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Transition in Afghanistan: 2009-2013

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in Strategy


August, 2013

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A Past History of Failed Transition Coupled to the Loss of Support from the American People.

Real World Aid: Declare Victory and Leave?

Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions




Following the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.

POLL

Washington Post
ABC News

Q: All in all, considering the costs to the United States vs. the benefits to the United States, do you think the war in Afghanistan has been worth fighting, or not?



July 2013


	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Independents
Worth fighting	28%	42%	22%	26%
Not worth fighting	67	51	74	71

April 2010

Worth fighting	45	69	32	41
Not worth fighting	52	29	66	56


**Most Fighting is Limited to
East and South Outside
Population Centers and
There Are Some Positive
*National Polls.***

Formal Transfers of Security Do Not Mean Real ANSF Security Capability




Regional Patterns in deaths and Injuries : 2009 - 2013



Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagement by region



Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by region



Perceptions of Security Are Improving on a National Average Level




^{*} Mantaqa is Pashto for “local area.”

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Perceptions of ANSF Are Improving on a National Average Level


Q: DOES THE NATIONAL ARMY NEED THE HELP OF THE FOREIGN FORCES OR IS IT CAPABLE OF OPERATING ON ITS OWN?

A: Capable as it is / Capable, but needs resources



Q: HOW OFTEN DO YOU SEE THE POLICE IN YOUR MANTAQHA?

A: Every day / Once a week




· “local area.”


***But,* the Overall Level of
Violence is Rising and
Remains Insurgent-Driven**

What is the Real Security Situation? No Unclassified Metrics Better Than 2009



“Victory” in Iraq




“Victory” in Afghanistan




Impact of Surge in Iraq vs. Surge in Afghanistan



No Progress in reducing Enemy Initiated Attacks in First Six Months of 2013 versus First Six Months of 2012




Broader Pattern in Enemy Initiated Attacks Has Recovered Since 2011



Source: Department of Defense, **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, p. A-3,.


***And,* Casualties Rise
Steadily in Spite of Past
“Surge” and Are
Increasingly Insurgent-
Driven**

Military Casualties Are Rising **Very** Sharply and Are Now Largely Afghan Driven: ANSF and ISAF KIAs, January 2010 – March, 2013




Source: Department of Defense, **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, pp. 10.


UNAMA: Civilian Deaths and Injuries: January to June: 2009 - 2013



UNAMA: Civilian Deaths by Parties to the Conflict: January to June: 2009 - 2013




UNAMA: Insurgents Shift to Targeted Killings: 2009 - 2013




176 percent increase in civilian casualties resulting from Anti-Government Elements initiating attacks against ANA, ANP and ALP locations. UNAMA documented 93 civilian deaths and 399 injuries (492 civilian casualties) during such attacks in the first six months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012. 1 Within these figures, the most dramatic increase is attacks against ALP that also caused civilian casualties. In 2013, UNAMA documented 18 attacks initiated by Anti-Government Elements targeting ALP, which resulted in 19 civilian deaths and 162 injured (180 civilian casualties), a 1,900 percent increase from 2012.

UNAMA: Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Anti-Government Elements: January to June: 2009 - 2013




US/ISAF Civilian Casualty Data Broadly Track with UNAMA's: Casualties Rising but Insurgent Driven




Total Civilian Casualties by Force and Total by Month

1 Oct 11 - 31 Mar 12



INS 1,304 (75%) ISAF 146 (8%)
ANSF 69 (4%) UNK 214 (12%)

1 Oct 12 - 31 Mar 13




INS 1,329 (85%) ISAF 58 (4%)
ANSF 52 (3%) UNK 120 (8%)

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, pp. 31-32.


**The ANSF is Making Real
Progress *But Will Remain
Dependent on Partners,
Advisors and Aid Through
At Least 2018***

Figure Two: The Slow – Taliban Enabling – US Build-up in Afghanistan versus the Initial Withdrawal and Late “Surge” in Iraq: US Boots on the Ground, 2001-2010

In thousands of troops



ANSF is Up, But Only Half is a Fighting Force





Force Element	Manpower Goal End 2012	% of Total
MOD	NA	NA
ANA	172,055	49%
AAF	7,639	2%
Subtotal	195,000	51%
MOI	NA	NA
ANCOP	14,451?	4%
AUP	110,279	31%
ABP	23,090	7%
Subtotal	157,000	45%
CNPA	2,986?	0.8%
ALP-		
Militias	30,000-40,000	NA
APPF	11,000-23,000	NA

As of 7 May 2011


UNCLASSIFIED

The Burden of Fighting and Casualties Has Shifted to the ANSF



United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, AFGHANISTAN MID-YEAR REPORT 2013 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT, Kabul, Afghanistan, July 2013, pp. 9,11.

ANSF Goes Up as US/ISAF Goes Down: Jan 2010-March 2013



Real Progress in ANSF-Led Operations

Operational Category	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops						1,852
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops						0
ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)	1,435	1,124	1,252	1,320	1,848	1,852
ANA Unilateral						18,768
ANP Unilateral						11,966
ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)	5,345	3,579	20,513	31,247	24,140	30,734
ISAF Led Combined (ANA)						316
ISAF Led Combined (ANP)						0
ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)	1,962	1,537	1,676	1,814	2,282	316
ANA Led Combined						956
ANA Led Enabled						332
ANA Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)	410	400	1,291	1,871	1,594	1,288
ANP Led Combined						0
ANP Led Enabled						183
ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)						183
ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)	410	400	1,291	1,871	1,594	1,471
Total Ops	9,152	6,640	24,732	36,252	29,864	34,373
Total ISAF Led Ops	3,397	2,661	2,928	3,134	4,130	2,168
Total ANSF Led Ops	5,755	3,979	21,804	33,118	25,734	32,205
% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led	37%	40%	12%	9%	14%	6%
% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led	63%	60%	88%	91%	86%	94%
	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13	Mar-13

Operation levels include Routine, Platoon/Toley, Kandak, and Above Kandak.


Reference: IJC "ANSF in the Lead OPREP Roll-up," April 2013.

Color scheme: Coalition is blue, ANP & ANA is green, combined is purple, and orange is summary statistics.

Note 1: In December 2012 IJC issued a FRAGO requiring all forces to report more categories of operations; see rise in total ops in DEC 2012.

Note 2: In March 2013 IJC began publishing these new operational permutations with greater specificity, e.g., ANA and ANP operations could be unilateral enabled or combined and be either ANA/ANP led or ISAF led.

But ANA Attrition and Need for Enablers Remains Critical Problem



Continued ANSF Dependence on Advisors and Partners


ANA RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)	HQs			OCC	Units			Total Required Units
	EA C	Corps/ Div	BDE		KDK	GSU	Coy	
Independent w/ Advisors	0	1	5	6	35	8	8	63
Effective w/ Advisors	1	6	17	25	99	12	14	174
Effective w/ Partners	0	0	3	4	16	5	5	33
Developing w/ Partners	0	0	1	0	10	0	2	13
Established	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	4
Not Assessed	0	0	0	2	4	1	8	15
Totals	1	7	26	38	166	26	38	302

ANP RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)	All CUAT Required Units								Total Required Units
	AUP		ABP		ANCOP		SPU		
	HQ	Unit	HQ	Unit	HQ	Unit	HQ	Unit	
Independent w/ Advisors	16	95	2	13	2	11	0	2	141
Effective w/ Advisors	15	139	3	17	4	13	0	2	193
Effective w/ Partners	0	69	1	6	0	4	0	11	91
Developing w/ Partners	1	28	0	4	0	2	0	2	37
Established	1	8	0	1	0	0	0	1	11
Not Assessed	1	28	1	20	0	2	0	3	55
Totals	34	367	7	61	6	32	0	21	528


Economics and Aid Remain Critical Challenges

Figure Three: The Delayed, Faltering and Erratic US Civil and Civil and Military Aid Programs in Afghanistan – Part One

APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR AND FUNDING CATEGORY (\$ BILLIONS AND PERCENT)




CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY, AS OF MARCH 31, 2012 (\$ BILLIONS)




Note: Numbers affected by rounding. Unlisted data resulted in a lower total for 2009.

**Figure Three: The Delayed, Faltering and Erratic US Civil and Civil and M
Aid Programs in Afghanistan – Part Two**

Erratic US Funding of Key Category of Military Aid to Afghans (In SUS Billions)




Erratic US Funding of Key Category of Economic Aid to Afghans (In SUS Billions)




An Economy Driven by Aid, Military Spending, and Narcotics

Outside Aid Spending Drives GDP After 2003/2004







Only 10% of Afghan Budget is Self-Funded

- **64% comes from US Aid**
- **26% from Other donors**
- **10% is Afghan funded**



Real World Aid: Declare Victory and Leave?

Development Assistance Levels Before and After Troop Reductions



Following the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.