Columbia International Affairs Online: Working Papers

CIAO DATE: 10/2012

The Afghan War: Creating the Economic Conditions and Civil-Military Aid Efforts Needed For Transition

Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold, Sean T. Mann

September 2012

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Abstract

The risks and issues in dealing with Afghanistan’s political, security, and economic problems cannot continue to be ignored or “spun” in presenting transition plans to the US Congress and public or to the legislatures and publics of other donor countries. They require a level of transparency, integrity, and professionalism that can rebuild the trust necessary to earn public support. The Dr. Pangloss approach to Transition – touting spin and optimism in this “best of all possible Afghan worlds” -- needs to be put to a firm end. “Afghan perfect” and “Afghan desirable” simply will not happen. Overselling the war is not helping the war effort, nor is it building credibility and support. It is instead distorting the civil and military efforts, wasting massive amounts of resources, and leading the decision makers and commanders directly involved in the war to embrace the existing mission in ways that further weaken the already limited chance of success. While the end result may not be deliberately dishonest, the lack of objectivity and realism is misleading. As a result, the civil and military efforts are discredited as the wagons are drawn into tighter and tighter defensive circles, leading to less and transparency and diminished credibility. Even if all the proposed steps are taken, Transition will not be easy and may fail to produce a stable Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it seems likely that more realistic goals and funding plans could accomplish a great deal. For all of the problems listed in this analysis, US, IMF, and World Bank working studies indicate that continuing flows of affordable US and European aid carefully focused on jobs and economic stability, as well as development, could lead to a stable transition. Realism based on “Afghan as good as it can actually get” offers a far better chance of producing plans and actions that may still be able to serve US, Afghan, allied and donor interests, achieve sustained support, and make a more modest form of Transition possible.