



US WITHDRAWAL AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES:

The Need for Continuing Aid

By

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

And

Adam Mausner
Research Associate, CSIS

12. The Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Military Forces

The security arena will face the most drastic changes in U.S.-Iraqi strategic relations over the next two years. Iraq must assume all responsibility for its internal and external security once the United States withdraws by December 31, 2011, unless it invokes the terms of the Strategic Agreement to seek additional US aid. Iraq must both deal with its own insurgents and with problems in its relations with neighboring countries like Iran, Syria, and the Gulf states. This makes the continued improvement of all elements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) vital both to Iraq and to the stability of the region, during the period of US withdrawal in 2010-2011 and in the years that follow.

Iraq has already assumed greater responsibility in such efforts, but it will need US advice and aid through at least 2014, and US support at a lower level for many years in the future. There will also be a serious gap between the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2011, and the development of Iraqi capabilities for external defense. Iraq is in a rough neighborhood, and the brief takeover by Iran of an inoperative oil well in Fakka, just inside Iraq on the disputed Iran-Iraq border may be indicative of the future Iraq will face after 2011.¹ Iraq simply will not be able to defend itself militarily for several years. Accordingly, building the right kind of US support for the ISF will be one of the most critical aspects of a US-Iraqi strategic partnership.

Shaping Iraqi Forces

Fortunately, there is much to build upon. **Figure 12.1** provides an estimate of the comparative strength of US and Iraqi forces in Iraq at the end of September 2009. These force levels are in constant fluctuation, however, and estimates differ in detail. MNSTC-I estimated that the ISF had over 645,000 authorized personnel, and some 662,874 assigned personnel as of September 30, 2009.² It also estimated that there were another 17,000 Iraqis in the Facilities Protection Services—including the security forces of other ministries—many of which were being transferred to the Ministry of Defense. These totals make the ISF one of the nation's largest employers, as well as one of the most expensive items in its limited budget.

The key components of the ISF come under the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The forces under the MoD had approximately 250,000 personnel authorized and over 225,000 assigned in September 2009. It had 198,633 men in the Army, 46,038 more in Army Training and Support Forces, 3,332 in the Air Force, and 2,595 in the Navy.³ As of December 2009, ISF force strength in the MoI, MoD, and Iraqi National Counter-Terrorist Force had a total assigned strength of 660,334 personnel.⁴

¹ Alaaldin , Ranj “Iran's mini-incursion into Iraq.” *The Guardian*. December 21, 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/21/iran-incursion-iraq-oil-field>

² Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) briefing of November 6, 2009.

³ Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) briefing of November 6, 2009.

⁴ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), January 31, 2010, p. 43.

As of April, 2009, USF-I reported that the assigned strength of the ISF had grown to 663,515 – in spite of the manpower freeze discussed later in this chapter – and the number of Iraqis in the Facilities Protection Services that were not included in these totals was actually 90,000. The forces under the MoD had approximately 246,000 personnel assigned, with 192,687 men in the Army, 45,323 more in Army Training and Support Forces, 5,167 in the Air Force, and 2,605 in the Navy.⁵ There is no way to compare these totals accurately to the reporting by MNSTC-I. After more than half a decade, there is still no consistent reporting on even the most basic manpower data, and no reporting at all on actual force strength – particularly data reflecting real world attrition and AWOL rates, and on leave data.

The Forces Under the Ministry of Defense

The MoD is developing a total of 14 Army divisions (13 infantry and one mechanized) and support forces, a Navy of 3,800 personnel, including two marine battalions, and an Air Force of 6,000 personnel. The MoD is developing logistics units and enabling capabilities for tactical units, such as engineer, bomb disposal, medical evacuation, signal, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets.⁶ There is also an Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force (INCTF), with 4,025 men in Special Operations, which reports directly to the Prime Minister as part of Iraq's COIN effort. Some reports indicate that the INCTF had a projected end-strength of 9,200 as of late 2009.

There have, however, been problems and delays in the ISF development efforts. Iraq's budget crisis forced both the MoI and MoD to impose a hiring freeze throughout 2009. According to the DoD, the MoD faced serious budget constraints, logistical and sustainment shortfalls, a recruiting shortfall, and a shortage of mid-grade leadership among officers and noncommissioned officers. The MoI was still able to improve its training capacity, but it also suffered from budget shortfalls and generally poor facilities.⁷

The MoD has been under a 253,000 personnel hiring freeze limitation imposed by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), but its impact is uncertain. The MoD has approximately 322,000 approved positions against which almost 271,000 personnel are allocated pay.⁸ The MoD has also had ambitious plans for further force expansion and the procurement of modern weapons. These goals would have raised the total strength of the ISF to 646,000 by 2010 if they had been fully funded, but the budget crisis in 2009 has made

⁵ USF-I, April 2010..

⁶ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), January 31, 2010, p. 43.

⁷ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), January 31, 2010, p. 43.

⁸ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010) p. 55.

such plans highly uncertain.⁹

US experts cite three main challenges to Iraq's force development efforts: First, a sharply constrained government budget; second, serious force quality problems in readiness, leadership, combat enablers, and limited sustainment/logistics capabilities; and third, a lack of strategic planning, budgeting, and acquisition process. They note, however, that there are initiatives to improve prioritized force generation and modernization, to create special Ministerial and force capabilities, to improve professionalization, to improve the border force, and to improve the quality of the police, and to give such projects a much higher priority -- if Iraq can get the necessary funds, as well as outside training and expertise.

The Changing Role of Outside Advisors

This raises a fourth challenge: finding the best way in which the United States can continue to provide Iraq with the support it needs. Both Iraq and the US now face serious challenges in ensuring that Iraq gets the degree of outside advice and support it needs.

Several important changes have already taken place. MNSTC-I reported in November 2009 that all MNF-I combat operations in Iraq were now being conducted with the IA, in accordance with the Security Agreement. It also reported that the ISF were almost fully in the lead for operations in areas of Iraq that were generally secure and had a low threat of violence. In other areas where the threat required major operations, Coalition forces took a larger role in partnering with the ISF to conduct clear, hold, and build-type operations.¹⁰

On January 1, 2010, MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I merged staffs to become USF-I. The USF-I Deputy Command General for Advising and Training (DCG (A&T)) assumed the roles and mission of MNSTC-I. DCG (A&T) will continue to advise, assist, and train the ISF until US forces' end of mission on December 31, 2011. In addition, the duties of the Multi-National Security Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) were transferred to two organizations. The first organization was the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) which was founded as part of a reorganization of MNSTC-I in June 2009. The second was the Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM)—“an enabling agency that facilitates procurement of equipment, services, and training (formerly the Security Assistance Office).¹¹

MNSTC-I had been the US and Coalition advisory body that has supported the development of the ISF. Its role has already been reshaped by the fact that Allied forces have left Iraq and that US forces withdrew from urban areas and villages on June 30, 2009, in compliance with the Security Agreement. An even more sweeping change of

⁹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 40.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252) (Dated June 2009, but issued in August.)

¹¹ <http://www.atsqol.org/Multi-National-Security-Transition-Command---Iraq.html>

mission will take place on August 31, 2010, which marks the end of US combat operations in advance of the departure of US forces and end of mission on 31 Dec 2011.

SIGIR describes this process as follows,¹²

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was established on June 28, 2004, to direct and support training and equipping the ISF. On December 31, 2009, MNSTC-I is scheduled to formally conclude its mission. As currently planned, the Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM) and the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) will assume MNSTC-I's duties by the end of the year.

ISAM will be the operational center of the U.S. Embassy's Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). ITAM will eventually transfer the police-training mission to the Department of State (DoS); the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will assume full responsibility for training Iraqi police.

In May 2009, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced the formation of the first Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs), which will deploy to southern Iraq this year. The AAB is specifically designed to enhance interagency reconstruction and stability operations. Pre-deployment training for soldiers assigned to AABs emphasizes civil affairs, city management, and border security, in addition to traditional combat operations. The AAB slated for southern Iraq will have the primary mission of supporting the PRTs and helping to train the ISF. DoD reports that at least six AABs are in the pipeline.

SIGIR reported in January 2010 that the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) had given priority to developing minimal essential capabilities within the Iraqi security ministries by December 31, 2011, and emphasizing capabilities in the MoI and MoD to enhance coordination and information sharing. The ITAM reported that the ISF still had to overcome significant challenges in developing self-sustaining capacity in its combined forces. These included:¹³

- A constrained budget.
- Limited combat specialization and sustainment/logistics capacity.
- Absence of strategic planning, budgeting, and acquisition processes.

The key ITAM initiatives to address these challenges were reported to include, “a prioritized force-generation and modernization program, a movement to professionalization (supported by specialized ministerial and force capabilities), and a focus on police primacy and border enforcement.”¹⁴

The Overall Pace of Iraq Progress to Date

General Odierno described the progress of the ISF as follows in testimony to the House Armed Service Committee on September 30, 2009:¹⁵

... I remain confident that the Iraqi Security Forces continue to learn, improve and adjust. After the 19 August attacks, the GoI responded promptly and effectively. They reassessed security

¹² SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semi-Annual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 July 2009, p. 9

¹³ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), January 31, 2010, pp. 43-44.

¹⁴ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), January 31, 2010, pp. 43-44.

¹⁵ OSD Public Affairs, September 30, 2009.

measures, made adjustments and increased operations, aggressively enhancing security in the cities—all enabled by US forces. And they continue to reassess today. GoI leaders reinforced national unity, and the people responded. To date, the extremists' efforts to destabilize Iraq have failed, the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people have rejected extremism. We see no indications of a return to the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq in 2006-2007.

...Overall, the professionalism and operational effectiveness of the approximately 663,000- strong Iraqi Security Forces—including 245,000 Soldiers and over 407,000 Police—continue to improve, thus bolstering public confidence and trust in the ISF. Supported by US forces, the ISF recently provided safe and secure environments for two mass Shiite pilgrimages in July and August in which millions of pilgrims participated. Iraqis are beginning to share more information with security forces who are also conducting more active patrolling resulting in an increasing number of weapon caches found ...You can honestly feel a difference amongst the people in Baghdad and around the large majority of Iraq.

The Iraqi Army and Federal Police continue to improve counter-insurgency implementation, planning and execution. In some cases, police primacy has been established in the cities, but this is still a work in progress. The NATO-Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) continues to focus on institutional training for the Iraqi Security Forces, enhancing their long-term professionalism. Although small, improvement continues in logistics and the sharing and integration of intelligence and operations. Their regional Operations Centers and Provincial Joint Coordination Centers continue to improve.

The Iraqi Security Forces are now in the lead across the entire country, with US forces advising, assisting and enabling operations in the cities and providing full-spectrum partnership outside the cities. The ISF are conducting more and more precision intelligence-driven operations, most of which are unilateral, US-enabled operations, relying on US intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), communications, aviation, and logistical support. We are seeing improved integration of GoI Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and US technical intelligence. Outside the cities, ISF continue a combination of independent, US-enabled and US-partnered full spectrum operations.

In addition, we continue to see great strides in GoI counter-terrorism operations. In May we began national, integrated operations with the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, facilitated by the Iraqi Operations Coordination Group (IOCG)—a standing Iraqi interagency organization—collocated with US counter-terrorism forces.

Every day we conduct jointly planned and executed counter-terrorism operations—with increasing tempo and results. I believe that by 2011, the Government of Iraq will have a national counter-terrorism force capable of dealing with a variety of extremist threats.

...Since 2006, we have systemically decreased the number of foreign fighters entering Iraq and significantly reduced Al Qa'ida in Iraq to a small ideological core that recruits disenfranchised Iraqis and criminals. In the north, AQI and some remnants of Sunni insurgent groups continue in their attempt to reestablish a foothold with the objective of expanding back into Anbar and Baghdad.

We are working with the Iraqi Security Forces to establish a defense in depth across Iraq. With the ISF in the cities and US forces conducting partnered, full spectrum operations in the surrounding belts and borders to deny extremist safe havens and reduce the flow of foreign fighters and lethal aid into Iraq, we believe the ISF will develop the capacity to conduct internal and basic external defense over the next two and one half years as we continue to drawdown our forces.

Progress, however, does not mean that the ISF will have the overall mix of capabilities they will need once US forces fully withdraw, nor that they can acquire such capabilities for several years after 2011. As General Odierno also noted,¹⁶

... Despite their increased capacity and progress in providing security, the Iraqi Security Forces continue to face shortcomings and budget constraints, due in part to declining oil revenues that affect their current and future operational capacity including logistical support across the ministries. We continue to assist and advise the Ministries of Defense and Interior as they prioritize their minimum essential capabilities for a foundational defense capability—land, sea and air—before the withdrawal of US forces in December 2011. Critical gaps remain in controlling and protecting Iraqi ground airspace and territorial waters.

¹⁶ OSD Public Affairs, September 30, 2009.

Figure 12.1: US and Iraqi Security Forces in Iraq as of September 30, 2009

SERVICE		ASSIGNED PERSONNEL	TREND	STATUS
U.S. Forces		120,000	↓	Drawdown continues—100,000 by end of 2009
Private Security Contractors ^a		25,500	↓	DoD continues to reduce the number of contracted security personnel
Iraqi Security Forces				
Ministry of Defense ^b	Iraqi Army (IA)	218,300	↑	All combat operations now conducted with the IA
	Training and Support	23,452	—	Implementing a training assessment program and generating a new Training Assessment Manual
	Air Force	2,100	↑	Developing Airmen cadre; foundational capability expected by 12/2010
	Navy	1,900	—	Initiatives underway to counter 2009 budgetary constraints
	Total MOD	245,752	↑	
Ministry of Interior ^b	Iraqi Police	292,400	↑	Continues to work toward independent force management
	Iraqi Federal Police	53,200	↑	Renamed this quarter from National Police
	Border Enforcement	42,431	—	Preparing for the drawdown of U.S. forces
	Oil Police	29,411	—	Budgetary constraints keep hiring freeze in place
	Facility Protection Service (FPS) ^c	90,000	↑	Pending reform legislation to make FPS a formal department under MOI
	Total MOI	507,442	↑	
Counter-Terrorism	Special Operations	4,160	—	Pending CoR reform legislation to become a new Iraqi ministry
ISF Total		757,354	↑	
Grand Total		902,854	↑	

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, p. 47.

The Budget Crisis and Iraqi Security Forces

Money is – and will remain -- a critical issue. Iraq's budget crisis has had a major impact on Iraq's force development plans and has increased the need for extended US aid. In late 2008, the Iraqi security forces were still planned for the major expansion shown in **Figure 12.2**, as well as for major investments in equipment and facilities. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense had also developed ambitious plans to convert the Iraqi armed forces from a counterinsurgency force to one that could defend Iraq against threats from Iraq's neighbors, and the Ministry of Interior plans to create and expand a much wider range of specialized police functions.

For the reasons discussed earlier, however, the MoI and MoD faced serious budget constraints in 2009, which interacted with the sharp cuts in US aid shown in **Figure 12.3**. These financial problems led to a budget-driven hiring freeze that limited the expansion of Iraqi forces, and left Iraq with the need to decide what to do with an additional group of 100,000+ personnel in the Ministry of Oil and other elements of the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), in addition to a large number of private security guards. Furthermore, the budget shortfall resulted in cuts in other areas, including weapons procurement, operations, and maintenance funds.

The MoD's Budget Problems

The MoD and MoI had to make these cutbacks because so much of the ISF budget had to be devoted to salaries and personnel costs, and the Iraqi government had very limited discretion over its national security spending. The Ministry of Defense's 2009 budget was approximately \$4.1 billion, down from an initial forecast of \$4.9 billion. Salaries and life support -- which are non-discretionary expenditures -- comprised about \$2.9 billion, or 71% of the total budget. This left about \$370 million for goods and services (O&M, in US terms), \$470 million for non-financial assets (procurement, in US terms), \$270 million for infrastructure (new construction), and \$6 million for other expenditures.

The Department of Defense warned in January 2010 that these problems were having a critical impact on MoD capabilities,¹⁷

The MoI has demonstrated an improved ability to obligate its budget. The MoD also shows improvements but continues to struggle, particularly in the areas of support, sustainment and infrastructure projects. Budget coordination between MoD and the MoF remains problematic because of inadequate automation and cumbersome manual processes. In light of the GoI's inability to achieve its oil revenue goals, which underpin the national budget, and the attendant decline in its cash reserves, MoI and MoD will at best realize limited funding increases over the next few years.

From January through December 2008, the MoD executed \$2.9 billion of its \$5.2 billion budget (55%). The major challenge facing the MoD in 2009 is a limited budget of \$4.21 billion, as opposed to the \$8 billion requirement. Although this amount is sufficient to pay and feed personnel it will marginally sustain the current ground force and cannot support desired growth or infrastructure. Exacerbating the budget shortfall is the need to purchase logistics support and

¹⁷ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 55-56.

enabler unit equipment and associated sustainment costs. These requirements will constrain capital growth programs beyond 2009. In short, the economic downturn and concurrent drop in oil prices will drastically curtail the rate at which the ISF can achieve foundational capabilities, develop facilities, and purchase equipment.

... In August 2008, the MoD implemented a recruiting and hiring freeze for all positions. The following month, the MoF established a 253,000 personnel cap based on estimates of affordability related to the 2008 defense budget. Based on March 2009 pay data, the Iraqi Armed Forces, including military, civilians, and contractors, currently exceed the personnel cap by more than 13,000 positions.

Growing concerns with funding have resulted in a near stalemate of personnel actions affecting IqAF and IqN force generation. Significant shortages in key enlisted, NCO and junior officer positions are offset by large numbers of entry-level soldier. These imbalances, when combined with growing operational demands and the current Iraqi leave policy, affect the ability to conduct current operations and train and equip units.

...The MoD maintenance budget for 2009 is only \$8.5 million. A conservative estimate for sustainment maintenance alone is \$360 million. Until the MoD and the GoI make maintenance a priority, facilities will continue to deteriorate at a rapid rate.

... The MoD's budget for 2009 is \$4.12 billion with 71% of this amount in allocated for salaries (\$1.91 billion) and goods and services (\$1.41 billion) of which nearly \$1 billion is devoted to life support and self-reliance funding. High-value items such as vehicles, ships and aircraft (\$467 million), and infrastructure (\$267 million) account for the rest. From January through September 30, 2009, the MoD executed \$2.3 billion of its \$4.12 billion budget (56%).

The lack of required funding in support of the overall readiness of the ISF will continue to be a significant problem in the coming years. The MoD must re-evaluate security force requirements and identify gaps that emerge as U.S. forces drawdown, taking into account available funding. According to the U.S. Treasury Attaché and the Director General for Programs and Budget advisors, the MoD should incorporate multi-year budget planning that factors in the necessary operations and maintenance costs to man and sustain new equipment and long term support requirements. Given current and projected budget expenditures, the MoD may not be able to continue the expansion of the ISF and force modernization.

MoD budget execution also remains a problem, although it has improved significantly in recent years, and the budget crisis has compounded the MoD's problems in spending. DoD reports that, "The MoD shows improvement but continues to struggle, particularly in the areas of support, sustainment, and infrastructure projects. Inter-ministerial budget coordination between the MoD and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) remains problematic due to cumbersome analog procedures."¹⁸

This mix of budget and planning problems has had a major impact in slowing the development of Iraq's armed forces, although the full ramifications remain unclear. The MoD is still revising its spending goals, and has not yet developed a detailed and comprehensive plan, program, and budget for review.

Until the MoD budget is more stable, and develops more realistic plans, it will be impossible to assess how well it will shape future efforts and just how well it can provide

¹⁸ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 40

the minimum essential capabilities necessary to replace US forces. A number of efforts, however, have already been put on hold, including: the formation of a new 18th Division (four brigades), the formation of maneuver brigades for 6th, 12th, and 17th Divisions (three brigades), the formation of corps-level sustainment brigades, and the addition of more artillery components.¹⁹

These budget problems have also led to a significant drop in unit manning levels and led to cutbacks in other aspects of force expansion plans, rendering it unlikely that the ISF will have sufficient armor, air defense, air strike, naval, artillery, ISR, logistics, or procurement capabilities by 2011. For instance, the creation of a logistics depot in Najaf to supply forces in southern Iraq was put on hold due to budget constraints.²⁰ This was done even though problems affect virtually all Iraqi logistics systems, and virtually every level of ISF development.


¹⁹ Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) briefing of November 6, 2009; Elliot, D.J. "Iraqi Logistics and Training." *Montrose Toast*. August 25, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/26/>

²⁰ Elliot, D.J. "Iraqi Logistics and Training." *Montrose Toast*. August 25, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/26/>

Figure 12.2: Past Growth of the ISF and Planned Growth in Late 2008

Past Growth


ESTIMATED ISF FORCE STRENGTH, CUMULATIVE, BY QUARTER



Note: Cumulative number of Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, Iraqi Police, National Police, Border Enforcement, and Special Operations Personnel. June–September 2009 data are SIGIR estimates.


Sources: DoD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 7/2005, 10/2005, 2/2006, 5/2006, 8/2006, 11/2006, 3/2007, 6/2007, 9/2007, 12/2007, 3/2008, 6/2008, 9/2008, 12/2008; DoS, *Iraq Status Report*, 3/18/2009; OSD, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/14/2009 and 9/30/2009; Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, "The Status of Ongoing Efforts in Iraq," 9/30/2009.

Planned Growth (as of Late 2008)



Source: Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, p. 48; and MNSTC-I, September 2008.

Figure 12.3: Iraqi versus U.S. Funding of the Iraqi Security Forces



Source: MNSTC-I, September

The US and Coalition Response

U.S. advisors have had to recommend that the security ministries employ a set of priorities that focus their limited discretionary funds on the most critical needs. They are encouraging the Iraqis to focus first on sustaining operations and then on building foundational capabilities.²¹ Furthermore, they have urged the ministries to begin multi-year programming and budgeting based upon sound forecasting – although there is only a limited prospect that the MoD and MoI budgets will increase sharply in 2010 and 2011, or be large enough to allow either ministry to improve the quality and strength of the ISF – enough to compensate for the impact of a US withdrawal by the end of 2011.

In June 2009, MNSTC-I called for three critical improvements in the ISF to allow it to fully assume the role of Coalition forces that remain critical priorities:²²

- **Lead - Localized security - Aggressive growth of ISF**
 - Acceleration of COIN force.
 - Provide sufficient quantity of sufficiently capable military and police forces.
 - Begin to develop supporting capabilities
- **Partner - Sustainable security – Complete COIN Force; Rapid Growth of Supporting Capabilities:**
 - Complete ground COIN force
 - Accelerate supporting capabilities.
 - Continue professionalism.
- **Enable & Advice - Secure Stable State: Improve Capability in Police and Military Forces; Transition Security; Increase Ministerial Capacity:**
 - Transition to police security in cities.
 - Complete build up of supporting units.
 - Accelerate Air Force and Navy
 - Build Borders and POE capability
 - Bilateral operations
 - Continue professionalization

The new structure under USF-I set very similar goals in the spring of 2009, and also emphasized the importance of resource problems. It reported the force levels shown in **Figure 12.4**, and listed five additional challenges in ISF force development:

²¹ “Foundational capabilities” for the ground forces include combat support and combat service support units necessary to sustain and support the current force, which is focused on fighting the insurgency and maintaining security. For the Iraqi Air Force foundational capabilities include sustaining a helicopter fleet that supports counterinsurgency operations and building a training capability for a future fixed wing force. This capability will require the purchase of advanced fixed wing training aircraft (such as the T-6). The Navy’s foundational capability encompasses protecting its two oil platforms in the Gulf and providing basic Maritime Security. Key to these capabilities is the purchase of modern patrol boats.

²² MNSTC-I, briefing, June 3, 2009.

- Tight time limits to phase down the scale of the US advisory effort and make the transition to ISF replacement of all US combat forces by the end of 2011.
- Sharply constrained GoI budget.
- Immature strategic planning, budgeting, and acquisition processes
- Improving ministerial transparency.
- Limited combat enabler and sustainment/logistics capacity.

USF-I made it clear that many of these challenges would continue after full withdrawal of US forces in 2011. It summarized its key initiatives in improving the ISF before the end of 2011 as:

- Providing minimum essential capabilities for internal security/defense against external threats by end-2011
- Setting the conditions for Police Primacy in establishing the rule of law and internal security
- Expanding KRG-GoI security cooperation and integration
- Developing key specialized capabilities/ improving professionalization.

Figure 12.4: Iraqi Security Force Strength in February 2010

Assigned personnel as of February 28, 2010

Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces		Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces*	
Army	192,687	Iraqi Police Service (PS)	298,540
Army Training and Support Forces	45,323	Federal Police (FP)	43,511
Air Force	5,167	Border Enforcement	40,205
Navy	2,605	Oil Police	29,316
		Point of Entry Enforcement	2,041
Total	245,782	Total	413,613

* Does not include 90,000 personnel in MoI part of Facilities Protection Force
Source: USF-I, April 7, 2010.

Uncertain Leadership at the Top

Achieving these goals, and continuing to build up Iraqi forces in 2012 and beyond, will not be easy. Iraq faces a multitude of political, leadership, and resource problems. Control over the ISF, for example, was a major political issue in Iraq during 2008 and 2009. Prime Minister Maliki pushed hard to place his own officials and senior officers in key roles, often by giving them temporary appointments that bypassed the confirmation process and then keeping them in the role indefinitely. He pushed Kurdish, Sunni, and less loyal Shi'ite officers aside or removed them. At the same time, he stressed the readiness of the ISF to replace US forces, even when the ISF are not ready.

Maliki also removed security barriers more quickly in Baghdad after US forces withdrew in June than either senior Iraqi or US officers advised, and took other risks in an effort to

show that he was a strong leader in the run-up to the national elections. This undercut some operations – like the fight against insurgents in Ninewa – and made it easier for insurgents to carry out bombings in populated urban areas. In some cases, the Iraqi government limited the role American forces could play in cities – even in joint operations with Iraqis—although some of this independence was exaggerated for political reasons. This had additional negative effects on American intelligence-gathering capabilities.²³

Politics have also affected the development of the forces within the MoI. While Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadir al-Mufriji, is a technocrat who has stayed out of politics, the Minister of the Interior, Jawad al-Bulani, ran for the office of Prime Minister. This caused considerable friction between Maliki and Bulani, and led to efforts to remove Bulani from office – efforts which have affected the functioning of the MoI. In early September, 2009 Maliki also removed three high ranking MoI officials without any formal review or investigation, ostensibly in response to police failures in not stopping major bombing attacks in late August.²⁴

Strengths and Weaknesses in Iraqi Military Institution Building

The Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi military forces are still deeply involved in basic institution building, and need help in developing core competence in a number of areas. Interviews with Coalition experts produced a list of the following major weaknesses that the ISF still needed to overcome in November 2009 – a list that has been repeatedly reinforced in more current Department of Defense reports.²⁵

- Limited staff capability.
- Dysfunctional organization; analog.
- Centralized, deferential, and ground-centric culture. The Minister and senior officers do not delegate properly, and often bypass the chain of command and proper procedures – effectively administering “by cell phone.”
- Lack of effective budgetary programming.
- Need to increase Iraqi autonomy and confidence.
- Need to improve maintenance and sustainment capability.
- Need for continued focus on education, training, and promotion by merit.
- Need for accurate requirements determination
- Failure to synchronize the budget requests and ability to execute
- Need to set readiness goals and measure performance

²³ Sly, Liz. “U.S. Troops Cope With Iraq Rejection.” *Los Angeles Times*, September 7, 2009.

²⁴ Allam, Hannah. “Maliki Accused of Purging Rivals Before Election,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Sept. 9, 2009.

²⁵ See Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 43-68.

- Significant risk in readiness will exist once US forces withdraw unless there is an appropriate level of GoI investment in sustainment and corresponding ability to execute.

USF-I noted in reporting in April 2010 that some 7,000 Iraqi military and civilians had had professional development courses and instruction within the MoD. It also noted that the MoD had implemented inspection standards for military inspections, and was sharply improving its educational standards. It reported that the MoD was implementing a resource management program to emphasize professionalism and education, and was improving its Ministerial Training and Development Center (MTDC) and the Iraqi International Academy for regional security studies.

It also reported that the MoD and MoI had made the following accomplishments and were taking the following initiatives:

- Maintenance and supply infrastructure developed or developing on a reasonable timeline
- Initial spares sufficient at all levels
- Contractor logistics support/sustainment packages in place for key weapon systems
- IT infrastructure developing and generating limited visibility
- MoI planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation (PPBE) system has reached near-term maturity
- MoD PPBE multi-year development plan in place
- Development and institutionalization of ISF force structure logistics doctrine and requirements determination
- Development and institutionalization of effective ISF logistics planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
- Development and institutionalization of ISF readiness measurement and reporting

At the same time, it reported that much still needed to be done. The MoD remained a “paper driven Ministry” that made only limited use of the available information technology. It had only limited strategic planning and programming capability, and still retained the centralized approval authority that normally climbed to the Ministerial level. It also noted that the MoD operated in a climate of severe budget constraints that affect every aspect of Iraqi force development.

Looking Towards 2011 and Beyond

The ISF cannot deal with these challenges without substantial outside aid for at least the next half decade, and the US may very well lose the peace in Iraq if it does not face this fact and respond effectively. The US must develop an effective mix of security policies and operations that look far beyond 2011, rather than simply concentrating on “responsible” withdrawal.

While the ISF has made significant progress in its COIN capabilities and in many other areas, it is still very much a work in progress, and it is unlikely that all of these problems can be overcome before 2012. The ISF also remains a force with a divided military culture at a time when it is transitioning to full self-sufficiency. Some officers see the need for attention to issues like the prudent use of resources, proper operations and

maintenance, and effective sustainment. Some older officers still tend to assume that they will be given anything and everything they need. Key developments, like a shift to the use of modern, well-trained non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are making major progress, but require continuing aid and support. Support for modern, demanding training and merit-based promotion also remains an issue, as does honest reporting on readiness and manning levels.

The key questions shaping such a US effort are how much improvement Iraqi forces can make in their most critical areas over time, how much support the US can provide, and how much aid Iraqis are willing to accept.

Short-Term Priorities through End 2011

US and allied experts indicate that the various elements of the ISF urgently need advice, aid, and training to achieve the necessary “minimum essential capabilities” by December 31, 2011. This includes help in improving the planning, budgeting and execution process of the MoD and the MoI, all of which are key, along with broad improvements in training and in self-sustaining security capabilities. The equipment of Iraqi divisions will do little to give the ISF “minimum essential capabilities” if they are not properly trained.

Experts cite the following areas where improvements are necessary to achieve necessary “minimum essential capabilities:”

- Internal security capabilities**

- Tactical mobility of police forces
- Institutional/tactical support/sustainment
- Air support to maintaining stability and security
 - Ground tactical support units, fixed-wing airlift maintenance and support, airfield operations, and C2

- Basic ground self-defense against external aggression**

- Modernized and fully equip 1 mechanized division
- Fully equip 3 infantry divisions
- Provide various echelons above division sustainment and transportation units

- Initial air control / sovereignty**

- Air surveillance
- Initial air defense/protection

- Maritime security and defense of key infrastructure (oil platforms and ports)**

- Defense of port infrastructure

- Sustainment packages and training to support this force**

Figure 12.5 shows how these critical requirements divide out by ministry and service, and the range of improvements that must be made to ensure that the US can make a responsible withdrawal, and to ensure a reasonable degree of Iraqi security and stability. It reflects an MNSTC-I and US assessment of where Iraqi security forces and ministries


will be in relation to the “minimum essential capabilities” (MEC) they need by December 31, 2011.

Green means that the force/ministry will reach MEC. Yellow means that the US must allocate additional resources to achieve MEC by end of mission. Red means that the ISF cannot achieve MEC by December 31, 2011, and that the US must thus have a transition plan that includes a mitigation strategy to provide the capability (i.e. hand off to US Embassy, Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), etc.) beyond 2011 and which is consonant with a strategic partnership. The critical requirements list the highest priority avenues for resource allocation to affect MEC.

Priorities for 2012-2014 and Beyond

This, however, is only part of the story. It is extremely doubtful that Iraq can meet every MEC requirement by the end of 2011, and even then it will still be years away from having all of the capabilities it needs for internal security and to maintain a rule of law. It will be a decade away from having all of the capabilities it needs to deter foreign threats. No one can determine just how much US aid and advice it will need during the process, but it seems likely that such aid will have to be substantial through at least 2014, and continue indefinitely unless the Gulf and its surrounding area become far more stable and peaceful than they are today.

Figure 12.5: Critical ISF Requirements During 2009-2011
(USF-I plans as of March 21, 2010)



Source: USF-I, as of April 7, 2010.

The Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Military Forces

This means the US-Iraqi strategic partnership must focus on two broad aspects of the Iraqi Security Forces: The regular armed forces under the MoD and the security and police forces under the MoI. Responsibility for assisting the regular Iraqi forces will remain under the Department of Defense and MNF-I until withdrawal, and the Department will continue to staff and support such efforts as part of the US Embassy country team after all US forces withdraw in 2011.

The Size and Structure of Iraqi Military Forces

Figure 12.6 shows the level of development the Iraqi armed forces reached by mid-2009. The Department of Defense summarized the state of Iraqi armed forces in early 2010 as follows:

Iraqi Army (IA)

The IA currently has 13 infantry divisions and one partially mechanized division organized under the IGFC. Ground forces include 189 generated and trained IA battalions and 55 combat brigades (51 infantry brigades, 3 mechanized brigades, and 1 tank brigade) with a force generation focus on enabler units to complete the divisional force structure. In addition to the combat brigades, the MoD established two Presidential Protection Brigades, each with three battalions, to protect the President and Prime Minister, and 15 Independent Protection Battalions to provide security for the Council of Representatives and other Iraqi VIPs and visitors. The Baghdad Brigade, officially responsible for IZ security, has been reflagged as the 56th Brigade of the 6th IA Division for administrative purposes...

As of November 30, 2009, the IA was manned at 82% of its officers, 55% of its NCOs, with 85% of total MTOE numbers. The policy driven leave rate continued to be 25% of assigned personnel.

Iraqi Air Force (IqAF)

The IqAF is on the path to achieving foundational capability in all mission categories except airspace control (the key to air sovereignty) by the end of 2011. Accessions, airlift, training (flying and technical), air staff effectiveness, ground attack, combat support, and command and control should, with continued support from U.S. advisors and adequate resourcing from the GoI, achieve foundational capability which can demonstrably contribute to internal security while setting the stage for future growth to a full military capacity.

The IqAF added four aircraft to the fleet for a total of 98 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. The November 2009 Hellfire launch from an AC-208 gives the IqAF initial precision ground attack capability with Hellfire missiles (the IqAF possess three AC-208 aircraft and 19 Hellfire missiles). Additional capability with the Directional Attack Guided Rocket (DAGR) on three Mi-17 helicopters is scheduled for summer 2010. The IqAF's inexperience in acquisition and the GoI budget forecast continue to make procurement a challenge, complicated by a requirement by the Defense Minister to make most acquisition decisions. Decision points to procure the necessary equipment to establish airspace control are rapidly approaching.

The new timeline resulting from the current Security Agreement required a reassessment of strategy for control of Iraq's skies. Starting in December 2009, and throughout 2010, several key decisions will need to be made cooperatively by the USG and GoI; these decisions will lay the path to air sovereignty for the IqAF. If the need for additional capabilities and equipment is determined, the process must start soon. The IqAF currently has 197 pilots (fixed and rotary-wing) with another 139 in the training pipeline.

...the IqAF currently has only two controllers against a requirement of 48, and the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority has eight controllers (with 39 recently-hired trainees) to fill a requirement of

160. Also, severe shortage of mid-career officers continues to be of special interest. Over 50% of pilots and 30% of ground officers will reach retirement age before 2020, and those remaining lack flying experience. These numbers point to a pending shortage of senior IqAF leaders in ten years. Only 103 of the 2,400 former Iraqi military members evaluated were returned to active duty. Finally, the IqAF must identify mid-career officers with potential to serve in the highest ranks and guide them through rigorous professional military development.

Iraqi Navy (IqN)

With the acquisition of new vessels, a comprehensive infrastructure build program for the Naval Base and an increase in training capacity brought about by an increase in the number of personnel supporting the training mission, the IqN is on track to achieve its short and medium term transition milestones. On its current trajectory, IqN progress will achieve minimum essential capability and allow for the withdrawal of advisory forces in accordance with the timelines set by the Security Agreement.

With the last two of four Italian-built patrol ships due for delivery by early 2010, and FMS contracts signed for the delivery of 15 Patrol Boats and two Offshore Support Vessels for delivery in 2010 and 2011, the IqN is on track for the acquisition of a modern capability. With the fleet of modern Fast Assault Boats Iraq is acquiring, the IqN and IqM will be properly equipped to deliver maritime security by the end of December 31, 2011.

Owing to MoD budgetary constraints, IqN accessions have been put on hold and the IqN estimates that it will not be able to access new Sailors until 2010. Achieving the IqN target of 2,900 personnel by the end of 2010 may not be possible.

Throughout this period, the IqM has seen its ranks improve significantly. Additional Marine recruits are expected to be transferred from the IA by the end of 2009 to bring the IqM to full strength, and a brigade commander was assigned in September 2009 to provide the necessary leadership in establishing a small brigade headquarters at Camp Bucca.

Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Force (INCTF)

The CTC is the operational HQ for combating terrorism in Iraq. CTC exercises C2 of ISOF units that execute combat operations. On July 1, 2009, the CTS established the 2nd ISOF Brigade HQ to improve span of control of ISOF. Both the 1st and 2nd Brigades conduct tactical operations in conjunction with U.S. advisors. These units are also capable of conducting limited unilateral operations. The 1st ISOF Brigade is composed of five battalions: the 1st Battalion (Bn) (Commando); 2nd Bn, which is designated the ICTF (Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force); 3rd Bn (Support); 4th Bn (RECCE); and 5th Bn, which operates the Iraqi Special Warfare Center and School (ISWCS).

Unfortunately, a GoI hiring freeze affecting all ISF prevents INCTF from adding new ISOF soldiers to fully man the ISOF brigades. Approximately 1,000 graduates of the Assessment and Selection Course are required to fully man each of the two Brigades. Potential ISOF soldiers must be assessed, trained, and equipped before they can be integrated into the force. Given known difficulties in obtaining support from the MoD for ammunition, equipment, and pay for the trainees—as well as the time, money and throughput issues inherent in executing the three core ISWCS courses—growing the force will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future.

Key Challenges

These forces have already assumed much of the day-to-day security role in Iraq, and the Ministry of Defense is making progress in improving its planning, command, and control capabilities, as well as in its plans for the creation of a more effective Joint Headquarters. As the Department of Defense reported in October, 2009 and January, 2010, however, the

MoD and Iraqi forces still face numerous challenges – many of which affect MoI forces.²⁶ These challenges include:

- ...Lack of a sustainment-funding plan and a centralized decision-making process continue to inhibit MoD force improvements. The Minister of Defense still reviews almost all procurement and maintenance funding decisions and approves most equipment purchases.
- Growing concerns with funding have resulted in personnel not being paid and stagnant personnel actions. Significant shortages in key enlisted, NCO, and junior officer positions are offset by excessive numbers of entry-level soldiers. These imbalances, when combined with growing operational demands and the current Iraqi leave policy, affect the ability to conduct current operations and to train and equip units simultaneously.
- Serious problems still exist in budgeting, planning, and acquisition management, defense policies and plans. MoD leadership often disregards the requirements generated by its subordinate staffs and is resistant to tying capability requirements to national security documents. The linkage among capability requirements, strength levels, equipment purchasing, and budgeting is marginal.
- The MoD's acquisition branches are marginally developing the capacity to routinely acquire the goods and services necessary to sustain and modernize the IJF. Responsibility for authorizing relatively low-level acquisitions, such as routine replacement of spare parts, requires decision approval by general officers. The lack of a multi-year acquisition strategy, weak requirements determination, late release of requirements funding, overly centralized decision-making authority, inadequately trained and inexperienced staff, and insufficient use of
- The MoD still does not place a priority on facilities sustainment and recapitalization. The MoD maintenance budget for 2009 is only \$8.5 million. A conservative estimate for sustainment maintenance alone is \$360 million. Until the MoD and the GoI make maintenance a priority, facilities will continue to deteriorate at a rapid rate.
- Logistics and sustainability capabilities are weak at best and often fall far short of minimal essential levels. It will be several years before these problems can be corrected.
- Approximately 40% of civilian positions across the MoD remain unfilled.
- Despite the JHQ's progress, the Iraqi national security C2 architecture continues to be poorly defined and overly centralized, which inhibits planning, decision making, and the ability to execute coordinated operations at all levels.
- The MoD is still working to develop plans to revise and fill the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) positions with capable employees and to develop and execute a veterans program and improve the retirement process.
- The payroll feature remains the MoD's number one priority...However, the MoD must continue to use the functioning paper-based system for at least three more years.
- As of July 2009, there are more than 1,300 MoD detainees in custody with 90% held in the seven largest detention facilities. In some of the facilities, persistent overcrowding creates difficulties for both guards and detainees and contributes to an environment where human rights violations can

²⁶ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 53-58, and Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010) pp. 55-68.

The Department of Defense summarized plans for the Iraqi armed forces circa October, 2009 as follows: “the MoD had approved a force structure for COIN operations that included 14 Iraqi Army (IA) divisions (13 infantry and one mechanized) and support forces; a Navy of 3,800 personnel, including two marine battalions; and an Air Force of 6,000 personnel. In addition, the INCTF, with a projected end strength of 9,200 personnel, was contributing significantly to the COIN effort.”²⁷ **Figure 12.6** shows the level of development the Iraqi armed forces had reached by mid- 2009 in more detail.

- The “MoD...continues to struggle, particularly in the areas of support, sustainment, and infrastructure projects. Inter-ministerial budget coordination between the MoD and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) remains problematic due to cumbersome analog procedures. In light of the decline in the market price of oil, MoD and MoI funding increases will be constrained by declining Iraqi revenues and large budget deficits.”²⁸
- Logistics, sustainment of ISF personnel, equipment distribution, infrastructure maintenance, and force generation continue to pose obstacles to long-term operational capability.
- The IA Fuel systems and processes continue to be a challenge.
- Although the IA has come a long way in Class II, V, and VII supply accountability, they continue to struggle with issuing real-time orders via electronic means. MoD-issued orders are still hand delivered to the General Depot Command in Taji to issue equipment to Iraqi units for Unit Set Fielding. The fear of corruption at the unit leadership level continues to force stringent original documentation and wet signature requirements, thus further exacerbating the extended timeframe to issue supplies and equipment.
- GoI budgetary constraints continue to affect the staffing of enabler combat support and combat service support units. The lack of soldiers entering the training base is forcing Iraqi leaders at all levels to staff enabler units from within their organizations by cross leveling from over-strength units, such as the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) formations and HQ elements. As the IA and MoD leadership negotiate continued manning and training challenges, the force generation of key enablers that are essential for completing the COIN force could be adversely affected.²⁹

Interviews with Coalition experts in late 2009 indicated that the Iraqi armed forces needed to make immediate progress in dealing with the following issues:

- Enabler capability.
- Shortage of trained officers and NCOs.
- Limited MoD institutional capability:
 - Cumbersome analog process.
 - Limited procurement capability.
- Centralized decision-making.

²⁸ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 40.

²⁹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), January 29, 2010, p. 59-61.

- Budgeting

Some MNF-I experts in Iraq warned in November, 2009 that these problems would be serious enough to prevent the Iraqi Security Forces from being ready take over all of the necessary security missions by the end of 2011. Experts also stated, however, that armed forces continued to carry out a number of ongoing initiatives:

- Integrate and reinforce logistic capability.
- Field enablers (Communications, engineers, IS&R, bomb disposal).
- Force generation 2009 – as step towards goals for 2020.
- Force modernization: M1A1, CI30J, ARH, T-6, F-16, P&A.
- English language training.
- Develop Ministerial capacity (acquisition, budgeting).
- Medical and heal care initiatives.

These assessments had not changed significantly as of April 2010.

Figure 12.6 Development of Iraqi Military Forces Through 2009

Defense Forces	<u>Current Set</u>		<u>Target Growth 2009</u>
	Personnel	Key Units/Forces/Capabilities	Key Units/Forces/Enablers
Iraqi Army	201,423	14 DIV HQs, 54 BDEs, 182 BNs	+3 Location Commands
Tng & Support	27,614	<i>1 Mech Div; 13 Light Div</i> (9 th IA Div is the Mech Div)	+12 Field Workshops; +12 Ordinance Parks
Total Army	229,037	10 Location Commands 1 Engineer Infrastructure BN; GTR 12 Motorized Transport Regiments	+48 Provisioning Platoons; +1 MP Co +1 Sig Co; +13 Sig TOCs; +3 ISR Co +13 LLVI Plts; +13 Lt. MTR Recon Plts +6 Engineer Battalions; +1 EOD Regiment Mortar: +20 82mm; +10 120mm Platoons
Iraqi Air Force	2,888	Open Operations Center 35 Fixed & Rotary Wing Training Acft 37 Fixed & Rotary Wing Mobility Acft 17 Fixed-Wing ISR/Ground Attack Acft Training School & Flight Training Wing	+23 total aircraft 2009 +10 Fixed & Rotary Wing Training Acft +12 Rotary Wing +1 Fixed Wing Ground Attack
Iraqi Navy	2,453	45 Small Vessels 2 Marine BNs (IOC) VBSS (IOC) Point Defense of KAA Oil Terminal	+50 Vessels +1000 personnel 2 Bn Marines (FOC) C4SIR system (IOC) Piers for new vessels Training Simulators
Total MoD	234,378		
With ISOF	238,796		

Source: MNSTC-I, June 3, 2009

The Regular Armed Forces: Personnel and Leadership

Political and sectarian influence over the Iraqi Army (IA) continues to be a problem, although this has improved greatly since 2006-2007. According to Najim Abed Al-Jabouri, the former governor of Tal-Afar and current fellow at NDU,


“The majority of these [Iraqi Army] divisions are under the patronage of a political party. For example, the 8th IA division in Kut and Diwanya is heavily influenced by the Dawa party; the 4th IA division in Salahadeen is influenced by President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; the 7th IA division in Anbar is influenced by the Iraqi Awakening Party, and the 5th IA division in Diyala is heavily influenced by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.”³⁰

While the extent to which these parties influence IA divisions is unclear, sectarian and/or political influence remains a problem in the IA and ISF. The MoD has begun more frequently rotating divisions throughout Iraq, which should help lessen the influence of local or sectarian influences on the units. In particular, IA divisions based in the north, where fighting against AQI and other insurgent/criminal groups continues, were being swapped out by divisions located in the calmer south.³¹ The current and planned rotations of IA divisions (as well as the planned incorporation of 2 Kurdish divisions) are illustrated in **Figure 12.7**.

³⁰ Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed. “Iraqi Security Forces after U.S. Troop Withdrawal: An Iraqi Perspective.” Strategic Forum. August 2009, pg. 4.

³¹ Elliot, DJ. “Iraqi Army Reorganization. *Montrose Toast*. February 15, 2010. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/52/>

Figure 12.7: Iraqi Army Divisions Current and Projected Rotations



Source: Elliot, DJ. "Iraqi Army Reorganization. Montrose Toast. February 15, 2010. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/52/>

Leadership is improving at both the higher level of command and at the small unit level in spite of these problems. While a lack of qualified officers has plagued the development of the ISF since 2003, this problem has gradually eased. Officers take time to train and acquire experience, a process that cannot be rushed. However, with time and a heavy focus on officer training by MNSTC-I, the officer gap has been closing slowly. Additionally, the re-instatement of Saddam-era officers has helped decrease the shortage. In early 2010, the MoD announced that 20,000 Saddam-era army officers were being reinstated. It was later clarified on February 26, 2010, that 13,000 soldiers had already been reinstated since 2008, and that the announcement really referred to the 7,000 additional soldiers that will be reinstated in 2010.³²

The number of battalions rated as capable of effective independent operations that can operate on their own continues to increase, as do capabilities at the brigade, division, and rear area support levels. MNSTC-I reported in November 2009 that key elements of Iraqi military forces do continue to expand and improve in quality. It estimated that over 90% of Iraqi Army Combat Battalions (167 of 186) were “in the lead” in operations. These included battalions in the Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, National Police, and Emergency Response Unit Battalions.

Nevertheless, Iraqi forces will need U.S. partner units, embedded advisers, help with logistics and sustainability, artillery and armor support, air combat and helicopter support, and support in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) until the ISF can acquire all of the capabilities it needs to replace them. The ISF will also need help in addressing additional problems in force quality. In the case of the regular armed forces, there are still major shortages of qualified officers and NCOs. Yet training competent officers takes time, and there is little action that the US can take now to change this.

The Regular Armed Forces: Procurement, Maintenance and Equipment Issues

Budget constraints, poor planning with the MoD and the Services, corruption, and a lack of proper evaluation procedures and fiscal controls have all limited Iraq’s ability to procure weapons systems. According to the DoD “The MoD faces numerous challenges, including the lack of a multi-year acquisition strategy, weak requirements determination, late release of requirements funding, overly centralized decision-making authority, inadequately trained and inexperienced staff, and insufficient use of technology to optimize processes.”³³ Iraq has already scaled back its weapons purchases since the fall of oil prices in 2008. Yet due to the budget crunch, Iraq does not have enough cash on hand to purchase even the scaled-back weapons systems it had planned.

³² Pearce, Tim. “Iraq pushes on with reinstating Saddam-era troops.” Reuters. February 26, 2010. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100226/wl_nm/us_iraq_army

³³ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 54

Most of Iraq’s procurement is done through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Iraq’s major FMS requests are shown in **Figure 12.8** and its levels of spending on key items are shown in **Figure 12.9**.

Iraq has several FMS purchases in the pipeline that have been approved by Congress. However, only its initial order of 140 M1 Abrams tanks has been paid for. Other DSCA (the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is in charge of the FMS system) or Congressionally approved orders that are currently being held up due to lack of funding include: a request to buy Humvees, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, 400 M1126 infantry carrier vehicles and 400 M2 .50-caliber machine guns; a request to buy 26 Bell helicopters, 26 Rolls Royce engines, 26 .50-cal machine guns and 26 Hellfire guided missile launchers in a deal worth \$366 million; and a sale of 80 Armored Security Vehicles and 400 Stryker vehicles.³⁴ There were indications in late 2009 that the IA would begin receiving M1126 Strykers in 2010.³⁵

At the same time, changes are needed to create an effective Iraqi-US strategic partnership. The US FMS sales process is slow and unwieldy, while Iraq often is slow to make decisions and then expects an immediate US response. The credit requirements for the FMS system do not allow Iraq, with its poor credit rating, to purchase weapons using loans. Iraq continues to face problems in executing FMS orders, as the DoD noted in November, 2009: “Execution of FMS cases in Iraq continues to be hindered by several factors, including diminishing budgets, a deficiency of ministerial staff capacity to define requirements and to process FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance, lack of a budget planning and execution process that allocates funds for identified requirements, and unrealistic program expectations regarding life cycle costs for a defense article, including the costs to purchase, train, sustain, and operate the defense article.”³⁶

USF-I summarized this state of affairs, and efforts to change it, as follows in April, 2010:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Major Paradigm Shift:
 - Growth from a fledgling FMS customer into an active partner—GoI rigorously learning the FMS system and participating in building their own ISF requirements
 - Taking ownership of the FMS and SA processes
 - Iraqi Navy selected Offshore Support Vessel builder
 - Procurement directorate championed M1A1 support
 - MoI wrote their own helicopter requirements document
 - Overcoming funding constraints through creative multi-year FMS arrangements and cost-sharing with U.S.
 - Eagerly seeking increased SA education opportunities

³⁴ Osborn, Kris. “Poor Cash Flow Delays Iraqi Deals” *Defense News* July 20, 2009.

³⁵ Elliot, D.J. “Iraqi Security Force Update – December 2009” *Montrose Toast*. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/41/>

³⁶ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 44

- Strengthening regional partnering: held two Jordan Security Assistance exchanges, with more planned
- **Initiatives**
 - Transition ownership of FMS processes to GoI
 - Increase education and training opportunities
 - Improve delivery/transportation accountability
 - Plan for transition from ISAM to Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission
- **Challenges**
 - Implementing FMS in —contingency environment||
 - Growing understanding and trust in FMS
 - Severe funding constraints
 - Requirement to pay full case value up front
 - Limited strategic planning horizon
 - FMS compared to global markets
 - Lack of GoI in-transit visibility of FMS goods
 - Export policy constraints

US Equipment Transfers to Iraq during the US Drawdown

Just as FMS purchases have faced delays, purchases of non-American weapons systems have also run into trouble. Iraq has had a poor record since 2003 of botched, corrupt or renege weapons deals with various non-American arms suppliers. Despite reforms and an increased reliance on the FMS system, these problems continue. The U.S. has been trying to purchase Russian Mi-17 helicopters for Iraq for two years. But despite paying \$322 million and signing a contract with a Russian firm to have the helicopters delivered by February 2009, as of September not a single helicopter had been delivered.³⁷

US equipment transfers offer an important way to ease many of the ISF's acquisition problems. The US military has imported an enormous amount of equipment in order to carry out its mission in Iraq since 2003. While most of this equipment will be removed from Iraq along with US combat forces in 2011, it is likely that the US will leave some of it to the ISF. The departure of so many American men and so much U.S. material from Iraq in the next two years gives the US a unique opportunity to cheaply and efficiently transfer some of it to the ISF.

The US military team in Iraq has developed plans to provide such transfers, and many more are already in progress. As an initial estimate, they could involve some 158,000 items ranging from small items to major combat vehicles, equipment which could cost Iraq hundreds of millions of dollars if it were to buy them new at market prices. The key items would total roughly 60,000 pieces of equipment.

Some 76% are surplus items already in Iraq. Another 20% are excess items not in Iraq, and the final 4% would have to be purchased as Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The Iraqi MoD has agreed to pay some \$200 to \$500 million as its share of the costs of transferring such equipment, and these transfers could play a critical role in helping the Iraqi armed forces and police deal with their equipment problems, but such agreements have not yet been approved and much depends on what will be needed for the

³⁷ Weinberger, Sharon. Helo Fiasco: U.S. pays \$322 Million, Still No Choppers (Updated)" *Danger Room*. April 1, 2009.

conflict in Afghanistan. The DoD plan for its equipment drawdown is shown in **Figure 12.10**.

Figure 12.8**Iraqi Requests for Major US FMS Purchases: 2003-2010*****2010****March 4**

- *Possible sale of communications equipment:*
 - (300) 50-watt Very High Frequency (VHF) Base Station radios
 - (230) 50-Watt VHF Vehicular Stations
 - (150) 20-watt High Frequency/Very High Frequency (HF/VHF) Base Station Systems
 - (50) 20-watt HF/VHF Vehicular Radios
 - (50) 50-watt Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) Base Stations
 - (10) 150-watt HF/VHF Vehicular Radio Systems
 - (10) 150-watt HF Base Station Radio Systems
 - (30) 20-watt HF Vehicular Mobile Radio Stations
 - (250) 20-watt HF/VHF Handheld Radio Systems
 - (300) 50-watt UHF/VHF Vehicular Stations
 - (10) 150-watt HF/VHF Fixed Base Station Radio Systems
 - (590) Mobile Communications, Command and Control Center Switches
 - (4) Mobile Work Shops
 - High Capacity Line of Sight Communication Systems with Relay Link, generators, accessories, installation, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support
- ⇒ **Estimated cost \$142 million**

2009**November 18**

- *Possible sale of helicopters*
- 15 AgustaWestland AW109 Light Utility Observation helicopters, or alternatively, 15 Bell Model 429 Medical Evacuation and Aerial Observation helicopters, or 15 EADS North America UH-72A Lakota Light Utility helicopters
- (Up to) 12 AgustaWestland AW139 Medium Utility helicopters, or alternatively, 12 Bell Model 412 Medium Utility helicopters, or 12 Sikorsky UH-60M BLACK HAWK helicopters equipped with 24 T700-GE-701D engines
- Also included: spare and repair parts, publications and technical data, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, ground support, communications equipment, U.S. Government and contractor provided technical and logistics support services, tools and test equipment, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$1.2 billion**

2008**December 9**

Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelters, Communication Equipment

- (64) Deployable Rapid Assembly Shelters (DRASH)
- (1,500) 50 watt Very High Frequency (VHF) Base Station Radios
- (6,000) VHF Tactical Handheld Radios, (100) VHF Fixed Retransmitters
- (200) VHF Vehicular Radios
- (30) VHF Maritime 50 watt Base Stations
- (150) 150 watt High Frequency (HF) Base Station Radio Systems
- (150) 20 watt HF Vehicular Radios, (30) 20 watt HF Manpack Radios
- (50) 50 watt Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) Ground to Air Radio Systems
- (50) 150 watt VHF/UHF Ground to Air Radio Systems
- (50) 5 watt Multiband Handheld Radio Systems
- associated equipment and services
- **Estimated Cost \$485 Million**

M16A4 Rifles, M4 Carbines and M203 Grenade Launchers

- (80,000) M16A4 5.56MM Rifles
- (25,000) M4 5.56MM Carbines
- (2,550) M203 40MM Grenade Launchers
- associated equipment and services

- **Estimated Cost \$148 million**
-
- *Possible sale of 26 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters*
 - 26 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines
 - 26 M280 2.75-inch Launchers
 - 26 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box
 - 26 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers
 - associated equipment and services
- **Estimated Cost \$366 million**
- *Possible sale of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration:*
 - 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles,
 - 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
 - 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers
 - 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers
 - 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles
 - 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances
 - 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters
 - associated equipment and services
- **Estimated Cost \$2.16 billion**
- *Possible sale of Coastal Patrol Boats, Offshore Support Vessels*
 - (20) 30-35meter Coastal Patrol Boats
 - (3) 55-60 meter Offshore Support Vessels
 - associated equipment and services
- **Estimated Cost \$1.10 billion**
- *Possible sale of 20 T-6A Texan aircraft*
 - 20 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) with CMA-4124 GNSSA card and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation System (INS) spares
 - ferry maintenance, tanker support, aircraft ferry services, site survey, unit level trainer, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$210 million**
- *Possible sale of 400 M1126 STRYKER Infantry Carrier Vehicles (ICVs)*
 - 400 M2 HB 50 cal Browning Machine Guns
 - 400 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs)
 - 8 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks
 - spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$1.11 billion**
- *Possible sale of 36 AT-6B Texan II Aircraft*
 - 6 spare PT-6 engines
 - 10 spare ALE-47 Counter-Measure Dispensing Systems and/or 10 spare AAR-60 Missile Launch Detection Systems
 - global positioning systems with CMA-4124
 - spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, tanker support, ferry services, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$520 million**

July 31

- *Possible sale of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration, 8 M88A2 Tank Recovery Vehicles*
 - 64 M1151A1B1 Armored High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
 - 92 M1152 Shelter Carriers
 - 12 M577A2 Command Post Carriers
 - 16 M548A1 Tracked Logistics Vehicles
 - 8 M113A2 Armored Ambulances,
 - 420 AN/VRC-92 Vehicular Receiver Transmitters
 - (Also included) 35 M1070 Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) Truck Tractors
 - 40 M978A2 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) Tankers,
 - 36 M985A2 HEMTT Cargo Trucks

- 4 M984A2 HEMTT Wrecker Trucks
- 140 M1085A1 5-ton Cargo Trucks
- 8 HMMWV Ambulances w/ Shelter
- 8 Contact Maintenance Trucks
- 32 500 gal Water Tank Trailers, 16 2500 gal Water Tank Trucks
- 16 Motorcycles
- 80 8 ton Heavy/Medium Trailers
- 16 Sedans
- 92 M1102 Light Tactical trailers
- 92 635NL Semi-Trailers
- 4 5,500 lb Rough Terrain Forklifts
- 20 M1A1 engines
- 20 M1A1 Full Up Power Packs
- 3 spare M88A2 engines
- 10 M1070 engines
- 20 HEMTT engines
- 4 M577A2 spare engines
- 2 5-ton truck engines
- 20 spare HMMWV engines
- ammunition, spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$2.16 billion**

July 30

- *Possible sale of technical assistance to ensure provision of adequate facilities and infrastructure in support of the recruitment, garrison, training, and operational facilities and infrastructure for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)*
 - The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will provide engineering, planning, design, acquisition, contract administration, construction management, and other technical services for construction of facilities and infrastructure (repair, rehabilitation, and new construction) in support of the training, garrison, and operational requirements of the ISF
 - The scope of the program includes provision of technical assistance for Light Armored Vehicles, Range Facilities, Training Facilities, Tank Range Complex Facilities, and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Facilities in support of Government of Iraq (GoI) construction projects throughout the country of Iraq
 - The facilities and infrastructure planned include mission essential facilities, maintenance and supply buildings, company and regimental headquarters, and utilities systems (including heating, water, sewer, electricity, and communication lines)
 - Services include support, personnel training and training equipment, acquisition of engineer construction equipment, technical assistance to Iraqi military engineers, other technical assistance, contractor engineering services, and other related elements of logistic support.
- **Estimated Cost \$1.6 billion**
- Possible sale of 24 Bell Armed 407 Helicopters or 24 Boeing AH-6 Helicopters
 - 24 Rolls Royce 250-C-30 Engines
 - 565 M120 120mm Mortars, 665 M252 81mm Mortars
 - 200 AGM-114M HELLFIRE missiles
 - 24 M299 HELLFIRE Guided Missile Launchers
 - 16 M36 HELLFIRE Training Missiles
 - 15,000 2.75-inch Rockets
 - 24 M280 2.75-inch Launchers, 24 XM296 .50 Cal. Machine Guns with 500 Round Ammunition Box
 - 24 M134 7.62mm Mini-Guns
 - 81mm ammunition, 120mm ammunition
 - test measurement and diagnostics equipment, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$2.4 billion**
- Possible sale of Light Armored Vehicles m392 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) which include 352 LAV-25, 24 LAV-CC, and 16 LAV-A (Ambulances):
 - 368 AN/VRC-90E Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS)
 - 24 AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS
 - 26 M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons
 - The following are considered replacements to vehicles/weapons requested in the Military Table of Equipment (MTOE)
 - 5 LAV-R (Recovery)
 - 4 LAV-L (Logistics)
 - 2 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

- 41 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR)
- 2 MK19 40mm Grenade Machine Guns
- 773 9mm Pistols
- 93 M240G Machine Guns
- 10 AR-12 rifles
- Non-MDE includes ammunition, construction, site survey, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support

- **Estimated Cost \$3 billion**

July 24

- Possible sale of 160 M2 .50 caliber Machine Guns and 160 M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs):
 - 4 Heavy Duty Recovery Trucks
 - 160 Harris Vehicular Radio Systems
 - 144 MK19 MOD3 40mm Grenade Machine Guns with Bracket
- spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$206 million**

July 25

- Possible sale of: 6 C-130J-30 United States Air Force baseline aircraft and equipment:
 - 24 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 engines
 - 4 Rolls Royce AE 2100D3 spare engines
 - 6 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems
 - 2 spare AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems, 6 AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems, 2 spare AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems. Also included are spare and repair parts, configuration updates, integration studies, support equipment, publications and technical documentation, technical services, personnel training and training equipment, foreign liaison office support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics personnel services, construction, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$1.5 billion**

May 7

- *Possible sale of technical assistance to ensure provision of adequate facilities and infrastructure in support of the recruitment, garrison, training, and operational facilities and infrastructure for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)*
 - The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will provide engineering, planning, design, acquisition, contract administration, construction management, and other technical services for construction of facilities and infrastructure (repair, rehabilitation, and new construction) in support of the training, garrison, and operational requirements of the ISF
 - The scope of the program includes provision of technical assistance for facilities and infrastructure in support of Government of Iraq (GoI) construction projects throughout the country of Iraq
 - The facilities and infrastructure planned include, new barracks/facilities, maintenance and supply buildings, brigade headquarters, and utilities systems (including heating, water, sewer, electricity, and communication lines)
 - Services include support, personnel training and training equipment, acquisition of engineer construction equipment, technical assistance to Iraqi military engineers, other technical assistance, contractor engineering services, and other related elements of logistic support
- **Estimated Cost \$450 million**

March 21

- *Possible sale of:*
 - (700) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Armored Gun Trucks
 - (4,000) AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Devices
 - (100,000) M16A4 Assault Rifles
 - (Also included) (200) Commercial Ambulances
 - (16) Bulldozers
 - (300) Light Gun Trucks
 - (150) Motorcycles
 - (90) Recovery Trucks
 - (30) 20 ton Heavy Trailer
 - (1,400) 8 ton Medium Trailers
 - (3,000) 4X4 Utility Trucks
 - (120) 12K Fuel Tank Trucks
 - (80) Heavy Tractor Trucks
 - (120) 10K Water Tank Trucks
 - (208) 8 ton Heavy Trucks

- (800) Light Utility Trailers
- (8) Cranes
- (60) Heavy Recovery Vehicles
- (16) Loaders
- (300) Sedans
- (200) 500 gal Water Tank Trailers
- (1,500) 1 ton Light Utility Trailers
- (50) 40 ton Low Bed Trailers
- (40) Heavy Fuel Tanker Trucks
- (20) 2000 gal Water Tanker Trucks
- (2,000) 5 ton Medium Trucks
- (120) Armored IEDD Response Vehicles
- (1,200) 8 ton Medium Cargo Trucks
- (1,100) 40mm Grenade Launchers
- (3,300) 9mm Pistols with Holsters
- (400) Aiming Posts
- (140,000) M16A4 Magazines
- (100,000) M4 Weapons
- (65) 5K Generators
- (5,400) hand-held VHF radio sets
- (3,500) vehicular VHF radio sets
- (32) Air Conditioner Charger kits
- (32) Air Conditioner Testers
- (4,000) binoculars
- (20) electrician tool kits
- (600) large general purpose tents
- (700) small command general purpose tents
- medical equipment, organizational clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost \$1,389 million**

2007

September 25

- Possible sale of major defense equipment including
 - (980) M1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV)
 - (123,544) M16A4 Rifles
 - Non-MDE includes:
 - 890,000 12 Gauge 00 Buckshot
 - 5,800,000 9mm Ball
 - 100,000,000 M855 5.56 Ball
 - 20,000,000 5.56mm Tracer
 - 16,700,000 5.56mm Blank
 - 5,700,000 5.56mm 4 Ball/1 Tracer
 - 5,700,000 7.62mm 4 Ball/1 Tracer
 - 13,600,000 7.62mm BallLong
 - 790,000 .50 Caliber 4 Ball/1 Tracer
 - 10,000 40mmHEDP Grenades
 - 32,000 60mm HE Mortar Rounds
 - 32,000 60mm Illumination Rounds
 - 5,000 81mm HE Mortar Rounds
 - 5,000 81mm Illumination Rounds
 - 7,000 Signal Flares
 - 7,300 Stun Grenades
 - 6,700 HC Smoke Grenades
 - 12,035 M4 Carbines
 - Upgrade and refurbishment of 32 additional UH-1 HUEY helicopters to the UH-1H configuration; Armored Land Cruisers (189)
 - Armored Mercedes (10); Light utility trucks (1,815)
 - Fire trucks (70); Fuel trucks (40)
 - Septic truck (20)
 - Water truck (45)
 - Motorcycles (112)

- Sedans (1,425)
- 5 Ton Trucks (600)
- Medium Trucks (600)
- BTR 3E1 (336)
- 8 Ton Trucks (400)
- 12 Ton Trucks (400)
- 16-35 Ton Trucks (100)
- 35 Ton Trucks (20)
- Ambulances (122)
- Bulldozers (33)
- Excavators (10)
- Wheeled Loader (20)
- Variable Reach Forklifts (10)
- 5Kw generators (447)
- ILAV Route Clearing Vehicle (55)
- Wrecker w/Boom (19)
- Fuel Pumps (34)
- 11 Passenger Bus (127)
- 24 Passenger Bus (207)
- 44 Passenger Bus (80)
- Contact Maintenance Trucks (105)
- communication towers, troposcatter and Microwave radios, IDN, DPN, VSAT Operations and Maintenance
- (1,518) VHF Wheeled Tactical and Base Station Radios
- (4,800) VHF hand-held radios
- (6,490) VHF man pack radios
- clothing and individual equipment, standard and non-standard vehicle spare and repair parts, maintenance, support equipment, publications and documentation; personnel training and training equipment; Quality Assurance Team support services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support
- **Estimated Cost 2.257 billion**

September 21

- *Possible sale of logistics support for three C-130E aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, electronic warfare support, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support*
- **Estimated Cost \$172 million**

August 17

- *Possible sale to upgrade 16 UH-1 HUEY helicopters to the UH-1H configuration, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and technical data, communications equipment, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, Quality Assurance Team support services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, preparation of aircraft for shipment, and other related elements of logistics support*
- **Estimated cost \$150 million**

May 23

- *Possible sale of medical consumables, pharmaceuticals, medical, surgical, dental supplies, medical equipment, support equipment, program support, publications, documentation, personnel training, training equipment, contractor technical and logistics personnel services and other related program requirements*
- **Estimated Cost \$1.05 billion**

May 18

- *Possible sale of technical assistance services to ensure provision of adequate facilities and infrastructure in support of the recruitment, garrison, training, and operational facilities and infrastructure for the Iraqi Security Forces.*
 - The U.S. Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE) will provide engineering, planning, design, acquisition, contract administration, construction management, and other technical services for construction of facilities and infrastructure (repair, rehabilitation, and new construction) in support of the training, garrison, and operational requirements of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense
 - The scope of the program includes technical assistance for construction of facilities and infrastructure in support of twelve separate construction projects throughout Iraq
 - The facilities and infrastructure planned include new temporary vehicle storage facilities, medical clinics, hospital steam plant, security walls, training barracks/facilities, dining facilities, recruit training facilities, training, maintenance and supply buildings, and utilities systems (including heating, water, sewer, and electricity)

- The facilities to be provided at the regional brigade locations include barracks, training, maintenance, and storage facilities, medical clinic, communications center, and required utilities. Services include support, personnel training and training equipment, acquisition of engineer construction equipment, technical assistance to Iraqi military engineers, other technical assistance, contractor engineering services, and other related elements of logistic support
- **Estimated Cost \$350 million**

2006**December 7**

- *Possible sale of HMMWVs, LAVs, Trucks, and Recovery Vehicles:*
 - Major Defense Equipment (MDE)
 - 522 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or 276 Infantry Light Armored Vehicles (I-LAVs)
 - Eight Heavy Tracked Recovery Vehicles -- either Brem Tracked Recovery and Repair or M578 Recovery Vehicles
 - Six 40-Ton Trailer Lowboy -- either M871 or Commercial
 - 66 8-Ton Cargo Heavy Trucks -- either M900 series or M35 series or MK23 Medium Tactical Vehicles or Commercial Medium Trucks
 - NON-MDE
 - 451 5-Kilowatt Generators Five Commercial Car Carriers
 - 102 Ambulances 578 Commercial Trailer 8-Ton Cargo
 - 68 Used Sedans 118 500 Gallon Water Tanks
 - 44 Tank Pumping Units 488 1-Ton Commercial Trailers
 - 136 Commercial Light Trucks 668 4X4 Commercial Light Utility Trucks
 - 78 Motorcycles 14 4X4 Commercial SUV Commercial Trucks
 - 78 New Sedans 23 Used Commercial Vans
 - 36 Recovery Trucks either - Brem Wheeled
 - Recovery Vehicles or Commercial

Also included logistics support services/equipment for vehicles (Armored Gun Trucks; Light, Medium, and Heavy Vehicles; trailers; recovery vehicles; and ambulances) supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support

⇒ **Estimated Cost \$463 million**

September 27

- *Possible sale of 24 King Air 350ER for Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance*
 - 24 King Air 350ER for Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance role with L-3 Wescam MX-15 Electro Optics/Infrared (EO/IR) system, plus 1 of the following Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR/ISAR)/Inverse Synthetic: APS-134 Sea View or APS-143 Ocean Eye or RDR-1700 or Lynx II (APY-8) or APS144 or APY-12 Phoenix
 - 24 Data Link Systems (T-Series Model-U or T-Series Model-N or ADL850 or TCDL or BMT-85)
 - 24 King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck Aircraft for light transport role
 - 48 AAR-47 Missile Warning Systems
 - 48 ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing Systems
 - 6,000 M-206 Flare Cartridges
 - 50 Global Positioning System (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems (INS)
 - Support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical

⇒ **Estimated Cost \$900 million**

- *Possible sale of one AN/FPS-117 or TPS-77 Long Range Air Traffic Control Radar*, support equipment, management support, spare and repair parts, supply support, training, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics support

⇒ **Estimated Cost \$142 million**

⇒

September 19

- *Possible sale of logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems*, on-job-training, laser pointers, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, technical support, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support
 - 10,126 M17 9mm Glock Pistols

- 50,750 M16A2 Rifles
 - 50,750 M4A1 Rifles
 - 3,442 M24 Sniper Rifles
 - 8,105 M249 Machine Guns
 - 3,037 M240B Machine Guns
 - 1,268 Generation (Gen) II Single Tube Night Vision Goggles
 - 15 AN/PVS-17 Gen III Assault Weapon Sights
 - 40 AN/PVS-10 Gen II Sniper Weapon Sights
 - 20 Mi-17 Troop Transport Helicopters
 - 600 Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers
 - 2,126,250 9mm Pistol Ammunition
 - 35,437,500 5.56mm Rifle Ammunition
 - 633,328 7.62mm Sniper Rifle Ammunition
 - 1,621,000 5.56mm Machine Gun Ammunition
 - 1,214,800 M240 7.62mm Crew Served Machine Gun Ammunition
 - 9,562 Hand Held Pyrotechnics and
 - 8,670 Hand Held Smoke Munitions.
- ⇒ **Estimated Cost \$500 million**
- *Possible sale of logistics support services/equipment for helicopters (Jet Ranger, Huey II and Mi-17) and vehicles (Standard/Non-Standard Wheeled Vehicles, Tracked Vehicles, Infantry Light Armored Vehicles Armored Personnel Carriers) and small/medium weapons and weapon systems including on-job-training, supply and maintenance support, measuring and hand tools for ground systems, software upgrades, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support*
- ⇒ **Estimated Cost \$250 million**

2005**March 10**

- *Possible sale of six T-56A-7 engines and logistics support for C-130 aircraft to include supply and maintenance support, flares, software upgrades, pyrotechnics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, publications and documentation, personnel training and training equipment, fuel and fueling services, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support*
- ⇒ **Estimated Cost \$132 million**

2004

None listed.

2003


None listed.

*Note: This figure only shows Iraqi requests for weapons systems and *possible* sales. Not all of the weapons sales listed above went through. This figure should not be taken as an accurate picture of Iraqi weapons purchases.

Source: adapted from DSCA press releases on Foreign Military Sales, <http://www.dsca.mil>. Accessed April 12, 2010.


Figure 12.9

Iraqi and US Funding of the MoI and MoD by Year



Source: United States Forces –Iraq Advising and Training and NATO Training Mission –Iraq, *Mission Brief*, April 2010, p. 25.

Figure 12.10: Equipment Drawdown



Source: Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31, 2009, p. 36.

As GAO statements indicate, however, the US faces problems in determining its transfer plans as it withdraws from Iraq,³⁸

DOD plans to transfer military equipment to the Government of Iraq in order to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq, but decisions still need to be made by DOD on what can and will be transferred to the Government of Iraq, contributing to planning uncertainty. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, an MNF-I subordinate command responsible for training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, has prepared a list of equipment it believes will enable the Government of Iraq to provide for its own security after U.S. forces have left Iraq.²⁶ This list comprises about 1.5 percent of the estimated 3.3 million pieces of equipment in Iraq, with a projected value of about \$600 million.

This list is currently undergoing progressively higher levels of review within DOD, for potential approval by the Military Department Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense. Until this list is approved, and an appropriate transfer mechanism determined, the equipment that will be transferred to the Government of Iraq remains uncertain. Currently, no decision has been made as to what authorities will be used to transfer these items to the Government of Iraq. While certain authorities exist that may permit the transfer of excess defense articles, DOD has also requested additional authority to transfer non-excess defense articles...Section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 provides an additional authority, requested by the Department of Defense, under which the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may transfer certain equipment to the Government of Iraq without the Military Departments declaring it excess to their needs...

Because this provision does not specify a In addition, other DOD officials expressed strong reservations about section 1234 prior to its passage, arguing that existing authorities, such as those which underpin Foreign Military Sales, are sufficient to transfer U.S. military equipment to the Government of Iraq, but are not fully understood within the department. Clarification of authorities to be used for transferring equipment to the Government of Iraq will help facilitate decisions on which equipment will be transferred, and will assist in ensuring that DOD will meet its stated timelines, A mechanism for reimbursing the Military Departments for the transfer of non-excess equipment, the loss of which may affect unit readiness, senior Army officials expressed concern about it prior to its passage, and the conference report accompanying the Act urged the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to reimburse the Military Departments for such items...

The complexity of issues surrounding transfer authorities has already presented obstacles to transferring equipment to the Government of Iraq. For example, beginning in May 2009, MNC-I undertook an initiative to turn over the Ibn Sina hospital, located in the International Zone, to the Government of Iraq as a fully equipped, fully operational hospital. However, 100 of the approximately 9,800 pieces of equipment in the hospital, such as intensive care unit beds, trauma centers, and patient vital signs monitoring equipment, were ineligible for transfer because, according to Army officials, the Army could not declare them as excess to the needs of the Army...As a result, officials had to seek alternate means to transfer or sell the remaining pieces of equipment necessary to outfit the hospital. Ultimately, the hospital was transferred to the Government of Iraq on schedule. However, Army officials stated that after exhausting all legal

³⁸ The GAO estimates that 65% of these items (2,143,699) are unit owned/authorized equipment, 18% (604,623) or contractor acquired property, 11% (369,296) are theater provided equipment, nonstandard, and 6% are theater provided equipment (standard.) Statement of William M. Solis, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, General Accountability Office, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq," Statement Before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO-10-179, November 2, 2009, p. 3.

options for transferring or donating the remaining equipment, the hospital was transferred without these 100 pieces of important equipment.

According to the Army, disposition for nearly all currently identified non-standard equipment in Iraq has been determined, but all items needing disposition have not yet been identified. Non-standard equipment is mainly theater provided equipment that has been issued to units that is not listed on their modified table of organization and equipment... Non-standard equipment includes a wide range of items such as construction equipment, materiel handling equipment, flat screen televisions, certain types of radios, and MRAPs. To facilitate the retrograde of non-standard equipment, the Army is implementing a new process in which the Life Cycle Management Commands are cataloguing all types of non-standard equipment in Iraq for entry into a new database... The Army then determines the location to which each type of item will be shipped upon retrograde from Iraq. Army officials state that they have determined disposition for the majority of types of non-standard equipment already identified in Iraq. However, these officials also state that additional types of non-standard equipment are still being entered into the database as efforts to gain accountability over non-standard equipment continue. Until this effort is complete, the disposition of some types of non-standard equipment in Iraq may be delayed.

The MoD faces equally serious problems maintaining its facilities and its infrastructure. Maintenance is simply not a priority to the MoD, as it is clearly facing a gargantuan number of more pressing issues. Yet its lack of concern for maintenance will end up costing a huge amount in years to come if facilities are allowed to deteriorate. Currently, the MoD has allotted only \$8.5 million for maintenance in the 2009 budget. However, according to the DoD, “A conservative estimate for sustainment maintenance alone is \$360 million.”³⁹

The Regular Armed Forces: Land Forces

Each element of the Iraqi armed forces will require a different form of support. The current structure of the Iraqi Army is shown in **Figure 12.11**. The army provides the core of real counterinsurgency capability and is the key to building effective national defense capabilities. Yet it is still relatively small for this task. In early 2009, it only had 250,000 authorized personnel, and was overmanned to compensate for leave and desertions with 225,000 assigned. These personnel had to be divided into 165 combat battalions. Iraqi Special Forces (ISF) have a relatively high level of operational competence, and are operating 6 battalions.

Coalition experts listed the following mix of accomplishments, initiatives, and challenges in the summer of 2009:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Manoeuvre Forces: 14 DIV HQs, 54 BDEs, 182 BNs
 - Training Base
 - 6 RTCs: BTC, MOSQ, NCO Training, SQD to BN collective training
 - 11 DTCs: Individual Training, SQD to BN collective training
 - CTC: Individual to CO collective training; C-IED training, Mortar FDC, and MIAI training
 - Logistics Affairs Training Institute (LATI)

³⁹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 54

- WTP completed two training cycles for a total of twelve battalions
 - Support Forces
 - Taji Supply and National Maintenance Depots
 - General Transportation Regiment
 - 12 Motor Transportation Regiments; 9 Location Commands
- **Initiatives**
 - Grow Enablers: ISR, Div signal, Eng BNs, mortars, and Log units
 - Transform Training Base: Centers of Excellence
 - IED Center of Excellence
 - Modernize Equipment: UAH, M16, SINGARS
 - M1A1 Program Management
 - C2: Joint Ops Center/Iraqi Logistics Ops Center (ILOC)
 - Expand the 81mm Mortar Fielding Program from 12 to 24 platoons per month at five sites
 - Prepare for an accelerated BCT surge at five sites to field 6,000 additional soldiers
 - Expand individual Military Occupation Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) training
 - Professionalize the Force
 - Warrior Training Program
 - Senior NCO Course; Tactical CDR’s course
 - Institutionalize After Action Review Process
 - Military Values, Principles, and Leadership Development
- **Challenges**
 - Logistics/sustainment structure “Under Construction”
 - Degrading infrastructure
 - Force Generation expectations
 - Force Management understanding
 - Acquire the initial capability to conduct fuel testing and to generate the fuel technical skills required for advanced weapons systems like the M1A1
 - Centralized decision-making
 - “New School vs. Old Camp”

USF-I provided a similar list in April 2010. While it reflected some progress since 2009, it also revealed such progress was slow, and that important problems still remained in key aspects of the ISF development effort.

- **Initiatives**
 - Training
 - Generating DIV Enablers (ISR, Signal, Engineer,
 - Logistics BNs)
 - Developing Iraqi Force Generation requirements
 - Developing COIN School & Chemical Defense Co
 - Assisting the KRG in the integration of PUK and KDP
 - Peshmerga forces
 - Logistics
 - Streamline the Unit Set Fielding process
 - Reorganize under a regional support concept (EAD-AT)
 -
- **Accomplishments**
 - Training
 - Developed 9 Training centers and 11 Location
 - Commands
 - Created an Institutional School System
 - Leveraged “Train-the Trainer” concept; transitioned from Coalition led to Iraqi led training

- Established a Combat Training Center at Besmaya
- Established an M1A1 Training Program
- Stood up an Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (NCOA)
- Logistics
 - Implemented the Iraqi Asset Management Program
 - Established the Iraqi Logistics Operation Center
 - Established a General Transportation Regiment
 - Enabled the Iraqi Army logistics depot system **120mm Mortar Crew Drill**
- M1A1 Phase 1 Graduation

- **Challenges**

- Logistics/Sustainment structure —”under construction.”
- Requirements driven planning is not utilized
- Corruption in the MOD is hindering Iraqi Army development
- Constrained budget has had unintended consequences on Unit Set Fielding process
- Training Centers are poorly resourced
- Resource Management is in its infancy

Iraq is only beginning to create the kind of armored, artillery, armed helicopter, and other “heavy” combat units it needs to fully defend itself. It is seeking to correct these problems by taking steps like the purchase of American M1A1 tanks and M1126 Stryker APCs. Yet due to budget constraints Iraq can neither purchase nor field these units in large quantities. The first order of 140 M1A1s began arriving in Iraq in March, 2009, although all 140 will not be delivered until September 2010.⁴⁰ Only one division, the 9th, currently fields howitzers and multiple rocket launchers, and the IA possesses fewer than 80 of these systems in total. This means Iraq must rely primarily on its existing armored forces for the next several years. As of late 2009, these forces included:⁴¹

- Two T72/BMP1-equipped tank battalions,
- Two T72/BMP1-equipped armored cavalry battalions,
- Two T55/BMP1-equipped tank battalions,
- Two BMP1-equipped “tank” battalions,
- One Type 63-equipped mechanized reconnaissance battalion,
- Two M113-equipped mechanized reconnaissance battalions,
- One EE9-equipped light armored reconnaissance battalion,
- Three BTR80-equipped mechanized battalions.
- Three BMP1-equipped “tank” battalions,
- One salvaged wheeled APC equipped motorized battalion, and
- At least two M113-equipped mechanized or mechanized engineer battalions.

⁴⁰ Elliot, D.J. “Iraqi Armor Developments” *Montrose Toast*. June 30, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/category/1/>

⁴¹ Elliot, D.J. “Iraqi Armor Status Change.” *Montrose Toast*. August 21, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/25/>


In addition, two more battalions of T72s are being donated by NATO. Most of these forces are currently in the 9th division.⁴² While Iraq clearly has some armored forces, much of these are Soviet era systems and are clearly outdated. The creation and fielding of modern armored forces will take several more years.

The Army's equipment problems, however, may have less immediate impact than its readiness problems. **Figure 12.12** shows an estimate of the readiness of Iraqi Army and other key combat battalions. It has taken four years of intensive effort to bring Iraqi forces up to the level where enough key battalions can stand on their own to ensure Iraq can defeat insurgents and move towards a national self-defense capability. The Iraqi budget crisis has virtually halted all improvements in readiness at precisely the time they are most needed to ensure that Iraqi forces can take over as US forces withdraw.

Moreover, these readiness ratings are largely based on the material and training resources that the units involved have had in the past. They do not reflect actual performance in combat, the quality of leadership, and the impact of key factors like retention and dependence on outside support in areas such as enablers and sustainment. All of these aspects of readiness will become steadily more important as the US withdraws, and a new and more demanding form of readiness assessment seems to be needed.


⁴² Elliot, D.J. "Iraqi Armor Status Change." *Montrose Toast*. August 21, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/25/>

Figure 12.11: Iraqi Army Divisions



Elliott, D.J. "Iraqi Army: Now and in the future." Montrose Toast. August 19, 2009.
<http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/pwpimages/Iraqi%20Army%20Divs.JPG>

Figure 12.12: ISF Combat Battalion Operational Readiness Assessment



Note: Over 90% or 167 of 186 Iraqi Army Combat Battalions were rated as “in the lead” for operations in September 2009

Source: Iraqi Assistance Group. As of 20 SEP 09.

The Regular Armed Forces: Air Forces

The deployments and structure of the Iraqi Air Force are shown in **Figure 12.13**. The Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) has plans to build a small but effective force, although it is not clear that Iraq has the resources to do this in the next decade.

The IqAF has been making slow but steady progress. The IqAF operates out of 4 bases, and is developing 5 more. The IqAF currently has 3 armed Cessna 208s capable of firing Hellfire missiles, a small but significant first step towards a real ground attack capability. According to Defense Minister Obeidi, Iraq will have a squadron of 18-24 fighter planes by the end of 2011, although whether this is an achievable goal remains to be seen. The first of fifteen T-6A training aircraft arrived in Iraq from the US in late 2009. The new Iraqi Air College was scheduled to begin offering its first classes in early 2010. This college will eventually have the capacity to teach 1,500 students.

The force is currently only 9 squadrons, with three more forming, none of which are modern fighter squadrons.⁴³ The 9 active squadrons are: 3 reconnaissance, 1 fixed-wing training, 1 rotary-wing training, 1 transport, 1 utility helicopter, 1 transport helicopter, and 1 special operations squadron.⁴⁴

The Iraqi Air Force only began to order small numbers of modern combat aircraft in mid-2008, and these will not be combat ready for years. Therefore a large gap will exist between US withdrawal in 2011 and the IqAF's ability to even minimally defend its airspace.

Recognizing this problem, Secretary Gates hinted in late July 2009 that Iraq could buy used American aircraft.⁴⁵ This would most likely be cheaper and faster than buying new ones. The USAF is retiring 134 F-16s in 2010, and these would be an obvious choice to lend, lease, or give to Iraq.⁴⁶ A major problem with this plan is the lack of Iraqi maintenance capabilities, as well as an entrenched military culture that does not prioritize preventive maintenance. As of October, 2009 no official contracts for used American planes had been announced.

While the IqAF is making slow progress in fielding basic combat and transport aircraft, other areas like air defense have not yet begun to develop. Iraq has no modern surface-to-air missile defenses, nor any immediate plans to acquire them. While man-portable anti-aircraft weapons are relatively easy to acquire, a national air defense network is costly and complex, requiring multiple radar and missile sites, as well as specially trained personnel. The IqAF also still needs to decide whether to procure fighter control aircraft and equipment, such as the AWACS system. The lack of such systems, and a modern

⁴³ Elliot, DJ. "Iraqi Air Force Development/Iraqi Aviation: Status and predicted force." Montrose Toast, February 12, 2010. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/53/>

⁴⁴ Elliot, DJ. "Iraqi Air Force Development/Iraqi Aviation: Status and predicted force." Montrose Toast, February 12, 2010. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/53/>

⁴⁵ Gates, Robert. DoD News Transcript. July 29, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4455>

⁴⁶ Rolfsen, Bruce "Iraq may get U.S.'s used F-16s." *Air Force Times*. August 29, 2009. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/08/airforce_iraqi_f16_082909w/

network of ground-based air control and warning systems, now serious limits Iraqi defense capabilities. The ISF's budgetary shortfalls virtually preclude the acquisition of any national air defense network in the near future. Nor has the ISF expressed any interest in purchasing cheaper man-portable air defense systems. It is likely that the US will continue to provide some sort of air defense capability for Iraq for the foreseeable future.

The IqAF also has manpower problems. It had some 3,332 men on October 1, 2009, and an adequate number of pilots. Its younger personnel were good, but like the Iraqi Army, its older personnel still have problems in adjusting to the need to manage resources effectively,

Coalition experts listed the following mix of accomplishments, initiatives, and challenges in the summer of 2009:


- **Accomplishments**
 - Aircraft 93: 37 training, 37 mobility, 18 ISR, 1 ground attack
 - Personnel doubled in 2008 from 1,300 to over 2, 500
 - Specialty Codes
 - AOC command & control of over 350 sorties/week
 - 7,500 fixed-wing flight training hrs; 18 pilots graduated
 - 103 pilots in pipeline (67 in-country & 36 out-of-country)
 - Initial-entry rotary-wing training began Jan 09; 12 students
 - Operational sorties: ISR, airlift, battlefield mobility; MEDEVAC
 - Supported operations in Basrah, Diyala, Karbala, Sadr City
- **Initiatives**
 - IqAF HQ move to Victory Base
 - Battlefield Mobility / Spec Ops support capabilities w/ Mi-17
 - T-6 Bed Down / Air Force College at Tikrit
 - Long-Range Radar / Spec Ops Center at Ali Base
 - Air-to-Ground Attack capability
 - AC-208s, Mi-17s, Gazelles
 - Partnering Opportunities w/ Coalition operational forces
 - Aircraft acquisition: C-130J, Armed Scout Helo, F-16
 - Integrated C2 System / ISR
- **Challenges**
 - Lack of real staff sections for full air force operations and planning.
 - No clear strategy for force development and employment.
 - Lack of direct budget and execution; everything flows through the MoD.
 - Training People
 - 3-5 years to train pilots, maintainers, and air traffic controllers
 - English Language Training is IqAF foundational capability
 - Severe shortage of mid-career officers: over 50% of pilots and 30% of ground officers will reach retirement age before 2020, and those remaining lack flying experience.
 - Proper logistics management and use of contract support.
 - Weak maintenance and support efforts.
 - Sustainment: delayed GOI-funded cases impacting operations
 - Infrastructure
 - IqAF needs to expand airfield infrastructure
 - Need for Coalition-occupied space at IqAF airfields
 - Airspace Management

- Partnering vs. Security

USF-I provided a somewhat different list in April 2010, and one that focused largely on the ISAF's continued training and sustainment needs:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Graduating Airmen
 - 8 pilot training classes, 23 instructor pilots, 57 graduates
 - 40 tech training classes
 - 1,658 students/graduates in pipeline
 - 11 functional areas, 45 career fields and 368 specialties
 - •Comprehensive full-spectrum election support
 - •AOC command & control of over 350 sorties/week
 - •Precision fires demo and C2
 - •New Iraqi AF HQC2
- **Initiatives**
 - Transitioning air base operations
 - •Expanding mentoring roles
 - •Iraqi AF College stand-up
 - •Joint Air Operations Integration Team
- **Challenges**
 - •Accessions surging / training demands
 - •Lengthy pipeline for highly technical skills
 - •English language training foundational to IqAF
 - •Infrastructure / sustainment
 - Partially funded basing plan
 - •CLS dependency
 - •Air sovereignty / complexity and demands

Figure 12.13: Iraqi Air Force



Source: Elliot, DJ. "Iraqi Air Force Development." Montrose Toast, February 12, 2010. <http://home.comcast.net/~djae/site/?/blog/view/53/>

The Regular Armed Forces: Navy

Iraq has a small Navy that totaled roughly 2,595 men in November, 2009. It currently plans to acquire 2 offshore support vessels, 4 Italian patrol ships, 15 patrol boats and some \$160 million worth of infrastructure. Like the Air Force, however, the Navy does not have enough funds to acquire all the combat systems it needs. As of late 2009, only 2 of the planned 4 Italian patrol ships had been delivered.⁴⁷ These shortfalls are compounded by serious problems in mobility forces, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and battle management assets, and furthermore by the amount of resources needed for combat logistics and sustainability.

Coalition experts listed the following mix of accomplishments, initiatives, and challenges in the summer of 2009:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Naval Squadron at 30 vessels – limited capability
 - 2 Marine Battalions
 - 1st for Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) and Oil Platform security
 - 2nd for Umm Qasr & Az Zubayr port security
 - 50 patrols per week (300% increase over last year)
 - Assumed approximately 30% security responsibility of oil platforms and 100% of port security at Umm Qasr
 - Built in sustainment capability through contractor assistance, lacking in the Army and Air Force.
- **Initiatives**
 - Training
 - USMC MiTT
 - English Language
 - 4 Patrol Ships due from Italy in next 9 months
 - Navy Intelligence cadre
 - Command and Control facilities on oil platforms
 - Handover full security of KAAOT in Dec 09
 - Umm Qasr Naval Base Infrastructure
- **Challenges**
 - Infrastructure – magazine, warehouses and simulators, Pier and seawall construction difficulties⁴⁸
 - Overcome IMOD Maritime Blindness to generate Navy
 - 15 Patrol Boats – training and integration
 - 4 Patrol Ships – return to Umm Qasr
 - 2 Offshore Vessels
 - Review doctrine and professionalize the force
 - Command and control
 - 31 Dec 2011 – delivery of Maritime Security

USF-I provided the following listed in April 2010, emphasizing both new acquisitions and a continued emphasis on trainings and readiness:

⁴⁷ MNSTC-I. “Iraqis celebrate arrival of Patrol Ship Nasir.” November 13, 2009. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28654&Itemid=128

⁴⁸ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), January 29, 2010, p. 66.

- **Accomplishments**
 - Force Generation
 - Naval Squadron at 57 vessels (4 Patrol Ships, 5 PB + FAB)
 - 2 Marine Battalions
 - Training
 - KAAOT perimeter defense
 - IqMpoint defense of ABOT (CTF-IM oversight)
 - Compliant Board and Search of merchant vessels
- **Initiatives**
 - Ambitious shipbuilding program
 - Final 2 Patrol Ships arrived from Italy in 12 Feb 10
 - 1st (of 15) Patrol Boat due from US in Aug 2010
 - 1st (of 2) Offshore Support Vessels due from US in Late 2011
 - Umm Qasr Naval Base Infrastructure investment
 - Command and Control facilities for IqNOps HQ,
 - OPLATS, and key ships supported by secure C4 network
 - Repair and sustainment infrastructure
- **Challenges**
 - Manning
 - Logistics and Maintenance
 - Iraqi infrastructure investment
 - C4ISR competence
 - Networks
 - Operations

The Iraqi Parliament did make progress in expanding the Navy on October 13th, 2009. It passed a security agreement to train and support Iraqi Navy forces responsible for protecting the Um Qasr port.⁴⁹ The agreement, aimed at protecting important oil terminals in southern Iraq, outlines that the UK will send 100 members of the British Navy to train Iraqi forces so that they are able to secure Iraq's only access point on the Persian Gulf.

Trade through the Um Qasr port is the country's second largest source of revenue (after oil) and Iraq ships most of its petroleum through two main terminals off the coast of Basra. This is an important step to rebuilding Iraq's struggling Navy, which hopes to expand by 50 percent, from 2,000 to 3,000 personnel, by 2010.⁵⁰ It also hopes to purchase combat patrol boats and other vessels from the British Navy.

Iraqi Intelligence Services

The capabilities of Iraq's intelligence services are increasing, but they have suffered from interference by the Prime Minister's office and from other internal power struggles. They will still need years of continued US aid in both internal security operations and in dealing with any potential threats from neighboring countries like Iran. This will involve training, equipment, and intelligence sharing. The details involved are too sensitive for an open-source analysis, but the requirement will exist indefinitely into the future.

⁴⁹ Gina Chon "British Security Pact Passes" *Wall Street Journal* (14 Oct 2009).

⁵⁰ Gina Chon "British Security Pact Passes" *Wall Street Journal* (14 Oct 2009).

US experts note that,⁵¹

The absence of an Iraqi Intelligence Law that delineates roles and missions of organizations, with clear legal mandates and C2 mechanisms, continued to hamper progress between the organizations. The responsibility and purview of the collective organizations are not clearly established and the legal boundaries for information collection are neither established nor agreed upon. Additionally, the absence of standardized security and clearance protocols continued to have a negative impact on sharing of information among IqIC members, and between the IqIC and U.S. partners. However, within the IqIC, secure voice and data information sharing were increasingly possible as the Iraqi Intelligence Network (I2N) continued to proliferate to units of the MoD and MoI throughout Iraq.

USF-I summarized the following accomplishments, initiatives, and challenges in the Iraqi intelligence effort in April 2010:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Established functional MoD and MoI intelligence
 - MoD: Directorate General for Intelligence and Security and Armed Services intelligence organizations
 - MoI: National Information & Investigation Agency (NIIA)
 - Improved training and operational facilities
 - Established and expanded national secure voice and data communication network (I2N)
 - Established imagery & mapping support to GoI
 - Established common MoD / MoI HUMINT training program
 -
- **Initiatives**
 - Establish document and media exploitation center to augment newly acquired collection capability
 - Develop national-to-tactical signals intelligence architecture with supporting cross-ministerial / agency ties
 - Train and equip Iraqi Army tactical intelligence units
 - Implement common data basing and link analysis software and sharing across ISF
 - Increase secure network's use and improve long-distance bandwidth and reliability
- **Challenges**
 - Sustainment of training and equipment
 - Funds available to ISF for intelligence purposes
 - Reluctant information sharing between agencies and centers
 - Immature security policy and controls with limited security enforcement / institutional mindset
 - MoD personnel shortage in MoD intelligence organizations

The Iraqi intelligence services also lack the full range of necessary legal guidelines. Iraq does not have an intelligence law, and in its absence a number of intelligence agencies have been formed. The relationships, areas of operation, and even legality of some

⁵¹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 53-58, and Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), p. 45.

agencies remains unclear. According to the DoD “The absence of an Iraqi intelligence law that delineates roles and missions of organizations, with clear legal established mandates and command and control mechanisms, continues to hamper progress between the organizations. Additionally, the absence of standardized security and clearance protocols continues to have a negative impact on sharing of information among IqIC members and between the IqIC and U.S. partners.”⁵²

Iraqi Special Forces

One key force stands aside from both the MoD and MoI, although its position is deeply controversial. The Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force (INCTF) is headed by the ministerial-level Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB). It includes the Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC) and Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF). Iraq has been able to generate a very capable special ISOF force over the past five years, despite the instability and resource constraints facing the ISF. Iraq’s special operations forces are some of the best trained indigenous forces in the region. Current ISOF deployments are shown in **Figure 12.14**. The CTC is the operational headquarters for combating terrorism in Iraq. It exercises command and control over ISOF units that execute combat operations. INCTF advisors also monitor personnel accountability, promotions, and personnel policies of ISOF. At the same time, one of its key functions is to improve coordination between the INCTF, MoD and MoI in strategic-level planning, targeting, and intelligence fusion.

USF-I summarized the accomplishments, initiatives, and challenges in the Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force as follows in April 2010:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Most capable tactical assault force in Iraq
 - Growth from 1 battalion in 2003 to the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) with 2 brigades and 9 subordinate battalions
 - Ability to conduct operations unilaterally (reliant on US for ISR, MEDEVAC and Air support)
 - Created an Iraqi Special Warfare Center and School (ISWCS)

- **Initiatives**
 - Generate the force to achieve minimum essential capability
 - Develop strategic and operational level processes
 - Establish collaborative interagency approach to CT
 - Coordinate with MoD for RW CT capability
 - Establish relationships with regional SOF partners

⁵² Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 42


- **Challenges**

- Council of Representatives has not passed Counter-Terrorism Law
- Budget Shortfalls
- Generating the Force
- Sustaining the Force

As has been touched upon earlier, there are also political problems. Control of the INCTF, CTB, and Iraqi Special Forces has been the subject of controversy and a power struggle between Prime Minister Maliki and the CoR. Under Prime Minister Directive 61, signed in April 2007, the INCTF has been independent of both the MoD and MoI. Legislation awaiting Council of Representatives (CoR) approval is intended to make the CTB its own ministry, which would give the Prime Minister direct control over the CTB and Iraq's Special Forces. According to the DoD, "The CoR's delay in addressing the CTS Law makes the Prime Minister's ability to fund CTS problematic and is impacting maintenance and sustainment programs in the CTS."⁵³

⁵³ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 63

Figure 12.14: Iraqi Special Operations Forces



Source: Elliot, DJ. "Iraqi Special Operations Force Growing and Adding Light Armor?" Montrose Toast. November 11, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djae/site/?blog/view/36/Strengths and Weakness in the Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police and Security Capabilities>

The Peshmerga

At some point, Iraq must also clarify the status of the Peshmerga. They either need to be integrated fully into the ISF of given some clearly defined level of autonomy. It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the size and character of Kurdish forces. The disposition, equipment levels, and training of the forces under the KRG all remain unclear. However, unofficial reports from U.S. military sources indicate that the Peshmerga have been organized into a brigade-centric infantry force with some armor and artillery support units. Most Kurdish forces remain divided between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, although these were officially united under one ministry in 2009. The approximate size and composition of the Peshmerga as of late 2008 is as follows:

- PUK Peshmerga—Projected residual force: ~ 27,800
- PUK Peshmerga—Earmarked for transfer to 16th Division IA: ~ 14,700
- KDP Peshmerga—Projected residual force: ~ 40,000
- KDP Peshmerga—Earmarked for transfer to 15th Division: ~ 14,700
- KDP Zervani: ~ 30,000 (former Peshmerga transferred to Interior Ministry)
- Total: ~127,200⁵⁴

Increasing tensions between the IA and Peshmerga in 2009 led to the formation of joint US-Kurdish-Iraqi patrols in northern Iraq, beginning in the spring of 2009. The US provides one battalion per each IA and Peshmerga brigade taking part in the joint patrols. These patrols have been somewhat successful in dampening tensions, as well as training the Kurdish forces for a possible transfer to GoI control.

The KRG and GoI have engaged in discussion for years now to incorporate Peshmerga forces into two new IA divisions. The two divisions involved in joint patrols, the Peshmerga 15th and 16th divisions, are the ones slated for incorporation into the IA. These contentious discussions have been deadlocked, primarily over monetary issues. As of early 2010, no official GoI announcement had been made regarding the incorporation of these new divisions. However, the negotiations appeared to be moving forward in 2010. In January 2010, Niqash met Mahmoud al-Sangawi, Secretary General of the Peshmerga forces and member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), stated that the 15th and 16th divisions were already “under the command of the Iraqi army and receive their military instructions from Baghdad.”⁵⁵ While this does not mean that the divisions have been integrated, it is clearly a sign of progress towards full integration.

⁵⁴ Lt. Col. Dennis P. Chapman, *Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government*, U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Civilian Research Project, 2009, pg. 112.

⁵⁵ Mahmoud, Shakhwan. “sangawi: the peshmerga will not be integrated into the iraqi army.” *Niqash* January 22, 2010. <http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2590&lang=0>

The Role the US Can Play

Any effective US effort must have two phases. During 2010-2011, US military missions in Iraq must provide a combination of contingency capabilities and military support or enablers, focus on “responsible withdrawal,” and find ways to “put the Iraqis in the lead.” After that time, US forces will withdraw from Iraq and possibly set up an aid and advisory mission, so long as Iraq requests this type of support.

From 2012 onwards, the US role in Iraq will be to provide military and civilian advisors, military assistance, FMS, and other arms sales to create strong and independent Iraqi military forces. This requires continuing efforts to create armed forces that can defend Iraq’s own interests and help bring security and stability to the Gulf. It also requires continuing efforts to create police and security forces that can help Iraq make the transition to domestic peacetime security and rule of law. These efforts will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 13.

The US will also need to provide IMET training funding, military aid funds, and rapid response Foreign Military Sales to help the Iraqi government, and to provide the incentives needed for lasting cooperation, the professional development of the ISF, interoperability, and suitable contingency capabilities. These resources will help the United States come to the aid of Iraq quickly and effectively in an emergency. The post-2011 US team will also need to work closely with Iraq so that it can regain the capability to defend its own territory from neighboring states like Iran and other potential threats. This will require US support in foreign military sales, and the transfer of lead systems like the M-1 tank and F-16 fighter.

There are other aspects of the US effort that need attention:

- *Today’s top commanders need to carefully consider their own eventual rotation and the fact that much of the most experienced team members will rotate out, presenting major problems in terms of continuity, influence, and relations with Iraqis.* There will be a real need to avoid bloc rotations, provide special incentives for continuity, and ensure a careful hand-off during the critical transition period from 2011 to 2012.

This raises the issue of whether special cadres of US military and civilians are needed that are recruited to spend several years to provide continuity to the US effort and above all to maintain US relationships with Iraqis on a personnel level. There needs to be a better bridge across rotations. Even when these involved personnel with multiple tours, they sometimes involve one year of experience in different areas at different tasks. Providing special pay and incentives could be of great importance, particularly given the turbulence in US-Iraqi relations that will come from downsizing the US presence and shifting to civilian lead.

At the same time, the strain of years of effort and repeated tours of duty requires special attention to avoiding sudden changes in assignments, extensions of duty, cancellations of leave, etc. It may take some special arrangements but I would try to ensure longer overlaps, earlier arrivals of rotations, and some surplus of critical personnel to avoid any risk of burn out.

- *Create a full spectrum I/O campaign to communicate US actions, intentions, and help to the Iraqi people.* There are reports that a long term I/O plan for the transition is being developed. This seems critical. It would be far better if the Iraqi government took the lead, but the US needs to keep Iraqis and others in the region steadily informed about the pace of US force cuts, shifts in the role of the remaining US forces, the value of US advice and aid, economic and governance reform and support efforts, investment, etc. This needs to show trends, report progress and go far

beyond the PAO type of announcement of individual developments to try to shape public understanding. It was not clear that the Iraqi government had yet made the proper level of effort even to explain the withdrawal of US combat forces from the cities, and if it does not, we must.

- *The country team also needs to carry out an I/O campaign in the US.* It needs to constantly remind the US of the strategic value and benefits of the effort in Iraq in the most specific terms possible. It is far too easy in the US to forget that the goal is not winning the war but creating an enduring strategic relationship in a critical region. Constantly talking about energy, the global economy, the regional threat of terrorism, Iran, etc, may seem redundant, but it is not. Constantly highlighting the benefits to the US and Iraq of the best outcome of the Strategic Framework Agreement is equally important. Given AfPak, the financial crisis, etc, there simply are too many distractions and other priorities to let this slip, and there is a tendency to assume understanding.

Finally, the US must make a major effort to help Iraq create and implement a coherent long-term force development effort. One approach that members of the US country team have suggested is to set up a planning cell that combines US military, diplomatic, and intelligence expertise to author regularly updated plans that help develop ISF forces and deal with contingency options. Such a cell could help bring together the civil and military side of the US effort, take advantage of the expertise that only an in-country presence can provide, and help ensure that US efforts really do provide mid and long term support at the level needed.

There are some practical examples of such efforts. MNSTC-I established a Partnership Strategic Group to look at both near-term needs for force development and long-term needs beyond 2011. It encouraged long-term planning, requiring parts of the team to look beyond present issues and focus on future efforts through 2012. This kind of practice needs to be institutionalized at every level in civil-military plans helping to develop the ISF. The present is so challenging that it is tempting to constantly deal with the next immediate critical deadline or the present tour of duty. However, the US must consistently look to the future and constantly recalibrate its plans to reflect new developments, and make plans that take account of the future, or at least the period between 2012 and 2014.

13. The Ministry of Interior, Iraqi Police and Internal Security Forces

The second major area of US-Iraqi security cooperation will be to improve the Ministry of the Interior and police forces. The US has had a great deal of trouble in generating Iraqi police forces, and the training and capabilities of the Iraqi Police are in many ways far behind those of the IA. Responsibility for this aspect of the US advisory and assistance effort will transfer to the State Department and its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) during the course of US withdrawal from Iraq from 2010 - 2011.

This transfer will require careful attention. INL has formal responsibility for promoting modernization of and supporting operations by foreign criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies, but its functions focus on law enforcement and the counter-terrorism mission rather than paramilitary or combat missions. This presented serious problems in the past when the forces INL was training and supporting were thrust into combat, and when their mission included more demanding paramilitary tasks. INL has never been able to handle the scale of effort required to build the Iraqi police forces and MoI during an insurgency. It is far from clear whether INL will be able to handle the task of supporting the development of the MoI and police forces once the US military hands responsibility over.

Strength in Numbers

Figure 13.1 shows the structure and strength of MoI forces in June 2009, and manning levels in late February 2010. It is striking that the data for 2010 show that the assigned personnel for the MoI are 1.7 times larger than the regular armed forces if one does not include all of the 90,000 facilities protection forces left out of the MoI total. The ratio is 2:1 if the FPS are included.

It is also important to note that the total ISF manning of over 663,000 personnel is equal to 8 percent of the total labor force of 8,175,000 as estimated by the CIA, 12 percent of the population of 5,711,000 adult males, and over 2 percent of the total population of 28,946,000. The MoI total manning of over 413,000 is equal to 5 percent of the total labor force as estimated by the CIA, 7 percent of the adult males, and over 1.4 percent of the population. This may well be an unsustainable number in the long run, and is an issue that will require careful planning and attention once the insurgency is fully defeated and Iraq can turn more of its resources to economic development.⁵⁶ **Figure 13.1** gives an estimated strength of MoI forces in 2010 compared to the goals listed for 2009.

⁵⁶ Calculations based on USF-I reporting as of April 7, 2010; and the data on Iraq in the CIA World Factbook as accessed on April 18, 2010 at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>.

As has been discussed earlier in Chapter 12, however, such comparisons have little real world validity and do not portray anything approaching the real world trends in the MoI in 2009-2010. There is no meaningful way to compare the data for 2009 with the data for 2010 because of constant changes in reporting methods for the ISF. There is still no reliable reporting on actual manning versus authorized or assigned manpower, and no way to know the real world impact of attrition, AWOL, “ghost” personnel and authorized leave on actual manning. The actual number of personnel in the field at any given time is difficult to calculate, but is likely to be significantly lower than official manning figures.

Figure 13.1: Development of Iraqi Interior Forces

Goals in June 2009

Interior Forces	<u>Current Set</u>		<u>Target Growth 2009</u>
	Personnel	Key Units/Forces/Capabilities	Key Units/Forces/Enablers
Iraqi Police	300,373	1300 police stations	+5 Headquarters contracted +40 Stations contracted +117 River Patrol Boats +12 CET
Federal Police	46,580	4Div HQs 15 BDE 1 Sustainment BDE 52 BNs	+18K to finish forming 4 th Div, 5 th Div +260 Armored Vehicles
Border Enforcement	45,000	13BDE; 48 BNs 6 Commando BNs	+13K (to include PoE) +260 UAH +2 Tugs; +20 Patrol Boat; +6 Gunboats
POE	2,087	29 Points of Entry (POE) 17 Land; 7 Air; 5 Sea	+Enhanced Technologies +Standard POE design
Oil Police	29,954	1 Directorate HQ, 3 Regional Directorate HQ 8 Pipeline Security BN 1 Emergency BN 35 Sections (pt security)	+7 BNs +45 Fuel & Water Tankers; +40 Busses =80 Cargo Trucks; +10 Road Graders
Total Police	415,566		
With FPS	433,214		

Assigned Manning in April 2010*

Iraqi Police Service (PS)	298,540
Federal Police (FP)	43,511
Border Enforcement	40,205
Oil Police	29,316
Point of Entry Enforcement	2,041
Total	413,613

* Does not include 90,000 personnel in MoI part of Facilities Protection Force

Source: MNSTC-I, June 3, 2009; MNSTC-I, January 29, 2010, and USF-I, April 7 2010.

Improving Ministerial Capacity

The US effort to assist the Ministry of the Interior will also involve many of the challenges in dealing with Iraqi forces that affect the Ministry of Defense. The MoI and its forces have made steady progress since 2007, and made some progress in 2009 in spite of Iraq's current budget crisis. The MoI improved its planning and budget execution efforts, developed a three year strategic plan for 2010-2012, and began to coordinate its planning with provincial governments. It has developed better financial management and tracking systems, set up Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCCs), and has improved its acquisition system. It is also in the process of creating a steadily more effective National Command Center (NCC) to improve the level of near time coordination with other national-level command centers and other ministries.⁵⁷

The MoI's Budget Problems

Like the MoD, the MoI must deal with serious budget problems. **Figure 13.2** shows both the degree to which Iraq has taken responsibility for funding the development of its forces and the extent to which personnel costs alone dominate Iraqi security spending. Like the MoD, some 83% of the MoI's operating budget is allocated to salaries and labor programs, which leaves limited capacity for other major budget programs. Its capital budget is limited and recent budget cuts have meant that the MoI has not fully funded some 98 projects.

In spite of the overall rise in Iraqi spending, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) still faces severe budgetary constraints. It had a budget of \$5.5 billion in 2009, far below the planned level of \$7.8 billion. About \$4.3 billion of its actual budget for 2009 went to salaries and life support, putting 79% into non-discretionary expenditures. This left the MoI with about \$1.1 billion for procurement, O&M and infrastructure -- \$620 million for goods and services (O&M, in US terms), \$310 million for non-financial assets (procurement, in US terms), \$220 million for infrastructure (new construction), and \$2 million for other expenditures. There was little money for procurement, and the MoI had to drastically curtail its spending.

The MoI executed \$4.3 billion of its \$5.7 billion allocated budget from January through December 2008, which equates to roughly 75% of its total budget.⁵⁸ The Department of Defense reports that,

The MoI's 2009 operating and capital budgets are a combined \$5.5 billion. The \$4.3 billion used for employee compensation accounted for 79% of the MoI's total 2009 budget. Latency in reporting monthly expenditures by the MoI's 24 spending units hinders its ability to accurately

⁵⁷ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 46-47.

⁵⁸ Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) briefing of November 6, 2009. Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252) (Dated June 2009, but issued in August.)

track budget execution and affects its ability to make timely budget decisions.⁵⁹

Infrastructure, procurement, maintenance, and goods and services account for \$1.2 billion of the MoI's budget, with the MoI presently experiencing a lack of capacity to execute in these areas. Overall, the MoI is on a path to exceed its 2008 expenditure rate based on senior ministry leadership involvement in the budget execution process. For the MoI annual budgeting process, the desired end state is to synchronize the bottom up submission of budget estimates with top down mission priority planning, which will enable the MoI to integrate prioritized mission requirements with available resources.⁶⁰

The MoI has, however, improved its ability to execute its budget, and the 2009 operating and capital budget is expected to be “fully” executed within the fiscal limits imposed by the budget crisis.⁶¹ While years of further effort are still required, the Department reports that,

The MoI registered a major advance in planning maturity with the August 2009 release of its first-ever Three-Year Strategic Plan (covering the years 2010-2012). This document serves as the basis for projecting annual budget requirements, establishing spending priorities, and “nesting” operational activities within MoI's strategic goals. By explicitly linking planning to resource allocation, this process addresses a weakness of prior planning efforts at the MoI.⁶²

..[T]he MoI worked throughout the 2010 planning cycle to link the annual planning effort with the budget formulation process led by the MoI Directorate of Finance. Provinces and ministerial directorates formulated their respective operational-level plans, which were consolidated to support the 2010 budget request, which was forwarded to the MoF in August 2009.⁶³

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Interior will be hard pressed to cover all of its operating costs as it assimilates police forces from other ministries, accelerates its training, invests increasingly in equipment and maintenance, builds new police stations, and continues to take over security missions from the Army. Unless the Iraqi government rapidly scales up its oil production, which is not likely given Iraq's poor infrastructure, the MoI will most likely need financial and advisory assistance from the United States.

⁵⁹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 48-49.

⁶⁰ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 48-49.


⁶¹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 45

⁶² Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 48-49.

⁶³ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 48-49.

Figure 13.2

Iraqi and US Funding of the MoI and MoD by Year



Source: United States Forces –Iraq Advising and Training and NATO Training Mission –Iraq, *Mission Brief*, April 2010, p. 24.

Other Key Problems in the MoI

Like the MoD, the MoI faces serious personnel shortfalls, and its detention facilities are inadequate and present human rights problems. Professionalization and training need improvement at every level, operational planning and execution need improvement, and logistics and sustainability present serious problems.⁶⁴ There is, however, no way to

⁶⁴ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 44-49.

estimate the level of such shortfalls because on the lack of any reliable data on trends in authorized and assigned strength, and the total lack of data on actual strength.

Moreover, Iraq is only beginning to integrate its police development efforts into an overall effort to create an effective justice system, and create the conditions in which to enforce an effective rule of law. There is a serious lack of coordination, and often serious tension, between the police and the judiciary, which inhibits the process of evidence gathering and prevents cases from being effectively developed and processed in Iraqi courts. The Department of Defense reported in January 2010 that,⁶⁵

The MoI court system continues to evolve, and significant progress is being made in judicial capacity building. Since hearings began in July 2008, the number of cases heard has increased each month, and the number of cases returned for further investigation or procedural correction has dropped from a high of 92% in August 2008 to a low of 18% in June 2009. These trends indicate a steady increase in the knowledge and professionalism of investigators and lower court judges. However, a lack of knowledge of the relevant MoI laws persists within the ISF. Thus, the continued professionalization of judicial officers remains a priority.

Similarly, SIGIR noted that,⁶⁶

U.S. government personnel are...working with the MOI and the Iraqi courts—IJs in particular—to improve the operating relationships between IJs and police. One goal of this ongoing effort is to mitigate the delay caused when investigative files are transferred between police and judges for further investigation. To this end, Rule of Law Advisors (RoLAs) working in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have established Criminal Justice Coordination Councils to encourage Iraqi police, judges, and military to work together and share information.

In the long term, INL is developing the Iraq Higher Judicial Council Court Administration Project, which will allow the HJC to increase its capacity in all aspects of judicial administration, including standardizing a national case management system (initially, via a manual system, and thereafter, through a phased-in computer system). The HJC currently lacks a central system for case management, and often there is little case tracking.

The MoI faces other challenges that affect its civil operations. A lack of governance, essential government services, and government spending help create further sectarian and ethnic problems, making it difficult for these forces to deal with high levels of crime and corruption. It still is more dangerous to be a member of the Iraqi police than to be an Iraqi soldier, and police support and facilities are inadequate for the types of operations the ISF encounter day to day.

Corruption continues to cause serious additional problems. A report by the inspector general of the Interior Ministry paid particular attention to the problems caused by bribery at security checkpoints – if insurgents can pay security guards to let them pass

⁶⁵ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010) p. 50.

⁶⁶ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, p. 53. SIGIR reported a wide range of additional problems in its December 2009 *Quarterly Report*. See pages 45-49.

without inspection then they can easily reach their targets without being stopped.⁶⁷ The blast that killed over 150 people at the Justice Ministry on October 25th was carried out by two trucks filled with explosives that had to pass through several checkpoints before reaching their destination, which indicates that inspection techniques are not sufficient to stop these kinds of attacks or that the insurgents were able to pass through with the help of Iraqi police.

Corruption has also been pervasive at higher levels of authority – money is skimmed off salaries, contracts are manipulated, commanders list non-existent police officers on their rosters and police officers are sometimes fired without accompanying cuts in funding for their salaries. Furthermore, criminals and insurgents can buy their own freedom with a well-placed bribe and detainees are often abused by guards to extort money from their relatives.⁶⁸

There have been reports of bribery and money laundering at all levels of the security apparatus in Iraq and no clear solution has emerged as to how the government can curb these types of corruption. The Board of Supreme Audits has found that the only way they can only successfully monitor the use of funds is by visiting every local and federal police station in the country every day.

But these audits have high financial and personal costs in some cases. People often wield their power to prevent the Board from reporting on a misuse of funds. For example, when the head of the Board of Supreme Audits, Abdul Bassit Turki, issued an audit report on the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Court (set up to rule on crimes committed during Saddam Hussein's rule), one of the judges issued an arrest warrant for him on a count of "extermination of the human race." This charge was later changed to "fraud."⁶⁹

At a different level, local and provincial leaders seek control or influence over the elements of the ISF in a given area, and the police have become an increasing part of local political power. Control over Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior jobs, promotions, procurements, and contracts are all elements of political power and will inevitably be affected by political rivalries– as will the real world policies shaping the sectarian and ethnic balance within the ISF, and any further efforts at de-Ba'athification. Depending on the results of the election, this could lead to considerable political turbulence within the ISF.

⁶⁷ Marc Santora "Corruption Rattles Iraq's Fragile State" *The New York Times* (29 Oct 2009)

⁶⁸ Marc Santora "Corruption Rattles Iraq's Fragile State" *The New York Times* (29 Oct 2009)

⁶⁹ Marc Santora "Corruption Rattles Iraq's Fragile State" *The New York Times* (29 Oct 2009)

This explains why the Ministry of Interior and all elements of the Iraqi police forces face continuing challenges in institution building, and will require help in developing core competence in a number of areas. Interviews with Coalition experts in 2009, and data provided by USF-I experts in April 2010, revealed that help would be needed in the following key areas:

- Assimilation, professionalization, and specialization.
- Strategic planning and programming, linked to shrinking budget.
- Utilizing information technology.
- Land jurisdiction issues,
- Transition to police primacy.
- Limited staff capability.
- Fully developing specialist units.
- Need to improve maintenance and sustainment capability.
- Continued focus on education, training, and promotion by merit.

Interviews with Coalition and USF-I experts revealed the following additional challenges:

- Forcing growth under a limited budget.
- Assimilation of other police forces (Oil, FPS, Electricity, etc.)
- Officer manning,
- Absorb part of Sons of Iraq
- Training backlog (police, oil police, FPS).
- Lack of key trained personnel and forensic skills and equipment.
- Inadequate detention facilities operating far beyond capacity with no real survey of the scale of the problem. Poor handling of juveniles.
- Border police ineffective, often illiterate (40%), and cannot provide surveillance.
- Port of entry police poorly trained, corrupt, and subject to political influence.
- Large numbers of Federal Police and regular police devoted to personal security details (PSDs) for senior Iraqi officials.
- Limited retention of trained personnel, and many locally recruited forces are poorly trained or lack training.

- Tensions between judges and the officials in the justice system and the police, and poor communication and trust between them, Lack of police training to provide evidence and proper investigations necessary to ensure convictions now that Iraq is increasingly returning to the rule of law.

Experts did report, however, that the MoI forces were making continued progress, and listed the following ongoing initiatives:

- Ministerial vision translated to planning.
- Strategic communications.
- Information technology.
- Foster ethical, professional, non-sectarian behavior.
- Border focus – security and throughput.
- Demonstrate that Iraq is a suitable environment for international investments.
- Integrate prioritized mission requirements with available resources⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), January 29, 2010, p. 49.

Uncertain Plans to Expand the Forces under the Ministry of Interior

The MoI does not have stable plans for ultimate force size. It is clear, however, that the MoI sought to expand its forces to a total of more than 400,000 authorized personnel in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), National Police (NP), and Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) alone as of early 2009.⁷¹ These plans have largely been put on hold since the budget crisis began in 2009. They forced a manpower freeze in 2009, are limiting MoI plans for near term expansion, and are delaying efforts to meet equipment and sustainment priorities.⁷²

The Federal Police

Each group of forces under the MoI performs different roles and has different needs. The Federal Police (formerly called the National Police) have largely corrected the massive problems they faced with corruption and sectarianism from 2006 to 2007. While major problems remain, widespread corruption as well as killings and intimidation motivated by ethnic or sectarian differences seem to be a thing of the past. The current structure of the Federal Police is shown in **Figure 13.3**.

The Department of Defense reported in October, 2009 that the Federal Police had become an important paramilitary force, one reorganized to the point that it now serves as an effective national force, rather than as a source of sectarian abuses:⁷³

“The Iraqi FP continues to improve the effectiveness of its units. Based on this improvement, U.S. advisors have shifted their focus from battalion-level advising to advising at the brigade-level and above. The exception is the newly-formed FP battalions that require more assistance to develop a capability for unilateral operations. U.S. advisors continue to assess FP unit capabilities and distribute and realign training teams to units requiring additional assistance. The Italian *Carabinieri* continue to train, advise, and assist with the professionalization of the FP through the NTM-I.⁷⁴

The newly-designated Iraqi Federal Police...will expand with the completion of the 3rd Division units in the northern region and continue generation of the 4th Division HQs and units in the southern region; however, the budget for 2009 will limit desired growth. Additionally, the FP will assume three new security force missions (the Central Bank of Iraq Security Force, Embassy Protection Force, and the Antiquities and Ruins Security Force) once force generation resumes.

⁷¹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252) (Dated June 2009, but issued in August.)

⁷² Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), January 31, 2010, p. 43.

⁷³ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 41-42.

⁷⁴ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 49-50.

With these additional missions and in consideration of budget restraints, the 2009 authorization for the FP has increased to more than 46,000 members. The FP Commander envisions expansion to more than 86,000 by 2012. The FP wants to recruit and train to complete formation of the new 3rd and 4th Division units. However, MoI budget shortfalls for 2009 will limit the FP's ability to hire, train, and equip the personnel required reach the desired end strength.

The Federal Police have taken up an additional role since the withdrawal of most US forces from the cities in June 2009: providing escort duty to US convoys through Iraqi cities. As of September 2009 they appeared to be carrying out this duty effectively. The FP do, however, face serious force development challenges, outlined by the Defense Department:⁷⁵

The Iraqi FP will expand with the completion of the 3rd Division units in the northern region, and the continued force generation of the 4th Division HQs and units in the southern region. Additionally, the IFP will assume three new security force missions (the Central Bank of Iraq, Embassy Protection Force, and the Antiquities and Ruins Security Force) once force generation resumes. With these additions and consideration of budget restraints, the 2009 authorization for the FP has increased to 46,580 members.

The FP Commander plans to incorporate IPS Emergency Response Units within the FP as an alternative to address FP personnel shortages. The FP currently has limited ability to staff the newly-formed 4th Division beyond a cadre force of varying strength, and they will struggle to build the new special security unit. The FP, as of October 2009, has 86 personnel trained to the NATO standard. The 3rd Division, with four brigades assigned, has expanded to provide a presence in Diyala, Mosul, Salah ad Din, and Anbar. The 4th Division, with one operational Brigade and two Brigades in force generation, has a presence in Wasit, Maysan, and Baghdad.

The FP continues to have success in recruiting across most of Iraq's ethnic and religious sects in each province. A notable exception is in the KRG controlled provinces that are expected to bring better balance to the ethnic makeup of the force in the future. The FP has a large roster of people wanting to join their ranks. The Iraqi people view the FP personnel as a federal force that is not tied to local influences and corruption due to the FP commander's requirement for FP personnel to move from their hometown region and his record of dismissal or punishment of those who engage in corruption.

Continued expansion of the FP into the provinces is supported by a three-year plan to base a brigade-sized FP force in each province, with a regionally based division HQ controlling these units and division support battalions providing logistical support. Additionally, the FP HQ is requesting its own budget to be able to conduct operations and sustainment without having to request funding from the MoI. As of November 2009, the FP HQ has available properties in the provinces to base each of the 14 brigade HQs. Finally, the continued support of the MoI is required to plan the equipping and infrastructure improvements required for the new units, as well as the ongoing need to replenish existing unit equipment and improve unit basing locations.

In 2009, the Federal Police were composed of four divisions and 17 brigades, with 42,000 personnel.⁷⁶ The authorized manpower for the FP rose to 46,000 personnel in

⁷⁵ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 52-53.

⁷⁶ Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq. Public Affairs Office, Phoenix Base. “Iraqi National Police Renamed Federal Police.” August 3, 2009. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27481&Itemid=128

2009, and the force may expand to as many as 86,000 by 2012.⁷⁷ While an overall hiring freeze remains in place, the FP was expanding by retraining and converting provincial Emergency Response Units (ERUs) into FP. Experts estimated that the FP could convert 6 brigades per year from provincial ERUs.⁷⁸ They indicated that the FP stationed in the KRG would probably be composed of Kurdish Special Police that transferred into the FP. As many as 30,000 Kurdish special police could transfer to the FP.⁷⁹ The FP also appear to be establishing an aviation squadron, and were expanding to put a brigade headquarters in every province of Iraq, including in the KRG region.⁸⁰ In another small but important sign of progress, the first women graduated from training to join the FP in late 2009.

⁷⁷ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 50

⁷⁸ Elliot, D.J. “Iraqi “Nationalization” Program.” *Montrose Toast*. December 8, 2009 . <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/pwpimages/Nationalization-mod.JPG>


⁷⁹ Elliot, D.J. “Partnering the ISF and Peshmerga.” *Montrose Toast*. January 31, 2010. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/49/>

⁸⁰ Elliot, D.J. “Iraqi Security Force Update: September 2009.” *Montrose Toast*. September 2, 2009. <http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/29/>

Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq. Public Affairs Office, Phoenix Base. “Iraqi National Police Renamed Federal Police.” August 3, 2009. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=27481&Itemid=128

Figure 13.3: The Iraqi Federal Police

(Map includes MoI Emergency Response Battalions, Provincial Emergency Response Battalions, and Provincial SWAT battalions as well)



Source: Elliot, DJ. "Iraqi "Nationalization" Program." Montrose Toast. December 8, 2009 .
<http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/pwpimages/Nationalization-mod.JPG>

The Iraqi Police Service and Other Elements of the Police

MNSTC-I and the Department of Defense reported in early 2010 that the Iraqi police and other forces under the Ministry of Interior have made significant progress in a number of areas. There are some 108 battalions of provincial or "regular" police.

The Department of Defense reported in January 2010 that the Iraqi Police Service IPS consisted of, “all provincial police forces (station, patrol, traffic, and special units) assigned to the 18 Iraqi provinces in more than 1,300 police stations across Iraq.”⁸¹ The IPS directs policy and strategic planning and has technical control over the training, vetting, and hiring of *Shurta*, or police officers. It also reported that, “IPS operational performance has improved with each operation; it is increasingly becoming a professional force that has begun to support the rule of law throughout Iraq in conjunction with the maturing court system. The disparate elements that make up the IPS are also starting to provide cross-department support to each other.”⁸²

At the same time, discussions with US experts in Iraq made it clear that bringing the various elements of the Iraqi police to the proper readiness needed to ensure sufficient security and stability will require a continuing effort through at least 2014. For all of their progress, many elements of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) still had low competence, showed little initiative, faced massive problems with corruption, and only about half of their assigned personnel had any real training.

USF-I summarized the accomplishments, ongoing initiatives, and key challenges in the IPS as follows in April 2010:

- **Accomplishments**

- Force Generation –Provincial, Border, Oil, Customs, and Federal Police Forces
- Training and Qualifications Institute
- Initiated specialized forces (EOD, K9, SWAT)
- Federal Police Professionalization
- Integrated female Shurta / Officers
- Training backlog eliminated (90k to zero)

- **Initiatives**

- Foster ethical, professional, non-sectarian behavior; anti-corruption measures
- Integrate technology (C2, surveillance)
- Implement/sustain professional training
- Build layered counter explosives capability
- Evidence based prosecution -Forensics
- Investigations

- **Challenges**

- Shift force generation to professionalization
- Counter Explosives
- Crime scene management and exploitation

⁸¹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), p. 53.

⁸² Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 49-50.

- Logistics management, sustainment, and maintenance
- Border and POE security
- Interoperability and C2

Directorate of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Enforcement

The Directorate of Border Enforcement forces face major problems in quality of training and literacy, and the Point of Entry Enforcement forces had serious problems with training as well as with corruption. While it is perhaps impossible to fully secure Iraq's borders, these forces are important as both a source of revenue and for security purposes. The DBE and Ports of Entry Directorate (PoED) are supposed to protect Iraq's 3,631 kilometers of international borders and 28 air, land, and sea ports of entry (PoEs) to, "prevent smuggling, sabotage, and infiltration activities [...] leading to increased security throughout the nation."

The Department of Defense reported in January 2010 that,⁸³

The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) and Ports of Entry Directorate (PoED) continue in their respective responsibilities to protect Iraq's 3,650 kilometers of international borders and 28 air, land, and sea ports of entry to prevent smuggling, sabotage, and infiltration activities.

The DBE is organized into five regions, with 14 Brigades and 53 Battalions, in addition to the Coastal Border Guard, which is under the command of Region 4 located in Basrah. Eight DBE Battalions are mobile Commando Battalions that are under the command of the regional commander. Although the DBE is currently authorized 45,000 personnel by the MoI, the force is envisioned to expand to more than 60,000 by 2012. DBE staffing is adequate to perform the basics of the border control mission. However, with the ongoing construction of border forts and annexes, the DBE saw a need for more personnel to staff these locations. The DBE continued to address the shortfall in basic recruit training and was at nearly 100% trained in basic skills as of October 2009.

The PoED is responsible for administration and security of 13 land ports of entry throughout Iraq, as well as having some presence at the six air ports of entry and five seaports. An additional five ports of entry in the KRG are not recognized or managed by the GoI. The PoED has no formal personnel authorizations. The PoED does not have authority over the numerous tenant ministry organizations at the PoEs, its own operating and maintenance budget, nor independent oversight of future construction efforts. The PoED is pursuing the FMS process in tandem with the MoI and U.S. force partners to support the reconstruction or renovation of four PoEs. This will allow the PoED to take advantage of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) program management, contracting, engineering, and financial management expertise. Moreover, the GoI is in the last stages of selecting non-intrusive inspection equipment (NIIE) with X-ray capabilities for Iraq's land and sea PoEs. This effort is in concert with the U.S. goal of purchasing half of the NIIE.

The most significant challenge to increasing the effectiveness of the DBE and PoED is a viable MoI sustainment system. Poor management and the lack fuel supply, electricity generation, and

⁸³ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 51-52. Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), pp. 54-55.

maintenance have hampered all aspects of border and PoE operations. In addition to this challenge, the DBE and PoED are combating reported incidents of corruption, with ongoing ethics training for employees, re-assignment of personnel between PoEs, and routine swapping of DBE unit areas of operation on the borders.

The Oil Police

The Iraqi Oil Police (OP) are responsible for protecting all oil production infrastructure, including oil fields, pipelines, refineries, convoys, and retail stations throughout Iraq along distribution lines in both remote and urban areas. The OP operates 43 static and 4 mobile battalions in three districts—South, Central, and North. The Department of Defense reported in January 2010 that,⁸⁴

The OP has 43 static battalions and four Mobile Emergency Battalions that have personnel strengths that vary depending on the location and priority of resource. Currently, select units of the IA guard designated areas of the oil production infrastructure, with the MoI scheduled to resume full responsibility for this mission in late 2010. The IA presently guards four major sections of pipeline throughout Iraq, including three critical pipeline exclusion zones (PEZs). The OP four Mobile Emergency Battalions are able to handle this mission but still lack basic required equipment. The MoI and the OP are acquiring \$35 million worth of vehicles, weapons, uniforms, and other specialty equipment.

All OP permanent hire personnel have completed the 240-hour IPS course. OP leaders are actively involved in their organizations and are qualified for their positions with most officers trained in a police or military academy. The only significant shortfall in leadership is found in the junior officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks. This problem continues to be reviewed and a detailed plan developed in conjunction with the MoI.

The Oil Police still lack basic equipment required to perform their mission. Furthermore, the government still has not transitioned the Oil Police from the Ministry of Oil to the Ministry of Interior, which continues to hamper OP capabilities. The MoI is planned to assume full responsibility, however, in late 2010.⁸⁵

The Facilities Protection Services

A separate force, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), is responsible for the protection of critical infrastructure throughout Iraq, including government buildings, mosques and religious sites, hospitals, schools and colleges, dams, highways, and bridges. FPS forces have previously been little more than low grade security guards. They also have been decentralized and divided by ministry and province. They have, however, made significant progress over the last year, even beginning construction of a new training academy in late 2009. The academy is scheduled to be completed by October 2011.⁸⁶ A

⁸⁴ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, p. 52

⁸⁵ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), p. 55.

⁸⁶ Owen, Bob. "Protection Services Break Ground for New Academy (Al Kut)." MNF-I. December 30, 2009. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29137&Itemid=128

pending FPS Reform Law may consolidate all FPS within the MoI except those FPS forces currently detailed to the MoO and MoE, as well as those currently detailed to the High Justice Commission.

The Department of Defense described the FPS as follows in January 2010,⁸⁷

As of October 31, 2009, the FPS had 16,429 IP employees and an additional 75,742 contractors, resulting in total end strength of 92,171. These contractors have met MoI hiring criteria, signed contracts, and receive their salaries through the MoI. The handover of operational control will occur when the FPS consolidation law is passed. The contract signing and payment by the MoI marks a significant step toward consolidation. The projected end strength of this force may be as high as 104,000 when consolidation is complete.

All MoI FPS IP personnel have been trained as of June 1, 2009. MoI FPS IP personnel are trained in the 240-hour IP course. In cooperation with the FPS, ITAM Police is developing a plan to train contractors to the MoI IP standard. U.S. forces, in cooperation with the MoI, are building an FPS training facility in Al Kut, Wasit Province, with a completion date expected in 2010. The FPS has traditionally been the unit with the lowest priority for equipment issue within the MoI and currently has less than 10% of its authorized equipment on hand.

This is a case where the Department's description is distinctly more favorable than those of many US advisors and other personnel in the field. The FPS remain marginal forces at a time when the physical security of Iraqi petroleum and other facilities will be critical to success in attracting and sustaining foreign investment and creating a normal economy. In practice, the OP and FPS still have serious problems in the quality of their training and leadership, and they may require significant further assistance.

Building the Iraqi Police to 2011 and Beyond

The police development effort has lagged consistently behind the effort to develop the Iraqi Armed Forces. There are competent elements within each service, however, especially within the Iraqi Federal Police. Coalition experts list the following mix of accomplishments, initiatives, and challenges:

- **Accomplishments**
 - Expand IPS forces to assume police primacy
 - Develop Training and Qualifications Institute
 - Build 175 of 232 programmed local police stations
 - Periodic Provincial Police Conferences
 - Develop/equip four forensic laboratories

⁸⁷ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), December 31 2009, (pages dated January 29, 2010), p. 25-26.

- Female basic/officer course; coed commissioner's course
- Develop IP and NP strategic visions
- **Initiatives**
 - Complete force generation (MoF cap 476K)
 - Increase Officer Strength (25%)
 - Professional training programs
 - Growing Iraqi K-9 program from 30 to 450 in 3 years
 - Right-sizing of police training centers
 - Leader development programs in foreign countries
 - MoA between Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Oil
 - Define Special Police roles/responsibilities
- **Challenges**
 - Shift from force generation to professionalization
 - Minimum training and performance standards for all MoI police training
 - Oil Police force size determination
 - Equipping an expanding force
 - Completing infrastructure requirements
 - Ensure qualified instructors/leader development

The Sons of Iraq

The Sons of Iraq (SoI) present challenges of a different kind. The task is to absorb some of them into the ISF and employ the rest, rather than continue to sustain them as a separate entity. They were vital to the reduction of violence in 2007-2008, but they have had difficulties re-integrating into the ISF and other security positions. As **Figure 13.4** shows, the problems in absorbing the SoI vary sharply by province.

As of August 2009, only 13,000 of over 100,000 SoIs had been integrated into the ISF.⁸⁸ Another 3,300 had been given other positions in the GoI. General Odierno reported

⁸⁸ Barnes, Julian E., "Analysts See Iraq on Edge," *Chicago Tribune*. August 23, 2009.

continuing progress in September 2009, but also stated that the situation remained somewhat problematic,⁸⁹

As you are aware, the Sons of Iraq program succeeded in drawing many out of the insurgency, giving them the opportunity to serve their communities and earn salaries to support their families. In April, the Government of Iraq assumed responsibility for the Sons of Iraq (SoI) program. Over 23,000 former SoI have transitioned to the Iraqi security forces and other non-security employment since 2008, including over 5,500 in Baghdad over the last two months. In October, over 5,000 more will transition in Baghdad.

Despite budget cuts across the Government of Iraq, the GoI has maintained funding for this program, understanding its importance not only to security but also to building greater trust between the Sunni community and the government. SoI payments through the summer are complete and September pay is ongoing. The GoI goal is to integrate all of the SoI into the ministries at the end of the year, but we do not believe they will meet this deadline. We will continue to monitor the progress of this program very closely.

SIGIR reported in October 2009 that,⁹⁰

The GOI plans to transition 20% of the 95,000 Sons of Iraq (SOI) members into the ISF and reintegrate the remaining 80% into public or private employment, a goal unchanged since the initiative began a year ago. As of September 30, 2009, however, only about half of the 19,000 members slated to enter the ISF have transitioned, about 6,800 have gone to the GOI, and about 8,800 members have transitioned into jobs outside of the security sector. The GOI assumed responsibility for paying the SOI in May 2009, reporting that payments continue in all provinces where the SOI have been operating. 161 DoD reports that the slow pace of integration has the potential to undermine Sunni confidence in the GOI, and if not corrected, could undermine security progress... In response to the increased use of female suicide bombers in Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and community leaders began calling for women to join the Daughters of Iraq (DOI), a female counterpart to the SOI community policing program. Although the DOI force remains at 800, this progressive initiative has attracted much attention.

Reporting by the Department of Defense in early 2010 was more favorable, but noted that serious problems remained, and that key aspects of the transition were far from completed:⁹¹

As of November 2009, approximately 67,000 Sons of Iraq (SoI) in nine provinces are awaiting transition into GoI ministry positions. In October 2009, the GoI completed a double payment for August and September 2009 salaries due to delays associated with Ramadan. SoI are paid by the Iraqi Army in all but one province (Anbar), where the IP are responsible.

IFCNR reported that the Qadisiyah Sheikhs agreed to a resolution, and pay operations began on November 23, 2009, for the 1,175 properly-registered SoI. Early SoI transition focus was on security transitions; however, the GoI focused heavily on non-security transitions during this reporting period. The GoI has transitioned 21,752 SoI into GoI ministry positions in Baghdad through mid-November 2009, raising total SoI transitions to 25,833 within civilian ministries and private enterprise. The vocational programs originally initiated with MoLSA have not gained

⁸⁹ Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, September 29, 2009, as provided by OSD (Public Affairs), September 30, 2009.

⁹⁰ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, p. 49.

⁹¹ Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, Report to Congress In accordance with the Department of Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law 110-252), October 30 2009, pp. 23-24.


traction within the GoI, and since transition began the ministries have handled SoI training programs internally. In addition to the SoI transitioned into nonsecurity positions, 13,342 SoI to date have transitioned into the ISF.

IFCNR is currently working SoI vetting for 20% transition into the ISF for provinces outside of Baghdad. According to IFCNR, all names of vetted SoI to be hired into the ISF for all provinces—with the exception of Qadisiyah due to ongoing pay issues—have been provided to the MoI. The pace of transition continues to be metered by the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) Commander's assessment of security in Baghdad and the upcoming National Elections.

Generally, SoI who have transitioned to ministry jobs are doing well. Current reporting shows SoI are receiving hiring notifications and information sheets with their job information and start date. SoI are satisfied with the notification process and with the positions they receive. In October 2009, IFCNR representatives responsible for SoI transition held meetings to facilitate coordination between the GoI and local officials, providing the required information to transition the SoI to security, ministries, and service departments

The Iraqi elections in March 2010 again highlighted the importance of these issues. However, the need to give the Sons new careers needs to be kept in careful perspective. There are millions of other young Iraqis – Sunni, Shi'ite, Kurd, and minority – that cannot find any other form of employment, and joining the ISF gives them the opportunity to pursue a real career. This ties into large economic and employment problems in Iraq. The SoI are an important security issue, but the overall level of employment and economic development discussed in previous chapters will be far more important to Iraq's stability and security, and to the US-Iraqi strategic partnership.

Figure 13.4: Success in Absorbing the Sons of Iraq as of November 2009



Source: US experts, November 2009

Other Key Issues

The US must help the ISF in dealing with several other key challenges. They are summarized in **Figure 13.5**, and they include the problems outlined below:

- The recent elections have done little to alter the balance of power among the militias and threat groups. The Sadr militia fragmented long before the elections, but still represents a force to be reckoned with and still has Iranian training and support. Fadhila and Maliki never had real militias, and the Badr Organization is more an arm of ISCI whose best members are now in the Iraqi Security Forces rather than the militia. The main threats to Iraqi security are hard-line Sadrist groups, some now with criminal or rogue elements, raids or bombings by elements of AQI, independent tribal or criminal groups, and the possible threat of indirect attacks by Iran.
- All aspects of infrastructure are potential targets and must be treated as such. Water security is no exception. Most insurgent attacks consist of one or two high profile killings or the bombing of government facilities. These kinds of attacks on key corporate, official, infrastructure, or project buildings may make dissuade foreign NGOs or countries from operating in Iraq.
- US military and security services should be considerate of the steadily diminishing US presence, and broad hostility to the US “occupation.” The US should strive for a partnership between the US Embassy and the Iraqi military with a shared goal to share as much intelligence, security, and contingency support as possible. The right balance would diminish the role of US military forces, which are generally unpopular and widely perceived as violent symbols of occupation.

Figure 13.5: Other ISF Challenges and Activities**INCTF-TT**

- ISOF expansion throughout Iraq
 - 1st ISOF Brigade (CT Bn, CDO Bn, SPT Bn, Recce Bn, Garrison Spt)
 - 2nd ISOF Brigade (4 x CDO Bns throughout Iraq)
- Develop CT rotary-wing air requirements
 - Establish Regional CT Centers to Enhance Intelligence Fusion
 - Develop professional NCO Corps for SOF
 - Unilateral operations within Iraq
 - Target approval Process
 - Warrant Based Operations

ISAM

- Improve the LOR-LOA approval and budget process with MoD and MoI
- Continuing education of both US and Iraqi personnel on FMS process
- Foster direct involvement between Iraqi acquisition personnel and state-side security assistance apparatus
- Improve Out-of-Country Training process
- Improve transportation and delivery accountability
- Plan the transition of operations from military to Department of State Office of Security Cooperation

INTEL-TT

- Increase capacity – improve intelligence infrastructure
- Improve and increase training and schools – New courses, greater throughput
- Multi-INT ISR – Going beyond HUMINT
- Improve institutional performance & professionalism; security programs
- Operating as an intel community; ops-intel coordination & intel sharing
- Refining police intel & investigator career paths

NTM-I

- National Police Training - 900 per course and T3 (50 by EOY 2009)
- Advice and mentoring of National C2
- Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command – Officer professionalization / NCO training
- Specific Training Augmentation Teams
- Equipment Donations
- Out of Country training
- NATO Long Term Agreement

The Role the US Can Play

A State Department team will need to be ready to take over the mission of assisting the Ministry of the Interior and Iraq's various civil police forces as Iraq moves towards civil order and a conventional rule of law. US support of the other Iraqi police and security forces under the MoI will transfer from MNSTC-I and the US military to the US Embassy, and the new advisory team will be a State Department program run by INL. This will be supported by a parallel US advisory effort to help Iraq develop a fully effective civil rule of law. Such help can ensure that Iraq develops both the military forces it needs and a justice system that combines effective courts and detention procedures with an effective mix of police forces.

The Transfer of Iraqi Police Training to INL

The problems in transitioning to an advisory role will be more complicated in the case of the police than will be with the Iraqi military. Any truly successful effort to give Iraq lasting security and stability requires that the ISF change its current roles and missions to transition to police primacy for internal security. This has been a major theme in the MNSTC-I advise, assist, and train role. It also requires that police primacy be supported by other critical measures on the civil side such as evidence-based warrants, the rule of law, and effective corrective institutions.

This mission cannot possibly be accomplished before US forces complete their withdrawal on December 31, 2011. This transition is shown in **Figure 13.6**. It presents serious potential problems if the process is not handled effectively, efforts are not properly staffed, or if the US does not provide sustained aid beyond 2011.

As has been touched upon earlier, the police training mission will transfer from the Department of Defense to INL in the Department of State by July 2011, and current plans call for it to be radically downsized in the process. As SIGIR reports, "INL believes that the basic components of training the Iraqi police services have been largely

accomplished, and it reports that it will focus on executive development, managerial training, and other specialized programs such as forensics. According to current plans, by 2011 the police training mission will have decreased its presence from 38 primary training centers to just 3 hubs: Baghdad, Erbil, and Basrah.”⁹²

SIGIR also reports that,⁹³


By October 2011, the USF-I units conducting police training will hand over responsibility for the police development mission, including 350 international police advisors (IPAs), to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) office. To administer this program, INL reports that its staff of 15 will need to grow to 21 in 2010, and to 27 by 2011.¹²¹ INL has reported plans to build on basic police training provided under the current military-led program by providing ministry-level assistance and support among the senior ranks in line with the GOI’s expressed needs. The INL program will focus on providing specialized training and mentoring in areas such as management, leadership, strategic planning, criminal investigation, and IT development.

This quarter, SIGIR also released an audit of DoS’s oversight of the DynCorp contract for support of the Iraqi police training program. SIGIR found that INL continues to exhibit weak oversight of the DynCorp task orders for support of the Iraqi police training program. To correct these long-standing weaknesses, SIGIR recommends that the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources direct an immediate examination of the organization responsible for managing the contract to determine if it is structured, staffed, and managed to effectively and efficiently oversee the contracts under its responsibilities.

⁹² Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, p. 38.

⁹³ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), December 31, 2009, pp. 35-36.

Figure 13.6: Transition of Iraqi Police Training, 1/2010-12/2011



Note: The nature of this transition is still in the planning stages, and final decisions have not been made.

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, p. 38.

The INL Baghdad Police Transition Team released a preliminary assessment in February, 2010. This assessment detailed the police training program INL will run after 2011. The INL program will operate out of three main hubs in Baghdad, Erbil and Basra, and will include a “robust” MoI support team.

This assessment also indicates that there will be a massive downsizing in the training effort upon transfer to State Department/INL control in 2011. The ITAM International Police Advisor (IPA) program had 800 IPAs at its height, in addition to the large number of PTTs from the Coalition military. As is seen in **Figure 13.7**, INL plans on staffing only 52 permanent INL advisors for the entire MoI and police training effort. Compared to the scale of the police development challenge, 52 personnel is absurdly short of the requirement. These advisors will be augmented by 298 contractor staff, but even the total of 350 training personnel is far less than required. INL has had severe problems with police training contractors in the past, although many of the currently serving ITAM IPAs will likely re-enlist as INL contractors, easing this problem somewhat and providing continuity. While the overall training effort will employ 1,417 personnel, the vast majority of these will be security or support staff.

The INL plan is:

. . . based on the concept of teams operating out of hubs in Baghdad, Erbil, and Basrah. The teams will concentrate on three main areas: police training; MOI development and support; and field operations. In addition, three major crimes units will be structured and staffed based on the current Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) model. We may consider supporting additional task forces focused on specific areas such as terrorism finance; money laundering; organized crime; and various types of trafficking (arms, persons, drugs).

INL Baghdad’s Director will oversee the Baghdad police training and mentoring programs’ command structure. A Senior Executive Police Advisor, who reports directly to the Director, will supervise training, support, and operations directorates, each led by a director and a deputy director. The Training Directorate will include three static police college training teams and mobile training teams. The MOI Support Directorate will include institutional development and police (management) development sections. The Operations Directorate will encompass police, border, oil police, and federal police training teams as well as the Major Crimes Units and Provincial Joint Command Center. A Performance Measurement Team and a Polygraph Team will report directly to the Senior Executive Police Advisor. Regional Team Leaders in Baghdad, Erbil, and Basrah are to manage hub operations and engage through the Operations Directorate.⁹⁴

As SIGIR predicted, INL appears to be assuming that the IP have already acquired basic policing skills, and that by the time they take over in 2011 they will be able to focus on more specialized skills. According to the Preliminary Assessment:

With the military's assistance, the Iraqi police have made significant progress towards developing a large cadre of personnel who have undergone basic police training. Sustaining this progress is critical to assuring the President's vision of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. INL police

⁹⁴ INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. “PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT.” February 1, 2010. Pg. 3.

training will not replicate the military's current police training program. Rather, building upon the military's emphasis on basic training, INL will narrow the program per the request of the Government of Iraq to focus on developing more advanced technical skills and increasing management and administrative capabilities at the ministry and headquarters levels.

. . . The focus on mobile teams developing higher-order technical skills, management, and leadership comports with Iraqi government priorities and needs observed by IPAs in the field. Current IPAs assigned to training centers report that they are engaged in more of an oversight and train-the-trainer support function, seldom providing direct training to trainers and students. Furthermore, after ITAM departs the MOI intends to close most of its provincial training centers and transition to a regional training concept, removing the need for a large number of dedicated classroom trainers. Thus, the INL PTT plan assures necessary oversight at the few remaining training centers while freeing IPAs to provide higher-order directed training, mentoring, and consulting at police facilities and other sites nationwide.⁹⁵

The Iraqi Police force clearly does need more advanced technical training, and has in many ways moved on from the basic training phase. Yet, the need for basic and adequate training of the Iraq Police is far from over. INL and ITAM (Iraq Training and Advisory Mission) seemed to disagree on this point, with the INL Preliminary Assessment noting that “The INL and ITAM visions of the future diverge somewhat on this point, with ITAM proposing that five IPAs be attached to each enduring Embassy constituent presence post, and a 60 IPA basic training cadre assigned to police basic training centers. Despite these differences, ITAM is preparing to recommend that current IPA recruiting focus on officers and managers with specialized and/or higher-level skills versus generalists. As a result, INL may well inherit many IPAs with the skills reflected in its proposed staffing pattern.”⁹⁶ Even if INL reassesses the basic training requirement, it is hard to see how 52 INL trainers and 298 contractors can achieve this.

Figure 13.7: INL Police Training Staffing projections Post 2011

	Baghdad	Erbil	Basrah	Total
INL Direct Hire Advisors	36	8	8	52
INL Contract Advisors	209	52	37	298
DS ARSO, SPS	53	13	9	75
Contract Security	571	103	65	739
Support Staff	210	24	19	253
TOTAL	1079	200	138	1417

Note: DS, ARSO, and SPS are support/security personnel.

⁹⁵INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. “PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT.” February 1, 2010. Pg. 7.

⁹⁶ INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. “PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT.” February 1, 2010. Pg. 8.

Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010. Pg. 5.

The INL police training plan does maximize the small number of personnel it has by creating a flexible advising program. According to the INL Preliminary Assessment:

[T]he INL training/mentoring teams will operate somewhat like the relatively autonomous regional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) based across Iraq. Under this flexible concept, regional teams will assess the needs of particular Iraqi police entities, or sub-entities, and will assign specialty teams to lend needed expertise in focused ways. Thus, each section of each mobile IPA team will move and operate independent of the main, except for the purposes of reporting and general mission direction. The INL organization will concentrate in three areas: police training; managerial development and support; and field operations. In addition, three major crimes units are to be structured and staffed similarly to the current Major Crimes Task Force. This will mark a departure from the current military model, which deploys large multi-disciplinary teams to Iraqi police stations in order to address all major issues regarding a particular station's performance.⁹⁷

This plan should give the training/mentoring teams the flexibility needed to meet the different requirements of Iraqi Police units around the country. The INL plan also leaves 44 personnel unassigned to fill possible gaps in needed areas. Unfortunately, while these teams may be flexible, it is hard to see how they will be able to meet the widely varying needs of IP units throughout Iraq with so few personnel. **Figures 13.8 through 13.14** show the planned INL police training structure.


The INL plan also puts a correct emphasis on MoI reform. The MoI is a large organization that faces many technical and bureaucratic problems not necessarily directly related to police forces and police training. According to the Preliminary Report "In addition to requiring personnel with senior executive-level experience in substantial police and security agencies, the program will need to source non-police professionals with high-level executive experience directing large, complex government and/or private sector organizations in domains such as civil engineering, information and technology, planning and logistics, budgeting and finance, human resources, and strategic planning. To accomplish this staffing mix it will be necessary to devise a special recruiting effort, most likely with the help of executive recruiters that do not customarily source subject matter experts for INL."⁹⁸

At present, however, it is far from clear that INL can carry out its mission on a timely basis without far more resources, personnel and funds than are currently programmed, and current plans seem to assume that far more progress has been made within the Iraqi police than has actually taken place. In practice, the INL training mission may have to be substantially larger than currently planned, and creating a police force with the needed capabilities may only be possible if this support continues through at least 2014.

⁹⁷ INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010. Pg. 7.


⁹⁸ INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010. Pg. 7.

Figure 13.8: IPA Management




Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1,

2010. Figure 13.8: MoI Institutional Development (Headquarters)




Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010.

Figure 13.10: MoI Police Development




Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010.

Figure 13.11: Baghdad Operations




Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010.

Figure 13.12: Erbil Operations




Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010.

Figure 13.13: Basra Operations



Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010.

Figure 13.15: Possible Specialized/MTT IPA Team Structures for 44 Unassigned Personnel



Source: INL BAGHDAD POLICE TRANSITION TEAM. "PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT." February 1, 2010.

14. US Support of Iraqi Security forces: “The Paradigm Shift”

Iraq’s security and stability will depend on the ability of its security forces to bring a final end to the insurgency and to the existence of other armed extremists and militias. This will take years beyond US withdrawal at the end of 2011, and Iraq will then require strong security forces to deter and defend against both internal extremism and terrorism and the threats posed by its neighbors indefinitely into the future.

This means the United States must treat the ISF—whether they are under the MoD or MoI—as part of an integrated long-term effort. The United States must cope with both the near-term military tasks to be performed before the end of 2011, and the need to build up a new form of security relations whereby Iraq leads and the US performs advisory and aid functions. As **Figure 14.1** shows, USF-I states that this will require a “paradigm shift” in the nature of the current ISF.

Figure 14.1: The Paradigm Shift in Iraqi Security Forces: Institutionalizing the Security Gains Made Over the Last Seven Years

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Support Rule of Law <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changed to evidence-based judicial system • Chief Justice personally trains each MoI ISF Judge • Standardization of Court system procedures – Anti-Corruption Measures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Established Internal Affairs / IG to protect against corruption and human rights violations • Police <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Democratic policing – Transformed the Federal (formerly National) Police – Professionalizing the Force <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iraqi curriculum now IAW International Standards – Evidence-based law enforcement – Operating 5 Forensic labs; growing to 10 (2011) • Intelligence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Cross-ministerial intelligence sharing – Emphasis on intelligence support to operations (MoD) and policing (MoI) vs. regime security | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoD <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Implementing a merit-based promotion process – Improving representation of Iraqi society (ethnic, sectarian composition) – Evolving toward demand-driven logistics – Improved acquisition and human resource practices • Army <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Creating a professional NCO Corps – Established an effective institutional training center system • Strategic Logistics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Acknowledgement of need to sustain the Iraqi Security Forces – Sustainment packages being put in place – Materiel readiness measurement and reporting – Use of Information Technology Systems |
|---|--|

Source: USF-I, April 7, 2010.

Supporting this paradigm shift means the US must work with the Mod and MoI to find practical answers to the questions shown in **Figure 14.2**, in order to shape the security aspects of its strategic partnership accordingly.

Figure 14.2: Determining the Nature of the US-Iraqi Security Presence

1stOrder Questions

•What security capabilities beyond MEC does the USG want to assist the ISF in achieving over the long term?

- How much?
- How fast?

•What should the nature of the bilateral US-Iraq security relationship be?

- Scope (e.g., combined ops/training, intel/ info sharing, interoperability, tech transfer)?
- Depth?

•What bilateral/multi-lateral relationships should the USG encourage / facilitate?

- In the region? Beyond?
- Under what strategic framework?

2ndOrder Questions

•What level of resourcing is the USG willing to commit to over the long run?

- Forces / People
- Money
- Time

•What set of security cooperation activities should the US pursue in its partnership with Iraq?

- Training/Advising/Equipping?
- Operational?

•What should the organization(s) that supports the long-term US-Iraq security partnership look like?

- Office of Security Cooperation

Source: Adapted from MNSTC-I briefing, November 6, 2009.

The United States must answer these questions in ways that take account of Iraqi sensitivities, sovereignty, and pride, and that build capacity rather than dependency. It must be clear to Iraq that the US is seeking true strategic partnership that serves Iraq's interests as well as those of the US, and will not force it to confront key neighbors like Iran unless Iraqis feel this is a vital Iraqi national security interest.

US advisors also stress that the goal must now be to support the Iraqi plan, not to give them the plan. They also stress the need to institutionalize and not simply provide a series of one time fixes, to build Ministerial capacity as well as forces, and to develop Iraqi sustainment and maintenance capabilities.

General Odierno discussed how the United States should pursue these tasks in his testimony to Congress on September 29, 2009,⁹⁹

...the focus of our forces is shifting from security to capacity building, our strategic goal remains to foster a long-term partnership with a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. We have a good plan that we are executing. I am confident in our way ahead.

Iraq is a state and a society under construction, struggling to define its identity and its place in the world after decades of oppression and violence. The way in which we draw down our forces will impact not only the relationship between US and Iraq into the future, but also the nature of the new Iraq. Our presence through 2011 provides psychological and physical support to the Iraqi people, the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces. It provides the opportunity for different groups to build up their constituencies, to participate in politics, to form alliances and to reach consensus. The level and nature of US engagement with the Iraqis will continue to change as

⁹⁹ Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, September 29, 2009, as provided by OSD (Public Affairs), September 30, 2009.

the US military draws down. Iraq is making steady progress, but has a long way to go. We must have strategic patience.


Through the Strategic Framework Agreement, the US has a mechanism for supporting Iraq to develop its institutional and human capacity. Success will be defined by our ability to support Iraq's developing institutional capacity— from governance to economics—that will sustain Iraq's long-term stability. The ISF have made steady progress and our efforts over the next two and a half years will help solidify the foundation of a professional and competent Iraqi Security Forces. We must leave Iraq with a security force capable of providing defending the Iraqi people and protecting GoI institutions.

Dealing With Iraqi Contingency Needs

This also means that the US must not focus simply on the short term development of the ISF, or on managing the withdrawal of its forces, and it cannot assume that everything will go according to plan during the course of withdrawal. The US must maintain contingency plans and options for dealing with serious crises – recognizing that its leverage and ability to intervene are rapidly diminishing as its force levels drop, and as Iraqi politics exert more influence over the internal dynamics of the ISF. The US must be ready to provide Iraq with a continued aid and advisory effort, and with the possibility of additional military assistance, to the extent that Iraq asks for this type of support.

Figure 14.3 shows an MNSTC-I estimate of how the US should manage the problems posed by the transition so that it can withdraw responsibly and fully empower the ISF to take over the security mission. The delays in the Iraqi election, and uncertainties surrounding the formation of a new Iraqi government affect some of these timelines, but the broad structure of the plan in **Figure 14.3** is still valid.

Figure 14.3: How to Manage the Risks of US Withdrawal and Transition to Full Iraqi Mission Capability



Assumptions	Risks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elections will occur The USG and GoI will adhere to the Security Agreement, and the GoI will not request an early withdrawal of forces The ISF is capable of maintaining internal security, and violence will be manageable throughout the transition of government The GoI requests for US assistance during this transition period will be largely limited to enablers Period of heightened risk extends only 60 days after elections The greater the public perception of legitimate and fair elections, the less chance there will be for heightened tensions between political and sectarian groups – and a shorter period of risk AQI will attempt to make high profile attacks to disrupt or interfere with free and fair elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lengthy delays in seating new government and/or an exceptionally lengthy transition period could: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay key security-force-related decisions/ activities, thereby postponing the achievement of MEC and Delay the signing of necessary FMS cases (LOAs), thereby unhinging the readiness of key systems Delay key transition timelines (e.g. OSC, INL, etc) Budget is not passed and Iraq enters an extended period of "continuing resolution" Rising corruption as "lame duck" leaders attempt to enrich themselves direct contract sales related graft Newly elected government may not be interested in pursuing a robust, long-term security partnership with the US, thereby: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Undermining the good advisory relationships MNSTC-I enjoys with the MOD, MOI and CTF Impairing MNSTC-I's ability to achieve MEC Election-related violence could pose a significant threat to MNSTC-I's security and mission posture Further politicization of MOD and MOI, which undermines inter-ministerial cooperation in key security matters

Source: US experts, November 2009, and USF-I, April 7, 2010

Transitioning to Aid and Advice to the Iraqi Security Forces: Advisory Brigades, USF-I, ISAM, INL and ITAM

Several important developments have already taken place in making this transition to a new form of US aid and advisory effort. The US is already converting its remaining forces into six Advisory Assistance Brigades -- two each in MND-North, MND-Center, and MND-South. They will focus on the development of the ISF as a key mission.¹⁰⁰ The first of these Advisory Assistance Brigades are already deployed, and they will be the core of force of some 50,000 military and some 75,000 support contractors that will remain in Iraq from August 2010 to late 2011.

Each Advisory Assistance Brigade is being tailored to meet both the advisory and security needs of the Iraqi forces in its area, and each has a significant combat element. These battalions can be mixed and deployed to meet urgent security needs. Hopefully, this will provide a strong enough combination of combat forces and advisors to meet the ISF's needs during this period.

Much broader changes are taking place in the US security effort. As has been described earlier, MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I merged staffs on January 1, 2010, and became USF-I. The USF-I Deputy Command General for Advising and Training (DCG (A&T)) assumed the roles and mission of MNSTC-I. DCG (A&T) will continue to advise, assist, and train the ISF until US forces' end of mission on December 31, 2011. In addition, the duties of the Multi-National Security Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) were transferred to two new organizations. The first was the Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM)—“an enabling agency that facilitates procurement of equipment, services, and training (formerly the Security Assistance Office) [which] will be ramping to 91 personnel.” It has the following roles:¹⁰¹

- **Enhancing Force Capability.** Facilitate procurement to equip police forces and assist the equipping of a self-defense capability.
- **Force Professionalization and Specialization.** Expand training programs and ensure adequate resources; translate Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Letters of Request and Letters of Acceptance; facilitate the development, processing, and preparation of candidates for the International Military Education and Training Program and for training and service abroad.
- **Enhancing Ministerial Capacity.** Improve strategic planning and policy development, improve GOI resource management, and expand regional exercises and engagement programs in support of a future security cooperation relationship with the GOI.

The second organization is the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM). Current plans indicate that this organization will eventually comprise of 337 personnel assigned to support the MoD and MoI, along with 574 International Police Advisors (IPAs) to

¹⁰⁰ MNSTC-I, November 18, 2009.

¹⁰¹ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, pp. 37-38.

train the Iraqi police forces. It currently performs the following roles:¹⁰²

- **Enhancing Force Capability.** Develop a competent and professional police force; enhance screening to control Iraq's borders; improve command and control throughout Iraq; develop a credible self-defense capability; and enhance ISF medical, logistics, and maintenance programs.
- **Enhancing Ministerial Capacity.** Improve strategic planning and policy development; synchronize planning and programming decisions; improve GOI resource management; develop life-cycle management programs; improve recruiting, training, manning, and equipping; and expand engagement and strategic communications programs.
- **Force Professionalization and Specialization.** Expose Iraqis to Western values and culture to promote tolerance, expand training programs and ensure adequate resources, increase interoperability with U.S. or Coalition forces, and improve medical training and equipment.
- **Rule of Law Primacy.** Strengthen anticorruption programs, improve leader accountability, enhance judicial security, and improve inspection programs.

The new organizational structure that has emerged from these changes is shown in **Figure 14.4**. This Figure shows both the makeup of the new US command structure and the way that the smaller and more specialized NATO NTM-I effort is linked to the US effort. USF-I summarizes its near term goals through 2011 as follows:¹⁰³

- **Advise, Train, Assist, and Equip Iraqi security partners from the national strategic to the tactical levels.**
- **Maintain key points of influence across Iraq to build institutional capability (USF-I and NTM-I)**
 - Security ministries
 - National and provincial command and control centers
 - National logistics nodes
 - Iraqi Security Forces Headquarters and Joint HQ
 - Institutional schools, training centers, support bases
 - Unit-partnered training with the Navy and Air Force
- **Ensure seamless ATAE effort with US Divs. and AABs**
- **Employ unique critical resources:**
 - Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)
 - \$1B (FY10-11) + \$1B (FY10 requested) + \$2B (FY11-12 requested)
 - Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Out of Country Training (OCT), and other forms of Security Assistance
 - FMS = \$11B Total (\$5.8B in LOA-LOR / \$5.2B being implemented)
 - US Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) (60K pieces)
 - NATO Trust Fund (\$24M) and Equipment Donations (\$208M)
 - Specialized Training and Equipping, including:

¹⁰² Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, pp. 37-38.

¹⁰³ USF-I, April 7, 2010.

- Carabinieri-led training for Federal Police
- Spain's Guardia Civil to train Border Police (T)
- Counter-IED, Forensics, and Criminal Evidence Labs

USF-I has also created a summary list of its near term mix of accomplishments, initiatives, and the key challenges that affect its operations:¹⁰⁴

- **Accomplishments**

- Starting a “Major Paradigm Shift.”
 - Growth from a fledgling FMS customer into an active partner—GoI rigorously learning the FMS system and participating in building their own ISF requirements
- Iraq is taking ownership of the FMS and SA processes
 - Iraqi Navy selected Offshore Support Vessel builder
 - Procurement directorate championed M1A1 support
 - MoI wrote their own helicopter requirements document
 - Overcoming funding constraints through creative multi-year FMS arrangements and cost-sharing with U.S.
- Actively seeking increased security assistance education opportunities
- Strengthening regional partnering: held two Jordan Security Assistance exchanges, with more planned.

- **Initiatives**


- Transition ownership of FMS processes to GoI
- Increase education and training opportunities
- Improve delivery/transportation accountability
- Plan for transition from ISAM to Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission.

- **Challenges**

- Implementing FMS in “contingency environment” with no stable long term GoI and force goals.
- Development GoI understanding and trust in FMS
- Coping with severe funding constraints
 - Requirement to pay full case value up front
 - Limited GoI strategic planning horizon
- Cost, processing and delivery delays, and politics of FMS compared to global markets
- Lack of GoI in-transit visibility of FMS goods
- US export policy constraints

¹⁰⁴ USF-I, April 7, 2010.

Figure 14.4: The New US and NATO Advisory Structure for the ISAF USF-I



NATO

<p>Total Strength: ~180</p> <table border="0"> <tr> <td> Bulgaria</td> <td> Albania</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Denmark</td> <td> Poland</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Estonia</td> <td> Romania</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Hungary</td> <td> Turkey</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Italy</td> <td> UK</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Lithuania</td> <td> USA</td> </tr> <tr> <td> Netherlands</td> <td> Ukraine, PFP</td> </tr> </table>		Bulgaria	Albania	Denmark	Poland	Estonia	Romania	Hungary	Turkey	Italy	UK	Lithuania	USA	Netherlands	Ukraine, PFP	<p>NTM-I Command Structure</p>
Bulgaria	Albania															
Denmark	Poland															
Estonia	Romania															
Hungary	Turkey															
Italy	UK															
Lithuania	USA															
Netherlands	Ukraine, PFP															
<p>Training and Assistance to ISF</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gendarmerie Type Training • National Command and Control Centers • Military Academies • National Defense College • Out-of-Country Training • Officer Professionalization and Development • Joint Staff College • War College • Defense Language Institute • Senior NCO Training and Education • Contributions: NATO Trust Fund ~ \$19.5M • Equipment Donations ~ \$166M 	<p>Strategic Engagement with GoI</p>															

Source: USF-I April 7, 2010

Looking Beyond 2011

These efforts, however, are only an interim step in a much longer process of developing the Iraqi Security Forces. In the future, USF-I plans to transition its missions for enhancing ministerial capacity, force capability, and police primacy to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad control, under the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in 2011, and to INL in the State Department. This latter transfer is more demanding than the first. The US must decide how large an OSC and advisory group it wants, and Iraq must decide what type of US presence it needs and is willing to accept since all 50,000 US forces remaining after August 2010 are scheduled to leave by December 31, 2011.

Some planners have talked about limiting the post-2011 US military advisory effort to 100-300 personnel, perhaps with a large number of support contractors. It does not seem likely that this effort would be able to meet Iraq's real world needs. A much larger mission seems to be needed and there is a strong case that the US should offer Iraq a much more robust post-2011 assistance program in the form of either a larger Office of Security Cooperation or through a long-term US Military Training Mission – similar to the kind that has been successful in Saudi Arabia. This means giving high priority to hiring and retaining qualified US personnel with experience in the field—some assigned to support Iraqi training centers and headquarters in the field. These may have to include much larger numbers of military personnel since it is not clear that Iraq will welcome contract support given some of the controversial events involving security contractors that occurred over the past five years.

A State Department team must also continue the mission of assisting the Ministry of the Interior and Iraq's various civil police forces as Iraq moves towards civil order and a conventional rule of law. US support for the other Iraqi police and forces under the MoI will transfer from MNSTC-I and the US military to the US Embassy, and the new advisory team will be a State Department program run by INL. This will be supported by a parallel US advisory effort to help Iraq develop a fully effective civil rule of law. Such help can ensure that Iraq develops both the military forces it needs and a justice system that combines effective courts and detention procedures with an effective mix of police forces.

How Much is Too Little, How Much is Too Much

Figure 14.5 show that the US must act to help Iraq overcome critical shortfalls in force capability in the near term, and be careful to ensure that Iraq does not try to sustain too large and too costly a mix of ISF forces. During 2010-2011, USF-I must help Iraq close a serious capability gap and bring its forces to the point where they will have all of the capabilities they need to operate without US forces. USF-I indicates that the capability gap involves the following needs:¹⁰⁵

- **Additional Iraq Security Forces Funding (ISFF) for:**

¹⁰⁵ USF-I, April 7, 2010.


- Specialty Training
 - Key weapons systems/equipment
 - Sustainment packages
- **Transfer of DOD Excess Defense Articles to MOD and MOI**
- **Focused training and advising efforts on building operational and institutional capacity**
 - Strategic planning and budgeting
 - Acquisition and sustainment system
 - Force generation, fielding and training

While **Figure 14.5** is more symbolic than a quantified measurement of trends, it is fully accurate in showing that the current level of defense spending falls well short of MNSTC-I assessments of where the ISF needs to be in achieving minimum essential capabilities by December 31, 2011,—and much further short of where the GoI would like to be.

Iraqis still have overambitious goals. If these plans were executed, the total size of the MoD and MoI security forces could exceed 700,000 to 800,000 in a country where this pool of men—which includes a large subgroup of literate and fairly skilled men—makes up a significant percentage of the labor force.

Iraq needs forces large enough to consolidate victory and security first, but as MNSTC-I fades out and the AA Brigades come in, the US advisory team will need to carefully address how to reduce force quantity and sustain critical areas of force quality while eliminating key gaps in support and enablers.

Figure 14.5: Keeping ISF Force Size and Costs in Proportion



MEC – The capability of the Iraqi security ministries, institutions, and forces to provide for their own internal security, and develop the foundation for external defense no later than 31 DEC 11.

Source: US experts, November 2009

The Need For Continuing US Aid Through 2014

Even the best advisory effort cannot be effective without resources and influence. Iraq cannot make a secure transition to creating the mix of armed forces, security forces, and police forces it needs without additional US financial aid. Its budget problems are too great and it will be years before its new petroleum programs produce a major increase in Iraqi government revenues. For all of the reasons analyzed earlier, Iraq will need several years of continued US financial aid.

Part of the problem is the sheer scale of past US aid, and the difficulties Iraq now faces in funding its forces without such support. A SIGIR analysis states that the Congress has appropriated \$18.04 billion to the ISFF to support Iraq's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) in developing the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) since the 2003 invasion. As of December 31, 2009, \$1.66 billion remained in unexpended obligations. A further \$1.29 billion remained unobligated, but only \$0.82 billion (64%) of these funds can be obligated to new projects. In total, \$16.75 billion (93%) of the ISFF had been obligated and \$15.09 billion (84%) had been expended as of the end of the quarter.¹⁰⁶

Of the \$18.04 billion appropriated to the ISFF, \$17.06 billion (95%) was allocated to four major subactivity groups:¹⁰⁷

- Equipment—equipment and transportation for military and police, force protection, and communications equipment
- Infrastructure—training academies/areas, military bases, and police stations
- Sustainment—maintenance, weapons, ammunition, and logistics support.
- Training—military and police training, ministerial capacity development, and instructor equipment and support.

The remaining \$0.98 billion (5%) of the ISFF was allocated to smaller sub-activity groups. These smaller sub-activity groups were collectively termed “Related Activities,” and included the ISFF Quick Response Fund, detainment centers, and rule-of-law complexes.

¹⁰⁶ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), December 31, 2009, p. 23.

¹⁰⁷ Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), December 31, 2009, p. 23.

Current US aid plans are shown in **Figure 14.6**. An estimate of the changes needed in the plans for FY2010 onwards, and the additional aid required during the transition from US forces to full Iraqi capability, is shown in **Figure 14.7**, along with the pressure on the MoD and MoI budgets that drive this need for aid. This Figure shows both that Iraq is projected to fund most of the ISF and gradually take over the burden of funding discretionary expenditures. It also shows, however, that past US aid funds will expire on September 30, 2010, and that US experts estimate that Iraq will need \$1 billion worth of reprogramming in FY2010, some \$2.5 billion in additional ISFF aid in FY2011, and approximately \$1 billion in FMF aid each year from FY2012 to FY2014.

This funding is essential to ensure Iraq's security, and to ensure that the US does not lose all of the gains it has made since the surge by rushing out before Iraq is ready. It will minimize the risks of US withdrawal, demonstrate to Iraqis that the US is truly serious about building a strategic partnership, and send a vital message to America's allies in the region that the United States will not let Iraq become a power vacuum that Iran and other outside powers can exploit.

This effort will require a large amount of continued US funding, but it still represents a fraction of the peak monthly US costs of being in Iraq at the time of the surge, and will cost less than any future US military deployment to try to compensate for the failure of the ISF to meet its mission. Such spending is more than justified by the threats posed by Iraq's neighbors, the needs of the Iraqi people after some 30 years of conflict, the importance of security in the Gulf, and the stability of world oil exports.

In short, the US must make a consistent effort to move beyond both the past military focus on stability and security, and the past problems in US and international aid efforts. It must make a clear shift to a cohesive State-led effort that can take over from the military during 2010-2011 and sustain itself in the future.

These are not tasks the US can dodge by claiming premature success or trying to shift the burden to international organizations or to its allies. Either the US side of the Iraqi force development effort will succeed, or the Iraqi side will fail. Moreover, any sustained US success in Iraq will determine how well the US can replace its forces with an effective and lasting US advisory effort, and will allow the United States to measure what level of military aid it will provide Iraq after US forces are withdrawn in 2011.

Figure 14.6: US Aid to the ISF and Current Appropriations: 2003-2010**Use of Major US Funds: 2003-September 30, 2009 (\$US billions)**

AREA	SECTOR	STATUS OF FUNDS			QUARTERLY CHANGE	
		ALLOCATED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
Security	Equipment	7.29	6.82	6.03	0.57 (9%)	0.94 (19%)
	Training	6.11	5.68	5.45	0.31 (6%)	0.42 (8%)
	Infrastructure	5.81	5.55	4.84	0.08 (1%)	0.13 (3%)
	Sustainment	2.55	2.41	2.17	0.10 (4%)	0.06 (3%)
	Rule of Law	1.50	1.48	1.27	-	-
	Related Activities	1.27	1.15	0.97	0.04 (4%)	0.03 (3%)
	Subtotal		24.52	23.09	20.72	1.10 (5%)

Note: ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. The “Unaccounted for CERP Allocations” total is the difference between the top-line allocation, obligation, and expenditure data provided by OSD and the categorical data available from IRMS. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil

Society, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors. Values for these sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.

Planned Spending on Iraqi Security Forces: FY2008-FY2010 (\$US Millions)**IRAQ SECURITY FORCES FUND SPEND PLANS**

\$Millions

SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	FY 2008/FY 2009		FY 2009/FY 2010	
	PREVIOUSLY APPROVED (9/2008)	REVISED SPEND PLAN	FY 2009 BRIDGE REQUEST	SPEND PLAN
MoD Sustainment	154.7	173.9	91.8	91.8
Equipment	917.9	925.0	1,030.1	260.1
Training	116.1	192.4	234.0	196.5
Infrastructure	298.5	298.5	—	—
Subtotal	1,487.2	1,589.8	1,355.9	548.4
Mol Sustainment	106.0	66.0	20.0	20.0
Equipment	392.0	432.0	125.6	125.6
Training	650.0	650.0	417.2	231.0
Infrastructure	110.0	110.0	—	—
Subtotal	1,258.0	1,258.0	562.8	376.6
Other Related Activities	254.8	152.2	96.2	75.0
Total	3,000.0	3,000.0	2,014.9	1,000.0

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.


Source: OSD, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/2/2009 and 9/30/2009.

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.


Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, (Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452), October 30, 2009, pp. 42 & 51.

Figure 14.7: Iraq’s Need for Continuing US Military Assistance: 2009-2012

The Iraqi Budget Challenge: Limited MoD and MoI 2010 and 2011 Discretionary Budgets



Required Security Assistance Funding



- ISF budgets will likely not grow significantly over the next 2 years.
- Hence, the Security Ministries will not have enough funding to build Minimum Essential Capabilities by themselves before the US leaves

Source: US experts, November 2009, and USF-I, April 7, 2010