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**36**

**BRIDGET L. COGGINS**

**DO FAILED STATES PRODUCE MORE TERRORISM:  
INITIAL EVIDENCE FROM THE NON-TRADITIONAL THREAT DATA (1999-  
2008)**

**Project on:  
Globalization and the  
National Security State**

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**"Do Failed States Produce More Terrorism?: Initial Evidence from the Non-Traditional Threat Data (1999-2008)"**

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Dr. Bridget Coggins' research lies at the nexus between domestic politics and international relations. She has two major ongoing projects. The first is a book manuscript, *States of Uncertainty*, which focuses on contemporary secessionist conflicts and the politics of external recognition. Dr. Coggins' second project focuses on failed states' international security consequences and employs new data on state failure and international insecurity to precisely identify the scope and intensity of the threats collapsed states pose to their neighbors and the wider international community. Dr. Coggins is currently an Assistant Professor at Dartmouth College, and offers courses on international relations, civil war, secessionism, and research design and qualitative methodologies.

## Abstract

Today, Americans are more threatened by weak and failed states than they are by the strong.<sup>1</sup> Or so we believe. A growing developed-world consensus sees failed states as the preeminent global threat.<sup>2</sup> But that consensus - and any new security policy derived from it - rests upon an uncertain foundation; insights into the nature and intensity of threats emanating from failed states remain surprisingly tentative and unsystematic. Using new panel data on state weakness, failure and terrorism (1999-2008), this study examines the relationship between internal anarchy and terror. Among the so-called non-traditional threats, terrorism has received by far the most scholarly and policy attention, but the literature is too incoherent to draw any reliable conclusions regarding internal weakness' influence on a country's likelihood to generate terrorism.

I find that failure at the country-level does not have a straightforward effect on the probability of terrorism. Specifically, there is no relationship between increased state weakness and a country's incidence or perpetration of terrorism. However, looking only at the 'most failed' states, one finds distinct, significant relationships between different aspects of state failure and terrorism's incidence and production. First, states with the worst human security records are significantly less likely to experience or produce terrorism. Second, the states judged most corrupt, least ruled by law and with the greatest political instability - including total government collapse - are more likely to experience terrorism within their borders. But, of those states, only those experiencing political collapse are more likely to produce terrorism. These results suggest that different types of state collapse yield different propensities toward terrorism; they offer promising avenues for future research; and the models offer methodological and substantive improvements on previous research.

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<sup>1</sup> Negroponte, John D. (2007) "Annual Threat Assessment and U.S. National Security Challenges" Statement for the Record to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Washington, DC, January 11, 2007 <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/79065.htm>; National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002; National Security Strategy of the United States, March 2006, pp.14-17, 33. The most recent National Security Strategy was produced by the Bush Administration, but there is reason to believe that the Obama administration also sees failed states as an important threat. For example see Rice, Susan E. (2003) "The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States" Brookings Policy Brief Series #115, *The Brookings Institution*.

<sup>2</sup> Krasner, Stephen and Carlos Pascual (2001) "Addressing State failure" *Foreign Affairs* 84:4, pp.153-163; "SCADPlus: European Security Strategy" December 12, 2003, Brussels, Belgium. Also "Africa: Promoting Peace and Stability in Africa" *European Gateway* [http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical\\_themes/africa/](http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/africa/).

## ***Introduction***

Coping with state failure became a major security concern within developed countries as existential threat declined after the Cold War. The threats posed by failed states, once thought limited to their own populations or close neighbors, were now acknowledged as potentially international in scope.<sup>3</sup> Today, failure is deemed responsible for a wide variety of threats to others. Failed states are seen as likely safe havens for international terrorism and cross-border insurgencies. The territories also act as anarchic conduits through which arms, drugs, money and people can be trafficked without notice, in turn creating problems for governments far outside their borders. In addition, threats to human security like ecological degradation, refugee flows, contagious disease and famine may burden foreign governments because failed states cannot manage humanitarian crises. Further, failure's internal disorder can become a cancer on entire regions, spreading chaos and violence to neighbors ill-equipped to handle any troubles beyond their own. Finally, given time to fester, criminality may be institutionalized as conflicting groups gain a stake in perpetuating the disarray.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The policy debate surrounding failed States has shifted from one of humanitarian concerns and intervention *in spite* of security interest to one where State failure itself is now considered a security threat to strong States. For example, witness the change in the terms of debate regarding Somalia. During the American intervention in 1993, critics suggested the United States had no legitimate security interest underlying its humanitarian intervention (Editorial *The Boston Globe*, December 5, 1992, p.10; Gordon, Michael "Mission to Somalia" *New York Times* December 5, 1992, 1:2, p.14; Krauthammer, Charles "Misguided and Dangerous Utopianism Shapes US Policy in Somalia" *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* August 16, 1993, p.B2). In contrast, contemporary debates over US policy in Somalia uncritically accept an inherent US security interest in Somali stability (Pendergast, John and Colin Thomas-Jensen "Getting it Wrong in Somalia, Again" *The Boston Globe* November 29, 2006, p.A15; Stevenson, Jonathan "A Fleeting Victory in Somalia" *New York Times* January 8, 2007, A:2, p.19).

<sup>4</sup> Collier, Paul (1999) "Doing Well Out of War" *Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* April 26-27, London, UK; King, Charles (2001) "Eurasia's Nonstate States" *East European Constitutional Review* 10:4. Perhaps the most dystopian prediction of the ultimate end-state for many of these States can be found in Robert D. Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet" *The Atlantic Monthly* (1994) February, p.44-75.

Confronted with failure, the international community typically maintains support for the regime nominally in power, encouraging institutional reform through incentives like development loans and other foreign assistance. So far, this strategy has met with little success. Stabilization efforts in places like Afghanistan, Somalia and Liberia, to name but a few, have achieved limited, precarious accomplishments in terms of economic or political development.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, failure's negative externalities may continue unabated. Advocates suggest greater commitments of time and material support would yield better results.<sup>6</sup> Critics counter that engaging corrupt, dysfunctional regimes rewards malevolence and incompetence, offering little potential for viable governance long term. In the most extreme cases, they argue, strong states might be better advised to revoke their assistance for weak states and "let them fail".<sup>7</sup> However, despite the supportive approach's equivocal track record and new appreciation for the potential international insecurity associated with failure, alternative proposals have not attracted many advocates.

Over the past decade, the United States (U.S.) has made various notable institutional changes in order to better cope with state failure. No longer an exclusively humanitarian or developmental problem, today there is a dedicated office for state building and reconstruction that acts as a hub for interagency coordination for weak states; purview

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<sup>5</sup> Boulden, Jane (2001) *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia and Bosnia* Westport, CT: Praeger Press; Coyne, Christopher (2006) "Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy" *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2:4, pp.343-360; Howe, Herbert (1996/7) "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping" *International Security* 21:3, pp.145-176; Jones, Seth et al. (2005) "Establishing Law and Order After Conflict" Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, p.xv; Marten, Kimberly (2006/7) "Failing States, Rising Warlords" *International Security* (Winter) 31:3, pp.41-73.

<sup>6</sup> For example, see the British Department for International Development's (DFID) January 2005 Report, "Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states" Retrieved July 25, 2007 <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Herbst, Jeffrey (2004) "Let Them Fail" Chapter 13 in Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.)(2003) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.312-313.

over engagements in failed states has decisively shifted to defense agencies; and the U.S. is more willing to intervene in ungoverned territories to prevent or counter nascent threats. Nevertheless, the overriding foreign policy approach toward failure (support and engagement) remains essentially unchanged. Greater attention to failed states and non-traditional threats has not translated into superior, readily implementable, foreign policy. It is easy to see why meaningful policy change has lagged behind changed threat perceptions. Although there is considerable concern and various strategies have been offered, little evidence supports the link between failure and external threat. Given the available information, it is difficult to judge whether current actions are effective, efficient or whether the proposed alternatives will make the U.S., or anyone for that matter, safer. This chapter marks an initial effort to clarify state weakness' relationship to terrorism.

### *The State Failure Literature*

Research on failed states generally falls into one of two categories: descriptive or prescriptive. Descriptive analyses are largely taxonomic and focus on categorizing and measuring failure. These works are conceptual; they theorize about the nature of failure and recommend how to best capture the phenomenon. Prescriptive studies begin with failure-associated threats and devise remedies specifically targeted to resolve or limit those problems. In these works, empirical evidence for the relationship between failure and external threat is gleaned from specific cases. Neither strand of literature is well suited to systematically analyze the relationship between failure and terrorism planned for this study, however.

### *Descriptive Studies*

Some exemplary descriptive works include the Failed States Index (FSI), produced annually since 2005 by the Fund for Peace; the Political Instability Task Force (formerly the State Failure Task Force) data produced by the CIA; the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, a project at the Brookings Institute; the World Bank's Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (formerly Low Income Countries Under Stress); and Marshall and Goldstone's State Fragility Index.<sup>8</sup>

The FSI, probably the most widely cited in the descriptive category, has been produced annually since 2005. It aims to capture the risk of failure by evaluating the world's states on twelve characteristics of good government (higher scores are equated with poorer governance), aggregating the scores for each state, and then ranking them relative to one another. The states with the highest scores are deemed the most "at risk" of failure. The 2011 Index counted 2-13 states at the most imperiled "alert" or "critical" level and an additional 62-98 at a "warning" or "danger" level.<sup>9</sup> Together they comprised over half of the world's 194 states. On the opposite end of the ranking, only between 1-12 states were judged fully sustainable; the United States, Britain and Japan were not among them.<sup>10</sup> However, the reality might not be as dire as it appears. Strictly abiding by the project's claims, one might conclude that there are no - and have been no - state failures between 2005 and 2009, only states "at risk" of failing. Most descriptive studies find far fewer

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<sup>8</sup> Noteworthy individual and collaborative qualitative efforts of the topic include: Rotberg Zartman, Herbst, Jeffrey (2000). *States and Power in Africa* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Reno, William (1999) *Warlord Politics and African States* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.; Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.)(2003) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.)(2003) *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Zartman, William I. (Ed.)(1995) *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

<sup>9</sup> Though previous iterations of the FSI included distinct categories of weakness, the most recent version does not draw precise distinctions between the different degrees of risk.

<sup>10</sup> Finland was the only country judged fully sustainable by the 2011 FSI.



imperiled states than the FSI because they use more restrictive definitions of the phenomenon. According to the most restrictive definition among the descriptive studies, the World Bank's Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries program, the only truly failed state in recent years is Somalia, which has been without a functioning government since 1991. In 2005, this rubric classified between 10 and 20 additional states as "fragile".

Unfortunately, existing descriptive studies of failure present methodological limitations when it comes to evaluating their relationship to non-traditional threats. First, many endogenize external threat production, treating it as an indicator of failure rather than a potential effect.<sup>11</sup> In order to adequately assess the relationship, the two must be analytically distinct. Second, studies of failure or weakness sometimes include only weak states in their analysis. If we hope to discover the relationship between failure and threat, all states, not just weak states, must be included. It is at least theoretically possible that non-failed states present equivalent or greater threats to others. Third, current studies evaluate weakness for a handful of years at the most, severely limiting the inferences we are able to draw. Additionally, most studies of failure are conceptual pieces not well suited to large N study. Many employ so many indicators and such varied sources as to be untenable for large, cross-national studies. And this is especially problematic because as states become increasingly weak, reliable data is increasingly scarce. Lastly, one surprising limitation of state failure datasets is their lack of basic demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic indicators. Those factors may play a significant role in determining whether failure threatens outsiders. For example, given two equally weak states, one landlocked with a population of 50 million people and another an island nation with less than one million people, the former would likely have more threat potential than

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<sup>11</sup> For example, the FSI's "Security Apparatus" and "Intervention" indicators.

the latter. However, these kinds of logical controls are not often present because the taxonomies were created for other purposes.

### *Prescriptive Studies*

Prescriptive studies proceed from an acknowledged non-traditional threat generated by a weak or failed state, (e.g. drug trafficking in Colombia, weapons trafficking in Moldova, or piracy in Somalia) on to policy prescriptions. Often, U.S. engagements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Somalia, to name only a handful, seem to hold important lessons about the insecurities that government collapse might cause.<sup>12</sup> These case studies are essential to creating effective foreign policies that are tailor-made to the specific circumstances giving rise to particular non-traditional threats. However, these cases may also be idiosyncratic and not generally indicative of the threats associated with failed states. Perhaps Somalia is a peculiar case relative to the set of maritime piracy producing states.<sup>13</sup> Or perhaps external military interventions muddle the causal relationship between failure and threat. Emblematically, many foreign civilians victimized by Iraqi and Afghan terrorism were there in support of occupations, making it difficult to discern whether governmental collapse would have inspired such high levels of international terrorism had the interventions not occurred. A more comprehensive approach would ensure that these important cases are not outliers or otherwise generating a misleading impression of the nature and intensity of external threat.

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<sup>13</sup> Coggins, Bridget (2011) "Nothing Fails Like Success: Anarchy, Piracy and State-building in Somalia; Percy, Sarah and Anja Shortland (2010) "The Business of Somali Piracy" *DIW Berlin, Discussion Papers* No.1033.

If failed states are no longer a purely humanitarian problem, but a potential security problem, then an unfortunate knowledge gap exists between descriptive analyses, case-based prescriptions and good foreign policy. Principally, we don't know the nature of the security problem being confronted. Sound empirical evidence helps to move the policy debate forward in at least two respects. First, it separates demonstrable threats from the litany of possible but unsubstantiated threats associated with failure. Second, it provides a basis for judging current policies against the proposed alternatives. Only with this new information can we accurately evaluate whether foreign policies are effectively and efficiently addressing threats associated with state failure. Indeed, according to one expert, the real threat, "...is that the United States will squander energy and resources in a diffuse, unfocused effort to attack state weakness wherever it arises, without appropriate attention to setting priorities and tailoring responses to poor governance and its specific, attendant spillovers".<sup>14</sup> The analysis undertaken in this project provides the policy community with a tool to ensure that this does not happen.

### ***Emergent Anarchy & Non-traditional Threat***

With a few notable exceptions, international relations (IR) scholars rarely examine state failure. However, this should not be taken to mean that international relations theory has nothing to contribute. IR does concentrate on anarchy - the absence of a centralized authority willing and able to enforce order among states. Scholars conceive of the international system's anarchic organization in contrast to the hierarchy that typically

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<sup>14</sup> Patrick, Stewart (2006) "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction" *The Washington Quarterly* 29:2 Spring, p.29.

prevails at the domestic level within states.<sup>15</sup> When a government collapses, the country no longer has a centralized authority, therefore state failure might be conceptualized as an instance of 'emerging anarchy'.<sup>16</sup> As with anarchy at the international level, anarchy at the domestic level is believed to be a permissive cause of so-called non-traditional threats. Yet anarchy within states might be especially problematic, not only due to its potential threats to outsiders, but also because other states have few legitimate means of dealing with those threats when they arise.

### *Anarchy*

Simply stated, anarchy is the "lack of a common government" among states.<sup>17</sup> For many in IR, it is one of, if not *the* primary driver of interstate conflict.<sup>18</sup> Importantly, anarchy itself is not equivalent to disorder or a violent 'war of all against all', but it is characterized as a 'state of war' because violent conflict might break out at any time absent an authority (common government) willing and able to stop it.<sup>19</sup> In fact, anarchy's pernicious effects on individuals in the state of nature were so severe that they justified the creation of formal hierarchy - state-like institutions - for political philosophers as diverse as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. For systemic realists, anarchy is a permissive cause of great power war as it instigates uncertainty and competition. For others, it is a

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<sup>15</sup> Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics* Reading, MA: McGraw-Hill, p.88

<sup>16</sup> Posen, Barry R. (1993) "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival* 35:1, p.27.

<sup>17</sup> Axelrod, Robert and Robert Keohane in Oye, Kenneth (Ed)(1986) *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, p.226; Milner, Helen (1991) The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique" *Review of International Studies* 17:1 (January), 67-85.

<sup>18</sup> Waltz, Kenneth (1979) *Theory of International Politics* Reading, MA: McGraw-Hill; Gilpin, Robert (1981) *War and Change in World Politics* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Art, Robert and Robert Jervis (1986) *International Politics, 2nd Edition* Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company;

<sup>19</sup> Hobbes, Thomas (1994) *Leviathan* Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Inc.

persistent barrier to international cooperation.<sup>20</sup> Even among those who believe that anarchy's effects are variable - and may yield enduring, cooperative norms of interaction - few argue that that pattern is currently manifested in the international system. Emblematically, for systemic constructivists anarchy is not destined to create conflictual relations between states, but system members have not yet realized a fundamentally different means of interaction.<sup>21</sup>

More recently, scholars have pointed to a particular set of problems that might be associated with the emergence of anarchy when state authority declines in the modern international system. Contemporary states are expected to fulfill a much more expansive array of tasks than their progenitors, from health care and education to providing security and economic opportunity. Very low or declining state capacity may catalyze anarchy-like consequences even if regimes still enjoy the trappings of external sovereignty. Posen, for example, argues that state collapse may engender competition between ethnic groups and initiate spirals of insecurity akin to those seen in the security dilemma at the international level.<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Atzili suggests that, post-collapse, the Democratic Republic of Congo's externally guaranteed borders have served to generate insecurity for its neighbors because they are unwilling to formally conquer and pacify anarchic lands.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, various scholars have pointed to the porousness of failed states' borders and

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<sup>20</sup> Axelrod, Robert (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation* New York, NY: Basic Books; Keohane, Robert (1984) *After Hegemony* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Oye, Kenneth A. (Ed.)(1986) *Cooperation Under Anarchy* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Grieco, Joseph (1988) "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" *International Organization* 42:3, 485-507.

<sup>21</sup> Wendt, Alexander (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>22</sup> Posen, Barry R. (1993) "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" *Survival* 35:1, p.27.

<sup>23</sup> Atzili, Boaz (2006/7) "When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict" *International Security* 31:3, pp.139-73.

their role in the transmission of foreign insurgents, drugs, and other traffic to neighboring states.

Given the anarchical international order, it may seem counterintuitive that domestic anarchy would present such a menace. If anarchy is a persistent feature of the international environment, why would leaders not simply extend the logic of international politics to their dealings with failed states? Despite its omission in many scholarly discussions of anarchy, there is significant hierarchy within anarchy at the international level.<sup>24</sup> Two particularly important types of hierarchy are characteristic of international relations: 1) informal hierarchies of status between states and 2) a foundational hierarchy between states and other, non-state actors.<sup>25</sup> The second type helps us to understand why anarchy within states might be more threatening than anarchy between them.

Though there is no world government, the international system is best conceived of as a rudimentary international society.<sup>26</sup> As such, there are shared rules and common practices among states that help to manage non-traditional threats when they arise. When sub-state groups or individuals within a state's territory present a threat, the state government is the point of contact. Government leaders expect, nay depend, on each other's ability to make good on their commitments, enforce order within their borders and control their populations. Second, because non-state actors have decidedly lesser status than states,

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<sup>24</sup> Lake, David A. (2007) "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics" *International Security* 32:1 (Summer), pp.47-79; MacDonald, Paul K. and David A. Lake. (2008) The Role of Hierarchy in International Politics. *International Security* 32:4, pp.171-180; Milner, Helen (1991) "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique" *Review of International Studies* 17:1 (January), pp.67-85.

<sup>25</sup> For empirical examples see Wendt, Alexander and Daniel Friedheim (1995) "Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State" *International Organization* 49:4 (September), pp.689-721; Kang, David C. (2003/4) "Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations" *International Security* 28:3 (Winter), pp.165-180. Historically, there have also been anarchical systems between differentiated units; some included states, others did not. See Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (1996) "Reconceptualizing Anarchy" *European Journal of International Relations* 2:4 (December), pp.403-438.

<sup>26</sup> Bull, Hedley (1977) *The Anarchical Society* New York, NY: Columbia University Press;

state leaders cannot expect that the same rules and conventions will prevail in their interactions with non-state actors. Non-state actors have not consented to the 'rules of the game' nor do they expect that states will treat them according to the conventions of international society. Most international governmental institutions, laws and norms are poorly suited to accommodate non-state actors and most exclude their participation outright. Characteristically, if a regime remains nominally sovereign, sovereignty dictates that outsiders defer to its authority. But if the nominal sovereign cannot or will not enforce order within its borders, and moreover will not allow outsiders to intervene in its territory, then the international community has few options for dealing with the problem. If outsiders intervene unilaterally, then they serve to undermine the institution of sovereignty as a whole. When a government collapses, it introduces a significant amount of uncertainty into relations with the population within that territory because outsiders cannot identify the proper authorities or the appropriate rules of conduct. Much of the perceived threat of emergent anarchy and state failure flows from this uncertainty.

### *Failure & Terrorism*

Of the various non-traditional threats associated with state failure, terrorism has received the most scholarly attention. However, the attention has not generated a consensus on the relationship between state weakness and terrorism. In fact, it has had the opposite effect. This is principally due to the wide variety of terrorism data and scholarly interests in particular subsets of terrorism (i.e. Southeast Asian terrorism, suicide terrorism, or transnational terrorism). Additionally, scholars have adopted alternative interpretations of state failure. The definitions range from deficiencies in specific areas of governance

(state failings) to complete governmental collapse. This project attempts to remedy the segmentation of the literature by beginning with broad and inclusive definitions and only moving to more nuanced definitions as necessary based upon the results.

How might state failure cause terrorism? The potential mechanisms vary. As a government becomes progressively weak, it loses its control over and legitimacy within its population. This is likely to generate additional crime and political violence within the state as the population becomes increasingly aggrieved and the state's deterrent effect is minimized. According to this mechanism, terrorism may be used by non-state actors to delegitimize and unseat the regime or may be used to settle disputes among sub-state actors in the absence of state authority. When a regime becomes corrupted and fails to operate according to the law, politicized violence may be associated with the competition for territory and scarce resources within the state. Lastly, the fundamental collapse of government may be associated with an increase in terrorism as insurgencies make regular use of terrorism alongside other non-traditional military tactics. Furthermore, a lapse in centralized governing authority often engenders multiple competing authorities within a country.

Failure may also generate the threat of terrorism for outsiders if domestic disorder and its related ills are able to cross borders. One specific concern is that failed states may operate as 'safe havens' for groups employing terrorism. According to this mechanism, failure is not not necessarily generating 'home grown' terrorism, but is providing a permissive environment or 'staging ground' for groups employing terrorism to exploit. This is often the shorthand used to describe Afghanistan's relationship to the September 11th attacks in the United States. Afghans were not the perpetrators of the attacks, but Afghanistan's



failure was significantly at fault. State failure may also generate terrorism if a country's inhabitants are actively engaged in a conflict that crosses borders. Civil or international conflicts in borderlands are likely to become more violent as borders become more porous and governmental control wanes. Furthermore, should non-state actors blame external interference for their country's ills, terrorism may also result. For example, Somalia's *Al Shabaab* insurgency has perpetrated terrorism in Uganda and Kenya and against Ethiopians for their meddling in Somali affairs.

The foregoing discussion yields the following preliminary hypotheses regarding the relationship between failure and terrorism:

H1: As states become increasingly weak, they will become more likely to produce terrorism.

H2: As states become increasingly weak, they will become more likely to experience terrorism.

H3: Failed states will be more likely to produce terrorism.

H4: Failed states will be more likely to experience terrorism.

### ***Methodological Approach & Data Specification***

Any serious attempt to systematically study state failure confronts serious analytical hurdles. Because governments acquisition and act as the repositories of most macro-level data, state weakness and failure are systematically related to the absence of data.<sup>27</sup> The dataset for this project controls for many of the potential problems. Third parties, and not weak or failing governments, provided data on terrorism. Failure variables were also

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<sup>27</sup> Lemke, Douglas (2004) "African Lessons for International Relations Research." *World Politics* 56:1, 114-138.

collected from international organizations making independent estimates of state capacity and goods provision, thereby avoiding the politicization of data or ambiguities deriving from the gap between law and practice or promised and actual goods provision.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, there is no agreement - either conceptually or operationally - about the nature of state failure.<sup>29</sup> Many promising indices and measurements of the phenomenon are too temporally or otherwise limited for even the decade under study. For example, the Fund for Peace, FSI has only been collected since 2005. Still, this study captures robust and varied measures of weakness and state collapse that cover the most common understandings of the phenomenon.

The nature of terrorism and this project suggest that a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE1) model is the most appropriate analytical tool.<sup>30</sup> A possible alternative means of modeling terrorism production for this project would be a one-way, country fixed effects model.<sup>31</sup> However, this would model whether state collapse in each individual state was related to an increase in terrorism in those particular states (within subject variation). In contrast, a GEE model will show whether, on average, state failure causes a greater

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<sup>28</sup> Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009) "Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008" *Policy Research Working Paper*, No.4978 (June 2009) The World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth Team, p.5

<sup>29</sup> Patrick, Stuart. (2011) *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p.330; Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.)(2003) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>30</sup> Because the dependent variable (terrorism production) is overdispersed, the analysis assumes a negative binomial distribution.

<sup>31</sup> Zorn, Christopher J.W. (2001) "Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data: A Review with Applications." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:2 (April), 470-490.; Thall, Peter F. and Stephen C. Vail. (1990) "Some Covariance Models for Longitudinal Count Data with Overdispersion." *Biometrics* 46:3 (September), pp.657-671. One way fixed effects on country, rather than two-way fixed effects with both country and year seems most appropriate alternative model as there were no obvious global, annual effects during the study period, there are many countries with seacoasts, and a potential degrees of freedom problem might result.

incidence of terrorism (population-averaged variation).<sup>32</sup> This is more consistent with the research question at hand. Because there is temporal dependence in terrorism production within countries, I specify the within-observation correlation matrix to follow an AR(1) format.

### *Terrorism*

Given the scholarly literature's incoherence regarding state weakness and terrorism, this project begins with an inclusive definition of terrorism and adopts more nuanced operationalizations as necessary. The dependent variables for the study are derived from the Rand Organization's Worldwide Terrorism Incidents Dataset (RDWTI). According to the RDWTI data, terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause; key elements include:

- Violence or the threat of violence
- Calculated to create fear and alarm
- Intended to coerce certain actions
- Motive must include a political objective
- Generally directed against civilian targets
- Can be a group or an individual<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Zorn, Christopher J.W. (2001) "Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data: A Review with Applications." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:2 (April), p.475; Hardin, James W. and Joseph M. Hilbe (2003) *Generalized Estimating Equations* Boca Raton, FL: Chapman and Hall/CRC.

<sup>33</sup> The definition can be found at <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about/definitions.html>

The RDWTI event data was used to create two annual, country level variables to capture a country's experience with terrorism. The first, *locationterror*, indicates the annual number of terrorism incidents occurring within a country's borders. Between 1999 and 2008, there were 32,521 terrorism events worldwide. *Locationterror* ranges from 0 to 3,968. However, Iraq was a significant outlier from 2004-2008.<sup>34</sup> Thailand had the next highest number of reported terror events in 2007 with 744. *Locationterror* has a mean of 16 events and a standard deviation of 134. There were 1,237 country-years that had zero reported terrorism events. The second, *perpterror*, captures the number of terrorism incidents claimed by a group based in or operating from within a country's borders during a year. Because far fewer terrorism events are claimed by those that perpetrate them than have known locations, there were 9,769 such events during the study period. *Perpterror* ranges from 0 to 610, has a mean of just over 5 events and a standard deviation of approximately 31. The country-year with the highest number of claimed terrorism events was Thailand in 2007; 610 of Thailand's 744 terror events that year were claimed by groups based in Thailand. There were 1,497 country-years coded zero. Although non-zero observations on both variables are uncommon, neither is so uncommon as to be considered a rare event. Further details on the coding of these new variables are available in the project codebook.

### *State Weakness & Failure*

In order to test whether state collapse is systematically related to failure, a number of measures were created. State failure has two common conceptual definitions. One is the fundamental collapse of governing authority, while the other is the failure to deliver even

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<sup>34</sup> Afghanistan was also a significant and consistent outlier.

rudimentary public goods to its population - due to a lack of capacity, a lack of will or both.<sup>35</sup> According to the Polity IV Data's coding of interregnum or 'internal anarchy', the first type of state failure only unambiguously occurred in six states, and for a total of 24 country years during the study period: Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands and Somalia.<sup>36</sup>

The second definition focuses on the delivery of public goods. Twelve variables, six of them dummy variables derived from the other six, using this conceptualization were created. Three variables measure human suffering and popular well-being to capture state weakness and three variables use state capacity to measure state weakness. The two types of variables suggest two different ways of understanding the nature of state failure, one continuous and the other discrete. The discrete, dummy variables attempt to capture the 'most failed' members of the international system, or those whose populations might be experiencing near anarchic circumstances. Each dummy variable was coded 1 for the bottom 5% of scores for states in the international system during the decade according to the associated continuous measure.

The first variable, *infant*, indicates a country's annual infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births. Higher rates of infant mortality suggest increasingly less basic healthcare service provision available to the population and should be associated with increasing rates of terrorism. *Fail1*, is a dummy variable indicating countries with an infant mortality rate

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<sup>35</sup> Patrick, Stuart. (2011) *Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, p.330; Rotberg, Robert I. (Ed.)(2003) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>36</sup> Marshall, Monty G. and Ted Robert Gurr (2010) Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu>> September 3, 2011. State collapse could theoretically cause states to drop out of the international system, thereby depressing the number of failed states. However, states rarely "die" and no states exited the international system during the period under study Fazal, Tanisha. (2007) *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation and Annexation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Correlates of War (2010) "State System Membership List, Version 2010.1" <<http://www.correlatesofwar.org>> October 14, 2011.

per 1,000 live births (*infant*) greater than or equal to 119.<sup>37</sup> This measure classifies 50 out of 1460 country years as failed. One of the most common means of measuring a country's economic well-being is its Gross Domestic Product per capita (*gdppc*). This variable indicates the annual per capita GDP for all states. Lower GDPs per capita suggest increasing poverty and should be associated with an increase in terrorism. For *fail2* a dummy variable indicating all states with a per capita GDP less than or equal to \$231.75 was created. According to this measure, 42 out of 1460 country years were coded as failed. Neither the *fail1* nor the *fail2* variables have any missing observations because the original infant mortality and GDP per capita measures, reported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), were estimated by the UNDP for years in which data was unavailable. The third measure, *hdivalue*, reports the UNDP's annual Human Development Index (HDI) score for each state. Lower values on the HDI suggest an increasing lack of basic public goods like healthcare and education and should be associated with an increase in terrorism. *Fail3* is a dummy variable indicating states with an HDI value less than or equal to .38. This yields 30 country years classified as failed out of 1460. Unfortunately, the HDI excludes information on a number of likely failed states during the study period like Somalia, Iraq and Haiti, so observations on 235 country years are missing.<sup>38</sup>

The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) estimate state capacity and include measures of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption.<sup>39</sup> The WGI are based on the perceptions of households, firms and other experts active within

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<sup>37</sup> The lowest 5% was calculated for all country years.

<sup>38</sup> This is particularly important because GEE models assume that missing data is missing at random.

<sup>39</sup> Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009) "Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008" *Policy Research Working Paper*, No.4978 (June) The World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth Team.

each country during a given year.<sup>40</sup> Government effectiveness (*geest*) "captures perceptions of the quality of public services, of the civil service...and the government's commitment to such policies".<sup>41</sup> As with the human suffering variables, three dummy variables were created by selecting the lowest 5% of states from each index. For the government effectiveness estimate, *fail4* was coded 1 for states with scores of -1.44 or less for a total of 62 country years. Rule of Law (*rolest*) captures whether individuals have confidence in and abide by laws, contract and law enforcement quality and the perceived likelihood of crime and violence (Ibid. 6). Country years with a rule of law estimate less than -1.49 populated the *fail5* measure (54 country years). Last, the control of corruption measure (*cocest*) captures "perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain" (Ibid. 6). The *cocest* measure generated *fail6*, for country years with scores less than or equal to -1.34 (58/1460 country years).

The final two dummy variables measure governmental collapse and localized internal anarchy. The first, (*fail7*) is coded 1 for those states coded as "perfectly incoherent" (-77) in a given year according to the Polity IV Data (Marshall and Gurr 2010). This occurred in 24 country years. The second, (*fail8*) is coded 1 for those states that experienced "complex" political instability according to the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) for at least six months of a given year.<sup>42</sup> This occurred in 141 country years.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 4

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 6

<sup>42</sup> Political Instability Task Force (PITF) (2009) "Consolidated Problem Set, version 2009." <<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>> April 3, 2011.

### *Country Characteristics*

Regime characteristics have been found to systematically influence the likelihood that a country will produce terrorism. *Polity 2* score, which "fixes" the traditional polity scores coded -66, -77, and -88 for use in quantitative analysis.<sup>43</sup> Twenty-eight countries, mostly very small and/or island states, were not included in the Polity IV data. I have also included a measure of regime durability (*durability*) and a dummy variable, *transition*, measuring whether transitional or unconsolidated regimes (those with polity scores between -5 and 5) are more likely to experience or produce terrorism.

Two additional control variables were created in order to capture the established relationships between terrorism production and targeting associated with civil and international war. The first variable, *civilwar*, is a dummy variable indicating an ongoing civil war in a given year. The civil war data comes from the PRIO CSCW data and includes conflicts with over 25 battle-related deaths in a given year.<sup>44</sup> In some cases, notably India, countries were involved in more than one civil war in a given year. The second variable, *intlwar*, is a dummy variable indicating that a country is involved in an international war during a given year. International war comes from the Correlates of War Interstate War data.<sup>45</sup> Although the data only extends to 2007, I included the single

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<sup>43</sup> Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers (2005 "Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004: Dataset Users' Manual" <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity>>; Marshall, Monty G. and Ted Robert Gurr (2010) Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu>> September 3, 2011. Specifically, country years coded -66 are recoded as system missing; those coded -77 are recoded 0 or "perfectly incoherent" and those coded -88 are pro-rated over the period when a country was occupied by a foreign government.

<sup>44</sup> Lacina, Bathany (2009) "Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946-2008: Codebook for Version 3.0" Center for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); Lacina, Bathany and Nils Petter Gleditsch (2005) "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths" *European Journal of Population* 21:2-3, pp.145-116.

<sup>45</sup> Correlates of War. (2010) <<http://www.correlatesofwar.org>> October 14, 2011; Sarkees, Meredith Reid 2000. "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18:1, 123-144.



international war in 2008, Georgia-Russia to extend the data through the end of this analysis period.

### ***Results & Interpretation***

The initial models of state weakness, failure, terrorism incidence and terrorism production confirm much of the existing wisdom, but challenge other aspects of it. Table 1 presents the results of the GEE negative binomial regressions with terrorism incidence as a dependent variable. The models run on two different understandings of failure - human security and state capacity - find little support for the link between increased weakness and increased incidence of terrorism. Only one model, that using the human development index as an indicator of state weakness, finds a significant relationship to terrorism incidence. But, contrary to the hypothesis, the relationship is positive; greater human development is associated with a greater incidence of terrorism.

Although the relationship is robust, there is some reason to doubt the HDI finding. Specifically, the HDI does not include observations on a number of countries at the bottom end of the scale. Because one assumption underlying the GEE model is that missing data be missing at random, this is a potentially important modeling problem. Both population and ongoing civil war had significant positive effects on the likelihood of terrorism. International war also had a positive effect. The state capacity variables did not include observations prior to 2002, therefore there were likely too few observations on the international war variable to find a significant effect in these models.

The second set of state weakness models (Table 2), using terrorism production as a dependent variable, find nearly identical results. Population, civil war and international

war find substantial support, while only the HDI weakness variable finds support among the failure variables.<sup>46</sup> Again, the hypothesized relationship between state weakness and terrorism production is just the opposite of what we find: greater human development scores are associated with a greater production of terrorism. Confirming lingering suspicions from the first, however, this HDI model fails to converge.

Using more discrete operationalizations of failure, shown in Tables 3 and 4, distinct relationships between the types of failure and terrorism are apparent. Country years classified as failures according to measures of human security (gdppercapita/fail2, hdivalue/fail3) are significantly less likely to have terrorism located within their borders and less likely to produce terrorism.<sup>47</sup> Country years classified as failures according to state capacity (rolest/fail5, cocest/fail6) are significantly more likely to have terrorism located within their borders, but demonstrated no significant relationship to terrorism production. Finally, country years coded as experiencing political collapse (polity/fail7, pitf/fail8) were significantly more likely to have terrorism located within their borders. The models for terrorism production using these two measures failed to converge, however.

In sum, as countries become increasingly weak, they are neither more likely to experience terrorism nor more likely to produce it. And this is true whether one measures state weakness according to human security or state capacity. Instead, one indicator of human security (HDI) finds a positive relationship between popular well being and the incidence of terrorism within a country. The weakest 5% of states in the international system had more nuanced relationships with terrorism. The most failed states according

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<sup>46</sup> In models 5 and 6, the international war variable is significant at .08.

<sup>47</sup> The model using infant/fail1 failed to converge.

to human security were significantly less likely to experience or produce terrorism. The most failed states according to state capacity were significantly more likely to experience terrorism, but no more likely to produce it. And the states experiencing political collapse were also significantly more likely to experience terrorism.

### ***Conclusion***

Are failed and failing states more likely to produce terrorism than other states? According to the data for this project so far, the evidence is mixed. In the decade from 1999 until 2008, increasing state weakness was not associated with the increased incidence or perpetration of terrorism. The only significant result regarding state weakness showed that, as states' human development increased, they became *more* likely to experience and produce terrorism. And yet, emergent anarchy does seem to provide a potential explanation for terrorism at the domestic level, since the most failed states according to state capacity and political collapse were more likely to experience terrorism (but no more likely to produce it).

Still, these findings are only preliminary and the research remains in progress. A number additional of models will delimit the relationship between failure and terrorism. First, as anticipated based upon the extant literature, during an ongoing civil conflict, countries were significantly more likely to experience terrorism and more likely to produce terrorism. This suggests that domestic and international terrorism should have distinct patterns. In particular, domestic terrorism appears to be related to non-state actors' participation in a guerrilla war against the government. Subsequent models will use the

RDWTI event data to examine domestic terrorism - or those events with both domestic perpetrators and victims - and international terrorism (with foreign victims) separately.

### *New Hypotheses*

H5: As states become increasingly weak, they will be more likely to (experience/produce) (domestic/international) terrorism.

H6: Failed states will be more likely to (experience/produce) (domestic/international) terrorism.

Four new variables will capture the different types of terrorism: domestic and international. It is possible that state failure would engender one type of terrorism, but not the other. *Domterrorloc* is an annual count of the number of terrorism events occurring within a country where either of the following statements are true: 1) perpetrator nationality is the same as the location, or 2) the location is the same as the target nationality. *Domterrorperp* is an annual count of the number of terrorism events occurring either 1) by perpetrators in the same country where the terrorism occurs or 2) by perpetrators of the same nationality as the target nationality. *Intlterrorloc* is an annual count of the number of terrorism events occurring within a country where any of the following three statements are true: 1) the perpetrator nationality is not the same as the location, 2) the location is not the same as the target nationality, or 3) the target is a public international organization or a private international business. *Intlterrorperp* is an annual count of the number of terrorism events perpetrated by nationals where 1) the perpetrators are not of the same nationality of the country where the terrorism occurs, 2)

the perpetrators are not of the same nationality as the target(s) or 3) the target is a public international organization or a private international business.

Second, while the results of this study find a significant relationship between the most failed states on measures of state capacity and political collapse and the experience of terrorism, it is not apparent that domestic groups are responsible for the terrorism events. It may also be the case that groups employing terrorism are crossing borders in a sort of predatory, unconventional war.

Finally, the potential quadratic relationship between failure and terrorism, including the demonstrated non-monotonic relationship with political freedom, should be explored further.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Abadie, Alberto (2004) "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism" *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper*, No.10859 <<http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859>> October 13, 2011.

TABLE 1 GEE1 Negative Binomial Models of Terrorism Location

Variable	<i>Human Security (1999-2008)</i>			<i>State Capacity (2002-2008)</i>		
	Model 1 ( <i>Infant</i> )	Model 2 ( <i>GDPpc</i> )	Model 3 ( <i>HDI</i> )	Model 4 ( <i>Effective</i> )	Model 5 ( <i>RoL</i> )	Model 6 ( <i>CoC</i> )
Population (log)	.798*** (.132)	.821*** (.133)	.914*** (.134)	.812*** (.142)	.796*** (.142)	.80*** (.143)
Polity2	.034 (.032)	.041 (.045)	-.004 (.053)	.066 (.052)	.064 (.052)	.059 (.043)
Durability	-.006 (.005)	-.004 (.008)	-.010 (.006)	.002 (.009)	.002 (.010)	.001 (.008)
Civil War	2.07** (.778)	1.98** (.717)	1.73* (.727)	2.39** (.777)	2.41*** (.753)	2.41** (.784)
Int'l War	.594** (.208)	.571*** (.174)	.586*** (.140)	.051 (.328)	.077 (.327)	.087 (.342)
Infant	-.011 (.008)					
GDPpc		8.51e-06 (.000)				
HDIvalue			4.90*** (1.14)			
Effective				-.261 (.508)		
RuleofLaw					-.279 (.528)	
CofCorruption						-.195 (.404)
Constant	-2.26*** (.637)	-2.89*** (.663)	-1.77 (.958)	-2.98*** (.742)	-2.95*** (.734)	-2.86*** (.698)
Groups N	153 1524	153 1524	148 1474	153 1068	153 1068	153 1068

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.001\*\*\*

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are semi-robust standard errors. GEE models assume an AR (1) correlation structure. The results were similar for models run with Afghanistan and Iraq included.

TABLE 2 GEE1 Negative Binomial Models of Terrorism Production

Variable	<i>Human Security (1999-2008)</i>			<i>State Capacity (2002-2008)</i>		
	Model 1 ( <i>Infant</i> )	Model 2 ( <i>GDPpc</i> )	Model 3 ( <i>HDI</i> )	Model 4 ( <i>Effective</i> )	Model 5 ( <i>RoL</i> )	Model 6 ( <i>CoC</i> )
Population (log)	.830*** (.179)	.869*** (.170)	.864*** (.101)	.910*** (.167)	.894*** (.163)	.900*** (.162)
Polity2	.004 (.051)	.010 (.069)	.024 (.134)	.043 (.073)	.041 (.074)	.037 (.063)
Durability	-.002 (.006)	.002 (.009)	-.003 (.006)	.007 (.010)	.006 (.012)	.006 (.009)
Civil War	2.21* (.935)	2.24** (.773)	2.25*** (.514)	2.59*** (.705)	2.59*** (.687)	2.63*** (.700)
Int'l War	.478 (.253)	.462* (.196)	.421*** (.128)	-.387* (.199)	-.349 (.198)	-.359 (.208)
Infant	-.015 (.010)					
GDPpc		9.96e-06 (.0000)				
HDIvalue			4.46** (1.70)			
Effective				-.307 (.540)		
RuleofLaw					-.270 (.588)	
CofCorruption						-.240 (.411)
Constant	-3.12*** (.929)	-4.01*** (.799)	-7.01*** (.678)	-4.26*** (1.01)	-4.19*** (.970)	-4.16*** (.872)
Groups	153	153	153	153	153	153
N	1524	1524	1524	1068	1068	1068

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.001\*\*\*

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are semi-robust standard errors. GEE models assume an AR (1) correlation structure. The results were similar for models run with Afghanistan and Iraq included.

TABLE 3 GEE1 Negative Binomial Models of Terrorism Location (1999-2008), Most Failed and Political Collapse

Variable	<i>Human Security</i>			<i>State Capacity</i>			<i>Political Collapse</i>	
	Fail 1 ( <i>Infant</i> )	Fail 2 ( <i>GDPpc</i> )	Fail 3 ( <i>HDI</i> )	Fail 4 ( <i>GE</i> )	Fail 5 ( <i>RoLaw</i> )	Fail 6 ( <i>CoC</i> )	Fail 7 ( <i>Polity</i> )	Fail 8 ( <i>PITF</i> )
Population (log)	.788*** (.143)	.798*** (.137)	.801*** (.134)	.834*** (.146)	.827*** (.148)	.830*** (.147)	.840*** (.153)	.732*** (.137)
Polity2	.044 (.041)	.043 (.043)	.044 (.042)	.056 (.040)	.056 (.040)	.057 (.040)	.024 (.064)	.081* (.034)
Durability	-.002 (.006)	-.003 (.006)	-.003 (.006)	-.000 (.005)	.000 (.005)	-.000 (.005)	.002 (.007)	.000 (.005)
Civil War	1.88* (.842)	1.91** (.732)	1.99** (.709)	2.31** (.784)	2.30** (.779)	2.30** (.782)	1.44* (.595)	1.56* (.658)
Int'l War	.571** (.184)	.571*** (.161)	.572*** (.166)	.038 (.322)	.036 (.319)	.039 (.319)	.560*** (.117)	.531*** (.136)
Fail 1 ( <i>d.v.</i> )	-2.61** (.832)							
Fail 2 ( <i>d.v.</i> )		-1.64*** (.338)						
Fail 3 ( <i>d.v.</i> )			-1.92*** (.232)					
Fail 4 ( <i>d.v.</i> )				1.13 (.645)				
Fail 5 ( <i>d.v.</i> )					1.19* (.548)			
Fail 6 ( <i>d.v.</i> )						1.24* (.521)		
Fail 7 ( <i>d.v.</i> )							2.43*** (.301)	
Fail 8 ( <i>d.v.</i> )								1.13** (.445)
Constant	-2.64*** (.704)	-2.71*** (.682)	-2.73*** (.671)	-3.06*** (.660)	-3.03*** (.667)	-3.05*** (.664)	-3.05*** (.703)	-2.84*** (.650)
Groups	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
N	1524	1524	1524	1068	1068	1068	1524	1524

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.001\*\*\*

Notes: Numbers in parentheses are semi-robust standard errors. GEE models assume an AR(1) correlation structure. Fail 3 not reproduced, but consistent with these results.



TABLE 4 GEE1 Negative Binomial Models of Terrorism Production (1999-2008), Most Failed and Political Collapse

<i>Collapse</i>	<i>Human Security</i>			<i>State Capacity</i>			<i>Political</i>	
	Fail 1 ( <i>Infant</i> )	Fail 2 ( <i>GDPpc</i> )	Fail 3 ( <i>HDI</i> )	Fail 4 ( <i>GE</i> )	Fail 5 ( <i>RoLaw</i> )	Fail 6 ( <i>CoC</i> )	Fail 7 ( <i>Polity</i> )	Fail 8 ( <i>PITF</i> )
Population (log)	.832*** (.178)	.847*** (.180)	.839*** (.175)	.951*** (.167)	.941*** (.168)	.938*** (.168)	.846*** (.116)	.637* (.281)
Polity2	.031 (.051)	.014 (.065)	.013 (.063)	.034 (.056)	.033 (.055)	.034 (.054)	.054 (.149)	-.024 (.054)
Durability	.004 (.006)	.004 (.006)	.004 (.006)	.004 (.006)	.004 (.006)	.003 (.006)	.011* (.004)	.011 (.009)
Civil War	2.55** (.977)	2.23** (.785)	2.26** (.763)	2.53*** (.695)	2.52** (.694)	2.54*** (.701)	2.00*** (.492)	1.45 (1.67)
Int'l War	.366 (.336)	-1.52* (.185)	.471* (.192)	-.386* (.194)	-.384* (.195)	-.376 (.200)	.423*** (.092)	.452 (.342)
Fail 1 ( <i>d.v.</i> )	-.794 (.547)							
Fail 2 ( <i>d.v.</i> )		-1.52*** (.307)						
Fail 3 ( <i>d.v.</i> )			-1.27*** (.241)					
Fail 4 ( <i>d.v.</i> )				.945 (.584)				
Fail 5 ( <i>d.v.</i> )					.904 (.482)			
Fail 6 ( <i>d.v.</i> )						.759 (.497)		
Fail 7 ( <i>d.v.</i> )							2.47*** (.564)	
Fail 8 ( <i>d.v.</i> )								2.06 (1.11)
Constant	-3.88*** (.848)	-3.87*** (.882)	-3.81*** (.849)	-4.38*** (.812)	-4.32*** (.816)	-4.28*** (.813)	-4.14*** (.906)	-2.95* (1.29)
Groups	153	153	153	153	153	153	153	153
N	1524	1524	1524	1068	1068	1068	1524	1524

p<.05\*, p<.01\*\*, p<.001\*\*\* Notes: Numbers in parentheses are semi-robust standard errors. GEE models assume an AR(1) correlation structure. Fail 3 not reproduced, but consistent with these results.

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