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# The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview

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**CSIS**


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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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in Strategy

*June 7, 2010*


[www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org) |

# The War Escalates: 2004-2009




Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, based on Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data as of 15 December 2009 reporting.


# Rising Intensity of the Fighting: 2005-2009




Security Incidents 01 Jan 05 – 15 Sep 05



Security Incidents 01 Jan 09 – 15 Sep 09




Security Incidents 01 Jan 07 – 15 Sep 07



Sources: Afghanistan JOIS NATO SIGACTS data.




# Where the Fighting Was: 2005




Security Incidents: 01 Jan 2005 – 15 Sept 20 05

# Threat Summary: 5-2010


*The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded geographically*



**Security Incidents 2007**




**Security Incidents 2008**





**Security Incidents 2009**

**Insurgent Influence and Capability**

- Not Assessed
- INS Limited Capability
- INS Demonstrated Capability
- INS Effective Capability




*The Insurgency had momentum in much of the South and East*





# The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009




**Militant Groups**

- Taliban (TB)
- Hezqani Network (HQN)
- Hezbe-e Islami Qulbuddin (HQ)
- Hezbe-e Islami Khalis (HIK)
- Mahsud/Tehrik-Taliban PAK (TTP)
- Tehrik-i-Netaj Shariat Muhammad (TNSM)/TTP
- Nazir
- Lashkar-e Islam (LeI)
- Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- Key al-Qaida concentration

**PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):**  
 Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)  
 Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)  
 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation , training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

# Where the Fighting Is: End 2009




Sources: Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data.

71% of initiated security incidents occurred in 10% of total districts.



# IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009




JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09  
 Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)




# Afghanistan - IED Incidents by Province

● March 2010 IED Incidents




Province	IEDs
Helmand	522
Kandahar	132
Khowst	59
Uruzgan	43
Ghazni	36
Other	195

March 2010 IED Incidents




This slide shows the 5 provinces with the most IED activity during March 2010, which accounted for 80% of the IED activity in Afghanistan.



## But the Fighting is Only Part of the Story: Insurgent Influence & Capability by District: End-2009

-  RED: Insurgents are effective, strong capability and influence among populace **95 Total**
-  Orange: Insurgents have demonstrated capability **97 Total**
-  Yellow: Insurgents have limited capability **162 Total**
-  White: Not able to assess **45 Total**




Sources: Afghanistan JOLIS NATO SIGACTS data through 30 Sep 09.






SECURITY INCIDENTS DURING POPPY ERADICATION BY PROVINCE, 2009



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.  
 Source: UNODC, "Afghanistan Opium Survey," 12/2009, p. 52.




# The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War



Source: NATO/ISAF: <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html>, as of April 2010


# The Problem of “Stand Aside” Forces:



4,715 of 16,515 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011



# Critical Impact of Civilian Casualties



- Tactical Directive
- Driving Directive
- Night Time Raid Directive
- Critical - remains a focus

Good isn't good enough



Civilian Casualties, whether ISAF or Insurgent are responsible, increases violence.

- When ISAF is responsible for civilian casualties kinetic activities increase by **25-65 % for 5 months**
- When Insurgents are responsible for attacks kinetic activities increase **10 and 25% for 3 months**

## Six Centers of Gravity

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- *Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.*
  - *Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.*
  - *Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).*
  - *Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.*
  - *Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.*
  - *Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF's formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.*
-

# COMISAF Intent

## Purpose

- Assist GIRoA in defeating the insurgency
- Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
- Gain popular support for the government
- Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
- Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

## Method


- Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
- Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
- Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
- Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

## Endstate

- Insurgency defeated to within GIRoA's capacity
- Legitimate governance extends to local levels
- Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
- GIRoA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security



# Campaign Design



# Campaign Strategy

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## ***Protect the Population.***

- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

## ***Enable Afghan National Security Forces.***

- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

## ***Neutralize malign influence.***

- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.


## ***Support extension of governance.***

- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

## ***Support socio-economic development.***





- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.

# ISAF Campaign Plan: May 2010





# ISAF Future Operations




# War of Perceptions

People have to believe that the future under GIRoA will be better.


- Detectable increase in confidence of GIRoA
  - Improved access to basic services
  - Improved Rule of Law
  - Better access to education
  - More opportunities for legitimate employment
  - Belief that corruption is being addressed
- Growing security and confidence in ANSF
  - People feel safer
  - ANSF trusted; leadership viewed as responsive
- Greater freedom of movement
- GIRoA viewed as empowering ANSF

# Population Density of Afghanistan






## Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat



Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

# The Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue



Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives --a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).

Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.

## But, Reality Shapes Afghan Perceptions


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**The War will be lost without better civil-military coordination, and a far more honest, capable, and actively present GIRoA:**

- **Need immediate progress in governance, prompt justice, jobs, and economic opportunity in the field as part of each operation.**
  - **Police, rule of law, and formal and informal justice efforts must be integrate and proactive at the local level.**
  - **Military and PRT cooperation must be far better and more operationally relevant.**
  - **UNAMA/UN, national, and NGO aid efforts need to focus on real world short and mid-term needs to get to long term. Need far more focus on validated requirements, Afghan perceptions, measures of effectiveness, and honest contracting.**
  - **Corrupt and incapable Afghan officials, officers, and power brokers need to be excluded from outside funding and support, kept under constant pressure, and “outed.”**
  - **Honest and capable Afghan officials, officers, and local leaders should be rewarded and encouraged at Ministerial, provincial, district, and local levels.**
  - **The US, ISAF, UNAMA, and all aid workers must address their role in causing corruption and waste, and funding the Taliban. The civil side of the war needs ruthless national, UN, and ISAF accountability and transparency.**
-




# Key Terrain and Area of Interest Districts






# Trends in Key Districts: 12/09 vs. 4/10

## Support for Afghan Government




## Comparative Security



# ANSF Force Levels and Goals: 2009-2013

**Afghan National Police:**

- ANP 2011 growth – 109K (2010); 134K (2011)
- Attrition remains An issue
- Highest combat casualties
- Current Strength ~104.5K



**Afghan National Army:**

- ANP growth to 134K (2010); 171.6 (2011)
- Recruiting success must be maintained
- Current Strength ~119K

ISAF, May 2010, and DoD FY2011 Budget Request, February 2010, p. 40.




## ANSF is Making Progress, But Development is Still in Crisis

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
- **Building an enduring and self-sustaining force remains a distinct challenge and attainment of the growth objectives is not assured...recruiting will significantly challenge our programs, both in regards to quality and quantity. The development of effective leaders and the persistent high attrition in specific components of the ANSF also pose major challenges.**
- **In November 2009, NTM-A/CSTA-A was manned at little more than 25%, and trainer to trainee ratio for ANA was 1:79 and as bad as 1:466 in some locations. All trainees graduated regardless of quality although only 35% made basic marksmanship, and training facilities lack key commo gear, vehicles, and weapons. Most ANP seldom received any formal training. ANSF lacked pay parity.**
- **By May 2010, major US reinforcements raise NTM-A manning to 70% and ration to 1:29. Marksmanship up to 65% and vehicle training underway. But, NATO allies short of 750 of pledged trainers (10% of requirement).**
- **Attrition better, but still a critical problem and 70% for ANCOP force. Lack of adequate rotation, rest, and follow-up training still a key problem.**
- **Cutting ANA and ANP training period by 2 weeks to make quantity has had a serious impact on quality.**
- **Makes partnering absolutely critical to achieve minimal capability in field.**
- **Corrupt and incapable Afghan officers still a key problem, compounded by lack of other elements of rule law, ethnic imbalances in force, lack of governance, and impact of power brokers.**
- **CRITICAL RISK WILL USE UP THE BEST OF THE ANSF; NOT DEVELOP A TRANSITION CAPABILITY**

# Continuing Crisis in NTM-A Personnel



**Does not include POMLETs, another critical shortfall. Other personnel does include 419 US Army personnel temporarily assigned to perform trainer duties.**

## Development and Build are Equal Challenges:




**Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010**



# Central Helmand Update


- Progress is slow, but steady
- Violence and intimidation
- Limited GIRoA capacity limiting governance and development
- Population tentative, but responding positively



GIRoA gaining credibility and earning legitimacy is a slow process.



# Civil-Military Progress in All of Helmand Will Be Critical







# Marjah is a Complex Civil-Military Challenge

## Where It May Take 12-18 Months

### More to Fully Establish “Clear, Hold and Build”



**Population Density**




**Tribal Map**



# Marjah is a Complex Civil-Military Challenge Where It May Take 12-18 Months More to Fully Establish “Clear, Hold and Build”




Infrastructure



Pop. Density, Tribes, Infrastructure Combined




# Kandahar in Context



# Focus on Kandahar

Why Kandahar?

Why is it planned this way?






# Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar



# Key Challenges




- Economic disparity between elites and populace
- Extreme patronage network
- Monopolization of contracts

- Criminality and illicit economy dominates
- Frequent land disputes
- Distorted commodity value-chains
- Inadequate Infrastructure



# Not a City, But a Critical Area Where Only a Phased Effort Can Succeed





# Governance is a Main Effort: A Real Campaign Plan or An Empty Slogan?

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
- Commitment from the Afghan government  
Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels
- GIRoA capacity to deliver services  
Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries
- Contracting and corruption  
Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries
- Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers  
Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences

# Resilient and Complex Insurgency

## Kinetic Events


2006: 957

2009: 2968






# Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation






# Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline: Success Requires a Sustained Effort Long Beyond 2010 or 2011



- Proof that new strategy and tactics work is possible by mid-2011
- Major transition to ANSF should not begin until force is ready -- probably late 2012 at earliest.
- Slow phase down of US troops must be conditions based.
- Foreign aid and continued funding of most ANSF costs probably needed well beyond 2015.

# Afghan Popular Trust in the Afghan Government in RC East: April 2010


(Green is highest level of trust)





# Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level: Struggle for the Rest of the Population

**Most Threatened Population Areas**



*Prevent GIROA development and influence  
Limit population ability to choose*

**Elements of Insurgent Influence**

- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

**Essential Security Influence**




*Create time and space  
Enable population opportunity to choose*

**Elements of Security Influence**

- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

## Afghan-Pakistan Military Operations: March 2010



Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation's history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.