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# **The War in Afghanistan: Key Trends in the Fighting and ANSF Development in the November 2010 1230 Report and Year-End NTM-A Reporting**

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**CSIS**


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
*December 1, 2010*

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# ISAF Concept of Operations




# ISAF Command Structure



\* 2SCR comprises CTU and CTZ, along with contributions from partner nations.


Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 12.

# District Security Ratings



The map shows the 02 September 2010 security district assessment results. The arrows indicate positive or negative change compared to the 18 March 2010 security district assessment. The change captured in the above figure is a district that changed to or from a “satisfactory” rating. A “satisfactory” rating is equal to green (secure environment) or yellow (occasional threats). The proportion of the population residing within the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts living in areas rated as “satisfactory” remains relatively unchanged over the past three quarters, (a “satisfactory” rating comprises the highest two rating levels, “Secure Environment” and “Occasional Threats.”) The map in Figure 10 below depicts the current ratings of the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts as assessed by IJC. The arrows indicate districts that have increased to or decreased from a rating of “satisfactory” compared to June 2010. In RC-East, three districts’ ratings decreased from June to September 2010. In particular, the Nawah ye Barakzai district in RC Southwest improved its security rating.


# Total Weekly Kinetic Events 7-08 to 9-10



Kinetic Events (KE) include Direct Fire (DF), Indirect Fire (IDF), Surface to Air Fire (SAFIRE), Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events. IED events comprise IED exploded, IED found/cleared, mine strike, mine found/cleared, and turn-ins.


There have been increases in all methods of attacks, except IEDs, which were lower in August 2010 than they were in August 2009, and direct fire (DF) is increasing at a higher rate than indirect fire (IDF). This is possibly due to the amount of resources it takes to attack utilizing IDFs versus DF and IEDs. Overall kinetic events are up 300 percent since 2007 and up an additional 70 percent since 2009. Total kinetic events increased nearly 55 percent over the previous quarter and 65 percent compared to the third quarter, 2009, as Figure 12 below indicates. The overall increase was driven primarily by increased incidents of direct fire. Insurgent-initiated attacks also increased this quarter by over 60 percent, and direct fire attacks comprised the majority of this increase. The rise in violence is partly attributable to the increase in Coalition Forces and ANSF as well as greater operational tempo. The sharp increase in insurgents' use of direct fire attacks may be significant, as it suggests capacity limitations for the insurgents.

# Civilian Casualties vs. Security Incidents




The trend line for 2010 in the figure below manifests a decreasing trend in ISAF caused civilian casualties during a sample 12-week period, compared to the same time period during 2009. ISAF and coalition forces have experienced a reduction in civilian casualties in spite of a spike in total violence during the summer fighting season. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS increased during the summer months, in line with the seasonal violence trends. Figure 15 illustrates the total number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties during this reporting period. The drop in CIVCAS compared to last year is attributable to both ISAF and insurgents. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS from direct fire doubled during the second half of the reporting period compared to 2009, which is likely due to insurgent shift in TTPs to a much greater use of direct fire.

# Monthly Kinetic Events in 2010 by Type & Location



During the second quarter of the reporting period, over 90 percent of all kinetic events occurred in RCs South, Southwest, and East

# Afghan Perceptions of Security




Positive perceptions of security have declined since the March 2010 Nationwide Survey, as shown in Figure 11. The number of Afghans rating their security situation as “bad” is the highest since the nationwide survey began in September 2008. This downward trend in security perception is likely due to the steady increase in total violence over the past nine months.



# IED Events

1-09 to 9-10



4-10 to 9-10

	IED Explosion	IED Found /Cleared	Other	Total IED
RC-East	791	636	114	1541
RC-South	947	1005	105	2057
RC-Southwest	1321	1068	32	2421
RC-West	241	240	27	508
RC-North	104	72	16	192
RC-Capital	12	13	3	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>3416</b>	<b>3034</b>	<b>297</b>	<b>6747</b>

Source: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 55.

# Focus of NTM-A Training Efforts: 2010 & 2011

Focus for NTM-A's 1st Year	Focus for NTM-A's 2nd Year
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grow the force</li> <li>• Increase the quality of the force</li> <li>• Build the foundation to professionalize the force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continued growth</li> <li>• Build support and enabling forces</li> <li>• Develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions</li> <li>• Begin the process to professionalize the force</li> </ul>

In the first year of NTM-A, we assisted our Afghan partners to **reverse negative trends** (for example: high attrition and low training standards) and to **field an infantry-centric (warfighting) force capable of participating in counterinsurgency operations**. NTM-A's focus areas were to: **grow the force, increase the quality of the force, and build the foundation to professionalize the force**. To support these focus areas, NTM-A changed our internal organization to build a seamless, combined headquarters. NTM-A updated approaches to key programs. NTM-A created a sense of urgency that supported accelerated ANSF growth. A lack of transparency and professionalism in many parts of the ANSF hampered our efforts, but recent leadership changes in the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) this past summer were seen as positive steps, representing a potential shift towards meritocracy and away from the degree of factionalism and nepotism we have seen in the past.

Over the next year we will **use the solid foundation we have built to ensure continued growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, and begin the process to professionalize the force**. Assisting our Afghan partners to build an enduring and self-sustaining force remains a distinct challenge, and the attainment of the growth objectives for the next year is not assured. While current growth objectives are ahead of projections, combat operations combined with frequent operational deployments, and the resultant attrition will pose real challenges for our collective efforts in both quantity and quality. As our focus shifts to the generation of a more balanced, self-sustaining force, the need for specialized trainers becomes urgent. There is a direct correlation between specialized instructor capabilities and the probability of successful long-term ANSF growth and professional development. We will need to continue to balance the tensions between current operational demands and longer-term ANSF growth and professionalization.

# Trainer Status and Critical Shortfalls

Authorized	In Place	Pledged	Shortage
2,796	896	980	920

NATO released CJSOR v10 on September 1, 2010, which incorporates requirements not filled in CJSOR v9.5, as well as additional requirements identified. Deputy Supreme Allied commander Europe (DSACEUR) increased efforts to fill the shortage in NATO ISAF institutional trainers.

Following the September 23, 2010 NATO Force Generation Conference, in-place trainers and pledges increased by 18 percent and 34 percent, respectively, which decreased the remaining shortage of trainers by 35 percent. The total requirement in CJSOR v10 is 2,796, a net growth of 471 personnel.

The current shortfall in CJSOR v10 for institutional trainers is 920, with 896 trainers in-place and 980 confirmed pledges for trainers (see Table for the current CJSOR trainer status).

The United States currently sources 1,711 non-CJSOR trainer positions to mitigate the shortfall from CJSOR v9.5.


To address the NATO CJSOR v10 shortfall temporarily, the United States is also providing an additional 868 personnel with skills not found in the deployed units. This U.S. bridging solution provides NATO with additional time to source CJSOR requirements.

For the fielded ANSF Force, the current shortfall is 16 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and 139 Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs).

This shortfall is compounded by the recent departure of the Dutch Forces operating in Uruzgan Province under RC-S.


In 2011, the shortfalls will increase with the departure of the Canadian brigade in Kandahar and the additional growth of the ANSF. By 2011, the shortfall is projected to be 41 OMLTs and 243 POMLTs.

# NTM-A Institutional Trainer Needs vs. Supply: 9/10-3/12





Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 25.

# NTM-A Top Capability Requirements




Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 21, and **NTM-A, Year In Review** November 2009 to November 2010, p. 27

# Resourcing ANSF Development-FY05-FY11



**Infrastructure Program for 305K Afghan National Security Force.**




# MoD Readiness

MoD Overall: CM-3	Current CM	Projected CM-1B (CY)
<b>Support to Operations</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4th Qtr 11</b>
MoD Intel	3	2nd Qtr 11
GS G2	3	1st Qtr 12
Operations	2B	3rd Qtr 11
Force Mgmt	3	1st Qtr 12
Communications	2B	3rd Qtr 11
CSU	2A	4th Qtr 10
Medical	3	NET 13
Reserve Affairs	4	1st Qtr 12
Disaster Response	2B	1st Qtr 11
Facilities Engineering	3	4th Qtr 11
<b>Personnel Mgmt</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2nd Qtr 11</b>
GS G1	3	1st Qtr 12
Personnel (Ministry)	2B	1st Qtr 11
Education (Ministry)	3	4th Qtr 11
Recruiting	2A	1st Qtr 11
Religious & Cultural Affairs	2B	1st Qtr 11

<b>National Logistics</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2nd Qtr 12</b>
AT&L	3	1st Qtr 12
GS G4	3	3rd Qtr 11
Logistics Command	3	3rd Qtr 11
Acquisitions Agency	3	2nd Qtr 11
<b>Hor. Int. &amp; Str. Mgmt</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3rd Qtr 11</b>
MoD	2A	1st Qtr 11
1st Deputy MoD	2B	1st Qtr 11
CGoS	3	3rd Qtr 11
VCGoS	3	3rd Qtr 11
Strategy & Policy	3	3rd Qtr 11
Parliamentary Affairs	2A	3rd Qtr 11
MoD Legal	3	1st Qtr 11
GS Legal	3	4th Qtr 11
Public Affairs	2A	4th Qtr 10
MoD IG	2A	1st Qtr 11
GS IG	2A	1st Qtr 11
MoD Finance	2A	2nd Qtr 11
GS Finance	2A	2nd Qtr 11

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 23.


# ANA Recruiting: 10/2009-10/2010



Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 8.







# Afghan Army Training Sites: 11/2010




Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 31.

## Progress in ANA Training: 2009 vs. 2010




# Afghan Army Branch School Plan: 9/2009-11/2001




# Army Officer and NCO Levels

ANA Officer Strength Goal and Actual (November 2009 - November 2011)




ANA Officer Strength Goal and Actual (November 2009 - November 2011)




Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 26-27.

## Afghan Army Quality: 9/2009-11/2001



Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 10.


# Army End Strength



As of August 2010, the ANA exceeded its October 2010 goal of 134,000 personnel, by 7,106 personnel. If current trends continue, the ANA will meet the 2011 goal of 171,600 personnel at or ahead of schedule. One risk to the projected ANA growth is attrition. In July and August, attrition rates increased over the 12-month average, 3.0 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively.<sup>15</sup> If attrition rates remain elevated, the ANA will not meet its October 2011 growth goals.

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 23.

# ANA Operational Effectiveness as of September 2010



Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), and OMLTs that perform coaching, training, and advising roles for their units. These training teams continually assess the kandaks and report their status through IJC through the Regional Commands utilizing the IJC Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) process, which operates on a six-week assessment cycle. As of September 2010, 10 units were "Effective 30with Assistance" and nine were "Dependent on Coalition Forces for Success"

Independent	0
Effective w/Advisors	7
Effective w/Assistance	10
Dependent on CF For Success	9
Ineffective	0
Not Assessed	2

\*Ratings are made with the RDL system.

## ANA Partnering as of September 2010

RC	Units	Kandaks	HQs	Embedded Partner		Partnered		Mentor		Uncovered	
				Kandaks	HQs	Kandaks	HQs	Kandaks	HQs	Kandaks	HQs
RC Capital	20	18	2	4	0	5	0	6	2	4	0
RC East	54	44	10	13	3	27	4	11	3	0	0
RC West	16	13	3	3	0	7	2	6	3	1	0
RC North	19	15	4	1	0	6	2	13	4	0	0
RC SW	24	20	4	11	1	6	2	7	1	0	0
RC South	31	26	5	6	0	16	5	15	3	1	0
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 26-27.



# Afghan Air Force Capacity Development Plan: 9/2009-11/2001

SEP 09	OCT 10	OCT 11
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**KEY**

- AAF Full Operational Capacity
- AAF Initial Operational Capacity
- NATC-A with AAF
- NATC-A training AAF

- PoA Airlift (RW)
- RW CAS
- Battlefield Mobility
- CASEVAC

- HA / DR
- NEO
- PoA Airlift (RW)
- C-27 IOC/Dip Ops
- Battlefield Mobility
- CASEVAC/MEDEVAC
- RW CAS (Mi-17/35)
- Fwd Observers (FO)
- Instrument/Night Ops
- NVG Ops
- Air Assault
- RW Sling Load
- Air Drop (C-27)

- PoA Airlift (RW & FW)
- Battlefield Mobility
- C-27 FOC/Diplomatic Ops
- Air Assault
- HA / DR
- NEO
- CASEVAC/MEDEVAC
- RW Sling Load
- Instrument/Night Ops
- NVG Ops
- Air Drop (C-27)
- RW CAS w/ FO (Mi-17/35)
- RW CAS with FO
- Tactical Training Det


Legend

- |                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| • HA: Humanitarian Assistance  | • CAS w/FO: Close Air Support with Forward Observer |
| • DR: Disaster Relief          | • CASEVAC: Casualty Evacuation                      |
| • NEO: Noncombatant Operations | • MEDEVAC: Medical Evacuation                       |
| • NVG: Night Vision Goggles    | • RW & FW: Rotary Wing & Fixed Wing                 |

# Afghan Air Training and Operations Sites: 11/2010


## Air Training and Operations Sites

- Air Wing (planned)
- Training Center (planned)
- Air Detachment
- Air Unit
- AIU HQ (planned Dets)



Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 30.

# Afghan Air Force Fleet Growth



1. The C-27—a turboprop, fixed-wing airlifter—will replace the six Antonov An-32 and An-26 platforms currently in use. The first Afghan C-27s arrived in November 2009. There are six in the fleet now, and the planned acquisition is 18 with an option for a total of 20 C-27s by 2012.

2. Procurement of six rotary-wing trainer aircraft will be selected with expected delivery by September 2011.

3. Procurement of up to 32 “Cessna-like” fixed-wing aircraft for initial flight and basic fixed-wing training with expected delivery by fiscal year 2013. The U.S. Air Force will conduct the source selection of this airframe.

4. Procurement of up to 20 aircraft for fixed-wing close air support (CAS). The U.S. Air Force will also conduct the source selection for this airframe.

The AAF currently maintains 27 Mi-17 medium-lift helicopters. An additional eight are in the United Arab Emirates for cockpit modifications, and will continue to arrive throughout 2010. The Mi-17 fleet will grow to 56 by 2016. Of these, 17 Mi-17s are expected to leave the fleet, either through battlefield loss or mechanical time-out, during fiscal years 2012 through 2016.

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 33..


# MoI Readiness

Mol Overall: CM-3	Current CM	Projected CM-1B (CY)
<b>Ministry of Interior</b>		
Parliamentary Affairs	4	1st Qtr 11
Public Affairs	2B	3rd Qtr 11
Inspector General	2B	1st Qtr 11
Anti-corruption	2B	3rd Qtr 11
Legal Affairs/LEGAD	3	1st Qtr 12
<b>DM of Counter-Narcotics</b>		
Counter Narcotics	3	3rd Qtr 11
<b>DM of Strategy and Policy</b>		
Strategic Planning	2B	3rd Qtr 11
Policy	3	3rd Qtr 11
<b>DM of Security</b>		

<b>DM of Security</b>		
Afghan Uniform Pol	3	3rd Qtr 11
Afghan Border Pol	2B	3rd Qtr 11
GDPSU	4	1st Qtr 12
Anti-Crime	2B	1st Qtr 11
ANCOP-(G)	3	4th Qtr 12
Operations Planning	2B	3rd Qtr 11
Force Readiness	3	1st Qtr 12
Intelligence	3	2nd Qtr 11
<b>DM of Admin &amp; Support</b>		
Personnel Mgmt	2B	3rd Qtr 11
Logistics	3	3rd Qtr 12
Finance & Budget	3	1st Qtr 12
Facilities & Installation	3	NET 13
Surgeon Medical	2B	1st Qtr 12
Info, Comms & Tech	3	1st Qtr 12
Training Mgmt	3	4th Qtr 11
Acquisition & Procurement	3	4th Qtr 11
Force Mgmt	3	1st Qtr 12

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 34..


# ANP Recruiting: 10/2009-10/2010



Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 9.





# Afghan Police Training Sites: 11/2010

## Afghan National Police Training Sites




Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 31.

## Progress in ANP Training: 2009 vs. 2010




## ANSF: Training Capacity: 9/2009-11/2001



Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 8.




# ANP End Strength



The ANCOP remains a top priority. Current attrition rates are the principal challenge for ANCOP growth. Attrition declined from 11.7 percent in December 2009 to 1.7 percent in August 2010 but still hovers above the target goal of 1.4 percent. The attrition challenge is compounded by poor recruiting, which has fallen short of expectations. Measures are being implemented to address these challenges, including: coupling literacy training with the NCO course; lowering entry-level recruiting literacy standards; partnering the centralized recruiting system with local units of employment; improving leadership with training and development (command and staff courses); and changes to leave practices. Implementation of a disciplined, operational deployment cycle (ODC) is the key to reducing attrition and increasing retention. The ANCOP ODC implementation will begin December 1, 2010.

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 37


# ANP Operational Effectiveness as of September 2010



Development of the ANP continues, with particular focus on increasing the operational effectiveness of the force. Development of the AUP fielded force continues to be a challenge. One unit is assessed as “Independent”, six as “Effective with Advisors” and “Effective with Assistance”, with seven still “Dependent on Coalition Forces for Success”

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 31.

# Attrition in the Afghan National Civil Order Police : 10/2009-9/2010



Source: NTM-A, **Year In Review**, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 9.

# ANP Partnering as of September 2010

Embedded Partner = Live / Train / Operate with Afghan formations; Partner (-) = train / operate with Afghan formation; Mentor = units have dedicated mentors and focus on developing capacity of the key unit leadership; Uncovered = no Coalition partnered or mentor units present.

ANP Type	Units	Embedded Partner	Partnered	Limited Partnering	Mentor	Uncovered
AUP (Prov. HQ)	18*	1	7	0	6	4
ABP (Zone HQ)	7**	2	1	0	1	3
ANCOP (BDE HQ)	4	0	1	0	3	0
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>

\*AUP (PHQ)- 4 Provinces w/ no Partner: Kunar, Nangarhar, Badghis, Kapisa

\*\*ABP HQ- Added Kabul ABP National HQ

Corruption and the perception of corruption continue to negatively affect the reputation of the AUP among the Afghan population. Only a few areas have positive popular perception ratings of the AUP.<sup>20</sup> Despite some efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to eliminate corruption and improve rule of law, overwhelming reports of corruption continue.

If corruption activities continue to go unchecked at current levels, they threaten to keep the population separated from the government. Corruption at the provincial headquarters and district headquarters (PHQ/DHQ) level negatively affect the trust of the populace.

HQ ISAF polling from June 27, 2010 indicates that people perceive improvement on security due to AUP in last 6 months in the following percentages: Badakshan (80 percent), Badghis (77 percent), Panjshir and Sar-e Pul (59 percent both), Laghman (58 percent), Parwan (56 percent), Faryab (55 percent), Samangan (54 percent), Balkh (51 percent).

16 of 17 AUP provincial headquarters are partnered (94 percent) and 74 of 81 (91 percent) key terrain district units are covered, meaning they have some form of partnering or mentoring.

As of late September, U.S. law enforcement advisors were embedded to provide intensive, on-the-job, subject matter expertise for partnered ANP units in key terrain districts. We do not have data on police in non-key terrain provinces.

Source: **Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan**, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 38-39.