From the CIAO Atlas Map of Europe 

email icon Email this citation

CIAO DATE: 03/02

Ideas on Bosnia for the Bush Administration

Mark Edmond Clark

March 2001

Columbia International Affairs Online

Bosnia has been an international challenge that after five years may appear intractable. However, it too has a handle. In the new Bush Administration, policymakers and analysts must recognize that Bosnia is not a Western state, and that the country’s bewildering social, economic, and political structures cannot be understood by viewing them through a Western prism. Only after these are examined and delineated can the new Administration get the business of rebuilding Bosnia underway guided by a policy more suited for its society and more coherent than that of the previous Administration.

Presented here are a few ideas on how policymakers might decide to look at things and do things differently in Bosnia. It is hoped that the ideas provided here might serve to support the development of an improved policy better suited to Bosnia’s society and more coherent than the current one. It is also hoped that they might allow for a more appropriate application of available development resources.

 

On US Strategic Interests in Bosnia

Bosnia is not in the strategic interests of the US, but it is in the strategic interests of its European allies. The Europeans are responsible for establishing stability in their own backyard. For that reason, the European states have deployed their forces in Bosnia under NATO, the most important US alliance. Performing peacekeeping duties in Bosnia is now a principal task for NATO. Since NATO is involved in Bosnia, it is in the interests of the US to be involved in Bosnia. If the US wants to remain involved in NATO, it must do so by leading NATO and making certain the alliance gets things done.

The US must exert some control over NATO issues. Its use of troops supports that control. Yet, a large troop presence may not be needed for the US to exert control in Bosnia. Among other considerations, NATO educational activities for Serb, Croat, and Muslim forces, set up through the standing Committee on Military Matters, might be broadened in order to further promote security, stability, and democratization, and support self-sustaining progress from the Dayton process. If the US opts to decrease troop levels, or withdraw, it may be enough to give NATO allies financial, logistical, and information support to help them keep the peace there. Development aid may also advance US efforts to exert control minus a troop presence. However, in the case of a further decrease or withdrawal, the US must maintain the capability to respond rapidly with force, together with NATO allies, to halt any renewed fighting by the former warring parties. Broadening NATO educational activities for Serb, Croat and Muslim forces, set up through the Standing Committee on Military Matters, may further promote security, stability and democratization and aid self-sustaining progress from the Dayton process.

 

Coping with NATO’s Likely Response to a US Withdrawal

There is the likelihood of that the Europeans would threaten to withdraw their troops from Bosnia if the US moved to withdraw its troops from Bosnia. Yet, its unlikely that Europeans would simply decide to withdraw. It must be remembered that the US intervened when it did in Bosnia because the Europeans could not handle the situation. The Europeans could hardly hope to establish an independent security and foreign policy identity in the near future, if they were simply to follow the US out of Bosnia. Additionally, Germany, France, Britain, and other European states have interests in Bosnia that go beyond the investment of their forces. Germany, for example, has encouraged investments from Siemens, Volkswagen, and other firms, which the Germans hope will serve as seeds for greater investment once the situation in Bosnia becomes truly stabilized. The deutsch mark’s role in the economic systems of the region’s states and the degree of influence Germany could could wield in the region as a result are also factors that Germany may consider in deciding to stay. If one European state decided to stay in Bosnia, the others would likely follow suit. France would hardly leave Bosnia to Germany for market development. The Europeans would certainly prefer to develop Bosnia and Balkans states in which they have inroads than develop markets beyond Europe.

An issue that would need to be negotiated in NATO is a revision of the current command structure for troops in Bosnia. US ground troops are considered the tip of the US spear in NATO. However, twenty-first century warfare is certainly does not give preeminence to ground forces. Air power will always play a significant role in determining combat power. The NATO command structure could be altered to reflect, to a greater extent, the ability of the US to provide air superiority, close air support to NATO forces, rapid ground reinforcement and communications support, as well as logistical and information support.

 

On Jump Starting Social, Economic, and Political Development in Bosnia

The Office of the High Representative (OHR), the chief civilian peace implementation agency in Bosnia, lacks an organic mechanism for implementing its own policies. To implement its development polices, OHR has relied heavily upon international organization, donor state, and private development agencies and NGOs, that in many cases have failed to perform. However, the international community ’s poor record on the ground in Bosnia, to a large extent, is due to an unwillingness within the international community to fully delineate the Bosnian social, economic, and political structures through appropriate studies. The US also has a record of allocating its resources poorly due to a failure to understand the Bosnians. As result, the US wasted the potential for success that came from its unique standing in Bosnia. Understanding Bosnia means knowing its history and discovering what is happening on the ground currently by connecting with average citizens as well as business and political leaders in the respective ethnic groups, and considering their views on issues.

US efforts to jump start the development process must begin with the US ambassador. The US ambassador should be the focal point of US efforts in Bosnia, and serving as an agent of goodwill, he must interact with the local population, project US values of democracy and ethnic tolerance, and show what can be done with Western support. The ambassador must review the performances of international organization, donor state, and private development agencies, and NGOs, to determine how to better allot development program funding and better match programs to agency and NGO talents. The visibility of the ambassador must be enhanced through public appearances and statements, and special events organized by the US embassy, that will encourage the people of Bosnia to rally around international efforts to inculcate democratic principles within their society and to reject the nationalists’ politics of fear and separation. The excessive use of hard-line public statements by the ambassador to admonish the Bosnians or to encourage them to move forward should be avoided. The ambassador must also work closely with the international community, especially OHR, and help formulate social, economic, and political development policies better suited for the situation on the ground. Development programs in Bosnia should have the goal of rejuvenating communities through the support of the residents’ entrepreneurial spirit and creativity. By creating economic growth, a new, positive focus for the people, and a greater sense of security will develop, and Bosnians of all groups will discover they can rely upon themselves for their society’s development.

 

On Instilling Democratic Values in Bosnia

Western governments have become frustrated by their failure to establish a viable multiethnic, democratic society in Bosnia. Lately, European foreign policy analysts, in particular, frequently remark that if the various ethnic groups in the Balkans do not want to come together, perhaps they should not be forced to do so. Some European states may be willing to accept a degree of separatism in Bosnia. However, recognizing Bosnia’s ethnic entities as states will likely lead to renewed fighting.

Western states have a duty to nurture fledgling multiethnic, democratic societies that seek to move away from ethnic nationalism. Moderate political parties and leaders accepting of US values must be well supported. The US must be an advocate for the defense of human rights in Bosnia and worldwide. Discrimination based on race, gender, religion, and culture, a main concept of nationalist politics in Bosnia, is contrary to US values. The US also must not let the nationalists achieve their goal of creating separate states. Refugee return must be pushed to counter the divisive acts of ethnic nationalists.

 

On War Criminals

War criminals must be arrested and prosecuted, but bringing individuals to justice for war crimes, will not alone cause the Bosnian people to accept that law and order has been restored and that a civil society can freely develop. Given considerations such as the manner in which many people in Bosnia acted and responded to the terrible actions of their authorities and neighbors during the war and during earlier periods of ethnic cleansing, and given the role most young men played in their society’s destruction as soldiers, it would be unreasonable to expect most to support efforts to vilify their emotional leaders and symbols of authority as criminals. Before recognizing their leaders, who allegedly defending their respective ethnic groups, as criminals, many Bosnians must first recognize their own actions as being criminal. One should not expect some collective consciousness allowing for a rejection of the nationalists and an admission of guilt to arise with the arrest of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. Instead, expect a very negative reaction not only from extremist and nationalist zealots, but from the ordinary citizen who has little else to cling to after the war except the national and social identity, and self-image, that the nationalists provided him.

Perhaps greater benefits with regard to social development may result from an effort to establish the culpability of nationalist leaders in the reckless disregard and destruction of the government system that was in the process of being established in Bosnia in 1991-92. The nationalists could be identified for the Bosnian people as treasonous anarchists who sought to enhance their own wealth while driving Bosnia to its current unsatisfactory condition. This approach would serve to strip nationalists leaders of any legitimacy and authority among the people and isolate them from the average citizen by holding them accountable for actions for which the people could never hold themselves accountable. The goal is to give the people some relief and the ability to move forward psychologically while fully recognizing that something very wrong has occurred. They must be allowed to accept that they were victims of morally bankrupt governance, and understand that is all that nationalist leaders will ever bring them. Following this effort, it would be necessary to fully address the issue of war crimes committed by nationalists by bringing men such as Karadzic and Mladic to justice.

 

On Sending Signals to the Bosnians

The Bosnians are uncertain of their future and uncertain of the role the international community will play in that future. Signals from the international community that Western powers will draw down their forces soon have convinced the Bosnians that the internationals will not stay in Bosnia. Many have sought security by drawing inward toward their respective ethnic groups. Separatist thinking among the Bosnians favors the nationalist parties because they typically stand under banners of ethnic unity and the protection of their ethnic groups. The US must always be mindful of how political and business leaders in Bosnia as well as the average citizens of its respective ethnic groups will react to signals they are sent.

Any effort to withdraw US troops from Bosnia must be accompanied with strong statements on the intent to use US military power to respond to renewed hostilities. The Bosnians must be assured the US is committed to maintaining peace in their state. They must be told that peace will be enforced, but US financial support will not be indefinite. US financial support must hinge on positive change in the society. The Bosnians should also be convinced that their support of more moderate political parties and comprehensive efforts at integration, especially by large businesses, will be rewarded. It should be explained to them that no positive future will ever come to their way if they continue to accept the separatist messages of the respective ethnic nationalist parties. The people of the respective ethnic groups should be encouraged to recognize their areas of commonality and no longer be subjected to repeated comments from internationals on how the Bosnians cannot live together due to ancient hatreds. An effort must be made to explain to the Bosnians that they are being brought forward into the international community and the international economic system, beginning with making Bosnia part of the larger effort to make the states of the Balkans more interdependent. They also must pressed to engage in judicial, banking, tax, and other economic reforms, with the understanding that doing so will serve to support the process of bringing their state into the international economic system.