

The background image shows a man in a blue jacket and plaid shirt carrying a large sack on his head, walking past a line of white trucks. A UN soldier in camouflage and a blue helmet stands in the foreground on the right. The scene is outdoors with green hills in the background.

COUNCIL *on*
FOREIGN
RELATIONS

Center for Preventive Action

Council Special Report No. 40
October 2008

Anthony W. Gambino

Congo Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress

Congo

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Cover Photo: Lionel Healing/AFP/Getty Images. Refugees walk along a road past United Nations soldiers on October 21, 2007, in Kibumba, near Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Foreword

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a country of tragedy and promise on a massive scale. Nearly one-quarter the size of the United States, the DRC is home to important tropical forests, vast hydroelectric potential, and resources ranging from diamonds to zinc. It is also home to an ongoing humanitarian disaster. A war that began in 1998 caused widespread death and displacement. Though it officially ended in 2002, violence has continued, particularly in the east. The International Rescue Committee estimates that more than five million Congolese have died since 1998—including more than 500,000 per year since the official end of the war.

Despite some positive developments, such as democratic elections in 2006 and an increase in foreign investment, the country continues to face severe security and development problems. In this Council Special Report, commissioned by the Center for Preventive Action, Anthony W. Gambino analyzes these problems and proposes steps the United States can take to help. He details the country's social, economic, and security challenges, ranging from lawlessness and corruption to poverty and poor health. He then recommends two priorities for U.S. policy: combating insecurity in the east and promoting sustainable development. To bolster security, the report urges the United States to ensure that the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC has an appropriate mandate and sufficient personnel and resources to remain in place for the foreseeable future, at least through the planned 2011 elections. On development, the report makes a number of recommendations, including increased U.S. assistance for the elections, environmental protection, and health.

Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress lays out a thoughtful agenda for U.S. policy toward the DRC. Its call for more resources may meet resistance in today's economic climate. But the report argues

that what happens in the DRC should matter to the United States—for humanitarian reasons as well as economic and strategic ones. The result is a sobering analysis that recognizes the scale of the challenge in the DRC but also outlines ways in which the United States can help the country toward a more promising future.

Richard N. Haass

President, Council on Foreign Relations

October 2008

Acknowledgments

I thank the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) for sponsoring this report, especially Paul Stares for his advice and support, Jamie Ekern for help on an exceptionally wide and complicated range of issues, and Katy Robinette for assistance large and small. Aimee Carter at CFR also provided access to particularly valuable information.

I benefited enormously from an advisory committee. Many committee members not only offered helpful comments at meetings, but also gave generously of their time. I thank Séverine Autesserre, Kay Boulware-Miller, Richard Carroll, Herman J. Cohen, Kathleen Cravero, Chester A. Crocker, Mauro De Lorenzo, Frederick H. Ehrenreich, Mark R. Ellington, Carlton W. Fulford Jr., J. Anthony Holmes, Aubrey Hooks, W. Russell King, Rob Krech, Michael S. Lund, Callisto E. Madavo, Mark Malan, Joshua Marks, Robert B. Oakley, Comer Plummer, Peter Rosenblum, Witney W. Schneidman, Madeline Seidenstricker, Herbert Weiss, Howard Wolpe, and I. William Zartman.

I am deeply indebted to Michelle D. Gavin for her guidance, support, and wise counsel. I also particularly thank Princeton N. Lyman for his help and insight. Gary Samore and Richard N. Haass provided useful comments on the draft. I also am grateful for the work of Sara Weeks on the Communications team and Patricia Dorff and Lia Norton in Publications.

Paul J. Hare, Holly Wise, and many others gave generously of their time and helped me better understand various issues. Many current officials of the U.S. government offered sound guidance and helpful feedback.

This report owes an enormous amount to Congolese friends and advisers, including advisory committee members Mbuyamu Matungulu and John Ulimwengu. The full list of Congolese, both in the United

States and in the Congo, who helped inform this report and my own understanding of their country, is too long to acknowledge here.

This publication was made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed in this report are solely my own.

Anthony W. Gambino

Map of Congo



Source: World Bank, November 2007 (IBRD 33391R1).

Acronyms

CBFP	Congo Basin Forest Partnership
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for the Defense of the People)
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EUSEC RD Congo	European Union Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance to Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
GDP	gross domestic product
IFIs	international financial institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MLC	Mouvement de Libération du Congo
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
NCOs	noncommissioned officers
NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo

RCD-Goma	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SRSG	special representative of the secretary-general
TSC	Training Strategy Conference
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

Council Special Report

Introduction and Summary

At the beginning of this decade, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was enmeshed in what was widely judged to be an intractable war.¹ Armies from five other African states were deeply involved in the stalemated conflict. By any definition, the situation in the DRC was a humanitarian catastrophe, with an estimated 2.5 million Congolese dead from violence, disease, or malnutrition. Millions of people were either displaced or out of the reach of humanitarian relief. The economy was in collapse, and Congo's rich endowment of minerals was funding war efforts and leaking out to other countries.

Remarkably, the situation began to change shortly after the assassination of President Laurent Kabila in early 2001. Laurent Kabila had been a minor rebel leader in the Congo in the early 1960s, and had re-emerged in late 1996 as the leader of a rebellion against President Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila seized power in May 1997, ending Mobutu's dictatorship. By 2001, his rule had degenerated into an autocratic style similar to Mobutu's. Kabila's son and successor, Joseph Kabila, moved rapidly in a different direction from his father, choosing a course of action that led ultimately to withdrawal of all foreign forces, a transition government, economic growth, and successful national elections in 2006.

Despite this clear progress, the Congo remains unstable and the humanitarian catastrophe continues. An estimated three million more Congolese have died since 2001. Today, the violence continues and instability pervades the rural areas of many provinces in eastern Congo, particularly North and South Kivu. These two provinces are the locations for the worst instances of sexual violence in the world today.²

In late 2007, the governments of the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement in Nairobi, Kenya, and, in early 2008, twenty-two Congolese armed groups signed an agreement in Goma, DRC, to resolve these situations. However, as of late summer 2008, rural North and South

Kivu remain humanitarian disasters, with 1.2 million displaced people and rampant ceasefire violations, other violence, and persistent insecurity in rural areas. Recent reports indicate that all sides have rearmed and heavy fighting restarted in late September.

As bad as this situation is, it would be worse without the presence of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, which is known by its French acronym, MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo). The presence of MONUC military contingents in major cities and rural areas in eastern Congo is the single most important factor preventing the full collapse of state authority there. MONUC's present mandate is to protect civilians, maintain stability, and participate in the disarmament and demobilization of foreign and Congolese armed groups, as well as in security sector reform. MONUC's mandate is up for renewal at the end of 2008 and, though the Security Council almost certainly will agree to continue support into 2009, there have been regular rumblings, particularly within the U.S. executive branch and Congress, that MONUC, because of its cost and the Bush administration's focus in Africa on ensuring funding for peacekeeping in the Sudan, should move rapidly toward closure. MONUC's continued presence with appropriate personnel levels, mandate, and funding will remain essential for a number of years, but it cannot be assumed that the Security Council will provide adequate support.

All institutions of the Congolese state—including the military, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and the police—remain dysfunctional and are not remotely close to assuming the vital security role that MONUC currently plays. This was demonstrated in late 2007 by another failed FARDC offensive in North Kivu that showed, yet again, that the government's security forces pose no serious threat to the ability of rogue armed groups to control territory and exploit Congo's natural wealth. The army and police are not only unable to maintain order in the eastern provinces, they are also part of the problem, each regularly committing horrible abuses against civilians.

The United States has important reasons to prevent the situation in eastern Congo from further deteriorating and to ensure that the fragile gains made in the rest of the country are not jeopardized as a consequence. First and most urgent, the continuing and expanding humanitarian emergency in eastern Congo compels the United States to strongly support international efforts to finally end this long-

standing tragedy. French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner warned in mid-October 2008 of the imminent risk of “huge massacres” in eastern Congo.³ Furthermore, the general impoverishment and suffering of the Congolese people throughout the country calls for continued U.S. assistance. Also, important U.S. strategic interests are at stake. Congo’s immense size and location make it vital to the stability of Central Africa. Congo is endowed with vast lodes of important minerals, the second most important forest in the world, and enormous hydroelectric potential. Large-scale international investors are reinvesting in the Congo, including U.S.-based Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold, Inc., one of the largest copper and gold mining companies in the world.

The George W. Bush administration has long accepted this justification for U.S. engagement in the Congo. In its most recent budget presentation to Congress, the Congo is identified as part of a small group of African countries deemed “critical to the continent’s stability.” Moreover, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer stated in 2007 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “it is vital that we remain fully engaged in assisting the Congolese and their international partners in addressing the enormous challenges that remain.” This rhetoric has been backed up by an impressive level of U.S. assistance. The United States provides approximately \$125 million to \$150 million per year to the Congo in bilateral assistance, including \$60 million in food and other humanitarian assistance, and contributes approximately \$300 million per year to help pay for MONUC’s operations. Over the last ten years, the United States has provided more than \$2 billion in assistance to the Congo through these programs.⁴

Yet for all its rhetorical and financial commitment to the DRC, the Bush administration never developed a comprehensive strategy to address the fundamental problem of insecurity in the eastern provinces. The strong rhetoric and commitment to some level of financing come from the middle levels of the U.S. government, but the major decisions required to adequately support U.S. engagement in the Congo are not made by the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, they are made by the secretary of state and the president. At those senior levels, though, policy has been largely reactive to events in the east, driven by the need to prevent episodic crises from escalating and reigniting wider, more destabilizing conflict in the Congo and in Central Africa rather than by a long-term sustainable solution to the root causes of insecurity in the east and throughout the country. At the highest levels of the State

Department, the National Security Council, and Congress, Congo is seen as requiring some middling level of U.S. engagement, but without a positive strategy to work with other donors and the Congolese for success. Senior policymakers appear satisfied with a strategy to avert complete disaster and collapse, and to tolerate a growing large-scale humanitarian emergency.

The status of the Goma and Nairobi agreements attests to the limitations of this approach. Both are failing for want of a minimally effective Congolese army and police force, without which there are no serious incentives for the militias to cooperate with the central government.

Furthermore, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Act, signed into law in 2006, threatens withdrawal of U.S. assistance should Kinshasa not make significant progress toward accomplishing a laundry list of ambitious goals, including a commitment to multiparty democracy, open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious freedom, ending the violence throughout the country, promoting peace and stability with its neighbors, rehabilitating the national judicial system and enhancing the rule of law, combating corruption, instituting economic reforms to promote development, and creating an environment to promote private investment. Withdrawal of U.S. assistance would produce the opposite of the intended effect, and would ultimately damage the United States' significant interests in the DRC, including regional stability, natural resources, and humanitarian concerns—not to mention protecting significant U.S. investments in UN peace operations and diplomacy.

This report argues that the United States must develop a sustainable, long-term approach to securing the peace and sustaining progress in the Congo, the aim of which is not just to tread water and prevent conditions from deteriorating, but to help move the country forward. The United States should focus on the two central challenges to securing peace and sustaining progress in the Congo: ending the rampant violence and insecurity in eastern Congo and promoting broad-based, environmentally sound sustainable development.

The U.S. approach to these challenges must be informed by three realities. First, the United States has only limited influence to affect change in the Congo. It must clearly understand what it can realistically do and how best it can utilize the levers of influence at its disposal.

Second, given other demands on U.S. resources, in Africa and beyond, and the magnitude of Congo's problems and needs, Washington

cannot by itself give the DRC all the external assistance it requires. The United States needs to work in close coordination with other interested states and institutions—and with reform-minded Congolese. Besides the UN, these include the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), European Commission, many African states, most European nations, and, increasingly, China. There is also a critical need to engage and encourage the private sector to play a positive role in Congo's development.

Third, though the variety of players in the DRC means that the enormous responsibilities and costs of helping the DRC can be shared, it nevertheless adds to the challenge of coordinating the various inputs and, more importantly, reconciling different interests. Such work is particularly important with Congo's eastern neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, and with China.

Given these realities, the United States should focus its efforts in the DRC on elements of U.S. comparative advantage, namely, the U.S. diplomatic power at the UN, in Central Africa, and in the Congo; a strong bilateral aid program; and good relations with private sector actors.

This report advocates that the United States take specific actions to meet these challenges. To end the rampant violence and insecurity in eastern Congo, the most important action the United States can take is to use its full diplomatic power at the UN Security Council to ensure that MONUC has the necessary personnel and mandate to fulfill its central role both in directly reducing insecurity and in helping to train a nucleus of a reformed Congolese army and police force that can undertake their basic functions while respecting basic human rights and the rule of law. If, however, these measures to stabilize eastern Congo and protect the civilian population fail in the short term, the United States, in the context of the responsibility to protect, should join with like-minded states in more aggressive actions to accomplish this. Such an intervention, which should be authorized in a Security Council resolution, should build on earlier European-led actions in Ituri in 2003 in eastern Congo and on the lessons from the successful British intervention in 2000 in Sierra Leone. Beyond strongly supporting such an action in the Security Council, the United States should be willing at least to provide logistical and intelligence support to any such operation. To promote broad-based, environmentally sound sustainable development, the United States should focus on maintaining the health of the Congo's forest, which is of global environmental importance; on

directing a greater percentage of its assistance to strengthening democratic institutions, including elections support; on aiding private sector growth, particularly in mineral-rich Katanga province; on promoting agricultural development; and on continuing its effective poverty alleviation programs, particularly in the health sector.

This report provides the background and context of the present situation in the Congo, discusses the specific challenges to peace and progress, and makes recommendations for U.S. policy to meet the two central challenges facing the Congo today.

Background and Context

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the third largest and fourth most populous state in Africa, with an estimated population of sixty-six million. Located in the center of Africa and surrounded by nine countries, developments in the DRC inevitably affect the stability of the region.⁵ In addition to its size and location, the DRC is endowed with vast lodes of important minerals, including copper, cobalt, cassiterite, columbite, tantalum, diamonds, gold, and uranium—making it a potentially vital source for development progress well beyond its own borders. It also has enormous hydroelectric potential, barely tapped, the second largest forest in the world after the Amazon, large regions with fertile soil, and a climate that permits year-round planting of crops in many areas.

Congo's vast size, large population, and abundant natural resources, however, have not translated into prosperity. As of 2006, Congo's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated as \$139, making Congo one of the poorest countries in the world. At independence in 1960, Congo's per capita GDP was \$380 (in constant 2006 dollars), almost three times as high. The Congolese economy grew into the early 1970s, but then began a long slide, with steady economic growth only restarting in 2002. Most Congolese live in rural areas, engage in subsistence agriculture, eat only one to two meals a day, and have extremely limited access to adequate health care, water, and sanitation. Many adults are illiterate and most rural Congolese children, particularly girls, do not finish primary school, so remain illiterate like their parents. Twenty percent of Congolese children die before reaching the age of five.

Recent studies by the Congolese government provide additional useful data.⁶ In the two poorest provinces, South Kivu and Equateur, 85 percent and 94 percent of the respective populations live below the poverty line, estimated at \$240 per capita per year in rural areas and \$380 per capita per year in urban areas throughout the DRC.

Those dire socioeconomic statistics explain Congo's ranking on notable indices. Of 141 states listed in the 2008 *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*, only Somalia and Afghanistan are considered weaker than the Congo; they are the only three on the list considered to be failed states. Congo is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranked 168 out of 179 by Transparency International.

RECENT HISTORY

The history of the Congo in the past fifty years has been marked by periods of great instability and insecurity accompanied by grave violations of human rights. This began immediately after Congo gained its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960: the Congolese military revolted only five days later, the province of Katanga seceded six days after that, and various rebellions and insecurity roiled the country into the mid-1960s.

Congo became the first newly independent African state to request and receive massive assistance from the UN. The UN Security Council authorized the *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC), which functioned in the country from July 1960 to June 1964, deploying 19,828 military personnel at its height. Its mandate "was to help the Congolese Government restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo; to help it maintain law and order throughout the country; and to put into effect a wide and long-range program of training and technical assistance."⁷

ONUC departed Congo in 1964 at a point when the Katanga rebellion had ended but overall state stability remained precarious. With rebellions still under way in disparate parts of the country, stability proved illusory. In November 1965, less than eighteen months after ONUC's departure, General Joseph Mobutu, with heavy support from key Western allies, including the United States, overthrew the elected government. President Mobutu, who later changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko, ruled from 1965 to 1997, positioning himself nearly always as an ally of the West. In the context of the Cold War, the stability brought by Mobutu's dictatorship was seen by Western governments, including the United States, as a success.

With the end of the Cold War, the West (and Mobutu himself) lost interest in the Congo. The West largely withdrew its assistance

programs, maintaining only minimal diplomatic missions. The United States closed its aid mission and drastically reduced its diplomatic presence. Mobutu retreated to a houseboat on the Congo River, maintaining the title of president but engaging in nearly no governance of this huge country.

Laurent Kabila, a minor rebel leader in the Congo in the early 1960s, reemerged in late 1996 as the leader of a rebellion against President Mobutu. This time no Western state supported Mobutu.⁸ At the same time, Rwanda intervened in Congo to end the threat of tens of thousands of Rwandan Hutus involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. These soldiers and their supporters had perched on the DRC side of the border since 1994. The roots of the Congolese rebellion lay in preventing mass killings in eastern Congo, but with large-scale assistance from Rwanda and its then ally Uganda, Kabila seized control of the entire Congo in May 1997, ending Mobutu's thirty-two-year dictatorship. When Mobutu fell, the vestiges of the Cold War finally disappeared and a new set of international understandings began to affect events in the Congo. The most important change was that Western powers, including the United States, believed the burdens required to maintain stability in the Congo were no longer justified by their interests in the Congo and in Central Africa.

The United States chose to engage with Laurent Kabila's government, albeit without providing much in terms of foreign assistance, but European states kept Laurent Kabila's government at arm's length. The World Bank, whose staff responsible for Central Africa was keen to reengage in the Congo, was kept from doing so because of Congo's huge debt to the bank, the IMF, and other international financial institutions (IFIs), as well as European reluctance to endorse the necessary steps. China, extremely active in Africa today and poised to become deeply involved in the Congo, was hardly engaged in the Congo at all beyond a small diplomatic mission.

African governments, particularly Congo's eastern neighbors Rwanda and Uganda, took on the role of supporting the Kabila government. But by the spring of 1998 nearly all of these states were discouraged by the incompetence and truculence of Kabila and many of his senior advisers.⁹ The extreme volatility of this situation was fully revealed in August 1998, when another war began that ultimately drew in African armies from Chad to Zimbabwe. Congo's neighbors split, with Angola supporting President Kabila, Rwanda supporting the

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-Goma) rebel movement, and Uganda supporting the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), the other major rebel movement.¹⁰

Western states and the UN Security Council were immediately concerned by the danger posed by the magnitude of the war. The lack of interest in stabilizing the Congo, which had characterized Western actions in 1997 and most of 1998, changed radically. The United States focused its engagement on two activities: helping broker a ceasefire arrangement and providing humanitarian relief. The EU adopted the same approach.

A ceasefire agreement, reached with support from Western nations, including the United States, was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, in the summer of 1999. A few months afterward, in November, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, known by its French acronym, MONUC. MONUC's initial mandate was to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

The ceasefire cemented the division of the Congo into three pieces: one controlled by the government, the other two by different rebel groups, the RCD-Goma and the MLC. By the beginning of 2001, the Congo appeared stuck in an intractable civil war, with armies from five other African states still deeply involved. This situation only began to change after the assassination of President Laurent Kabila in mid-January 2001. After Joseph Kabila, his son, became president in 2001, and as he led the Congo toward reconciliation and elections, the West developed an ever-clearer understanding of its role in assisting this process. Effective diplomacy by the United States and others, coupled with large-scale intervention by MONUC, supported President Kabila's rapprochement with rebel leaders, leading to the creation of a transition government of national unity in 2003, and, ultimately, successful national elections in 2006.

In the context of the myriad constraints in the Congo, the 2006 elections were reasonably free and fair, as a result of tremendous, often heroic, efforts of the Congolese, particularly members of the Independent Electoral Commission headed by Abbé Apollinaire Malu-Malu. These efforts were supported by substantial financial resources from the international community and security protection provided by MONUC throughout the electoral period.

The period leading up to the installation of a democratically elected national government in Kinshasa was characterized by heavy engagement by the international community, including the UN, the EU, SADC, a number of SADC member states, Britain, Belgium, France, and the United States. The EU committed approximately \$500 million dollars toward elections and deployed troops in Kinshasa to ensure stability during the electoral period. MONUC provided logistical support and deployed its forces aggressively throughout the country to ensure calm. The EU, SADC, and the Carter Center sent large election-observer missions. These efforts were remarkably successful.

Since the elections, private investment is up dramatically, and Lubumbashi, the capital of mineral-rich Katanga province, is beginning to look like a boom town. Steady economic growth, which ceased in the Congo in the early 1970s, restarted in 2002, was greater than 6 percent in 2007, and may reach 10 percent in 2008.

Challenges to Peace and Progress

After more than thirty years of de-development, and despite recent progress, Congo has immense impediments to reestablishing fundamental stability and supporting effective, broad-based economic growth. The most important challenges are ending the rampant violence and insecurity in eastern Congo, resolving uncertainty about the future of MONUC, reforming an ineffectual national army and police force, reducing endemic corruption in the public sector, improving inadequate national infrastructure, restarting private sector development, protecting the forest, reinvigorating the neglected agricultural sector, and reducing the abject poverty level of Congo's population.

INSECURITY IN EASTERN CONGO

In the absence of effective security forces, rebel groups dominate much of North and South Kivu. The Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—a rebel group consisting of Rwandan Hutus who participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, other Rwandan Hutus, and Congolese—operates across much of South and North Kivu, committing horrific acts of violence and prolonging the humanitarian disaster there.¹¹ The Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), an armed group led by Laurent Nkunda, has been operating inside and outside of the Congolese government for a number of years, at one moment seen as rebels, the next as members of the FARDC. Nkunda himself and many CNDP members are Congolese Tutsis. The international community has been searching for a way to end the instability resulting from the marauding and abuses of the FDLR, Nkunda's forces, and various militia groups.

To restore security and stability to eastern Congo, the Congolese government signed two agreements over a six-month period in late 2007 and

early 2008. The governments of the DRC and Rwanda signed an agreement in Nairobi, Kenya, in late 2007 to take steps to end the threat of the FDLR. The Congolese government and various rebel groups—including the CNDP—signed an agreement in Goma, DRC, in early 2008 intended to end their fighting in eastern Congo. The various militias agreed that their fighters would enter into a process either of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) or of integration into the regular Congolese army. The United States played a central role in the negotiation of both the Nairobi and Goma agreements. However, the Goma agreement's ceasefire provision was violated before the ink was dry, and continual ceasefire violations by all groups have occurred. Resumption of heavy fighting occurred in North Kivu province in late September.

The FARDC has proven itself entirely incapable of restoring order to these provinces. In fact, the Congolese army does more to compound insecurity than to bring peace. The Congolese police force, led by John Numbi, a brutal, corrupt crony of former president Laurent Kabila, is violent and incompetent. The Congolese police also are part of the problem in eastern Congo today, regularly mistreating civilians.¹² The Congolese government has taken no effective actions to improve the overall performance of the military or police.

Although the Congolese government signed the Nairobi agreement, pledging to take steps to end the threat of the FDLR, senior military officials in the government continue to provide arms and other support to that rebel group. They have provided such support to the FDLR (and its predecessor organizations) since 1998, largely without interruption. The FDLR continues to operate widely throughout North and South Kivu.

The government's behavior toward Laurent Nkunda's CNDP rebels has been equally inconsistent. In December 2007, the government of the Congo launched a military offensive to defeat the CNDP. The offensive was a total failure, exposing once again the incapacities of the FARDC. Immediately thereafter, in the wake of this failure, and encouraged by the international community, the government moved to negotiate, signing the Goma Agreement with the CNDP and other rebel groups.

The Goma agreement is an attempt to fill the security vacuum created by the incapable Congolese police and army. However, both the Goma and Nairobi agreements are failing to produce results because no rogue armed group has any incentive to work seriously with the

government, given that the government's security forces pose no serious threat to their continuing ability to control territory and exploit Congo's natural wealth.

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT MONUC

For many years, because of the failings of the FARDC, MONUC has been deeply involved in carrying out functions normally reserved for a national army. MONUC's role intensified after two crises, one in Ituri in 2003, the other in South Kivu in 2004. In 2003, MONUC troops and civilians in Bunia were nearly overrun by Congolese militia. At that point, MONUC was constituted as a Chapter VI peacekeeping force, without the type of troops required to protect itself or Congolese civilians, even in urban centers like Bunia. The failure in Bunia moved the EU to lead a Security Council–authorized military mission from June to September 2003. The French-led force, known as Artemis, fully secured the city of Bunia, but had no mandate and took almost no actions relating to the horrible insecurity prevalent in rural Ituri outside of the town of Bunia.

One year later, in June 2004, MONUC had received a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. Although MONUC forces were deployed in the city of Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province, and at the airport serving Bukavu, MONUC did nothing to stop two rebel forces, one led by Jules Mutebutsi, the other by Laurent Nkunda, from overrunning Bukavu.

Over time, MONUC reacted to these events and to preparations for the Congolese elections held in July 2006 by putting into effect a new, Artemis-like policy: MONUC would protect major Congolese cities from rebel incursions. Today, MONUC is deployed to guarantee that major cities in eastern Congo, including Bunia, Goma (the capital of North Kivu province), and Bukavu, remain under government control. MONUC troops intervened aggressively most recently in early 2008 to ensure that troops under Laurent Nkunda did not take the town of Sake, a population center seen as too close and important to Goma. However, MONUC deployments and strategies in rural Congo are doing little to improve protection of the civilian population in rural areas, where most Congolese live.

Despite this shortcoming, MONUC's presence remains the single most important factor preventing the full collapse of state authority in the east, which is why uncertainty about MONUC's future presents a challenge to progress. The Security Council and Congolese government are beginning to seriously consider when MONUC can begin to draw-down in anticipation of its eventual departure from the DRC. In May 2007, the Security Council requested the secretary-general to provide it with "benchmarks and an indicative timetable for the gradual drawdown

MONUC FACTS AND FIGURES

Authorization and start date: November 30, 1999 (S/RES/1279)

Current authorization: Until December 31, 2008 (S/RES/1794 [2007])

Strength (as of October 7, 2008): 17,498 total uniformed personnel, including 16,475 troops, 719 military observers, 304 police; 1,036 international civilian personnel, 2,114 local civilian staff, and 562 UN Volunteers

- *Largest military and police contributors (as of October 7, 2008):* India (4,372), Pakistan (3,551), Bangladesh (1,330), Uruguay (1,324), South Africa (1,056), and Nepal (1,030).

Approved budget (July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008): \$1,115.65 million (A/C.5/62/23)

- *Largest contributor:* United States, estimate \$284,661 million in FY08

Note: Statistics for international and local civilians are as of October 7, 2008. Civilian personnel include specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs, and medical and administrative support.

Sources: UN Mission in DR Congo, <http://www.monuc.org/Contributions.aspx?lang=en&menuOpened=About%20MONUC>; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/>; *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008); U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100014.pdf>.

of MONUC.” The UN secretary-general has stated that no drawdown should be contemplated before the successful conclusion of local elections in the DRC, now scheduled for 2009. President Kabila publicly has stated that MONUC could begin to withdraw after local elections.

Prior to any consideration of MONUC’s drawdown, the secretary-general has suggested that three preconditions and two overarching objectives must first be met. The preconditions include the following:

- Congolese and foreign armed groups would be disarmed and demobilized or repatriated to the extent that they no longer posed a significant threat to peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or to neighboring countries, particularly in the east;
- FARDC and the Congolese National Police would achieve levels of capacity which would enable them to assume responsibility for the country’s security, including duties now performed by MONUC;
- MONUC would remain deployed at its current strength at least through local elections.

The first two describe the bare minimum conditions necessary to contain instability in the DRC. Today, they are far from reality.

The secretary-general also stated that progress needed to be measured in the context of the Congo’s “progress towards two overarching objectives . . . namely (a) the establishment of an overall stable security environment and (b) the consolidation of democratic institutions.”

The secretary-general laid out six benchmarks to define how to decide when these objectives have been attained. These included:

1. stabilization of sensitive areas, particularly in the east;
2. completion of the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and the disarmament and/or repatriation of foreign armed groups;
3. extension of state authority throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
4. security sector reform, comprising creation of national armed forces respectful of human rights and the rule of law with the operational capacity to defend the constitutional institutions and the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; development of a unified national police entrusted with public security and capable

- of protecting the people and their property while maintaining law and order and respect for human rights; and the establishment of an independent, functioning judicial system;
5. adoption of essential legislation and establishment of essential state institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels, and progress made toward decentralization;
 6. successful conduct of credible local elections.

The United States and other Security Council members have yet to state whether they endorse these benchmarks. The secretary-general will make a specific request in fall 2008 regarding MONUC's requirements to meet these objectives and benchmarks for 2009.

INEFFECTUAL ARMY AND POLICE

Donors, including the United States, have long been aware that the FARDC and Congolese police are ineffectual and incapable of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the DRC. The international community, particularly the EU, MONUC, and individual European and African countries, have tried for a number of years to reform the Congolese military and police. The results to date are extremely discouraging.

Donors have tried two approaches to increase the effectiveness of the FARDC, one through MONUC and one largely through the EU and European and African bilateral donors led by France, South Africa, and Belgium.

MONUC's mandate requires it to attempt to work with the FARDC in securing Congolese territory. Despite palliative efforts at training, MONUC's efforts have not succeeded in improving the quality of the FARDC.

Europeans have focused on overall security sector reform intended to create a new army and police force of the right size, with the right training, and which functions effectively. Unfortunately, the Congolese government itself has shown no serious commitment to such a goal. Well-intentioned efforts by the EU, organized as the EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance to Security Sector Reform in the DRC (EUSECRD Congo), have foundered fundamentally because of the bad faith of officials in the Congolese Ministry of Defense and the FARDC.

Other efforts have failed because they were one-off, half-hearted attempts at reforming the Congolese army. Various training programs to create integrated brigades of the FARDC, with training from the Belgians, French, South Africans, and others, have led to no noticeable improvements either in fighting capabilities or in respect for civilians. The small amount of training provided by the United States—as well as present U.S. training plans—fits into this category.

ENDEMIC CORRUPTION

The roots of endemic corruption in the Congo go back decades. The real purpose of the Zaïrian government under Mobutu was not to fulfill basic state functions as understood by political scientists; rather, the government existed as a structure for individual enrichment and patronage. Officials at the highest levels stole large sums of money, usually from mineral or customs revenues, sometimes through extremely straightforward strategies, such as literally pocketing gem diamonds and having them sold for personal gain in Antwerp or elsewhere.

During the final decades of Mobutu's rule, civil servants throughout the country—soldiers, doctors, teachers—became accustomed to extremely low salaries, which were often stolen by other government officials. All civil servants were forced to develop coping strategies to try to accumulate at least the minimum required for basic survival.

This actual structure of government in the Congo was bequeathed by Mobutu to Laurent Kabila, who made no serious modifications to it before war broke out again in August 1998. No fundamental changes could happen during wartime, nor could they occur during a politically complex and messy transition, when power was divided according to blatantly corrupt access to resources and patronage principles, with ministries regularly assigned to officials lacking even the most basic competencies to undertake their functions. Particularly for well-placed officials, the present system provides rapid access to great wealth. Congolese officials to date have shown little interest in fundamental change.

In July, based on a government audit, the Congolese government announced that \$1.3 billion had been embezzled by officials. It appears that some officials will be prosecuted based on this information, but no actions have been taken to date to correct the large-scale, regularized abuses that remain pervasive.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Although the Congo has enormous potential to become one of the richest countries in Africa, restarting private sector development will require years of heavy, effective public sector investments and donor assistance. Of critical importance is improving infrastructure, years of neglect and war having left Congo's roads, bridges, and energy infrastructure in shambles. The World Bank offers this sober assessment:

The deterioration of infrastructure has also reached proportions that make economic development almost impossible in many areas. In a country the size of Western Europe, there are less than 600 km of paved roads. Out of ten provincial capitals, only one can be accessed by land from Kinshasa, three can be accessed from abroad, and six can only be accessed by plane. Electrification rates are the lowest in Africa. Short of a major infrastructure reconstruction program, complemented by reform of the dysfunctional operations and maintenance systems, the potential for economic growth and private sector activity may not materialize in most provinces.¹³

Private investment in Congo is beginning. According to the World Bank, Congo has seen nearly \$3 billion in new private sector investment since 2003, mainly in the mining sector. U.S.-based Freeport McMoran has begun activities at one of the largest mining concessions in the world, in Tenke-Fungurume, located in Katanga. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is providing up to \$400 million in financing and political risk insurance to this project. Despite renewed interest, though, the formal private sector remains miniscule, particularly outside extractive industries.

The Congolese government, like other African states, is working with Beijing. Reports indicate that China and the Congo are likely to agree to a multiyear set of business deals worth approximately \$9 billion.¹⁴ China's central focus is to facilitate its access to Congo's enormous deposits of copper and cobalt, which it needs for its own development. As part of its agreement with the Congolese government, the Chinese will build roads and other infrastructure throughout the country. Reports indicate that in exchange for these investments China will obtain the rights

to purchase ten million tons of copper and 600,000 tons of cobalt from six Gécamines-run mines over a decade at a fixed price.

Although investments in infrastructure are sorely needed, building a major, new road through the heart of Congo's forest and modernizing Congo's mining sector create secondary challenges for progress toward fundamental stability and broad-based economic growth. The Congo Basin's forest is the second most important forest on earth. Most of that forest lies within the DRC. The forest in the Congo remains in remarkably good condition, with much of it untouched, but new moves toward development could rapidly threaten its health, and by extension affect global climate change and biodiversity.

Modernizing the mining sector involves a shift away from artisanal mining, the main method of mineral exploitation today in the Congo. Numerous reports have detailed that this type of mining is extremely dangerous and exploits the individual workers, many of whom are children, with little of the wealth generated staying in the Congo and benefiting Congolese. In Ituri in northeastern Congo and in North and South Kivu, where almost all mining is artisanal, these activities are not only dangerous and exploitative, but the wealth generated is regularly used to fund militias and other rogue groups, fueling violence and insecurity.

Critical in making that shift, however, is ensuring that both the private sector and the Congolese government act responsibly with regard to environmental degradation, transparency, and human rights. With regards to transparency, in February 2008, Congo was accepted as a candidate country in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).¹⁵ Congo has two years to become an EITI-compliant country. To do so, it must, by early 2010, ensure that

- regular publication of all material oil, gas, and mining payments to the government and all material revenues received by the government from oil, gas, and mining companies are circulated to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive, and comprehensible manner;
- company reports are based on audited accounts to international standards;
- payments and revenues are reconciled by a credible, independent administrator, applying international auditing standards;

- this approach is extended to all companies, including state-owned companies;
- civil society is actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of this process, and contributes toward public debate;
- a public, financially sustainable work plan for all these elements is developed, with assistance from the international financial institutions where required, including measurable targets, a timetable for implementation, and an assessment of potential capacity constraints.¹⁶

Freeport McMoRan, the largest mining company in Congo, supports the EITI through its membership in the International Council on Mining and Metals.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

According to a recent study, “because of their size, the forests of the Congo Basin constitute a carbon reserve of global significance for regulating the primary greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide.”¹⁷

Severe economic decline, certain geographic impediments, and, over the last dozen years, chaos in the Congo has preserved the forest. If it were to be severely deforested, the implications for global climate change would be devastating. The forest in the Congo remains in remarkably good condition, with much of it untouched, but new moves toward development could rapidly threaten its health. Stability and economic growth cannot be permitted to lead to the destruction of the forest.

The United States announced the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) initiative at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. Through the creation of the CBFP, the United States led the process by which various international organizations, Central African and European states, and nongovernmental organizations joined to preserve the forest as part of the global fight against climate change and to maintain the forest’s extraordinarily important biodiversity. Recently, the Congo Basin Forest Fund was created. The United Kingdom and Norway announced contributions of \$200 million over the next four years.

AGRICULTURE

The Congolese government and donors, including the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have largely neglected this sector. Agriculture is not among President Kabila's stated five priorities of water, electricity, education, health, and transport, and receives only 2 percent of the government's budget. Donors only provide 2 percent of their funds towards agriculture.¹⁸

Agriculture is barely mentioned in the Congolese government's strategy to alleviate poverty and promote growth despite the fact that approximately 70 percent of Congolese live in rural areas and agriculture accounts for more than half of GDP. The agricultural sector employs over 75 percent of the labor force, according to the most recent report by *The Economist's* Economic Intelligence Unit. Most of these farmers are extremely poor women.

Overlooking agriculture is a mistake, because broad-based economic growth cannot be restarted and sustained in the Congo without dramatic improvements in this sector. Indeed, the World Bank asserted in its 2008 World Development Report that "agriculture and its associated industries are essential to growth and to reducing mass poverty and food insecurity. Using agriculture as the basis for economic growth in the agriculture-based countries requires a productivity revolution in smallholder farming." Furthermore, experts believe that Congo has the potential to be the breadbasket of Africa: "The potential of Congo is huge. It could be another Brazil."¹⁹

POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND HEALTH

Beyond its humanitarian assistance programs, the United States, through USAID, has financed long-term efforts to reduce the extreme poverty of Congolese, particularly through strengthening the health-care system. The health statistics of the Congolese population remain among the worst seen in the world. For example, the mortality rate for children under five is the ninth highest in the world, with more than 20 percent of all children dying before they reach the age of five. USAID's activities have contributed to substantial improvements in the health of poor Congolese. USAID has led in successful programs to nearly eradicate polio in the Congo, distribute bednets to fight malaria throughout

the country, dramatically increase immunization coverage for children under five, and make other substantial improvements to the health of Congolese. Many other donors, including the World Bank, have used USAID's health program as a model for their own activities. Despite these efforts, the official Congolese health system, the only option for treatment for many Congolese, remains dysfunctional. Patients routinely are required to pay for and provide the medicine, bandages, and other materials they need. Those who cannot provide these materials are regularly denied treatment in state-run clinics and hospitals.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The George W. Bush administration has recognized the importance of the Congo to the United States. In the administration's most recent budget presentation to the Congress, the Congo is identified as part of a small group of African countries deemed "critical to the continent's stability." Rhetoric by senior Africa policy officials such as Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi E. Frazer has been backed up by U.S. assistance. The United States provides approximately \$125 million to \$150 million per year to the Congo in bilateral assistance, with roughly \$10 million per year in military assistance, \$75 million in development assistance, and \$60 million in food and other humanitarian assistance. The United States also contributes approximately \$300 million per year to help pay for MONUC's operations. Until recently, USAID has worked nearly exclusively through nongovernmental actors. In its proposal for activities in FY2009, it usefully proposes to refocus more on governance reform and agriculture. Over the last ten years, the United States has provided more than \$2 billion in assistance to the Congo through these programs.

Senator Barack Obama introduced, Congress passed, and President George W. Bush signed the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Act of 2006. This law emphasizes the importance of Congo based on American interests and values, listing fifteen policy directives for the executive branch to implement. The law usefully emphasizes the importance of "multilateral actions to address urgent needs" in the DRC, and, in this section of the law, concentrates on MONUC's effectiveness. The law sets the arbitrary level of \$52 million for U.S. bilateral assistance in 2006 and 2007, and urges that levels for 2008 and 2009 be larger than this.

The greatest deficiency in this law is found in sections stating that, if the DRC does not make "sufficient progress towards accomplishing" various extremely ambitious, long-term goals—including commitment

to multiparty democracy, open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious freedom, ending the violence throughout the country, promoting peace and stability with its neighbors, rehabilitating the national judicial system and enhancing the rule of law, combating corruption, instituting economic reforms to promote development, and creating an environment to promote private investment—then “the President shall consider withdrawing United States support.”²⁰ In a state as weak as the Congo, the road to reaching these long-term laudable aspirations will be long and bumpy, with many twists and turns, some of them backwards. The steady, long-term support of interested states like the United States is required so that Congo has a better chance of reaching these goals. The United States regularly insists on conditions for its programs that are unpopular with Congolese government officials. Some in the Congolese government would welcome the withdrawal of U.S. bilateral assistance, given that the goal of some U.S. programs is to weaken the hold of corrupt government officials. In these circumstances, withdrawal of assistance would produce the opposite of the intended effect, and would ultimately damage significant U.S. interests in the DRC and Central Africa, including regional stability, natural resources, and humanitarian concerns. Such an action also would undercut significant U.S. investments in UN peace operations and diplomacy.

The United States should focus on the two central challenges to securing peace and sustaining progress in the Congo: ending the rampant violence and insecurity in eastern Congo and promoting broad-based, environmentally sound sustainable development. The Bush administration, though it recognizes these goals, has not adopted adequate strategies to ensure that these challenges are met. The following sections provide recommendations for a more robust policy in each of these areas.

SECURING PEACE IN EASTERN CONGO

There are two keys to peace in eastern Congo: resolving the uncertainty about the future of MONUC and creating a professional, functioning nucleus from the ineffectual Congolese national army and police force.

The United States should use its diplomatic power at the UN Security Council to support MONUC in obtaining the necessary capabilities

and authorities—in terms of personnel and mandate—when its current mandate comes up for renewal at the end of 2008, and in subsequent, probably annual, renewals. MONUC is essential to ending the violence in eastern Congo and to reforming the Congolese military. A Security Council decision either to deny MONUC the minimum tools it needs in eastern Congo or to force MONUC to withdraw prematurely before minimal democratic stability is in place would threaten Congo's stability and recent democratic progress, intensify the risk of wider conflict in Central Africa, ensure the indefinite prolongation of the humanitarian crisis, and jeopardize recent business investments. In addition to its critical role in guaranteeing the stability of urban areas in eastern Congo, MONUC is the largest, most expensive peacekeeping operation in the world. MONUC's success or failure will have a great impact on the overall future of UN peacekeeping operations.

Building the nucleus of a reformed Congolese army and police force that respects basic human rights and the rule of law is essential to stability in eastern Congo. This nucleus needs to be sufficient to guarantee Congolese territorial integrity. However, direct U.S. bilateral security assistance to the Congolese security forces is not a U.S. strength. MONUC, the EU and some of its member states, and South Africa are the most important outside actors in this area. Any U.S. bilateral security assistance must be carefully coordinated with the major actors.

BUTTRESS MONUC'S ROLE

MONUC, despite abuses by some officials and other failings, remains essential to ending the instability in eastern Congo and establishing the conditions for progress in the Congo. The secretary-general's preconditions and benchmarks are useful as a general road map of medium-term success in the Congo. However, the crucial benchmarks on security and justice are wildly ambitious. The national-level goals will take decades to meet, long after any imaginable period for MONUC to remain in the Congo, yet some progress in these sectors is essential prior to MONUC's departure.

The United States should lead in the Security Council in revising the six benchmarks to provide clear, measurable goals that then should guide the Security Council in its consideration of appropriate support for MONUC. Starting from MONUC's own language on benchmarks,

the United States should work to revise and distill the benchmarks into the following six essential tasks:

1. stabilization of sensitive areas, particularly in the east;
2. creation of the nucleus of a reformed Congolese army respectful of human rights and the rule of law with the operational capacity to defend the constitutional institutions and the people of the DRC;
3. sufficient disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and disarmament and/or repatriation of foreign armed groups so that renegade Congolese soldiers and foreign armed groups are no longer serious threats to stability;
4. creation of the nucleus both of a reformed Congolese national police and of an independent, functioning judicial system in key regions;
5. adoption of essential legislation and establishment of essential state institutions at the national, provincial, and local levels, particularly in key regions, and progress made toward decentralization;
6. successful conduct of credible local elections, probably in 2009, and the successful conduct of the second round of national elections, scheduled for 2011.

Progress on all the benchmarks is necessary before MONUC's eventual drawdown and departure. However, the conditions set in the revised benchmarks 1, 2, 3, and 6 must be fully met.

These six benchmarks align with U.S. goals in the DRC. Strong U.S. support to MONUC so that it can organize successful action in eastern Congo responds to the fundamental U.S. goal of stability and is the single most important action that would end the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, another key goal of U.S. policy.

MONUC's authorized personnel ceiling was 5,537 in 2000. This number was increased in 2002 to 8,700, and in mid-2003 to 10,800. On August 16, 2004, former U.S. ambassador William T. Swing, then the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) in charge of MONUC, requested a dramatic increase in troop levels. "An additional 13,100 military personnel [are] required," he argued, for MONUC to successfully carry out its mandate. The Security Council rebuffed Ambassador Swing's proposal for a ceiling of 24,000, and MONUC today is authorized to deploy 17,030 military personnel and 760 military observers, well below the recommendations made by Swing in

2004 and, interestingly, below the ONUC levels authorized in the early 1960s for a Congo with one-fourth the population it has today.

The permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the United States, presently appear set against any increase in MONUC's overall personnel levels. As the UN secretary-general has publicly indicated, this arbitrary limitation narrows the range of effective actions for MONUC. For MONUC to play its essential role in stabilizing eastern Congo, MONUC's overall troop ceiling may have to be raised, probably to a level similar to Ambassador Swing's 2004 request. Newly effective FARDC units will only develop over time, based on difficult work involving effective training, mentoring, and co-deployment with MONUC. It is likely that FARDC units will remain at best secondarily effective behind MONUC's capable troops through most, if not all, of 2009. Only in 2010, if many things go well, might it be possible to begin to see the emergence of some genuinely capable FARDC soldiers.

Securing eastern Congo, however, cannot wait for 2010 and the hope of a newly capable FARDC. MONUC must be given the necessary personnel, materials, and mandate to secure eastern Congo, including at least those urban and rural areas with the greatest population concentrations, by early 2009. This will require overall increases in troop strength. Furthermore, MONUC cannot begin to consider withdrawal or drawdown until a nucleus of FARDC is effective. This points to a date of 2011 as the earliest feasible time when this might begin to be plausible. This is the optimistic timetable. Specific future MONUC troop levels must be based on progress toward securing peace in eastern Congo.

The Congo is scheduled to hold its next presidential and legislative elections in 2011. Even with an effective nucleus, the FARDC, Congolese police, and other relevant state institutions on their own will be incapable of providing the necessary support for successful free and fair elections in 2011. MONUC provided essential logistic and security support for the 2006 elections and is expected to do so for the 2009 local elections. MONUC must remain at sufficient strength to provide necessary logistical and security support to the 2011 elections.

The critical action for the United States is to use its seat on the Security Council to provide MONUC with the necessary personnel, mandate, and funds to meet these challenges. U.S. action in support of MONUC should include training the FARDC if and only if the United

States can do so effectively. Effective military training in Francophone African countries is not among U.S. strengths.

The United States traditionally pays roughly one-quarter of the cost of peacekeeping missions. Yet the Bush administration's peacekeeping request for FY2009 is more than \$600 million shy of overall estimated peacekeeping costs. This shortfall will leave the United States more than \$2 billion in arrears to the UN. Such dishonest budgeting already has pushed this problem to the next administration and Congress.

The new administration should address this issue early, proposing full funding for peacekeeping needs, including in the Congo. MONUC is currently funded at around \$1 billion per year, of which the U.S. share is \$250 million. An approximate additional \$400 million to \$500 million per year is required over the next few years for the proposed strengthening of the mission. The majority of these funds will come from other nations, with approximately \$100 million to \$125 million from the United States. A total contribution of approximately \$350 million to \$375 million is not too much for the United States to provide, given what is at stake in the DRC.

Furthermore, if these efforts prove insufficient in the short term, the United States should join with like-minded states to secure eastern Congo and protect Congolese civilians. The responsibility to protect, as adopted by the UN, states that if a government cannot fulfill its responsibility to protect its own people, it becomes the responsibility of the international community to do so. This report advocates that MONUC be given the necessary tools to do this now. If MONUC is unable to accomplish this, the international community needs to move to more aggressive action, along the lines taken by a UN-sanctioned, European-led force in 2004 in Ituri and by the British in 2000 in Sierra Leone. The United States should strongly support the authorization for such a multinational force by the Security Council. This force should be authorized to intervene for a short period of time, perhaps six months, to stabilize eastern Congo and neutralize the abilities of various armed groups to control large areas and terrorize hundreds of thousands of Congolese. To ensure its success, the United States should at least provide logistical and intelligence support. MONUC should also be provided with the necessary capabilities to preserve these gains after the departure of the force.

In addition, the United States should participate in vigorous diplomatic actions with the Congolese government and other Congolese

actors, with other Central African states, and with the African Union to promote long-term stability in eastern Congo. U.S. regional diplomacy in Central Africa has been active and relatively successful over the last five years. The Tripartite Plus process, whereby the United States facilitates meetings of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to discuss common security issues, could be used initially for regional discussions between Central African states.

***HELP BUILD AN EFFECTIVE
NATIONAL ARMY AND POLICE FORCE***

The only long-term solution to securing eastern Congo and maintaining Congolese territorial integrity is for the Congolese state and donors to focus on building the nucleus of a reformed Congolese army and police force that respects basic human rights and the rule of law. This new nucleus of the FARDC must have the operational capacity, initially working with MONUC, to protect the civilian population and defeat rogue militias and other armed groups operating inside the DRC.

Half measures to provide a few months of training to pieces of the Congolese army or police will continue to fail. With an army as broken as the FARDC, whose leaders remain uncommitted—or actively hostile—to reform, a more serious approach needs to be adopted.

The proposed approach builds on the methods used by the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia, as well as those of the British in Sierra Leone. It also draws on lessons learned from donor interventions in various sectors in the Congo and elsewhere.

Recent successes elsewhere in Africa offer hope and promising lessons. In 2000 in Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom decided it would take the necessary steps to stabilize the situation. Major General Jonathon Riley, the UK commander in Sierra Leone during the relevant period starting in 2000, described the major tasks required and actions taken:

- the manning, training, and equipping of the Sierra Leone army, air force, and navy by a combination of specialist trainers and partnering with assigned British units for collective training;
- the structural, institutional reform of the Sierra Leone armed forces: its training organization, command structure, administration, supply, maintenance, and personnel management systems;

- fighting the RUF either directly, or using Sierra Leone army units with embedded mentors, or by maneuver to force them to accept the UN’s DDR process.²¹

After years of failure, it appears that a convergence of interests may permit the Congolese government, MONUC, EUSEC RD Congo, and others to collaborate on such an effort. The government has agreed to form a Rapid Reaction Force, which, according to MONUC, “is expected to form the nucleus of a reformed Congolese Army.” The members of the Rapid Reaction Force should be vetted by MONUC to ensure that no one plausibly accused of committing a war crime or crime against humanity is a member. It is essential that the leadership of this force be vetted with particular care. If serious human rights abusers are permitted to lead the Congo’s new elite force, created with substantial international support, the credibility of the effort would be completely undercut.

Training of this force has already begun. Such training must account and correct for the great difficulties involved in turning elements of a force in as bad a condition as the FARDC into minimally competent soldiers. Military experts, led by MONUC but potentially working with others from South Africa, EUSEC RD Congo, the United States, and other countries, need to commit to the type of training that has succeeded in countries like Sierra Leone and that the United States is presently implementing in Liberia. Such training requires the following components:

- A small, but adequate, number of FARDC soldiers must be trained to constitute an adequately sized force to conduct effective operations in the Kivus. It is likely that one to two well-trained and motivated FARDC brigades would be sufficient.
- As in any serious operation working with a highly deficient military, training must involve specialists and embedded mentors. At present, it appears that EUSEC RD Congo, MONUC, and South Africa will be involved in this type of training.
- MONUC must be at the center of this task and is the only international military actor in the Congo that can plausibly take on the essential task of embedding mentors. MONUC, however, is not staffed today to embed. MONUC probably requires additional non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and others who can perform this essential yet difficult function.

- The newly trained force must be co-deployed with MONUC units. MONUC NCOs need to be embedded down to the company level of relevant FARDC units.
- Once trained in camp and deployed, FARDC units in priority areas of eastern Congo must undergo additional collective training with MONUC. This should be much more serious than the present cursory training that MONUC undertakes.

The strategy is similar to what the U.S. military has undertaken in both Iraq and Afghanistan. It must be undertaken in Congo. The U.S. military regularly embeds American mentors in units of the Iraqi and Afghan armies. However, U.S. military training for the Congo, as currently contemplated under the State Department's AFRICAP program, appears highly unlikely to provide what is required. The scope of work stipulates that

Contractor will recommend courses to assist in achieving a professional military force and focus on the assistance for transitioning training and management to the DRC's Ministry of Defense Chief of Training for FARDC. The contractor will provide 8 to 10 Light Infantry subject matter experts to conduct a seventeen-week Quick Reaction/Response Force (Light Infantry Battalion) training program. The contractor shall plan and facilitate a Training Strategy Conference (TSC) for senior military officers and civilian officials of the FARDC. As many as 20 officials will participate in the TSC. The TSC will assist the FARDC in defining its training doctrine, goals, strategy, resources and management structure, with an emphasis on training for participation in post conflict operations in eastern Congo. At the completion of training, the participating FARDC battalion will be able to plan and conduct company level light infantry operations in order quickly respond to any situation determined to require immediate reaction and force.²²

This is likely to be another uncoordinated, understaffed activity with overly optimistic goals. In general, the United States does not have a comparative advantage to offer such training in a Francophone country in Africa. In the extremely difficult environment of the DRC, the AFRICAP effort looks poorly designed and inappropriate. If such

U.S.-funded training activities go forward, they must, at a minimum, be carefully coordinated with MONUC and EUSEC RD Congo.

Effective training is necessary, but insufficient. The FARDC is notoriously poorly paid, and many soldiers often receive less than their full monthly salary—or they receive no salary at all. An enlisted man receives roughly \$40 per month, a colonel roughly \$65 per month. Some units of the FARDC deployed to eastern Congo have been told that they will not be paid and should live off the land.

In special circumstances, donors are willing to pay salaries, or provide salary supplements to get salaries up to an adequate level. The United States has paid police salaries in Liberia and elsewhere. In the Congo, the EU has paid salary supplements as part of its successful justice program in Ituri in northeastern Congo. Major General Riley discussed the rationale for payment of adequate salaries as part of the British strategy in Sierra Leone: “There was also money for proper salaries for the army, police, and civil service. Proper funding of salaries is one of the best methods of tackling corruption at lower levels since it removes the impetus. If a man can feed his family properly, he has no need to look for bribes and backhanders; if he does, he has something to lose in being fired.”²³

Adequate salaries, with salaries paid on time every month to those FARDC units deployed with MONUC in eastern Congo, is another essential component of creating an effective nucleus within the FARDC. Instead of the present salary scale of \$40 to \$70 per month, salaries for this nucleus of soldiers should be set to provide a minimally acceptable standard for soldiers, probably \$150 to \$250 per month.

The best circumstance is for the Congolese government to pay such a minimally adequate salary to all its soldiers using its own funds. If the IMF and MONUC believe that the government does not have enough resources to pay adequate salaries, or if the government is unwilling to do so, salary supplements should be provided by the donors, but only for the new, vetted FARDC nucleus of trained units deployed in eastern Congo.

Effectively trained and paid FARDC units, with embedded MONUC soldiers, would co-deploy with MONUC units for any actual missions, including potential combat, in eastern Congo, whether against the FDLR or other armed groups. MONUC already has accepted this, with the secretary-general stating that “capacity building of FARDC units will need . . . to include mentoring of FARDC units during operations.

As such, MONUC military units will be expected to provide mentoring to FARDC in theater, down to company level, including during combat operations.”²⁴ Once operationalized, this will provide a key missing piece to effective stability operations in rural eastern Congo.

The Congolese government must be held accountable for the adequate pay and performance of these FARDC units. Systems must be put in place by the government and by donors to identify whether a soldier has not been paid in any given month. If an officer steals part or all of the salary of a soldier, the monitoring system should be able to identify who is responsible. FARDC soldiers who violate the public trust by stealing, abusing civilians, or committing other crimes must be punished for their actions. EUSEC RD Congo already has substantial experience in this area, and should work with the Congolese government so that such a structure functions effectively. Any U.S. involvement should be carefully coordinated with EUSEC RD.

Similarly, any Congolese soldier deployed in such a unit must be held to high standards, whether in combat or in interactions with civilians. Any abuses must be punished. If, as is likely, these soldiers receive substantial salary supplements from donors, and if MONUC and other trainers succeed in imbuing these units with an enhanced sense of professionalism and esprit de corps (something nearly entirely absent from the FARDC today), then expulsion from the unit may be an adequate penalty. Returning to the misery of the regular FARDC may be enough of a disincentive for most members of this new elite unit to function at a higher level.

Finally, a system of military justice must be in place in these regions to try any FARDC member accused of committing a crime. Such a system would be established in a similar way as the creation of an effective nucleus of a reformed FARDC. Donors would focus on a select group necessary to establish a functioning system of military justice for the new FARDC nucleus. These officials would be trained, receive adequate salaries—with donor supplementation, if required—and would lose their newly prestigious jobs if they abused their positions.

This strategy is similar to the successful program implemented by the EU to restore a basic system of justice to Ituri in northeastern Congo. The Europeans have provided training, paid salaries, and carefully monitored implementation. This program is a model for others in the DRC. It can be directly applied to establishing an effective nucleus

within the military justice system. U.S. involvement in the area of military justice reform should be based on this EU model.

One to two brigades of effectively trained FARDC units working hand-in-glove with MONUC troops would, for the first time, constitute a viable force to protect the civilian population in eastern Congo. By co-deploying for combat operations with MONUC, these forces should be able to stop the worst aspects of present militia and FDLR activities, and to restore basic stability to most of rural eastern Congo. This stability would permit the return of police, justice sector, and other officials to reestablish a regular state presence, as well as the permanent presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in rural communities to fund and implement development activities. MONUC has prepared a stability plan which includes reestablishing state authority and service provision in areas of eastern Congo. When this occurs, stability, reconstruction, and development finally will begin to reach those hardest hit and most in need in the rural areas of eastern Congo.

Although the United States probably does not have a comparative advantage to directly support these activities, it is critical that the United States support MONUC in taking on the essential work of creating a functioning nucleus within the Congolese army. As above, the most important U.S. interventions are in the Security Council.

PROMOTING BROAD-BASED, ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The Congo is filled with development challenges. Every sector, from education to health to the private sector to agriculture to the environment, is in deep trouble and requires substantial outside support. The United States cannot possibly help the Congolese in all these sectors. It should focus on the key challenges in the Congo and emphasize its comparative advantage by directing a greater percentage of its assistance to strengthening democratic institutions at the national and regional levels, including elections support; aiding private sector growth, particularly in mineral-rich Katanga province; maintaining the health of the Congo's forest; promoting agricultural development; and continuing its effective poverty alleviation programs, particularly in the health sector.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Strengthening democratic institutions, including elections support, as suggested in MONUC's benchmarks, is fundamental to securing peace and progress. Before the 2006 Congolese elections, U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance was heavily focused on support to Congolese civil society. USAID is beginning to refocus its programs on strengthening governmental structures, but the design of and support to such programs remains inadequate. Further, USAID programs alone will never be large enough to help the Congolese meet minimal goals in these areas. The United States must use its influence so that major donor strategies continue to be harmonized, as they are under the new Country Assistance Framework process coordinated by the World Bank.

Given the importance of nurturing Congo's new democracy in the context of deeply embedded corruption and poor governance, the United States should focus a substantial portion of its assistance program on improving governance. Addressing deep-seated, long-standing corruption requires more than training and support to attend conferences criticizing corruption. USAID should work with other donors and the Congolese government to implement strategies to address the dual problems of inadequate salaries and corruption within the civil service whereby even those inadequate salaries are regularly stolen. The goal of donor programs should be to create functioning civil service units (for police, justice, health) in key regions in South Kivu.

Congo's next presidential and legislative elections are scheduled for 2011. The EU took the lead among donors, providing \$500 million in assistance. Although U.S. assistance was early and timely, it amounted only to a paltry \$20 million. Congolese presidential and legislative elections in 2006 were reasonably free and fair. The subsequent indirect elections of regional governors were marred by high levels of fraud and corruption. Local elections, already delayed and presently scheduled for 2009, will require tremendously high levels of organization to succeed. The Congolese government will require substantial support from MONUC and donors for these elections. It is not clear that either Congolese government or outside support will be enough for these important elections.

However, the next round of presidential and legislative elections, scheduled for 2011, are critical to democratic progress in the DRC. MONUC logistical support and substantial donor support were essential to the success of the 2006 elections. They will be vital again in 2011.

Given the importance of the 2011 elections, U.S. electoral assistance should be substantially greater than that provided in 2006. The United States should provide at least \$100 million. This money should begin to flow no later than FY2010 so that it can be used to strengthen the press, support other relevant governmental and nongovernmental structures, and provide direct electoral support as required.

GOVERNANCE

Because of the high-levels of corruption within the Congolese government, USAID programs have worked through NGOs to provide services in sectors such as health and education. Even when working in sectors that require governmental leadership, such as justice, USAID has worked through NGOs to strengthen civil society monitoring of governmental actions. Recently, however, USAID has begun some programs to directly build capacity within the Congolese government. But these programs appear to be too small, scattered, and uncoordinated with others to produce needed improvements.

Decentralization and devolution of power to the provincial level is essential to effective governance in a state as large as the Congo. The Congolese constitution is clear on this point: "The share of national revenue allocated to the provinces is established at 40 percent. It is retained at its source."²⁵ Also, the constitution reserves substantial powers solely for the provinces.

USAID should work with the World Bank and other donors to design a coordinated capacity-building approach for key Congolese ministries and regions, focusing on justice, agriculture, education, and health. Because of the deep-rooted corruption and inefficiencies in these ministries, such efforts must be carefully designed, monitored, and coordinated. Justice sector interventions should be modeled on successful European programs in Ituri, which have included training, provision of adequate facilities and materials, and payment of salary supplements as required.

Individual donors probably should take the lead in particular sectors, but overall approaches and policies must be coordinated. It makes sense for the European Union to lead on justice and for USAID to lead on health. The UN Children's Fund has done the most creative and effective work in education, and could take the lead in coordinating donors in this sector.

Agriculture poses the largest problems because no bilateral donor or multilateral agency has focused on it. Donors are beginning to pay more attention to this sector, but much more needs to be done. The first step is for donors to work with the Congolese government to make agriculture the high priority it must be.

The small USAID programs in agriculture will not have much of an effect on this effort. The United States can play a major role with strong diplomatic support for greatly increased attention to and support of the sector, including at the World Bank and for international agricultural institutions, such as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.

In all these sectors, effective capacity building will require detailed assessments, followed by the design of interventions that take into account training needs, salary shortfalls, and weak accountability mechanisms. Specific, measurable goals must be set, within the scope of donors' abilities to monitor outcomes. In all these sectors, setting priorities among regions is critical because overall donor financial and human resources are highly unlikely to permit the implementation of effective national programs.

To enhance its effectiveness in eastern Congo, the United States has opened a small office in Goma. Over time, the United States should open an office in Lubumbashi to cover Katanga province, and consider opening offices in other key regions.

PRIVATE SECTOR

Congo's economy must continue to grow sustainably for the DRC to remain stable. Promoting sustainable growth in the Congo involves improving inadequate national infrastructure and restarting private sector development.

The United States does not have a comparative advantage in funding large-scale infrastructure projects. These projects are generally undertaken by the World Bank and the EU. China has also indicated that it will begin major infrastructure projects in the Congo. The United States needs to use its diplomacy to support such projects and to ensure that no projects undercut the viability of the Congo's forest.

U.S. diplomacy also can assist Congo in fostering an environment conducive for continued foreign investment to sustain economic growth. Most Western investors remain chary of the Congo because

of its instability and poor record of respecting contractual agreements. Present actions by the Congolese government to reevaluate mining contracts risks further chilling investment interest. The Congolese government, with assistance from the Carter Center, has reevaluated mining contracts with a series of companies, including Freeport-McMoRan. The government has said that it intends to renegotiate many of these contracts. The government maintains strong support for its parastatal, Gécamines, and has focused much of its renegotiation strategy on increasing the share of Gécamines in contracts, even though the company is a shell with nearly no operational capability.

The Congolese government review of mining contracts presently under way has been fraught with difficulties. During earlier stages, the government increased transparency by publishing many of the actual contracts and comments a government commission made. Today, it appears headed in the wrong direction and risks sending exactly the opposite signal to the international business community. Instead of openly, transparently, and fairly reexamining contracts between mining companies and the government (including its parastatal companies), the government apparently intends to extract additional financial benefits for Congolese elites without regard for contractual fairness or respect for contractual agreements.

The Congolese government has already agreed to participate in EITI, which, if implemented, would be extremely positive. U.S. policy should encourage the Congolese government to take the necessary steps to become an EITI-compliant country and to move away from the poorly organized, chaotically implemented reexamination of mining contracts. The United States also should encourage Congolese and multinational corporation involvement in the EITI validation process.

Additionally, Chinese economic activities, if undertaken as planned, will alter the Congolese government's relationships with other states and the IFIs. Because of the potential impact of Chinese activities, U.S. diplomacy should vigorously engage with both the Congolese and Chinese. Although China does not focus on democracy, it does share the U.S. interest in stability and economic growth.

The United States should also vigorously support the modernization of the Congolese economy by supporting the entry of international businesses that operate according to international standards, particularly in areas such as mining, where these actors often replace exploitative artisanal activities and companies that operate at well

below accepted international labor, safety, and other standards. The entry of modern international businesses into the Congo, particularly as they replace the horrific labor conditions prevalent under artisanal practices, dramatically increases benefits to Congolese society.

ENVIRONMENT

The environment requires substantial U.S. attention because maintaining the health of the Congo's forest is of global environmental importance. The Bush administration requested \$12 million for its regional Congo Basin environmental program for FY2009. This compares unfavorably with the \$200 million over four years that Norway and the UK recently pledged for a similar program. U.S. support to this program should be increased to at least \$50 million per year.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND HEALTH

Finally, USAID has built up a strong comparative advantage in its health programs, which over the last decade have improved the health of the poorest Congolese, particularly in rural areas. Despite consistent success in producing impressive results, USAID's health program has regularly faced cutbacks. For FY2009, the administration proposes cutting this important program by more than 25 percent. This is counterproductive. The program should at least be maintained at its present level of approximately \$50 million, with a greater focus on institution building within the Congolese Ministry of Health at the national, regional, and health zone levels.

Conclusion

Since 2001, the DRC has made significant progress, much of it due to a remarkable collaboration between the Congolese and the international community. However, the problems of the Congo are so immense that the weak Congolese state is still unable to master them by itself. The stability of the Congolese state remains very much at risk.

The United States, with its role at the center of the international system, a large range of interests in the Congo and in Central Africa, and American values compelling it toward effective action to bring an end to this long-running humanitarian disaster, must become a key participant in effective international community actions in the Congo. The United States needs to make the long-term commitment necessary to fulfill this responsibility.

In the final months of 2008, with MONUC's mandate up for renewal, the most important role the United States can play is through the UN Security Council. The partnership between the Congolese and the international community, with MONUC as the chief international actor in the Congo, must be maintained at least until 2012. MONUC must also be provided with the necessary personnel, mandate, and resources to meet the proposed revised benchmarks. This will require additional MONUC troops, including some with specialist skills, such as accomplished military trainers. Further, the mandate should be expanded to make clear that, until a minimally capable FARDC is trained and ready to help maintain Congo's territorial integrity, MONUC's responsibilities include securing and protecting urban and rural populations in North and South Kivu. MONUC will have to shoulder this responsibility through most, if not all, of 2009. With effective training and support from the Congolese, newly trained units of the FARDC should be able to begin to deploy jointly with MONUC during the second half of 2009. The total cost of these changes will require perhaps an additional \$400 million to \$500 million. The majority of these funds will come

from other nations, with approximately an additional \$100 million to \$125 million from the United States.

If the United States, MONUC, and other interested actors succeed in helping the Congolese meet these benchmarks, then a timetable for MONUC's drawdown and eventual withdrawal can be reasonably set. With strong U.S. support, one plausible positive scenario would be for rural areas of eastern Congo to become increasingly stable during the first half of 2009. The humanitarian emergency would be dramatically reduced by mid-2009 and over by the end of 2009. A brigade or more of the FARDC could become effective and begin to play an important role in securing Congolese territory by 2010. A nucleus of the Congolese police, military justice, and civilian justice systems could be in place in key regions by the end of 2009 or early in 2010.

In the course of 2010, with eastern Congo increasingly secure, more aspects of state authority could be successfully extended, particularly throughout eastern Congo. It should be possible, with continuing support from MONUC and others, for the DRC to hold reasonable democratic elections at the local level as soon as feasible, perhaps in 2009 and at the national level in 2011.

Under this optimistic scenario, after a second round of reasonably free and fair presidential elections, a newly elected government would be installed in Kinshasa by the end of 2011 with the country much more stable and peaceful than it is today. This would mean that economic growth would continue, international private sector interest would proceed and expand, helpful Chinese involvement would deepen, artisanal economic activity based on child labor would be reduced, general strategies implemented by the United States and other donors to alleviate poverty would be increasingly successful, the Congo Basin forest would remain the world's "second lung," and Central Africa would be highly likely to remain peaceful. Reality will certainly be messier than this, but these specific medium-term desired outcomes should be kept as goals.

In circumstances like these, or others that are reasonably similar, the drawdown and ultimate withdrawal of MONUC could occur in the hope that, though Congo will certainly remain extremely poor and weak for many years, the basic elements of stability and development would be in place.

If the United States supports the necessary actions recommended in this report, Congo has a good chance to resolve the security and

humanitarian crises in eastern Congo and move forward. The relatively modest commitment of American diplomatic and financial resources would lead to long-term benefits in terms of American interests and values. The benefits to the people of the Congo would be incalculable.

Endnotes

1. The country today known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo has had various names incorporating the word “Congo” for most of its history since the mid-1880s. The period from 1971 to 1997, when President Mobutu Sese Seko renamed the country Zaire, is the one exception. This paper will refer to the country either as the DRC or the Congo, except during discussions of the Mobutu period.
2. UN undersecretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator John Holmes stated, “the sexual violence in Congo is the worst in the world. The sheer numbers, the wholesale brutality, the culture of impunity—it’s appalling.” *New York Times*, October 7, 2007.
3. See http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/106/article_1861.asp.
4. Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2009, pp. 212–215; USAID, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Annual Report for FY2007, p. 8. Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Peace Operations 2008, p. 228. MONUC’s annual budget is approximately \$1 billion, with the U.S. share approximately 27 percent of the total. USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, various years.
5. The DRC borders Angola, Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia.
6. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, June 2006.
7. The UN website on ONUC can be found at <http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm>.
8. After ONUC departed the Congo in 1964, the West intervened on a number of occasions to ensure the stability of Zaire, including in both 1977 and 1978, when the Zairian army was unable to contain incursions from neighboring Angola.
9. In one telling example, President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, then seen by the Clinton administration as a leading example of Africa’s “New Leaders,” who were thought at the time to be bringing democracy and renewed prosperity to their countries, came to Washington in 1998 and, in a private meeting, told a group of U.S. government officials that, though Kabila was a fool, it would be a mistake to disengage from his government.
10. Congo’s other neighbors, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia, did not play as important a role.
11. As designated by the secretary of state, the FDLR is on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
12. The police were responsible for recent abuses in the western Congo province of Bas Congo as well, where a UN investigation found that approximately one hundred people were killed, most of them by the Congolese police. The investigation found that the police committed the following abuses: “Excessive and reckless use of force, arbitrary executions, looting, destruction of property and arbitrary arrests, on some

- occasions followed by cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, were the main human rights violations committed during and after the events. Isolated cases of sexual violence were also reported.”
13. Country Assistance Strategy for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, World Bank, November 16, 2007.
 14. Even before the commencement of major activities under this agreement, Chinese activity in the Congo has dramatically intensified. In particular, China appears now to dominate the movement of artisanally mined copper and cobalt from Katanga through southern Africa and into the modern economy.
 15. “The EITI is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors, and international organizations. . . . The EITI supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas, and mining.” See <http://eititransparency.org/eiti/summary>.
 16. “Validation Guide,” EITI, 2006, p. 10; “EITI Factsheet,” EITI, August 2005.
 17. Congo Basin Forest Partnership, *The Forest of the Congo Basin: State of the Forest 2006* (2007), p. 13.
 18. Democratic Republic of the Congo, *Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper*, June 2006; Country Assistance Strategy for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, World Bank, November 16, 2007.
 19. Quotation from Joachim von Braun, director-general of the International Food Policy Research Institute, in Reuters Africa, “Hungry Congo Could Help Feed the World,” September 18, 2008.
 20. Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006, Public Law 109–456, Section 202. A “commit(ment) to multiparty democracy, open and transparent governance, respect for human rights and religious freedom, ending the violence throughout the country, promoting peace and stability with its neighbors, rehabilitating the national judicial system and enhancing the rule of law, combating corruption, instituting economic reforms to promote development, and creating an environment to promote private investment” is only one of the fifteen policy goals outlined in this law.
 21. Jonathon P. Riley, “The UK in Sierra Leone: A Post-Conflict Operation Success?” Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lecture no. 958, August 10, 2006.
 22. U.S. Department of State, Office of Acquisition Management, Solicitation #SAQMMA08R0237, June 27, 2008, p. 8.
 23. Riley, “The UK in Sierra Leone: A Post-Conflict Operation Success?” Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lecture no. 958, August 10, 2006.
 24. UN, 26th Report of the Secretary-General of the UN Organization Mission to the DRC, S/2008/433, July 3, 2008, para. 39.
 25. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Article 175.

About the Author

Anthony W. Gambino served for two and half years as USAID mission director for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, receiving USAID's Superior Honor Award. He first went to the Congo (then called Zaïre) in 1979, where he served for three years as a Peace Corps volunteer. From 1997 to 2004, he worked for USAID on the Congo and other countries in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. He returned to the Congo in 2006 to monitor presidential and National Assembly elections. He has worked on international development issues for the House of Representatives, the State Department, and nonprofit organizations. He presently works as an independent consultant on international development and foreign policy issues.

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