Limiting impact of power brokers.**
  - **Sustainability, O&M, repair, supply push vs. demand pull, medical, mobility.**
- **Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.**
  - **AWOL, attrition, stable personnel.**
  - **Recruitment, promotion, pay and privileges.**
  - **Role of junior officers and NCOs.**
  - **Civil-military interface.**
  - **Medical services/medevac, post-trauma support.**
- **Shifting to effective training/recovery and leave cycles.,**
- **Creating fully effective MOD, Corps, other higher command, procurement, logistic, training structures.**



# MoD Readiness: June 2014

**DOD reported this quarter no improvements in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions**



This quarter, SIGAR was provided CM ratings for 35 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 37 last quarter and 46 in quarters prior.

Six offices were rated CM-1B; the others are not expected to attain this rating until after 2014.

The only office that had achieved the top rating of CM-1A as of last quarter, the Communications Support Unit, did not retain that rating this quarter

# Regular Forces are 45% of Total Authorized and Actual ANSF Strength in May 2014

## ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, MAY 2014

ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 5/2014	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	181,439 (97%)	-5,561 (3%)
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	152,123 (97%)	-4,877 (3%)
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,731 (84%)	-1,269 (16%)
<b>ANSF Total</b>	<b>352,000</b>	<b>340,293 (97%)</b>	<b>-11,707 (3%)</b>

**However, ANA strength continues to include 9,647 civilian personnel.**



# ANA & AAF Manning by Corps

## ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE

ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	18,130	18,130	None	17,489	17,606	117
203rd Corps	20,798	20,798	None	20,029	22,114	2,085
205th Corps	19,097	19,097	None	17,891	18,534	643
207th Corps	14,879	14,879	None	13,806	14,204	398
209th Corps	15,004	15,004	None	14,554	14,674	120
215th Corps	17,555	17,555	None	16,310	16,999	689
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,174	None	8,921	8,356	-565
Special Operations Force	12,149	11,013	-1,136	10,458	10,649	191
Echelons Above Corps <sup>a</sup>	34,866	36,002	1,136	29,727	36,610	6,883
TTHS <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	24,356 <sup>c</sup>	12,299 <sup>d</sup>	-12,057
Civilians	-	-	-	9,236	9,394	158
<b>ANA Total</b>	<b>161,652</b>	<b>161,652</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>182,777</b>	<b>181,439</b>	<b>-1,338</b>
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,097	7,370	273	6,513	6,478	-35
AAF Civilians	-	-	-	250	253	3
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>168,749</b>	<b>169,022</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>189,540</b>	<b>188,170</b>	<b>-1,370</b>

Notes: Quarters are calendar-year; Q1 2014 data is as of 3/31/2014; Q2 2014 data is as of 5/31/2014.

<sup>a</sup> Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

<sup>b</sup> Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 4,701 cadets

<sup>d</sup> Includes 5,157 cadets

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014 and 7/1/2014.

# Core Force Structure Very Light, Few Enablers

**Afghan National Army (ANA)** 179,000

5 regional comd.

## FORCES BY ROLE

### SPECIAL FORCES

1 spec ops div (1 SF gp; 2 cdo bde (total: 5 cdo bn))

### MANOEUVRE

#### Mechanised

2 mech bde HQ

5 mech inf bn (2 more forming)

#### Light

1 (201st) corps (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bde, 1 mech bde, 1 EOD coy)

3 (207th, 209th & 215th) corps (1 cdo bn, 3 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)

2 (203rd & 205th) corps (1 cdo bn, 4 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)

1 (111st Capital) div (2 inf bde)

### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 int bn

1 sigs bn

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**APC** 673

**APC (T)** 173 M113A2<sup>†</sup>

**APC(W)** ε500 MSFV (inc variants)

**TOWED** 109: **122mm** 85 D-30<sup>†</sup>; **155mm** 24 M114A1<sup>†</sup>

**MOR** **82mm** 105 M-69<sup>†</sup>

**MSL • SSM** SS-1 *Scud*<sup>†</sup>

**MW** Bozena

**Afghan Air Force (AAF)** 6,800

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

**TPT** 37: **Medium** 2 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 35: 6 Cessna 182; 26 Cessna 208B; 3 PC-12

**TRG** 2 L-39 *Albatros*<sup>†</sup>

#### HELICOPTERS

**ATK** 11 Mi-35

**MRH** 46+: 6 MD-530F; 40+ Mi-17

**Paramilitary** 152,350

Afghan National Police 152,350

Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes 85,000

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 15,000 Afghan

National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 23,000 Afghan

Border Police (ABP), Police Special Forces (GDPSU) and

Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

# Key Equipment Levels and Shortfalls: 4/2014

ANA Weapon: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
NATO Individual Weapons	221,072	1,788	212,492	(10,368)	202,205	11,147	(9,508)
NATO Crew Served Weapons	12,667	493	10,563	(2,597)	10,488	441	(2,231)
NATO Indirect Fire Weapons	140	921	1,168	107	1,168	20	127
Non-NATO Standard Weapons	7,453	13	54,518	47,052	54,518	57,975	105,027
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>241,332</b>	<b>3,215</b>	<b>278,741</b>	<b>34,194</b>	<b>268,379</b>	<b>69,583</b>	<b>93,415</b>

## ANA Vehicles: Status Summary

Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered			LOCATION OF VEHICLES DELIVERED			
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)	US PORT READY TO BE CALLED FWD	JAX PORT	IN TRANSIT	AUTL
Light Tactical Vehicle	17,834	70	18,781	877	17,463	(369)	(810)	0	0	1318	336
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles	0	623	623	0	476	0	(147)	57	0	97	0
Medium Tactical Vehicle	6,310	218	7,447	919	7,288	(326)	434	62	62	71	63
HMMWV Variants	9,021	270	11,191	1,900	9,854	(407)	156	1260	1260	401	67
Heavy Vehicles & Fire Equipment	894	1	869	(26)	869	40	14	0	0	0	15
Engineer Equipment	1,424	150	1,783	209	1,293	(2)	(283)	0	0	241	2
Trailers	5,301	25	6,065	739	6,021	(74)	621	0	0	181	28
Material Handling Equipment	819	2	859	38	757	39	(25)	0	0	0	29
People Haulers	1,184	4	1,351	163	918	142	(128)	0	0	377	11
Other	1,161	45	2,175	969	1,743	(830)	(293)	1	1	1	46
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43,948</b>	<b>1,408</b>	<b>51,144</b>	<b>5,788</b>	<b>46,682</b>	<b>(1,787)</b>	<b>(461)</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>2687</b>	<b>597</b>

# US Investment in ANA Equipment

## CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)

	Weapons	Vehicles	Communications	Total
April 2013	\$878.0	\$5,556.5	\$580.5	<b>\$7,015.0</b>
July 2013	622.8	5,558.6	599.5	<b>6,780.9</b>
October 2013	447.2	3,955.0	609.3	<b>5,011.5</b>
December 2013	439.2	4,385.8	612.2	<b>5,437.2</b>
March 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	<b>5,517.3</b>
July 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	<b>5,517.3</b>

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 10/1/2013, 12/30/2013, 3/31/2014, and 7/1/2014.

## COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT


Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$461,197,802	\$32,055,904
Vehicles	4,385,763,395	8,260,489
Communications	670,307,101	48,810,799
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$5,517,268,298</b>	<b>\$89,127,192</b>

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014.



# ANA: Lack of Weapons Accountability

## Afghan Army Extra Weapons




Created with [Datavrapper](#)

Source: [SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A data](#); Chart: [LINDSEY COOK](#), [Get the data](#)

**Does not include substantial unaccountability for vehicles, ammunition, and wide range of other equipment.**

Source: Tom Risen, "U.S.-Supplied Weapons Vulnerable After Afghanistan Withdrawal Weapons given to Afghanistan have gone missing before, and it may, happen again," *USN&WR*, July 28, 2014 | 12:01 a.m. EDT and SIGAR, "Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability," SIGAR 14-84 Audit Report, July 2014.

# Maturing ANA Infrastructure 4/2014



**Project Status**

Force	Complete	In Progress	Acquisition	Planned	TOTAL
111	11	10	0	0	21
201	13	2	0	0	15
203	13	7	0	0	20
205	14	6	0	1	21
207	13	2	0	0	15
209	24	4	0	1	29
215	11	4	0	0	15
AAF	21	10	0	1	32
Ministry	2	1	0	1	4
SOF	20	13	2	0	35
Support	102	6	0	2	110
Training	37	13	1	5	56
<b>Feb (SM)</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>373</b>
<b>Jan (SM)</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>374</b>

# **SIGAR and 1230 Reports Contain Key Warnings on Readiness & Sustainability**

- **CSTC-A stated that “the ANA counts those personnel ‘in the field’ or actively engaged in combat operations as unavailable, with present for duty only representing those personnel ‘in barracks.’”**
- **This explains the low present-for-duty numbers for Corps actively engaged in operations. This quarter, the percentage of ANA personnel “unavailable” ranged from 70.1% (215th Corps) to 20.5% (209th Corps). About 1.7% of the Afghan Air Force’s 6,529 personnel were unavailable.**
- **Although details to account for the 126,658 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter were limited, SIGAR determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories:**
  - **Present-for-Duty or “Combat Strength”: 62,753 (50%)**
  - **Unavailable (including personnel in combat and on leave but not AWOL): 54,862 (43%)**
  - **Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL): 9,043 (7%)**



# ANA Attrition by Corps/Division March 2014


ANA	Attrition*
201 Corps	1.6%
203 Corps	1.8%
205 Corps	2.0%
207 Corps	2.6%
209 Corps	2.1%
215 Corps	4.1%
111 Div	1.2%
SOF	0.9%
EAC****	0.7%
<b>ANA Total</b>	<b>1.8%</b>

- High attrition rate continues to be a challenge, but has remained stable over 2013.
- Causes of attrition are assessed as high op tempo, sustained risk, soldier care/ quality of life, and leave issues.
- Though combat losses are a relatively low percentage of total attrition- it likely contributes to morale issues


\*ANA attrition decreased slightly from 3.3 percent (Feb) to 1.8 percent (march) in Solar Month March 14.

\*\*\*\*EAC- Echelon Above Corps includes a number of organizations; MP Guard Brigade; HSSB; Army support Command; Logistics Command; ANATC; ANAREC; Medical Command; ANDU; Ministry of Defense; General Staff; Ground Forces Command; and Mobile Strike Force.

# ANA Attrition & Recruitment March 13-Feb 14



# ANA Force Generation Readiness 12/2013



Note: Bde = Brigade

Source: IIC, Regional ANSF Status Report, December 2013.

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment. • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

# ANA Readiness 6/2014

REGIONAL ANSF STATUS REPORT - ANA ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE																				
	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed			
	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-
Combined Arms Operations	8	8	0		12	14	2		3	2	-1		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Leadership	15	16	1		6	6	0		2	2	0		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Command & Control	9	12	3		14	12	-2		0	0	0		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Sustainment	6	5	-1		11	14	3		6	5	-1		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Training	6	6	0		13	14	1		3	3	0		1	1	0		1	0	-1	
Attrition	1	5	4		9	8	-1		0	0	0		14	11	-3		0	0	0	

Notes: Numbers represent brigades. Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0-1.99% = Fully Capable; 2-2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing. Quarters are calendar-year.

Sources: IJC, March 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 4/9/2014; IJC, June 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 6/1/2014.


Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment, • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 brigades within corps and two brigades of the 111th Capital Division). Of those, 92% were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined-arms operations. This is an increase from the 87% assessed at those levels last quarter. This was due to one brigade improving from “partially capable” to “capable” and one brigade, not assessed last quarter but earlier deemed “capable,” being assessed as “capable.” In most assessment categories, the ANA’s capability showed some improvement.

Significant improvement was reported in attrition with 54% of brigades rated “fully capable” or “capable,” an increase over the 42% rated last quarter. Forty-six percent of brigades were still considered “developing,” meaning that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more per month. However, this is a notable improvement from the last two quarters, when 58% and 71% were rated as “developing.” In other areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (92%), command and control (100%), sustainment (79%), and training (83%).



# ANA Readiness by Location 3/2014



# ANA SOF: February 2014

ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)	HQs	Units		Total Units & HQs
	DIV/BDEs	KDKs	SPT Units	
Fully Capable	0	0	0	0
Capable	0	4	2	6
Partially Capable	3	5	5	13
Developing	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	0	0	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>19</b>

Operational Category	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14
<b>ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>GDPSU &amp; ANASF/CDO Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>249</b>
ISAF Advised Ops (with ANSF in lead)	163	93	136	70	50	82
ANSF- Led ISAF Enabled Ops	199	185	244	217	253	133
ISAF - Led Partnered Ops	3	1	2	19	27	0
<b>Total Partnered, Enabled, or Advised SOF Ops (Total)</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>215</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>606</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>541</b>	<b>468</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>599</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>464</b>
<b>% of Total Ops Led by ISAF</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops Led by ANSF</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>96%</b>	<b>95%</b>	<b>99%</b>

Note: Special operations recorded above include operations carried out by ISAF SOF, GDPSU, and ANASF/CDO units, but do not include operations conducted by TF 94-7.1 Effective May 2013 ANA SF CDO ops were added to this table. Previously, only ISAF SOF and GDPSU ops were included. Effective June 2013, National Directorate of Police Security (NDS) were added into this table.

NDS = National Directorate of Security; GDPSU = General Directorate of Police Special Units; CDO = commandos; Ktah. Khas = specialized Afghan commandos in the ANASF.

Color scheme: Combined is purple, ANSF is green, coalition is blue, summary statistics are orange.

# Key ANA Political Challenges

- Ensuring key elements like SOF and ANCOPs and best units do not become either coup-oriented or tools of President and political control.
- Limiting corruption and role of power brokers.
- Preventing emergence of local “war lords.”
- Ensuring tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective civil-military relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  - Rules of engagement. Limit civil casualties, tensions, and conflicts.
  - “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
- Provincial and District civil-interface.
- Lead role in making layered defense effective – relations and controls over with elements of police and ALP.
- Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.
- Forcing effective cooperation, combined operations across unit and command lines.
- Accountability



## ANA Ethnicity- Tajik Impact: February 2014

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	41.4%	39.6%	8.0%	4.5%	6.5%
Officer Delta	-2.6%	14.6%	-2.0%	-3.5%	-6.5%
NCO	38.3%	31.8%	12.5%	9.9%	7.5%
Soldier	38.8%	30.9%	10.1%	12.5%	7.8%
Total Force	39.0%	32.4%	10.7%	10.4%	7.5%
Delta	-5.0%	7.4%	0.7%	2.4%	-5.5%
ANA Ethnic Breakout Goal	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

# **The Challenge of the ANAF**

# The Challenge of the ANAF


The ANAF presents the problem that it was never supposed to be ready before 2016. It also raises the issue that close air support is one of the few rapid reaction tools that can deal with a crisis in land combat, land medevac can be too slow in many areas, and air mobility is another asset that save a unit under fire, provide a key tactical advantage. Or deal with serious terrain distance issues.

There is no current public plan for dealing these issues or to indicate whether any US and other ISAF air enablers will be present after 2014. There is no indication of how the afghan could manage air assets effectively, or deal with the problem of civilian casualties that became serious for ISAF. ANAF contracts have also been a source of corruption and waste in the past.

The key challenges affecting the ANAF are listed on **Page 74**.

The status of the ANAF as of December 2013 is summarized on **Page 75**.

# ANAF Attrition & Recruitment March 13-Feb 14



Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2014, pp. 44..

# US Investment in ANAF Equipment

**U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2015** (\$ THOUSANDS)

Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	\$461,877	\$778,604	\$1,805,343	\$111,129	\$2,300	\$21,442
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	141,077	164,187	123,416
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	469,230	520,802	780,370
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	53,000	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$760,299</b>	<b>\$1,683,250</b>	<b>\$2,621,237</b>	<b>\$774,436</b>	<b>\$687,289</b>	<b>\$925,228</b>

# Key ANAF Transition Challenges

- **Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.**
  - **Real-world close-air support, rear area, interdiction needs.**
  - **IS&R, Targeting damaging assessment.**
  - **Civil-military impact and rules of engagement.**
  - **Role of air mobility, Medevac.**
  - **Revised command and C3I/BM system.**
  - **Affordable readiness, sustainment, and procurement**
  - **Defining rotary and fixed wing roles and modernization**
- **Workable and responsive structure for joint warfare.**
- **Limits to corruption and waste.**
- **Command effectiveness and accountability.**

# **The Challenge of the ANP**



# The Challenge of the ANP

The ANP makes up roughly half of the ANSF, but Page only the small ANCOP portion of the force is fully trained and equipped to lay a paramilitary role in COIN. The MoI and most elements of the ANP – except for the ANCOPs – also present major problems in terms of overall competence, corruption, leadership, extortion and civil abuses, and ties to powerbrokers and narco-traffickers. Some elements make deals with insurgents.

The ANP presents additional problems because it is not supported by an effective justice system in most of the country, courts are also corrupt, the legal system is slow and unresponsive, detention methods lead to abuses, and detention facilities are poor or lacking.

These issues are addressed in depth in the DoD 1230 report and various SIGAR reports, as well as in human rights and other reports. The corruption and inefficiency within elements of afghan Border Police also limits the flow of a key source of revenue to the government. However, it is unclear what overall structure the ANP will have after the end of 2014, what kind of training efforts will exist after Transition, and what types of outside aid will be provided. Key issues involve:

- The range of challenges to ANP forces are shown.
- The trends in Afghan's low ranking in terms of the rule of law and stability.

- The structure and manning of the ANP.
- The highly optimistic estimate of the readiness of the MoI.
- The readiness, build-up, and attrition levels of the ANP. Attrition has generally been lower than in the ANA because the ANP is locally recruited and deployed, but could change radically if the ANP becomes a steady source of casualties.
- As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by unit even using force generation methods of effectiveness.
- As is the case with the ANA, ethnic structure is a problem, and Tajiks make up roughly 50% of the officers but are only 20% of the population. Few Southern Pashtun are in the ANA and the number in the ANP is limited..
- As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by region and does not reflect threat levels and priorities.

# Key ANP Challenges

- **Set real-world Afghan limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management**
- **Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 paramilitary military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, relations with ANA and controls over with elements of police and ALP.**
- **Redefine role of police in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.**
  - *Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration*
- **Accept that police will go “local.” But, set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.**
  - **Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.**
- **Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.**
  - **Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.**
  - **“Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.**
- **Provincial and District civil-interface.**
- **Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.**

# Mol Readiness: December 2013

## CM RATINGS

**4** The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.

**3** Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.

**2B** Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.

**2A** Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.


**1B** Coalition oversight  
**1A** Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

Ministry of Interior Overall Rating	Current CM	Projected 1B Date
<b>CM2A</b>		
<b>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</b>		
Public Affairs	1A	Achieved
Inspector General	3	1Q, 2015
Legal Advisor	1B	Achieved
Legal Affairs	1B	Achieved
Intelligence	2A	2Q, 2014
Democratic Policing	3	N/A
Gender Affairs	2B	4Q, 2014
<b>DM Counternarcotics</b>		
Counternarcotics	2A	4Q, 2014
<b>DM Strategy and Policy</b>		
Strategic Planning	1B	Achieved
Policy Development	1B	Achieved
Force Management	1B	Achieved
<b>DM Support</b>		
Logistics	2B	2Q, 2015
Finance & Budget	2B	1Q, 2015
Facilities & Installation	2B	2Q, 2015
Surgeon Medical	2A	3Q, 2014
Info, Comms & Technology	2B	4Q, 2014
Acquisition & Procurement	2B	3Q, 2014
<b>DM Admin</b>		
Personnel Management	2B	2Q, 2015
Civil Service	2A	3Q, 2014
Training Management	1B	Achieved
Recruiting Command	2B	4Q, 2014
<b>DM Security</b>		
Afghan Uniform Police	1B	Achieved
Fire Services	2B	1Q, 2014
Afghan Border Police (ABP)	2A	4Q, 2014
GDPSU	1B	Achieved
Anti-Crime Police	1B	Achieved
ANCOP	1A	Achieved
Afghan Local Police (ALP)	2A	3Q, 2014
Plans & Operations	1B	Achieved
Force Readiness	1A	Achieved
Counter-IED	2A	2Q, 2014
<b>DM Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)</b>		
APPF	2B	4Q, 2014

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2013, p. 30  
[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April\\_1230\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf), p. 34.

# Mol Readiness: June 2014

**DOD reported this quarter no improvements in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions**



All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; 10 progressed and none regressed since last quarter, according to CENTCOM.


However, the projected date for three staff sections to achieve CM-1B was extended from one quarter to one year.

Three MOI staff sections are rated CM-1A: the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness. In addition,

MOI staff sections have attained a CM-1B rating; an increase of six since the last reporting period

# ANP Manning & Attrition: 3/2013-2/2014

## Afghan National Police




	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14
<b>Actual</b>	151,766	151,227	151,824	152,191	152,498	152,657	152,336	150,688	149,466	150,683	151,793	153,269
<b>Attrition*</b>	-1,973	-1,580	-2,301	-2,019	-2,892	-2,154	-3,173	-3,114	-3,021	-2,377	-2,724	-2,182
<b>Total Gain**</b>	1,748	1,199	2,223	1,911	2,376	1,227	1,690	942	1,478	1,419	1,720	3,658
<b>Goal</b>	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000
<b>Retention %</b>	44%	46%	43%	51%	58%	60%	50%	67%	51%	71%	71%	74%
<b>Mo. Attrit'n %</b>	-1.3%	-1.0%	-1.5%	-1.3%	-1.9%	-1.4%	-2.1%	-2.0%	-2.0%	-1.6%	-1.8%	-1.4%
<b>Attrit'n last 12 mos</b>								-18.8%	-19.3%	-19.7%	19.1%	-19.5%

# ANP Attrition By Command: 1/2014

ANP Unit	Attrition <sup>^</sup>
AUP Kabul Central	0.42%
AUP Asmaye HQ (101)	0.41%
AUP Shamshad PHQ (202)	1.56%
AUP Pamir PHQ (303)	1.35%
AUP Maiwand PHQ (404)	2.97%
AUP Spinghar PHQ (505)	1.61%
AUP Ansar PHQ (606)	1.37%
AUP Lashkargah PHQ (707)	2.05%
ABP HQ	1.61%
ABP Quick Reaction Unit	1.37%
ABP Kabul Airport	2.05%
ABP Customs Unit	0.00%
Nangarhar ABP (Central) (1st)	2.33%
Gardez ABP (East) (2nd)	4.57%
Kandahar ABP (South) (3rd)	0.62%
Herat ABP (West) (4th)	2.53%
Balkh ABP (North) (5th)	1.60%
Helmand ABP (Southwest) (6th)	5.25%
ANCOP HQ	1.07%
ANCOP 1 <sup>st</sup> BDE (Kabul)	7.00%
ANCOP 2 <sup>nd</sup> BDE (Nangarhar)	6.10%
ANCOP 3 <sup>rd</sup> BDE (M-e-S)	5.48%
ANCOP 4 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Kandahar)	6.49%
ANCOP 5 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Gardez)	4.36%
ANCOP 6 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Herat)	4.64%
ANCOP 7 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Helmand)	4.18%
<b>ANP Total*</b>	<b>1.81%</b>



# ANP Force Generation Readiness 12/2013



Notes: AUP – Afghan Uniform Police; ABP – Afghan Border Police; ANCOP – Afghan National Civil Order Police

Source: IJC, Regional ANSF Status Report, December 2013.

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment. • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

# ANP Readiness 6/2014

## REGIONAL ANSF STATUS REPORT - ANP ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE

	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed			
	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-
Law Enforcement Operations	5	2	-3		10	10	0		3	5	2		0	1	1		3	4	1	
Leadership	10	6	-4		6	8	2		2	2	0		0	0	0		3	6	3	
Command & Control	5	5	0		9	10	1		4	3	-1		0	0	0		3	4	1	
Sustainment	4	1	-3		12	12	0		2	5	3		0	0	0		3	4	1	
Training	5	2	-3		9	8	-1		3	6	3		1	2	1		3	4	1	
Attrition	7	10	3		4	5	1		0	0	0		9	7	-2		1	0	-1	

Notes: Numbers represent brigades. Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0-1.99% = Fully Capable; 2-2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing. Quarters are calendar-year.


For the ANP, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 18 of 22 regional ANP components—the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—in seven different zones.

IJC notes the four components were not assessed due to reduced Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams coverage. 1 Of the 18 that were assessed, 67% were “fully capable” or “capable” of carrying out law-enforcement operations. The RASR defines law-enforcement operations as “making arrests and prosecuting those arrested.” The common shortfalls are lack of investigative, evidence collection, and crime-scene processing skills. IJC noted that ANP rates of materiel readiness or equipment levels are generally similar to the previous reporting period.

Attrition has improved, but continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 32% of regional components are considered “developing,” meaning attrition in these units is 3% or more per month. That is a reduction since last quarter, when 45% of regional components were considered “developing.” In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (88%), command

and control (83%), sustainment (72%), and training (56%). Notwithstanding the RASR assessments, General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of ISAF and USFOR-A, has told the Congress that the ANSF will need continued support after 2014: “If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate, the security environment will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”

# ANP Readiness by Location 3/2014



Fully Capable
Capable
Partly Capable
Developing
Not Assessed

Attrition
0-1.99%
2.0-2.99%
3%+

Unit 5-pillar halo represents SFAAT assessed overall rating from RASR

Call out boxes represents the 5 pillar ratings and current attrition rating (data as of March 1, 2014)

FC = Fully Capable  
 C = Capable  
 PC = Partially Capable  
 D = Developing  
 NA = Not Assessed



# Police Pose a Critical Challenge in Terms of Corruption and Effectiveness – As Do ALP

<b>ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE</b>						
<b>ANP Component</b>	<b>Authorized</b>			<b>Assigned</b>		
	<b>Q3 2013</b>	<b>Q4 2013</b>	<b>Quarterly Change</b>	<b>Q3 2013</b>	<b>Q4 2013</b>	<b>Quarterly Change</b>
AUP	110,369	110,369	None	109,574	106,784	-2,294
ABP	23,090	23,090	None	21,399	20,902	-497
ANCOP	14,541	14,541	None	14,516	13,597	-919
NISTA <sup>a</sup>	6,000	6,000	None	4,905	5,333	+428
<b>ANP Total</b>	<b>154,000</b>	<b>154,000</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>150,394</b>	<b>146,616</b>	<b>-3,282</b>
CNPA	2,247	2,243	-4	2,759	2,850	+91
<b>ANP + CNPA Total</b>	<b>156,247</b>	<b>156,243</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>153,153</b>	<b>149,466</b>	<b>-3,191</b>

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, it is not known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.

# ANP Ethnicity: July 31, 2013

**Total Population**      **42%**      **27%**      **9%**      **9%**      **13%**

	<b>Pashtun</b>	<b>Tajik</b>	<b>Hazara</b>	<b>Uzbek</b>	<b>Others</b>
<b>Ethnic Target</b>	44.0%	25.0%	10.0%	8.0%	13.0%
<b>Officer</b>	13.2%	49.7%	14.9%	7.3%	3.3%
<b>NCO</b>	24.2%	53.5%	33.7%	20.8%	3.9%
<b>Patrolmen</b>	62.6%	35.9%	51.4%	71.8%	7.3%
<b>Officer Delta*</b>	-25.7%	24.7%	-4.9%	-4.9%	-9.7%
<b>Total Force Delta*</b>	-2.1%	18.5%	-4.2%	-2.1%	-7.3%


**\*The Delta represents the difference between the ethnic target and the actual percentage**

## ANP Ethnicity- January 2014

Rank	Pashtu	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	13%	15%	16%	7%	12%
NCO	26%	39%	36%	23%	27%
Patrolmen	61%	46%	48%	70%	61%
Total % of Force	41%	43%	5%	6%	5%
Ethnic Target	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

# Maturing ANP Infrastructure 4/2014

## Expenditure



## Project Status

Facilities	Complete	In Progress	Acquisition	Planned	Total
AUP	392	55	3	0	450
ABP	100	30	0	0	130
ANCOP	26	7	1	0	34
AACP	21	9	0	0	30
I&S	41	13	2	0	56
Ministry	7	2	2	0	11
Agents	35	0	3	0	38
<b>Feb (SM)</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>749</b>
<b>Jan (SM)</b>	<b>614</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>744</b>



# US Investment in ANP Equipment


## COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP EQUIPMENT

Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$187,251,477	\$4,093,066
Vehicles	1,966,075,183	3,744,582
Communications Equipment	211,062,672	544,573
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,364,389,332</b>	<b>\$8,382,221</b>

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2014.

# ANP: Lack of Weapons Accountability

## Afghan Police Extra Weapons



Created with [Datavrapper](#)

Source: [SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A data](#); Chart: [LINDSEY COOK](#), [Get the data](#)

**Does not include substantial unaccountability for vehicles, ammunition, and wide range of other equipment.**

Source: Tom Risen, "U.S.-Supplied Weapons Vulnerable After Afghanistan Withdrawal Weapons given to Afghanistan have gone missing before, and it may, happen again," *USN&WR*, July 28, 2014 | 12:01 a.m. EDT and SIGAR, "Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability," SIGAR 14-84 Audit Report, July 2014.

# **The Challenge of the ALP**

# The ALP

The use of local forces is always a high risk given the problems in controlling them, making them effective, dealing with abuses and corruption, and their potential to turn on the government or create links with insurgents.


The 1230 report indicated in October 2013 that ALP expansion was expected to reach 28,500 by February, 2014 and 30,000 by December, 2014. It reported that the ALP appeared to be one of the most resilient institutions in the ANSF. It was heavily targeted by EIAs resulting in the highest casualty rate, while recording one of the lowest monthly attrition rates of all ANSF.

As of January 4, 2014, Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprised 25,477 personnel. There were 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014. The ALP operates in 126 districts in 29 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces..

Capability varied sharply by area, and there were reports of civil abuses and tensions with the ANP and Government. The ALP with US SOF training did, however, generally make ALP units at least somewhat and all ALP units were to fully transfer to the Afghan government by October 2014.

It is not clear how the Afghan Local police or other paramilitary forces like the APPF will be integrated into a post 2-104 structure or what their effectiveness will be.

# ALP Locations and Development: 2/2014



Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2014, p. 54.


# Key ALP Challenges

- **Accept that the key is to pay for support and loyalty where it is most needed. “Bribe your way to victory.”**
- **Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, and controls over with elements of police and relations with ANA .**
- **Set real-world Afghan limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management, Provincial and District civil-interface.**
- **Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 paramilitary military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Redefine role of ALP in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.**
  - ***Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration***
- **Set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.**
  - **Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.**
- **Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.**
  - **Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.**
  - **“Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.**
- **Limit internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions.**

# **The Challenge of ANSF Corruption and Abuses**




# World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative



# Who Takes Bribes: The ANA Got Worse

## Prevalence of bribery, by public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)



Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them.

But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of public official.

According to this indicator, four types of official (prosecutors, teachers, judges and customs officials) are the most likely to receive bribes when dealing with citizens.

While there has been little change in prevalence rates since 2009 in relation to prosecutors, judges and customs officials, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years.

Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army.

## **UN Warnings About ANSF Abuses**

**With Afghan national security forces leading military operations country wide, UNAMA reinforced the need for improved implementation of directives and rules of engagement mandating civilian protection, and for permanent structures in the Ministries of Defence and Interior to investigate reports of civilian casualties by Afghan forces, initiate remedial measures and take follow-up action. UNAMA's report also called on the Government of Afghanistan to investigate any allegations of human rights violations by Afghan forces as required under Afghan and international law.**

**Despite reports of improved security due to the presence of Afghan Local Police (ALP), from many communities across Afghanistan, UNAMA recorded 121 civilian casualties (32 civilian deaths and 89 injured) by ALP, almost tripling civilian casualties attributed to ALP from 2012.**

**Most of these involved ALP members in certain areas committing summary executions and punishments, intimidation, harassment and illegal searches.**

**The ALP Directorate in the Ministry of Interior reported it investigated more than 100 cases against ALP members in 2013, referring 59 cases to military prosecutors. Despite these encouraging steps, information on any prosecutions, convictions, suspensions or other action taken was not available. UNAMA called for increased efforts to provide accountability for violations by Afghan Local Police.**

**The UNAMA 2013 report recorded 39 incidents of human rights abuses including killings carried out by Pro-Government armed groups resulting in 55 civilian casualties (18 civilian deaths and 37 injured). The majority of incidents occurred in areas where armed groups held considerable power and influence, including in Uruzgan, Kunduz, Faryab, Baghlan and Jawzjan provinces.**

**The report urged the Afghan Government to speed up efforts to disband and disarm such groups**

# State Department Warnings About ANSF and Afghan Government Abuses - I

The most significant human rights problems were torture and abuse of detainees; increased targeted violence and endemic societal discrimination against women and girls; widespread violence, including armed insurgent groups' killings of persons affiliated with the government and indiscriminate attacks on civilians; and pervasive official corruption.

Other human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces; poor prison conditions; ineffective government investigations of abuses and torture by local security forces; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of women accused of so-called moral crimes; prolonged pretrial detention; judicial corruption and ineffectiveness...

There were several credible reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that in January an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander and several ALP members broke into a home in the Chardara District of Kunduz Province and killed a 65-year-old man and two women before stealing valuables from the home and fleeing. NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated extrajudicial killings.

there were widespread reports that government officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police committed abuses. NGOs reported that security forces continued to use excessive force, including torturing and beating civilians.

NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated the torture of detainees. UNAMA reported systematic torture at several ANP detention facilities and one Afghan Border Police Station in Kandahar Province. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) found multiple individuals detained by the ANP in

# State Department Warnings About ANSF and Afghan Government Abuses - II

Kandahar who claimed mistreatment and torture while in ANP custody. Detainees reportedly were tortured at official and unofficial locations, including ANP check posts, ANP headquarters, and other ANP facilities in Kandahar. Methods of torture included beatings with fists and electric cables; kicking; choking; electric shock; and squeezing of testicles.

UNAMA reported that it found “sufficiently reliable and credible” incidents of torture at 10 National Directorate of Security (NDS) facilities as well as at 15 ANP facilities. For example, UNAMA reported systematic torture at the NDS detention facility in Kandahar Province and NDS Department 124 (counterterrorism) in Kabul. A government delegation assigned to investigate the claims made by UNAMA in its January report also found that officials tortured detainees at NDS Department 124, including with electric shocks, beatings, and threats of sexual violence. During its monitoring visits, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) also continued to find instances of torture and abuse of detainees who were held at NDS Department 124.

UNAMA also found instances of torture or other mistreatment of detainees held in Afghan National Army (ANA) and ALP custody prior to transfer to the NDS or ANP. Similarly, the government found that 48 percent of detainees interviewed for its investigation (284) had been tortured.

.... Nevertheless, human rights problems persisted, and observers criticized the inadequate preparation and lack of sensitivity of local security forces. Human rights institutions expressed concerns about the limited oversight and accountability that existed for security institutions, especially the ALP, although the Ministry of Interior took some measures at the end of the year to increase accountability of the ALP. For example, the Ministry of Interior worked with the ICRC to increase human rights training for ALP recruits.

# **Russian Military Scenario Analysis of Probability of Success or Failure**

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General  
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation



**REPORT**  
made by Lieutenant General  
Igor Sergun

**SUBJECT:**

**"Probable scenario of further developments in Afghanistan  
after foreign military withdrawal"**



## Major contingencies in Afghanistan after 2014




Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence

Seizure of power by the Taliban

Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclave

Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence






# Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence




# Seizure of power by the Taliban






## Seizure of power by the Taliban




# Seizure of power by the Taliban






## Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclaves





# Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclaves



# ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:




about 40000 of personnel;




over 40000 units of materiel incl. armored vehicles and transport;



over 300 helicopters



Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF





# ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:




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
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## Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF




# ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:

about 40000 of personnel;

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Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF

