

UKRAINE AND NATO
The Policy and Practice of Co-operating with the
Euro-Atlantic Security Community

With a Preface by Leonid Polyakov
First Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine

Nienke de Deugd

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The Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) is an independent institute for research, consultancy, education and training, based in the Netherlands. Its aim is to promote transparent, accountable and effective governance of the security sector, broadly defined. It seeks to advance democracy and the rule of law, help governments and civil society face their security challenges, and further the civilized and lawful resolution of conflict.

CESS is international, multidisciplinary and collaborative. Its work is part of the European quest for peace and security both within and outside Europe. CESS encourages informed debate, empowers individuals, fosters mutual understanding on military and other security matters, promotes and sustains democratic structures and processes and supports reforms that favour stability and peace.

PREFACE

Euro-Atlantic integration is defined by law as a component of Ukraine's strategic development. Our country's goal is to join the system of Euro-Atlantic security, and this requires an open and deliberate government policy of cooperation with the Alliance.

Democratic fundamentals reflected in Ukrainian government policy aim to ensure human rights and freedoms, in line with the values of the Euro-Atlantic community. In recent years, our country has not merely seen democratic changes; it has undergone an irreversible political transformation. Despite continuing policy disputes within the government, Ukraine's state policy on Euro-Atlantic integration remains invariable.

Ukraine's cooperation with NATO provides us with effective tools and incentives to deepen our ties with the Alliance and with other countries wishing to join NATO. The process of NATO enlargement, meant to enhance Euro-Atlantic security, has proved a strong incentive for membership candidates to reform their defence and military sectors. This is good for Ukraine. However, our country's accession to NATO would also benefit the alliance and the wider region.

Located on a crossroad of ideological, economic, ethnical and religious processes in Europe and Asia, Ukraine is open to the influences of diametrically opposed political systems. At the same time, Ukraine's partnership and cooperation with influential international organizations such as the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe demonstrate the desire of the Euro-Atlantic community to maintain stability in our region and ensure the independence of our country.

Today Ukraine remains a reliable contributor to collective security. Our country continues its participation in peace-keeping missions under NATO's guidance in the Balkans (Kosovo) and in Iraq. Recently, Ukraine prepared the operation 'Active Efforts' and provided air-transportation services in support of an African Union peace-keeping mission in Sudan. Ukrainian specialists are also under consideration for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

This book will find many readers and supporters in Ukraine and abroad. Perhaps some of them, in countries now taking the path of democratic development, will learn from Ukraine's experiences of cooperation with NATO.

Leonid Polyakov
First Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine

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Foreword

The Centre for European Security Studies has a long track record in Ukraine. Starting in 1993, CESS has conducted numerous seminars and training sessions related to civil-military relations and the democratisation of the armed forces. Transforming the defence sector and other fields of policy in Ukraine has been and still is a Herculean task. Naturally, we applaud the current reforms designed and vociferously pursued by the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. Defence Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko, First Deputy Minister of Defence Leonid Polyakov and their colleagues have introduced and successfully implemented an impressive number of measures, ranging from defence planning to restructuring of the armed forces. This is an essential contribution to Ukraine's stature in Europe as an independent state. It also represents a crucial step on the road towards cooperation with and eventually integration in Western political and security communities, i.e. NATO and the EU.

At CESS we have a special reason to be pleased with these strident advances, because back in 1996, when he was still an officer in the Ukrainian armed forces, Anatoliy Grytsenko was our first Volkswagen Research Fellow. In our first Harmonie Paper, entitled *Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System Emerging from Chaos* and published in 1997, Colonel Grytsenko described in great detail and with admirable frankness the huge difficulties of the political process of defence reform. Of course, when he wrote this patriotic and determined account of the task that lay ahead, he could not know that ten years later, his country would call on him to face the challenges of 'getting it right in practice'.

The present study is based on Nienke de Deugd's doctoral dissertation, which I had the pleasure to supervise at Groningen University. De Deugd looks at the dozen or so years of lukewarm reform and 'two vectors' orientation of Ukraine political leadership that came to an end when the Orange Revolution firmly reoriented Ukraine towards the Euro-Atlantic security community. We are very pleased to publish her in-depth analysis which carries the telling subtitle *The Difference between Policy-on-Paper and Policy-in-Practice*. During the Kuchma years, she concludes, little of the 'system' Grytsenko envisaged in his Harmonie Paper, 'emerged from chaos'. For those devoted to defence reform, these were difficult, if not painful years. They are well documented in this study. I believe De Deugd's findings contain several lessons for defence reformers anywhere in the world. I hope these lessons are learned and applied.

Peter Volten, Director of CESS

Introduction

*“Ukraine has not yet perished, nor its glory, nor its freedom.
Upon us, fellow-Ukrainians, fate shall smile once more.
Our enemies will vanish, like dew in the morning sun.
And we too shall dwell, brothers, in a free land of our own”.*¹

The opening lines of the national anthem of Ukraine are a reflection of the country's history. For much of its past, Ukraine was divided between, and subjected by, such powerful neighbours as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, Poland, the Russian Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It was only on 24 August 1991, amidst the epochal events that characterised the end of the Cold War, that the country regained its independence.

Ukraine

In the wake of the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*, the country became involved in the process of determining the position that it was to occupy on the Euro-Atlantic stage. On the one hand, Ukraine was still tied to the successor to the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (RuSSR), namely the Russian Federation (RF). The many historical, cultural, religious and linguistic similarities that existed between the inhabitants of the two countries, as well as problems concerning the Ukrainian dependence upon Russian gas and oil, the recognition of borders, the division of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and the transfer of nuclear weapons, meant that it could not afford to ignore its neighbour to the east.

On the other hand, Ukraine sought to establish relations with its neighbours to the west, and to cooperate with – and possibly integrate into – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe (CoE). Also, the country aimed at becoming actively involved in the development of the so-called Euro-Atlantic security architecture, a new and overarching framework designed to address the various challenges with which the Euro-Atlantic area was faced in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Underlying these attempts to advance on the proverbial road back to Europe was the desire to become a part of the zone of peace that was originally

¹ Translation of the first verse of the national anthem of Ukraine.
<http://www.national-anthems.net/countries/index.php?id=UP> (9 June 2004).

formed by the countries of North America and Western Europe, and that, from the late 1980s onwards, was gradually enlarging in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe. Arguably, participation with this, as it may be defined in theoretical terms, security community was the best guarantee that Ukraine's declaration of independence would not be made undone.

The Euro-Atlantic security community

In this regard, it is of importance to note that the Euro-Atlantic security community is essentially a community of values, based upon a specific set of common ideas concerning the relationship between security on the one hand, and military affairs, politics, economics, social affairs and the environment on the other hand. In turn, this implies that, if Ukraine was to pursue the western dimension of its foreign and security policy to its full extent, it would have to adopt – and subsequently translate into behaviour – each of the five dimensions of which the so-called Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed.

Here, the concept of civil-military relations comes into play. With reference to Samuel Huntington's *The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations*, this notion addresses the way in which (1) military actors safeguard security (2) within the boundaries set by their civilian counterparts.² In countries that participate with the Euro-Atlantic security community, these boundaries are determined by the military, political, economic, social and environmental dimensions that together constitute the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security.

When both military and civilian actors adhere to – and act in accordance with – the set of common ideas that underlies the Euro-Atlantic security community, this results in civil-military relations characterised by the democratic and civilian oversight of the armed forces. In other words, given that in this particular system of interaction between military actors and their civilian counterparts the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is well-established, its development serves both as a case study, and as a litmus test, of the ability and/or willingness of Ukraine to meet the conditions for participation with the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community of values.

From policy-on-paper to policy-in-practice

According to the Ukrainian minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Tarasyuk, his country should not encounter any problems in fulfilling the requirements for realising its officially declared goal. As he wrote in *Between Russia and the*

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations* (Cambridge MA 1959) 2.

West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine, “integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and strengthening of our country’s position within the family of European nations, with whom we share common historical and cultural traditions, as well as values and views on the future of the continent remain the consistent orientation of Ukraine”.³

What made the country’s adoption, and subsequent translation into behaviour, of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security – and hence, its participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community – seem even more probable was the support that it received from the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations. NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE recognised that “an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole”.⁴ Consequently, they pledged to assist the country on its journey back to Europe.

However, it remains to be seen if these international organisations were able and/or willing to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice. Given that NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE were faced with the task of adjusting to the changed post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic security environment, and of expanding their membership to include several of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it is likely that they were more interested in supporting potential member states, than in aiding a country that still had a long way to go before being recognised as such.

For, Ukraine’s self-proclaimed status as a likely participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether it was, in fact, in a position to meet the criteria concerned. As a country that had, for so long, been cut off from the developments that were taking place in North America and Western Europe, it is uncertain if Ukraine was able and/or willing to put words into deeds, and to come to adhere to, and act in accordance with, a way of thinking that took the original members of the western zone of peace years to establish.

Research questions

In light of the above, the first question that is central to this Harmonie paper is the following: in what way has Ukraine dealt with the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community? As a litmus test of the country’s ability and/or willingness to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-

³ Boris Tarasyuk, ‘Foreword’ in: Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger and Derek Müller (ed.), *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine* (Bern 1999) 9-11, q.v. 10.

⁴ *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* (Madrid, 9 July 1997) article 1.

in-practice, the second question that is posed is: to what extent has Ukraine developed a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces? In finding an answer to these questions, the guiding hypothesis is that, as concerns the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, Ukraine has been unable and/or unwilling to put words into deeds. In addition, it is the contention of the book in hand that this holds true with regard to the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations as well.

The issue of participation

The theoretical underpinnings of the research undertaken in this Harmonie paper are formed by that particular subfield within the theory of international relations that addresses the concept of socialisation. Socialisation can be defined as the process in which (1) an international organisation uses some form of material inducement to convey the values on which the security community that it represents is founded, to a prospective participant (2) who then adopts, and subsequently translates into behaviour, this set of ideas. So, by making use of this specific theoretical framework, it becomes possible to not only carry out an analysis of Ukraine's efforts to meet the conditions for participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, and, more specifically, to develop a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, but also to link those efforts to the manner in which NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE have tried to provide assistance.

Chapter outline

In *Chapter I The issue of participation*, the notions that underlie the book in hand are elaborated upon. To this end, the various steps that lead from the desire to become a participant with a security community, to the need to establish the relevant way of thinking, to the support that is offered by international organisations, are explored. More particularly, the way in which the concept of socialisation follows from, and overlaps with, that of a security community is clarified – an exercise that leads to the formulation of the two requirements necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed that were mentioned in the previous paragraph. In addition, the chapter shows that, as a facilitating condition, socialisation is dependent upon the interplay of change on the international level with change on the domestic level.

With reference to the first part of this latter condition, *Chapter II The Euro-Atlantic security community* addresses the extent to which there was change on the level of the Euro-Atlantic security community. The epochal events that took place in the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and the

manner in which the end of the Cold War led the western zone of peace to become open to the prospect of enlargement, are discussed – as are the various dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed, and the significance of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces. Moreover, the chapter looks at the first requirement necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed, and analyses the policies that the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations developed – on paper at least – to use inducements of a material nature in order to assist Ukraine in becoming a participant with the Euro-Atlantic community of values.

Chapter III Ukraine addresses the second part of the facilitating condition just mentioned, and presents a brief overview of the country's history up until the moment of the adoption of the declaration of independence on 24 August 1991. This is followed by an account of the events that took place under the *aegis* of Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, and his successor, Leonid Kuchma. Also, attention is paid to the development of the country's foreign and security policy, and, more specifically, to the way in which Ukraine established relations with its neighbour to the east, while simultaneously seeking to become involved with its neighbours to the west – including the Euro-Atlantic security community. In so doing, the extent to which the Ukrainian elites came to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is touched upon as well.

This second requirement necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed is analysed in further depth in *Chapter IV From policy-on-paper to policy-in-practice*. Against the background that was sketched in the previous chapter of the wider military, political, economic, social and environmental developments, the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations is elaborated upon, and the various elements that come into play when forming a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces are explored. Furthermore, the policies that were pursued – not only on paper, but also in practice – by those international organisations that represent the Euro-Atlantic security community, are clarified. Taken together, these steps result in an analysis of the manner in which the concept of civil-military relations, as a particularly important aspect of the issue of Ukraine's participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, has been dealt with.

Rationale

In turn, this leads to the validation or rejection of the guiding hypothesis of this Harmonie paper, as well as to the formulation of an answer to the two central research questions. Depending on the outcomes, Ukraine either is a feasible member of the western zone of peace, or it is not. Obviously, this has a number

of consequences for the country itself. If it should be the case that it has not put words into deeds, and has thus failed to realise the western dimension of its foreign and security policy to its full extent, then the time has come for a reappraisal of the position that the country is to occupy on the Euro-Atlantic stage. In other words, the analysis undertaken in the book in hand goes a long way towards indicating the future direction of Ukraine's relations with its neighbours both to the west, and to the east.

Yet, the extent to which it has established the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security, and, more particularly, has developed a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, is a matter that is of importance, not only to Ukraine, but also to the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. In view of its location in-between the recently enlarged European and transatlantic (security) organisations on the one hand, and the RF on the other hand, the country is the keystone in the arch of Euro-Atlantic security and stability.⁵ A Ukraine that is in tune with the military and non-military dimensions that together constitute the Euro-Atlantic concept of security may wield the influence that comes with this position in a positive way, whereas a Ukraine that is out of touch with the values that underlie the western zone of peace, may do so in a negative manner.

⁵ The phrase is borrowed from: Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the arch. Ukraine in the emerging security environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington 1997).

I The issue of participation

In this chapter, the notions that underlie the book in hand are elaborated upon. The various steps that lead from the desire to become a participant with a security community, to the need to establish the relevant way of thinking, to the support that is offered by international organisations, are explored. More particularly, the way in which the concept of socialisation follows from, and overlaps with, that of a security community is clarified – an exercise that leads to the formulation of three requirements necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed.

The concept of a security community

The concept of a security community was first introduced in the vocabulary of the theory of international relations by Richard van Wagenen.⁶ In *Research in the international organization field: some notes on a possible focus*, Van Wagenen sought to find a novel solution to the age-old problem of the prevention of war, by proposing the initiation of a process of integration.⁷ As he maintained, integration would lead to the development of a zone of peace through “the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with “reasonable” certainty over a “long” period of time” [original emphasis added].⁸

Together with Karl Deutsch and several other scholars associated with the Princeton Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Van Wagenen elaborated upon the concept of a security community in *Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organization in the light of historical experience*.⁹ In an attempt to determine the extent to which the countries of North America and Western Europe were moving in the direction of the formation of a zone of peace, and to give recommendations as to how the necessary process of integration could be stimulated, Deutsch – with whom this project is most often associated – drew upon a large sample of historical case-

⁶ Donald James Puchala, *International politics today* (New York 1972) 164.

⁷ Richard W. van Wagenen, *Research in the international organization field: some notes on a possible focus* (Princeton 1952) 10.

⁸ Van Wagenen, *Research in the international organization field: some notes on a possible focus*, 10-11.

⁹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Security communities in theoretical perspective’ in: idem (ed.), *Security communities* (Cambridge 1998) 3-28, q.v. 8-9.

studies.¹⁰ This enabled him to not only define the concept itself, but also analyse the different types of security communities that may exist, the conditions for their attainment, and the phases of their development.

Yet, appealing as the concept of a security community might be to those who aspire to the realisation of regional or even global peace, the project of the Princeton Center was still-born. The Cold War, with its potential for mass destruction by nuclear weapons made the notion that conflicts could be resolved in a peaceful manner seem highly utopian. In fact, it was not until the 1990's, when Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett published their *Security communities*, that someone took up where Deutsch *cum suis* had left off.¹¹

The concept of a security community revisited

In an attempt to revive the concept of a security community, and to make it a more suitable instrument for analysing present-day developments, Adler and Barnett sought to refine the definition that was used in *Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organization in the light of historical experience*.¹² As they saw it, a security community is a: "transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change".¹³

Conditions

According to Adler and Barnett, the first condition that countries that are to be a part of a security community have to meet, has to do with "shared identities, values, and meanings".¹⁴ The set of common ideas that this denotes, not only needs to be adopted, but also translated into behaviour. Moreover, this translation into behaviour has to take place both on the international, and on the domestic level.¹⁵

The idea that adhering to, and acting in accordance with, a given set of common ideas are essentially two sides of the same coin is closely related to a point made by Peter Katzenstein, the editor of *The culture of national security*.

¹⁰ Karl W. Deutsch et al, *Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organization in the light of historical experience* (Princeton 1957, 1st paperback edition Princeton 1968) 3-5.

Puchala, *International politics today*, 164.

¹¹ Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspective', 9.

¹² Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A framework for the study of security communities' in: idem (ed.), *Security communities*, 29-65, q.v. 29.

¹³ Ibidem, 30.

¹⁴ Ibidem, 31.

¹⁵ Ibidem, 36.

Norms and identity in world politics and author of the volume's introduction 'Alternative perspectives on national security'. As he maintained, it are norms and identities that determine a country's interests, and hence, its actions.¹⁶ With regard to the development of a security community, this implies that a group of countries will only act in a similar way on the material level, when they display a certain degree of similarity on the ideational level.

Katzenstein, together with Christopher Hemmer, reflected upon the extent to which, as it was put by Martha Finnemore in 'Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism', "ideologies, or shared cultural and normative understandings about what a state is and what an individual is" lead countries to identify with each other, and change their behaviour accordingly, in 'Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism'.¹⁷ As they claimed, the moment that a country comes to experience a sense of community, its behaviour changes. With regard to countries that are perceived to be a part of the same group, patterns of behaviour tend to converge, whereas they tend to diverge as concerns countries that are thought to be belonging to another, different group.¹⁸

When seen from this perspective, it becomes clear that participation with a security community is not necessarily restricted to countries from the same geographical area. In *Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organization in the light of historical experience*, there was considerable discussion whether the North Atlantic security community should be equated to the member states of NATO, to those countries bordering the North Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea and the countries in the hinterland of this area, or to countries that had adopted a democratic political system.¹⁹

Yet, in *Security communities* it was clearly argued that regions are not limited by boundaries in a material sense. Rather, "regions are socially constructed and are susceptible to redefinition".²⁰ Thus, every actor that has adopted the relevant set of common ideas, and behaves accordingly, can join the community of values that a zone of peace represents. This way, Australia can be considered to be a part of the western security community.²¹

¹⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: alternative perspectives on national security' in: idem (ed.), *The culture of national security. Norms and identity in world politics* (New York 1996) 1-32, q.v. 30.

¹⁷ Finnemore, 'Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism', *International organization*, no. 2, vol. 50 (1996) 336.

¹⁸ Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism', *International organization*, no. 3, vol. 56 (2002) 575-607, q.v. 587.

¹⁹ Karl W. Deutsch et al, 'Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organization in the light of historical experience', 9-10.

²⁰ Adler and Barnett, 'A framework for the study of security communities', 33.

²¹ Ibidem.

A similar argument was brought to the fore by Jessica Gienow-Hecht in 'Shame on US? Academics, cultural transfer, and the Cold War – a critical review'. Paraphrasing Georg Simmel, who in *Soziologie des Raumes* had written on the ideational as opposed to material nature of space, she claimed that "a border is not a geographical fact with sociological consequences but a sociological fact that then takes a geographical (and political) shape".²² This point was underscored by Hemmer and Katzenstein, when they stated that "regions do not just exist as material objects in the world. Geography is not destiny. Instead, regions are social and cognitive constructs that can strike actors as more or less plausible".²³

The second requirement necessary for the development of a security community has to do with the fact that countries that are part of a zone of peace engage with each other in multiple ways. The relationships that define a security community are not restricted to a limited number of issue-areas, nor are they conducted in an indirect manner. Rather, they are given meaning "through some form of face-to-face encounter and relations in numerous settings".²⁴ Clearly, this ties in with the foregoing, especially with regard to the translation into behaviour on the international level of the set of common ideas concerned.

In turn, this line of reasoning leads one to the third condition that was identified by Adler and Barnett, namely reciprocity. Precisely because countries can work with one another for considerable periods of time, and with regard to a wide variety of subjects, they are expected to develop a long-term interest in each other's survival. In some cases, this may even lead to displays of altruism.²⁵

However, as Adler and Barnett maintained, this is not to say that the countries concerned have left behind their own interests. They continue to pursue national goals – goals which, at times, may even conflict with those of the other participants with a security community. Still, countries tend to cooperate with each other because they see a security community as an alternative, and perhaps more effective, way of fulfilling their objectives.²⁶

²² Jessica Gienow-Hecht, 'Shame on US? Academics, cultural transfer, and the Cold War – a critical review', *Diplomatic history*, no. 3, vol. 24 (2000) 465-494, q.v. 488.
Georg Simmel, 'Soziologie des Raumes' in: Rüdiger Kramme, Angela Rammstedt and Otthein Rammstedt (ed.), *Georg Simmel. Aufsätze und Abhandlungen 1901-1908 Band I* (Frankfurt am Main 1995) 132-183, q.v. 133.

²³ Hemmer and Katzenstein, 'Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism', 578.

²⁴ Adler and Barnett, 'A framework for the study of security communities', 31.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 31-32.

Phases

With regard to the phases of development of a security community, Adler and Barnett proposed a structure composed of three tiers.²⁷ The first element that they discerned deals with precipitating conditions, that is, the factors that lead countries to begin contemplating the possibility of cooperating with others. These factors can be very diverse, and include “developments of new interpretations of social reality” and “change in technology, demography, economics, and the environment”.²⁸

Here, there are two qualifications that need to be kept in mind. First of all, the aforementioned facilitating conditions – which, in general, have a tendency to occur in periods of change on the domestic level – are not only of importance to countries that hope to develop an entirely new security community, they are also at play when it comes to countries that seek to join a zone of peace that is already in existence. However, in view of the fact that the latter development is dependent upon the willingness from the original participants to engage in a process of enlargement – which, in turn, is something that is only likely to occur in a period of change on the international level – the expansion of a community of values requires an interplay of not only internal, but also external transformation.²⁹

Secondly, even though a security community is only viable when it is founded upon a shared set of common ideas, it may well have been founded with an eye to satisfying not only ideational, but also material demands.³⁰ In other words, even though the process of establishing a security community is, in itself, an ideational one, it is beset with material qualities. Clearly, this point ties in closely with the arguments that were put to the fore in the previous paragraph and that concerned the interests on the level of domestic politics that compel a country to consider developing a community of values on the level of international politics.

Still, no matter what the motivations of those countries that are involved in the development of a security community might be, what is of importance to note is that, initially, they seldom share a similar way of thinking. Yet, once, under the influence of precipitating factors, they have come to adopt at least some ideas that are compatible, this leads to the development of international organisations. In turn, these organisations play a part in enhancing cooperation, examining the possibilities for the establishment of further ties and, last but not least, monitoring the extent to which each party keeps up his end of the bargain.³¹

²⁷ Ibidem, 37.

²⁸ Ibidem, 51-52.

²⁹ Ibidem, 37-39.

³⁰ Ibidem, 51.

³¹ Ibidem, 51-52.

Especially with regard to issues in the sphere of security, international organisations fulfil a somewhat broader function than merely the provision of collective defence. They also contribute to a deepening of the various connections that tie a group of countries together, and lead to a communality of “visions of a better material progress (economic, environmental, health, human rights, etc.)”, as well as to the promotion of “ideas about “cooperative security”, that is, the notion that the security of states – defined in terms of the interdependence of military, economic, environmental, and human rights issues – is interdependent”.³² Taken together, this implies that the benefits that flow from cooperation with, and possibly integration into, international organisations are not only of an ideational, but also of a material nature.

The second tier in the process of the formation of a security community has to do with the “factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity”.³³ These factors fall into two different categories, namely those of structure and those of process. On the structure side, power comes into play. First of all, power can enable countries to determine which set of common ideas becomes the basis on which the security community is to be founded.³⁴ Secondly, it can allow the more powerful countries to persuade, or force, those that are less powerful to respect the rules of the game.³⁵ Finally, as Adler and Barnett maintained, powerful countries can act as a magnet, that is “a community formed around a group of strong powers creates the expectation that weaker states that join the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other benefits that are associated with that community”.³⁶

The second structural element concerns knowledge or, more precisely, so-called cognitive structures. Here, the underlying assumption is that “shared meanings and understandings” induce countries to trust one another to the extent that they will not wage war upon each other. In general, the set of common ideas (for that is what this is really about) that is most likely to result in the development of a security community, is thought to be that associated with a liberal, or civic culture, based upon democracy, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights.³⁷

Yet, when dealing with countries that seek to participate with a security community that has already been developed, which is the topic of the research undertaken in this Harmonie paper, the question that presents itself is how they can come to adopt these particular values. This holds true especially with regard to countries that, like Ukraine, have only just regained their

³² Ibidem, 50.

³³ Ibidem, 38.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibidem, 39.

³⁶ Ibidem, 39-40.

³⁷ Ibidem, 40.

independence.³⁸ In *Security communities*, Adler and Barnett offered some tentative solutions to this problem, by addressing the issue of social learning – which is one of the elements on the process side (the other being that of increased interactions among the countries concerned; a point mentioned earlier).³⁹

Social learning concerns the replacement of an old set of common ideas by a new one. This is more than just the adaptation of ideas to suit changing circumstances, but involves the adoption of ideas as a way of dealing with a changed reality.⁴⁰ As it was maintained in *Security communities*, international organisations can greatly facilitate this process, by conveying the set of common ideas concerned.⁴¹ Here, there exists an interesting parallel with an idea that was put to the fore by Finnemore. With reference to James March and Johan Olsen, who in *Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of politics* claimed that participation with an international organisation comes natural to a country, she emphasized that international organisations can even constitute, not only what a country wants, but also what it is.⁴²

The theorising of Stanley Hoffmann and Robert Keohane developed along similar lines. In 'Structure, strategy and international roles', they elaborated upon the various roles that, as they termed them, international institutions can play in managing change.⁴³ According to Hoffmann and Keohane, it is possible that international organisations can alter not only the rather material interests of a country, but also its more ideational preferences.⁴⁴ Such an effect can occur via, as they termed it, socialisation, that is, a process in which the relevant set of common ideas is transmitted by an international organisation, and subsequently received by the prospective participant with the security community that that international organisation represents.⁴⁵

The extent to which countries that seek to become a participant with a security community can come to do so via socialisation by an international organisation, is a theoretical notion that is analysed in the next paragraph. For now, suffice it to say that this process is an important contribution to the third

³⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, 'Conclusion: structure, strategy and international roles' in: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), *After the Cold War. International institutions and state strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge MA 1993) 381-404, q.v. 401.

³⁹ Adler and Barnett, 'A framework for the study of security communities', 41.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, 43-44.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 44.

⁴² Finnemore, 'Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology's institutionalism', 338.

James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering institutions. The organizational basis of politics* (New York 1989) 171-172.

⁴³ Keohane and Hoffmann, 'Conclusion: structure, strategy and international roles', 395-404.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 401.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

tier that Adler and Barnett discerned, namely that in which collective identity and mutual trust have been so firmly established as to lead to a “dependable expectation of peaceful change”, and hence, to the existence of a security community.⁴⁶

The concept of socialisation

As has just been touched upon, socialisation is a process that has two different dimensions to it, namely transmission – or the conveyance of a specific set of common ideas by one actor – and reception – or social learning, which involves the establishment of that set of common ideas by another actor. If successful, socialisation leads the receiver to become a participant with the community that the transmitter represents. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, who wrote about the way in which a hegemon can socialise a less powerful country, made this point succinctly in ‘Socialisation and hegemonic power’.⁴⁷

Definition

When following Hoffmann and Keohane, who tacitly assumed that the power that is exercised by a hegemon can be replaced by the influence that is wielded by an international organisation, and amending the concepts used by Ikenberry and Kupchan accordingly, socialisation can be defined as: “the process through which national leaders internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the international organisation and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community that that international organisation represents”.⁴⁸

Phases

As Ikenberry and Kupchan maintained, socialisation can take place in three different ways, namely via internal reconstruction, normative persuasion, and (as the most likely one) external inducement.⁴⁹ The first of these applies to the intervention in a country that has adopted certain values that are fundamentally opposite to those that are espoused by the international organisation concerned. When the international organisation intervenes, it begins the process of reconstructing political institutions. This is followed by the

⁴⁶ Adler and Barnett, ‘A framework for the study of security communities’, 38 and 45-49.

⁴⁷ John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, *International organization*, no. 3, vol. 44 (1990) 283-316.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 289-290.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, 290.

introduction of a new set of common ideas. In the final instance, the relevant elites come to adopt the mindset that was forced upon them.⁵⁰

Here, there exists a stark difference with the second route to socialisation. In the case of normative persuasion, the international organisation refrains from the use of force and relies, instead, on the power of communication. By engaging the elites of the country concerned in various forms of contact, they are supposed to develop a desire to adopt the same set of common ideas as that which the international organisation represents. Once this has been achieved, the country's behaviour changes so as to become compatible with that of the participants with the security community.⁵¹

Thirdly, external inducement lays somewhere in-between internal reconstruction and normative persuasion. On the one hand, the international organisation employs incentives of a material nature – for example in the form of military threats and economic benefits – to get a country to change its behaviour and make it fall in line with the international system. On the other hand, this change in behaviour is, ultimately, voluntary, as is the accompanying adoption of the underlying set of common ideas.⁵²

In this regard, it should be taken into account that, again, adhering to, and acting in accordance with, a certain way of thinking go hand in hand. Although this was not made explicit by Finnemore, Hoffmann and Keohane with regard to the issue of social learning, it does exhibit strong similarities with the emphasis placed by Adler, Barnett, Hemmer and Katzenstein on the adoption of a set of common ideas, and its translation into behaviour on the international, as well as on the domestic level.

Moreover, the theorising done by Ikenberry and Kupchan closely resembles that of Roberta Sigel. In 'Assumptions about the learning of political values', which deals with social learning by children, she spoke of "the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes, and behaviour accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system".⁵³ When properly carried out, this process should lead individuals to behave in a manner that is in accordance with the general way in which a society functions.⁵⁴

Conditions

What has become apparent from the analysis of the different types of socialisation that may exist, is that internalisation of the set of common ideas

⁵⁰ Ibidem, 291-292.

⁵¹ Ibidem, 290.

⁵² Ibidem, 290-292.

⁵³ Roberta Sigel, 'Assumptions about the learning of political values', *The annals of the American academy of political and social science*, vol. 361 (1965) 1-9, q.v. 2.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

concerned by elites is one of the conditions that has to be met if socialisation is to succeed. This implies that endorsement of the public at large alone is not enough. Also, it refers to that what has already been stated, and what can be found in 'Assumptions about the learning of political values' as well, namely that the newly-found mindset needs to be adopted, as opposed to the mere adaptation of the old mindset.⁵⁵ Once more, this is something that needs to reveal itself both in behaviour on the level of relations with other countries that (seek to) participate with a security community, and in behaviour on the level of domestic politics.⁵⁶

In addition, the by now familiar combination of ideational and material factors needs to be taken into account. According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, elites are much more likely to change their mindset when they stand to gain something from doing so. Such a reward may either be related to the military threats and economic benefits already mentioned, or to domestic advantages concerning political advancement and legitimisation of one's own position.⁵⁷ Thus, here as well, the parallel with the claims made by Adler and Barnett concerning the importance of domestic, and material incentives for international, and ideational cooperation becomes manifest.

A final, and facilitating condition that was mentioned in 'Socialization and hegemonic power' has to do with a point that was also brought to the fore in *Security communities*, namely the interplay between change on the international and on the domestic level. When the international system is in turmoil, for example in the aftermath of a period of war, the group of countries that together constitute a security community may experience difficulty in continuing to adhere to the original set of common ideas. While, as Sigel claimed, it is possible for a security community to adopt an altered, or even a new, set of common ideas in order to conform to the changed reality with which it is faced, it is also likely that the composition of the security community is altered as a way of accounting for the changing world order.⁵⁸

When it comes to countries that previously were excluded from participation with the security community (i.e. newly independent states) the process of enlargement that this entails is much more likely to succeed when the elites of the prospective participant are involved in a domestic crisis of such magnitude that they have no alternative available to them than to resign in favour of a younger generation, or to change their mindset, and hence, their behaviour.⁵⁹ Hence, socialisation is, at least in part, dependent upon the

⁵⁵ Ibidem.

⁵⁶ Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and hegemonic power', 289-290.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, 293.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, 292.

Sigel, 'Assumptions about the learning of political values', 8.

⁵⁹ Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization and hegemonic power', 292.

existence of a “critical historical period in which international change coincides with domestic crisis”.⁶⁰

Concluding remarks

The main concern of Adler and Barnett was with the development of a security community. However, many of the elements that they found to be of significance – such as the simultaneous occurrence of an impetus for external, as well as internal change, the role played by not only ideational, both also material qualities, and the existence of a powerful actor, be it a country or an international organisation, that can nudge prospective participants along – also need to be taken into account when studying the way in which countries can come to participate with a security community that is already in existence. This holds true especially with regard to the adoption of a set of common ideas, and its subsequent translation into behaviour on the international, as well as the domestic level.

As Adler and Barnett, together with Finnemore, Hoffmann, Keohane, Ikenberry and Kupchan suggested, countries that seek to become a participant with a security community are most likely to succeed in adhering to, and acting in accordance with, the relevant way of thinking via a process of social learning – which is one of the two components of socialisation, the other being the transmission of the set of common ideas concerned by an international organisation that is a representative of that security community.

With reference to the introduction of this chapter, the way in which the concept of socialisation not only follows from, but also overlaps with, that of a security community, leads to the formulation of several requirements necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed. When taking into consideration the way in which participation with a security community, the adoption – and subsequent translation into behaviour – of the relevant set of common ideas, and the assistance provided by international organisations are linked, these conditions can be defined as follows: (1) socialisation is dependent upon the application of inducements of a material nature by international organisations; (2) socialisation is dependent upon elites adhering to – and acting in accordance with – the set of common ideas concerned. As a facilitating condition, the following needs to be kept in mind as well: (3) socialisation is dependent upon the interplay of change on the international level with change on the domestic level.

As concerns the topic that is central to the book in hand, namely the way in which Ukraine has dealt with the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, the aforementioned requirements can be adapted in the

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

following manner: (1) socialisation is dependent upon the application of inducements of a material nature by the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations; (2) socialisation is dependent upon the Ukrainian elites adhering to – and acting in accordance with – the set of common ideas that underlies the Euro-Atlantic security community, namely the Euro-Atlantic concept of security; and (3) socialisation is dependent upon the interplay of change in the Euro-Atlantic security community with change in Ukraine.

II The Euro-Atlantic security community

With reference to the requirements necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed that were defined in *Chapter I The issue of participation*, this chapter addresses the extent to which there was change on the level of the Euro-Atlantic security community. The epochal events that took place in the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and the manner in which the end of the Cold War led the western zone of peace to become open to the prospect of enlargement, are discussed – as are the various dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed, and the significance of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces. Moreover, the chapter in hand looks at the first condition that was mentioned, and analyses the policies that the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations developed – at least on paper – to use inducements of a material nature in order to assist Ukraine in becoming a participant with the Euro-Atlantic community of values.

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture

The reappearance of Ukraine as a member of the international community, and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), together with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the revolutions that took place in many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, clearly signalled the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the epochal events that took place in the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's marked the dawn of an era in which a number of tested approaches, for example with regard to the instruments needed for safeguarding security and stability, were to be defined anew.

Already in the autumn of 1989, the then American Secretary of State James Baker proposed the development of a so-called Euro-Atlantic security architecture.⁶¹ According to the United States (US), the establishment of such an overarching framework would allow NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE to jointly address the challenges with which they were faced in the aftermath of the Cold War. What is more, the creation of a new instrument held out the prospect of putting the issue of burden sharing back on the agenda.⁶² In

⁶¹ Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis, 'Preface' in: idem (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture* (Boulder 1994) ix-x, q.v. ix.

⁶² Alexander Moens, 'The formative years of the new NATO: diplomacy from London to Rome' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 24-47, q.v. 26-27 and 42.

other words, by means of furthering cooperation on the basis of complementarity and transparency, the US sought to get their North Atlantic and European partners to both take responsibility for dealing with the rapidly changing Euro-Atlantic security environment, and pay a more equal share of the bill.

For a variety of reasons, the other major actors on the Euro-Atlantic stage also came out in favour of the development of a security architecture.⁶³ To Germany, it was a way of continuing its policy of maintaining close ties with the US, while simultaneously remaining involved in the ongoing process of European cooperation and integration.⁶⁴ For Great Britain, the establishment of a new means for dealing with the security of the Euro-Atlantic area was a way of preserving its special relationship with the US, without alienating its European partners.⁶⁵

France saw the establishment of an overarching framework, composed of more organisations than NATO alone, as a chance to realise its long-cherished dream of making European security and defence less dependent upon American military power.⁶⁶ Finally, the RF perceived it as an opportunity to, on the one hand, diminish the role played by NATO, an organisation of which it is not a member, and, on the other hand, increase the importance of the OSCE, an organisation in which it does have a say.⁶⁷

With all the important players thus in agreement with Baker's proposal, efforts were undertaken to make it into a reality. For example, at a meeting of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries that participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), held in Berlin on 19-20 June 1991, the development of a European architecture was the first item

⁶³ Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis, 'Failures of the first round and a proposal for a new strategy' in: idem (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 227-248, q.v. 227.

⁶⁴ An overview of German foreign and security policy can be found in: Roy Rempel, 'German security policy in the new European order' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 159-196.

⁶⁵ An overview of British foreign and security policy can be found in: Anthony Forster, 'The United Kingdom' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 135-158.

⁶⁶ An overview of French foreign and security policy can be found in: Anand Menon, 'France' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 197-223.

⁶⁷ An overview of Russian foreign and security policy can be found in: Sergei Plekhanov, 'NATO enlargement as an issue in Russian politics' in: Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Lévesque (ed.), *The future of NATO. Enlargement, Russia, and European security* (Montreal 1999) 168-185.

on the agenda to be discussed.⁶⁸ Also, at a meeting held in Prague on 30-31 January 1992, it was stressed that “the CSCE (...) has a prominent role to play in the evolving European architecture”, and that “the challenges facing Europe call for multi-faceted forms of co-operation, and a close relationship among European, transatlantic and other international institutions and organizations, drawing as appropriate upon their respective competences”.⁶⁹

Furthermore, at a summit of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member states, held in Rome on 8 November 1991, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) too deliberated the possibility of creating a new instrument for dealing with the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. As it was put in the *Rome declaration*, “the challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other”.⁷⁰

However, these good intentions notwithstanding, the development of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture did not surpass the phase of policy-on-paper. Although France, Germany, Great Britain, the RF and the US agreed on the necessity of establishing an overarching framework, as well as on the choice of organisations that should be a part of it, the differences that existed between them implied that they were at odds with regard to such topics as the extent to which they were supposed to actually contribute to this new instrument, and the functions that it was to fulfil.⁷¹

The enlarging zone of peace

However, even though the Euro-Atlantic security architecture did not become a reality in a material sense, as a security community it was, in fact, already in existence on an ideational level. Following the end of World War II (WWII),

⁶⁸ The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) at a summit held in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, in order to reflect its intention of becoming a more important actor in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Budapest summit declaration: towards a genuine partnership in a new era (Budapest, 5-6 December 1994) article 3.

Summary of conclusions of the first ministerial council (Berlin, 19-20 June 1991) article 3.

⁶⁹ *Summary of conclusions of the second ministerial council* (Prague, 30-31 January 1992) article 10.

⁷⁰ *Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC))* (Rome, 8 November 1991) article 3.

⁷¹ Moens and Anstis, ‘Failures of the first round and a proposal for a new strategy’, 227.

which had caused such tremendous damage, both domestically and internationally, the countries of North America and Western Europe set out to build a lasting peace. Over the years, they began to adhere to, and act in accordance with, a specific way of thinking concerning the relationship between security on the one hand, and military affairs, politics, economics, social affairs and the environment on the other hand.⁷²

Although this was a development that went largely unnoticed by those scholars that were dealing with the theory of international relations, the establishment of this set of common ideas – which can be defined in terms of the liberal, or civic culture mentioned in the previous chapter – led them to identify with each other to the extent that the use of war as a means of resolving any disputes that might arise between them, became unthinkable.⁷³

Undoubtedly, the growth of the necessary sense of community was influenced by the perceived threat of the “red peril”. Still, the end of the period of the Cold War did not lead to the dissolution of the Euro-Atlantic security community. On the contrary, as a consequence of the desire of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to “return to Europe”, and as a result of their efforts to adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the relevant values, the western zone of peace conformed to the changed reality with which it was faced by engaging in a process of enlargement.⁷⁴

The Euro-Atlantic concept of security

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about the relationship between security, and military affairs, politics, economics, social affairs and the environment was susceptible to change as well. In the early stages of the Cold War, the concept of security was defined in strictly military terms.⁷⁵ While non-military dimensions were considered to be of significance in their own right, they were seen as devoid of implications for security.

According to Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, the authors of *Security: a new framework for analysis*, it was not until the 1970's and 1980's that it became clear that economic crises and ecological disasters could have a

⁷² Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism’, 588-591.

⁷³ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Security communities in theoretical perspective’, 16.

⁷⁴ Emanuel Adler, ‘Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE's security community-building model’ in: Adler and Barnett (ed.), *Security communities* (Cambridge 1998) 119-160, q.v. 119.

Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, ‘The new security threats in Europe: theory and evidence’, *European foreign affairs review*, no. 4, vol. 7 (2002) 423-452, q.v. 451.

⁷⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Boulder 1998) 2.

negative effect on the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.⁷⁶ Moreover, as James Sperling and Emil Kirchner maintained in *Recasting the European order. Security architectures and economic cooperation*, it was only in the 1990's, when the countries of Central and Eastern Europe struggled to democratise their political systems, to reform their economies, to deal with social upheaval and to address the results of decades of environmental degradation, that the idea took hold that the concept of security should be regarded as being composed of not only the military dimension, but the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions as well.⁷⁷

Dimensions

The widening of the narrow Cold War concept of security into the comprehensive post-Cold War one, was a process that was reflected in the declarations that were issued by the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations. From the late 1980's onwards, NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE increasingly referred to security in both military, and non-military terms. To cite but one example, at the November 1991 meeting of the NAC, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member states adopted a new *Strategic concept*, which allowed them to put into practice their "broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects, along with the indispensable defence dimension".⁷⁸

With regard to the contents of this latter dimension, the Alliance underlined that military institutions should be prepared to "deter, and defend against, any threat of aggression" vis-à-vis the territorial integrity and political independence of the countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.⁷⁹ In addition, and in line with the *Strategic concept* that was adopted at a summit held in Washington D.C. on 23-24 April 1999, it was stressed that these institutions should be able to participate in various forms of military cooperation, and to contribute to crisis management operations.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Ibidem.

⁷⁷ James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, *Recasting the European order. Security architectures and economic cooperation* (Manchester 1997) 1-2 and 79.

⁷⁸ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Rome, 8 November 1991) preamble.

Declaration on Peace and Cooperation issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (including decisions leading to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)) article 4.

⁷⁹ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999) article 10.

⁸⁰ Ibidem.

Concerning the four non-military dimensions that are a part of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security, it should be taken into account that, as it was put by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in 'Security communities in theoretical perspective', the OSCE served as a norm-setting organisation.⁸¹ The other European and transatlantic (security) organisations often and explicitly referred to the guidelines that it set.⁸²

Regarding the political dimension of security, this had as a result that it was defined by the OSCE's steadfast commitment to furthering the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights.⁸³ With an eye to the economic dimension, the claim concerning the need to develop market economies – a claim that was already brought to the fore by the Heads of State and Government of the OSCE member states at a summit held in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, when they declared that "market economy and sustainable economic development are integral to the comprehensive concept of security" – had to be taken into consideration.⁸⁴

The social dimension of security derived its meaning from the importance that the OSCE attached to the attainment of social stability and social justice.⁸⁵ Finally, as concerns the environment, the *Charter of Paris for a new Europe*, which was adopted at a summit of the CSCE, held on 19-21 November 1990, and in which the participating countries pledged to "intensify endeavours to protect and improve [the] environment in order to restore and maintain a sound ecological balance in air, water and soil" was of significance.⁸⁶

Strategy and change

The changes that beset the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's had an impact, not only on the Euro-Atlantic security community and its underlying concept of security, but also on the way in which military institutions were supposed to function. Here, the concept of strategy comes into play. As it was argued by Carl von Clausewitz in *Vom Kriege*, and Colin Gray in *Modern strategy*, strategy is the notion that relates the goals that are defined by political

⁸¹ Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspective', 18.

⁸² For example, the importance of the OSCE was recognised in: *European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries* (Madrid, 14 November 1995) article 20.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, article 29.

⁸³ *Lisbon declaration on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the twenty-first century* (Lisbon, 2-3 December 1996) articles 3-4.

⁸⁴ *Budapest summit declaration: towards a genuine partnership in a new era*, article 15.

⁸⁵ *Lisbon declaration on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the twenty-first century*, articles 3-4.

⁸⁶ *Charter of Paris for a new Europe* (Paris, 19-21 November 1990).

actors, to the instruments that are deployed by military actors.⁸⁷ With regard to the military dimension of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed, this implies that deterrence of, and defence against, aggression, participation in various forms of military cooperation and contribution to crisis management operations constitute the instruments with which the goal of securing a stable and peaceful Euro-Atlantic area should be reached.

However, as a result of the widening of the narrow concept of security into the comprehensive one, military institutions were supposed to take into account not just the military dimension, but also the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security. In other words, in response to the challenges with which the Euro-Atlantic area was faced in the aftermath of the Cold War, the way in which they were expected to operate underwent a significant transformation – military institutions now needed to be able to adhere to, and act in accordance with the principles that come with democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, market economies, social stability and social justice, and environmental protection.

In turn, this required them to undergo a process of Security Sector Reform (SSR). As Jane Chanaa explained in *Security Sector Reform: issues, challenges and prospects*, the concept of SSR was originally developed in the course of the 1990's as a way of addressing the role that military institutions can play in the transition from war to peace.⁸⁸ It was recognised that with regard to, for example, the observance of formally agreed peace accords, the compliance with a process of sustainable development and the appearance or disappearance of so-called failed states, security sectors could function either to the detriment, or to the advantage of the necessary process of change. Consequently, attention was paid to the reforms that should be undertaken in order to allow military institutions to play a constructive role in bringing security and stability.⁸⁹

Over the years, it became apparent that the process of SSR was not only relevant to countries that had experienced protracted armed conflict and were building a lasting peace. Given that, as has just been touched upon, military institutions that continued to be organised according to the notions that were valid during the Cold War were incapable of functioning in accordance with the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic concept of security, SSR was also of value to countries that were engulfed in the process of adjusting themselves to the new Euro-Atlantic security environment.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On war* (Princeton 1975) 128).

Colin Gray, *Modern strategy* (Oxford 1999) 17.

⁸⁸ Jane Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: issues, challenges and prospects* Adelphi paper 344 (Oxford 2002) 8.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, 19-21.

Among the issues that the concept of SSR addresses, are, first of all, quantitative ones concerning the size, recruitment and supply of military institutions – including the fundamental question of the proportion of a country's resources devoted to defence budgeting. Secondly, the concept deals with such qualitative aspects as organisation, composition, equipment and deployment, as well as cooperation with allied countries. Thirdly, SSR is concerned with dynamic issues regarding the utilisation of military institutions.⁹¹

Yet, apart from these rather material dimensions, the process of SSR is also characterised by an ideational dimension – in the sense that it takes into account issues concerning the personnel that works in military organisations.⁹² It can be argued that the process of reforming a security sector is not just about reorganising institutions, but also about preparing people for playing their part in accordance with the set of common ideas that – in the case of the book in hand – underlies the Euro-Atlantic security community. According to Chanaa, the reform of military institutions will not lead to the desired result of enabling them to act in accordance with both the military, and the non-military dimensions of security, when the actors involved do not understand exactly what this entails.⁹³

Democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces

When combining the role that military actors are to fulfil in order to comply with the requirements necessary for participating with the western zone of peace, with the part that is to be played by their civilian counterparts, one touches upon the concept of civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington explained in *The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations*, the relationship between military and civilian actors is shaped by two different forces, namely a functional and a societal imperative.⁹⁴ The functional imperative concerns the way in which the threats to its security that a given country is confronted with, are addressed, and is the realm of military institutions. The societal imperative has to do with the set of common ideas that is dominant within that country, and is the domain of political elites.

The crux of the problem of developing a system of civil-military relations is to establish that particular type of relationship between military and civilian actors in which (1) the former safeguards security (2) within the boundaries set by the latter.⁹⁵ Clearly – and in accordance with the arguments that were put to the fore in the previous paragraph – for participants with the Euro-Atlantic

⁹¹ Huntington, *The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations*, 1.

⁹² Chanaa, *Security Sector Reform: issues, challenges and prospects*, 29-30.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, 28-30.

⁹⁴ Huntington, *The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations*,

2.
⁹⁵ *Ibidem*.

security community these boundaries are determined by the Euro-Atlantic concept of security. Arguably, this holds true not only as concerns military institutions, but also with regard to their civilian counterparts.

In the countries of North America and Western Europe, this has resulted in a system of civil-military relations to match that can be referred to as one of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces.⁹⁶ In turn, given that in this particular type of interaction between military institutions and their civilian counterparts the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is adopted, and subsequently translated into behaviour, by both sets of actors involved, its development has come to serve not only as a case-study, but also as a litmus test of a country's ability and/or willingness to become a part of the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community of values.

Conditions

With regard to the issue of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, it is of importance to note that it is not possible to give a clear and definite list of the criteria to which to adhere – an argument that was put to the fore by David Betz in 'The persistent problem of civil-military relations in East and Central Europe: a briefing note on democratic control of armed forces'.⁹⁷ In view of the fact that the point of departure was different for each individual country, and that they were all confronted with their own peculiar set of problems along the way, there was no uniform roadmap to which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could refer.⁹⁸

Still, this notwithstanding, it is possible to give at least a few guidelines as to how this particular system of interaction between military and civilian actors could be developed. First of all, it is necessary to concisely define the military institutions involved. Traditionally, the concept of civil-military relations addresses the armed forces. Yet, especially in the various former constituent republics of the USSR, there are also border troops, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, troops of the secret service, the presidential guard and other (para-) military organisations that could become the focus of attention.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Jeffrey Simon and Sean Kay, 'The new NATO' in: Ronald Tiersky (ed.), *Europe today. National politics, European integration and European security* (Lanham 1999) 369-399, q.v. 373.

⁹⁷ David Betz, 'The persistent problem of civil-military relations in East and Central Europe: a briefing note on democratic control of armed forces' in: Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri (ed.), *Security Sector Reform and democracy in transitional societies* (Baden-Baden 2002) 105-111, q.v. 105.

⁹⁸ Ibidem, 105-106.

⁹⁹ *Budapest summit declaration: towards a genuine partnership in a new era. Part IV: Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security* (Budapest, 5-6 December 1994) article 25.

Secondly, the position that these military institutions occupy in the society of the country concerned has to be addressed. This topic can be approached from two different angles. On the one hand, Huntington argued for the development of a system of civil-military relations that is based on the principle of objective civilian control.¹⁰⁰ Such a system requires not only the maximising of the powers of civilian actors, but also the maximising of military professionalism. Military institutions have to be sufficiently professional to accept the orders given to them by civilian actors, and to carry them out in the best possible way. In turn, this implies that military actors are treated as a distinct group in their own right, separate from the rest of society.¹⁰¹

On the other hand, Morris Janowitz, author of *The professional soldier. A social and political portrait*, was in favour of a system that is based on the principle of the citizen-soldier. In such a system, military institutions are regarded as a fundamental part of society. This implies that all military actors, and in particular officers, need to participate in educational programmes, in which their professional military training is linked to the national and international interests of the country that they serve.¹⁰²

Guided by historical experience, most of the countries of North America and Western Europe have already decided between a system of civil-military relations that is based either on the principle of objective civilian control, or on that of the citizen-soldier. To the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, this choice is still open. Yet, it should be kept in mind that to civilian actors who are still heavily engulfed in a variety of processes of transformation and reform, military actors who operate too independently are a liability, rather than an asset. In other words, to them, the approach adopted by Janowitz is likely to be preferable to the path chosen by Huntington. This is reflected in the *Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security*, which was adopted at the December 1994 meeting of the OSCE, and in which it was stated that the integration of "armed forces with civil society [is] an important expression of democracy".¹⁰³

Hence, one of the issues that needs to be dealt with when developing a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces is that of military education. By making military actors acquainted with the various military and non-military dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed, and by providing them with knowledge concerning the way in which they are supposed to operate within the confines that are set by such principles as democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, market

¹⁰⁰ Huntington, *The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations*, 85.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, 80-85.

¹⁰² Morris Janowitz, *The professional soldier. A social and political portrait* (New York 1964) 7-13.

¹⁰³ *Budapest summit declaration: towards a genuine partnership in a new era. Part IV: Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security*, article 20.

economies, social stability and social justice, and environmental protection, they should be able to play their part as an integral element of society.

Thirdly, attention needs to be paid to the civilian actors that are involved in security and defence policy making. According to Réka Szemerényi, the author of *Central European civil-military reforms at risk*, it is of the utmost importance that the people who operate as the Head of State, or belong to the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defence (PCNSD), are “genuine” civilians – as opposed to retired officers.¹⁰⁴ This holds true all the more as concerns the minister of Defence.¹⁰⁵

Fourthly, a legal framework, in which the respective powers and responsibilities of the various military and civilian actors concerned are outlined, has to be established.¹⁰⁶ In this regard, there are several elements that need to be taken into account. For example, parliament should be allowed to play an important part in security and defence policy making – particularly as concerns defence budgeting.¹⁰⁷ Also, as Betz maintained, “clear lines of authority over the military” have to be established.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, in *Central European civil-military relations and NATO expansion*, Jeffrey Simon stated that “the constitution and/or its amendments and laws must establish a clear division of authority between the president and government (prime minister and defence minister)”.¹⁰⁹

Finally, this legal framework needs to put it into practice. As it was explained in – again – the *Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security*, “each participating state will at all times provide for and maintain effective guidance to and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities vested with democratic legitimacy. Each participating state will provide controls to ensure that such authorities fulfil their constitutional and legal responsibilities”.¹¹⁰ Here, it needs to be kept in

¹⁰⁴ Réka Szemerényi, *Central European civil-military reforms at risk* Adelphi paper 306 (London 1996) 3.

¹⁰⁵ Betz, ‘The persistent problem of civil-military relations in East and Central Europe: a briefing note on democratic control of armed forces’, 107.

¹⁰⁶ Szemerényi, *Central European civil-military reforms at risk*, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Betz, ‘The persistent problem of civil-military relations in East and Central Europe: a briefing note on democratic control of armed forces’, 107.

Jeffrey Simon, *Central European civil-military relations and NATO expansion* (Washington 1995) 153.

An overview of the various roles that parliament can play within a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces can be found in:

Contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité: principes, mécanismes et pratiques (Geneva 2003).

¹⁰⁸ Betz, ‘The persistent problem of civil-military relations in East and Central Europe: a briefing note on democratic control of armed forces’, 107.

¹⁰⁹ Simon, *Central European civil-military relations and NATO expansion*, 153.

¹¹⁰ *Budapest summit declaration: towards a genuine partnership in a new era. Part IV: Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security*, article 21.

mind that these controls go beyond the level of governmental institutions. As Simon, together with Sean Kay argued in 'The new NATO', public accountability has to be assured as well.¹¹¹ In other words, through the press and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the public at large needs be involved in issues that have to do with security and defence as well.¹¹²

Participation with Ukraine

In turning from the significance of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, to the policies that the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations designed in order to assist Ukraine in fulfilling the requirements necessary for participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, it is of importance to recall that they had to do so in a period of turmoil. NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE had to come up with a response to the Ukrainian desire to cooperate – and even integrate – amidst attempts to develop a new instrument for safeguarding the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, and changes that affected both the Euro-Atlantic security community, and its underlying set of common ideas.

The CoE and Ukraine

As concerns the way in which relations between the CoE and Ukraine developed, it should be kept in mind that the former serves the purpose of monitoring the extent to which the countries in the Euro-Atlantic area adhere to, and act in accordance with, the various non-military dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed.¹¹³ As such, Ukraine's admission as a full member was seen as a confirmation of its European identity. According to the then Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who was present at the official welcoming ceremony, held in Strasbourg on 9 November 1995, membership with the CoE was an epochal event, as it implied that "another large blank spot has been removed from the map of the new Europe".¹¹⁴ However, in spite of the fact that the CoE's cooperation with Ukraine had a real significance on the ideational level, in a material sense it was of limited value.

¹¹¹ Simon and Kay, 'The new NATO', 387.

¹¹² Carsten Hoffmann, 'Media and armed forces – a special relationship' in: Hans W. Odenthal and Vojin Demitrijević (ed.), *Democratic control of armed forces: the role of parliament, media and academia* (s.l. 2003) 119-124, q.v. 119-120 and 124.

Simon and Kay, 'The new NATO', 387.

¹¹³ Charles Krupnick, 'European security and defence cooperation during the Cold War' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 3-23, q.v. 7 and 9.

¹¹⁴ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence* (London 1999) 497.

The WEU and Ukraine

Still, the ties that existed between the CoE and Ukraine were of a more substantial nature than those that existed between the WEU and Ukraine. Even though the country, in the spring of 1996, declared its intention to become a so-called associate partner – a status that would award it the right to take part in discussions and to be invited to participate in working groups on a case-by-case basis – no official type of cooperation came into existence.¹¹⁵ Yet, and this may perhaps seem paradoxically, it remains to be seen whether this setback had any serious consequences with regard to Ukraine's efforts to advance on the road back to Europe.

Given that the WEU is an organisation that is in constant search of a *raison d'être*, it can hardly be qualified as an active contributor to the management of Euro-Atlantic security. The fact that it was revived in Bonn on 19 June 1992, when the *Petersberg declaration* was adopted, could do nothing to remedy this situation. The organisation quickly became subordinated to, and divided between, the EU and NATO.¹¹⁶ Attempts to break this deadlock, and make the WEU a bridge between EU policy objectives and NATO military means – such as the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) initiative – fell victim to great power rivalry, and hence, proved to be ineffective.¹¹⁷

The EU and Ukraine

With the WEU thus described as a rather weak organisation, the EU failed to acquire the military muscle needed to back up the initiatives launched within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹¹⁸ However, it is an important actor in the Euro-Atlantic area with regard to the various non-military dimensions that together constitute the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security. As such, the organisation has the potential to play a part

¹¹⁵ *Document on a status of association with WEU for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic* (Kirchberg, 9 May 1994) article 1.

Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 517.

¹¹⁶ Edward M. Whalen, 'The military aspects of European security' in: Carl Cavangh Hodge (ed.), *Redefining European security* (New York 1999) 255-271, q.v. 259.

¹¹⁷ Moens and Anstis, 'Failures of the first round and a proposal for a new strategy', 227. Sperling and Kirchner, *Recasting the European order. Security architectures and economic cooperation*, 36 and 69-73.

¹¹⁸ Charles Krupnick, 'Not what they wanted: American policy and the European Security and Defence Identity' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 115-134, q.v. 132.

Gerhard Wettig, 'Introduction: crucial problems of security in Europe' in: Hodge (ed.), *Redefining European security*, 1-10, q.v. 8.

concerning the provision of the material advantages that would follow from the adoption, and subsequent translation into behaviour, of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security.

And indeed, as concerns the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia – countries that, together with Cyprus and Malta, joined the EU on 1 May 2004 – the argument can be put to the fore that the organisation was involved in a process of socialisation. In this regard, the concept of conditionality merits attention.

At a summit held in Copenhagen on 21-22 June 1993, the European Council declared that integration in the EU was only open to those countries that had met a specific set of conditions. Through inducements that took the form, not of military threats, but of financial benefits and the proverbial carrot of membership, the EU sought to assist those countries that were earmarked as potential member states in making the changes that compliance with the so-called Copenhagen criteria entailed.¹¹⁹ In turn, given that these criteria encompassed the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security, their fulfilment not only implied that the country concerned was ready to join the EU, but also indicated its ability to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community.

However, the EU's relations with Ukraine developed according to an alternate pattern. Initially, the situation looked quite promising. For reasons that are outlined in the next chapter, Ukraine thought it to be of importance to enter into some form of cooperation with the EU, something to which the latter responded by establishing an official representation in Kyiv.¹²⁰ Moreover, on 16 June 1994, a *Partnership and Co-operation Agreement* (PCA) was concluded between the European Communities and their member states, and Ukraine – the first of such an agreement to be signed with a former constituent republic of the USSR.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ The Copenhagen criteria can be defined as follows: Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

European Council in Copenhagen: conclusions of the presidency (Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993)

http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (11 October 2004).

¹²⁰ *Ukraine on the world arena*.

<http://www.ukremb.com/politics/foreignpolicy.html> (8 September 2004).

¹²¹ 'Partnership and co-operation agreement between the European Communities and their member states and Ukraine', *Official journal of the European communities* no. L 49 (19 February 1998).

Inna Pidluska, 'Ukraine and the EU. What prospects for integration' in: Ann Lewis (ed.), *The EU and Ukraine. Neighbours, friends, partners?* (London 2002) 183-197, q.v. 184.

According to the provisions of the PCA, its main objectives were (1) “to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of close political relations”; (2) “to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties so as to foster their sustainable development”; (3) “to provide a basis for mutually advantageous economic, social, financial, civil scientific, technological and cultural cooperation”; and (4) “to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy”.¹²²

Yet, these ambitious expectations were not met. On the one hand, as is elaborated upon in the final chapter of this Harmonie paper, Ukraine found it difficult to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice.¹²³ On the other hand, this cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that to the EU, which was primarily concerned with those countries from Central and Eastern Europe that were aspiring to membership, Ukraine was not a priority.¹²⁴ For its part, this helps to explain why Ukraine ratified the PCA already on 10 November 1994, and the EU and its member states only more than three years later.¹²⁵

When, on 1 March 1998, the PCA eventually did come into effect, Ukraine was quick to launch the next step on the road back to Europe.¹²⁶ On 11 June 1998, the then Ukrainian president Kuchma signed the *Decree on the approval of the strategy of Ukraine’s integration to the European Union*.¹²⁷ In this document, the country officially announced its intention to join the EU, and to ensure its involvement in “the European political, economic and legal space”.¹²⁸ As an intermediate goal, Ukraine declared that it sought associate membership.¹²⁹

¹²² ‘Partnership and co-operation agreement between the European Communities and their member states and Ukraine’, article 1.

¹²³ Ann Lewis, ‘Ukraine: where next?’ in: idem (ed), *The EU and Ukraine. Neighbours, friends, partners?*, 259-266, q.v. 261-262.

¹²⁴ Lewis, ‘Ukraine: where next?’, 261.

¹²⁵ *Ukraine on the world arena*.

¹²⁶ Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘The EU Common Strategy on Ukraine: a response to Ukraine’s ‘pro-European choice’?’ in: Lewis (ed.), *The EU and Ukraine. Neighbours, friends, partners?*, 213-220, q.v. 213.

¹²⁷ ‘Decree of the president of Ukraine on the approval of the strategy of Ukraine’s integration to the European Union’ in: Lewis (ed.), *The EU and Ukraine. Neighbours, friends, partners?*, 285-292.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁹ Sasse, ‘The EU Common Strategy on Ukraine: a response to Ukraine’s ‘pro-European choice’?’, 214.

The EU responded to this move on 11 December 1999 with the adoption of the *European Union Common Strategy on Ukraine*.¹³⁰ In this document, it was explicitly recognised that “the strategic partnership between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine, based on shared values and common interests, is a vital factor enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. The freedom, independence and stability of Ukraine rank among the greatest achievements in the new Europe rid of old dividing lines. Geography as well as size, the resources of its population as well as its location along the North-South and East-West axis give Ukraine a unique position in Europe and makes it a determinant regional actor”.¹³¹

Still, even though the *European Union Common Strategy on Ukraine* acknowledged the important contribution that Ukraine could make to the Euro-Atlantic security community, it stopped short of addressing the issue of Ukraine’s application for membership. Instead, it stated only that “the EU remains firmly committed to working with Ukraine at national, regional and local levels, in order to support a successful political and economic transformation in Ukraine, which will facilitate Ukraine’s further rapprochement with the EU”, and that “the EU and its Member States offer to share with Ukraine their various experiences in building modern political, economic, social and administrative structures, fully recognising that the main responsibility for Ukraine’s future lies with Ukraine itself”.¹³²

This unwillingness from the part of the EU to recognise Ukraine as a potential member state and, as a consequence, to become an active contributor to the process of socialisation, was expressed even more clearly in the spring of 2002. At a summit of the European Council held in Luxembourg, the so-called special neighbour policy was adopted, which outlined the way in which relations between an enlarged EU, and its new neighbours should develop, and which grouped Ukraine together with Belarus and Moldova – countries that had not prospects whatsoever of being able to return to Europe.¹³³

The OSCE and Ukraine

With regard to the OSCE, the situation looked somewhat different. Given the fact that the USSR had been one of the initial participants with the then still CSCE, the various post-Soviet republics that came into existence in 1991,

¹³⁰ ‘European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine’, *Official journal of the European Communities* no. L 331 (23 December 1999).

Sasse, ‘The EU Common Strategy on Ukraine: a response to Ukraine’s ‘pro-European choice?’’, 215.

¹³¹ ‘European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine’, article 1.

¹³² *Ibidem*, article 6.

¹³³ James Sherr, ‘Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic choice: is failure inevitable?’. <http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine.inevfail.htm> (8 September 2004).

experienced no difficulties whatsoever in gaining membership. Ukraine was officially admitted to the OSCE on 30 January 1992, and signed the *Helsinki final act* and the *Charter of Paris for a new Europe* on 26 February and 16 June of the same year respectively.¹³⁴

However, in line with what had been the case with regard to the other European and transatlantic (security) organisations, the effect of cooperation between the OSCE and Ukraine turned out to be limited. Even though the organisation did develop into an important actor with regard to so-called soft security issues, such as election monitoring and the protection of human rights, it was kept from fully realising its potential by the divergent interests of France, Germany, Great Britain, the RF and the US.¹³⁵

Furthermore, the OSCE did not grow beyond the task mentioned earlier of setting the guidelines to which (prospective) participants with the Euro-Atlantic security community should adhere.¹³⁶ Its membership of 55, encompassing countries as diverse as Canada and Kyrgyzstan, and Finland and Georgia, implied that it was incapable of playing its part with regard to the process of socialisation – with those countries that it sought to socialise already admitted, it was difficult to persuade them to alter their attitude, and hence, their behaviour.¹³⁷

NATO and Ukraine

Finally, NATO too had to address the Ukrainian demand to enter into some form of cooperation. Initially, the then 16 member states of NATO – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the US – found it difficult to come to terms with the many changes

¹³⁴ OSCE participating states.

http://www.osce.org/general/participating_states/ (19 July 2004).

¹³⁵ Whalen, 'The military aspects of European security', 259.

Christopher Anstis, 'The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)' in: Moens and Anstis (ed.), *Disconcerted Europe. The search for a new security architecture*, 76-112, q.v. 106.

Sperling and Kirchner, *Recasting the European order. Security architectures and economic cooperation*, 66.

¹³⁶ Adler and Barnett, 'Security communities in theoretical perspective', 18.

¹³⁷ OSCE participating states.

John Baylis, 'European security between the "logic of anarchy" and the "logic of community"' in: Hodge (ed.), *Redefining European security*, 13-28, q.v. 20.

that affected the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's.¹³⁸ More particularly, NATO was reluctant to become engaged in any form of security arrangement with the former member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the successor states to the USSR.¹³⁹

At a meeting of the NAC, held in London on 5 and 6 July 1990, the Heads of State and Government did nothing more than recognise that "the Atlantic community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our enemies in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship".¹⁴⁰ Yet, this declaration was not given substance. Despite the pressure that was applied by, most notably, the members of the so-called Visegrád group (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland), in the spring of 1991 the then secretary-general Manfred Wörner would not go any further than stating that the Alliance was "in no way indifferent to their security".¹⁴¹

It was only at the November 1991 meeting of the NAC that the relations between the member states of the Alliance and their former adversaries were formalised.¹⁴² Within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could engage with their counterparts from North America and Western Europe on a variety of levels, and on a variety of issues.¹⁴³ As it was declared by the ministers of Foreign Affairs in the *North Atlantic Cooperation Council statement on dialogue, partnership and cooperation*, which was adopted at the first meeting of the NACC, held in Brussels on 20 December 1991, "we have agreed to build on our existing liaison and to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues (...)".¹⁴⁴

From the part of Ukraine, the creation of the NACC was greeted with enthusiasm – something to which the country's admission on 10 March 1992

¹³⁸ *The North Atlantic treaty* (Washington D.C., 4 April 1949).

Protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (London, 22 October 1951).

Protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany (Paris, 23 October 1954).

Protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of Spain (Brussels, 10 December 1981).

¹³⁹ Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997. Blessings of liberty* The Washington papers 174 (Washington 1998) 10.

¹⁴⁰ *London declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (London, 5-6 July 1990) article 4.

¹⁴¹ Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997. Blessings of liberty*, 10.

¹⁴² Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, 'The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: managing European security in the twenty-first century' in: Charles Krupnick (ed.), *Almost NATO. Partners and players in Central and Eastern European security* (Lanham 2003) 17-45, q.v. 20.

¹⁴³ Jeffrey Simon, 'The Partnership for Peace path and civil-military relations' in: idem (ed.), *NATO enlargement: opinions and options* (Washington 1995) 45-72, q.v. 48-49.

¹⁴⁴ *North Atlantic Cooperation Council statement on dialogue, partnership and cooperation* (Brussels, 20 December 1991) article 4.

testifies.¹⁴⁵ As it was explained with regard to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the successor to the NACC that was established on 30 May 1997, such an instrument “for regular consultations between NATO and countries of the former Warsaw Pact, and with newly independent states created after the collapse of the USSR, on a broad range of political issues and issues of European and regional security” was a suitable way of enhancing cooperation between NATO and partner nations, and between partners themselves.¹⁴⁶ What is more, in view of the fact that the RF participated both in the NACC, and in the EAPC, these types of cooperation were seen by Ukraine as a safe way of furthering cooperation with its neighbours to the west, without alienating those to the east.¹⁴⁷

Yet, from the part of countries that, like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, were not interested in cooperation and partnership, but in integration and membership, the NACC and EAPC were seen as insufficient.¹⁴⁸ A similar divergence of opinions existed with regard to the Partnership for Peace (PfP), an initiative that was launched at a meeting of the NAC, held in Brussels on 10 January 1994.¹⁴⁹ To the prospective member states just mentioned, the, as it was dubbed, Partnership for Postponement, was a disappointment.

On the one hand, the *Partnership for Peace: framework document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* did go some way towards indicating the conditions that prospective participants would have to meet. As it was stipulated, countries that sought to join NATO would have to be able to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the underlying set of common ideas.¹⁵⁰

More specifically, there were four issues that were designated as being of particular importance: (1) “facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes”; (2) “ensuring democratic control of defence forces”; (3) “maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE”; and (4) “the development of cooperative

¹⁴⁵ *Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council*. <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&subject=epc> (11 October 2004).

¹⁴⁶ *Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council*.

¹⁴⁷ Hilary D. Driscoll and Neil S. MacFarlane, ‘Russia and NATO after the Cold War’ in: Krupnick (ed.), *Almost NATO. Partners and players in Central and Eastern European security*, 231-260, q.v. 239 and 246.

¹⁴⁸ *Basic document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council* (Sintra, 30 May 1997). Jeffrey Simon, *NATO enlargement & Central Europe. A study in civil-military relations* (Washington 1996) 13.

Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997. Blessings of liberty*, 18.

¹⁴⁹ *Partnership for Peace: invitation document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Brussels, 10 January 1994).

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises (...).¹⁵¹

On the other hand, the PfP failed to specify the roadmap and time schedule that would guide the process of enlargement. When taking into account the *Partnership for Peace: invitation document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, it becomes clear that the PfP was a way for NATO to strengthen the ties with its neighbours to the east, and to convey the message that it was open to the prospect of future enlargement, without specifying a concrete timeline.¹⁵²

As it was put: “we [the Heads of State and Government] (...) wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe”.¹⁵³

Here, it is important to note that NATO's hesitant behaviour with regard to the issue of opening up the Alliance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe – including those that had been a part of the USSR – was caused not only by doubts concerning the strains that enlargement would place on the organisation itself, but also by fears concerning the reaction of the RF to the expansion of its former Cold War enemy.¹⁵⁴ It was deemed that the ongoing Russian process of military, political, economic, social and environmental transformation, which could be to the benefit of the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole, should not be endangered by taking a position that might be interpreted as aggressive, thereby playing into the hands of the so-called “red-brown” coalition (composed of both communists and nationalists) that sought to turn the RF away from its reformatory path.¹⁵⁵

Yet, from the perspective of Ukraine, the drawbacks of the PfP just mentioned were of little significance. For the same reasons that the country

¹⁵¹ *Partnership for Peace: framework document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Brussels, 10 January 1994) article 3.

¹⁵² Peterson Ulrich, ‘The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: managing European security in the twenty-first century’, 22.
David S. Yost, *NATO transformed. The Alliance's new roles in international security* (Washington 1998) 98.

¹⁵³ *Partnership for Peace: invitation document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council*.

¹⁵⁴ Stephen A. Cambone, ‘The strategic implications of NATO enlargement’ in: Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *From Madrid to Brussels: perspectives on NATO enlargement* (s.l. 1997) 1-27, q.v. 2.

Simon, ‘The Partnership for Peace path and civil-military relations’, 50.

¹⁵⁵ Cambone, ‘The strategic implications of NATO enlargement’, 2.

welcomed the development of the NACC and the EAPC, it reacted positively to the PfP. On 8 February 1994, as the first of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine signed the *Partnership for Peace: framework document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council*.¹⁵⁶ This first step was followed on 25 May 1994 and 19 June 1995 respectively, by the submission of the so-called *Presentation document*, and the signing of the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP).¹⁵⁷

In the latter document, the various activities that Ukraine, in close cooperation with the NATO member states, was to entertain – such as, for example, military exercises, exchanges in the sphere of military education and language courses – were outlined. Given that these forms of partnership were usually financed by NATO, the PfP had a significance that encompassed not only ideational, but also material factors.¹⁵⁸ According to Tor Bukkvoll, the author of 'Ukraine and NATO. The politics of soft cooperation', it is likely that cooperation with NATO was seen as an additional source of funding.¹⁵⁹

In the meantime, with NATO-Ukraine relations thus developing at a slow and gradual pace, other countries from Central and Eastern Europe continued to pressure NATO into becoming more outspoken with regard to the issue of their applications for membership. The next step towards enlargement was taken in September 1995, with the publication of the *Study on NATO enlargement*, in which a number of criteria for membership were stated.¹⁶⁰

Here again, the importance of the adoption of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security, and, more particularly, of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, was stressed. NATO stated that countries interested in joining the Alliance, would have to have (1) "demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles (...)"; (2) "shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility"; and (3) "established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence forces (...)".¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ *Ukraine on the world arena*.

¹⁵⁷ Laszlo Nagy and Gyorgy Varga, 'Contacts between Ukraine and NATO: the view from Hungary', *National security and Defence*, no. 8, vol. 1 (2000) 48-52, q.v. 49.

Ukraine on the world arena.

¹⁵⁸ *Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO: participation of the armed forces of Ukraine in PfP program*.

<http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&subject=participation> (11 October 2004).

Nagy and Varga, 'Contacts between Ukraine and NATO: the view from Hungary', 49.

¹⁵⁹ Tor Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine and NATO. The politics of soft cooperation', *Security dialogue*, no. 3, vol. 28 (1997) 363-374, q.v. 365.

¹⁶⁰ Simon, *NATO enlargement & Central Europe. A study in civil-military relations*, 23.

¹⁶¹ *Study on NATO enlargement, chapter V: What are the implications of membership for new members, including their rights and obligations, and what do they need to do to prepare for membership* (Brussels 1995) article 72.

Moreover, as the adoption of the *NATO enlargement facilitation act* by the American Congress in July 1996 underscored, it was becoming clear that enlargement was no longer a question of “if”, but of “when” and “how”.¹⁶² Still, it was only after the signing of the *Founding act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation* in Paris on 27 May 1997 that the relations between the member states of NATO on the one hand, and the RF on the other hand had been established in such a fashion as to allow for the first three countries from Central and Eastern Europe to be invited to join the Alliance.¹⁶³ In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland gained membership of NATO.¹⁶⁴ Five years later, this first wave of enlargement was followed by a second one as Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia also integrated into Alliance.¹⁶⁵

However, NATO did more than transform the composition of its membership. As has already been touched upon, the role that it played changed as well. Originally, as envisioned by the provisions of the *North Atlantic treaty*, the organisation’s core functions were to serve both as a forum for consultation, and – even more importantly – as an instrument for collective defence against, and containment of, a common enemy.¹⁶⁶ As such, the Alliance did not only act as a guarantor of security, thereby providing for a stable North Atlantic area, but it also played a part in facilitating cooperation between the countries of North America and Western Europe, as well as between post-war Germany and its former adversaries. Put differently, with reference to the words of NATO’s first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, the Alliance’s traditional goals were to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.¹⁶⁷

After the end of the Cold War, NATO became deeply involved in discussions concerning such issues as burden sharing, the formation of a so-called “European pillar” within the framework of the Alliance, the possibility of going to Afghanistan and Iraq to operate out-of-area and the necessity to

¹⁶² Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997. Blessings of liberty*, 99.

¹⁶³ Driscoll and MacFarlane, ‘Russia and NATO after the Cold War’, 245.

Solomon, *The NATO enlargement debate, 1990-1997. Blessings of liberty*, 130.

¹⁶⁴ *Protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary and the Republic of Poland* (Brussels, 16 December 1997).

¹⁶⁵ *Protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia* (Brussels, 26 March 2003).

¹⁶⁶ Charles-Philippe David, ‘Conclusion: will NATO live to celebrate its 100th birthday?’ in: David and Lévesque (ed.), *The future of NATO. Enlargement, Russia, and European security*, 216-222, q.v. 217.

Moens, ‘The formative years of the new NATO: diplomacy from London to Rome’, 26.

¹⁶⁷ Sperling and Kirchner, *Recasting the European order. Security architectures and economic cooperation*, 59.

engage in crisis management operations.¹⁶⁸ Yet, by continuing to stress the importance of its underlying way of thinking concerning the relationship between security, and military affairs, politics, economics, social affairs and the environment, NATO also manifested itself as a community of values.¹⁶⁹

Moreover, by using the forms of financial assistance that were mentioned earlier, in combination with the carrot of membership, it greatly contributed to the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security, and, more particularly, to the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces by those countries from Central and Eastern Europe that sought involvement with the Alliance. Here, there exists an obvious parallel with the manner in which the EU dealt with the issue of enlargement.

The changes that beset NATO with regard to the way it was to function on the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic stage found a reflection in the organisation's policies vis-à-vis Ukraine. Although the country did not – at least not initially – submit a formal application for membership, during the course of the 1990's NATO began to recognise that its relations with Ukraine were “central to building peace and stability within the Euro-Atlantic region”, and that it should “support Ukraine's reform efforts on the road towards full integration in Euro-Atlantic security structures” accordingly.¹⁷⁰

This commitment from the part of NATO to assist Ukraine in its efforts to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community and to facilitate the process of socialisation that this entailed (a commitment that differed both qualitatively, and quantitatively from that of the EU), found a reflection in the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*.¹⁷¹

In this document, which was adopted at a summit of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member states, held in Madrid on 9 July 1997, it was reiterated that “an independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole”.¹⁷² Also, both NATO and Ukraine recognised the importance of the various dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of

¹⁶⁸ Ted Galen Carpenter, 'NATO's new strategic concept: coherent blueprint or conceptual muddle', *Journal of strategic studies. Special issue on: NATO enters the 21st century*, no. 3, vol. 23 (2000) 7-28, q.v. 7.

Moens, 'The formative years of the new NATO: diplomacy from London to Rome', 34

¹⁶⁹ *Study on NATO enlargement, chapter V: What are the implications of membership for new members, including their rights and obligations, and what do they need to do to prepare for membership*, article 70.

Simon and Kay, 'The new NATO', 370.

¹⁷⁰ *NATO-Ukraine: a distinctive partnership*.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine-e.pdf> (11 October 2004).

¹⁷¹ *NATO-Ukraine relations: evolution of NATO-Ukraine relations*.

<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/evolution.html> (14 September 2004).

¹⁷² *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* (Madrid, 9 July 1997) article 1.

security is composed, and, more specifically, stressed the need for Ukraine “to carry forward its defence reforms’ and “to strengthen democratic and civilian control of the armed forces”.¹⁷³

Moreover, the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* specified the instrument through which the various forms of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine should take place. These included the establishment of a NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Kyiv, the creation of a NATO-Ukraine Commission and a Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR), as well as the development of relations between the North Atlantic Assembly and the parliament of Ukraine.¹⁷⁴

In an attempt to “deepen and broaden” the relations that existed between NATO and Ukraine even further, a *NATO-Ukraine action plan* was adopted at a summit of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member states, held in Prague on 22 November 2002.¹⁷⁵ The purpose of this document was to identify “Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities in pursuit of its aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, and to provide a strategic framework for existing and future NATO-Ukraine cooperation under the Charter”.¹⁷⁶

To this end, the *NATO-Ukraine action plan* contained a number of principles and objectives regarding: (1) “internal political issues”; (2) “foreign and security policy”; (3) “economic issues”; (4) “information issues”; (5) “defence and security sector reform”; (6) “cooperation with NATO”; (7) “resource implications”; (8) “information protection and security”; and (9) “legal issues”.¹⁷⁷ Also, the drafting of an annual *Target implementation plan* was envisaged, in which the measures, necessary for realising the various principles and objectives, should be outlined.¹⁷⁸

This implied that, under the heading of “internal political issues”, the strengthening of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces was to be obtained through (1) “elaborating a strategy of the implementation of democratic civilian control over the armed forces of Ukraine”; (2) “taking actions on adoption of the *Law on democratic civilian control over the Ukrainian armed forces*”; (3) “training civilian personnel for the MoD and other law enforcement and security structures”; (4) “holding NATO-Ukraine consultations on civil-military relations and civilian democratic control in the defence sphere of Ukraine”; and (5) “organising NATO-Ukraine projects to develop civilian cadres for the MoD and for other security structures as appropriate”.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷³ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem, articles 11-13.

¹⁷⁵ *NATO-Ukraine action plan* (Prague, 22 November 2002) introduction.

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁷ Ibidem, sections I-IV.

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem, section V.

¹⁷⁹ *NATO-Ukraine 2003 target plan in the framework of the NATO-Ukraine action plan*, section I.

Yet, apart from stating in a very concrete way the different steps that needed to be taken both by NATO, and by Ukraine, in order for the latter to be able to advance on the road back to Europe, the *NATO-Ukraine action plan* was of importance in another way as well. It served as a clear expression of Ukraine's goal, not only of becoming a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community, and of carrying out the reforms necessary to adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the various military and non-military dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed, but also of joining NATO as a full member state – a goal that was first brought to the fore on 23 May 2002, when the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) declared that the country officially sought membership of NATO.¹⁸⁰

Concluding remarks

In *Chapter I The issue of participation* it was stated that one of the conditions that has to be met if a process of socialisation is to succeed, deals with change on the international level, when the security community concerned begins to consider the possibility of expanding its membership, and the international organisations involved gain an interest in applying material inducements in order to assist a prospective participating country in establishing the relevant set of common ideas. With reference to the introduction of the chapter in hand, it can be argued that this requirement has largely been met.

Leaving the failed attempts to establish a Euro-Atlantic security architecture aside, the zone of peace that was originally formed by the countries of North America and Western Europe responded to the new circumstances with which it was faced by becoming open to the prospect of enlargement. In addition, the epochal events that took place in the late 1980's and early 1990's led to an alteration of the set of common ideas on which the Euro-Atlantic security community is founded. As the narrow Cold War concept of security widened into the comprehensive post-Cold War one, the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions gained prominence, and became as important as the traditional military one.

In turn, the changes that affected the Euro-Atlantic concept of security resulted in a transformation of the boundaries within which military institutions were supposed to operate. Apart from deterrence of, and defence against, aggression, military cooperation and crisis management operations, compliance with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, market economies, social stability and social justice, and environmental protection became of significance.

¹⁸⁰ Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Weekly issue*, no. 21 (20 May-26 May 2002).
NATO-Ukraine action plan, section I.

Yet, it were not only military actors that had to adhere to – and act in accordance with – the set of common ideas that underlies the Euro-Atlantic security community. One of the aspects that the concept of civil-military relations addresses has to do with the parameters that are set by civilian actors. Hence, they too were expected to adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security. Given that in a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces both elements are supposed to be present, the extent to which that particular type of interaction between military institutions and their civilian counterparts is developed, serves not only as a case-study, but also as a litmus test of the extent to which the conditions for participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community are met.

The importance of the concept of civil-military relations was reflected in the policy of NATO vis-à-vis Ukraine. Whereas the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE too had expressed their desire to see the country become a participant with the enlarging zone of peace, they were either unable, or unwilling to put words into deeds concerning the provision of actual support for the process of reform that this former Soviet republic was supposed to undergo. Thus, it was the Alliance (which used its role as a representative of the Euro-Atlantic security community to try and facilitate the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security in Ukraine) that was the international organisation best suited to assist the country in completing the necessary process of social learning – the more so since it had the instruments at its disposal to apply inducements of a material nature (instruments that took the form of financial benefits, and the carrot of membership). In this sense, the argument can be put to the fore that, at least when it comes to policy-on-paper, the first of the requirements necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed has been met as well.

III Ukraine

In *Chapter II The Euro-Atlantic security community*, it was argued that in the aftermath of the Cold War, the western zone of peace experienced a period of transformation. In the present chapter, the extent to which these changes on the international level coincided with changes on the domestic level is analysed. To this end, a brief overview of the country's history up until the moment of the adoption of the declaration of independence on 24 August 1991, followed by an account of the events that took place under the *aegis* of Ukraine's first president, Kravchuk, and his successor, Kuchma, is presented. Also, attention is paid to the development of the country's foreign and security policy, and, more specifically, to the way in which Ukraine established relations with its neighbour to the east, while simultaneously seeking to become involved with its neighbours to the west – including the Euro-Atlantic security community. In so doing, the second condition for participation with the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community of values, namely the extent to which the Ukrainian elites came to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security, is touched upon as well.

History of Ukraine

When, on 24 August 1991, the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine* was adopted, the country had little experience with independent statehood.¹⁸¹ For much of its past, Ukraine had been a borderland, divided between, and subjected by, such powerful neighbours as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire.¹⁸² It was only amidst the turmoil that followed from the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 that Ukraine was provided with the opportunity to enter the Euro-Atlantic stage as a sovereign and unified actor. However, the country's attempts at gaining independent statehood proved to be short-lived. In 1920, western Ukraine came under Polish rule, and eastern Ukraine was incorporated into the USSR.

¹⁸¹ *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*.
http://gska2.rada.gov.ua7777/site/postanova_eng/res_declaration_independence_rev12.htm (7 September 2004).

¹⁸² The word "окраина" means "borderland".

The Soviet period

In the early 1920's, the relationship between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) and the other constituent republics of the USSR was not yet clearly defined. Only with the adoption of the Soviet *Constitution* in 1924 was it laid down which policies remained under the jurisdiction of the various republics, which matters remained within the exclusive domain of the USSR, and which affairs had to be decided upon by both parties.¹⁸³ In addition, in an attempt to underline the supposedly federalist character of the USSR, the *Constitution* awarded each republic with the right to secede. Yet, given the fact that the Communist Party had to agree with such a decision before it could take effect, the *de jure* sovereignty of the Soviet republics did not exist *de facto*. It was the Russian dominated, Moscow-based Communist Party, and in its wake the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (RuSSR), that enjoyed a position of supremacy within the USSR.¹⁸⁴

Still, the leadership of the USSR realised that, if the communist revolution was to succeed, it would have to take root in the various constituent republics. Especially Ukraine, the second-largest Soviet republic, would have to be won over to communism. To this end, a policy of Ukrainisation was officially implemented.¹⁸⁵ This new policy was directed, first of all, towards the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). In order to make it more acceptable to the people of Ukraine, many of its Russian and Jewish leaders were replaced by ethnic Ukrainians. Moreover, members of the CPU were instructed to use the Ukrainian language when conducting party or government business. Special language courses were set up, and those party-officials that did not complete them successfully were demoted. Also, efforts were made to increase the number of Ukrainian rank-and-file party-members.¹⁸⁶

Secondly, Ukrainisation made its mark on education. In an attempt to bring down the level of illiteracy, many new schools were founded, both on the primary, and on the secondary level. In all of these, Ukrainian became the compulsory language of instruction.¹⁸⁷ Thirdly, the policy of Ukrainisation had a positive impact on the development of Ukrainian culture. As more and more writers began to use the Ukrainian language, prose and poetry flourished. The theatre and the filmmaking industry also profited from these developments, as did the various branches of science, and the media.¹⁸⁸ All in all, with Ukrainian

¹⁸³ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history* (Toronto 1992) 385.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, 385-386.

¹⁸⁵ Władysław A. Serczyk, 'Die sowjetische und die 'polnische' Ukraine zwischen den Weltkriegen' in: Golczewski (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, 202-223, q.v. 208. Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 387.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 208.

¹⁸⁷ Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 388-389.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, 389-399.

culture and language prospering on an as yet unprecedented scale, the 1920's came to be regarded as "the golden age for Ukrainians under Soviet rule".¹⁸⁹

However, this situation did not last very long. The 1930's can be categorised as one of the most traumatic periods in the history of eastern Ukraine. Under the leadership of Josef Stalin, the USSR embarked upon the twin-policies of centralisation and industrialisation. For the UkrSSR this implied that, in order to attain the goals set out in the various five-year plans, the agricultural sector would have to undergo a process of collectivisation. The leadership of the USSR thought that a system of collective agriculture would, on the one hand, allow peasants to enter the industrial workforce, and, on the other hand, secure a constant supply of foodstuffs.¹⁹⁰

Yet, no matter what the potential benefits of a policy of collectivisation might be, the Ukrainian peasants were not prepared to give up their land, crops and livestock, and move to the state-owned collective agricultural enterprises. Therefore, Stalin took to a policy of forced collectivisation. This policy, and the terror that accompanied it, were of a horrifying nature. The liquidation of the *kulaks*, the supposedly wealthier peasants that were suspected of obstructing the collectivisation attempts, and the famine that occurred in 1931-1933 as a result of the massive requisitioning of grain, led to the death of millions of people.¹⁹¹

The 1930's took their toll of the Ukrainian people in yet another way. In 1933 the policy of Ukrainisation was abandoned, as Stalin declared it to be a form of local nationalism, and hence, a threat to the unity of the USSR. In its place came a policy of Russification, which annulled much of what had been gained in the previous decade.¹⁹² With regard to the CPU, it led to the purging of many of the Ukrainian party officials who had come to power in the 1920's. These nationalists, as they were branded, were replaced by loyal communists of ethnic Russian origin.

In the field of education too, the impact of Russification was felt, as many Ukrainian-language schools were either closed down or forced to accept Russian as the compulsory language of instruction.¹⁹³ Ukrainian literature, art, science and media suffered as well, since many of the achievements that had been made under the influence of the policy of Ukrainisation were denounced as being bourgeois and nationalist in character. In short, the policy of Russification led to a glorification of the Russian people, history, culture and language, and – subsequently – to an attitude of contempt for all things Ukrainian.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁹ Ibidem, 380.

¹⁹⁰ Ibidem, 409.

¹⁹¹ The word "кулак" means "independent farmer".

Paul Robert Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine* (Toronto 1996) 553-563.

¹⁹² Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 421-422.

¹⁹³ Ibidem, 422-423.

¹⁹⁴ Ibidem.

The Polish period

In western Ukraine, people found themselves in a roughly similar situation.¹⁹⁵ Although Poland had pledged to grant autonomy to the various national minorities living on its territory, these promises were never honoured. As the country developed from a democratic into an authoritarian state, the Ukrainians were faced with a curtailing of their political prerogatives. For example, on the local level, self-government was abolished in 1930, when Ukrainian-inhabited villages were placed under the direct administration of Polish officials.

With regard to the development of the Ukrainian culture and language too, the situation looked grim. Notwithstanding the fact that they had promised to allow the Ukrainian language to be used in public affairs, the Poles officially forbade the use of the Ukrainian language in 1924. Furthermore, Ukrainian-language schools were closed down, and subsequently transformed into bilingual ones – which, in reality, meant that they became Polish-language schools.

The inhabitants of western Ukraine, whose national consciousness was actually stronger developed than that of their counterparts in eastern Ukraine, were not prepared to accept these oppressive Polish policies, and to submit to the obvious attempts at Polonisation. The largest Ukrainian political party, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO), continually stressed the need for the creation of a united, independent Ukrainian republic. It was hoped that by stimulating the growth of the Ukrainian national movement, and by, simultaneously, fostering socio-economic development, the people of western Ukraine could be prepared for independent statehood.

Another political movement, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) advocated a similar set of goals. However, it differed markedly from the UNDO with regard to the way in which these aims were to be achieved. The OUN, which can best be described as a rightist radical movement, committed acts of sabotage, and killed both Polish officials, and Ukrainians who were willing to cooperate with the Poles. Yet, despite the fact that both the OUN and the UNDO were highly active in the inter-war years, and that both enjoyed a considerable measure of support among the people of western Ukraine, they were, ultimately, unsuccessful.

The Soviet period: part II

WWII – or, as it was known in the USSR, the Great Patriotic War – had grave implications for both western and eastern Ukraine. In material and human terms, the scorched-earth policy that was applied by the retreating Soviet armed

¹⁹⁵ An overview of the developments that took place in western Ukraine in the inter-war years can be found in: Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 425-452.

forces, and the brutality of the invading German armed forces resulted in tremendous devastation. On the political level, WWII saw the incorporation of the western Ukrainian territories into the UkrSSR.¹⁹⁶

On the insistence of the leadership of both the RuSSR, and the USSR, this enlarged UkrSSR made its appearance on the international stage, and became one of the founding members of the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, it became a member of twenty other international organisations, and concluded around sixty treaties. However, since the UkrSSR always followed the lead of the USSR, these actions had a symbolic, rather than an actual value. Despite appearances, Ukraine was still not a truly sovereign republic.¹⁹⁷

Nor was it a veritably unified one. The differences between western and eastern Ukraine still loomed large, and could not be bridged overnight. It took a considerable amount of time, energy and especially force, before agriculture had underwent a process of collectivisation, the armed insurrection of the OUN against what its members saw as Russian occupation had been crushed, and membership of the CPU had become an attractive option for the people of western Ukraine.

Apart from the efforts to incorporate it within the UkrSSR, western Ukraine also suffered, as did eastern Ukraine, from Stalinist repression. During the Great Patriotic War, in an attempt to boost the morale of the various peoples inhabiting the USSR, Stalin had allowed nationalism to spread. However, with the war won, this policy was no longer deemed necessary. In fact, it was even considered to be dangerous, as it could possibly lead to the disintegration of the USSR. Thus, in the years after the end of WWII, all manifestations of nationalism were again being crushed.

The consequences that this reversal of policy had for Ukraine lay mostly in the cultural sphere. To name but a few examples, authors who glorified Ukrainian history, or who took pride in Ukraine's efforts to defeat the German armed forces were being prosecuted, and composers who used traditional Ukrainian themes were being forced to admit their "mistakes". With regard to politics, the effects of the policy of Russification were limited. The leadership of the CPU already consisted of Russians, and was, moreover, keen to follow Stalin's lead.

With the death of Stalin in 1953, and the resultant loosening of the ideological reigns, the situation in which the people of Ukraine found themselves, changed once again. Especially on the political level, reforms were initiated. For the first time since the coming into being of the UkrSSR, an ethnic Ukrainian was appointed as head of the CPU. Ukrainians rose to other

¹⁹⁶ On overview of the experiences of western and eastern Ukraine during the Second World War can be found in: Magocsi, *A history of Ukraine*, 611-637.

¹⁹⁷ An overview of the developments that took place in the UkrSSR between the end of the Great Patriotic War and the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev can be found in: Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 481-537.

important positions as well, both on the level of the UkrSSR, and of the USSR as a whole. Also, the signs that the new leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, looked favourably upon Ukraine were greeted with a massive rise in the membership of the CPU.

De-Stalinisation made itself felt in the cultural field too. The Ukrainian intelligentsia pressed for the rehabilitation of those who had fallen victim to the Stalinist terror of the 1930's and late 1940's. With regard to their own work, they demanded freedom from ideological interference, and recognition of the significance of the Ukrainian history, culture and language.

Yet, under Khrushchev as well, there were limits as to how far Ukrainian nationalist tendencies were allowed to spread. For example, those artists who went too far in displaying a sense of bourgeois nationalism, were still being punished. Concerning politics, the situation was such that, although Ukrainians now occupied important positions, they could not act with their country's interests at heart. On the contrary, in exchange for career opportunities, they were supposed to cooperate with, and support the leadership both of the RuSSR, and of the USSR. Thus, despite the loosening of the Stalinist screws, and the granting of a number of concessions to the Ukrainians, the twin-policies of subservience to the USSR and Russification remained in place.

They continued to be so under the aegis of Leonid Brezhnev, Khrushchev's successor as head of the USSR. Politically, nor culturally, nor linguistically were the people of Ukraine in a position to decide upon their own fate. This situation only changed with the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, and the subsequent introduction of the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.¹⁹⁸

Independent statehood: part II

Whereas *perestroika* was especially important with regard to the economic field, *glasnost* had mainly political consequences. As was the case in the other constituent republics of the USSR, in the UkrSSR the different grievances, that had been harboured for so long, and had always been repressed, came to the fore. The late 1980's saw the proliferation of a number of dissident movements. Initially, these groups, which were composed of members of the cultural intelligentsia and newly-released political prisoners, were only small and insignificant. They were too fragmented to win over the general public to their

¹⁹⁸ The word "перестройка" means "restructuring". The word "гласность" means "openness". Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 514-521.

messages of democracy, national self-determination, human rights, religious freedom and environmental safety.¹⁹⁹

However, in the autumn of 1988, this situation began to change. In the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, so-called popular fronts, in which dissidents and moderate communists joined forces to extend the boundaries of the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, had achieved considerable successes. Inspired by these examples, the members of the various opposition groups agreed to try and launch a similar initiative in Ukraine.

In the summer of 1989, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring (Rukh) was formed. Its inaugural congress, which was held in September of the same year, was attended by representatives from over a thousand organisations, as well as by delegates representing the various minorities inhabiting Ukraine, such as Russians, Belorussians, Poles and Jews. The attendance of the latter group of participants was made possible by the fact that Rukh tried to address not the Ukrainian people, but the people of Ukraine, i.e. it sought to appeal to all of the inhabitants of the territory of Ukraine, and not only to ethnic Ukrainians.

In view of this, it is not surprising that Rukh's programme called for, as it was termed, ethnic harmony. Moreover, it advocated the introduction of a social market economy, the foundation of a democratic, law-based state and the "creation of a sovereign Ukrainian state". Also, Rukh supported the conclusion of a renewed Union treaty that would allow the various constituent republics of the USSR to define their relations on a new, and more equal, footing.

Clearly, the leadership of the CPU did not look kindly upon Rukh, which was rapidly gaining in popularity. It was seen as an organisation that could grow to become a political party, capable of rivalling with the CPU. The reaction to this perceived threat was twofold. On the one hand, hard-line communists tried to weaken Rukh's base of support by slandering it in the media. On the other hand, the more moderate communists wanted to expand their dialogue with Rukh. This way, they hoped to turn the potentially destructive calls for reform to their own advantage, analogous to what had been the case in the Baltic states.

The cooperation between Rukh and the moderate communists intensified after elections for the Ukrainian parliament had been held in March 1990. These first multi-party elections ever to have been held in the UkrSSR were a landmark in the political history of the country. The so-called Democratic Bloc, of whom Rukh was a constituent and important part, managed to obtain just over a 100 of the 450 eligible seats. Thus, not only was the loss of the CPU significant, but the new political situation that arose in the aftermath of the elections also made it impossible for the communists to ignore the members of Rukh, and of the other, smaller democratic groups, any longer.

¹⁹⁹ An overview of the developments that took place in the UkrSSR between the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and the moment of the declaration of independence can be found in: Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence* (London 1999).

One of the first issues that the members of the Ukrainian parliament were confronted with, was the debate regarding the question of sovereignty. The members of the Democratic Bloc, together with the more moderate members of the CPU, stated that the sovereignty that had been accorded to the UkrSSR by the *Constitution* of the USSR was nothing but a hoax. They argued that, under the present circumstances, Ukraine could not decide upon its own fate, and could not participate as a full and equal member in the affairs of the USSR. In order to correct this situation, they proposed the adoption of a new – and this time genuine – declaration of sovereignty.

In July 1990 the draft version of the *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*, as the document was officially entitled, was put to the vote. Under pressure from the developments that were taking place in the other constituent states of the USSR, where sovereignty (or even independence) was also being proclaimed, and heavily influenced by the mass demonstrations that were taking place throughout Ukraine, even the more hard-line communists decided to come to terms with reality, and accept the proposal. Hence, with an overwhelming majority, the republic's sovereignty was officially proclaimed on 16 July 1990.

The year following this momentous event, was a very uncertain one. With the transitions that were taking place throughout the USSR, it was clear that far-reaching reforms were needed. Yet, it remained to be seen whether these reforms would take the form of the conclusion of a renewed Union treaty, or of the dissolution of the USSR. The events that took place in August 1991 in Moscow brought matters to a head. The failed attempts to bring an end to the era of reforms, and to return to the pre-1985 situation made it abundantly clear to both the members of the Democratic Bloc, and all but the most staunch members of the CPU that, as long as the future of the UkrSSR, and of the USSR as a whole, was not decided upon, the country was still vulnerable to outside interference.

Therefore, on 24 August 1991, again under the influence of both the developments that were taking place in the other Soviet republics, and the huge crowds of Ukrainians that were demonstrating throughout the country, the parliament of the UkrSSR voted in favour of the declaration of the "independence of Ukraine and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state". In a referendum held on 1 December 1991, the people of Ukraine, whether of Ukrainian, Russian, Belarusian, Polish or Jewish decent, overwhelmingly endorsed this historic decision. Hence, by the end of the year 1991, Ukraine had – for the second time in a century – regained independent statehood.

Ukraine since 1991

Together with the referendum on independence, Ukraine held its first presidential elections. Out of the six contenders, Kravchuk was the only representative of the former communist elite.²⁰⁰ Yet, this did not prove to be a drawback. On the contrary, given that, as the chairman of the parliament of the UkrSSR, Kravchuk had played a pivotal part in the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*, he was perceived by many as an advocate of the country's national interests.²⁰¹ Moreover, with the CPU's organisational structure still largely in place, and the media being under continued control of the state, he was in a better position to bring his message across than his rivals – who were hopelessly divided anyway.²⁰² So it came about that, with 62% of the vote, Kravchuk was elected as the new Head of State.²⁰³

Ukraine under Kravchuk

Upon assuming office, it became clear that Kravchuk reacted to the changed circumstances with which he was confronted, not only by acting as the champion of the cause of Ukrainian independence, but also by trying to initiate a process of far-reaching transformation.²⁰⁴ For reasons that, undoubtedly, were connected to the advantages that were mentioned in *Chapter I The issue of participation*, namely those of political advancement and legitimisation of one's own position (in the eyes both of the Ukrainian society, and of the Euro-Atlantic security community) Ukraine's newly-elected president sought to do away with the legacy of his country's past, and to introduce the principles that come with democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, market economies, social stability and social justice, and environmental protection.²⁰⁵

However, as he was to discover, there existed a sharp distinction between policy-on-paper and policy-in-practice – between announcing the adoption of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security, and actually translating it into behaviour. With regard to the military dimension of security, Ukraine found it difficult to form national armed forces out of the variety of units of the Red Army

²⁰⁰ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: perestroika to independence* (Houndmills 2000) 195.

²⁰¹ Kuzio, *Ukraine: perestroika to independence*, 194.

²⁰² Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 407.

²⁰³ Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of independence. Ukraine after totalitarianism* (New York 1993) 153.

²⁰⁴ An overview of the way in which Kravchuk changed his attitude can be found in: Motyl, *Dilemmas of independence. Ukraine after totalitarianism*, 149-174.

²⁰⁵ George Bush, 'Joint declaration with president Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine' (s.l., 6 May 1992).

<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92050601.html> (5 January 2005).

that were stationed on its territory. While this is something that is addressed in more detail in the next chapter, for now, what needs to be kept in mind is that, to a country that had already lost its independence once, and that considered the provision of security and stability to be of the utmost importance, this was a serious problem.

As concerns the various non-military dimensions that together constitute the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security, there too were a number of problems. In the political sphere, Ukraine became engaged in the process of creating national bodies of government. Although the UkrSSR had been a sovereign actor *de jure*, it had not been so *de facto*. Hence, some institutions had to be established anew – such as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – while others had to be transformed from purely ceremonial into actually functioning ones – such as parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers.²⁰⁶

Moreover, the system within which the different governmental bodies were supposed to operate had to be reformed. In the *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*, it was stated that the parliament of the UkrSSR strove “to create a democratic society” – a point that was reiterated in the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*, where the country was defined as “an independent democratic state”.²⁰⁷

Kravchuk sought to give substance to these calls for democratisation by urging the members of parliament to replace the by now obsolete *Constitution* of the USSR by a new Ukrainian one, and to write out parliamentary elections.²⁰⁸ Yet, as parliament turned out to be reluctant to dissolve itself, new elections were only held in March 1994.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, the proposed *Constitution* was not adopted until 1996. In the meantime, the formation of political parties was a process that took place haphazardly. With Rukh slowly disintegrating into a number of loose formations, and the CPU officially disbanded, a multi-party system in the western sense of the term failed to come into existence.²¹⁰

The faltering pace with which democratic reforms took place was not the only issue that Kravchuk was confronted with. Due to the many cultural,

²⁰⁶ Marc Nordberg, ‘State and institution building in Ukraine’ in: Taras Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics of post-Soviet transformation* (Armonk 1998) 41-55, q.v. 43.

²⁰⁷ *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*.
http://gska2rada.gov.ua:7777/site/postanova_eng/declaration_of_state_sovereignty_of_Ukraine_rev1.htm (7 September 2004).

Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine.

²⁰⁸ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 432.

²⁰⁹ An overview of the 1994 parliamentary elections can be found in: Sarah Birch, ‘Party system formation and voting behaviour in the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of 1994’ in: Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics of post-Soviet transformation*, 139-160.

²¹⁰ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 432-434.

religious and linguistic similarities that existed between Ukrainians and Russians, there were repeated calls to make Russian the second state language, and to establish a system of dual citizenship.²¹¹ Such tendencies were especially strong in the eastern and south-eastern *oblasts* of Ukraine – something that can be explained, not only by pointing to reasons of a historical origin, but also by referring to the large number of Russian immigrants that, from the end of the 19th century onwards, had come to settle there.²¹²

Here, an important qualification needs to be made. What should be kept in mind is that, for the majority of the population, the reluctance to sever the ties with the successor to the RuSSR, the RF, had to do with the Russian nation, and not with the Russian state. Anatol Lieven, the author of *Ukraine and Russia. A fraternal rivalry* captured this attitude quite clearly when he quoted someone from eastern Ukraine – someone who was in favour of the establishment of friendly relations with his neighbours on the other side of the border – as saying: “they [the Russians] always want to be big brother to the Ukrainians, but instead of behaving like a brother, the Russian government today is simply trying to gouge out every advantage for Russia”.²¹³

However, this attitude was not shared by the inhabitants of the Crimean peninsula. Historically, the Crimea had always been a part of Russian territory. The ethnic composition of the peninsula, which (according to the data from a census carried out in 1989) was 67% Russian and only 26% Ukrainian, testifies to this.²¹⁴ Yet, in 1954, Krushchev “donated” the Crimean peninsula to the UkrSSR as “a token of friendship of the Russian people”.²¹⁵

From 1991 onwards, despite the fact that even in the Crimea the majority of the population (54%) had voted in favour of the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*, people increasingly came out in support of secession, and, subsequently, of some sort of renewed union with the RF.²¹⁶ The resulting tensions led the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to publish a report in which it warned for a potential break-up of Ukraine “along ethnic and geographic lines”.²¹⁷ Although this was too pessimistic a scenario, and the problems surrounding the Crimea were eventually solved when the peninsula was awarded the status of an autonomous republic, it did

²¹¹ Ibidem, 434.

Roman Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000* (London 2003) 53.

²¹² The word “область” means “region”.

Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the arch. Ukraine in the emerging security environment of Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington 1997) 14.

²¹³ Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia. A fraternal rivalry* (Washington 1999) 141.

²¹⁴ Garnett, *Keystone in the arch. Ukraine in the emerging security environment of Central and Eastern Europe*, 14.

²¹⁵ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 499.

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 28.

²¹⁶ Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia. A fraternal rivalry*, 114.

²¹⁷ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 469.

serve as a sign that Ukraine's renewed existence as an independent state was by no means uncontested.²¹⁸

The situation in which Ukraine found itself in the early 1990's was further complicated by the problems that the country experience on the economic level. With the economies of the various Soviet republics being highly interdependent, roughly 80% of Ukraine's trade took place within the framework of the USSR.²¹⁹ In 1991, exports and imports to and from the RF accounted for 71% of that percentage.²²⁰ The situation was particularly pressing with regard to the country's position as an energy-importer. Whereas it had previously been an energy-exporter, by the time it became independent Ukraine was relying, for an estimated 85% of its total energy supply, upon the delivery of Russian gas and oil.²²¹ The resulting imbalance in the terms of trade led the country to become greatly indebted to the RF – a problem that was compounded by the fact that, between 1992 and 1995, the latter raised the price of gas and oil to world market standards.²²²

The problems that were caused by Ukraine's dependence upon the RF were further aggravated by the controversies that marred the process of economic reform in a more general sense. On the positive side, there were efforts to pass laws on privatisation, and to attract foreign investments. Also, the country managed to secure assistance from the part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of substantial loans.²²³ However, on the negative side, the decision to cut subsidies on a variety of industrial goods, and to raise the prices of foodstuffs and public transport, led to large-scale strikes, and increasing social unrest.²²⁴ In combination with the falling output of production, a growing shadow economy, a sharp rise in corruption, and an

²¹⁸ *Constitution* (Kyiv, 28 June 1996) articles 134-139.

An overview of the developments that have been taking place on the Crimean peninsula can be found in: Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia. A fraternal rivalry*, 119-123.

²¹⁹ Hermann Clement, 'Economic aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations' in: Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger and Derek Müller (ed.), *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine* (Bern 1999) 281-302, q.v. 283.

²²⁰ Clement, 'Economic aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations', 284.

²²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *The world factbook: Ukraine*.

<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html> (30 August 2004).

Clement, 'Economic aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations', 282 and 297.

International Energy Agency, *Energy policies of Ukraine, 1996 survey* (Paris 1996) 45-47.

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 40.

²²² Clement, 'Economic aspects of Ukrainian-Russian relations', 285.

Heiko Pleines, 'Verschleppte Wirtschaftsreformen und ihre Folgen: Fallbeispiel Energiesektor' in: Gerhard Simon (ed.), *Die neue Ukraine. Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik (1991-2001)* (Cologne 2002) 225-243, q.v. 228-229.

²²³ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 436.

²²⁴ *Ibidem*, 450.

increasing rate of inflation, this had as a result that Ukraine remained far removed from its goal of being awarded with the status of “market economy”.²²⁵

In turn, as Marta Dyczok argued in *Ukraine: movement without change, change without movement*, the lack of transformation in the economic sphere had a number of consequences with regard to social affairs. This is something that goes beyond the aforementioned strikes and upheaval. For example, while the standard of living was in a state of decline, housing costs rose rapidly, as did the prices of utilities.²²⁶ Also, even though Ukraine had, on paper, a comprehensive system of social security – according to a report that was published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1996 it was “one of the most elaborate in the world” – it lacked the resources to pay for child care, unemployment benefits and pensions in practice.²²⁷ Furthermore, with infectious diseases like diphtheria, cholera, dysentery, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS becoming more common, and the quality of medical facilities deteriorating, the level of health care dropped.²²⁸

Although the latter remark could be made with regard to each of the former constituent republics of the USSR, Ukraine was a case in itself, in the sense that it was confronted with the aftermath of the Chornobyl disaster. As a result of the accident that took place in a nuclear reactor on 26 April 1986, 4.300 people died, 3.6 million (half of whom children) became infected with radiation poisoning, and many more others suffered from side-effects, and the distress caused by relocation.²²⁹

Together with the problems that were mentioned earlier, this proved to be too much to handle for Kravchuk. Or so the Ukrainian population thought when, in the presidential elections that were held in 1994, they replaced him with Kuchma – a former prime minister, and director of the largest missile plant in the world.²³⁰ During the first round of voting, which took place on 26 June, Kravchuk still received the support of 38% of the population, against 31% for Kuchma. Yet, 14 days later, on 10 July, the latter defeated the former by 52% against 45%.²³¹

²²⁵ Paul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq and Paul Estrin, ‘Ukraine: the legacies of central planning and the transition to a market economy’ in: Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics of post-Soviet transformation*, 181-200, q.v. 182.

²²⁶ Marta Dyczok, *Ukraine: movement without change, change without movement* (Amsterdam 2000) 90.

²²⁷ Dyczok, *Ukraine: movement without change, change without movement*, 94-95.

²²⁸ Ibidem, 91.

²²⁹ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 511.

²³⁰ Ibidem, 447.

²³¹ Ibidem, 472.

Ukraine under Kuchma

Kuchma thanked his victory to the votes that he mastered in the eastern and south-eastern *oblasts* of Ukraine.²³² There, his promises to seek closer cooperation with the RF were well received.²³³ Yet, once elected, the new president made some qualifications to these earlier remarks, when he stated that he had never implied that “Ukraine was to become a part of the Russian empire”.²³⁴ According to Kuchma, “Ukraine’s relations with Russia are strategic, but they must not be at the expense of other countries east and west”.²³⁵ The implications that this line of reasoning had as concerns Ukraine’s foreign and security policy are elaborated upon in a subsequent paragraph.

For now, the focus is on the manner in which Kuchma dealt with the issue of the proposed establishment of the values on which the Euro-Atlantic security community is founded.²³⁶ With an eye to the country’s transition to a market economy, it should be noted that, from the late 1990’s onwards, Ukraine was experiencing economic growth for the first time since the moment of the declaration of independence.²³⁷ Also, in September 1996, the new national currency, the *hryvnya* was introduced – a process that was accompanied by a curtailment of inflation.²³⁸

However, this notwithstanding, many of the economic reforms that were proposed by Kuchma were not carried out, or at least not to their full extent.²³⁹ As a result, a small group of businessmen – the so-called *oligarchs* – managed to acquire control over certain key sectors of the economy – and thus gain in both power and wealth.²⁴⁰ In this regard, Paul Hare, Mohammed Ishaq and Paul Estrin, the authors of ‘Ukraine: the legacies of central planning and the

²³² Ibidem.

²³³ Ibidem, 472.

²³⁴ Ibidem, 474.

²³⁵ Ibidem.

²³⁶ With regard to the Kravchuk-period, it is difficult to find Ukrainian sources on the way in which the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community was dealt with. For the Kuchma-period the situation is slightly better, thanks in no small part to the publications of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies. For example, an overview of some of the issues that come into play concerning economic development can be found in:

National security and defence, no. 6, vol. 1 (2000), no. 2, vol. 2 (2001), no. 5, vol. 2 (2001), no. 6, vol. 3 (2002), no. 9, vol. 3 (2002), no. 4, vol. 4 (2003), no. 11, vol. 4 (2003), no. 2, vol. 5 (2004).

²³⁷ Dyczok, *Ukraine: movement without change, change without movement*, 79.

²³⁸ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 528.

²³⁹ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma. Political reform, economic transformation and security policy in independent Ukraine* (Houndmills 1997) 174.

²⁴⁰ The word “олигарх” means “oligarch”.

Hare, Ishaq and Estrin, ‘Ukraine: the legacies of central planning and the transition to a market economy’, 198.

transition to a market economy' spoke of "the contradictory nature of the Ukrainian experience of transition".²⁴¹

These failing attempts at reform made their mark, not only in the economic sphere, but also on the other non-military dimensions of security.²⁴² To Kuchma, it proved to be as difficult as it had been to Kravchuk to solve the many social and environmental issues with which Ukraine was faced – the more so since corruption was running ever more rampant.²⁴³

And then there were the problems that beset the political sphere.²⁴⁴ On the positive side, the peaceful solution of the conflict surrounding the Crimean peninsula – a conflict that, as the CIA warned, had the potential to transform Ukraine into a second Yugoslavia – should be noted. Also, after intense debates, parliament finally agreed to the adoption of a new *Constitution* on 28 June 1996.²⁴⁵ Yet, on the negative side, the *Constitution* conferred substantial – and disproportionate – powers upon the president. To cite but one example, he had the power to appoint ministers, and dismiss them, without having to seek parliamentary approval.²⁴⁶ In turn, this resulted in a second downturn of Ukraine's nascent political system, namely instability. With ministers being fired at a relatively high rate, it was difficult to effectively implement coherent policies.²⁴⁷

What is more, the position of preponderant power that was enjoyed by Kuchma endangered the process of democratisation in yet another way.²⁴⁸ Both the parliamentary elections that took place in 1998 and 2002 respectively, and

²⁴¹ Ibidem.

²⁴² A Ukrainian perspective an overview of some of the issues that come into play concerning social and environmental development can be found in: *National security and defence*, no. 2, vol. 1 (2000).

National security and defence, no. 8, vol. 2 (2001).

²⁴³ An overview of the scope of corruption in Ukraine can be found in: Igor Zhdanov, 'Corruption in Ukraine: essence, scale, and influence'. <http://www.uceps.org/eng/show/114/> (24 March 2005).

²⁴⁴ Ilya Prizel, 'Ukraine between proto-democracy and "soft" authoritarianism' in: Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (ed.), *Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova* (Cambridge 1997) 330-369, q.v. 363.

A Ukrainian perspective an overview of some of the issues that come into play concerning political development can be found in: *National security and defence*, no. 4, vol. 2 (2001), no. 12, vol. 2 (2001), no. 7, vol. 3 (2002), no. 11, vol. 3 (2002), no. 2, vol. 4 (2003), no. 9, vol. 4 (2003), no. 10, vol. 4 (2003).

²⁴⁵ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 522.

²⁴⁶ Freedom House, *Nations in transit 2004: Ukraine* (s.l. s.a.) 12.

²⁴⁷ An overview of the fate that befell the various Ukrainian governments under Kuchma's presidency can be found in: Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*.

²⁴⁸ Kuzio, *Ukraine under Kuchma. Political reform, economic transformation and security policy in independent Ukraine*, 134.

the presidential elections of 1999 were marred by fraud.²⁴⁹ To give just one example, Kuchma managed to defeat his opponent Petro Symonenko (the former received 36 % in the first round, and 56% in the second one, as opposed to 22% and 38% respectively for the latter) at least in part via interference of the authorities in campaign activities, and a monopoly over media coverage.²⁵⁰

Here, one touches upon the position of the press in Ukraine in a more general sense. Based upon official statistics, 70% of Ukrainian newspapers and magazines, and 95% of its television and radio stations are privately owned.²⁵¹ However, given that, for the most part, these owners belong to the group of *oligarchs* that was mentioned earlier – a group that, obviously, has a vested interest in maintaining the *status quo* – this is not the same as stating that the media are free. On the contrary, according to the *Survey of press freedom*, which was published by the Freedom House in 2003, the country moved from the “partly free” to the “not free” category.²⁵² Together with the problems that prevented Ukrainian NGOs from fully functioning, this implied that the situation in which Ukraine found itself in the Kuchma-period was complicated even further by the fact that it was faced with a civil society that was still in its early stages.²⁵³

Neighbours to the east

Aside from the problems that both Kravchuk, and Kuchma had in responding to the new reality with which they were faced by – on the level of domestic politics – moving from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice, and adopting, and subsequently translating into behaviour, the set of common ideas that underlies the Euro-Atlantic security community, they were also faced with the challenge of – on the level of international politics – establishing good-neighbourly relations with Ukraine’s neighbours to the east and west. Especially with regard to the RF, this was by no means an easy task.

²⁴⁹ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Republic of Ukraine: parliamentary elections 29 March 1998* (s.l. s.a.) 3.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Ukraine presidential elections 31 October and 14 November 1999. Final report* (Warsaw 2000) 1.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Ukraine parliamentary elections 31 March 2002. Final report* (Warsaw 2002) 1.

²⁵⁰ Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Ukraine presidential elections 31 October and 14 November 1999. Final report*, 1.

²⁵¹ Freedom House, *Nations in transit 2004: Ukraine*, 9.

²⁵² *Ibidem*.

²⁵³ *Ibidem*, 7-9.

Multilateral cooperation

As has already been referred to, the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine* did not result in the dissolution of the various ties that bound the country to the other former Soviet republics, and, more particularly, to the RF.²⁵⁴ In view of the many historical, cultural, religious, linguistic and economic connections that continued to exist between Ukraine and its neighbour to the east, the latter expected the former to come out in favour of the conclusion of a renewed Union treaty. At least to Gorbachev, this seemed like the logical thing to do, as he told a journalist that “there can be no Union without Ukraine, I feel, and no Ukraine without the Union. These Slavic states, Russia and Ukraine, were the axis along which, for centuries, events turned and a huge multinational state developed. That is the way it will remain, I am convinced of it.”²⁵⁵

Yet, Gorbachev was wrong. Whereas, prior to the moment of the declaration of independence, Ukraine had indeed hoped to reform the USSR – it was one of the issues that was of importance to the platform of Rukh – the events that had taken place in August 1991 had fundamentally altered its position. As a newly independent country, and, even more importantly, as a country that harboured a deeply-felt mistrust of Russian intentions, it was no longer prepared to accede to an overarching structure anew.

At a meeting held in a hunting lodge near Brest on 7-8 December 1991, matters came to a head. Boris Yeltsin, the president of the RF, and his colleague from Belarus, Stanislau Shushkevich, made every effort to win over Kravchuk – who in 1985 had written the book *In a single family*, in which the joys of belonging to the community of Soviet republics were expounded – to the idea of reinvigorating the USSR. However, in spite of the arguments that were put to the fore, and the pressures that were applied, Ukraine’s newly-elected president refused to give in.²⁵⁶

As an alternative, Kravchuk proposed the development of a so-called Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose, non-state framework that was based upon the model of the European Community (EC).²⁵⁷ When Yeltsin and Shushkevich realised that he was not to be persuaded, and that without the participation of Ukraine the renewed Union treaty would remain still-born, they

²⁵⁴ Taras Kuzio, ‘The domestic sources of Ukrainian security policy’, *The journal of strategic studies*, no. 4, vol. 21 (1998) 18-49, q.v. 29.

Anatol Lieven, ‘Restraining NATO: Ukraine, Russia, and the West’, *The Washington quarterly*, no. 4, vol. 20 (1997) 55-77, q.v. 60.

Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia. A fraternal rivalry*, 1-2.

²⁵⁵ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 397-398.

²⁵⁶ Motyl, *Dilemmas of independence. Ukraine after totalitarianism*, 150.

Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 424.

²⁵⁷ Peter Kenez, *A history of the Soviet Union from the beginning to the end* (Cambridge 1999) 276.

had no other option available to them than to agree with Kravchuk.²⁵⁸ So it came about that, during a ceremony held in Minsk on 8 December 1991, the *Agreement on the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States* was signed.²⁵⁹

Even though the CIS was developed on the instigation of Kravchuk, Ukraine was a far from enthusiastic participant. Given that the country was, again, anxious to safeguard its newly-found independence, the CIS was regarded as an instrument for dealing with the legacy of the past, and referred to as “a civilized form of divorce”.²⁶⁰ Thus, whereas the other member states of the CIS (apart from Belarus, the RF and Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also joined) were willing to develop it into something of a more substantial nature, Ukraine greeted any such attempt with – to say the least – disinterest.²⁶¹

For example, the country did not sign the *Collective security treaty*, which was concluded in Tashkent on 15 May 1992.²⁶² In view of the fact that the, as it is more commonly known, *Tashkent treaty* stipulated not only that the parties involved would refrain from the use of force, or the threat to do so, that they would settle their disputes by peaceful means and that they would render all necessary assistance in case one of them was confronted with aggression, but also that they would forfeit the right to join other military alliances, ratifying it would imply that Ukraine could not become too closely involved with the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations –an issue that, as is analysed in further detail in a later paragraph, ran counter to its foreign and security policy.²⁶³

Also, Ukraine refused to become a party to the *Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States*, which was adopted in Minsk on 22 January 1993, and which was supposed to provide the CIS with a legal and organisational structure.²⁶⁴ Furthermore, it did not participate in the creation of a customs union, and declined to sign the *Treaty on deepening integration in the economic and humanitarian fields*, which was adopted at a meeting held in Moscow on 29 March 1996, and which sought to develop the CIS into a Eurasian form of the EU.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁸ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 424-425.

²⁵⁹ *Commonwealth of Independent States*.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/commonwealth_of_independent_states (17 August 2004).

²⁶⁰ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 427.

²⁶¹ *Commonwealth of Independent States*.

²⁶² Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 61.

²⁶³ *Apropos the Collective Security Treaty*.

<http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2002/05/14/28655.html> (21 September 2004).

²⁶⁴ *Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States* (Minsk, 22 January 1993) chapter I: bodies of the Commonwealth.

²⁶⁵ Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 63.

In explaining this attitude, the suspicions concerning Russian ulterior motives that were touched upon earlier come to the fore once more. Especially the publication by Yeltsin, on 14 September 1995, of a presidential decree *On affirming the strategic course of the Russian Federation with the member states of the CIS* did much to confirm Ukraine's fear that the RF would try to use the CIS as a way of reclaiming its position as the *primus inter pares* of the former Soviet republics. For, in this document, the organisation's purpose was defined as allowing for the creation of "a politically and economically integrated group of states in which Russia's CIS partners should be persistently and consistently guided towards the elaboration of joint positions on international problems and the coordination of activity in the world arena".²⁶⁶

The "near abroad"

In this regard, it should be taken into account that the opinion that was expressed in Yeltsin's decree did indeed serve as a reflection of the RF's more general policy with regard to its neighbours. As a country that was reluctant to come to terms with the dissolution of the USSR, and to deal with the resultant loss of empire, the RF was unwilling to relinquish its hold over the various post-Soviet republics that had sprang up in 1991. The Russians believed that, if they were to regain their previous position of preponderant power, these countries should not be allowed to advance too far on the road back to Europe.²⁶⁷

That this attitude was expressed most clearly with regard to Ukraine, had to do with the fact that, as the second-largest of the former constituent republics of the USSR, the country was of importance in a material sense. Yet, there was something else at play as well. On a more ideational level, Ukraine was perceived as "Малороссия" or "Malorussia", which means "little Russia".²⁶⁸ On the basis of a way of thinking that dated back to the period when Ukraine was still a part of the Russian Empire, the Russians, as the "older brothers" deemed that it was up to them to guide their "younger brothers", the Ukrainians, and to make their decisions for them.²⁶⁹

In other words, instead of being regarded as an equal member of the international community, Ukraine was seen as an integral part of the Russian "near abroad".²⁷⁰ According to Jevgeniy Ambartsumov, the former head of the

²⁶⁶ Taras Kuzio, 'Geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia'. http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=8&issue_id+452&article_id=3863 (20 September 2004).

Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 496.

²⁶⁷ Olga Alexandrova, *Von einer Sowjetrepublik zu einem europäischen Staat: Anfänge der Außenpolitik der Ukraine* (Cologne 1992) 14.

²⁶⁸ Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history*, 141.

²⁶⁹ Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia. A fraternal rivalry*, 151.

²⁷⁰ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 456.

Committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian parliament, this implied that, analogous to the way in which the US had applied the *Monroe doctrine* in its relations with the countries of Latin America, the RF claimed the right to treat Ukraine as a zone of special interest.²⁷¹

In a similar vein, on 23 May 1996 the Russian Council of Foreign and Defence Policy – which, according to Bohdan Nahaylo, the author of *The Ukrainian resurgence*, represented “a broad section of the centrist and liberal elite” – published the policy paper *Will the Union be reborn? The future of the post-Soviet space*, in which it argued that the RF should engage Ukraine in “an asymmetric system of mutual obligations”, that would prevent it from leaving the Russian sphere of interest.²⁷²

Borders and the Black Sea Fleet

As has already been explained, the RF tried to create such an asymmetric system by making use of the CIS – an effort that was thwarted by Ukraine’s reluctance to become too closely involved. However, there were still other means that the RF could utilise to apply pressure upon its “near abroad”. Of these, the issue concerning the recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine by the RF provided the latter with a particularly powerful form of leverage over the former.

The crux of the problem was formed by the Russian refusal to guarantee the inviolability of the Ukrainian borders. Without such a guarantee, Ukraine was of the opinion that the formal recognition of its independence (a recognition that was extended by both Yeltsin, and his successor Vladimir Putin) was of limited value. The controversy that ensued, had its roots in a treaty that was signed in November 1990, and that stipulated that the RuSSR and the UkrSSR “acknowledged and respected” each other’s territorial integrity “inside the borders presently existing within the framework of the USSR”.²⁷³ With the dissolution, a little over a year later, of the USSR, the RF insisted that the issue of the inviolability of borders should now be resolved within the context provided for by the CIS.²⁷⁴ However, in view of Ukraine’s fear that the CIS was to become a vehicle for Russian great-power aspirations, it vehemently resisted any such plan.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ The *Monroe doctrine* was introduced by president James Monroe in December 1823, and declared that, while the US were entitled to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the western hemisphere, other countries were not.

Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 518-520.

²⁷² Scott Parrish, ‘Will the Union be reborn’, *Transition*, no. 15, vol. 2 (1996) 32-35 and 62, q.v. 34.

²⁷³ Wolczuk, *Ukraine’s foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 28.

²⁷⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

In an attempt to alert the international community to its plight – a plight that was shown quite clearly by Anatoliy Sobchak, the influential mayor of St. Petersburg who, in a statement given on 4 December 1991 in a reaction to the outcome of the referendum held just three days earlier, warned that the RF would make territorial demands, and reclaim “numerous Russian provinces that were given to Ukraine” if Kyiv would refuse “to join in a political union with Moscow” – Ukraine even went so far as to put the issue of nuclear disarmament on the agenda.²⁷⁶

As the most western part of the USSR, the UkrSSR was deemed to be of great military importance, and hence, was considered to constitute the so-called first strategic echelon. Amongst other things, this meant that, taken together, the Kyiv military district, the Carpathian military district and the Odesa military district were home to approximately 1.250 nuclear warheads and 2.500 nuclear weapons.²⁷⁷ In turn, this had as a result that, when, in the wake of the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*, the country decided to take control over the various military units that were stationed on its territory, and to transform them into national armed forces, it suddenly became the third-largest nuclear power in the world, right after the RF and the US.²⁷⁸

In the *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*, the Ukrainian parliament declared its intention to adhere to “three nuclear free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons”.²⁷⁹ Moreover, in August 1991, the then ambassador of Ukraine to the UN, Gennadiy Udovenko, reiterated his country’s commitment to becoming a nuclear-free state.²⁸⁰ Also, in order to become a member to the *Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT), Ukraine agreed to send its nuclear warheads to the RF, which would subsequently destroy them by 1 July 1992, and to eliminate the other nuclear weapons itself before 1 January 1995.²⁸¹

Yet, in view of the aforementioned forms of pressure that were being applied on the country, it was gradually beginning to fear that it might become subject to nuclear blackmail, as Kravchuk told the then American president George Bush during a visit to Washington in May 1992.²⁸² Consequently, Ukraine sought guarantees from the part of the international community that the

²⁷⁶ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 423.
Roman Solchanyk, ‘Ukrainians vote for independence, Kravchuk elected president’.
<http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/rusland/krono.exe?2142> (2 September 2004).

²⁷⁷ *The creation of the Ukrainian armed forces*.
http://www.mil.gov.ua/old/eng/derg_prog/history.htm (26 November 2002).

²⁷⁸ *The creation of the Ukrainian armed forces*.
²⁷⁹ *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*.

²⁸⁰ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 395.

²⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 402 and 429-430.

²⁸² *Ibidem*, 442.

nuclear warheads that it had shipped off to the RF would in fact be destroyed, and not be subsumed into the Russian nuclear arsenal.²⁸³

The concerns from the side of Ukraine were alleviated somewhat when, on 23 May 1992, the country, together with the other former constituent republics of the USSR that possessed nuclear weapons – Belarus, Kazakhstan and the RF – signed a protocol to the *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* (START).²⁸⁴ To Ukraine, this represented not only the opportunity to be recognised as an equal partner in discussions concerning nuclear disarmament, but also the assurance that the nuclear capabilities of its neighbours would be restricted to certain limits.²⁸⁵

However, just a few months later, in September 1992, it became clear that the US were buying enriched uranium from the RF – enriched uranium that was taken from nuclear warheads that were scheduled for destruction.²⁸⁶ In view of Ukraine's economic hardships and its mounting energy debts, this went down the wrong way. In a sharp reaction to this development, Kravchuk declared that ratification of START was now dependent upon the quantity of financial assistance that his country would receive.²⁸⁷ Given that the ratification of the new START II (which was a bilateral treaty, concluded between the RF and the US) was only possible if the Ukrainian parliament agreed with the agreement reached in May 1992, this was indeed a powerful bargaining chip.²⁸⁸

The issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament was finally resolved on 14 January 1994, when, at a meeting held in Moscow, the presidents of Ukraine, the RF, and the US hammered out a deal. Under the provisions of the *Trilateral agreement*, Ukraine agreed to resume the removal, and destruction of its remaining nuclear weapons, in exchange for security guarantees within the framework of the OSCE, Russian reactor fuel, \$175 million in economic and technical assistance, a promise for additional aid once Ukraine had become a non-nuclear state, and the assurance that the recognition of the country's territorial integrity and its participation with the CIS would be treated as two separate issues.²⁸⁹

Still, Ukraine and Russia remained at odds as regards the issue of territorial integrity and the recognition of borders. With the problems surrounding the transfer of nuclear weapons solved, attention now shifted to the Crimean peninsula. As has already been stated, many of the Crimea's Russian inhabitants were in favour of close cooperation with the RF. Consequently,

²⁸³ Ibidem.

²⁸⁴ *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)*.

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/> (7 September 2004).

²⁸⁵ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 442.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).

²⁸⁶ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 457.

²⁸⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸⁸ Ibidem.

²⁸⁹ Ibidem, 464.

attempts were made to prove that the events of 1954 had been illegitimate.²⁹⁰ Moreover, Russian politicians came out strongly against supposedly forced attempts at Ukrainisation of their compatriots living on the peninsula. With regard to related incidents in Moldova, the former Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, even went so far as to state that the RF “will be protecting the rights of Russians in other states of the CIS. This is top priority. We shall be protecting their rights firmly and will be using powerful methods if needed”.²⁹¹

With reference to a previous paragraph, this turned out to be unnecessary, as the peninsula gained the status of an autonomous republic, and the potential conflict was, eventually, solved. However, the Crimea remained an area of interest to the RF for another reason as well. Here, the status of the Crimean city of Sebastopol comes into play. Traditionally, Sebastopol was home to the powerful BSF. After the dissolution of the USSR, the RF and Ukraine both claimed ownership over the BSF, as well as over its assets. Given that these assets also involved basing rights and the use of the related infrastructure, the division of the BSF created something of a dilemma.²⁹²

If Ukraine refused to agree to the partition of the fleet and its assets into a Ukrainian and a Russian part, the RF would almost certainly refuse to recognise the inviolability of the borders of Ukraine. Yet, if Ukraine was to accept the division of the BSF, than the RF would – through the basing rights, and the use of infra-structural works, acquire a foothold on Ukrainian territory – which, obviously, would constitute a violation of its territorial integrity. Differently put, the issue of the recognition of the inviolability of the borders of Ukraine, and the division of the BSF were tightly linked.²⁹³

During the period 1992-1996 several proposals were launched to break the deadlock. For example, at a meeting held in Dagomys on 23 June 1992, an agreement was reached on “the creation of Ukrainian and Russian navies based on the Black Sea Fleet, the details of which are to be worked out in continuing talks”.²⁹⁴ And indeed, in the *Sochi accords*, which were signed on 9 June 1995, some of the remaining problems were actually resolved.²⁹⁵ However, time and again, mistrust, misunderstanding and miscommunication led to the signing of the long-awaited final treaties being postponed.²⁹⁶

Interestingly enough, it was only in 1997, when it was becoming apparent that NATO was about to engage in its first wave of enlargement, that a solution

²⁹⁰ Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 29.

²⁹¹ Neil. V. Lamont, ‘Ethnic conflict in the Transdnierster’, *Military review*, no. 1, vol. 75 (1994-1995) 56-69, q.v. 59.

²⁹² Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 29.

²⁹³ *Ibidem*.

²⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, 30-31.

²⁹⁶ *Ibidem*.

was within reach. As the RF sought to adjust itself to the changed circumstances with which it was confronted in the aftermath of the Cold War, it had to contend not only with the fact that it had lost its grip over the former members of the WTO, but also with the imminent signing of the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*.²⁹⁷ These developments led the Russians to fear that they were being increasingly marginalised in the Euro-Atlantic area – a fear that, in turn, prompted them to be more forthcoming to Ukraine.²⁹⁸

On 28 May 1997, three separate agreements were signed concerning the division of the BSF. Under the provisions of the treaties, Ukraine and the RF each received a portion of the fleet's ships, as well as of its assets. With regard to the basing rights and the related infrastructure that became a part of the Russian package, both sides agreed to the concept of leasing, i.e. the RF hired parts of the city of Sebastopol from Ukraine, in exchange for a partial lowering of the latter's unpaid energy bills.²⁹⁹

With these issues solved, there were no longer any impediments to the signing of the *Treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine*, which took place on 31 May 1997.³⁰⁰ Whereas the BSF treaties were perhaps unfavourable to Ukraine (with regard to the quantity and quality of its share of the fleet and assets), the, as it has sometimes been called, Big Treaty was an unequivocal success.³⁰¹ Six years after the country had declared its independence, the RF finally agreed to “respect the territorial integrity [of Ukraine] and affirm the inviolability of [its] borders (...)”.³⁰²

Economy and energy

However, this (from the perspective of Ukraine) positive development notwithstanding, the RF had yet another, and arguably even more powerful, instrument at its disposal in its efforts to induce its neighbour into cooperation –

²⁹⁷ The *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* was signed in Lisbon on 9 July 1997.

²⁹⁸ Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine and NATO: the evolving strategic partnership', *The journal of strategic studies*, no. 2, vol. 21 (1998) 1-30, q.v. 7.

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 32.

²⁹⁹ Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 37.

³⁰⁰ Roman Woronowycz, 'Russian Duma vice-chairman calls bilateral treaty with Ukraine 'mistake''.

<http://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/1998/519802.shtml> (7 September 2004).

³⁰¹ Ivana Klympush, 'Ukraine and Russia: strategic partnership vs. mutual dependence' in: Spillmann, Wenger and Müller (ed.), *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine*, 237-255, q.v. 245.

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 37.

³⁰² Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 33.

cooperation that it hoped would lead to integration. In the document *Will the Union be reborn? The future of the post-Soviet space* mentioned earlier, the Council of Foreign and Defence Policy suggested making use of the Ukrainian dependence upon the Russian economy as a way of strengthening relations between the two countries.³⁰³

And indeed, as the Ukrainian economy found itself in a state of perpetual decline, and the transition to a market economy progressed only slowly, it became increasingly clear that, at least in the short term, it would be impossible to substitute cooperation with the former Soviet republics for cooperation with the countries of North America and Western Europe.³⁰⁴ This helps to explain why, on 19 September 2003, Ukraine decided to join Belarus, Kazakhstan and the RF in forming the Common Economic Space (CES) – which can be defined as “an economic space in which economic regulation mechanisms (...) function to guarantee the free flow of commodities, services, capital and the workforce.”³⁰⁵

Here, it is important to note that especially Ukraine’s unpaid energy bill provided the RF with a powerful form of leverage – leverage moreover that it was not afraid to use. The dependence of Ukraine upon the RF was used by the latter, not only to persuade the former to join the CES, but also to get it to agree to a substantial lowering of the accumulated debt, in exchange for the acquisition of a stake in the network of pipelines that spanned the Ukrainian territory.³⁰⁶ With about 90% of the Russian export of gas and oil to the countries of Western Europe going through Ukraine, the RF sought to prevent Ukraine from blocking the transit of energy (as well as from siphoning it off for its own usage) as a means of counterbalancing the pressures that were being exerted upon it. In turn, this implied that, as it was difficult for Ukraine to completely sever the material ties that still bound it to its neighbour to the east, it was also difficult to leave the Russian sphere of influence altogether. In this sense, the assumptions of the Russian Council of Foreign and Defence Policy turned out to be correct.

³⁰³ Parrish, ‘Will the Union be reborn’, 34 and 62.

³⁰⁴ An overview of the various economic reforms that have taken place in Ukraine since 1991 can be found in: Igor Burakowskij, ‘Wirtschaftsreformen: die Kluft zwischen Erwartungen und Ergebnissen’ in: Simon (ed.), *Die neue Ukraine. Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik (1991-2001)*, 197-223.

Volkhart Vincentz, ‘Perspektiven für einen Reformschub in der Wirtschaft’ in: Simon (ed.), *Die neue Ukraine. Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik (1991-2001)*, 245-265.

³⁰⁵ Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Weekly issue*, no. 38 (15 September-21 September 2003).

³⁰⁶ Wolczuk, *Ukraine’s foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 39.

Foreign and security policy

The problems that beset the establishment of relations between Ukraine and its neighbour to the east found an expression in the development of the country's foreign and security policy. In the first instance, Ukraine committed itself to occupying a neutral and non-aligned position on the Euro-Atlantic stage. Already in the *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*, the Ukrainian parliament declared "its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs".³⁰⁷ Apparently, the country hoped that, through insisting on maintaining a, as it was reiterated in the *Military doctrine* (which was adopted on 19 October 1993), non-bloc status, it would be able to resist the pressures that were being applied upon it by the RF.³⁰⁸

However, as has just been exemplified, this line of reasoning turned out to be flawed. Ukraine discovered that, instead of providing it with the much-needed breathing space, maintaining a non-bloc position meant that it was left to address the Russian attempts to infringe upon its newly-found independence all by itself.³⁰⁹ Consequently, Ukraine began to search for ways of shaping its foreign and security policy in a different manner.

The first time that the possibility of amending the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment was mentioned, was in the *Basic principles of Ukraine's foreign policy*, which was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament on 5 July 1993, and which remained valid throughout the terms-in-office of both Kravchuk, and Kuchma.³¹⁰ According to the provisions of this document, the "crucial transformations following the disintegration of the USSR", implied that the country's "intentions of becoming a neutral, non-bloc state should be adapted to new circumstances".³¹¹

A year later, under the *aegis* of president Kuchma, this change of course was officially confirmed with the adoption of the so-called multi-vector policy.³¹² While this type of foreign and security policy too was based on the premise that the country should become as invulnerable as possible to the sometimes

³⁰⁷ *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*.

³⁰⁸ C.J. Dick, *The military doctrine of Ukraine* CSRC occasional brief no. 27 (s.l. 1993).

Kuzio, 'Ukraine and NATO: the evolving strategic partnership', 11.

³⁰⁹ In this regard, dr. Ihor Karchenko, the former director of the Department of Policy Analysis and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, spoke of Ukraine's appearance in a security vacuum.

Ihor Karchenko, 'A view from Ukraine' in: Jeffrey Simon (ed.), *NATO enlargement: opinions and options* (Washington 1995) 143-153, q.v. 144.

³¹⁰ Olga Alexandrova, 'The premises of Ukrainian foreign and security policy' in: Spillmann, Wenger and Müller (ed.), *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine*, 31-52, q.v. 32.

³¹¹ Karchenko, 'A view from Ukraine', 144.

³¹² James Sherr, 'Eine gescheiterte Partnerschaft? Die Ukraine and der Westen' in: Simon (ed.), *Die neue Ukraine. Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik (1991-2001)* 321-346, q.v. 321.

offensive tactics that were being used by the RF, it differed from the previous policy in the sense that it advocated the position that Ukraine's continued existence as an independent state could only be guaranteed by pursuing the double-track policy of cooperation with both the "eastern vector", and the "western vector".³¹³

On the one hand, the multi-vector foreign and security policy was based on the idea that, by entering into relations with its neighbours to the west, the country would be in a position to counterbalance the various forms of leverage that the RF had at its disposal.³¹⁴ In other words, by seeking the support of the countries of North America and Western Europe and the zone of peace that they constitute, as well as of NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE, Ukraine should be able to shield itself from the influence that was wielded by its "big brother".

On the other hand, it was deemed to be of importance to establish good-neighbourly relations with the country's neighbour to the east, and to pursue a policy, not of isolation, but of normalisation – i.e. Ukraine hoped that, if it would treat the RF as it would any other member of the international community, the latter would reciprocate. In addition, by choosing not to focus on the western dimension alone, it was possible for Kuchma to placate both those inhabitants of Ukraine's eastern and south-eastern *oblasts* who were in favour of the establishment of close ties with their neighbours on the other side of the border (and who, as has already been mentioned, supported his presidential campaign for this very same reason), and the powerful *oligarchs*, whose business empires were intertwined with those of their Russian counterparts.³¹⁵

Neighbours to the west

No matter what the incentives for this change in the Ukrainian foreign and security policy might be, what is interesting to note is that, with regard to the western vector, the countries of North America and Western Europe were reluctant to recognise Ukraine as an equal partner. They were fearful that the sudden reappearance of a country with a territory larger than that of France, a population of approximately 48 million people and a substantial percentage (around 25%) of national minorities, would threaten the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.³¹⁶

³¹³ Alexandrova, 'The premises of Ukrainian foreign and security policy', 34-35.

³¹⁴ Tor Bukkvoll, 'Ukraine and NATO. The politics of soft cooperation', *Security dialogue*, no. 3, vol. 28 (1997) 363-374, q.v. 367.

³¹⁵ An overview of the attitude of both ordinary Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian elites, on the country's foreign and security policy can be found in the opinion polls that are published on a regular basis by Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies and the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.

³¹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *The world factbook: Ukraine*.

The hesitation of the countries of North America and Western Europe to enter into any form of cooperation with Ukraine was voiced by Bush during a visit to Kyiv on 1 August 1991. In a speech to the Ukrainian parliament, he applauded the country for trying to regain its freedom, but also issued a stern warning that “freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred”.³¹⁷

Undoubtedly, these comments were met with dismay from the side of the assembled parliamentarians, as they had declared in the *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine* that “the Ukrainian SSR acts as an equal participant in international affairs, actively promotes the reinforcement of general peace and international security, and directly participates in the general European process and European structures”.³¹⁸ Still, the – as it was later dubbed – Chicken Kiev speech did not deter Ukraine from using the *Basic principles of Ukrainian foreign policy* mentioned in the previous paragraph to reaffirm its commitment to European cooperation.³¹⁹

On the contrary, as has just been touched upon, following the introduction of Ukraine’s double-track foreign and security policy, the country came out in full support of, as it was officially phrased, “complete integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures”.³²⁰ What is more, the argument can be put to the fore that, from the middle of the 1990’s onwards, this policy gradually evolved from an approach that placed a similar emphasis on both the eastern, and the western vector, into an instrument that advocated cooperation with the country’s neighbour to the east, but integration with its neighbours to the west.³²¹

Regional cooperation

In an attempt to give substance to this new line of declaratory policy, Ukraine sought to become engaged in various forms of regional cooperation. It was hoped that, by establishing good-neighbourly relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine would be able to persuade the countries

³¹⁷ George Bush, ‘Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet Union’. <http://www.brama.com/ukraine/history/bush/> (30 August 2004).

³¹⁸ *Act of the declaration of state sovereignty of Ukraine*.

³¹⁹ ‘Welcoming speech of mr. Chaly, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine’, *European integration: parliamentary dimension* (s.l. 13-14 October 2000). http://www.icps.com/ua/doc/parliament_confer.eng.doc (8 September 2004). Taras Kuzio, *Ukrainian security policy* (Westport 1995) 55-56.

³²⁰ Olexander Potekhin, ‘Features of Ukraine’s foreign policy’, *Studia Diplomatica*, no. 6, vol. 51 (1998) 37-56, q.v. 44.

³²¹ Sherr, ‘Eine gescheiterte Partnerschaft? Die Ukraine und der Westen’, 321.

of North America and Western Europe to take it into consideration as a possible partner.³²²

Thus, in the period 1992-1997, Ukraine concluded a series of *Treaties on good neighbourly and friendly relations and cooperation* with Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Romania respectively.³²³ These agreements were a clear sign that, especially with regard to Poland, the country had managed to set historically formed animosities aside, and to behave in a manner befitting a potential participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community.

In addition, their ratification paved the way for Ukraine's membership of the Central European Initiative (CEI).³²⁴ Together with Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Yugoslavia, this allowed the country to work "for the cohesion of a united Europe, a Europe without dividing lines, [and] with shared values".³²⁵

However, not every attempt at regional cooperation was that successful – as becomes manifest from the case of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). The CEFTA, which functioned in accordance with the rules and regulations set by the EU, and which was composed of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, was deemed to be the foremost of the various forms of cooperation that had sprang up in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.³²⁶

While Ukraine was aware of this, and tried to gain membership, its efforts were in vain.³²⁷ First of all, even though the member states of CEFTA – and especially Poland – were sensitive to their neighbour's fear of being drawn back more and more into the Russian sphere of influence, and recognised the negative consequences that such a development could have with regard to their own security and stability, they were weary to accept a member whose level of economic development was so decidedly below their own.³²⁸ Secondly, given that it was becoming increasingly clear to these countries that membership of

³²² Alexandrova, *Von einer Sowjetrepublik zu einem europäischen Staat: Anfänge der Außenpolitik der Ukraine*, 22.

³²³ Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 74-87.

³²⁴ *Ibidem*, 102.

³²⁵ *The Central European Initiative: main events of the CEI history*.

http://www.ceinet.org/view/01/01_03.htm (9 September 2004).

The Central European Initiative: CEI goals and objectives.

http://www.ceinet.org/view/01/01_02.htm (9 September 2004).

³²⁶ *Central European Free Trade Agreement*.

<http://www.cefta.org> (29 September 2004).

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 103.

³²⁷ Oleksandr Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe', *Security dialogue*, no. 3, vol. 28 (1997) 347-361, q.v. 351.

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 101.

³²⁸ Pavliuk, 'Ukraine and regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe', 348.

the EU and NATO was within reach, their enthusiasm to further invest in Central and Eastern European forms of cooperation was rapidly waning.

The concept of regional cooperation was beset with difficulties in another way as well. Apart from taking away the fears that had been expressed by Bush, Ukraine expected that through establishing relations with countries that were also hoping to participate with the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations, it would be able to profit from conjoined efforts to “return to Europe”.³²⁹ Yet, as its experience with GUUAM (an acronym for Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) shows, this turned out not to be the case.

Initially, the goal of GUUAM – an informal grouping that was set up in 1996 – was to search for alternative routes for the transport of oil and gas, which would allow its participants to lessen their dependency upon the RF.³³⁰ However, as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan all came to share the Ukrainian desire to cooperate with, and integrate into, such organisations as NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE, they began to look upon GUUAM as a means of furthering their, as it was referred to, “common European future”.³³¹

Yet, this similarity in objectives could not obscure the fact that the value of GUUAM was limited. As Roman Wolczuk pointed out in *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, the poverty of its participants, as well as the RF's hold over them, made it difficult “to exaggerate the significance of influence of GUUAM”.³³² Furthermore, in view of the many differences – differences of both a material, and ideational nature – that separated Ukraine from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Uzbekistan, it was doubtful if they would ever be in a position to advance on the road back to Europe together.

International organisations

These drawbacks notwithstanding, Ukraine did not waver from its goal of participating with the international organisations that were formed by the countries of North America and Western Europe, and – to an increasing extent – by those of Central and Eastern Europe. In a speech held at the headquarters of the CoE in Strasbourg on 24 April 1996, Kuchma stressed that his country aimed at “rapid integration into the European process and increasing its

³²⁹ Ibidem, 355.

³³⁰ Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Stacy Closson, ‘NATO's strategic engagement with Ukraine in Europe's security buffer zone’ in: Charles Krupnick (ed.), *Almost NATO. Partners and players in Central and Eastern European security* (Lanham 2003) 199-230, q.v. 205.

³³¹ Ibidem.

Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 149-150.

³³² Wolczuk, *Ukraine's foreign and security policy 1991-2000*, 151.

participation in the activities of European and transatlantic organizations and structures”³³³.

On the one hand, Ukraine’s aspirations were informed by the desire to find a means to counterbalance the RF – a point that has already been made. On the other hand, it was hoped that by seeking involvement with the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations, the country could benefit, in a tangible manner, from the opportunities that they had to offer. For example, admission to the CoE would serve as a direct testimony of Ukraine’s credentials as a European country. Also, engaging in trade relations with the EU would provide the country with a solution to the issue of diversification of its economic ties. Furthermore, participation with NATO would grant it the financial and technical assistance needed to modernise its armed forces.³³⁴

However, with reference to the account of the events that took place under the leadership of Kravchuk and Kuchma, there was something else at work as well. As has already been explained, Ukraine sought to adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security. In part, this had to do with the country’s attempts to do away with the legacy of its Soviet past, as well as with Kravchuk’s and Kuchma’s desire for political advancement and legitimisation of their own position. Yet, in part, this was also connected to Ukraine’s efforts to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community – a topic that is analysed in further detail in a subsequent paragraph.

In turn, given that international organisations can assist a country in adhering to, and acting in accordance with, the set of common ideas upon which the security community that they represent is founded, it was thought that participation with the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations would assist Ukraine in completing the process of social learning that this entails.³³⁵ In this regard, it is more than likely that the repeated references from the part of NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE to the country’s role as “one of the key factors for ensuring stability in Central and Eastern Europe, and the continent as a whole”, as well as to their own intention to “share with Ukraine their various experiences in building modern political, economic, social and administrative structures” greatly encouraged it in pursuing this course of action.³³⁶

³³³ Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence*, 516.

³³⁴ Bukkvoll, ‘Ukraine and NATO. The politics of soft cooperation’, 365.

Kuzio, ‘Ukraine and NATO: the evolving strategic partnership’, 5.

³³⁵ This was recognised most clearly with regard to NATO.

Serhiy Pyrozhkov, ‘The new situation requires new thinking’, *National security and defence*, no. 8, vol. 3 (2002) 7-9, q.v. 7.

³³⁶ *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* (Madrid, 9 July 1997) article 1.

‘European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine’, *Official journal of the European Communities* no. L 331 (23 December 1999) article 6.

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture

In *Chapter II The Euro-Atlantic security community*, the issue of participation between the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations and Ukraine has been discussed in some length. To the chapter in hand, what is important to note is that the country sought to realise its, as it was termed by James Sherr in his article 'Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic choice: is failure inevitable?' "strategic course of entering Europe" in yet another way.

According to the *Basic principles of Ukraine's foreign policy*, the country hoped to achieve "full-scale participation in the all-European security structure".³³⁷ As Udovenko, who, at that time, held the post of minister of Foreign Affairs, explained in an address given to the Belgian Royal Institute for International Relations on 23 April 1997, this new security system should be based upon the principle of the indivisibility of security, as well as on that of mutual complementarity. Moreover, it "should (...) incorporate all concerned Euro-Atlantic countries".³³⁸ In other words, the Euro-Atlantic security architecture was supposed to develop into a zone of peace, a zone of peace moreover that – ideally – would also include the country's neighbour to the east, the RF.

Here, it needs to be taken into account that Ukraine was not alone in advocating the development of a new instrument for dealing with the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Again, with reference to the previous chapter, the countries of North America and Western Europe also supported the development of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture, and even discussed ways in which cooperation between the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations could be stimulated – attempts that, in the end, amounted to nothing.

The Euro-Atlantic security community

Yet, even though it did not come about in a material way, as a security community the Euro-Atlantic security architecture was a reality in an ideational sense. From the late 1980's onwards, the countries of North America and Western Europe – and to an increasing extent those of Central and Eastern Europe – came to establish a specific way of thinking about security, which led them to expect that any conflicts that might arise between them, would be resolved in a peaceful manner.

Although the concept of a security community is, of course, a highly theoretical one, it was no less relevant. As "a transnational region comprised of

³³⁷ Karchenko, 'A view from Ukraine', 144.

³³⁸ Gennadiy Udovenko, 'Ukraine's foreign policy: a way to the European integration', *Studia Diplomatica*, no. 2, vol. 50 (1997) 31-41, q.v. 34-35.

sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”, it provided Ukraine with the instruments needed to resist the Russian efforts to encroach upon its existence as an independent state.³³⁹ Moreover, as a group of countries that share a specific way of thinking concerning the relationship between security on the one hand, and military affairs, politics, economics, social affairs and the environment on the other hand, participation with the western zone of peace held out the prospect of joining a community that was founded on the same values as those that also seemed to appeal to Ukraine.

When combining these features, and comparing them with the reasons that motivated both Ukraine’s efforts to cooperate with – and possibly integrate into – the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations, and its attempts to become involved in the development of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture, it becomes clear that what underlay the country’s attempts to advance on the road back to Europe was the desire to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community.

In a speech delivered on the occasion of the Day of Europe 2004, Kuchma made this point succinctly, when he said that “Ukraine is committed to follow the European reformatory path (...). This policy of the Ukrainian state meets the deepest expectations of the Ukrainian people, who have always realised their historical belonging to the family of the European nations. Ukraine cannot image itself being beyond Europe. It has remained and will always be a European country, full and inseparable member of the European family”.³⁴⁰

In addition, a similar comment was made by Boris Tarasyuk, the Ukrainian minister of Foreign Affairs. As he wrote in *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine*, “integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures and strengthening of our country’s position within the family of European nations, with whom we share common historical and cultural traditions, as well as values and view on the future of the continent, remain the consistent orientation of Ukraine”.³⁴¹

Concluding remarks

In the introduction of this Harmonie paper, it was stated that the opening lines of the national anthem of Ukraine, which translate as “Ukraine has not yet

³³⁹ Boris Gumenjuk, ‘Prioritäten der ukrainischen Politik im Bereich der europäischen Sicherheit’ in: Siegfried Bock and Manfred Schünemann (ed.), *Die Ukraine in der europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur* (Baden Baden 1997) 105-112, q.v. 106.

³⁴⁰ *President Kuchma’s address to Ukrainian people on the Day of Europe*. <http://www.president.gov.ua/eng/activity/zayavinterv/speackto/253826322.html> (8 September 2004).

³⁴¹ Boris Tarasyuk, ‘Forework’ in: Spillmann, Wenger and Müller (ed.), *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine*, 9-11, q.v. 10.

perished, nor its glory, nor its freedom”, are a reflection of the country’s history. And indeed, as has been explained in this chapter, these words serve as a powerful reminder of the many long years in which Ukraine was divided between, and subjected by, such powerful neighbours as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, Poland, the Russian Empire and the USSR. In this sense, it can be argued that the events surrounding the popular approval of the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine* constituted a period of change on the domestic level.

The same holds true as concerns the years that followed Ukraine’s renewed realisation of independent statehood. Even though both president Kravchuk, and his successor Kuchma belonged to the former Soviet elites, they adjusted to the changed conditions in which they found themselves by attempting to launch reforms, and by declaring to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security. Also, they sought to react to the new reality with which they were faced, by trying to establish good-neighbourly relations with the countries to Ukraine’s east and west.

What is more – as yet another sign that the second part of the facilitating requirement necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed has been largely met – in the development of its multi-vector foreign and security policy, the country preferred the establishment of relations with its neighbours to the west over the reinvigoration of the ties that bound it to its neighbour to the east. More specifically, the reluctance from the part of the RF to let Ukraine leave its “near abroad”, in combination with the various forms of leverage that the former tried to apply in its attempts to engage the latter in an asymmetric system of mutual obligations, led Ukraine to seek both regional cooperation, as well as participation with NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE, and involvement in the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Underlying these attempts to advance on the road back to Europe was Ukraine’s desire to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community. The numerous Russian attempts to infringe upon the country’s newly-found independence provided it with a (as it was mentioned in *Chapter I The issue of participation*) material incentive on the domestic level to seek participation with a zone of peace on the international level. In addition, Ukraine’s aforementioned desire to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the various military and non-military dimensions that together constitute the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security, provided it with an ideational motivation to join the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community of values.

In view of this, it may be expected that, as concerns the second condition for socialisation, the establishment of the relevant set of common ideas should not pose a problem – the more so since the tangible advantages that Ukraine hoped to achieve through establishing ties with the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations provided the latter with the possibility of applying inducements of a material nature. Yet, with reference to the

introduction of this chapter, one of the subjects that was touched upon, concerned the difficulty that the Ukrainian elites experienced in moving from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice.

There are several reasons that may be used to account for this apparent paradox, ranging from a lack of experience with independent statehood as well as of understanding of the contents of the values upon which the Euro-Atlantic security community is founded, to the ties that continued to bind Ukraine to its neighbour to the east, to the unwillingness from parts of the country's population to pursue the western dimension of the Ukrainian foreign and security policy to its full extent, to – with reference to the previous chapter – the ability and/or willingness from the part of NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE to put words into deeds. However, their discussion has to wait for the next chapter.

IV From policy-on-paper to policy-in-practice

In *Chapter III Ukraine*, the difficulties that the Ukrainian elites experienced in adopting, and subsequently translating into behaviour, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security, were touched upon – as were the various elements that may be used as explanatory variables. In the present chapter, this second requirement necessary for the process of socialisation to succeed is analysed in further depth. Against the background that was sketched in the previous chapter of the wider military, political, economic, social and environmental developments, the country's system of civil-military relations is elaborated upon, and the conditions that come into play when creating a democratic and civilian form of oversight over the armed forces are explored. Furthermore, the policies that were pursued – not only on paper, but also in practice – by NATO, are clarified. Taken together, these steps result in an analysis of the manner in which the concept of civil-military relations, as a particularly important aspect of the issue of Ukraine's participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, has been dealt with.

Democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces

As a part of the USSR, the UkrSSR was not entitled to the development of a national system of civil-military relations. According to the provisions of the Soviet *Constitution*, all matters pertaining to security and defence fell under the jurisdiction of the USSR, to the exclusion of the authority of the various constituent republics.³⁴² Consequently, when Ukraine gained independent statehood, the decision concerning the type of interaction between military and civilian actors that the country was to establish, still had to be made.

From the outset, it was clear that Ukraine did not seek to copy the authoritarian and military form of control that had been prevalent in the USSR. On the contrary, in keeping with its goal of gaining recognition as a member of the “family of European nations”, the country quickly came out in favour of the creation of a type of oversight that would be both democratic, and civilian in nature.³⁴³

On the level of domestic politics, this commitment to develop a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces was reflected in the *Law on defence of Ukraine*, which was adopted on 6 December 1991, and in which the MoD was charged with the task of “ensuring the realisation of

³⁴² Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: a history* (Toronto 1992) 385.

³⁴³ Boris Tarasyuk, ‘Forework’ in: Spillmann, Wenger and Müller (ed.), *Between Russia and the West: foreign and security policy of independent Ukraine*, 9-11, q.v. 10.

democratic and civilian control over the armed forces of Ukraine”.³⁴⁴ Moreover, in the *Concept (fundamentals of state policy) of the national security of Ukraine*, which was adopted on 16 January 1997, “democratic civilian control over the military sector and other structures within the system of national security” was mentioned as one of the main principles upon which the country’s security was to be based.³⁴⁵ In the same document “ensuring democratic civilian control over the military organisation of the state” was referred to as one of the goals of Ukraine’s policy with regard to issues in the sphere of security and defence.³⁴⁶

On the level of international politics too, Ukraine assumed a number of obligations concerning the development of a new system of civil-military relations. For example, the country adhered to the *Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security*, which was drafted by the OSCE at a summit held in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, and in which it was stated that “the participating states consider the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security”.³⁴⁷ Also, by joining NATO’s PfP, the country agreed to undertake efforts to develop a system of “democratic control of the armed forces”.³⁴⁸ And in the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*, which was adopted in Madrid on 9 July 1997, Ukraine stressed its desire to “strengthen democratic and civilian control of the military” – a point that was reiterated in the *NATO-Ukraine action plan*, a document that was signed on 22 November 2002.³⁴⁹

Definition of military institutions

When moving from the level of policy-on-paper to that of policy-in-practice, the first issue that needs to be addressed has to do with the definition of military institutions. With reference to *Chapter II The Euro-Atlantic security community*, as well as to the previous paragraph, Ukraine focused mainly on the provision

³⁴⁴ *Закон України про оборону України 1932-XII* (Kyiv, 6 December 1991) розділ II, стаття 10.

³⁴⁵ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію (основи державної політики) національної безпеки України 3/97-ВР* (Kyiv, 16 January 1997).

³⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁴⁷ *Budapest summit declaration: towards a genuine partnership in a new era. Part IV: Code of conduct on politico-military aspects of security* (Budapest, 5-6 December 1994) article 20.

³⁴⁸ *Partnership for Peace: framework document issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Brussels, 10 January 1994) article 3.

³⁴⁹ *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* (Madrid, 9 July 1997) article 3.
NATO-Ukraine action plan (Prague, 22 November 2002) section I.

of oversight over its armed forces – as opposed to the implementation of control over the country's border troops, the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the national guard and the civil defence troops.

According to Tim Edmunds, the author of 'Promoting democratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe: lessons learned and future research agendas', this was a situation that could be found not only in Ukraine, but also in other countries from Central and Eastern Europe that were engaged in the process of reforming their system of civil-military relations.³⁵⁰ Especially the newly-independent countries that came into being with the demise of the USSR, as well as several of the former Yugoslav republics, saw the proliferation of a variety of units within the security sector that did not belong to the armed forces *per se*, and that were not subjected to the same rules and regulations as those that applied to the regular military formations.³⁵¹

What made this into such a cause for concern was the fact that para-military formations that remained outside the scope of political, let alone democratic, control could readily be used by those people who sought to increase their own power and move towards authoritarian forms of government. Serbia, where former president Slobodan Milosevic relied on troops other than the regular armed forces to sustain his position, serves as a case in point.³⁵²

With regard to the topic in hand, it should be noted that the circumstances in which Ukraine found itself were a far cry from those that prevailed in Milosevic's Serbia. This notwithstanding, the existence of a rather diverse number of para-military units in a country where the process of democratisation was faltering, was a distinctly negative feature – the more so as the border troops, the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the national guard and the civil defence troops were continually growing in manpower. It implied that, even if Ukraine was to succeed in developing a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, it would still be confronted with a relatively high number of military institutions that remained outside the boundaries that were set by the Euro-Atlantic concept of security.³⁵³

³⁵⁰ Tim Edmunds, 'Promoting democratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe: lessons learned and future research agendas' in: Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri (ed.), *Security Sector Reform and democracy in transitional societies* (Baden-Baden 2002) 99-103, q.v. 102.

³⁵¹ Edmunds, 'Promoting democratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe: lessons learned and future research agendas', 102.

³⁵² *Ibidem*.

³⁵³ An overview of the problems that this may create can be found in: *National security and defence*, no. 4, vol. 5 (2004).

The armed forces

Concerning the armed forces themselves, it is of importance to recall that they had to be constructed from scratch. During the Soviet-period the UkrSSR had been divided into the Kyiv military district, the Carpathian military district and the Odesa military district. Taken together, these three districts, which, due to their location on the western border of the USSR, were considered to be of great military significance, were home to approximately 1.250 nuclear warheads and 2.500 nuclear weapons, as well as to BSF.³⁵⁴

What is more, on the territory of Ukraine there were stationed a strategic rocket army, an air defence army, three combined arms armies, two tank armies and one army corps. In total, these formations numbered 780.000 men, and could deploy 1.500 combat aircraft, more than 800 attack helicopters, 5.000 artillery systems, more than 7.000 armoured vehicles and 6.500 tanks.³⁵⁵

In the wake of the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine*, the parliament in Kyiv decided to put the aforementioned units of the Red Army under its authority.³⁵⁶ Already on 24 August 1991, the *Law on military formations in Ukraine* was adopted, according to the provisions of which all parts of the armed forces of the USSR that were stationed on the republic's territory were to be nationalised.³⁵⁷ Put differently, Ukraine constructed its armed forces – armed forces whose military power was rated as third in the world, after that of the US and the RF – simply by assuming control over, and by renaming, a diverse number of military formations.³⁵⁸

Security Sector Reform

The problems that this course of action created between Ukraine and the RF with regard to the transfer of nuclear weapons and the division of the BSF, have been explored in *Chapter III Ukraine*. However, the process of developing national armed forces was beset with other difficulties as well – difficulties that were related to the changes that the country's military institutions were supposed to undergo in order to operate in a Euro-Atlantic security environment

³⁵⁴ *The creation of the Ukrainian armed forces.*

http://www.mil.gov.ua/old/eng/derg_prog/history.htm (26 November 2002).

³⁵⁵ *The creation of the Ukrainian armed forces.*

³⁵⁶ Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian resurgence* (London 1999) 392.

³⁵⁷ *Decree of the parliament of Ukraine on military units in Ukraine 1431-XII* (Kyiv, 24 August 1991).

³⁵⁸ Anatolij Grytsenko, *Civil-military relations in Ukraine: a system emerging from chaos* Harmonie paper 1 (Groningen 1997) 5.

that was governed by the comprehensive post-Cold War concept of security.³⁵⁹ In turn, this implied that Ukraine needed to implement a process of SSR. And indeed, in line with the country's intention to advance on the road back to Europe and the national and international obligations that it had undertaken accordingly, it announced its plans to do so.³⁶⁰

With reference to the first element that the introduction of a process of SSR entails, namely that of the quantity of troops and supplies, Ukraine needed to make some sharp reductions. The *Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe* – or, as it is more commonly known, the *CFE treaty* – which was concluded between the member states of NATO and those of the WTO on 19 November 1990, and which stipulated the so-called ceilings of military personnel and equipment that they were allowed to deploy on the European continent, had to be negotiated anew with the dissolution of the latter party.³⁶¹ For Ukraine, the renewed *CFE treaty* resulted in the following limits: personnel 450.000, combat aircraft 1.090, attack helicopters 330, artillery systems 4.040, armoured vehicles 5.050 and tanks 4.080.³⁶²

On the face of it, it seems as though compliance with the *CFE treaty* was the logical thing to do for a country that was faced with continued economic hardship and dwindling defence budgets.³⁶³ Sure enough, as the table hereunder indicates, over the years Ukraine implemented a series of cutbacks

³⁵⁹ For the purpose of the chapter in hand, the account given in this paragraph of the way in which Ukraine dealt with the issue of Security Sector Reform is intended to be a generic survey. A more exhaustive overview can be found in: *National security and defence*, no. 1, vol. 1 (2000), no. 1, vol. 3 (2002), no. 5, vol. 3 (2002), no. 8, vol. 5 (2004). *Ukraine's strategic defence bulletin until 2015 (defence white paper)* (Kyiv 2004).

Военна безпека України на межі тисячоліть (Kyiv 2002).

Реформування сектору безпеки України (Kyiv 2004).

³⁶⁰ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію (основи державної політики) національної безпеки України 3/97-ВР.*

Ukraine's strategic defence bulletin until 2015 (defence white paper).

Partnership for Peace: framework document issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, article 3.

Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine, article 1.

NATO-Ukraine action plan, section II.

³⁶¹ *Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe* (s.l., 19 November 1990).

³⁶² *Agreement on adaptation of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe* (s.l., s.a.) article 21.

³⁶³ Walter Parchomenko, 'Prospects for genuine reform in Ukraine's security forces', *Armed forces & society* no. 2, vol. 28 (2002) 279-308, q.v. 283-284.

'Military reform in Ukraine: the start, or another false start? Reasons that hampered military reform in Ukraine', *National security and defence*, no. 1, vol. 1 (2000) 17-27, q.v. 21-23.

that made its amounts of personnel and equipment fall well below the required ceilings.³⁶⁴

	24 August 1991	CFE ceiling	1 August 1996	1 August 2001
Personnel	780.000	450.000	400.686	303.800
Combat aircraft	1.500	1.090	1.008	543
Attack helicopters	855	330	270	247
Artillery systems	4.095	4.040	3.727	3.702
Armoured vehicles	7.000	5.050	4.896	4.850
Tanks	6.500	4.080	4.039	3.937

Still, downsizing the armed forces was by no means a straightforward operation. As colonel Ihor Pylypchuk, the head of the political branch of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Department of the General Staff (GS) explained, sending military personnel into retirement, and writing off equipment were not the cheap and easy solutions that they appeared to be.³⁶⁵ Regarding their personnel, the armed forces were required by law to pay benefits to former servicemen, and to provide them with housing facilities. Apart from representing a drain on already scarce resources, these policies led to social unrest, as pensions were generally unsatisfactory and apartments unavailable.³⁶⁶ As concerns military hardware, the problems that followed from the inability to safely store, and subsequently dismantle, the huge amounts of ammunition that had been made redundant, came to the fore as recently as May 2004, when an explosion in a weapon storage facility in Melitopol killed five people and injured dozens more.³⁶⁷

Secondly, with an eye to the qualitative dimension of SSR, Ukraine was faced with the task of building not only national armed forces, but also a national organisational structure. Like so many other institutions of government, both the MoD, and the GS had to be created anew.³⁶⁸ The problems that this caused were compounded by the fact that the three military districts into which

³⁶⁴ *The military balance: annual estimates of the nature and size of the military forces of the principal powers 1996-1997* (London 1996) 101-102.

The military balance: annual estimates of the nature and size of the military forces of the principal powers 2001-2002 (London 1997) 101-103.

³⁶⁵ Interview with colonel Ihor Pylypchuk, head of the political branch of the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Department of the General Staff (Kyiv, 28 May 2003).

³⁶⁶ A similar argument can be made regarding the situation in which active duty personnel finds itself. 'Military reform in Ukraine: the start or another false start? Why does Ukraine need military reform so badly?', *National security and defence*, no. 1, vol. 1 (2000) 3-16, q.v. 10-11.

Parchomenko, 'Prospects for genuine reform in Ukraine's security forces', 285-287.

³⁶⁷ Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Weekly issue*, no. 19 (3 May- 9 May 2004).

³⁶⁸ 'Military reform in Ukraine: the start, or another false start? Reasons that hampered military reform in Ukraine', 17.

the UkrSSR had been divided, did not represent a unity in terms of organisation, composition and deployment. Whereas the Carpathian military district had been a part of the so-called western theatre of operations, the Kyiv and Odesa military districts belonged to the south-western one.³⁶⁹

For its part, this lack of experience in dealing with armed forces that existed in their own right – as opposed to troops that merely fell under a larger force grouping – was complicated by an element that has already been touched upon, namely the problems that Ukraine experienced in transforming its economy and, hence, in allocating sufficient funds to the military sector. According to the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS), a leading NGO in the sphere of security and defence, weapon systems were quickly becoming obsolete, and in urgent need of replacement.³⁷⁰ Also, the experts of UCEPS maintained that, as exercises were only conducted, either on a small scale, or in a classroom, there were but a few units that were actually combat-ready.³⁷¹

The third element of SSR, that of dynamic issues concerning the utilisation of the armed forces, was marred with a similar set of controversies. In response to the epochal events that took place in the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's, Ukraine had to define its strategy in new terms. Like its counterparts from Western Europe and North America, the country was no longer faced with the threat of large-scale attack. Instead, it had to ensure that its armed forces were able to operate in accordance with the principles that come with democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, market economies, social stability and social justice, and environmental protection.

On the basis of the *Concept (fundamentals of state policy) of the national security of Ukraine* and the *Defence white paper: Ukraine's strategic defence bulletin until 2015* – both of which provide a clear overview of the new dangers with which Ukraine was confronted, as well as of the ways in which these should be met – it is possible to conclude that the country's political and military elites were well aware of the fact that they were confronted with a changed reality.³⁷² However, as was the case concerning the wider political, economic, social and environmental developments that were addressed in the previous chapter, this realisation did not make it any less problematic to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice.

³⁶⁹ *The military balance: annual estimates of the nature and size of the military forces of the principal powers 1991-1992* (London 1991) 41.

³⁷⁰ 'Military reform in Ukraine: the start or another false start? Why does Ukraine need military reform so badly?', 8.

³⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

³⁷² *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію (основи державної політики) національної безпеки України 3/97-ВР. Ukraine's strategic defence bulletin until 2015 (defence white paper).*

Once again, a combination of financial difficulties and of a lack of experience with processes of policy making and policy implementation, meant that Ukraine was unable to put words into deeds. According to Walter Parchomenko, the author of 'Prospects for genuine reform in Ukraine's security forces', these problems formed the reason why the implementation of the *State programme for the development of the armed forces until 2005 and beyond* – a document whose recommendations were in accordance with those of the *Concept (fundamentals of state policy) of the national security of Ukraine* – was postponed twice (until 2010 and 2015 respectively).³⁷³

Here, a few words on cooperation between Ukraine and NATO are in order. As an organisation that was committed to supporting the former's "reform efforts on the road towards full integration in Euro-Atlantic structures", the latter had several instruments at its disposal to try and induce the former to both adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the set of common ideas that underlies the Euro-Atlantic security community.³⁷⁴ Among these were the financial benefits that the Alliance bestowed upon the country within the framework of the PfP.

Undoubtedly, the funds that Ukraine received for its contribution to military operations in, for example, the Balkans and Iraq, and its involvement in a variety of so-called joint exercises, were a welcome source of extra income – not counting the fact that these forms of military cooperation provided the country with the opportunity to show its ability to, at least on the international level, adhere to, and act in accordance with, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security.³⁷⁵

However, in spite of the ideational value of this latter element, on the level of domestic politics, the results of participation with the PfP were of a much more negative nature. Those units that were designated for the conduct of peacekeeping operations and joint exercises were heavily funded, to the detriment of those that were not; thereby further complicating the process of SSR.³⁷⁶ Put differently, whereas the financial advantages that NATO provided were certainly of use to those units that were earmarked for international cooperation, it is unlikely that they affected the armed forces as a whole in any significant, or for that matter particularly positive, manner.

³⁷³ Parchomenko, 'Prospects for genuine reform in Ukraine's security forces', 281-282.

³⁷⁴ *NATO-Ukraine: a distinctive partnership*.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine-e.pdf> (11 October 2004).

³⁷⁵ In the period 1994-2002 Ukraine conducted 128 military exercises within the framework of the PfP.

Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO: participation of the armed forces of Ukraine in PfP program.

<http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=cooperation&subject=participation> (11 October 2004).

³⁷⁶ 'Military reform in Ukraine: the start or another false start? Why does Ukraine need military reform so badly?', 7.

As concerns the other form of inducement of a material nature, namely the proverbial carrot of membership, it needs be kept in mind that, even though Ukraine did indeed state its intention to join NATO, it did so only on 23 May 2002 – more than a decade after it had gained independent statehood. And even when the issue of membership, eventually, did become a form of leverage, it was of limited value.

Given that Ukraine was unable to completely leave the Russian “near abroad”, the country remained fearful that the active pursuit of integration into the Alliance might lead to a negative reaction from the part of the RF. In fact, in the summer of 2004, after a series of visits by his Russian colleague Putin, president Kuchma apparently succumbed to the pressures that were being applied upon him, and deleted all references to the goal of joining NATO from the draft version of the new *Military doctrine*.³⁷⁷

Yet, there was another factor at play besides the existence of the manifold ties that continued to bind Ukraine to its neighbour to the east. The unwillingness from parts of the population to become too closely involved with the country’s neighbours to the west should be taken into consideration as well. In view of the upcoming presidential elections of October and November 2004, it seems likely that Kuchma introduced amendments to the *Military doctrine*, and de-emphasised the importance of NATO, in an attempt to boost the campaign of his intended successor, Viktor Yanukovitsch. After all, Yanukovitsch had his base of support in eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, where people took to a more negative view of the Alliance than the inhabitants of western Ukraine.

In a more general sense, the ease with which the issue of NATO membership was abandoned, gives way to speculations that, as is elaborated upon in the remainder of the chapter in hand, the Ukrainian elites themselves were reluctant to make the western dimension of their country’s foreign and security policy into an issue of fundamental importance, and to give top priority to the required reforms not only on paper, but also in practice. Without discarding the importance of such explanatory variables as a lack of experience with independent statehood, the failure to understand what advancing on the road back to Europe actually signifies, a shortage of funds, the bonds that continued to tie Ukraine to the RF, and the pro-Russian attitude of a portion of the population, the argument can be put to the fore that it was the elites’ unwillingness to contribute to the process of adhering to, and acting in accordance with, the set of common ideas that is shared by the countries of North America and Western Europe that prevented them from carrying out their declared agenda.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁷ Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, *Weekly issue*, no. 31 (26 July-1 August 2004).

³⁷⁸ For reasons that are outlined in more detail in a later paragraph, this holds true most notably with regard to president Kuchma.

When following this line of reasoning, it should come as no surprise that, like the aforementioned incentives of a material nature, the various instruments that were designed with an eye, not so much to inducing, but rather to assisting Ukraine in the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security – such as the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the JWGDR – did nothing to speed up the translation of ideas into behaviour.

The JWGDR was defined by a member of the international secretariat of NATO's Defence Policy & Planning Division as a "talk shop".³⁷⁹ The participating military representatives, and senior government officials found it difficult to give substance to their task of facilitating "practical cooperation on defence and security sector reform issues".³⁸⁰ A similar argument can be made with regard to the NATO-Ukraine Commission, a body which convenes several times a year at the level of ambassadors and military representatives, at the level of minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and at the level of Heads of State and Government.³⁸¹ Although the discussions that were held concerning the need to implement the provisions of the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* were, in themselves, a useful exercise, the fact that the means that the commission had to put words into deeds were unclear, was a serious downturn.³⁸²

In a similar vein, the *Target implementation plan 2003*, which outlined the way in which cooperation between Ukraine and NATO could contribute to the realisation of the goals of the *NATO-Ukraine action plan*, and which included measures in the sphere of "defence and security reform", failed to live up to its expectations. As James Greene, the head of the NLO in Kyiv stated in his article 'NATO membership is a realistic goal if Ukraine shows courage and resolve', "it was a list of activities rather than a reform program with clearly measurable objectives".³⁸³

On the one hand, this was perhaps to be expected. After all, in 2003 it was only the first time that a *Target implementation plan* was drafted. On the

³⁷⁹ Interview with a member of the Defence Policy & Planning Division, NATO international secretariat (Brussels, 4 November 2004).
David Karns, 'NATO relations with Ukraine: prospects for progress', *National security and defence*, no.8, vol. 1 (2000) 26-36, q.v. 29.

³⁸⁰ *NATO-Ukraine: a distinctive partnership*.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-ukraine/nato-ukraine-e.pdf>

James Sherr, 'Professionalisation of armed forces: the case of Ukraine' in: Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (ed.), *The challenge of military reform in postcommunist Europe. Building professional armed forces* (Houndmills 2002) 211-229, q.v. 223.

³⁸¹ *NATO-Ukraine commission. Developing NATO-Ukraine relations and cooperation*.

<http://www.nato.int/issues/nuc/index.html> (14 September 2004).

³⁸² See for example: *Chairman's statement. Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government held in Istanbul, Turkey* (29 June 2004).

³⁸³ James Greene, 'NATO membership is a realistic goal if Ukraine shows courage and resolve' in: *Ukraine-NATO: the future depends on the past*, (Kyiv 2004) 156-166, q.v. 164.

other hand, the fact that the version for 2004 contained only a few improvements (and minor ones at that), and did not address any of the criticisms just brought to the fore, was a cause for serious concern.³⁸⁴ In keeping with what has just been suggested, the fact that it was Ukraine, and not NATO, that bore the chief responsibility for the writing of the document, shed doubt, not only on the ability, but, more importantly, also on the willingness, of the country's elites to set boundaries for their military institutions that were in accordance with the requirements necessary for participation with the western zone of peace.

Military education

When moving from the first condition for the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces to the second one, the issue of military education comes to the fore. In view of the fact that Ukraine's military personnel was expected to be able to operate as an integral element of the society to which it belonged, it would have to be trained in not only the military, but also the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions that together constitute the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security.

The importance of this more ideational dimension of the concept of SSR was explicitly recognised by the MoD. In the *State programme for the development of the armed forces until 2005 and beyond*, it was stated that "modern armed forces of democratic Ukraine call for shaping officers' corps of a new generation, which in its turn calls for an appropriate re-organization of military educational system".³⁸⁵ In addition, the document explained that "currently a military professional has to be not only well-trained in military sphere, but also have knowledge of other areas".³⁸⁶

However, these good intentions notwithstanding, the proposed reforms of Ukraine's system of military education were carried out in a contradictory manner – a situation that can be attributed to more factors than just the failure to put the provisions of the aforementioned *State programme* into practice. The frequent changes in leadership within the MoD should be taken into account as well.

In 1992, the then minister of Defence, Kostiantyn Morozov, ordered that the various educational establishments should be placed under the direct authority of the Department of Military Education of the MoD. Two years later,

³⁸⁴ Greene, 'NATO membership is a realistic goal if Ukraine shows courage and resolve', 164.

³⁸⁵ *Державна програма реформування та розвитку збройних сил України на період до 2005 року* (Kyiv, 28 July 2000).

http://www.mil.gov.ua/old/eng/derg_prog/dpr.htm (26 November 2002).

³⁸⁶ *Ibidem*.

when Vitaliy Radetski was appointed as Morozov's successor, he transferred the responsibility for military education to the various branches of the armed forces. In 1996, under the leadership of Valeriy Shmarov, this decision was revoked, and the Department of Military Education was put back in charge. Yet, the following year, when Shmarov was replaced with Oleksandr Kuzmuk, the educational establishments were given back to the control of the armed forces.³⁸⁷

Apart from the fact that these struggles for power, which were so very characteristic of Ukraine's nascent political system, rendered it uncertain whether, as is addressed in more detail in a subsequent paragraph, the MoD and, more particularly, the minister of Defence were able to play their designated part in the system of civil-military relations, they also made the development of a unified curriculum into a difficult task. What is more, the introduction of courses on both the military, and the various non-military dimensions of security, was hampered by the fact that not everybody within the armed forces of Ukraine was in favour of such a policy.³⁸⁸ As Hrygoriy Perepelytsya, the director of the military department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) maintained, especially the principle of civilian oversight was seen as a potential infringement upon the positions that were occupied by top military officials, and hence, rejected.³⁸⁹

In turn, this attitude helps to explain why, in the early years of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, the results were rather poor. Members of the Ukrainian armed forces were invited, on a regular basis, to attend the NATO Defence College in Rome, the NATO School in Oberammergau and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen.³⁹⁰ Furthermore, several member states of the Alliance organised educational programmes of their own, such as the American International Military Education

³⁸⁷ 'Military reform in Ukraine: the start, or another false start? Reasons that hampered military reform in Ukraine', 24.

³⁸⁸ A member of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv explained that, more often than not, the Ukrainian copies of the *NATO handbook* that were sent to military educational establishments were not handed out to the students for which they were intended.

Interview with a member of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre (Kyiv, 10 June 2003).

³⁸⁹ Interview with Hrygoriy Perepelytsya, director of the military department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) (Kyiv, 12 June 2003).

³⁹⁰ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', *National security and defence*, no. 11, vol. 1 (2000) 14-26, q.v. 24.
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and Training (IMET) initiative and the Dutch International Staff Officers Orientation Course (ISOOC).³⁹¹

In all of these, the consequences of the expansion of the narrow Cold War concept of security into the comprehensive post-Cold War one, as well as the importance of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces were addressed.³⁹² However, given that, as David Karns stated in 'NATO relations with Ukraine: prospects for progress', people either didn't show up, or were on the verge of retirement, or didn't speak English, it seems unlikely that these programmes resulted in the development of a group of officers that was in tune with the changed circumstances with which it was faced.³⁹³

Yet, over the years, this situation began to change. As more and more members of the Ukrainian armed forces participated in forms of military cooperation with NATO member states, and became acquainted with the benefits of working with well-funded, well-equipped and well-trained troops, resentment against the adoption, and subsequent translation into behaviour, of new notions lessened.³⁹⁴ In combination with the stricter requirements concerning the ranks and language skills of course attendants that were formulated by the institutions involved, this resulted in the development of a gradually growing group of military personnel that was able to meet the demands that were posed by the Euro-Atlantic security community.³⁹⁵

That the situation with regard to the ideational dimension of SSR was improving, was also evidenced by the changes that took place within the National Defence Academy (NDA), the country's leading military educational institution. To begin with, on 28 August 2000, the first in a series of Multinational

³⁹¹ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 25.

Nienke de Deugd, 'Feit of fictie. Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van de democratische civiel-militaire betrekkingen in de landen van Midden- en Oost-Europa', scriptie onderzoekcollege geschiedenis 'Koopman, dominee en militair in actie. De Nederlandse hulpverlening in en ten opzichte van Midden- en Oost-Europa'.

³⁹² 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 24.

De Deugd, 'Feit of fictie. Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van de democratische civiel-militaire betrekkingen in de landen van Midden- en Oost-Europa'.

³⁹³ David Karns, 'NATO relations with Ukraine: prospects for progress', 32-33.

³⁹⁴ Interview with Perepelytsya.

This is one of the goals of the American International Military Education and Training initiative.

Interview with major John Kershaw, Office of Defence Cooperation of the United States (Kyiv, 29 May 2003).

³⁹⁵ De Deugd, 'Feit of fictie. Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van de democratische civiel-militaire betrekkingen in de landen van Midden- en Oost-Europa'.

Interview with Anatoliy Grytsenko, president of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (Kyiv, 26 May 2003).

Interview with Oleksandr Sushko, director of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (Kyiv, 29 May 2003).

Staff Officers Courses (MSOC) was launched. According to captain Ivan Ablazov, the acting director of MSOC, the goal of these courses was to train a select group of junior officers in the various skills that they would need in order to be able to operate in an international environment.³⁹⁶ To this end, MSOC included modules on NATO and PfP, on cooperation with civilians, and on dealing with the media.³⁹⁷

Moreover, in the wake of the decision that was taken in May 2002 to officially seek membership of NATO, a Chair on Euro-Atlantic Cooperation was created.³⁹⁸ As a member of the NLO explained, this move resulted in the removal of courses on “Soviet tank attack strategies”, and the introduction of English language courses.³⁹⁹ In addition, given that the majority of the staff of the accompanying Department on Euro-Atlantic Cooperation had received at least part of their training in the countries of Western Europe and North America, there now existed the opportunity to pass the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security on to the younger generation; or at least to a small portion of it.⁴⁰⁰

Finally, in 2001, the NDA saw the introduction of the “international week”, or as it was sometimes referred to, the “NATO week”.⁴⁰¹ In close cooperation with the NATO Information and Documentation Centre (NIDC), the NLO and the NATO Defence College, this module provided a select group of junior officers with the opportunity to become acquainted with such topics as “the Euro-Atlantic security architecture”, “NATO’s strategic concept”, “Membership Action Plan (MAP) – lessons learned” and “NATO relationships with Ukraine and Russia”.⁴⁰²

Yet, when recalling the way in which Ukraine carried out the other, quantitative, qualitative and dynamic dimensions that are a part of the process of SSR, these positive features should not lead one to discard some of doubts that can be raised as to the reasons behind these reforms – it may be argued

³⁹⁶ Interview with captain Ivan Ablazov, acting director of the Multinational Staff Officers Courses, National Defence Academy of Ukraine (Kyiv, 2 June 2003).

³⁹⁷ Interview with Ablazov.

Multinational Staff Officer Center.

<http://www.mil.gov.ua/en/education/msoc.htm> (13 September 2004).

³⁹⁸ Interview with a member of the NATO Liaison Office (Kyiv, 28 May 2003).

³⁹⁹ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with a member of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre.

⁴⁰¹ Interview with a member of the NATO Liaison Office.

⁴⁰² *Interview with James Greene, head of the NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Ukraine.*

<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/204/s040803a.htm> (14 September 2004).

NATO Defence College/Ukrainian National Defence Academy/International week in Kiev – NATO after Prague. Weekly agenda – 10 to 14 February 2003.

http://www.nato.int/structur/nmlo/international_week/agenda.pdf (11 April 2005).

NATO Defence College/Ukrainian Defence Academy/International week in Kiev. Weekly agenda – 9 to 13 February 2004.

http://www.nato.int/structur/nmlo/international_week/agenda_2004.pdf (11 April 2005).

that they were only implemented to make a favourable impression on NATO and its member states. Nor should it lead one to forget that the reach of these reforms were limited – it is questionable whether the institutions for military education that were located in the eastern and south-eastern *oblasts* of the country underwent any significant transformation.

Definition of civilian actors

When addressing the concept of civil-military relations, it are not only military institutions that should be taken into consideration; their civilian counterparts are of equal significance. With reference to – again – *Chapter II The Euro-Atlantic security community*, it is necessary to clearly define who the various actors involved in security and defence policy making are.

Regarding the first of these, the Head of State, both Ukraine's first president, Kravchuk, and his successor, Kuchma, were "genuine" civilians – and not retired officers. In the early years of the independence of Ukraine, both the political and the military elites thought this to be a positive feature of the country's system of civil-military relations – a characteristic moreover that would place Ukraine in a favourable light on the Euro-Atlantic stage.⁴⁰³ Due to a lack of understanding of what the establishment of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces entailed, it was thought that if the Head of State, who also acted as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was a civilian, then everything would be in order.⁴⁰⁴

Yet, this line of reasoning was, obviously, flawed. On the one hand, civilian oversight over the armed forces requires more than just the involvement of the president. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether Kravchuk and Kuchma were truly non-military in their outlook. For, the presidential administration, and especially those sections that were dealing with security and defence policy, were mainly composed of active duty and retired military

⁴⁰³ According to his memoirs, Ukraine's first minister of Defence, Kostiantyn Morozov, was aware of the importance of not only democratic, but also civilian oversight over the armed forces.

Kostiantyn P. Morozov, *Above and beyond. From Soviet general to Ukrainian state builder* (s.l. 2000) 147.

⁴⁰⁴ *Interview with James Greene, head of the NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Ukraine.*

Leonid Polyakov, 'Ukrainian experience in civil-military relations', paper presented at the international conference 'Taking stock on civil-military relations', organised by the Centre for European Security Studies (The Hague, 9–11 May 2001) 3.

personnel.⁴⁰⁵ This implied that, as Leonid Polyakov, the director of military programmes of UCEPS explained, the civilian oversight that the president was supposed to provide was of a distinctly military nature.⁴⁰⁶

As concerns the second civilian actor that needs to be taken into account, namely the NSDC, there too existed a considerable military presence. Apart from the president, the following people were, *ex officio*, part of the NSDC: the Prime Minister, the minister of Defence, the minister of Foreign Affairs, the minister of Internal Affairs and the head of the Security Service. To these, Kuchma added the minister for Emergencies, the minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, the minister of Finance, the minister of Justice, the chief of the GS, the head of the presidential administration, the head of the State Committee for the Protection of the State Border and the president of the National Academy of Sciences.⁴⁰⁷ Together with the NSDC's secretary, this brought its membership to 15. In 2000, seven of the members of the council were active duty or retired officers.⁴⁰⁸ A similar situation existed with regard to the staff of the NSDC. Even though the majority was made up of civilians, there were, as Polyakov, together with Anatoliy Tkachuk, wrote in 'Security sector expert formation: achievements and needs in Ukraine', "many retired servicemen too".⁴⁰⁹

Thirdly, parliament, or, more particularly, the PCNSD, was an actor that was at play. With an eye to its composition, it should be kept in mind that it was possible for military personnel to be elected as a member of parliament while continuing to serve in the armed forces.⁴¹⁰ Together with the fact that many of the non-military members of parliament were reluctant to become too closely involved with issues in the sphere of security and defence, this had as a result that active duty (or retired) officers were the candidates best suited to participate in the proceedings of this particular parliamentary committee.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁵ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 18. Leonid Polyakov and Anatoliy Tkachuk, 'Security sector expert formation: achievements and needs in Ukraine' in: Philipp H. Fluri and David M. Law (ed.), *Security sector expert formation – achievements and needs in South East Europe* (Geneva 2003) 247-271, q.v. 257.

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with Leonid Polyakov, director of military programmes of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (Kyiv, 22 May 2003).

⁴⁰⁷ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 17.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰⁹ Polyakov and Tkachuk, 'Security sector expert formation: achievements and needs in Ukraine', 257.

⁴¹⁰ *Роль парламенту в демократичному контролі за збройними силами і політика безпеки* (Kyiv 2002) 35.

⁴¹¹ This attitude is an example of the historical legacy that Ukraine inherited from the Soviet-period. In the USSR military affairs were never publicly discussed, least of all by civilians.

Thus, to give just one example, during the parliamentary period 1998-2002, six out of the 22 members of the PCNSD were military personnel.⁴¹²

In the final instance, there was the MoD. With the exception of Shmarov, each of the people who held the post of minister of Defence during the Kravchuk-period and the Kuchma-period, was a military man. Morozov, who was in office from 3 September 1991 until 4 October 1993, was a major general. Radetsky (8 October 1993-26 August 1994) was a general, Kuzmuk (1 July 1996-24 October 2001, and again 24 September 2004-4 February 2005) was a lieutenant general, Volodymyr Skidchenko (12 November 2001-20 June 2003) was a general, as was Yevhen Marchuk (25 June 2003-22 September 2004).

Minister of Defence	Rank
Kostiantyn Morozov	major general
Vitalii Radetsky	general
Valeriy Shmarov	<i>civilian</i>
Oleksandr Kuzmuk	lieutenant general
Volodymyr Skidchenko	general
Yevhen Marchuk	general
Oleksandr Kuzmuk	lieutenant general

When, on 26 August 1994, Shmarov first took up office, the top brass in the MoD, as well as in the GS and the armed forces in general, were not necessarily opposed to his appointment.⁴¹³ It was thought that a civilian, someone who was relatively untouched by the Soviet way of thinking about security, could implement the necessary reforms more easily.⁴¹⁴ Moreover, given that Shmarov enjoyed the support of the president, it was hoped that with the help of this powerful backer, real changes could be made.

In addition, there existed a broad consensus that the appointment of a civilian minister of Defence was a move that was highly favoured, both by the countries of North America and Western Europe, and by the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations.⁴¹⁵ In view of the fact that the man who had appointed Shmarov, the newly-elected president Kuchma, had at that point in time not yet introduced the multi-vector foreign and security policy – a policy that eventually led his country to, on paper anyway, seek cooperation with the east, but integration with the west – this was of special significance.

Yet, as it turned out, Shmarov – who had made a career for himself in the military-industrial complex of the USSR – lacked knowledge with regard to many of the other problems in the sphere of security and defence policy making

⁴¹² 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 16.

⁴¹³ Grytsenko, *Civil-military relations in Ukraine: a system emerging from chaos*, 27.

⁴¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹⁵ Polyakov, 'Ukrainian experience in civil-military relations', 3.

that had to be dealt with.⁴¹⁶ Also, he failed to form a staff of like-minded advisors, thereby making it virtually impossible to gather enough support for his attempts at transformation.⁴¹⁷ In short, the appointment of a civilian minister of Defence turned out to be a disappointment; a conclusion that resulted in Shmarov's dismissal on 1 July 1996.

A similar set of problems in making the transition from a military to a civilian MoD presented itself concerning the ministry's staff. On average, only 33% of the employees were civilian, as opposed to the 67% who were military employees.⁴¹⁸ This situation (which was completely opposite to that which existed in the countries to Ukraine's west) was compounded by the fact that civilian personnel was only placed in those department that were dealing with administrative or medical issues – and even there, they only occupied the lower positions.⁴¹⁹

The resulting imbalance in the composition of the MoD was connected to the difficulties that the higher and older echelons within the ministry had in coming to terms with the concept of civilian oversight.⁴²⁰ As has already been touched upon in the previous paragraphs, the top brass in the MoD was unable to determine where civilians should be placed, because, in their opinion, civilians should not be allowed to deal with issues in the sphere of security and defence in the first place.⁴²¹ In other words, many officers were not inclined to allow civilians to enter their bulwark, let alone have them operate from influential positions – an attitude that was reinforced by the poor performance of Shmarov.⁴²²

For its part, this helps to understand why, in the few cases in which civilians were appointed to senior posts, it were not really civilians that came to work in the MoD, but rather retired officers. To give an example, when the post of state secretary of Defence was created, it was stipulated that it should be filled by a civilian. In an attempt to solve the apparent problem that this requirement created, Ivan Bizhan, a three star general and long-term employee of the MoD was sent into retirement, only to be appointed to this new post just

⁴¹⁶ Grytsenko, *Civil-military relations in Ukraine: a system emerging from chaos*, 31.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 29-30.

⁴¹⁸ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Democratic civilian control over the military, its substance and urgency for Ukraine', *National security and defence* no. 11, vol. 1 (2000) 3-13, q.v. 7.

⁴¹⁹ Frank Cook and Yvan Zayets, *Ukraine and its armed forces: a new actor on the European stage* NATO parliamentary assembly, defence and security committee AS 253 DSC (99) 8 (s.l. 1999) 15.

⁴²⁰ Natalie Mychajlyszyn, 'Civil-military relations in post-Soviet Ukraine: implications for domestic and regional stability', *Armed forces & society* no. 3, vol. 28 (2002) 455-479, q.v. 462.

⁴²¹ Interview with colonel Igor Lymarenko, first deputy director of the Department of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Kyiv, 6 June 2003).

⁴²² Interview with Perepelytsya.

a few days later.⁴²³ As colonel Igor Lymarenko, the first deputy director of the Department of International Cooperation confirmed, this was a normal and accepted procedure.⁴²⁴

Yet, the failure to civilianise the MoD can not be attributed solely to a lack of will to make the changes necessary for the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces.⁴²⁵ What should be taken into consideration as well is that it was far from simple to fire military personnel. In view of the costs involved, making jobs available for civilians by means of sending their military counterparts into retirement, was not a viable option.

Also, it turned out to be difficult to find civilians capable of working in the MoD. Given that, during the Soviet-period, it was not common for civilians to be engaged in issues in the sphere of security and defence, there were few civilians that were sufficiently knowledgeable to occupy senior posts.⁴²⁶ And of course, with an eye to the process of SSR in which the MoD was involved, replacing competent military personnel with less competent civilians was a policy that was to be avoided.⁴²⁷

Furthermore, the MoD experienced problems in getting those civilians who were indeed capable of participating in security and defence policy making to come and work in the ministry. Once more, the difficult financial situation in which the MoD found itself should be taken into account. The ministry was unable to offer its civilian employees the same salaries and additional benefits that are awarded to its military personnel.⁴²⁸ Consequently, the few civilians who were actually qualified to occupy positions in the MoD, civilians who were very highly educated, and who had been abroad to study, tended to seek other, better paying, jobs.⁴²⁹

⁴²³ Interview with Polyakov.

⁴²⁴ Interview with Lymarenko.

⁴²⁵ Ibidem.

Interview with Perepelytsya.

'Military reform in Ukraine: the start, or another false start? Concrete proposals as to military reform planning in Ukraine', *National security and defence* no. 1, vol. 1 (2000) 28-39, q.v. 35.

⁴²⁶ Interview with Pylypchuk.

Christopher D. Jones and Natalie Mychajlyszyn, 'Overview: civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe in former communist societies', *Armed forces & society* no. 3, vol. 28 (2002) 375-384, q.v. 378.

⁴²⁷ Jeffrey Simon, 'Defense planning experiences of NATO new members', *National security and defence* no. 11, vol. 1 (2000) 87-88, q.v. 88.

⁴²⁸ Mychajlyszyn, 'Civil-military relations in post-Soviet Ukraine: implications for domestic and regional stability', 463.

⁴²⁹ Interview with Perepelytsya.

Mychajlyszyn, 'Civil-military relations in post-Soviet Ukraine: implications for domestic and regional stability', 463.

Legal framework

Another element that is of significance to the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, is the establishment of a legal framework, in which the respective powers and responsibilities of the various actors concerned, whether of a civilian, or of a military nature, are outlined. In Ukraine, this legal framework was based upon the following documents: the *Decree on the concept for the defence and the formation of the armed forces of Ukraine*; the *Law on defence of Ukraine*; the *Constitution*; the *Concept (fundamentals of state policy) of the national security of Ukraine*; and the *Law on the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine*.⁴³⁰

With regard to the GS, it was specified that, as the leading body of the armed forces, it had the authority to provide operational management, as well as operational command and operational control.⁴³¹ Moreover, the GS was to analyse future trends in the sphere of security and defence, and to determine both the development of the armed forces, and the amounts of personal, material, financial and other resources necessary in order to secure that development.⁴³² Furthermore, with regard to the issue of civil-military relations, the GS was intended to serve as the representative of the armed forces in its relationship with society at large and, more specifically, with the various bodies of government concerned.⁴³³

The president was to provide overall leadership in the sphere of security and defence, as well as in the system of civil-military relations.⁴³⁴ According to the provisions laid down in the legal framework, he had the authority to give out decrees on any issue pertaining to military affairs.⁴³⁵ Also, the Head of State could take decisions, both concerning war and peace, and concerning the

⁴³⁰ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12* (Kyiv, 11 October 1991).

Закон України про оборону України 1932-XII.

Constitution (Kyiv, 28 June 1996).

Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію (основи державної політики) національної безпеки України 3/97-ВР.

Закон України про ради національної безпеки і оборону України 183/98-ВР (Kyiv, 5 May 1998).

⁴³¹ *Закон України про оборону України 1932-XII*, розділ II, стаття 11.

Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12, розділ III, стаття 5.

⁴³² *Ibidem*.

⁴³³ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12*, розділ III, стаття 5.

⁴³⁴ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію (основи державної політики) національної безпеки України 3/97-ВР*, розділ V.

Державна програма реформування та розвитку збройних сил України на період до 2005 року.

⁴³⁵ *Закон України про оборону України 1932-XII*, розділ II, стаття 6.

mobilisation and deployment of the armed forces.⁴³⁶ Moreover, he was supposed to conduct negotiations with third parties.⁴³⁷ Finally, the president had the right to appoint or dismiss members of the Cabinet of Ministers and military commanders.⁴³⁸

The NSDC was intended to serve as the main supervising body in the sphere of security and defence and, more particularly, in the system of civil-military relations.⁴³⁹ Under the specifications of the legal framework, it had the right to both coordinate and control the activities that were undertaken by the various bodies of executive power.⁴⁴⁰ Also, the NSDC was to outline the basic principles concerning the development of defence and security policy, as well as those regarding the development of the armed forces.⁴⁴¹ Moreover, it was awarded with the authority to prepare normative documents, such as laws, directives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and international treaties.⁴⁴² However, the NSDC lacked the authority to implement these acts on its own accord. It had to submit all proposals to its head, the president, who could then give out a decree to put them into effect.⁴⁴³

The PCNSD, as a representative of the parliament of Ukraine at large, was supposed to serve as the main body of legislative power in the sphere of security and defence, as well as in the system of civil-military relations.⁴⁴⁴ According to the provisions laid down in the legal framework, it had the authority to ensure the realisation of the necessary legislative regulations.⁴⁴⁵ In combination with its task of carrying out parliamentary oversight, this implied that the PCNSD also had to approve the decrees given out, and the decisions taken, by the president.⁴⁴⁶ Moreover, it was set to supervise the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers and, more specifically, of the minister of Defence.⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, the PCNSD could determine the functions the armed forces were to perform, together with the conditions for military cooperation with third

⁴³⁶ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12, розділ III, стаття 2.*

⁴³⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁴³⁸ *Constitution*, article 106.

⁴³⁹ *Ibidem*, article 107.

⁴⁴⁰ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію (основи державної політики) національної безпеки України 3/97-ВР, розділ V.*

⁴⁴¹ *Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12, розділ III, стаття 3.*

⁴⁴² *Закон України про ради національної безпеки і оборону України 183/98-ВР, розділ II, стаття 4.*

⁴⁴³ *Constitution*, article 107.

⁴⁴⁴ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 16.

⁴⁴⁵ *Закон України про оборону України 1932-XII, розділ II, стаття 5.*

⁴⁴⁶ *Constitution*, article 85.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibidem.*

parties.⁴⁴⁸ Finally, the PCNSD had the right to approve the state budget, introduce amendments to it and supervise its implementation.⁴⁴⁹

The MoD, as the provider of military-political and administrative leadership over the armed forces, served as the main body of executive power, both in the sphere of security and defence, and in the system of civil-military relations.⁴⁵⁰ As such, it had the right to develop defence and security policy.⁴⁵¹ Also, the MoD was to determine the course of development of the armed forces, necessary for the realisation of these policies.⁴⁵² Moreover, it was set to bear the responsibility for the realisation of the plans concerning the course of development of the armed forces.⁴⁵³ Finally, it had the authority to determine the contribution of the armed forces to peacekeeping operations, and to participate in negotiations with third parties.⁴⁵⁴

In short, the legal framework that was drawn up in Ukraine can be represented as follows:

⁴⁴⁸ Ibidem.

Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12, розділ III, стаття 1.

⁴⁴⁹ *Constitution*, article 85.

⁴⁵⁰ *Державна програма реформування та розвитку збройних сил України на період до 2005 року.*

⁴⁵¹ *Закон України про оборону України 1932-XII, розділ II, стаття 10.*

⁴⁵² Ibidem.

⁴⁵³ Ibidem.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibidem.

Постанова верховної ради України про концепцію оборони та будівництва збройних сил України 1659-12, розділ III, стаття 4.

GS	President	NSDC	PCNSD	MoD
Leading body of the armed forces	provider of overall leadership in the sphere of security and defence	main supervising body in the sphere of security and defence	main body of legislative power in the sphere of security and defence	main body of executive power in the sphere of security and defence
to serve as a representative of the armed forces in the relations with society at large	provider of overall leadership in the system of civil-military relations	main supervising body in the system of civil-military relations	main body of legislative power in the system of civil-military relations	main body of executive power in the system of civil-military relations
to serve as a representative of the armed forces in the relations with the various bodies of government concerned	to give out decrees	to coordinate the activities of the various bodies of executive power	to ensure the realisation of legislative regulations	provider of military-political and administrative leadership
provider of operational management, command and control	to make decisions concerning war and peace	to control the activities undertaken by the various bodies of executive power	to carry out parliamentary oversight	to develop defence and security policy
to analyse future trends	to make decisions concerning the mobilisation and deployment of the armed forces	to outline the basic principles concerning the development of defence and security policy	to supervise the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers	to determine the course of development of the armed forces
to determine the development of the armed forces	to conduct negotiations with third parties	to outline the basic principles concerning the development of the armed forces	to determine the functions the armed forces are to perform	to bear the responsibility for the realisation of the plans concerning the course of development of the armed forces
to determine the necessary amounts of personal, material, financial and other resources	to appoint or dismiss members of the Cabinet of Ministers	to prepare normative documents	to determine the conditions for military co-operation with third parties	to determine the contribution of the armed forces to peacekeeping operations
	to appoint or dismiss military commanders		to approve the state budget	to participate in negotiations with third parties
			to introduce amendments to the state budget	
			to supervise the implementation of the state budget	

Legal framework in practice

Still, the fact that Ukraine managed to draw up a legal framework notwithstanding, this did not automatically imply that the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces proceeded without difficulty.⁴⁵⁵ The aforementioned powers and responsibilities also needed to be put into practice.

The president

To the president, this did not seem to be a problem, as he used the prerogatives that were assigned to him to their full extent. For example, Kravchuk and Kuchma were both actively involved in the conduct of negotiations with third parties, such as with NATO, concerning the Ukrainian participation in the PfP, the signing of the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* and the conclusion of the *NATO-Ukraine action plan*.⁴⁵⁶

Also, with regard to their ability to appoint or dismiss members of the Cabinet of Ministers, the presidents together nominated, and subsequently fired, no less than six ministers of Defence. Yet, whether this type of activity was such a positive development is something that remains to be seen. Not only were the numerous changes in leadership within the MoD a sign of the immaturity of the Ukrainian political system, but they also made the implementation of coherent policies over longer periods of time into a difficult affair; as is evidenced by the problems that the military educational institutions experienced in developing a unified curriculum.

Minister of Defence	Appointment	Dismissal
Morozov	3 September 1991	4 October 1993
Radetsky	8 October 1993	26 August 1994
Shmarov	26 August 1994	1 July 1996
Kuzmuk	1 July 1996	24 October 2001
Skidchenko	12 November 2001	20 June 2003
Marchuk	25 June 2003	22 September 2004
Kuzmuk	24 September 2004	4 February 2005

⁴⁵⁵ Vadym Grechaninov, 'Truly democratic civilian control over the military barely emerges in Ukraine', *National security and defence* no. 11, vol. 1 (2000) 68-70, q.v 68.

⁴⁵⁶ Mychajlyszyn, 'Civil-military relations in post-Soviet Ukraine: implications for domestic and regional stability', 462.

James Sherr, *Security, democracy and 'civil democratic control' of armed forces in Ukraine* Conflict Studies Research Centre G 90 (Camberley 2001) 8.

Concerning their other powers and responsibilities, Kravchuk, and especially Kuchma, made extensive use of their authority to give out decrees on issues in the sphere of national security and defence. A document as fundamentally important as the *State programme for the development of the armed forces until 2005 and beyond* was drafted under the auspices of the NSDC, and then put into effect (and subsequently postponed) by its head – the president.⁴⁵⁷ The PCNSD was excluded from the entire process of the document's development, and did not devote a single debate to its contents.⁴⁵⁸ Again, this serves as a clear sign of the problems that Ukraine experienced in making the transition from a communist to a democratic political system; the more so as the document dealt with such issues as the functions the armed forces were to perform, and their deployment – issues which, according to the provisions laid down in the legal framework, should all be subjected to discussion by parliament.

Here, the position of the parliament of Ukraine comes into play in a more general sense. Prior to 28 June 1996, the PCNSD had the right to be involved in the development of state programmes pertaining to military affairs. Yet, under the provisions of the *Constitution*, the committee had to be consulted concerning the adoption of “all-state programmes of economic, scientific, technical, social, national and cultural development”.⁴⁵⁹ The prerogative to deal with other all-state programmes was transferred to the president.⁴⁶⁰ This helps to explain why, once Kuchma had given out the decree concerning the adoption of the *State programme for the development of the armed forces until 2005 and beyond*, all the PCNSD could do was carry out its task of parliamentary supervision, and either adopt or reject the decree in its entirety. Given the existence of a pro-presidential majority in parliament, it chose the former option.⁴⁶¹

In turn, what this example makes clear is that, as was the case concerning the wider military and non-military dimensions of which the Euro-Atlantic concept of security is composed, with regard to the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations as well, the powers and responsibilities of the actors

⁴⁵⁷ James Sherr, 'Civil-democratic control of Ukraine's armed forces: to what end? By what means?' in: David Betz and John Löwenhardt (ed.), *Army and state in postcommunist Europe* (London 2001) 65-77, q.v. 74-75.

⁴⁵⁸ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Civilian control over the military in Ukraine: correspondence to the effectiveness criteria', *National security and defence* no. 11, vol. 1 (2000) 27-41, q.v. 34.

⁴⁵⁹ *Constitution*, article 85.

⁴⁶⁰ Anatolii Grytsenko, *Civil-military relations in Ukraine: on the way from form to substance* NATO fellowship programme (Kyiv 2000) 19.

⁴⁶¹ Sherr, 'Civil-democratic control of Ukraine's armed forces: to what end? By what means?', 75.

involved were not distributed equally.⁴⁶² The existence of such an imbalance can be attributed to the existence of flaws in the various decrees, laws and concepts that together constituted the legal framework.⁴⁶³ At first sight, this seems to be a matter of a lack of experience, in combination with a lack of understanding.⁴⁶⁴ After all, Ukraine had to start the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces not only scratch, but also from a background that was heavily influenced by the experience of being part of the USSR for more than 70 years.

However, the gaps that beset the legal framework were caused by more than just inexperience and misunderstanding. The ongoing struggle for power between the various bodies of government should be taken into consideration as well. As has already been discussed in the previous chapter, following the moment of the declaration of independence, Ukraine was faced with the double challenge of (1) creating its own institutions of government, and of (2) building a democratic political system. As these twin-problems proved to be too difficult to solve, they resulted in an unfinished democracy, in which the rule of law was not firmly established, and a variety of immature bodies of government were constantly trying to assert themselves – most often at the expense of others.⁴⁶⁵

By and large, this struggle for power was won by the Head of State. Again, this holds true not only with regard to the political system of Ukraine in general, but even more so with regard to issues in the sphere of security and defence.⁴⁶⁶ As Oleksandr Sushko, the director of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine stated, and Inna Pidluska, the president of the Europe XXI foundation confirmed, Kuchma – and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Kravchuk – rose to occupy the position of the single most important source of authority in the system of civil-military relations.⁴⁶⁷

What made this situation into such a cause for concern was the fact that Kuchma was not inclined to use the position of preponderant power that he enjoyed to further the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces. As Anatoliy Grytsenko, the current minister of Defence, stated when he was still the president of UCEPS, Kuchma simply did

⁴⁶² Jones and Mychajlyszyn, 'Overview: civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe in former communist societies', 380.

Sherr, *Security, democracy and 'civil democratic control' of armed forces in Ukraine*, 6.

⁴⁶³ Vyacheslav Pichofsjek and Christopher Pett, 'De transformatie van de Oekraïense strijdkrachten', *NAVO Kroniek* no. 5, vol. 42 (1994) 21-25, q.v. 22.

⁴⁶⁴ *Interview with James Greene, head of the NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Ukraine.*

⁴⁶⁵ Mychajlyszyn, 'Civil-military relations in post-Soviet Ukraine: implications for domestic and regional stability', 461.

Polyakov, 'Ukrainian experience in civil-military relations', 2.

⁴⁶⁶ Sherr, *Security, democracy and 'civil democratic control' of armed forces in Ukraine*, 6.

⁴⁶⁷ Interview with Sushko.

Interview with Inna Pidluska, president of the Europe XXI foundation (Kyiv, 5 June 2003).

not display any significant interest in developing such a type of relationship between military and civilian actors.⁴⁶⁸

Yet, the fact that the president paid so little to the development of a new form of interaction between military and civilian actors cannot be explained solely by pointing to his lack of interest in that issue. There was something else at work as well. As it was widely suggested, it is very probable that Kuchma was not really in favour of the development of such a type of system of civil-military relations. In all likelihood, he only pretended to be, because he thought that that was what the participants with the Euro-Atlantic security community expected of him.⁴⁶⁹

After all, if Kuchma truly would have been as committed to this particularly important aspect of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security as he appeared to be on the level of declaratory policy, would he then not, being the powerful actor that he obviously was, have been more forthcoming in implementing the necessary process of reform? The answer to this question is provided by an overview of the events that took place in 2000, when the president asked the NISS to analyse the current state of affairs with regard to the system of civil-military relations, and to devise a strategy to implement the reforms necessary for the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces.⁴⁷⁰ When it turned out that the findings and recommendations of the NISS were very critical and, were they to be implemented, would have rather far-reaching consequences, Kuchma decided that the results were not to his liking. Consequently, the report was shelved, and nothing changed.⁴⁷¹

This ties in with the arguments that were brought to bear in previous paragraphs, namely that the president was not really in favour of the adoption, and subsequent translation into behaviour, of the values that are shared by the countries of North America and Western Europe; at least not if that course of action would harm his own interests. While, on the level of international politics, there were good reasons for the country's elites to come out in favour of the establishment of a new set of common ideas (in the sense that that course of action was a way of being recognised as a reliable partner, worthy of receiving assistance) on the level of domestic politics this incentive to cast the Soviet way of thinking aside, did not exist.

⁴⁶⁸ Interview with Grytsenko.

Демократичний контроль над системою національної безпеки та збройними силами: поширення цінностей НАТО в Євроатлантичному просторі (Dolya 2003) 19.

⁴⁶⁹ Interview with a member of the NATO Liaison Office.

Interview with Grytsenko.

Interview with Oleg Kokoshinsky, vice-president of the Atlantic Council of Ukraine (Kyiv, 23 May 2003).

Interview with Lymarenko, Perepelytsya, Pidluska and Polyakov.

⁴⁷⁰ Polyakov, *Ukrainian experience in civil-military relations*, 8.

⁴⁷¹ Interview with Polyakov.

With regard to the issue of the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, it should be kept in mind that, to the majority of the population of Ukraine, military matters were of little significance. Hence, the advantages of political advancement and legitimisation of one's own position that were mentioned in *Chapter I The issue of participation*, were of no importance in this respect. When dealing with the comprehensive post-Cold War concept of security in a more general sense, it needs to be taken into account that, as has already been sketched in the previous chapter, Kuchma and his group of *oligarchs* found themselves in quite an advantageous position – a position that could only deteriorate by introducing a process of far-reaching reforms.

The latter point is connected to the characteristics that marked the political system of Ukraine as a whole. Aware of the fact that everything depended upon the political position that one occupied, most politicians cared only about staying in office for as long a period as possible. Consequently, very often the only policies that were being developed were short-term, rather than long-term, and based on personal interest instead of national interest.⁴⁷²

This line of reasoning concerning Kuchma's reluctance to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice is further supported by the events surrounding the National Centre for the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. As part of the administration of the president, this organisation was established in January 2003 for the stated purpose of furthering Ukraine's participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community. As Vitaliy Shved, a member of the Centre's military branch, explained, this goal was to be reached by giving recommendations concerning the various steps to be taken, as well as by monitoring the implementation of the various cooperation agreements that were concluded with NATO, such as the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* and the *NATO-Ukraine action plan*. Yet, as Shved himself was forced to admit, the proposals that were sent to the president, were, more often than not, ignored.⁴⁷³

From a somewhat broader perspective, it may even be contended that this apparently negative attitude towards the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security was connected to a less than positive view on the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community.⁴⁷⁴ Tentatively, one can argue that, even though on the level of policy-on-paper Kuchma clearly was in favour of pursuing the western dimension of his country's foreign and security policy to its full extent, on the level of policy-in-practice he was not; or at least not

⁴⁷² Interview with Pidluska.

⁴⁷³ Interview with Vitaliy Shved, member of the military branch of the National Centre for the Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine (Kyiv, 6 June 2003).

⁴⁷⁴ Interview with Kokoshinsky, Perepelytsya, Pidluska.

completely.⁴⁷⁵ In other words, apart from the various difficulties that rendered Ukraine both unable, and unwilling to play its part in the process of socialisation that have already been discussed, a certain measure of unwillingness to join the enlarging community of values, and – hence – to take the necessary steps on the road back to Europe, should not be discarded beforehand.

Together with the adjustments that were made to the *Military doctrine* concerning the issue of membership with NATO, the fate that befell Boris Tarasyuk serves to exemplify this. While Tarasyuk is currently acting as minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Ukraine's newly-elected president, Viktor Yushchenko, he also served under Kuchma. As a staunch defender of the goal of seeking integration into the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations, Tarasyuk – who was first appointed to his post on 17 April 1998 – quickly gained the support of the countries from North America and Western Europe. Yet, it was precisely this pro-western orientation and, more specifically, his enthusiasm for cooperation with NATO, that gained him many enemies within his own country. On 29 September 2000, Kuchma joined in with the chorus of critical voices and decided to dismiss Tarasyuk – a move that was seen by many representatives of the western zone of peace that the pro-Russian camp within Ukraine was gaining in influence.⁴⁷⁶

The NSDC

When addressing the position that the president occupied within the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations, the NSDC needs to be taken into account as well. Through its authority to prepare laws, directives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and international treaties, this body greatly enhanced the president's capability to be involved in, and give out decrees on, issues pertaining to security and defence.⁴⁷⁷ The *State programme for the development of the armed forces until 2005 and beyond* just mentioned serves as a case in point.

Still, with regard to some of the other powers and responsibilities that were assigned to the NSDC, its position was rather more ambiguous. According

⁴⁷⁵ In this regard, the argument that can be brought to the fore is that, in spite of the material and ideational advantages that participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community had to offer on the level of policy-on-paper (and, from the point of view of the countries of North America and Western Europe, also on the level of policy-in-practice), pursuing the western dimension of Ukraine's foreign and security policy to its full extent was perhaps one step too many on the road back to Europe for someone who had previously been a part of the Soviet *nomenklatura*.

⁴⁷⁶ An analysis of the pros and cons of the dismissal of Boris Tarasyuk can be found in: James Sherr, *The dismissal of Borys Tarasyuk* CSRC occasional brief no. 79 (s.l. 2000).

⁴⁷⁷ Jones and Mychajlyszyn, 'Overview: civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe in former communist societies', 380.

to the provisions laid down in the legal framework, it was set to serve as the main supervising body in the system of civil-military relations. However, it was not quite clear what was meant by "supervising". Did the use of the term imply that the NSDC was to coordinate the activities undertaken by the various bodies of executive power in the sphere of national security and defence, or that it was to control them? In the original wording of the *Constitution*, the term that was used is *контролюєт* or "kontroliruet", which means "monitor". Obviously, this was a rather vague term, which made it impossible to clearly define the role that the NSDC was supposed to play.⁴⁷⁸

Here too, the existence of flaws and gaps in the legal framework can be attributed to a lack of both experience, and understanding. Yet, the aforementioned incessant struggle for power should be taken into consideration as well. Arguably, the wording of the *Constitution* was left ambiguous on purpose, thereby allowing the president some room to manoeuvre, and to use the NSDC to suit his own interests.

That the president did indeed utilise the NSDC to strengthen his position in the system of civil-military relations, becomes evident from looking at the relationship between the head of the NSDC on the one hand, and its secretary on the other hand.⁴⁷⁹ At times when the president and the secretary of the NSDC saw eye-to-eye, and were able to work together effectively, the president allowed the NSDC considerable leeway in exercising its responsibilities and powers. In other words, under such circumstances, the power of the NSDC increased. Most notably, this was the case during the period 1996-1999, when Volodymyr Horbulin was secretary of the NSDC. Yet, under Horbulin's successor, Marchuk, this relationship deteriorated. As a consequence, the president made less and less use of the NSDC, which – in turn – meant that its powers were waning. This is best exemplified by the fact that in 2000, the NISS was resubordinated from the NSDC to the president, thereby depriving the former of its highly respected research institute.⁴⁸⁰

Yet, whereas the waxing and waning fortunes of the NSDC were a negative feature of the system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces that was being developed in Ukraine, the organisation did, in and of itself, not exert any significant influence on the establishment of such a type of interaction between military and civilian actors. Although the NSDC was, from time to time, able to play its part within the sphere of security and defence as a whole, it was never actively involved in that particular issue. Even in such times when the cooperation between the president and the NSDC could be characterised as successful, the latter never made an effort to implement the

⁴⁷⁸ Sherr, *Security, democracy and 'civil democratic control' of armed forces in Ukraine*, 9.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibidem.

reforms necessary for the establishment of a type of oversight that was in keeping with the Euro-Atlantic concept of security.⁴⁸¹

Given the composition of the NSDC, this is hardly surprising. In all likelihood, the NSDC's military component was not exactly prone to develop a system of civil-military relations that would deprive them of their authoritative position.⁴⁸² In addition, with the members of the NSDC being appointed by the president – who was, as has just been argued, not truly committed to the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces – it cannot be expected that a body of government that stood under his supervision took to a different point of view.

The PCNSD

As has become clear from the manner in which the *State programme for the development of the armed forces until 2005 and beyond* was devised and accepted, the inconsistencies that beset the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces in Ukraine – or, for that matter, the country's political system as a whole – were to the detriment of the PCNSD. In part, this can be attributed to the powerful position that was occupied by the president. Yet, in part, the impotence of Ukraine's parliamentarians was a factor that was at play as well; as becomes evident from the difficulties that the committee experienced in using the other powers and responsibilities that were conferred to it effectively.

One of the levers of influence that was available to parliament, was the right to supervise the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers. With regard to the PCNSD, this implies that it had the opportunity to put questions before the minister of Defence. However, in this respect, the committee was sometimes referred to as a "sleeping beauty", and with good reason.⁴⁸³ As a member of the NIDC explained, during the parliamentary terms 1991-1994, 1994-1998 and 1998-2002, the minister of Defence was seldom called to parliament to be held accountable for his actions.⁴⁸⁴

In fact, whenever the minister of Defence did come to parliament – and of the six people who have held the post of minister of Defence since 24 August 1991, only Kuzmuk regularly made his appearance – he did so out of his own accord, thereby providing himself with the chance to impress his own views on issues in the sphere of security and defence upon the members of the PCNSD,

⁴⁸¹ Interview with Pidluska and Polyakov.

⁴⁸² Polyakov and Tkachuk, 'Security sector expert formation: achievements and needs in Ukraine', 256.

⁴⁸³ Polyakov, 'Ukrainian experience in civil-military relations', 5.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with a member of the NATO Information and Documentation Centre.

and maybe gain an edge in the ongoing struggles for influence that affected the Ukrainian political scene.⁴⁸⁵

When trying to explain this situation, the presence of active duty or retired officers within the PCNSD comes to the fore. Arguably, the military members of the committee were of the opinion that, in their newly-acquired position as politicians, they should either not meddle in the affairs of the armed forces, or support only those measures that would increase, rather than decrease, the military's power and influence.⁴⁸⁶ In turn, their attitude was shared by the other, non-military parliamentarians. As has already been explained, due to Ukraine's historical legacy – in the USSR, issues pertaining to the sphere of security and defence were never publicly discussed, least of all by civilians – they too felt that it was not up to them to interfere in military matters, least of all in a critical fashion.⁴⁸⁷

What is more, the PCNSD not only reflected the desire from the part of the majority of the population of Ukraine to stay away as far as possible from security and defence policy making, it also lacked the knowledge to make a meaningful contribution to the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, as well as to the process of SSR. Especially the civilian members of the committee were ill-trained in the meaning of the concepts that underlay the Euro-Atlantic security community.⁴⁸⁸

With regard to another area in which the PCNSD did not operate as effectively as it was supposed to, there was a relatively similar set of elements at work. Parliament had several responsibilities and powers in the budgetary sphere, including the right to approve the state budget, to introduce amendments to it, and to supervise the budget's implementation. Given the fact that practically every decision taken by the Cabinet of Ministers, and every decree issued by the president required funding, the committee's prerogatives in this particular field were meant to provide it with the opportunity to exercise influence on issues it would normally be excluded from debating about. In other words, through making use of its budgetary powers, the PCNSD could try to reassert itself as an important actor within the system of civil-military relations.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁸⁶ Interview with Pidluska.

⁴⁸⁷ *Парламентский контроль над вооруженными силами: опыт Европейских стран* (Kyiv 2002) 397.

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with Grytsenko.

Polyakov and Tkachuk, 'Security sector expert formation: achievements and needs in Ukraine', 253.

Парламентский контроль над вооруженными силами: опыт Европейских стран, 397.

⁴⁸⁹ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Democratic civilian control over the military, its substance and urgency for Ukraine', 9.

However, it failed to use this particular lever of influence. Especially in the early years of the independence of Ukraine, it was impossible for the PCNSD to carefully examine the budget, and to make a balanced decision concerning its contents.⁴⁹⁰ As the budget was drawn up so poorly – in the sense that it was composed of just a few unspecified items – there, in effect, wasn't much of a budget to scrutinise.⁴⁹¹

Again, this was a matter not only of inexperience, but also of the problems that beset the Ukrainian political system more broadly speaking. Making it very difficult for the PCNSD to use its budgetary powers in any meaningful way, was a simple way of preventing it from gaining in importance. In addition, as has already been touched upon, the armed forces, and especially the GS, had great difficulty in accepting public scrutiny by civilians, and were very reluctant to give information concerning budgetary issues.⁴⁹² Evidently, this attitude was detrimental to the process of drawing up a useful budget.

Gradually, this situation began to change somewhat. Over the years, the budget became more substantiated and differentiated. This can be attributed not only to the overcoming of initial mistakes caused by inexperience, but also to a growing awareness on the part of the GS that if they were to entertain any hope of carrying out the necessary reform and development of the armed forces, they had no choice but to openly specify their needs on the budget.⁴⁹³ Also, the members of the PCNSD started to become more knowledgeable about financial matters, as a consequence of their first attempts at collaboration with outside experts from NGOs.⁴⁹⁴ This allowed them to become more influential with regard to the issue of approving the state budget and of introducing amendments to it. However, as concerns the issue of supervising the implementation of the state budget, the committee still didn't play a role of any significance.⁴⁹⁵

Here, a few words on the cooperation between the parliament of Ukraine and the North Atlantic Assembly – a form of cooperation that was established after the conclusion of the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine* – are in order. On the positive side, it should be noted that these meetings, the first of which was held in

⁴⁹⁰ Sherr, *Security, democracy, and 'civil democratic control'*, 8.

⁴⁹¹ Ibidem.

⁴⁹² 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Civilian control over the military in Ukraine: correspondence to the effectiveness criteria', 40.

⁴⁹³ Ibidem.

⁴⁹⁴ In this regard, UCEPS stands out. Given that this NGO was, to a considerable degree, composed of former military men, it was in a better position to bring its views across than were NGOs that were truly civilian in their outlook.

Sherr, *Security, democracy, and 'civil democratic control'*, 8.

⁴⁹⁵ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Democratic civilian control over the military, its substance and urgency for Ukraine', 10.

Brussels on 2-3 November 2000, were open to discussions on a wide range of issues, including military cooperation, SSR, military education and the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces.⁴⁹⁶

However, on the negative side – as was the case with the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the JWGDR – it was not immediately evident how the various declarations (which abounded with good intentions) were to be translated into behaviour.⁴⁹⁷ Put differently, while Ukraine-NATO cooperative activities were of some significance on the level of policy-on-paper, they were not so on the level of policy-in-practice.

This is best exemplified by the words of Dimitri Polishuk, the head of the secretariat of the PCNSD. As he declared, the members of this particular parliamentary committee were not only very committed to the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, they were also both willing, and able to use the powers and responsibilities that were assigned to them to their full extent.⁴⁹⁸ According to Polishuk, the system of civil-military relations that was being created in Ukraine, was composed of four different kinds of actors, namely the president, the executive power, parliament, and NGOs. As he professed, within that system, the PCNSD, as a representative of the parliament of Ukraine at large, was more than able play its part as the main body of legislative power.⁴⁹⁹

Yet, in view of the arguments just brought to the fore, this was, clearly, not the case – a conclusion that sheds doubt on Polishuk's motivation for asserting that the PCNSD was such an active and important actor. In all likelihood, he only recycled what had been declared by the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations, in an attempt to present Ukraine in a favourable light on the Euro-Atlantic stage – a phenomenon that has familiar ring to it.⁵⁰⁰

The Ministry of Defence

Concerning the MoD, the situation looked somewhat different, albeit equally problematic. Since its creation, the ministry has been involved in a series of

⁴⁹⁶ *NATO-PA – Ukrainian Parliament Joint Monitoring Group on the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Meeting at NATO Headquarters* (Brussels, 2-3 November 2000).

⁴⁹⁷ See for example:

Visit to Kyiv, Ukraine by the joint meeting sub-committee on Central and Eastern Europe and Ukraine-NATO interparliamentary assembly.

<http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?shortcut=468> (5 January 2005).

⁴⁹⁸ Interview with Dimitri Polishuk, head of the secretariat of the Committee on National Security and Defence of the parliament of Ukraine (Kyiv, 27 May 2003).

⁴⁹⁹ Interview with Polishuk.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview with Pidluska.

conflicts with the GS. First of all, these conflicts concerned the issue of authority.⁵⁰¹ The chief of the GS served as the first deputy minister to the minister of Defence – which implied that the GS was subordinated to the MoD. However, the chief of the GS was also a member of the so-called General Headquarters, which belongs to the administration of the president – a situation that indicated that the GS was subordinated to the president.

Such a scheme of dual subordination can be found in countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, and especially in those of Western Europe and North America.⁵⁰² There, years of experience of working together on a friendly basis ensure the resolution of any rivalries that may arise.⁵⁰³ Yet, in Ukraine, where the MoD and the GS lacked a tradition of cooperation, both bodies were still heavily engulfed in a process of establishing their authority vis-à-vis each other.⁵⁰⁴

For, the controversies that marred the relationship between the MoD and the GS stemmed, secondly, from the way in which the various powers and responsibilities of the former were defined and delineated, as opposed to those of the latter.⁵⁰⁵ It was far from clear where the boundaries lay between the military-political and administrative leadership that the MoD was to provide, and the operational management that the GS was to exercise. Also, it was difficult to determine where the responsibility of the MoD to develop defence and security policy began, and that of the GS to analyse future trends in the sphere of security and defence ended. Moreover, the distinctions between the MoD's task of determining the course of development of the armed forces, necessary for the realisation of the defence and security policy, and the GS's task of determining the development of the armed forces, were rather vague.

The fact that a clear distinction between the MoD on the one hand, and the GS on the other hand, was not made, can be attributed – once more – to the existence of flaws in the various decrees, laws and concepts that together make up the legal framework. Yet, especially the MoD was plagued with other troubles as well. The aforementioned uncertainty regarding the way in which it was expected to operate prevented it from exercising its responsibilities and powers to their full extent. In combination with the position of preponderant power that was enjoyed by the president, and the numerous appointments and dismissals of ministers of Defence, this led to a situation in which the MoD was

⁵⁰¹ Grytsenko, *Civil-military relations in Ukraine: a system emerging from chaos*, 28-29.

⁵⁰² 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Democratic civilian control over the military, its substance and urgency for Ukraine', 6-7. Anatoliy Lopata, 'Civilian control over the military is an imperative of the moment', *National security and defence* no. 11, vol. 1 (2000) 71-74, q.v. 73.

⁵⁰³ Lopata, 'Civilian control over the military is an imperative of the moment', 73.

⁵⁰⁴ Grytsenko, *Civil-military relations in Ukraine: a system emerging from chaos*, 6.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, 28.

unable to serve as the main body of executive power in Ukraine's system of civil-military relations.⁵⁰⁶

And then there was the problem connected to the composition of the MoD, which was largely military in nature. While this was, in and of itself, a sign that the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces was not proceeding according to plan, it was also a negative factor in the sense that the upper echelons within the ministry were composed of people who were opposed to many of the elements of which the comprehensive post-Cold War concept of security is composed. The detrimental effects that this situation – together with other factors – had on the process of SSR, have already been brought to the fore.

In turn, this begs the question what happened to those members of the armed forces that had received (part of) their education in the countries of North America and Western Europe, or at the NDA. Given that they had already replaced the Soviet way of thinking about security with the Euro-Atlantic one, they should be both able, and willing, to contribute to the process of reform. Yet, in this regard, there were a number of problems – not counting the concerns that were raised earlier concerning the reasons behind, and the scope of, the reforms that took place within Ukraine's system of military education.

To begin with, as the military liaison officer of one of the NATO member states explained, people were not always assigned to the posts for which they were trained.⁵⁰⁷ Also, those officers who were actually placed within the MoD, found it difficult to break through the so-called glass ceiling. Being of middle rank, they encountered numerous problems in convincing their superiors of their ideas. Moreover, in parallel with their civilian counterparts, well-educated military professionals often decided to leave the armed forces in search of other, financially more attractive, jobs.⁵⁰⁸

Apparently, NATO's efforts to contribute to the education of the members of the armed forces of Ukraine were not wielding the expected results. Here, one touches upon an important problem, one that is related to the assistance that was provided by the Alliance in a more general sense. For reasons that have already been outlined with regard to the way in which the process of SSR proceeded, the inducements of a material nature that NATO could apply, were not suitable for pressing for the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight. And neither were the various cooperative activities that were undertaken by NATO.

⁵⁰⁶ Anatoliy Grytsenko, 'Ukraine's military reform efforts: lessons learned' in: Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (ed.), *Post-Cold War defence reform. Lessons learned in Europe and the United States* (Washington 2002) 78-110, q.v. 94.

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with the military liaison officer of one of the NATO member states (Kyiv, 21 May 2003).

⁵⁰⁸ Interview with Kershaw.

On the one hand, the focus was on high-level events, such as the signing of the *Charter on a distinctive partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Ukraine*, and the conclusion of the *NATO-Ukraine action plan*. Together with the adoption of declarations within the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the JWGDR, these events presented the Ukrainian elites with the opportunity to show to the international community that their country was a part of Europe, firmly committed to the establishment of the set of common ideas on which the western zone of peace is founded. Yet, the accompanying instruments for making the transition from the level of policy-on-paper to that of policy-in-practice were lacking.

On the other hand, attention was paid to practical and low-level issues, such as military-to-military cooperation and military education. While they too gave Ukraine the opportunity to show that, on the international level at least, it was a suitable candidate for participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, they did nothing to facilitate the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security on the domestic level in any structural manner. Apparently, what was missing were the mechanisms to either move top-down, or bottom-up. In other words, there were no mechanisms to translate ideas into behaviour, and to transform individual experiences into experiences from which the system of security and defence policy making as a whole would benefit.⁵⁰⁹

Still, whatever the downturns that beset the instruments that NATO had at its disposal to assist its neighbour on the road back to Europe might be, it should be taken into account that, as it was Ukraine that sought to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community, it was also Ukraine that should bear the brunt of the process of transformation. Put differently, although the means that the Alliance used were far from perfect, these flaws could have been overcome if, in Ukraine, the will to do so would have existed – something that it obviously did not.

The events surrounding the summit of the Heads of State and Government of the NATO member states that took place in Prague on 21-22 November 2002 illustrate this quite clearly. Even though the summit was an important milestone in Ukrainian-NATO relations – it marked the signing of the *NATO-Ukraine action plan* – it was marred with controversy. Given that Ukraine was, at that point in time, suspected of having sold Kolchuga radar systems to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Kuchma was not invited to attend the proceedings. However, this boycott did not prevent Kuchma from travelling to Prague anyway, thereby causing not only a diplomatic scandal, but also doing further

⁵⁰⁹ Greene, 'NATO membership is a realistic goal if Ukraine shows courage and resolve', 158.

Interview with a member of the NATO Liaison Office (Kyiv, 22 October 2004).

damage to Ukraine's reputation as a country that was "committed to following the European reformatory path".⁵¹⁰

Civil society

A final factor that hampered the actual implementation of the legal framework, necessary for the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, has to do with the state in which Ukraine's civil society found itself. With regard to NGOs, there were several of them that claimed to take an interest in issues in the sphere of security and defence and, more specifically, in the concept of civil-military relations. Among these, the Atlantic Council of Ukraine (ACU), the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (CNPS), CPCFPU, the Europe XXI foundation, the NISS, UCEPS, the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) and the Ukrainian Centre for International Security Studies (UCISS) are worth mentioning.⁵¹¹

On the one hand, the existence of these NGOs may lead one see a gradually growing involvement of society at large in the system of civil-military relations – the more so as these organisations were invited to attend seminars and conferences on a more and more regular basis.⁵¹² Also, as Polishuk said, the PCNSD sought to establish ties of close cooperation with NGOs in an attempt to expand their knowledge-base.⁵¹³ Furthermore, any critical and in-depth analyses that were being published, were written by NGOs. The assessment of the state of affairs with regard to the Ukrainian system of civil-military relations that was published by the NISS and that was mentioned earlier, serves as a case in point – as do the various publications of the experts of UCEPS.

On the other hand, with reference to *Chapter III Ukraine*, the development of Ukraine's civil society was still in its embryonic stages. As the transformation from a communist political system into a democratic one faltered, many of the aforementioned NGOs led only a marginal existence. As a

⁵¹⁰ When Kuchma showed up for dinner, the seating arrangements, which were in English, would have had him sit near the prime minister of the United Kingdom and the president of the United States – a situation that Tony Blair and George Bush could not tolerate. Therefore, seating arrangements were quickly translated into French. Roman Woronowycz, 'Kuchma insists on travelling to Prague though he is not wanted at NATO summit'.

<http://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/2002/470203.shtml> (12 June 2005).

President Kuchma's address to Ukrainian people on the Day of Europe.

<http://www.president.gov.ua/eng/activity/zayavinterv/speackto/253826322.html> (8 September 2004).

⁵¹¹ Sherr, *Security, democracy, and 'civil democratic control'*, 10.

⁵¹² *Ibidem*.

⁵¹³ Interview with Polishuk.

consequence, their influence was by no means as strong as it could be.⁵¹⁴ And even those NGOs that, like UCEPS, were successful, were confronted to an increasing extent with opposition from the part of the government.⁵¹⁵

While this situation was not specific to those parts of civil society that dealt with matters related to security and defence policy making – other NGOs, for example in the sphere of democratisation led an equally piecemeal existence – nor to Ukraine – many of the other former Soviet republics went through a similar phase – it was a cause for concern nonetheless.⁵¹⁶ It implied that the participation of the public at large in the system of civil-military relations could not be guaranteed on such a scale as actually required by the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces.

As concerns the media, the situation was such that, in a country where the freedom of the press was gradually being curtailed, there were but a few newspapers that published independent and critical reports on military matters, let alone on the development of a new type of interaction between military institutions and their civilian counterparts.⁵¹⁷ In other words, even in those cases where such respected newspapers as *Ukrayina Moloda*, *Kievskie Vedomost*, *Den* and *Zerkalo Nedeli* dealt with issues pertaining to security and defence, such as the military airplane crash at an air show held near L'viv in July 2002, the focus was on the condition of the equipment of the armed forces, or on the training of personnel, but not on the role played by the authorities involved.⁵¹⁸

In this sense, the media did nothing to secure the involvement of society at large in the system of civil-military relations – a situation that was compounded by the fact that the MoD, which published 14 newspapers and

⁵¹⁴ Cook and Zayets, *Ukraine and its armed forces: a new actor on the European stage*, 15.

⁵¹⁵ This helps to explain why the president of UCEPS decided to join the presidential campaign of Victor Yuchenko.

Parchomenko, 'Prospects for genuine reform in Ukraine's security forces', 281.

⁵¹⁶ See for example: Yevgeny Bendersky, 'Democracy in the former Soviet Union'.

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=249&language_id=1 (13 June 2005).

Paula Dobriansky, 'A vision for Ukraine'.

<http://www.artukraine.com/buildukraine/dobriansky.htm> (13 June 2005).

Myron B. Kuropas, 'Reflections on Ukraine's civil society',

<http://www.civilsoc.org/resource/ukcivsoc.htm> (13 June 2005).

⁵¹⁷ Given that many journalists were former military men – including Ukraine's two most prominent journalists in the sphere of national security and defence, Valentyn Badrak and Serhiy Zhurets – this is hardly surprising.

Interview with Pidluska.

⁵¹⁸ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 22-23.

Interview with Sushko.

magazines of its own, and also broadcast several television programmes and radio shows, saw no need to deal with other, non-military types of media.⁵¹⁹

Concluding remarks

Following the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine* on 24 August 1991, the country was confronted with the task of establishing a national system of civil-military relations. As far as politics-on-paper were concerned, the Ukrainian elites lost no time in declaring their intention to develop a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces. However, during the terms in office of both Kravchuk and Kuchma, it became clear that, with regard to politics-in-practice, they did not achieve this goal.

Although the respective powers and responsibilities of the various bodies of government concerned were defined and delineated in a legal framework, this was not done very clearly. Whereas the president, with the assistance of the NSDC, became far too influential, the PCNSD and the MoD were not influential enough. This latter argument can also be made as concerns the position that NGOs and the media occupied within the system of civil-military relations. Consequently, the type of interaction between military and civilian actors that was being developed in Ukraine, was not truly democratic. Nor was it of a truly civilian nature. While, with the exception of the MoD, the president, the NSDC and the PCNSD were – to a greater or lesser degree – composed of civilians, these civilians were not always in a position to contribute to the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security.

Here, there are several elements that need to be taken into consideration, such as a lack of experience with the requirements that come with independent statehood, and a lack of understanding of what democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, together with the other aspects that constitute the military, political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security, entails. In addition, it needs to be kept in mind that Ukraine was still tied to its neighbour to the east, the RF, in a number of ways – a situation that prevented the former from pursuing a course of action that the latter would disapprove of. Still, these drawbacks notwithstanding, it can be argued that they could all have been overcome if the will to do so would have existed – which it clearly did not.

When seen from this perspective, it should come as a no surprise that NATO's attempts to facilitate the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security were far from successful. Given that, on the level of domestic politics, the Ukrainian elites stood nothing to gain from the implementation of a series of far-reaching reforms, the financial benefits and the

⁵¹⁹ 'Democratic control over the military in Ukraine: the path from form to substance. Ukraine's gains in forming the system of civilian control over the military', 22-23.

carrot of membership that the Alliance had to offer, were not enough to induce them to change their attitude. This holds true independently of the fact that the instruments that NATO had at its disposal were not the most suitable means anyway.

All in all, when looking at the concept of civil-military relations as a particularly important aspect of the issue of Ukraine's participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, and when referring to the introduction of this chapter, the second condition for the process of socialisation to succeed was not met – a conclusion that, when set against the wider military, political, economic, social and environmental developments that were taking place within the country, is reinforced even further.

V Conclusion

In the wake of the epochal events that took place on 24 August 1991, the newly-independent Ukrainian state became involved in the process of determining the position that it was to occupy on the Euro-Atlantic stage. From the outset, Ukraine stated its intention to join the zone of peace that was originally formed by the countries of North America and Western Europe, and that, as a result of the epochal events that took place in the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's, was gradually enlarging in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe. In this book, the focus has been on this westernmost dimension of the country's foreign and security policy.

The issue of participation

Chapter 1 The issue the participation, in which the theoretical framework underlying the research undertaken in the book in hand was outlined, discussed the various steps that lead from the desire to become a participant with a security community, to the need to establish the relevant way of thinking, to the assistance that is provided by international organisations. To this end, the central tenets of the concept of a security community as described by Adler and Barnett were surveyed. In *Security communities* the importance of adhering to – and acting in accordance with – certain values was underlined. Moreover, Adler and Barnett emphasised the role that is played by not only ideational, but also material factors. Furthermore, they stressed the need for international in combination with domestic change, as well as the importance of the existence of a powerful actor – be it a country or an international organisation – that can nudge prospective participants along.

Here, they touched upon one of the elements that are conducive to socialisation – which was the topic that was addressed in the next part of chapter I. Again, it was stated that a country can become a participant with a security community when it adopts the set of common ideas on which that community is based, and behaves accordingly. As the representatives of a security community, international organisations can facilitate the process of social learning that this entails, by using some form of material inducement. This corresponded with an idea that was put to the fore by Ikenberry and Kupchan in 'Socialisation and hegemonic power'.

In following their line of theorising, and addressing both the different ways in which socialisation can occur, and the conditions that facilitate its eventual success, it became manifest that the concept of socialisation not only follows from that of a security community, but also overlaps with it in a multitude of

ways. In the final instance, this conclusion resulted in the formulation of a set of conditions that provided the guidelines for subsequent chapters. These requirements were the following: (1) socialisation is dependent upon the application of inducements of a material nature by the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations; (2) socialisation is dependent upon the Ukrainian elites adhering to – and acting in accordance with – the set of common ideas that underlie the Euro-Atlantic security community, namely the Euro-Atlantic concept of security; and (3) socialisation is dependent upon the interplay of change in the Euro-Atlantic security community level with change in Ukraine.

The Euro-Atlantic security community

In *Chapter II The Euro-Atlantic security community*, which dealt with conditions (1) and (3), the extent to which there was change on the international level that led the Euro-Atlantic security community to become open to the prospect of enlargement, and the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations to engage in a process of socialisation, was analysed. To begin with, the way in which the reappearance of Ukraine as a member of the international community and the dissolution of the USSR, in combination with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the revolutions that took place in many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, necessitated the creation of a new instrument for safeguarding the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, was addressed. More specifically, the proposal that was launched in the autumn of 1989 by the then American Secretary of State Baker to develop a Euro-Atlantic security architecture, was surveyed.

Yet, given that the Euro-Atlantic security architecture failed to become a reality in a material sense, the second part of the chapter focused on that which existed on an ideational level, namely the Euro-Atlantic security community. As was discussed, in the aftermath of the epochal events that took place in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the zone of peace that was originally formed by the countries of North America and Western Europe was challenged to enlarge in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe. What is more, the underlying set of common ideas concerning the relationship between security on the one hand, and military affairs, politics, economics, social affairs and the environment on the other hand, was susceptible to change as well. Gradually, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security came to be defined in terms of not only the military dimension, but also the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions.

An element that cannot be boxed neatly into either the military, or the various non-military dimensions of security, is that of civil-military relations. In the third instance, the way in which that concept was defined by Huntington in

The soldier and the state. The theory and practice of civil-military relations, was elaborated upon. According to Huntington, the crux of the problems that beset the relationship between military and civilian actors was to establish that particular type of system in which (1) the former safeguards security (2) within the boundaries set by the latter. In the case of the Euro-Atlantic security community, these limits are set by the Euro-Atlantic concept of security. In turn, this implies that the extent to which a potential participant has established, the set of common ideas on which the Euro-Atlantic security community is founded, can be derived from the extent to which it has developed the system of civil-military relations to match – that of democratic and civilian oversight.

In view of this, it may be expected that, in so far as the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations assisted Ukraine in fulfilling the western dimension of its multi-vector foreign and security policy, the development of a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces was of special significance. And indeed, as was shown in the fourth, and final, part of chapter II this was the case. Yet, it should be taken into consideration that not every international organisation was in a position to facilitate Ukraine's process of social learning. Whereas the OSCE, the WEU and the CoE lacked the ability to apply inducements of a material nature, the EU was unwilling to do so. In fact, it was NATO that revealed itself to be the organisation best suited to socialise a prospective participant in the security community of which it is a representative.

Ukraine

With the questions regarding change on the international level, and the possibilities of inducements of a material nature to be applied (at least on paper), thus answered, *Chapter III Ukraine* addressed requirements (2) and (a). The extent to which change on the domestic level led Ukraine to seek participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, and to express its intention to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the relevant set of common ideas, was analysed. First of all, a brief outline of the country's history was presented. As it was argued, the country was a borderland – divided between, and subjected by, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Habsburg Empire, Poland, the Russian Empire and the USSR respectively. In combination with Ukraine's failed attempt to gain independent statehood in the wake of the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, this historical legacy implied that the adoption of the *Act of the declaration of independence of Ukraine* was indeed a moment of change.

In the second part of the chapter, it was explained that the events that took place in Ukraine in August 1991 led to alterations of another kind as well. Although the country's first president, Kravchuk, was a former member of the

Soviet *nomenklatura*, he sought to adjust to the changed circumstances with which he was confronted, by coming out in favour of far-reaching reforms in the military, political, economic, social and environmental sphere. The same holds true with regard to Kravchuk's successor, Kuchma. He too repeatedly expressed his commitment to adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the Euro-Atlantic concept of security. While the extent to which Kravchuk and Kuchma were able to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice was limited, what was of significance to the chapter in hand was that Ukraine reacted to the epochal events that took place in the Euro-Atlantic area in the late 1980's and early 1990's in yet another way, namely in the form of attempts to establish relations with its neighbours on a new – and more equal – footing.

Yet, as was elaborated upon in the third instance, with regard to the country to its east, this was by no means an easy task. Ukraine was still tied to the other former constituent republics of the USSR, and especially to the successor to the RuSSR, the RF, in a number of ways. Although the country was determined to regard those connections solely as a legacy of the past – the Ukrainian attitude towards the conclusion of a renewed Union treaty, and the development of the CIS attest to this – the reluctance from the part of the RF to let Ukraine leave its sphere of influence, together with the various forms of inducement that the former had at its disposal, meant that the latter could not leave the Russian “near abroad” altogether.

The way in which the difficulties that beset the Ukrainian-Russian relationship influenced the development of the country's foreign and security policy was a topic that was addressed in the fourth part of chapter III. Here, there were two developments that merited attention. Initially, Ukraine opted for neutrality and non-alignment. It was hoped that, by occupying a non-bloc position on the Euro-Atlantic stage, the country would be able to resist the Russian attempts to infringe upon its newly-found independence. Then, as it turned out to be impossible to completely ignore the RF, Ukraine devised the multi-vector policy, which was supposed to allow it to work for the normalisation of relations with its neighbour to the east, while, simultaneously, investing in the development of closer ties with its neighbours to the west.

Finally, the western dimension of Ukraine's foreign and security policy – the development of which could, again, be characterised as an element of change – was analysed in further detail. By paying attention to the way in which the country tried to realise its goal of “complete integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures” (namely via regional cooperation, via cooperation with, and integration into, NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU, and the CoE, as well as via involvement in the development of a Euro-Atlantic security architecture) it became evident that, as has already been touched upon, what underlay Ukraine's attempts to “return to Europe” was the declared desire to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community.

From policy-on-paper to policy-in-practice

In *Chapter IV From policy-on-paper to policy-in-practice* – the focus of which was on requirement (2) – the extent to which Ukraine came to adhere to, and act in accordance with, the concept of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces was analysed. To begin with, a brief outline of the contents of the various laws, concepts and other legal documents that the country adopted in the sphere of security and defence was given. By doing so, it became clear that, at least with regard to politics on paper, Ukraine was very committed to the establishment of this particular type of interaction between military and civilian actors. Both on the level of international politics, and on that of domestic politics, it repeatedly stated its intention to do away with the authoritarian and military type of control over military institutions that was prevalent during the Soviet-period.

Secondly, attention was paid to the different military institutions that Ukraine either inherited from the USSR, or created in the wake of the moment of the declaration of independence. As was explained, the country was mainly interested in the development of levers of influence over its armed forces, and not so much in the establishment of forms of oversight over the border troops, the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the national guard, and the civil defence troops. Although this was a situation that was not uncommon to countries from Central and Eastern Europe that were engulfed in the process of creating a new system of civil-military relations, the downturn of it was that Ukraine was faced with a relatively high number of military institutions that remained outside the scope of the boundaries that were imposed by the Euro-Atlantic concept of security – a problem that was further compounded by the fact that the country found it difficult to reform its armed forces so as to enable them to play their part in accordance with the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic security environment.

An important element of this process of SSR is that of military education, which was the topic that was elaborated upon in the third part of chapter IV. In a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces, military actors are expected to represent an integral element of the society from which they stem. In turn, this requires them to adopt, and subsequently translate into behaviour, the various principles that come with the Euro-Atlantic way of thinking about security. On the one hand, Ukraine tried to accomplish this by changing the curriculum of the NDA. On the other hand, NATO attempted to provide several members of the Ukrainian armed forces with the opportunity to participate in courses at the NATO Defence College in Rome, the NATO School in Oberammergau and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

Fourthly – in moving from the military, to the civilian actors that were involved in the system of civil-military relations – the extent to which the Head of

State and his administration, the NSDC, the PCNSD and the MoD were genuinely non-military in nature was addressed. What was shown was that the large military presence within the MoD, and the numerous active duty and retired officers that were a part of the PCNSD, the NSDC and the president's staff, in combination with the inability and unwillingness from the part of their civilian colleagues to become involved in security and defence policy making, implied that the development of a system of civilian oversight over the armed forces was not proceeding according to plan.

The same holds true as concerns the establishment of a democratic form of control. Although, as was made manifest in the fifth instance, Ukraine developed a legal framework, in which the various powers and responsibilities of the different actors concerned were stipulated, it proved to be difficult to implement this.

The way in which the president, the NSDC, the PCNSD, the MoD and the GS put politics into practice was addressed more fully in the final instance. What became clear was that these bodies were – again – neither able, nor willing, to actually move from the phase policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice. The fact that NATO applied inducements of a material nature, and developed several cooperative activities, designed to facilitate the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security in Ukraine, did nothing to change this situation – regardless of the extent to which these policies were the most suitable ones.

Research answers

All in all, when analysing Ukraine's participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, it becomes clear that the answer to the first research question, namely in what way has Ukraine dealt with the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, should be that Ukraine put considerable emphasis on this particular dimension of its foreign and security policy on paper, and also sought assistance from NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the CoE in practice, but did not move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice with regard to the actual implementation of the reforms necessary to establish the set of common ideas on which the western zone of peace is founded; a conclusion that may even shed doubt on the validity of the desire to become a participant with the Euro-Atlantic security community in the first place.

In turn, the various difficulties that the Ukrainian elites experienced in fulfilling the requirements necessary for participation with the enlarging community of values are reflected in the answer to the second research question – to what extent has Ukraine developed a system of democratic and civilian oversight over the armed forces – which served as the litmus test of the

ability and/or willingness from the part of Ukraine to put words into deeds, and which should, for the most part, be answered in the negative.

What is more, these research answers imply that this book's guiding hypothesis, namely that, as concerns the issue of participation with the Euro-Atlantic security community, Ukraine has been unable and/or unwilling to move from the phase of policy-on-paper into that of policy-in-practice, is valid. A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the assumption that the various European and transatlantic (security) organisations were not in a position to support Ukraine in the adoption, and subsequent translation into behaviour, of the Euro-Atlantic concept of security.

Finally, with reference to the *Introduction* of this Harmonie paper, it is of importance to note that the aforementioned outcomes have as a consequence that, for the first 13 years of its existence as an independent state, Ukraine remained an unlikely participant with the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community of values – with all that this may entail, both regarding the declared and actual orientation of the country's foreign and security policy, and concerning its position as the keystone in the arch of Euro-Atlantic security and stability.

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