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Shaping the War in Afghanistan: The Situation in the Spring of 2010

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in Strategy

April 29, 2010

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Where We Stand and How We Got There

“The insurgency is confident “...Winning a War of Political Attrition by Reducing International Support

Most Likely


- Goal: Maintain pressure, enable ISAF withdrawal, population centric approach
- Operations:
 - Contest ISAF presence, create opportunity for ISAF withdrawal of forces
 - Steadily increase violence, sustain high profile attacks in urban areas
 - Contest ISAF / GIRoA in north and west
 - Consolidate influence in areas they dominate, accommodate ISAF supporters who shift sides
- Impact:
 - ISAF/ANSF able to secure population centers
 - Reduced international support for Afghanistan
 - Growing popular apathy toward GIRoA
 - Reduced support for ANSF
 - Ethnic fissures exacerbated, but militia remain focused on the insurgency

Most Dangerous

- Goal: Increase pressure, seek to destroy ISAF, punish population
- Operations:
 - More aggressively contest ISAF, inflict casualties if forces withdraw
 - Significantly increase high profile attacks in urban areas
 - Foster ethnic rivalries in north and west
 - Impose TB Sharia in areas they dominate, punish ISAF supporters
- Impact:
 - Reduced security in population centers
 - Significant loss of international support
 - Open popular frustration with GIRoA
 - Popular enmity toward ANSF
 - Open fighting between ethnic groups, drawing in regional benefactors

... looking toward post-ISAF Afghanistan.

The War Escalates: 2004-2009




“Time is Running Out...”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces

Kinetic Events by Geography



01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05




01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07




01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09


Kinetic Events by Week and Type



- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09)




The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009



PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):
 Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
 Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)


- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation , training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Where the Fighting Is: 2009



Casualties at End-2009


CIVILIAN CASUALTIES



Note: Casualties reported from 9/21/2009 to 12/27/2009.


Source: UC, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/21/2010;
CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 1/4/2010.


TOTAL CASUALTIES BY MONTH, JULY-DECEMBER 2009



In 2009, the number of civilian casualties was the highest since 2001, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). UNAMA recorded 2,412 deaths in 2009, a 14% increase from the 2,118 deaths recorded in 2008. Of all civilian deaths reported by UNAMA in 2009, 67% were attributed to anti-government elements and 25% to pro-government forces. The remaining 8% could not be attributed to either category because some civilians were killed in cross-fire or when unexploded ordnance detonates.


Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: 2009

-  **RED:** Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace **95 Total**
-  **Orange:** Insurgents have demonstrated capability **97 Total**
-  **Yellow:** Insurgents have limited capability **162 Total**
-  **White:** Not able to assess **45 Total**




Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.

Going South & Aiding the Taliban: Opium Poppy Cultivation Trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)




Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC

Area under Poppy Cultivation (ha) and Potential Production of Opium (mt) 2001-2008



Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)


Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)



Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2009, UNODC.


Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC

Security Incidents from Poppy Eradication



How IEDs Became the “Stingers” of this Afghan War


IED Attacks: 2007-2009




Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data through 09 December, as of 13 December 2009 reporting.

Steadily Increasing Size of Charges

**IED Main Charge Weight
May 2008**




**IED Main Charge Weight
Dec 2009**




- Percentage of IEDs with charge weights over 25 lbs has dramatically increased
- Trend of increasing charge size is an effort by INS to provide a low-cost method of attempting to defeat friendly force armor technology
- The IED is the weapon of choice for the Taleban (akin to the surface to air missile system for the mujahideen)

IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009




Afghanistan - IED Incidents by Province (Mar 2010)

● March 2010 IED Incidents




Province	IEDs
Helmand	522
Kandahar	132
Khowst	59
Uruzgan	43
Ghazni	36
Other	195

March 2010 IED Incidents




This slide shows the 5 provinces with the most IED activity during March 2010, which accounted for 80% of the IED activity in Afghanistan.



*Lack of ISAF and Aid Donor Unity
of Effort is Another Key “Threat”*


Deteriorating Afghan Support for ISAF

How would you rate ISAF in Afghanistan?



- 36,2% negative: 14.7% had a very low opinion of ISAF; 18.8% had a bad opinion
- 29.3% of Afghans had a very good or good opinion of ISAF; down from 39.5% in 2008.
- 34.4 % had a neutral opinion.

ISAF Regional Commands






No Room for Caveats: National Commitments in April 2010

46 Troop Contributing Nations ISAF Total Strength: approx 102,500 27 Provincial

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)




	Albania	250		Germany	4665		Poland	2515
	Armenia	40		Greece	70		Portugal	105
	Australia	1550		Hungary	335		Romania	1010
	Austria	3		Iceland	4		Singapore	40
	Azerbaijan	90		Ireland	7		Slovakia	230
	Belgium	590		Italy	3300		Slovenia	75
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	10		Jordan	6		Spain	1270
	Bulgaria	525		Republic of Korea	0		Sweden	485
	Canada	2830		Latvia	115		The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	215
	Croatia	280		Lithuania	145		Turkey	1795
	Czech Republic	460		Luxembourg	9		Ukraine	10
	Denmark	750		Mongolia	40		United Arab Emirates	25
	Estonia	155		Montenegro	30		United Kingdom	9500
	Finland	100		Netherlands	1885		United States	62415
	France	3750		New Zealand	225			
	Georgia	175		Norway	470		Total	102554

The Problem of “Stand Aside” Forces: ISAF Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: April 10, 2010



4,715 of 16,515 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011


ISAF and the US vs. the Taliban



just 38 percent rate the work of the United States in Afghanistan positively – up 6 points in the past year, but far below its peak, 68 percent, in 2005. (NATO’s ratings are as low, and flat.) Fifty-one percent have a favorable view of the United States overall – vastly below its high point, 83 percent, in 2005. And U.S. favorability drops to 35 percent in the East and 29 percent in the South (vs. 59 percent in the rest of the country) – again, plummeting where the United States is most actively engaged in combat.



While its performance is rated poorly, most Afghans nonetheless see a need for the United States’ presence in Afghanistan – a view probably informed by very broad rejection of the likely alternative, the Taliban. As noted, more than two-thirds of Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces in their country, slightly up from last year although still below its peak. (Most Afghans last year opposed a troop increase in the abstract; the shift from those views to support for Obama’s surge is mirrored in U.S. public opinion as well.)

UN Estimates that NATO/ISAF is Responsible for Far Smaller Percent of Civilian Deaths



Source: UN and NATO/ISAF as reported by ABC News, 11.1.2010.

But Perceptions Differ on Air Strikes and Where Offensives Have Not Brought Lasting Security



There clearly are many other remaining challenges for Afghanistan and its Western allies alike. In addition to their weak overall ratings and the issue of civilian casualties, 40 percent say U.S. or NATO forces have a strong presence in their area – up 6 points from a year ago, but well below its peak. And just under half, 48 percent, are confident in the ability of these Western forces to provide security and stability – again up a bit, but far below its level in 2006, 67 percent.


Strikingly, just 42 percent in the South and East support the presence of U.S. forces in their area, compared with 78 percent in the rest of the country. Positive ratings of the U.S. performance dive to 16 percent in the South and 28 percent in the East, vs. 45 percent in the rest of the country. And just 26 percent in these two regions are confident in the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to provide security, compared with 56 percent elsewhere.

More generally, support for the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is 18 points higher among people who rate their local security positively, 26 points higher where reports of violence are lower and also 26 points higher where there's no coalition bombing reported. Similarly, where the presence of U.S. and NATO forces is seen as strong, 67 percent report confidence in the ability of these forces to provide security, 73 percent rate their performance positively and fewer blame Kabul or the West for the country's violence.


...more Afghans also say the United States and NATO are doing worse, not better, in avoiding civilian casualties, by 43-24 percent. This may reflect dismay over widely publicized individual incidents, such as the bombing of a pair of hijacked fuel tankers in September that killed scores of civilians in Kunduz province. It's another measure the allies want to move their way if their basic support is to rise.

Civilian Casualties Remain a Critical Problem Although Insurgents Account for 80%: 10/09 to 3/10

Killed



Wounded



*A Population-Centric Strategy in
Response: “Shape, clear, Hold,
Build, and Transfer”*

Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transfer

- Shape:** Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.
- Clear:** Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;
- Hold:** Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,
- Build:** Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.
- Transfer:** Shift responsibility and activity to Afghan government, ANSF, and Afghan people.

Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

- *Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.*
 - *Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.*
 - *Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).*
 - *Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.*
 - *Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.*
 - *Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF's formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.*
-

Afghanistan as A Host Country

- **Can influence, but not transform.**
- **Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.**
- **Need host country forces to become the face of operations as quickly as possible.**
- **Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.**
- **Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.**
- **Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.**
- **Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.**

*Shape:
Refocusing the ISAF and Afghan
Government Response to Focus on
80 Key Districts*

Shape


In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and the economic status of a given area.

- Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.**
- Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.**


Priorities for Shaping Operations in Afghanistan

- Combined IJC and Afghan Government planning teams identified 80 districts as key terrain.
- Key terrain is defined in military terms as those areas that afford a marked advantage to whichever party controls them, are those districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world.
- These districts roughly follow the line of Highways 1, 4, and 7 through the most densely populated portions of the country.
- Supplementing the 80 Key Terrain districts are an additional 41 districts identified as areas of interest. In general these are districts that for a variety of reasons exert influence on Key Terrain districts to a degree that renders it necessary to focus information collection and operational resources upon them to support operations in the Key Terrain districts.
- Focus on these 121 districts does not imply that what happens in the rest of the country is unimportant, but it does indicate that the focus of the IJC operations is concentrated in those areas that have been identified by combined Afghan and ISAF planning efforts as the most critical to success. Operational assessment necessarily focuses upon these areas.
- Population sympathizes with the Afghan government in 24% (29 of 121) districts.
- ISAF is working closely with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community to coordinate and synchronize governance and development in the 48 focus districts prioritized for 2010.


Population Density of Afghanistan




Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005-2009




Security Incidents 01 Jan 05 – 15 Sep 05



Security Incidents 01 Jan 09 – 15 Sep 09



Security Incidents 01 Jan 07 – 15 Sep 07




Sources: Afghanistan JOINS NATO SIGACTS data.


Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan




Trends in Kinetic Events: 12-07 to 3/10



•Violence is sharply above the seasonal average for the previous year an 87% increase from February 2009 to March 2010 - partly due to mild winter, and partly due to operations in Helmand and preparation for operations in Kandahar



IED Events Continue to Rise: 10/09 to 3/10




- IED attacks and associated casualties decreased compared to the last reporting period but were still high compared to the same period of the previous year. IEDs continue to cause the most civilian and military casualties.

- IED events increased markedly in 2009. The overall number of events was two times higher in December 2009 compared to 2008. This increase led to an increase in the total number of casualties by 55%, with a 123% increase in international partner casualties.


- January to March 2010 saw a 16% increase in IED use, mainly caused by central Helmand operations where insurgents prepared an IED-based defense.

Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

Support for Afghan Government




Comparative Security



Uncertain Afghan Perceptions of Security

How is the security situation in your mantaqa?



•Although widespread insurgent influence remains, a high percentage (84%) of Afghans feel that security is either good or fair in their *mantaqa* (area).

•Additionally, 44% of respondents rated security as good.


•However, a decline in Afghan perceptions toward ISAF has been evident over the last quarter.

•In December 2009, the perception of ISAF improved from the post-election lows of September 2009.

•However, in March 2010, perceptions dropped again. The very good rating has reached its lowest point since polling began in September 2008.


•29% of Afghans had a very good or good opinion of ISAF with an additional 34% reporting a neutral rating.

ISAF Concept of Operations: April 2010




Afghan Popular Trust in the Afghan Government in RC East: April 2010


(Green is highest level of trust)



Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar



Afghan-Pakistan Military Operations: March 2010




Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation's history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.

Criteria for Assessing Districts


Color Code	Governance	Development	Security	Overall
Green	Full Authority	Sustainable Development	Secure Environment	Population supports Afghan Government
Blue	Emerging	Dependent Growth	Occasional Threats	Population Sympathizes with Afghan Government
Yellow		Minimal Growth	Frequent Threats	Population Neutral
Gray	Dysfunctional	Stalled Growth	Dangerous Environment	Population Sympathizes with Insurgency
Red	Nonexistent	Population at Risk	Insecure Environment	Population Supports Insurgency

District Assessment Model



District Assessment

(Overall assessment based on **Governance, Development, Security**)



* An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas; or areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.

Defining Key Districts

- **Key Terrain:**

- The combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) or the insurgents, to include:

- Population centers
 - Commerce routes
 - Production areas
 - Border crossing points

- **Area of Interest:**


- The 41 Area of Interest Districts represent a second tier of districts representing combination of a concentrated population and physical infrastructure that the control of, and support from, provides a marked advantage to either the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) or the insurgents.

- Operationally, these are districts where deliberate comprehensive Governance, Development, and Security activities are not planned but where they are occurring or are planned to occur, such as districts which correspond to national and sub-national efforts to develop Government, Development and Security, including Focused District Development (FDD) process, District Delivery, District Support Teams (DSTs), and districts of concern for Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). These districts are generally adjacent to Key Terrain Districts or have a direct influence on activities in the key terrain.

- **White Areas:**

- An area outside the key terrain, activity tracked but not formally assessed: Afghan efforts with international assistance are likely to be successful in these areas
 - Areas where insufficient data available for complete assessment.

Overall District Assessments



Population actively supporting Govt and Security Forces

Population sympathizing w/ Govt and Security Forces



Population neutral/on the fence

Population sympathizing with Insurgents


Population actively supporting Insurgency

Not Assessed*

National Trends in Violence: 2007-2009



Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts



Clear:
Creating the New Security
Capabilities Needed to Provide
Lasting Security


Clear

In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.

ISAF will focus on 80 of 364 districts in 2010. Has not identified the districts, but are key population centers.

ANSF Force Levels and Goals: 2009-2013



ISAF and DoD FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010,
p. 40.

The Insurgency Reaches a Crisis: 2005-2009


- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive
- Insurgent strength is enabled by GIRoA weakness
- International support for development has not met population's expectations
- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency
- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters

Rising Pace of Kinetic Events



01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05



01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07




01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09



In COIN, catch up ball does not work

Building on a Small Core of ANA Forces




In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations


ANA and ANP Casualties: 2007-2009

ANA



From September 21 to December 27, 2009, there were 238 ANA casualties, according to IJC: 173 soldiers wounded in action and 65 killed in action. The number of ANA casualties decreased by 46% from the preceding quarter. The greatest number of casualties occurred in Helmand.


ANP




From September 21 to December 27, 2009, there were 258 ANP casualties, according to IJC: 155 personnel wounded in action and 103 killed in action. Total ANP casualties decreased by 52% from the preceding quarter. Casualties were concentrated in the southern provinces. The greatest number of casualties occurred in Helmand.

ANA and ANP Equipment

ANA EQUIPMENT



ANP EQUIPMENT



From October 1 to December 31, 2009, the ANA fielded 1,791 radios, 980 vehicles, and 15,097 weapons), according to CSTC-A. The only weapons that the ANA procured this quarter were 12,305 M16A4 rifles. The largest difference in equipment fielded was the number of weapons, which was more than seven times as many as last quarter. The ANP fielded 309 radios, 520 vehicles, and 1,257 weapons, according to CSTC-A. The only ANP procurements this quarter were 1,515 AK-47 assault rifles and 395 light tactical vehicles.

ANSF Force Goals for Beginning of Transfer in October 2011

- ANSF Growth and Development
 - ANP: 134k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
 - ANA: 171.6k, delivered at CM-2, balanced against operational requirements
 - ANAAC: 5.7k end strength, operating at CM-2, integrated C2 system, balanced against operational requirements; CM-1 by 2016
 - ANSF medical system at CM-3, with growth to CM-1 by 2020
 - Systems: Enduring Afghan operated and sustained systems (*Capability in terms of DOTMLPF, objective proficiency and other applicable measures*)
 - Education & Training at CM-2; Logistics at CM-2; C4I at CM-2; Personnel at CM-2
 - Recruiting and Training Commands
 - ANAREC at CM-2
 - ANPREC at CM-2
 - ANATC at CM-2
 - ANPTC at CM-2
 - Infrastructure
 - ANA at CM2: 75% in Permanent Facilities
25% in Temporary Facilities (for no more than one winter)
 - ANP at CM2: 60% in Permanent Facilities
40% in Temporary Facilities

MoD & MoI Goals for Beginning of Transfer in October 2011

GIRoA

- ONSC coordinating cross-ministerial issues
- MoD at CM-1
- MoI at CM-1


Leader Development

- Annual attrition goals achieved: ANA 14%, ANP 16%
- NCO and Officer positions filled to at least 85%
- Recruiting systems are established to sustain ANSF force levels and enable future growth if required
- ANA/ANP have achieved 70% approval ratings


Information Engagement

- Ministries and ANSF IE at CM-2
- Ministries and ANSF IE plan present and effective with objectives met

Afghan National Army Trained and Assigned January 2007-November 2008




US ETT Personnel Required and Assigned August 2007-2013




ISAF OMLTs

June 2007-2013



The Afghan National Army is Growing In Strength



ANA Recruiting, Retention, and Ethnic Balance are Improving

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	42%	41%	8%	4%	5%
NCO	46%	36%	10%	4%	3%
Soldier	38%	31%	14%	10%	7%
Total Force	41%	34%	12%	8%	5%


In late May 2009, the MoD reported that the ANA end-strength was 89,521 and as of late March 2010, ANA end-strength had grown to 112,779, which is slightly above its March 2010 goal of 112,700.

- Recruiting within the ANA has largely exceeded goals between October 2009 and March 2010, and in several months the ANA recruited more personnel than they could train.
- Retention within the ANA (defined as the ability to re-contract ANSF personnel) has also been strong as the ANA exceeded its goal of 60% retention for each of the past six months.
- Attrition (defined as the unplanned loss of ANSF personnel), still remains a problem as the ANA has failed to meet desired goals over the last six months.
- Absent without leave (AWOL) personnel remain a significant contributor to attrition rates, with the percentages growing over the past year from six percent in May 2009 to a high of 12% in November 2009. For the last twelve months, AWOL has averaged nine percent.
- NTM-A and the MoD anticipate pay raises, instituted in December 2009, and other initiatives to provide better equipment (including up-armored vehicles and crew-served weapons), will improve attrition rates.


Afghan National Police Trained and Assigned January 2007-November 2008



PMTs, US Personnel Required and Assigned June 2007 – November 2008



So is the Afghan National Police (ANP)



Growth in ANP Manning by Element

	AUP			ANCOP(G)			ABP			Special Police	ANP Total		
	Goal	Asgn	% Asgn	Goal	Asgn	% Asgn	Goal	Asgn	% Asgn		Goal	Asgn	% Asgn
May-09		51,763			2,709			12,967		14,808		82,247	
Jun-09		54,005			2,890			12,867		15,185		84,947	
Jul-09		59,677			3,211			12,945		14,246		90,079	
Aug-09	62,034	60,512	97.5%	5,365	3,056	57.0%	17,621	13,817	78.4%	14,744	96,800	92,129	95.2%
Sep-09	62,114	61,122	96.4%	5,365	3,455	64.4%	17,621	13,815	78.4%	14,952	96,800	93,344	96.4%
Oct-09	63,724	63,841	100.2%	5,400	3,284	60.8%	17,400	12,826	73.7%	13,858	96,800	93,809	96.9%
Nov-09	62,229	62,934	101.1%	5,400	3,431	63.5%	17,400	12,800	73.6%	15,793	96,800	94,958	98.1%
Dec-09	62,229	63,945	102.8%	5,400	3,226	59.7%	17,400	13,117	75.4%	16,089	96,800	96,377	99.6%
Jan-10	62,229	64,724	104.0%	3,870	3,269	84.5%	13,698	13,235	96.6%	17,037	96,792	98,265	101.5%
Feb-10	62,114	64,221	103.4%	5,365	4,941	92.1%	17,482	13,729	78.5%	16,686	97,589	99,577	97.6%
Mar-10	62,114	65,499	105.4%	5,365	5,802	108.1%	17,482	13,912	79.6%	16,925	99,261	102,138	102.9%

•By December 2009, the ANP achieved their 2009 growth objective of an additional 14,800 police; however, there were insufficient numbers of police to achieve security for the August 20, 2009 election

•The JCMB agreed to immediately increase the end-strength of ANP in Kabul and ten high-threat districts by 14,800 personnel prior to the election. The Mol was able to recruit only 9,800 prior to the election and failed to ensure they all completed basic training on time. Due to the compressed time period available to train these police, 6,900 attended three weeks of the eight-week training program prior to the election and 2,900 received no training. After the election, a plan was implemented to ensure these police completed the entire eight-week program with the first class in September 2009. They are projected to be complete by July 2010.

•In January 2010, the JCMB, the international community, and the U.S. Government agreed to the Afghan proposal to grow the ANP to 109,000 by October 2010 and 134,000 by October 2011.

Hold:
*Establishing Government, a Rule of
Law, and a Broader Definition of
Security*

Hold


In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.


Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.

Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat



The Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue



In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives --a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded "yes" This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.


Afghan Expectations Are More Positive

“...the latest poll by ABC News, the BBC and ARD German TV finds that sharply more Afghans now see the Taliban as the main source of their country’s strife, while many fewer blame the United States or its allies – significant progress in a central aim of the new commander of U.S. and NATO forces, Gen. Stanley McChrystal.

Another, basic change is larger still: After steep declines in recent years there’s been a 30-point advance in views that the country is headed in the right direction; 70 percent now say so, the most since 2005. Afghans’ expectations that their own lives will be better a year from now have jumped by 20 points, to 71 percent, a new high. And there’s been a 14-point rise in expectations that the next generation will have a better life, to 61 percent.

Many challenges remain. Complaints about official corruption are higher than ever. Views of the United States and NATO’s performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai’s honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.”

...There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views.



But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Another result on security points the same way. In 2005, 72 percent of Afghans rated their personal security from crime and violence positively. A year ago that fell to 55 percent. Today it’s still at 55 percent – stabilized, at least, but still well below its best, or where millions of Afghans clearly want it to be.

Afghans’ better hopes for the future, as noted, could also reflect hopes that the renewed Western commitment will ultimately resolve their country’s strife. Moreover, in addition to the U.S./NATO efforts, this poll find a 12-point rise in confidence in local commanders and their militia to provide security – a result that may reflect efforts by some local militia, called *arbakai*, to oppose the Taliban.


Afghan's Still Support Their Government and the ANSF, and the US/ISAF Rating Has Improved

Views of the United States and NATO's performance remain poor, with six in 10 rating their work negatively. And accounts of local violence have held steady, with many Afghans still blaming allied forces for civilian casualties. All these raise the question of whether the overall improvements can hold as Hamid Karzai's honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.

There also are significant regional differences. Support for U.S. and NATO efforts are sharply lower in the South and East, where the fighting is heaviest. Local support for the Taliban rises to 27 percent on its home turf, in the country's Southwest, vs. 10 percent in the rest of the country. And views of the country's direction are markedly less bright in some high-conflict areas, such as Helmand, heart of the opium poppy trade.

Critical from the U.S. perspective is that, despite poor views of its performance, 68 percent of Afghans continue to support the presence of U.S. forces in their country – and nearly as many, 61 percent, favor the coming surge of Western troops initiated by President Obama. But support for the surge drops to 42 percent in the South and East; support for the presence of U.S. forces also drops in these regions, and support for attacks on U.S. and NATO forces, while sharply down overall, remains much higher in the restive South. honeymoon fades and the fighting continues.


...Support for the planned increase in U.S. and NATO forces is accompanied by majority belief the United States will accomplish the goals set out by Obama – for example, training Afghan forces to take over security, strengthening the Kabul



government, preventing the Taliban from retaking control, preventing al Qaeda from re-establishing a base of operation and reducing corruption. But fewer, ranging from 22 to 33 percent, are very confident these will happen.

The commitment expressed by the planned surge may be another factor bolstering public hopes. There are, in any case, other signs of improved views of the West: There's been a 14-point gain from last year, to 83 percent, in the view among Afghans that it was right for the United States to invade and overthrow the Taliban just more than eight years ago. And the number of Afghans who say attacking Western forces can be justified has dropped sharply, from 25 percent a year ago to 8 percent, a new low. (It jumps to 22 percent in the South – but that's half of what it was there a year ago.)


UNDOC Estimate of Opium Growing Levels in 2010



According to the UNODC, there is a strong correlation between insurgency and cultivation. The UNODC Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey indicates that almost 80% of villages with very poor security conditions grew poppy, while poppy grows in only 7% of villages unaffected by violence.

Counternarcotics Strategy is Changing to Emphasize a Focus on Traffickers

Narcotics and Precursor Chemical
Seizures in Kilograms, October 1, 2009-
March 31 2010



The U.S. CN Strategy is closely aligned with four Afghan national CN priorities as laid out in its National Drug Control Strategy:

- Disrupt the drug trade by targeting traffickers and their backers;
- Strengthen and diversify legal rural livelihoods;
- Reduce the demand for illicit drugs and treatment of problem users; and
- Develop state institutions at the central and provincial levels vital to delivery of Afghanistan's CN strategy.

The U.S. Government continues to support the Afghan Government's eight-pillar National Drug Control Strategy, which includes international and regional cooperation, institution building, demand reduction, public awareness, alternative livelihoods, interdiction, justice sector reform, and eradication.

Build:
*Providing the Economic Dimension
of Security and Effective and
Popular Governance*


Build

In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.


The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.

Development and Build” are Equal Challenges:



Afghan Macroeconomics Do nothing More Than Mislead: War Creates a Growing Gross Domestic Product (Licit): 2002-2008



United Nations Development Assistance (UNDAF) Development Report

About eighty percent of Afghanistan's population lives in rural areas. A significant proportion is poor and lacks adequate and secure sources of livelihoods. The situation has worsened as a result of the global food price crisis and recurring food shortages. The country's long-term stability and prosperity hinge on expanding the agricultural sector, improving natural resource management and increasing options for people in rural areas to make a living. The Government's long-term vision is to ensure the social and economic well-being of these communities, especially the poor and vulnerable among them.

Afghanistan's livelihood base of agriculture and natural resources has been depleted by a combination of factors including violent conflict; the absence of an enabling environment for the private sector; and poor management of natural resources, especially land. Frequent natural disasters are matched by limited and even declining capability to manage such disasters. Social cohesion and the sense of community have been undermined by mass displacement and migration, population growth and a lack of resources.

Dependence on World Food Programme: 2010

•In 2009, WFP fed a total of approximately 9 million vulnerable Afghans. (30%+)

•This included the provision of 51,370 metric tons of food assistance to nearly 1.4 million Afghans, including 325,400 people affected by localized emergencies such as the spring floods.

• In close cooperation with UNHCR, it also assisted 118,800 internally displaced persons and 43,600 returnees.

• Although the winter has been mild, humanitarian agencies had developed winter-preparedness plans as part of each regional humanitarian contingency plan. The World Food Programme (WFP) pre-positioned to remote areas some 28,760 metric tons of food to support 803,715 beneficiaries. This was complemented by non-food items distributed by UNHCR to more than 200,000 vulnerable displaced persons.

•The new, more focused Humanitarian Action Plan for 2010 was launched in January. Although the Plan has yet to receive funding this year, it was well noted at the London Conference, and efforts are ongoing to engage a wide spectrum of donors active in Afghanistan.


World Food Programmed Estimate of Afghan Needs

- 7.4 million people – nearly a third of the population – are unable to get enough food to live active, healthy lives. Another 8.5 million people, or 37 percent, are on the borderline of food insecurity.
- Around 400,000 people each year are seriously affected by natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, earthquakes or extreme weather conditions.
- While life expectancy has increased slightly to 44.5 years for men and 44 for women, many of the country's health indicators are alarming. Along with a high infant mortality rate, Afghanistan suffers from one of the highest levels of maternal mortality in the world (1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births).
- More than half of children under the age of five are malnourished, and micronutrient deficiencies (particularly iodine and iron) are widespread. (39% are underweight.)
- In 2008, Afghanistan was hit by both drought and globally high food prices, which saw the price of wheat and wheat products increase dramatically across the country. Despite prices beginning to fall in 2009, they remain higher than normal.
- Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Insurgent activity and military operations have affected food security in some regions, undermined reconstruction efforts and restricted humanitarian interventions.
- Environmental degradation a severe problem. War, uncontrolled grazing, pastureland encroachment, illegal logging and the loss of forest and grass cover have worsened drought conditions and reduced agricultural productivity.

Afghan Agriculture

- **Climate:** Arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers
- **Terrain:** Mostly rugged mountains; plains in north and southwest
- **Arable Land:** 12.13%
- **Permanent Crops:** 0.21%
- **Other:** 87.7% (2005)
- **Irrigated land:** 27,200 square kilometers out of 652,230. (2003)
- **Total renewable water resources:** 65 cubic kilometers (1997)
- **Freshwater withdrawal (domestic/industrial/agricultural):**
 - total: 23.26 cu km/yr (2%/0%/98%)
 - per capita: 779 cu m/yr (2000)
- **Food production:** Opium, hashish, wheat, rice, barley, pulses, oilseeds, fruits, nuts, vegetables, sheep. (leather)
- **Annual harvest:** 4.8 million metric tones of cereals (estimated)
- **Agricultural production (47.2% of GDP, WFP):** 47.2 (31% CIA)
- **78.6% of active labor force is involved in agriculture, but unemployment is at least 35%**
- **36% of population is below poverty line**
- **Annual per capita income is \$800. (219th in the world)**

Corruption is a Critical Issue



Internally, ...corruption is a very prominent threat to hopes for progress. Nearly all Afghans – 95 percent – now say official corruption is a problem in their area, up 23 points since 2007. Seventy-six percent say it’s a big problem; both are new highs.

Outside their immediate area, 90 percent see official corruption as a problem at the provincial level, and 83 percent call it a problem in the national government in Kabul – both vast numbers – with nearly two-thirds saying it’s a big problem at both these levels of government.

But, Governance is Less of a Problem in Afghan Eyes


Given the continued challenges, a fundamental question is what's behind the improvements in Afghans' attitudes about their country's direction and leadership. The answer appears to be a variety of elements rather than one silver bullet.

As noted, relief in the election's end is a strong factor; the promise of stability can be appealing, fears of civil unrest after the disputed election were not realized and Karzai's endorsement by several of his leading opponents may have carried weight.

Karzai may also be experiencing a typical winner's rally, often seen in U.S. elections; indeed, beyond presidential approval, Americans' views of the United States' direction improved after Obama's election – in still-challenging times – just as they've now soared in Afghanistan. A question is to what extent support may fade (as has Obama's), especially if Karzai's campaign promises are unmet.

ELECTION – On the Afghan election itself, this poll finds majority suspicion of fraud in voting and vote counting alike – 56 and 60 percent, respectively, think these occurred. But far fewer (three in 10) see it as widespread fraud; 82 percent express confidence that “a system of freely voting for leaders” will work in Afghanistan; and 75 percent say they're satisfied with the election'.

Positive views of the election are a clear factor in Afghans' brighter hopes for the future; among those who say they're satisfied with the outcome, 78 percent say the country's headed in the right direction; among those who are dissatisfied this dives to 45 percent.



Positive views of the country's direction likewise are dramatically higher among people who are confident democracy can work in Afghanistan, as well as among those who rate Karzai's performance positively. Those who suspect widespread fraud, on the other hand, are considerably less sanguine about the country's direction overall.

Karzai, for his part, is not immune from the country's geographical divisions. His performance rating drops to 40 percent in Helmand vs. 72 percent in the rest of the country. And underscoring the impact of development, his rating is 18 points higher in areas where people give a positive rating to the availability of jobs and economic opportunity.

Another result on elections may not be one that Western governments would prefer: Forty-three percent of Afghans say their preferred form of government is an Islamic state, rather than a democracy (32 percent) or strongman rule (23 percent). Support for an Islamic state spikes to 56 percent in the East, bordering Pakistan's tribal areas. But elsewhere such views have changed; in Iraq, support for democracy ultimately soared after a series of successful elections.


Views of Economy & Development Offer Hope for “Build”

Economic and development advances are additional factors. After long delay, there are positive reports of development in this impoverished country. Fifty-five percent of Afghans now say they have electricity, up 15 points since 2007. From its low in 2007, there’s been a 24-point gain in the number who rate their electrical supply positively – albeit just to 38 percent, indicating the continued need to develop power supply and delivery.

Fifty-six percent report new or rebuilt roads in their area in the past five years, up 21 points from 2007; the number who rate their local infrastructure positively has more than doubled since first measured in 2005. While access to medical care remains a problem, half report new or rebuilt health clinics, up 13 points from 2007. And, in a largely rural nation with heavy reliance on subsistence farming, positive ratings of support for agriculture – availability of seed, fertilizer and equipment – is up by 9 points in the past year, albeit just to 45 percent.

On the economy, while affordability of food and fuel remain significant problems, 45 percent of Afghans rate the national economy positively, up 12 points from a year ago. Fewer, 39 percent, rate their own financial situation positively, but that too is up, by 7 points. The availability of jobs and economic opportunities is still a challenge, rated positively by just four in 10, but that’s up by 11 points in the past year.

Part of the improvement in economic attitudes may reflect aspirations; the Karzai government has announced a plan to raise teachers’ salaries, encouraging some speculation that other public sector raises – army, police – may follow. Again, if they don’t, positive views could be at risk



In one sign of consumer advances – small in the grand scheme, but potentially powerful in its personal impact – the number of Afghans who report having a cell phone in their household has essentially doubled since 2005, from 31 percent then to 60 percent now

There’s also a continued sense that, whatever the problems, living conditions are better now than they were under the Taliban – 70 percent say so. Two-thirds also say the rights of women have improved; six in 10 report greater freedom to express political views. But fewer than half report better economic opportunities or security from crime and violence than in the Taliban days, underscoring these continued challenges.

Conditions of Life

Poverty and Unemployment

Poverty Levels and Unemployment, September 2008

Unemployment Rate	40 percent
Population below the poverty line	53 percent

Communications

Wireless phone subscriber and landlines, September 2008

Wireless phone subscribers	6,536,830
Landlines	45,668 (2001: 15,000)

Energy

Installed Electrical Generation Capacity, September 2008

Installed Electrical Capacity	754MW (2001: 430MW)
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Conditions of Life (continued)

Transportation

Kilometers of road and percentage of the Ring Road complete, September 2008

Roads Built (USAID only)	2,700km
Percentage of Ring Road complete	73 percent

Health

Access to the Basic Package of Health Services, Trained Healthcare personnel, and Clinics constructed or rehabilitated, September 2008


Percentage of population with access to the BPHS	80 percent
USAID Trained health care workers	10,600
Clinics constructed/rehabilitated by USAID	670

Education


Students enrolled in School, Percentage Female Students, and School Constructed or Rebuilt, September 2008

Students enrolled in school	6,000,000
Percentage of female students	33 percent
Schools constructed or rebuilt by USAID	680

Population Growth: 1950-2020



Demographic Pyramid in 2010



International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan

	(\$ in millions)
Britain	2,897
World Bank	2,803
Asia Development Bank	2,200
Japan	1,900
European Commission (EC)	1,768
Netherlands	1,697
Canada	1,479
India	1,200
Iran	1,164
Germany	1,108
Norway	977
Denmark	683
Italy	637
Saudi Arabia	533
Total Non-U.S. Pledges (including donors not listed)	25,800 (includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report, p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over \$500 million total.

A “Coalition of National Branding and the Uncoordinated:” Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

Key Facts:

- Commander: General (USA) Stanley A. McChrystal
- 43 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 71,030
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command Capital: (appx ISAF strength 6,130)

- HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
- HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
- KAIA (ESP)

Regional Command South: (appx ISAF strength 36,500)

- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command West: (appx ISAF strength 4,400)

- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (appx ISAF strength 5,700)

- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (appx ISAF strength 18,300)

- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOST (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

US Funds Supporting Afghanistan Reconstruction Efforts (\$Billions)



ASFF: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program

ESF: Economic Support Fund

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement


Other: Other Funding

Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ^a DoJ, DoD, DoS, Treasury, USDA, USAID, and other agencies.


Sources: OMB, response to SIGAR vetting, 1/21/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2010; DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2010, 1/12/2010, 1/6/2010, 10/14/2009 (preliminary numbers), and 10/1/2009; FY 2010 DoD Appropriations Act Explanatory Statement; USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010, 1/8/2010, and 10/9/2009; DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 1/8/2010 and 10/16/2009; DoT, response to SIGAR data call, 1/6/2010; DoJ, response to SIGAR data call, 7/7/2009; USDA, response to SIGAR data call, 4/2009.

International Funding

ARTF CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 2009, AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009 (IN MILLIONS)




LOTFA CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 2009 (IN MILLIONS)




US Funding Trends

APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, AMOUNT, AND PERCENTAGE (\$ BILLIONS)



CUMULATIVE APPROPRIATIONS BY FUNDING CATEGORY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009 (\$ BILLIONS)



ESF Funds


**Appropriations by Fiscal Year
(\$Billions)**



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by USAID for FY 2002–2009.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/21/2010.

**Cumulative Comparison
(\$Billions)**




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Sources: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 1/15/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/21/2010.

CERP FUNDS


**Appropriations by Fiscal Year
(\$Millions)**



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by DoD for FY 2004–2009.

Sources: House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, "Division A, DoD Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2010," p. 405; DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 1/13/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/21/2010.

**Cumulative Comparison
(\$Billions)**



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) and amounts reported as provided by DoD except as specified. Updated data from DoD resulted in a lower obligation figure than that reported as of 9/30/09.

Sources: House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, "Division A, DoD Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2010," p. 405; DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 10/14/2009 and 1/13/2010; OMB, response to SIGAR data call, 1/21/2010.

The US Civilian “Surge” is Having an Impact

The United States leads 13 of 27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.

- U.S. civilians are posted to all 13 U.S.-led PRTs and to 13 of the 14 PRTs led by our international partners.
- U.S. civilians staff District Support Teams (DSTs) in 32 of ISAF’s 48 focus districts (18 in RC-East, 13 in RC-South, and one in RC-West).
- An additional eight DSTs are scheduled to come into operation in 2010.

Since January 2009, the number of U.S. civilians operating in Afghanistan has tripled. As of April 1, 2010, there are over 1,000 civilians in country.

- During this same time, U.S. civilian presence in the field outside Kabul, has more than quadrupled, from 67 to over 350.
- The majority of new civilian personnel were deployed to RC-South and RC- East. Embassy Kabul has requested an additional 20%-30% increase in civilian staff levels by the end of 2010.

Key initiatives are:

- Increasing significantly the number of civilian technical advisers in key line ministries in the provinces and district centers;
- Implementing a new civil-military agriculture redevelopment strategy to deprive the insurgency of new recruits and income from the narcotics trade;
- Expanding sub-national capacity building efforts through new civil-military initiatives, such as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams;
- Facilitating the re-emergence of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms while strengthening the formal justice system;
- Targeting drug traffickers and their networks, instead of targeting poor farmers through eradication;
- Supporting Afghan Government efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system; and
- Designing a new communications strategy to counter al Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, while delivering media and other resources to the Afghans to enable them to shape their own political narrative.

*Transfer:
Conducting a Responsible
Withdrawal?

Or, A Premature Cut and Run?*

Transfer

No clear definition as yet, but “transfer” is to begin by mid 2011.

- **Afghan government will remain dependent on US and outside financial aid indefinitely into the future -- probably through 2021 and beyond.**
- **US military advisors talk about doubling (and largely funding) the ANA and ANP, but Presidential approval is uncertain and force expansion is to be assessed annually.**
- **US military advisors call for real partnership with Afghan forces, but it is unclear if this can be implemented before 2011, must less fully prepare for transfer before 2014.**
- **No clear plan for increasing Afghan governance capacity or economic support and development.**

Success requires the US to address all six centers of gravity in the war.

The US must have truly integrated civil military efforts.

And, there is Pakistan...

Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

- **Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.**
- **Promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.**
- **Develop increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.**
- **Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.**
- **Restructure the UN, allied, NGO, and the international community efforts to actively address these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.**

Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

- 1) Securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and**
- 2) Training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.**

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.
