CIAO DATE: 03/2009
November 2007
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
In recent years there has been a proliferation of international rules, laws and institutional forms in world politics. This has triggered attention to the role that forum-shopping, nested and overlapping institutions, and regime complexes play in shaping the patterns of global governance. A few policymakers, some international relations scholars, and many international law scholars posit that this trend will lead to more rule-based outcomes in world politics. This paper suggests a contrary position: institutional thickness has a paradoxical effect on global governance. After a certain point, proliferation shifts global governance structures from rule-based outcomes to power-based outcomes - because institutional proliferation can enhance the ability of great powers to engage in forum-shopping.
It is possible, however, that not all regime complexes are created alike. This leads to question: Under what conditions will great power governments be constrained from forum-shopping? Most of these factors suggested in the international regimes literature do not pose either a consistent or persistent constraint to forum-shopping. The paper then examines a case that represents a "tough test" for the proposed argument: The 2001 Doha Declaration on Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health, and its aftermath. This is a case where forum-shopping was temporarily constrained. I argue that issue linkage and organizational reputation can temporarily increase the viscosity of global governance. The barriers to forum-shopping are not constant over time, however; in the long run, there is little viscosity in global governance structures.
Resource link: Institutional Proliferation and World Order: Is There Viscosity in Global Governance? [PDF] - 434K