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**THE U.S. SENATE AND IRAQ:
WHO CHANGED THEIR VIEWS, AND WHY?**

**Project on:
Globalization and the
National Security State**

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The U.S. Senate and Iraq: Who Changed their Views, and Why?

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Abstract

Focusing on the evolving views of the 77 U.S. Senators who voted to authorize the use of force in Iraq in 2002, we seek to explain why some political leaders changed their views markedly from 2002 to 2008 and others did not. We argue that in view of the great preponderance of evidence that the initial premises of U.S. intervention in Iraq were not fulfilled, Bayesian updating cannot by itself explain the persistence of divergent views on Iraq. It is also puzzling that a half-dozen senators persisted in their support of Bush's position on Iraq even though this may have contributed to their electoral defeat. We use a combination of political and psychological variables, including ideology, party affiliation, safety of the senator's seat, military service, cognitive style, and presidential aspirations to explain why some senators changed their public positions on Iraq within a year, others did so by 2006, still others in 2007, and some changed very little in more than five years. We combine these variables into a typological theory and test it against a qualitative analysis of 20 senators' views on Iraq. We conclude that our model is relatively successful in predicting not only when senators' views changed but what rationales they gave for why their initial expectations were not borne out. We also note several senators who prove important anomalies for our model, including Senators Lieberman, who was the only Democrat who did not move toward opposing Bush's policies, and McCain, who thus far has not moved toward the political center on Iraq despite having effectively secured his party's nomination.

The U.S. Senate and Iraq: Who Changed their Views, and Why?

How and why do political leaders sustain, change, and explain their (mis)judgments on the use of force when battlefield results prove contrary to initial expectations? Why do some leaders maintain their support for the use of force even when success begins to look unlikely, why do others proclaim their initial support for a failing military effort to have been a mistake, and why do still others move to limit unpromising military missions without ever suggesting that their earlier support for these efforts was in error? We address these questions through an analysis of the evolution of views on the conflict in Iraq among members of the U.S. Senate who voted in the fall of 2002 to authorize the use of force in Iraq.

Whatever the final outcome, and despite the lower levels of military and civilian casualties in Iraq through the latter half of 2007 and early 2008, the ongoing conflict in Iraq has already confounded the expectations of many of those who advocated the war. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have not been found; traditional American allies have not come around to supporting the U.S. engagement; the size, duration, and cost of U.S. military deployments have far exceeded proponents' initial expectations; U.S. casualties have been high and are ongoing; the Iraqi economy has not grown substantially beyond pre-war levels; widespread looting caught U.S. officials by surprise; no evidence of operational cooperation between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda has been found; support for the U.S. from repressed groups in Iraq has proved shallow and short-lived; Iraqi exiles put forward by the U.S. as potential leaders proved unpopular or ineffective; democracy in Iraq remains tenuous and has not carried over into other states in the region; and Iraqi ethnic factions have engaged in civil war rather than uniting behind a democratically elected government. Not all of the unmet expectations of the war's proponents were negative—the absence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction reduced the dangers and casualties of the first stage of U.S. military operations and a feared humanitarian disaster in the first few weeks of the intervention did not materialize—but clearly most of the unmet expectations were those cited by proponents as reasons for intervening in Iraq.

We are interested not in predicting or explaining which senators initially supported or opposed the use of force in Iraq, but rather why some senators later changed their stances on Iraq and others did not. As it turns out, many senators who initially voted to authorize force moved toward less support of President Bush's policies from 2002 to 2008 and many remained supportive of the President's policies, but not a single senator who opposed the use of force moved toward long-term support of the president's approach. One possible explanation that we address is that the slowly changing balance of votes in the Senate simply reflects rational Bayesian updating by

individuals with differing prior beliefs as new information was revealed. On the whole, however, Bayesian updating appears at best to be only a partial explanation for changing views on Iraq. Despite the many manifestly failed predictions made by proponents of intervention in Iraq, there is a relative dearth of politicians who have publicly concluded that the initial decision to intervene was in error, even among those who later became strong opponents of ongoing large-scale intervention. In addition, individuals with seemingly similar prior expectations have diverged sharply on whether and how they consider their initial expectations to have been in error. This suggests that forces other than Bayesian updating are at work as well, including not only political incentives to avoid admissions of error and charges of “flip-flopping,” but psychological dynamics that create tendencies to explain away failed predictions.

In particular, Philip Tetlock has demonstrated in a study of academics that there are strong psychological pressures to explain away failed predictions, to insist that they may yet prove true, and to blame any admitted failures on unlikely or unforeseeable events or other individuals’ bad policy decisions or poor policy implementation. Tetlock concludes that individuals with what Isaiah Berlin termed “fox”-like cognitive styles are more likely to acknowledge error and update their beliefs, while those with a “hedgehog” cognitive style are more likely to persist in and explain away seemingly failed predictions. We build on Tetlock’s research by looking at how both political and psychological incentives shaped the ways in which political leaders, in this case members of the U.S. Senate, decided whether, when, and how to advocate changing course on Iraq. We also look at whether individual senators acknowledged any mistakes regarding their initial decisions or predictions, and the rationales they offered for any changes in their policy positions.

To conduct this analysis, we develop hypotheses on the determinants of decision-making from several relevant literatures, including those on cognitive styles, role responsibilities, the electoral and political dynamics in Congress, peer group influences on judgment and beliefs, and rational Bayesian updating. From these literatures, we focus on the variables of political ideology, party affiliation, military service, safety of the senator’s seat, cognitive style and role responsibility, political events relevant to Bayesian updating, and the presidential aspirations or lack thereof of individual senators and the effect on decision-making outcomes. We integrate these variables into a typological theory and emphasize the types of senators that include those aspiring to run for President and those whose seats were vulnerable in upcoming elections. We expect Democrats running for President to have been the most likely to change their initial support of Bush’s policies on Iraq and Republicans running for president or those with safe seats to be the least likely to have changed their approval of Bush’s policies. Also, we expect Republicans to have blamed Iraqis

themselves for failures in Iraq, and Democrats to blame policy implementation failures by the President and Administration officials.

To test these predictions, we examined in detail the views of *20 of the 77 Senators who voted in the fall of 2002 to authorize the use of force in Iraq and who fit into these types, including *14 who later moved toward some degree of opposition to continuing the large-scale military deployment to Iraq and *7 who remained steadfastly in favor of this deployment. We find that our predictions on the types of senators most and least likely to have changed their positions are largely borne out, as are our predictions on the kinds of explanations senators of both parties would offer for why their initial expectations were not met. We do find important anomalies, however, including Senator Lieberman's unswerving support for Bush's policies and Senator McCain's limited movement toward the political center on Iraq even after effectively securing the Republican nomination in the spring of 2008. We also find a surprising number of Republican senators who continued in their support of Bush's policies even at the risk of, and eventually the loss of, their seats in the Senate.

An Overview of Evolving Senate Support for Military Intervention in Iraq

In the fall of 2002, 77 U.S. Senators voted in favor of the resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, including 48 Republicans and 29 Democrats. In varying degrees, those who voted to authorize the use of force agreed with the Bush Administration's rationales for threatening force against Iraq, including Iraqi recalcitrance regarding WMD inspections and potential Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda. Those opposing the authorization of force at this time included 21 Democrats, one Republican (Chafee), and one independent (Jeffords).

A subsequent key Senate vote on Iraq in October 2003 authorized President Bush's request for an \$87 billion emergency supplemental spending bill for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By this time, the occupation of Iraq was already proving more difficult than its foremost proponents had suggested and the \$87 billion request was much larger than most observers had expected, indicating the depth of the challenges the United States faced in Iraq. Although the Senate passed the administration's request by a wide margin, the first signs of strong Senate opposition to the President's policies in Iraq emerged. Four Democrats who had voted in 2002 to authorize force now became the earliest to switch their stance and vote against the funding request, including Senators Edwards, Harkin, Hollings, and Kerry. Interestingly, all except Edwards had themselves served in the military, and both Edwards and Kerry were already campaigning at the time for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. No Republicans voted against the supplemental funding, but *eight Republican senators (Brownback, Campbell, Collins, Chambliss, Ensign,

Graham, Murkowski, and Snowe) resisted heavy White House lobbying and joined most Democrats in voting 51-47 to make \$10 billion of the funds a loan to the Iraqi government rather than a grant (this provision was dropped from the bill during reconciliation with the House version of the bill). Only two senators in this group (Collins and Snowe) later voted against the 2007 “surge”, however, suggesting that the others who voted to make part of the funds a loan were motivated more by fiscal conservatism than by opposition to the President’s policies. *Fourteen senators who had opposed the authorization of force in 2002 supported the \$87 billion in supplemental funding, including thirteen Democrats and the lone Republican who had voted against the initial authorization of force (Chafee). Most of the senators in this group argued that even though the initial intervention was ill-advised, having already intervened, U.S. forces had to be given support and that the President’s policies should be given at least a short-term lease on life to provide some chance of success.

There were very few Senate votes in 2004 or 2005 that indicated any movement on the issue of Iraq after the fall of 2003. One of the few significant votes on the subject was that on an amendment offered by Senator Ted Kennedy in June 2004 that would have placed additional reporting requirements on the President on the war and on efforts to relieve the burden on members of the U.S. armed forces serving in Iraq and the region. The amendment failed 50-48 on a mostly party-line vote, with Senators McCain and Hagel joining the Democrats and Senators Lieberman and Miller voting with the Republican majority. The vote in 2005 that best indicated the senators’ evolving views on Iraq was probably the November 15 vote on an amendment sponsored by Senator Levin that would have called on President Bush to set a timetable for withdrawing from Iraq. This amendment failed by a vote of 58-40, with Senator Lincoln Chafee the only Republican to favor the amendment and five Democratic senators voting against it: Kent Conrad (ND), Joseph Lieberman (Ct), Bill Nelson (Fl), Ben Nelson (Neb), and Mark Pryor (Ark). That same day, the Senate approved by 79-19 a measure sponsored by Senator Warner that put less restrictive reporting requirements on the President; the opposition on this vote included both strong supporters of the Bush administration’s policies who wanted no limits on Bush’s authority on Iraq and Democrats who felt the restrictions did not go far enough.

By the middle of 2006, public opposition to Bush’s policies in Iraq had grown. On June 22, 2006, 16 Democrats who had supported the initial 2002 vote, but not a single Republican, voted for a non-binding resolution urging the President to begin withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq, with no firm deadline. In this group were all of the Democratic senators who were publicly contemplating a run for the Presidency, including Senators Biden, Clinton, and Dodd (John Edwards was no longer in the Senate for the June 2006 vote but had written an op-ed stating that his October 2002 vote to authorize force was a mistake; Barack Obama voted for the troop-withdrawal resolution but was not

in the Senate at the time of the October 2002 vote to authorize force). In addition, *14 of the 15 senators who had voted to give the President's policies a lease on life—that is, those who voted against the use of force in October 2002 but voted for supplemental funding in October 2003—now voted in favor of the June 2006 withdrawal resolution, with the only exception among those still in the Senate in 2006 being Senator Mark Dayton. The resolution failed on a vote of 39-60, but it signaled growing opposition to the President's policies.

By February 2007, the Senate voted 56-34 in support of a House resolution expressing disapproval of President Bush's plan to increase U.S. troops in Iraq by a "surge" of an additional 20,000 troops, although the Senate failed to reach cloture to end debate on the measure (which requires 60 votes). Despite the fact that the bill failed to pass, the vote still stands as a test of the senators' support for the Bush Administration's Iraq policy. "Late switching" Democrats who supported the President in the June 2006 votes but opposed the surge included Senators Landrieu, Bill Nelson (FL), and Ben Nelson (NE), and Republicans who also moved in this direction between the 2006 and 2007 votes included Senators Collins, Hagel, Smith, Snowe, Specter, and Warner. Norm Coleman (MN) also switched between the 2006 and 2007 votes, although he was not in the Senate in 2002 to vote in the original war authorization bill.

In sum, the evolution in Senate votes from support to opposition of the Bush administration's policies on Iraq involved: a few "**early switchers**" (Edwards, Harkin, Hollings, and Kerry, all Democrats); a larger group of *15 Senators (14 Democrats and one Republican) who voted against the 2002 authorization of using force, then gave the President's policies a **lease on life** by supporting funding in 2003, but returned to opposition by 2006 in calling for withdrawal; a group of "**middle switchers**," all 16 of whom were Democrats who voted for force in 2002 but for withdrawal in 2006; and a small group of "**late switchers**" that included three Democrats and six Republicans. We set aside any further analysis of the "lease on life" group, as we are focused on the question of how those who initially supported the war evolved in their views on the war and their justifications for the predictions that underlay their early support for the war.

How can we explain the differences among early, middle, and late switchers, and the justifications they offered for their initial predictions and subsequent votes? Clearly, even the brief narrative presented here indicates that partisan affiliations played a major role, but we examine several other variables as well, including political ideology, military service, safety of each senator's seat, cognitive style and role responsibility, political events relevant to Bayesian updating, and the presidential aspirations or lack thereof of individual senators.

*Political Ideology**

We expect that each member's voting behavior with respect to authorizing the Iraq invasion and sustaining U.S. military presence was directly influenced by the member's political ideology. The more conservative members are more likely to have voted in favor of military intervention in Iraq, in part due to ideological allegiance between the member of Congress and the conservative Bush Administration, which advocated invading Iraq and has continued to pressure Congress to maintain funding for elevated troop levels. Conservatives also are more likely to subscribe to military solutions to international security challenges, relative to more liberal members. Once having voted to authorize the use of force, we expect conservatives to be less likely to change their views, and more likely to defend their votes with claims that success is still attainable in the future. There is likely to be an interaction effect here with political party (described below); conservative republicans who did change their views on the war were likely to give "close call counterfactuals" about how the intervention was nearly successful, or to blame bad luck for the unexpectedly poor outcome, while conservative Democrats who turned against the intervention were more likely to blame their initial support on poor or misleading information from the Bush Administration and to blame the poor outcome in Iraq on poor policy implementation by the Bush Administration. This same logic suggests that liberal members of both parties who initially supported the use of force were more likely to change or recant their early views. This is expected of more liberal members of Congress for a variety of reasons, including a greater appreciation of the binding effects of international law (and subsequently greater skepticism of U.S. policy perceived to be in violation of international law, as the U.S.-led invasion was widely seen to be). A liberal orientation also leads many senators and representatives to be wary of the utility of military instruments to settle international disputes, though liberals would support the use of force against direct security threats and many support humanitarian interventions as well. Although many liberal senators and representatives were under siege by the fervent patriotism unleashed by September 11, it is likely that a liberal orientation would be more likely to inspire resistance to military intervention in Iraq.

We measured the ideological orientation of members of Congress by examining two ratings for each member, one generated by the liberal-leaning organization Americans for Democratic Action and one scored by the conservative-leaning American Conservative Union. This data was located in Congressional Quarterly's *Politics in America 2006: The 109th Congress*.

Political Party

We expect that Republican members of Congress, being of the same party as President Bush and cognizant of the utility of party loyalty, will be more likely to mirror the Bush Administration's public position and support the war in all three critical votes. Party allegiance is a strong incentive for congressional members, particular when defection from the party line corresponds with defiance of the president of the United States.

Republicans are expected to fall in behind President Bush on critical issues of national security, an issue on which the value placed on party cohesion is particularly high (value is also placed on bipartisanship in national security issues, to enable U.S. officials to present the United States as a united voice, which by most measures increases U.S. diplomatic leverage in international negotiations).¹ *While it is hypothetically possible for a Republican member to score higher than a Democrat on the ADA average rating, for example, or for a Democratic to score higher than a Republican on the ACU rating, in no case did this occur. In other words, the Liberal/Conservative rating closely correlates with the party identification. The two variables do exhibit different properties, however, in that the ideological rating is an interval variable (0 to 100 percent) whereas the party identification is a binomial value (Republican or Democrat). Also, as noted above, we expect Democrats and Republicans whose views on the war changed to have given rationales for this change.

Party affiliation also overlaps with an often-overlooked dimension of congressional member decisionmaking: peer-group pressure from both fellow members of Congress and party members, media and academic pundits, interest groups, and other in-group members outside of Congress. Republican senators switching into opposition faced strong peer-group criticism, while Democrats who failed to criticize the conduct of the war engendered criticism from their largely anti-war peer groups. Conversely, when prominent and centrist senators or other leading political figures with a strong reputation on foreign policy went against the majority of their party—including Republicans who turned against Bush's policies on Iraq and Democrats who continued to resist calls for a withdrawal timetable—they created political cover and social space for others to follow suit. Thus, we might expect some "cascade effects" as key senators moved into opposition to the President's policies.

¹ Robert Putnam argues in "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games" that a fractionated public *enhances* rather than *degrades* U.S. influence at the international level. For a more recent perspective that an erosion in national unity degrades U.S. influence abroad, see Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The demise of liberal internationalism in the United States," *International Security*, 32, no. 2 (2007): 7-44.

Safety of the Seat

There are two metrics that we utilized to determine whether a senator was secure in his or her seat. The first was the margin of victory in the previous election or whether the senator was up for reelection the year of their vote switch. When these numbers are pushing in different directions, we identified the voting margin as the determining value and selected the margin of victory of 20 percent as the threshold level. The margin of victory is a more meaningful value than simple percentage the member received, as multiple candidates in an election would distort the meaning of total percentage as a measure of how safe the seat actually was. Given the structural advantage of the incumbent in any election, such as name recognition and advantages in fundraising, a threshold level of 20 percent resulted in only 9 seats out of the 26 vote-switchers being coded as being unsafe. We also coded as “safe” those who decided to retire by 2004 rather than face reelection. This included Senators Breaux, Campbell, Fitzgerald, Gramm, Helms, Miller, Thompson, Thurmond, and Torricelli. In the analysis of specific senators in the period after 2004, we code as safe any Senators who announced their retirement within two years after casting an important vote on Iraq or taking a public position on the issue.

	Safe	Unsafe
Switchers	17	9
Non-switchers	33	11

We expect the safety of the seat to have had a strong causal effect on voting behavior. Given the residue of September 11 and the high level of patriotism as well as public anxiety over the volatile mix of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, we expect members from unsafe seats to be more likely to support the war resolution in Congress. By the June 2006 vote, however, no weapons had been found and the purported relationship between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist attacks of September 11 had been widely discredited. At the same time, conditions on the ground in Iraq had deteriorated and casualties—both American and Iraqi—had begun to increase substantially. Stability in Iraq seemed to be as much of a mirage as the flourishing of democracy. The public, which had supported the use of force in Iraq by a 71 to 22 percent margin in March 2003, was evenly divided by February 2005 on whether the war had been a mistake, and by February 2007 a majority of 54 percent felt the war had been a mistake.²

As a result, the safety of the seat should have had an opposite effect on voting behavior in October 2002 than it had on the June 2006 and February 2007 votes. We expect that in the latter two votes, if a member was in an insecure seat as indicated by the measures described above, the

² Scott Keeter, “Trends in Public Opinion about the War in Iraq, 2003-2007,” *Pew Research Center Publications*, March 15, 2007, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/431/trends-in-public-opinion-about-the-war-in-iraq-2003-2007>.

member would be more likely to oppose a continuation of the war effort in Iraq. As it turned out, *16 of the 20 senators from unsafe seats initially supported the intervention, and 9 of these 16 later shifted to oppose continuing a large scale U.S. deployment to Iraq. Members from secure seats would have been less likely to vote in accordance to the shifts in public opinion, and thus their votes as a function of public opinion were indeterminate.

	Oct 02	June 06	Feb 07
Safe Seat	Indeterminate	Indeterminate	Indeterminate
Unsafe Seat	Y	N	N

The likelihood of a primary challenge complicates this picture, however. A Republican in a safe seat might risk a primary challenge from the right by moving into opposition to the war, while a Democrat supporting a continued large scale deployment in Iraq might face a primary challenge from the left. This is evident in the case of Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, who actually lost his party’s nomination to an anti-war Democrat but managed to retain his seat in the 2006 election by running as an Independent. We expect the likelihood of a primary challenge to be highest for members who are in their first term in Congress, who faced a tough primary challenge in a recent election, and from states dominated by their own party such that a competitive primary race will not jeopardize that party’s hold on the seat in the general election.

Military Service

The effect of military service on voting behavior is complex. For this first cut, we coded service in the reserve corps as serving in the military and made no distinction between enlisted and reserve military service. Yet individuals who were enlisted service members were likely to have been more deeply committed to and influenced by the military culture than those who reported for reserve duty several weekends each year. If military service had any impact on voting behavior, it is likely that the effects of military culture and the level of personal experience in combat affected voting behavior.

There are several other factors that mediate the impact of military service on commitment to the war as well. Military experience and “fellow feeling” for soldiers could cut both ways among members of Congress. It could incline those with military experience to support the self-selected, highly patriotic, and increasingly Republican cohort of soldiers that comprise the all-volunteer U.S. armed services, which would lead to consistent support for the use of force. (*cite IS articles on increasing Republican affiliation of the US military). Alternatively, military experience could lead to caution in committing forces to war because those who have lived through combat have direct

knowledge of the tragic costs of war. Also, members of Congress with military experience who opposed the use of force in the fall of 2002 were less vulnerable to charges that their vote against the war jeopardized U.S. security. Similarly, a high concentration of veterans in a member's state could also affect that member's votes in complex ways, as the opinions of those who have served in or are serving in the military might move in different directions from those of the general public.

Less ambiguous is the fact that among those who initially voted for the use of force, members with military experience should have had greater political cover to later change their views without looking weak. Another reason that military service might predict decreasing support for large deployments in Iraq is that military veterans serving in Congress were more cognizant of the need for maintaining military readiness and preserving the military's capabilities and morale.

We expect these effects of military service to have been mediated by the general public perception since the 1980s that Democrats put more emphasis on non-military approaches to national security issues. Therefore, we expect military service and political party to have had interactive effects, in that Democrats with military service were more likely to oppose the war from the start, and Republicans with military service were more likely to initially support the war but then switch their votes as conditions deteriorated. We expect Democrats without military service, especially those in vulnerable seats, to have been more likely to support the war initially and then switch as the war effort worsened. Republicans without military service were the most likely to maintain their support for the war through all three critical votes evaluated in this project. This combination of variables is depicted in the table below. We expect, however, that military service would have modest effects compared to party affiliation and the safety of electoral seats, since a minority of members of Congress have combat experience.

	Republican	Democrat
Military Service	Support → Oppose	Consistent Opposition
No Military Service	Consistent Support	Support → Oppose

Role Responsibilities and Cognitive Style

Recent research in social and cognitive psychology suggests that the attributions an individual makes on the causes of failed predictions and the policies based upon them are shaped by a combination of cognitive, motivational, and instrumental variables (McGraw 2001, Tetlock 1999, Tetlock 2005). Cognitively, attributions on the reasons for failure are greatly affected by whether an individual feels responsible for the decisions and actions that led to the failure. Individuals

whose responsibility is inescapable often are slow to make even qualified acknowledgments that a prediction is not coming to fruition or a policy is failing. Motivationally, individuals are tempted to displace blame to contextual factors beyond their control or to other actors higher or lower in the policy hierarchy. This makes it hard for top leaders to admit mistakes, as they have few options for displacing blame. The policy roles that individuals play affect all of these factors. Ruling party politicians, including both the President and his or her party in Congress, face both policy risks (the risk of adverse policy outcomes) and political risks (the risk of political blame for adverse outcomes), while opposition party politicians face far fewer political risks should a foreign policy fail, as voters are more likely to put responsibility for failure on the President and their party (Lamborn 1985). Thus, we should expect Republican senators to have been slow to acknowledge setbacks in Iraq, to have argued that the prospects for future success remained good, and, when acknowledging setbacks, to claim success was nearly achieved but for “unforeseeable” events or mistakes made by Iraqi leaders and U.S. military or State Department officials rather than by the President. This group could also argue that the counterfactual outcome had the U.S. not intervened in Iraq would be even worse than the present situation in Iraq.

There is a related literature on how individuals attribute responsibility for successful or failed outcomes when these individuals know they may be held accountable for their actions. When they may be held accountable, individuals are tempted to attribute responsibility for policy failures to other actors for both cognitive and motivational reasons. As Keith Markman and Philip Tetlock note about such “self-serving” attributions:

Individuals will often try to mitigate responsibility for poor performance by constructing external attributions. In general, then, strategies designed to lessen or mitigate feelings of control and personal responsibility appear to serve a more central motive - - a quest to convince both oneself and others that one possesses desired traits.

This suggests that with respect to attributions of responsibility for failure bureaucratic roles or “seats” need to be decomposed into both motivational and cognitive components, as well as the instrumentally rational calculations that are at the heart of the traditional bureaucratic politics model. Politicians’ motives include not just material and career interests, but shame and honor, blame and vindication.

Kathleen McGraw has distinguished among types of attributions potentially accountable actors might give for outcomes that are widely viewed as failures. Actors might accept or deny that they were responsible for the actions in question, and they might accept or deny that the results were a failure. This leads to four types of attributions. Concessions include an acknowledgement that the

outcome was undesirable and that the actor was responsible for the decisions leading to this negative outcome. Excuses admit that the outcome is negative, but deny that the actor was responsible for the decisions that led to failure. This can include allegations that decision-makers at a higher or lower level of responsibility are at fault or suggestions that unforeseeable circumstances or bad luck intervened. Justifications accept responsibility for the outcome but try to minimize its negative consequences or point out its desirable aspects. Denials involve attempts to both renounce responsibility for the outcome and downplay its negative consequences (“it wasn’t my fault, and anyway it is not so bad”). These are summarized below.

		Event Negative?	
		Yes	No
Actor Fully Responsible?	Yes	Concession	Justification
	No	Excuse	Denial

McGraw’s focus is on the effectiveness of these alternative attributions in winning support from an audience, whereas our focus is on why actors, for both cognitive and instrumental reasons, choose to endorse particular attributions for failure. We therefore adapt and build on her framework in the following ways. First, as the ongoing intervention in Iraq has over time become a deeper and clearer failure compared to the ambitious objectives laid out for the intervention, the option for political actors to minimize the undesirability of the outcome without losing all credibility has successively narrowed. The strategy of denying that the intervention in Iraq was at least a disappointment if not an outright failure should have become less and less common over time.

Those with no responsibility for policies or implementation in Iraq, and with broad but largely indirect experience with its local, domestic, and international consequences, should have had more leeway in assigning blame, and been more likely to blame policy implementation for failures there. This group includes members of Congress not on the Armed Services, Intelligence, or International Affairs committees. Senators on the Armed Services, Foreign relations, and Intelligence committees should have had a harder time explaining their initial support of the war.

In addition to role responsibilities, cognitive style affects attributions on seemingly failed predictions. As noted above, Philip Tetlock³ has provided considerable evidence that individuals with a fox-like cognitive style are better at making predictions and updating beliefs than those with

³ Philip Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? How can we know?* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2005).

a hedgehog-like cognitive style.⁴ Tetlock finds that there is an inverse relationship between confidence in predictions and accuracy in making predictions,⁵ and that a commitment to theoretical parsimony hinders forecasting.⁶ Tetlock uses a thirteen-item questionnaire to establish cognitive style along the hedgehog vs. fox dimension; in a future iteration of this paper we will use this same questionnaire (administered to members of Congress whenever possible, or to staff members when the member is unavailable) with the same factor loadings that Tetlock developed to assess the cognitive styles of the Senators included in our study.⁷

Tetlock also usefully outlines several generic categories of justifications individuals typically offer for earlier predictions that might appear to have been disproved by subsequent events. These include:

- 1) Invoking a “close call counterfactual” in which events no reasonable observer could have expected, or miraculously bad luck, prevented the predicted outcome from arising;⁸
- 2) Arguing that it was prudent to "err on the side of caution" by making a choice that had the highest expected value, even if that choice included a risk of failure;⁹
- 3) Maintaining that the original prediction will yet be proved right in the future;¹⁰
- 4) Arguing that the counterfactual outcome, had decisionmakers failed to act on the predicted outcome or failed to follow the prescribed policies, would have been even worse;¹¹
- 5) Suggesting that the policies predicated on the prediction and subsequently attempted by decision-makers were the right policies but were badly implemented;
- 6) Arguing that unlikely and unforeseeable events brought about an unexpected outcome.

One additional tact that a political leader can take to deal with a failed prediction is to change their expectations privately and stop repeating their earlier predictions, without acknowledging publicly that they view their initial predictions to have been erroneous (this possibility was not an option in Tetlock’s experiment, as he directly asked individuals to assess the accuracy of their earlier predictions).

We should expect recourse to these tactics to have varied across groups. Any of the proponents of intervention in Iraq could invoke close call counterfactuals, counterfactuals that the

⁴ Tetlock, op. cit., pp. 76-81.

⁵ Tetlock, op. cit., p. xi.

⁶ Tetlock, op. cit., p. 68.

⁷ Tetlock, op. cit., pp. 72, 241.

⁸ Tetlock, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

⁹ Tetlock, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁰ Tetlock, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

¹¹ Tetlock, op. cit., p. 2.

alternative to intervention would have been even worse, and arguments that the predicted successful end state may yet materialize. Republicans would be less likely to blame the President for poor policy implementation, however, and those on the relevant security and foreign policy committees would have a harder time blaming the administration for poor or misleading intelligence, as it was their job to push the administration for credible information.

It is important to note that senators may have had mixed views on the prospects for intervention in Iraq. They may have maintained separate views on different dimensions of the Iraq issue—such as the likelihood that Iraq had WMD, the likelihood that democracy could be established in Iraq, and the number of U.S. troops an intervention required—and some of these beliefs might have favored intervention while argued against it. The literature on cognitive consistency suggests that senators' views were likely to cluster largely on one side of the issue or the other, however, and that the need to justify their initial vote would reinforce this tendency. The case studies of individual senators examine empirically whether views on intervention clustered into consistent groups, and how and when individual Senators changed views on each dimension of the intervention as new information arose.

Events in Iraq and Bayesian Updating

An alternative to the above explanations involves rational Bayesian updating of expectations as new information arose. In Bayesian updating, individuals start out with potentially divergent subjective prior beliefs and update these beliefs as new evidence comes in. The more surprising new evidence is relative to an individual's prior beliefs, and the better it fits alternative explanations, the more an individual will downgrade the likelihood they attach to their prior belief proving true, and the more they will increase their confidence in the alternative explanations that fit the new evidence. Conversely, the better new evidence conforms to an individual's prior expectations, and the worse it fits the alternatives, the more an individual gains confidence in their prior belief. Bayesian updating is potentially complementary to instrumental political motives, but it clashes more directly with the cognitive hypothesis. Both a political-psychological model and a Bayesian-political model allow for a gap between the private inferences individuals draw regarding blame for mistaken predictions and the public portrayals these individuals make regarding earlier decisions. One of the main testable differences, however, is that the Bayesian model expects quick convergence of expectations if unambiguous information is revealed. The model can explain remaining differences between individuals in similar political contexts only through differences in these individuals' prior beliefs, but such differences should "wash out" as unambiguous information accumulates. The psychological-political model, building on Tetlock, allows instead for lasting

variations in attributions depending on individuals' differing cognitive styles and role responsibilities.

In the case of Iraq, Bayesian updating should have led to strong convergence in beliefs despite individuals' widely different priors, as information on the intervention was plentiful, public, and largely unambiguous, at least through the summer of 2007, when the increase in 30,000 U.S. troops positively affected the security metrics in Iraq. Beginning within a month after the taking of Baghdad in the spring of 2003 and more decisively as time went on, a series of U.S. government and external reports and studies converged on findings that Iraq lacked any nuclear, chemical, or biological WMD at the time of the intervention and that there was no evidence of operational cooperation between the government of Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda regarding the 9/11 attacks. These findings undercut two of the key rationales offered for the intervention.

David Kay, top U.S. weapons inspector, in testifying before Congress on January 28, 2004, after his investigation into Iraqi weapons, said, "Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong." He said plainly in an interview that, "My summary view, based on what I've seen, is we're very unlikely to find large stockpiles of weapons. I don't think they exist."¹²

Charles Duelfer, who succeeded David Kay as chief weapons inspector in Iraq, issued a report to two congressional committees on October 6, 2004. In his investigation, Duelfer found that Saddam Hussein's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons had all decayed significantly in recent years and that he had no plans to develop such weapons. In addition, a number of other predictions on the costs and benefits of intervening in Iraq proved unambiguously wrong in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq—some within a few months of the fall of Baghdad and others over the course of several years:

- U.S. casualties continued and increased even after President Bush declared major combat operations in Iraq to be over on May 1, 2003; post-combat phase casualties exceeded those of the combat phase by August 2003 and grew to 1,000 U.S. soldiers killed by October 2004 and 4,000 killed by the spring of 2008.
- Already by the fall of 2004 the number, duration, and cost of U.S. troop deployments far exceeded expectations and estimates upon which war planning was based.
- Sectarian violence became a growing concern starting in 2004 and increased sharply after the bombing of a key Shiite mosque in *Samarra in February of 2006.
- The Iraqi government has made little progress by 2008 on sharing oil revenues among Iraq's regions.

¹² CNN. "Kay: No evidence Iraq stockpiled WMDs." Accessed online. <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/25/sprj.nirq.kay/>.

- Regional and parliamentary elections took place in Iraq in January and December of 2005 but voting mirrored the sectarian division of the country.
- Allied contributions proved far below the levels of the first Gulf War; even before the March 2003 intervention Turkey refused to allow its territory to be used for staging the ground invasion and allied deployments have dropped precipitously over time.
- Iraq's economy and oil production were slow to recover to pre-war levels and have not grown substantially beyond pre-war levels even five years later.
- Iraqi exiles proved to have a limited following inside Iraq
- The occupation of Iraq has not demonstrably contributed to democratization elsewhere in the region.

From a Bayesian perspective, the accumulation of negative indicators on the occupation of Iraq should have produced a large swing toward opposition to continued large-scale U.S. deployments and sharp convergence of views among U.S. Senators. The first of these expectations largely proved true, as many senators moved to oppose continued deployments and not a single senator moved from initial opposition toward lasting support for continued deployment. Continuing differences among Senators prevented the convergence of views from being as uniform as a Bayesian approach would suggest, however. Between a short honeymoon of support immediately after the initial intervention and a leveling off of opposition in late 2007 and early 2008 when U.S. casualties declined after the "surge" deployment of an additional 20,000 U.S. troops in 2007, Senate support for the president's Iraq policy steadily eroded. Twenty-six of the original 77 Senators who voted to authorize force in the fall of 2003 later moved to some degree of opposition to President Bush's policies on this issue. Not a single senator who initially opposed the authorization of force moved toward long-term support for continuing a large deployment. Yet Bayesian updating cannot explain why considerable divergence still remained on whether a continued large-scale U.S. deployment could succeed.

Presidential Aspirations

The 2004 and 2008 presidential elections included an unusually large number of senators who contemplated or attempted a campaign for the presidency. In 2004, Senator Kerry was the Democratic nominee, Senator Edwards was his running mate, and Senators Lieberman and Graham campaigned for the Democratic nomination. In 2008, Senators Obama, Clinton, Edwards, Biden, Dodd, and McCain campaigned for their respective party's nomination, as did former Senator Fred

Thompson. Senator Hagel publicly considered the possibility of running but declined to enter the race.

Senators considering a run for the presidency would naturally take into account national public opinion as they contemplated their positions regarding Iraq, but the stronger effect for all but the eventual party nominee is the need to appeal to party activists. Party activists are typically more ideological and farther from the political center than most voters, so likely voters in the Republican primaries were more conservative and pro-war than most Republicans, and likely voters in the Democratic nomination process were more liberal and anti-war than most Democrats. Long shot challengers for each party's nomination were likely to try to appeal to these highly mobilized voters through highly polarized appeals on Iraq. For long-shot Democrats who sharply and quickly changed their views on Iraq as they sought the nomination, this strategy raised the danger of charges of "flip-flopping" on a key issue. Republican long shot candidates, a group that included all the Republican candidates as there was no clear Republican front-runner throughout 2007, were likely to continue or intensify their support of Bush's policies on Iraq to appeal to party activists, even though this strategy risked damaging their support among the general public should the war still be unpopular by the fall of 2008.

Conversely, front-runners for each party's nomination, and the eventual nominees, were likely to position themselves closer to the political center with a view toward the general election. The case of 2004 Democratic nominee John Kerry is instructive here, as his position on the war evolved as he moved from focusing on his Senate duties, to being one of many challengers for the Democratic nomination, and finally to being the Democratic nominee. In 2002 Kerry voted to authorize the use of force, but as the primary season approached in the fall of 2003 he was one of the few Senators to vote against additional funding for the war (Edwards, another presidential contender at the time, followed this same pattern). Once he became his party's nominee, Kerry famously hedged the latter vote by stating that he voted for the funding before he voted against it. This opened Kerry to criticisms that he had flip-flopped on the war. In comparison, Hillary Clinton, who was the front-runner throughout 2007 for the Democratic nomination, risked the anger of party activists by steadfastly refusing to renounce her 2002 vote to authorize the use of force, perhaps with a view toward the general election in 2008. Once Clinton lost her front-runner status, however, she finally acknowledged in a key debate with Obama on the eve of the Texas caucus and Ohio primary that the one vote she would change if she could was her 2002 vote on Iraq.

Combining the Variables into a Typological Theory

In the table below we combine our variables into a typological theory. This theory makes predictions on whether senators representing each possible combination of our variables, or type, should have been an early switcher, a late switcher, or should have tried to hedge their position or committed to staying on the President's course in Iraq. The prediction for each type takes into account both a weighting of the variables and the interactions among them. We put the greatest weight on party affiliation, consistent with the extant literature on congressional voting behavior. The two other political variables, the safety of the senator's seat and his or her status as a potential presidential candidate, are weighted heavily as well. For the sake of simplicity, two variables, both concerning priors, were not included in the typological table. The first, ideology, tracks closely with party affiliation and so we did not expect it to have a large independent effect. The second, the flow of information that entered into Bayesian updating, should have affected all senators in the same direction, toward greater criticism of the occupation of Iraq. As noted above, the military service variable and the cognitive style/role variables interact in complex ways with the other variables, but if the process tracing evidence indicates that these variables matter at all it will be an important finding, as this would run counter to the existing literature's heavy emphasis on political variables.

Notably, the expected outcomes are more strongly determined for some types than they are for others. For example, the most likely case for a senator to switch would be a Democrat who served in the military, had a safe seat, had a fox-like cognitive style, and was a presidential candidate. Indeed, Senator Kerry, the sole example presently coded as this type, was one of the few early switchers on Iraq, and most of the other early switchers were also strongly determined as they shared all of Kerry's characteristics except for his presidential aspirations. The most likely senators to "stay the course" were Republicans who had not served in the military, had a safe seat, had a hedgehog-like cognitive style, and were long-shot candidates for their party's presidential nomination. We do not currently have any Senators who are coded in this category, though interestingly Rudy Giuliani, although not a senator, appears to fit this type well and was a strong supporter throughout his presidential candidacy of continuing a large scale U.S. deployment to Iraq. We include in the table coding for all of the 77 Senators who voted to authorize force in 2002 and remained in office beyond 2003, even though at this point much of the coding is preliminary and may change as we review the data more closely. We have not yet coded any of the senators on cognitive style, although we include this in the table to indicate its role in our theory. Next to each senator's name is the preliminary outcome coding for that senator (ES for early switch, MS for

middle switch, LS for late switch, SC for stay the course). Note that the actual outcomes for each senator usually but not always fits the outcome predicted for that type of senator.

Senators out of office by 2007 who voted to authorize force in 2002 are listed. For those who voluntarily retired, the date of the end of their term in office is listed. For those who lost re-election, the date of the election loss is listed.

***A Typological Theory on Senators' Evolving Views on Iraq**

Party	Military Service	Safe Seat?	Cognitive Style	Presidential Candidate?	Expected Outcome
D	Y	Y	H	Y	Late Switch
D	Y	Y	H	N	Late Switch
D Kerry (MA) ES	Y	Y	F	Y	Early Switch
D Harkin (IA) ES Hollings (SC) ES, VR 2004 Kohl (WI) MS Carper (DE) MS	Y	Y	F	N	Early Switch, Middle Switch
D	Y	N	H	Y	Late Switch?
D	Y	N	H	N	Stay Course
D	Y	N	F	Y	Early Switch
D Cleland (GA) LR 2002	Y	N	F	N	Late Switch
D	N	Y	H	Y	Late Switch
D	N	Y	H	N	Stay Course
D Clinton (NY) MS Edwards (NC) ES, VR 2004 Biden (DE) MS Dodd (CT) MS	N	Y	F	Y	Early Switch, Mea Culpa
D Breaux (LA) VR 2004 Torricelli (NJ) VR 2002 Schumer (NY) MS Nelson (NE) LS Baucus (MT) MS Bayh (IN) MS Dorgan (ND) MS Feinstein (CA) MS Reid (NV) MS	N	Y	F	N	Middle Switch
D	N	N	H	Y	Late Switch
D	N	N	H	N	Late Switch

D	N	N	F	Y	Early Switch
D Landrieu (LA) MS Lincoln (AR) MS Johnson (SD) MS Nelson (FL) LS Cantwell (WA) MS Lieberman (CT) SC Carnahan (MO) LR 2002 Daschle (SD) LR 2004	N	N	F	N	Late Switch
R	Y	Y	H	Y	Stay Course
R	Y	Y	H	N	Stay Course
R Hagel (NE) LS McCain (AZ) SC	Y	Y	F	Y	Stay the course
R Warner (VA) LS Lugar (IN) SC Stevens (AK) SC Craig (ID) SC Roberts (KS) SC Cochran (MS) SC Inhofe (OK) SC Bennett (UT) SC Thomas (WY) SC Enzi (WY) SC	Y	Y	F	N	Stay the course
R	Y	N	H	Y	Stay Course
R	Y	N	H	N	Late Switch
R	Y	N	F	Y	Indeterminate
R Specter (PA) LS Sessions (AL) SC	Y	N	F	N	Late Switch
R	N	Y	H	Y	Stay Course
R	N	Y	H	N	Stay Course
R Brownback (KS) SC	N	Y	F	Y	Stay the course
R Snowe (ME) LS Collins (ME) LS Shelby (AL) SC Crapo (ID) SC Grassley (IA) SC McConnell (KY) SC Lott (MS) SC	N	Y	F	N	Stay the course

Gregg (NH) SC Domenici (NM) SC Voinovich (OH) SC Hutchison (TX) SC Hatch (UT) SC Campbell (CO) VR 2004 Murkowski (AK) SC Fitzgerald (IL) VR 2006 Frist (TN) SC, VR 2006 Gramm (TX) VR 2002 Helms (NC) SC, VR 2004 Miller (GA) SC, VR 2004 Nickles (OK) SC, VR 2006 Thompson (TN) VR 2002 Thurmond (SC) SC, VR 2003					
R	N	N	H	Y	Stay Course
R	N	N	H	N	Stay Course
R	N	N	F	Y	Indeterminate
R Bunning (KY) SC Kyl (AZ) SC Allard (CO) SC Bond (MO) SC Ensign (NV) SC Santorum (PA) SC, LR 2006 DeWine (OH) SC, LR 2006 Hutchinson (AR) LR 2002 Smith (NH), LR 2002 Burns (MT) SC, LR 2006 Smith (OR) LS Allen (VA) SC, LR 2006	N	N	F	N	Late Switch

Notations in the Table:

R=Republican

D=Democrat

ES= Early Switch

MS= Middle Switch

LS = Late Switch

SC = Stay the Course

VR=Voluntarily Retired, followed by date of end of term in office

LR = Lost Reelection, followed by date of reelection loss

Shaded area for the cognitive variables indicates that these are not yet coded

Case Selection and Coding Procedures

Our primary interest in the current draft of this paper is the evolution of positions of those senators who voted to authorize force in 2002 and remained in office through subsequent votes on Iraq through 2007 (in a subsequent draft, we plan to look at Senators who voted for force but later retired or were voted out of office, to see if the end of their political constraints changed their positions). Of this group, we are particularly interested in those who considered running for or did run for their party's nomination for president in 2004 or 2008. We are also especially interested in those who went against the majority of their party; that is, Democrats who did not switch on Iraq (Lieberman is the sole example here) and Republicans who moved to some degree of opposition to Bush's policies. We looked as well for "deviant cases," or senators who did not fit our theory, such as Senator Lieberman. We also chose senators with a view toward getting a wide range of our types and variation on our independent and dependent variables, including both senators who switched and those who stayed the course. The resulting list for the case studies in the current draft of this paper includes the following *21 Senators: Wayne Allard, Joe Biden, Jim Bunning, Hillary Clinton, Susan Collins, Chris Dodd, Chuck Hagel, Tim Johnson, John Kerry, John Kyl, Mary Landrieu, Joseph Lieberman, Blanche Lincoln, Richard Lugar, John McCain, Chuck Schumer, Jeff Sessions, Gordon Smith, Olympia Snowe, Arlen Specter, and John Warner. To get information on the evolution of these senators' views, we reviewed their Senate speeches on Iraq around the times of key votes on Iraq, as well as reviewing news reports and press releases on Nexis-Lexis using each senator's name and "Iraq" as key words.

DYYY

This type is expected to be sensitive to national public opinion, given the senator's presidential aspirations. While their safe seats enable them to take positions independent of trends in public opinion, their interest in the presidency keeps them closely attuned to the public mood and even more closely focused on the Democratic party activists during the primary process who are key to the party's nomination. A partial exception here would be a strong front-runner for the Democratic nomination, who could afford to hew to the center of public opinion to improve their prospects in the general election, thus avoiding having to placate party activists who are kingmakers in close Democratic nomination battles. The military service of senators of this type gives them greater freedom to turn critical of the President's policies in Iraq without opening them to charges of being unfaithful to U.S. troops in the field. In short their military service and safe seat give them some leeway with public opinion, while their party affiliation and presidential aspirations encourage

opposition to the increasingly unpopular war closely associated with the Republican administration. This dynamic leaves this type conflicted about taking a clear position on the war when public opinion was still anxious about Iraq as a result of the September 11 attacks. Given the dominance of party affiliation and particularly presidential aspiration, we expect the dependent variable in this case to be an early switch, coupled with early hedging behavior.

Of the *73 senators in our typological table, only John Kerry was this type. Kerry's military service in Vietnam was a featured part of his political biography, as was evident in the 2004 presidential campaign. Kerry opened his acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention by saluting the assembled members of his party and declaring, "Reporting for duty." Yet Kerry's military record did not entirely insulate him from conflicting political pressures on Iraq from Democratic Party activists who were already turning against the war and a general public still focused on post-9/11 security. Through his attempts to respond to these crosscurrents, Kerry ended his 2004 campaign with widespread perceptions that he had flip-flopped on the issue.

In May 2003, consistent with his 2002 vote to authorize the war, Kerry characterized the intervention in Iraq as "the right thing to do," and noted that he had supported Bush's decision. By the fall of 2003, with Howard Dean gaining strength among party activists in his race for the Democratic nomination, and with evidence mounting that no WMD would be found in Iraq, Kerry blamed Bush for failing to do "almost anything correctly" as they "rushed" to war against Iraq. Shortly thereafter, Kerry voted for a version of Bush's \$87 billion supplemental request that would have funded the war by repealing tax cuts for Americans earning over \$200,000, before joining a small minority of senators who voted against the final version of the bill, which did not specify a funding source. Later, after securing the Democratic nomination, Kerry famously attempted to move to the center and explain these votes by stating that "I actually did vote for the \$87 billion before I voted against it." Kerry also argued after he was the nominee that he would have voted to authorize the use of troops in Iraq even if he had known that no WMD would be found and that no close connection existed between Iraq and Al Qaeda, though he criticized the ways in which Bush had implemented policy on Iraq.¹³

Only when the presidential campaign heated up in the fall of 2004 did Kerry challenge Bush more directly on Iraq policy, criticizing Bush for "stubborn incompetence." Reversing his own earlier statement, Kerry argued that had it been known that Iraq had no WMD and no ties to Al

¹³ David E. Rosenbaum, "Fact Check," *The New York Times*, October 26, 2004.

Qaeda, the U.S. should not have invaded. Kerry also suggested, despite his own 2002 vote, that he would not have gone to war with Iraq had he (Kerry) been elected president in 2000.¹⁴

DYYN

We expected this type to be early to middle switchers. The only difference with the DYYY type above is this group's lack of presidential aspirations. Since senators of the DYYN type were not running for president, they likely would be less sensitive to party activists than the DYYY type and somewhat less likely to change their position on the war as the news grew increasingly negative, unless they faced a potentially strong primary challenge from an anti-war activist. As the war had not become manifestly unpopular by 2004, no incumbent Democrats faced a strong primary challenger until 2006. As a result, the switch from pro-war to anti-war is expected, although possibly later than for the DYYY type. As it turned out, of the three senators who fit this group, one was an early switcher (Harkin) and two were middle switchers (Kohl and Carper). No senator in this type waited until the February 2007 vote to take a position against the war, which is consistent with our prediction.

DYNY

This type is expected to be highly sensitive to the center of public opinion, given the presidential aspirations and seat insecurity. At the same time, party affiliation, the potential for an anti-war primary challenger, and military service would have been factors encouraging a shift from supporting to opposing the war. Taken together, depending on the proximity of the senator's reelection campaign, these considerations suggest an early shift as public opinion shifted sharply negative, which started to occur in 2005.

Given the structural advantages that incumbents historically have had over challengers, and the fact that most close Senate seats in 2000 and 2002 went to Republican candidates, a small minority of Democratic Senators were actually vulnerable in any of the elections between 2004 and 2006. Consistent with this explanation, this type was empty, primarily because the only difference with the above DYYY type (of which there was only one senator) is the safety of the senator's seat.

DYNN

Given the explanation immediately above, this type was also likely to switch to oppose the war, though perhaps later than the DYNY type given the lack of presidential ambitions and reduced

¹⁴ Jodi Wilgoren and Elisabeth Bumiller, "In Harsh Critique Yet, Kerry Attacks Bush Over War in Iraq," *The New York Times*, September 21, 2004.

sensitivity to public opinion. For the same reason that the DYNY type was empty, the DYNN type was also empty of members still in office.

DNY

Given that this type includes senators without military experience who aspired to be president, we should expect them to have supported the war at the outset. The pressure to burnish one's security bona fides was intense in the aftermath of September 11 and the onset of the "global war on terror." Once the decision to invade Iraq was made, however, and the indicators of progress were not apparent, members of this type would be expected to remain closely attuned to public sentiment. As Democratic activists and later the public turned against the war, we expect these Senators to have maintained a strong pro-military posture while following the public mood and voting against the war. The expected behavior of senators of this type, except for a strong front runner for the nomination (which in 2007 proved to be Hillary Clinton), is an early switch and a mea culpa. In order to maintain their strong reputation on security issues, they would be likely to infuse their comments with pro-military rhetoric and praise for the troops while blaming the administration for poor tactical planning.

Senators Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, John Edwards, and Christopher Dodd all inhabit this typological category, with Clinton expected to be a middle to late switcher as the front runner. Consistent with our prediction, Dodd and Biden were middle switchers on Iraq. Dodd voted to authorize force in 2002 and voted against a firm withdrawal deadline from Iraq in June 2006, but by early 2007 as he contemplated a race for the presidency he began to characterize the war as a mistake. Dodd voted in the spring of 2007 to set a deadline for withdrawing from Iraq, and during the campaign in the summer he criticized other presidential contenders, including Clinton and Obama, for failing to endorse such a deadline.¹⁵

Senator Biden's evolving views on Iraq reflected both his expertise and position as the ranking Democrat and sometime Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as well as his presidential aspirations. In the summer of 2002, Biden, then the Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, co-authored an op-ed with the Committee's ranking Republican, Senator Lugar, calling for a more focused national discussion on the possibility of using force against Iraq. Foreshadowing committee hearings on the subject, the two senators supported many of the rationales offered for intervening in Iraq, noting that Bush was rightly concerned about Saddam Hussein's "relentless" pursuit of WMD and his demonstrated willingness to use them against his

¹⁵ Peter Urban, "Dodd expands anti-war views," *Connecticut Post online*, June 3, 2007.

own people. The op-ed also implicitly tied Iraq's potential WMD to the issue of terrorism, stating that a containment strategy "raises the risk that Mr. Hussein will play cat-and-mouse with inspectors while building more weapons and selling them to those who would use them against us. If we wait for the danger to become clear and present, it may be too late." Yet the op-ed also noted the potential risks of using force, including the danger of a regional war, the potential diversion of forces from other fronts in the war on terrorism, the need for allied support, the costs of rebuilding Iraq, the political challenge of managing a post-war and post-Saddam Iraq, and the need to demonstrate that the U.S. was committed to Iraq or the "long haul."¹⁶ Although Biden then voted in October 2002 to authorize the use of force, already by the summer of 2003 he began to express frustration that the Bush Administration's optimistic pre-war assessments were falling short, noting that the fiscal cost of the war was already far exceeding the Administration's estimates and arguing that stabilizing Iraq would require 40-60,000 more U.S. troops than the 139,000 then deployed.¹⁷ Biden continued to support funding votes on the war through 2007, however. In a November 22, 2005 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations he rejected an earlier call by Rep. John Murtha to set a firm withdrawal deadline on Iraq, saying that a continued U.S. troop presence was necessary but that he nonetheless expected most U.S. troops to be out by January 2007.¹⁸ Soon afterward, in a November 27 appearance on "Meet the Press," Biden stated that "It was a mistake" for him to have voted to authorize the war in 2002.¹⁹

Biden further lowered his expectations for Iraq in a May 1, 2006 op-ed he co-authored with former Council on Foreign Relations President Leslie Gelb. In their op-ed, Biden and Gelb proposed a sharp decentralization of authority in Iraq along federal lines as an alternative to either "staying the course" or "bringing the troops home now." In their view, this solution would allow a substantial redeployment leaving only a "small residual" force of U.S. troops in Iraq to focus on terrorists. Blaming Bush for lacking a "strategy for victory" in Iraq, Biden and Gelb, while resisting the term "partition," argued that establishing "largely autonomous" Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni regions in Iraq, while leaving border defense, foreign affairs, and division of oil revenues to the central government, would lessen sectarian violence, which in their view had "surpassed the insurgency as the main security threat." Although acknowledging that this solution would not be

¹⁶ Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Richard G. Lugar, "Debating Iraq," *The New York Times*, July 31, 2002.

¹⁷ Eric Schmitt, "Senators Assail 2 Officials For Lack of Postwar Details," *The New York Times*, July 30, 2003; Brian Knowlton, "Senators Say Iraq Needs More U.S. Troops," *The New York Times*, August 25, 2003.

¹⁸ Chris Cillizza, Special to The Washington Post, "Biden Criticizes Bush Policy on Iraq but Opposes a Pullout Deadline," *The Washington Post*, November 22, 2005.

¹⁹ Richard Cohen, "More than a 'Mistake' on Iraq," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 2005.

easy, Biden and Gelb argued it would be preferable to the rampant sectarian violence plaguing Iraq at the time.²⁰

Later, after the Bush Administration failed to pursue Biden and Gelb's approach, in December 2006 Biden stated that he "totally" opposed the proposed "surge" of additional U.S. troops to Iraq.²¹ In April 2007, Biden continued to argue that Bush's "surge" was doomed to fail,²² although Biden was the only one of the Democratic candidates for President to continue voting for funds for U.S. military efforts in Iraq through the middle of 2007, arguing that the Congress could not undercut the efforts of U.S. troops in the field.²³

John Edwards was the earliest switcher in this group, penning an apology in a November 13, 2005 op-ed in the *Washington Post*.

In contrast to Edwards' strong denunciation of his own authorization vote, Clinton, as the Democratic front runner through 2007, steadfastly refused to characterize her 2002 vote as a mistake despite enormous pressure from party activists and considerable media attention to this issue. Only when Clinton had clearly lost her front runner status did she acknowledge, in response to a direct question in a debate with Senator Obama just before the Texas caucus and Ohio primary, that if she could take back one vote of her Senate career, it would have been the 2002 vote on Iraq. This position marked a clear shift in her earlier campaign strategy of refusing to revisit the past with respect to Iraq and focusing exclusively on the future—and admonishing others who had turned highly critical of the war to do the same.

DNYN

The single difference from the type immediately above is that these senators were not planning a presidential run. As a result, they likely would have been less attuned to national public opinion and Democratic Party activists. Overall, however, unless their state was insulated from national trends in polling data, their predicted positions would be the same as that of the DNYY type above (early switch), or possibly a middle switch given the lower sensitivity to party activists. Still, if they faced election in 2006, they had to anticipate potential anti-war primary challengers, and so would have felt increasing pressure to repudiate their 2002 vote authorizing war against Iraq.

²⁰ Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Leslie H. Gelb, "Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq," *The New York Times*, May 1, 2006; Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Leslie H. Gelb, "Federalism, Not Partition," *The Washington Post*, October 3, 2007.

²¹ Helene Cooper and Jeff Zeleney, "Biden Opposes a Troop Increase In Iraq, Foreshadowing a Fight With the Bush Administration," *The New York Times*, December 27, 2006.

²² Dan Balz and Chris Cillizza, "Bush's Troop Initiative Doomed, Biden Says," *The Washington Post*, April 12, 2007.

²³ Anne Kornblut and Dan Balz, "Democrats Focus on Iraq in Contentious Second Debate," *The Washington Post*, June 4, 2007.

Of the seven senators in this type still in office that voted to authorize force, all eventually became critical of Bush's policies and all but one were middle-switchers. Only Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska did not switch until the February 2007 vote. One of the Senators in this category, who did switch in the middle period of 2006, was Charles Schumer (NY). Schumer remained a strong supporter of U.S. deployments to Iraq up through his reelection campaign in 2004, although he began to criticize the pre-war intelligence estimates by the summer of 2003 and to blame the Bush administration more generally for failures in Iraq in 2004 and especially in 2005. In the fall of 2005 Schumer, as one of a total of 34 Democratic Senators, signed an open letter to Bush that sharply criticized the President for lacking a strategy for victory in Iraq. Schumer voted against the June 22, 2006 call for a withdrawal deadline in Iraq, but for a similar resolution in March 2007. As far as present research can determine, Schumer has not publicly characterized his own 2002 vote as a mistake.

DNNY

Given this type of senators' presidential aspirations and the insecurity of their seat, it is expected that these senators would have been torn between the need for a centrist stand to win their state and the anti-war views of party activists who dominate the presidential primaries. This type of Senator was thus difficult to predict, though if a senator of this type voted for the war, an early switch is most likely. No Senators who fit this type voted to authorize force in 2002.

DNNN

This type would have been particularly sensitive to state-wide public opinion polls, given the fact that their Senate seat was not secure. Although national polling would have been less at issue as this type did not have presidential aspirations, it is still expected that as public opinion turned negative on the war, the senators would have moved toward opposition as well, particularly to forestall an anti-war primary challenge from another Democrat seeking their seat. Given the reduced pressures of national polling, the switch is expected to be later than the DNNY type. As Democrats, senators in this group were likely to blame Bush for poor implementation of policy on Iraq, rather than publicly renouncing their own initial authorizing vote.

Six senators still in office were of this type. Of these six, five were middle or late switchers. There were no early switchers. Perhaps the clearest example of this type is Tim Johnson (D-SD), who faced a close election in 2002 against challenger Rep. John Thune (R-SD). In advance of the October 11, 2002 vote on Iraq, Thune began running ads featuring a picture of Saddam Hussein and criticizing Johnson for voting against the 1991 Persian Gulf War and against missile defense

programs. Under pressure from these ads, Johnson, one of the very few members of Congress having a son in the military who might be deployed to Iraq, announced just three days before the October 11 vote that he would support the authorization of force.²⁴ Johnson went on to narrowly win re-election. By the summer of 2003, he criticized the Bush Administration for failing to gather more allied troop contributions in Iraq,²⁵ although he voted in support of the \$87 billion supplemental in the fall of 2004. Johnson had a severe stroke on December 13, 2006, so there is no information on his views beyond that date.

Another particularly interesting example of this type, and one contrary to our expectations, is Joseph Lieberman, who remained a strong supporter of the war from 2002 to the present. The consequences of Lieberman's unswerving support for the war illustrate the mechanisms of our theory, however, as Lieberman took a considerable risk and ended up losing his Senate nomination campaign to an anti-war activist. Lieberman ended up winning reelection as an independent, but his example served to remind other Democrats of the risks of ignoring party activists on the war.

Another member of this type was Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA). Consistent with our prediction, Landrieu voted to authorize force in 2002, but gradually moved toward opposition to Bush's policies on the war. In explaining her late switch in February 2007 and declaring her opposition to the "surge" of additional U.S. forces to Iraq, she stated that "The administration's escalation plan lacks clear benchmarks for our commitment in Iraq and is devoid of specific mileposts by which to measure success." She did not offer an explanation of her previous votes on Iraq and instead focused on the president's poor execution of the war.

One other Senator facing a potentially close re-election campaign was Blanch Lincoln (D-AR). Lincoln was a middle-switcher, voting in 2006 to urge Bush to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq. Upon Rumsfeld's resignation in November 2006, Lincoln blamed "the civilian mismanagement at the Pentagon in regards to the war in Iraq" for costing the U.S. "dearly in the lives of brave men and women as well as influence around the world," and she called for "a new strategy and a change in course to stabilize Iraq so our troops can return home safely and as soon as possible."²⁶ In 2007, in remarks supporting a bipartisan group of Senators who urged adopting the bipartisan Iraq Study Group's recommendations, Lincoln put blame on the Iraqi government's failure to take responsibility rather than on any U.S. policy mistakes.²⁷ In April 2007, she put more blame on the President even as she defended her continuing support for funds for the U.S. military

²⁴ Mike Madden, report in *The Argus Leader*, October 9, 2002.

²⁵ Mary Dalyrimple, AP, "Senate Kills Attempt to Account for Spending on Operations in Iraq, in *The Bismarck Tribune*, July 17, 2003.

²⁶ "Sen. Lincoln Issues Statement on Rumsfeld Resignation," *States News Service*, November 8, 2006.

²⁷ "Lincoln, Bipartisan Group Introduce Iraq Study Group Implementation Bill as 'New Way Forward,'" *States News Service*, June 5, 2007

effort in Iraq, stating that Bush's "justification for staying in Iraq becomes harder to stomach each day" and criticizing his surge strategy as "high risk."²⁸

But even as late as 2008 Lincoln was muted in her criticism of Bush's policies on Iraq. Responding to the President's final State of the Union address, Lincoln noted that she also celebrated the recent improvements in Iraq that Bush pointed to, but argued in very general terms that "we are still without a plan for bringing our troops home. While the President continues to urge patience from the American people, I share the belief of many Arkansans that an open-ended commitment of American lives and resources is not the answer. The problems in Iraq require Iraqi solutions, and we need to bring our troops home safely and as soon as we possibly can."²⁹ At present, however, our research has not uncovered any public indication that Lincoln considers her 2002 vote a mistake.

RYYY

Like the *DYYY* type, senators in this category were less sensitive to public opinion as the war progress stalled due to the safety of their seat and military background. Furthermore, their party affiliation and their presidential aspirations in the 2007-2008 nomination process, which lacked a clear front runner, increased the pressures to join Republican party activists in their continued support for the war even as conditions worsened, thus voting to stay the course. Our theory suggests the eventual nominee will move back toward the center of public opinion on the war as the fall election approaches.

Two senators occupied this category—Senator John McCain (AZ) and Senator Chuck Hagel (NE), both veterans of the Vietnam War. Among Republican Senators, Hagel became a relatively early and vocal critic of Bush's conduct of the war, arguing that conditions on the ground had changed in ways that endangered U.S. troops. Hagel argued that "Iraq is not just a sectarian conflict—a violent, vicious sectarian conflict—but an intrasectarian conflict. Is it not time and don't our troops and the American people expect the Congress, after 4 years, when things have gotten progressively worse, not better, to engage?" Perhaps aware that the criticism of Bush's conduct of the war had made him unpopular among Republican Party activists and had diminished his prospects of winning the Republican nomination, Hagel belatedly decided not to run for the Republican nomination.

John McCain, on the other hand, consistently supported the long-term deployment of large-scale U.S. forces to Iraq even as he criticized aspects of Bush's implementation of policies there.

²⁸ "Lincoln on U.S. Senate Floor: Congress is Committed to Funding Troops," *States News Service*, April 19, 2007.

²⁹ *States News Service*, January 28, 2008

Contrary to our model, this has thus far continued to be true even after McCain became the likely Republican nominee in the spring of 2008. McCain's position has been bolstered by the drop in U.S. and Iraqi casualties since the 2007 "surge;" it remains to be seen if McCain will hew closer to the center should casualties in Iraq once again increase prior to the fall election. In fact, McCain's movement to the center has become evident on other international issues. After becoming the likely nominee, McCain took more moderate views than the Bush Administration on a range of topics, such as encouraging a renewed look at an international treaty to address global warming and pledging his support for restoring U.S. alliances that have become frayed during the Bush Administration's tenure.

RYYN

The only difference with this type and the RYYY type immediately above is the lack of presidential aspiration of Senators in this category. As a result, we expect this type to be even less sensitive to trends in public opinion and thus less likely to switch from support to opposition to the war, voting to stay the course.

Ten senators occupied this type, nine of which were stay-the-course Republicans. The lone senator who switched was John Warner of Virginia, who went public with his criticisms of Bush's planned troop increase and called for the President to start reducing U.S. forces in Iraq in October 2006. Warner justified his changed position without rationalizing his earlier votes in favor of the intervention but rather in terms of the lack of progress on the ground. In addition, rather than criticize Bush, Warner put the blame on Iraqis themselves, stating that "I do not...have strong evidence that the Iraqi forces are measuring up in any amount to what the President laid down on January 10 (2007)."³⁰ Notably, Warner's public opposition to the "surge" came within a year of his announcement in August 2007 that he would not run for reelection in 2008. It was not immediately apparent the extent to which his decision to retire was related to events in Iraq.

RYYN

Affiliation with the Republican Party and military service both create pressures on senators of this type against changing their positions. On the other hand, the lack of safety of their seats and their presidential goals would lead them to question U.S. policy in Iraq. As a result of these countervailing forces, we expect senators of this type to exhibit hedging behavior and even vote against continued large scale U.S. deployments, but ultimately to be indeterminate. Consistent with

³⁰ "Democrats Increasingly Divided on Iraq" *The Frontrunner*, Fox News Special Report (2/27, Brit Hume).

the DYNY and DYNN types and given the structural advantages of incumbency, few Senate seats are actually vulnerable in any given electoral year. In this instance no vulnerable senators chose to run for president and this type is empty of senators.

RYYN

The difference with the RYNY type above is that this type does not have presidential aspirations and thus would be less concerned about Republican Party activists unless they faced a pro-war Senate primary challenger. As a result, we expect senators of this type to be sensitive to public opinion to keep their vulnerable seats and thus likely to be late switchers on the war.

Two senators in our list were of this type—Senator Arlen Specter (PA) and Senator Jeff Sessions (AL). Sessions was only barely vulnerable by our 20% standard, having won reelection by a margin of 19% in 2002, and did not face the prospect of reelection until 2008. He remained an outspoken supporter of Bush’s position on the war, speaking to a September 2005 rally of Bush’s supporters and charging that a much larger anti-war rally the previous day did not represent American ideals. In contrast, Specter did switch late to oppose the war. He expressed concern over failed progress in Iraq, but never clearly rationalized his earlier votes that authorized and continued the military excursion into Iraq. “We’re all looking for a plan that will work,” he explained on February 6, 2007. “The current plan is not working, and 21,500 additional troops — it’s a snowball in July. It’s not going to work.”³¹

RNYN

This category consisted of senators who were somewhat sensitive to the national mood and more attentive to Republican party activists (presidential aspirants) but relatively secure from the unpopularity of the war at the state-wide level (secure seats). These factors encouraged the senator to support a stay-the-course policy, and lack of military service also inhibited a change to oppose the war. While some hedging behavior is possible with this type, an abrupt shift to opposition is not expected. Only Sam Brownback (KS), a short-term presidential candidate, fills this type. As predicted, Brownback was a consistent supporter of the war.

RNYN

The only difference from the RNYN type immediately above is that this type was not running for president. As a result, this type was even less attentive to the general public and

³¹ Think Progress. “‘Anti-escalation’ senators vote for escalation,” Accessed online. <http://thinkprogress.org/2007/02/06/iraq-escalation-vote/>.

similarly sensitive to partisan pressures, thus making them one of the least likely types to switch to oppose the war and thus vote to stay the course.

Thirteen senators from our sample (of those still in office) inhabited this category (eight other senators of this type voluntarily retired sometime prior to the 2007 vote). Eleven of the 13 were stay-the-course senators, early and consistent supporters of the war. Two of the senators acted contrary to our expectations, however. Senators Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe, both of Maine, were late switchers. In supporting the war authorization, Collins cited weapons of mass destruction and the malign nature of Saddam Hussein. She was insistent, however, that policy focus on eliminating the Iraqi weapons threat rather than on deposing Hussein. To succeed in pressuring Iraq to accept U.N. inspectors, Collins voted to authorize the use of force, stating that “Secretary Powell... has convinced me the process for effective action by the United Nations to disarm Iraq depends on the credible threat of the use of force, and that is the reason ultimately that I will decide to cast my vote in favor of this resolution.”

Yet when events deteriorated on the ground, Collins justified a new position in February 2007 by citing the changed conditions. “In Baghdad, the capital is engulfed in sectarian violence. Yes, Baghdad is in the midst of a civil war between the Shiites and the Sunnis. To insert more American soldiers in the midst of this sectarian struggle would, in my judgment, be a major mistake.” Senator Snowe shifted positions at the same time. “2006 was going to be the year of transition to Iraqi sovereignty. It was 2006 when we would turn over all the security to the Iraqi security forces. But 2006 has come and gone. We haven't made any measurable progress,” she said. Neither Snowe nor Collins explained their earlier positions in a clear *mea culpa*. Rather, new conditions called for new policy, and blame fell more on the Iraqis than on the Bush Administration.

RNNY

This type was expected to be highly sensitive to public opinion, given the lack of security of their seat, but also focused on Republican activists critical to the nomination process. The lack of military service would have limited such senators' independence on the Iraq issue. In sum, the prediction for this type is indeterminate, depending on how heavily such a Senator would have weighed their presidential aspirations against retaining their Senate seat. As it turned out, this type was empty of any Senators.

This type is expected to be sensitive to the general public, given that they had to protect their vulnerable seats and were not running for president. Due to the strength of the party affiliation variable and the threat of a pro-war Senate primary challenger, this group was for the most part likely to continue to support Bush's policies unless they faced a near-term reelection campaign. Still, while unlikely to switch, among Republicans this group was more likely to move into opposition (although likely late in the process) than any other Republican type except those senators who had military service, had vulnerable seats, and were not running for president.

Jim Bunning (KY), Jon Kyl (AZ), Wayne Allard (CO), Kit Bond (MO), and John Ensign (NV) are the only senators who occupied this typological category who remain in office (five other senators of this type lost reelection in 2006). Despite their relatively close elections, each of these senators came from solid so-called "red states," with the exception of Wayne Allard, as Colorado has been trending Democratic in recent elections. As a result, it is expected that these senators continued to support the war, since they experienced publics that were more supportive of sustained deployment in Iraq than the national average.

Emblematic of this type that supported stay-the-course policies and fidelity to the Bush Administration's policies, Senator Bunning not only voted to authorize force in 2002, but four years later emphasized "recent successes in Iraq, including the death of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Al-Zarqawi and the installation of Prime Minister al-Maliki's Cabinet."³² Six months later, Bunning implicitly tied the conflict in Iraq and the issue of terrorism, stating, "I believe the cost of failure in Iraq is too high to leave now. I do not want to have to send American soldiers back to Iraq in a few years to deal with an even tougher situation. I do not want to leave a breeding ground of terror."

Conclusion

Overall, our typological theory performed quite well. The party, ideological, and political variables that have received the most emphasis in the extant literature on Congress indeed proved powerful, but significant anomalies arose for the "rational Bayesian updating" theory that may prove explicable in terms of cognitive variables once we code these variables in our future research. Taking into account all the senators who voted for force in 2002 except for those who voluntarily retired in 2006 or earlier, our model predicted *five of the nine expected to be early switchers (four proved to be middle switchers), 6 of the 7 predicted middle switchers (one was a late switcher), 1 of the 6 expected late switchers (four proved to be middle switchers, and one stayed the course), and

³² "Bunning Statement on Senate Passage of Defense Authorization Bill" *States News Service*, reporting on a statement issued by the office of Senator Bunning.

37 of the 43 Senators predicted to stay the course (six turned out to be late switchers). The most significant anomalies were Senator Lieberman, who unexpectedly continued to support Bush's policies even at the cost of losing his party's Senate nomination, and Senator McCain, who has thus far not moved to the center even after effectively securing the Republican nomination. Senator Hagel has also proved to be a stronger critic of Bush's policies on Iraq than our model would predict, at the cost of losing his appeal to Republican activists and his prospects for successfully competing for the Republican presidential nomination. Incorporating information on these Senators' cognitive styles and ideological ratings in our future research might help to address these anomalies.

Our model also proved to be accurate for the most part in predicting the kind of blame attributions Senators would make, with Republicans blaming outside forces like Iraqi politicians and Democrats blaming the Bush Administration's poor policy implementation. Very few senators—largely those our model would predict (Democrats with Presidential aspirations)—characterized their own 2002 votes as a mistake, even if they moved to oppose Bush's policies. A final interesting finding for future research, which challenges both political and Bayesian explanations but which is not yet directly addressed by our current case selection, is the half-dozen Republican Senators who persisted in supporting Bush's policies on Iraq even though this risked (and ultimately cost) their Senate seats.

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