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Iraq After the Election: Meeting the Challenges of 2010

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Key Challenges: Democracy and Governance Overtake Insurgency



Key Challenges in 2010

- •Paralysis by democracy: lack of national unity government
- •Lack of government effectiveness and capacity at every level
- •Remnants of insurgency and possible revival
- •Sectarian and ethnic challenges
- •Budget crisis, crippled economy, loss of foreign aid
- •Halt in progress in developing Iraqi security forces
- •Coming US withdrawal
- •Uncertain neighbors



Key Rivals in the Election



Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p.8



Election Results

- Strong nationalist, anti-incumbent vote, but still strong sectarian and ethnic character.
- Maliki's State of Law Party (89 seats and 27.4% of the vote),
- Allawi's Iraqiya (91 seats and 28% of the vote) and
- Hakim-Jafaari-Sadr coalition in the Iraqi National Alliance (70 seats and 21.5% of the vote).
 - Sadrists get nearly 60% of the seats within the INA –
 approximately 39 seats versus 9 for Badr, 8 for ISCI, 1 for Jaafari, 6 for Fadhilla, and 5 for other candidates.
- Kurdish vote shows considerable unity of PUK and DPK (43 seats and 13.2 % of vote).
- Iraq's Unity Alliance (Bulani) is major loser.
- Both MoD and MoI lose, as does head of Accountability Commission



Paralysis by Democracy: One Model of Election Gap

TIME LINE OF THE GOVERNANCE GAP

EVENT	TIME PERIOD	CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY			
Preliminary election results	4 days after election				
Uncertified official results	15 days after election	All election inquiries resolved by Iraq's Higher Judicial Council (HJC)			
Certified official results	Pending recount	HJC certifies the election			
CoR convenes	15 days after certification of the election	Article 54: Eldest member shall chair the first session to elect the speaker and two deputies			
CoR Speaker elected	During first session of the CoR	Article 55: Elected by absolute majority of secret balloting			
President elected	No set deadline	Article 70: Elected by 2/3 majority. If no candidate receives required majority, two candidates with highest number of votes compete; majority vote wins.			
Presidential charge to form government	Within 15 days of President's election	Article 76: President asks the largest CoR bloc to nominate a candidate for Prime Minister			
Prime Minister-designate names Council of Ministers	Within 30 days of designation	Article 76: If Prime Minister-designate fails to name CoM within this time period, the President shall charge a new nominee for Prime Minister			
Prime Minister-designate puts forth Council of Ministers and ministerial program for approval	No set deadline	Article 26: If they do not receive a vote of confidence, the President must ask a new nominee to form the CoM within 15 days.			

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, "Process of Government Formation," 3/11/2010; UNAMI, "Iraqi Constitution," www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf, accessed 4/16/2010.

Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 79



Iraq: Another Model of Forming a New Government

Action	Time I Phase	Time Frame (in Days) Phase Cumulative		
Special needs voting and Election Day	3	3		
Tally of results and preliminary results	4-7	7-10		
Complaints and adjudications: Provisional Results	20	27		
Appeals and Certification of Results	50	77		
First Session of Council of Republic; negotiations for selection of Speaker (maxium of 30 days after certification)	21	98		
Speaker elected	30	128		
Council of the Republic elects President and other members of the Presidential Council	30	158		
Prime Minister nominated (maximum of 15 days)	15	173		
Prime Minister picks Council of Ministers. (maximum of 30 days) 30	203		
Prime Minister and Council of Ministers sworn in. (Presidential Council must designate new Prime Minister in	30	238		



Iraqi Governance: The Problem of Creating an Effective Cabinet and National Leadership

Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members

Pres.	Jalal TAL ABANI				
Vice Pres.	Adil ABD AL-MAHDI				
Vice Pres.	Tariq al-HASHIMI				
Prime Min.	Nuri al-MALIKI				
Dep. Prime Min.	Rafi al-ISSAWI				
Dep. Prime Min.	Rowsch Nuri SHAWA YS				
Min. of Agriculture					
Min. of Communications	Faruq ABD AL -QADIR Abd al-Rahman				
Min. of Culture	Mahar Dill i al-HADITHI				
Min. of Defense	Abd al-Qadir Muhammad al-MUFRIJI				
Min. of Displacement & Migration	Abd al-Samad SULTAN				
Min. of Education	Khudayr al-KHUZAI				
Min. of Electricity	Karim Wahid al-HASAN				
Min. of Environment	Nermin OTHMAN				
Min. of Finance	Bayan Baqir JABR Sulagh al -Zubay di				
Min. of Foreign Affairs	Hoshyar Mahmud ZEBARI				
Min. of Hea lth	Salih Mahdi Mutlab al-HASNAWI				
Min. of Higher Education	Abid Dhiyab al -UJAYLI				
Min. of Housing & Construction	Bayan DIZAYEE				
Min. of Human Rights	Wijdan Mikhail SALIM				
Min. of Industry & Minerals	Fawzi al -HARIRI				
Min. of Inte rior	Jawad Karim al-BULANI				
Min. of Justice	Dara NUR AL -DIN				
Min. of Labor & Social Affairs	Mahmud Muhammad Jaw ad al-RADI				
Min. of Municipalities & Public Works	Riyadh GHARIB				
Min. of Oil	Husayn al-SHAHRIST ANI				
Min. of Planning	Ali BA BAN				
Min. of Science & Technology	Raid Fahmi JAHID				
Min. of Trade					
Min. of Transportation	Amir Abd al-Jabar ISMAIL				
Min. of Water Resources	Latif R A SHID				
Min. of Youth & Sports	Jasim Muhammad JAFAR				
Min. of State for Civil Society Affairs	Thamir Jafar al-ZUBAYDI				
Min. of State for Council of Representatives Affairs	Safa al-Din al-SAFI				
Min. of State for Foreign Affairs	Muhammad Munajid al -DULAYMI				
Min. of State for National Dialogue	Akram al-HAKIM				
Min. of State for National Security	Shirwan al -WAILI				
Min. of State for Provinces	Khulud Sami Izara al -MAJUN				
Min. of State for Tourism & Antiquities	Qahtan Abbas al -JABBURI				
Min. of State for Women's Affairs (Acting)	Khulud Sami Izara al -MAJUN				
Min. of State Without Portfolio	Ali Muhammad AHMAD				
Min. of State Without Portfolio	Hasan Radhi Kazim al -SARI				
Min. of State Without Portfolio	Muhammad Abbas al -URAYBI				
Governor, Central Bank of Iraq	Sinan Muhammad Ridha al-SHABIBI				
Governor, Central Bankor Iraq Sinan Munamimad Ridna al-SHABIBI					

Source: CIA



Once a Government Exists Iraq: Key Challenges in 2010-2011

- Revitalize effort to develop effective the Iraqi security forces.
- Resolve the problems left over from the fact that the 2009 budget expired without funding a wide range of projects, deal with the deficit problems in the 2010 budget, and put the 2011 budget on a more stable path.
- Move towards an effective rule of civil law that adapts IraqÕsŅonfesson-basedÓ legal system; and find an effective balance between the judiciary and police
- Perform triage between the mix of Iraqi government projects and the results of US and other foreign aid efforts to ensure the best aid projects are effectively transferred and sustained..
- Find some compromise between Arab and Kurd that at least buys time for a broad, negotiated political settlement,.
- Find ways to ease the tensions between Arab Sunni and Arab Shi@te that were exacerbated by the election campaign and new de-Ba@thification efforts.
- Deal with the past failure to create effective programs to deal with internally displaced Iraqis and Iraqi refugeesoutside Iraq.
- More forward to ensure that the petroleum contracts signed in 2009 are fully supported by the new government.
- Make similar reforms to provide incentives for private and foreign investment that are competitive with those offered by other Gulf states.
- Define the practical relations Iraq will have with the United States as part of the Strategic Framework Agreement for both civil and military aid and relations before US forces fully withdraw, and in time to setclear goals for US aid funding to Iraq in the FY2012 budget.




Iraq: Key Challenges in 2012 and Beyond

- Complete the constitutional and legal basis for Arab and Kurdish political accommodation; move towards truly National Ótreatment of Sunni and ShiÕite.
- Stable planning and funding of economic and infrastructure development.
- Fully shift away from outside aid; create stable planning, spending, and control of budget without major deficits.
- Creation of jobs for steadily growing population. Rise in per capita income from 160th to Gulf standards, better distribution of income.
- Structural reform of agriculture
- Long-term solutions to water problems.
- Conversion-modernization-privatization of state industries.
- Full legislation and liberalization to attract foreign and domestic investment.
- Reconstruction and modernization of upstream and downstream petroleum sector; pipelines and Gulf facilities; stable Iraqi-foreign company partnership.
- Make Ministries effective; revitalize health and education sectors.
- Deal with foreign refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Shift and downsizing of Iraqi military from counterinsurgency to deterrence and defence against foreign threats.
- Shift of police and security forces from counterinsurgency to rule of law; checks on corruption and organization crime.



Iraq: Underlying Challenges to Security and Stability





Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges -- Pre Census "Guesstimates"


- ◆Sectarian Challenges
 •Iraq: 60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other
- ◆Ethnic Challenges
 •Iraq: Arab 75-82%, Kurdish 13-20%, Turcoman,
 Assyrian & Other 3%
- ◆ Tribal Challenges
 •Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.



Sectarian Violence and the Insurgency: Casualties and Emigration



Who Has Been the Target: 2007-2009



1 person represents 100 deaths.




Deaths in Iraq, 2007 – July 2010

	Shiite	Sunni	Kurd	IND*	UNKN	Iraqi Sec. Forces	US/Coalit. Forces	Iraqi Government	Monthly/Annual Totals
2007 Total	2575	549	675	391	342	649	182	117	5480
2008 Total	566	413	25	542	285	364	50	61	2306
2009 Total	833	206	128	516	130	190	19	36	2058
January (2010)	0	0	0	49	1	13	0	13	76
February (2010)	112	0	0	2	0	9	0	9	132
March (2010)	11	16	0	90	0	21	0	0	138
April (2010)	89	5	0	56	3	3	0	0	156
May (2010)	117	0	2	25	6	10	0	0	160
June (2010)	4	17	0	44	11	21	2	0	99
July (2010)	104	45	0	11	4	15	0	4	183
2010 Total	333	38	2	266	21	77	2	22	761

Source: The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, July 28, 2010.



Iraq: The Overall Displaced Persons Challenge




Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009. Pp 80-81.



The Internal Displaced Persons Problem






Source: Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "IDPs in Iraq by District January 2010," www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F0048E3B1/(httpinfoFiles)/
A1F617996D005FF7C12576A900385588/5file/iraq_unhcr_idps-by-district_jan10.pdf, accessed 3/5/2010.


Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 84

FACTORS AFFECTING IDP DECISIONS TO STAY PUT OR RELOCATE





Reasons IDPs Said They Chose To Return



Note: Survey respondents were allowed to select more than one reason; therefore, percentages do not add to 100%.


Sources: International Rescue Committee, "A Tough Road Home: Uprooted Iraqis in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq," 2/2010, p. 7; Norwegian Refugee Council, International Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Patterns of Return and Resettlement," 3/1/2010, http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(http://countries)/718916EEB6743EEF802570A7004CB9B9? OpenDocument&expand=118link=23.11&count=10000#23.11, accessed 3/5/2010.

Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, April 2010. p. 86



Ethnic Divisions and the Kurdish Issue


Iraqi Ethnic Divisions



Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09




Iraq: National Unity




Source: SIGIR Quarterly Report, January 30, 2010, p. 73



Iraq: "The Kurdish Issue"



Iraq-Kurd Disputed Territory



Source: USCENTCOM 9.28.09



Other Key Iraq Updates

Security

- Reduction in size of Army bases from 500 to 126 aim is to be at 94 by September 1, 2010
- Currently 88,000 troops on the ground aim is to be at 50,000 by September 1, 2010
- Moved 18,000 vehicles out of Iraq, and more than 600,000 containers
- US has picked up or Killed 34 of the 42 top AQ in Iraq officials. AQ in Iraq has lost contact with AQSL (Al-Q'aida Senior Leadership) in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- All of this is a result of the mixed efforts of the US troops along with Iraqi military and law enforcement efforts.
- Iraq continues to face frequent bomb attacks suicide or remote detonated. Two car bombs exploded in the holy Shiite city of Karbala. The explosion killed 22 people and wounded 54 others. Another car bomb exploded outside the offices of Al Arabiya in Bagdad killing four people and wounding ten others. (Source:
 - http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/07/2010726172923823721.html, July 26, 2010)

Economy

- Iraq's Real Gross GDP estimated at 4.3% due to falling oil prices and global economic downturn
- Irag's Presidency Council ratified a \$73.26 billion budget for 2010. 23.5% increase from 2009
- Extended Natural Gas negotiations with Royal Dutch Shell for an additional 6 months
- Electricity production rises 14% since 2009
- Iraq and Iran are setting the stage for economic cooperation particularly in the fields of electricity and oil. (Source: http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=223680, July 26, 2010)

Funding

- The US, GOI, and International community have committed \$162.83 billion towards Iraq's Reconstruction efforts.
- The US has appropriated \$53.31 billion towards these efforts through four major funds ISFF, IRRF, ESF, CERP
- Congress has also allocated \$6.10 billion towards smaller reconstruction initiatives
- The International Community has appropriated \$18.10 billion
 - Administration has requested an additional \$4.45 billion
- The Government of Iraq (GOI) has committed \$91.43 billion
- The U.S. Defense Department is unable to account for 95% of the Iraqi oil money tapped by the U.S. for rebuilding Iraq. (Source: http://goshennews.com/breakingnews/x2105968819/U-S-cant-account-for-8-9-billion-sent-to-Iraq, July 27, 2010)