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FREE CORSICA !

A Study of Contemporary Chinese Nationalism

By James Pearson



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FREE CORSICA!

A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY CHINESE NATIONALISM

JAMES ANTHONY EDWARD PEARSON

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2008年4月，法国总统萨科奇威胁抵制奥运以及奥运圣火传递在巴黎遭到破坏两起事件在中国引发了强烈的抗议。中国网民在网络上发起了抵制法货的运动，来自法国的家乐福超市随即成为了民族主义和反法情绪宣泄的目标。作为反击，一场支持科西嘉岛独立的运动也一短时间在中国流行起来了。在巴黎发生的事件是如何演变为一场针对一个看似毫不相干的在华法国公司的大规模抗议活动的？这场抵制家乐福的运动符合现有的中国民族主义理论吗？或者它已代表了一个民族主义发展的新方向？本文首先通过对现有的关于中国民族主义文献的研究展开对家乐福事件发展的讨论。以展露这一事件的真相，当时关于这场抵制运动的网络论坛帖子和文字信息会被加以分析。此外，本文使用四步

公式法指出巴黎抗议事件引发中国抵制法货运动的模式，并提出此方法可以运用到对未来民族主义情绪爆发的预期中。作者同意现有文献所认为的中国人的民族情绪仍然是中国共产党用来使其政治目标得以实现的手段这一观点，同时也认为现有文献把中国人的民族认同感的形成和中国人的史学相联系的观点在这场运动的发展中得以体现。本文最后还提出中国在民族主义保护伞下开展的所有大规模的运动都可认为是具有误导性的。然而，本文也指出，如果把所有中国的大规模运动归于民族主义情绪的爆发，那显然是不准确的。我们需要更深入的了解大规模群众运动中中国的网络和社会媒体所扮演的角色，以避免将其误判是具有侵略性的民族主义的行为。

Abstract

In April 2008, the combination of a threat by French president Nicholas Sarkozy to boycott the Olympic games and a disrupted Olympic torch relay in Paris caused outcry and prompted an online call by Chinese netizens to boycott French products. In the events that followed, the French supermarket Carrefour became the target of outbursts of nationalist and anti-French sentiment and a small campaign to promote Corsican independence to outline French hypocrisy briefly became a popular cause. But how did events in Paris evolve into a mass protests against a seemingly unrelated French company in China? Do the events of the Carrefour boycott fit within the existing theories of Chinese nationalism or did they present a new direction in its evolution? This study first looks at existing academic work on Chinese nationalism in order to create the framework within which to debate the developments of the Carrefour case. In an effort to uncover its origins, the boycott itself is analysed through online posts and

text messages from the time. Additionally, by using a four-step formula to address the pattern by which protests in Paris led to boycotts in China, this study suggests that such a formula could be used in the anticipation of future outbursts of nationalist sentiment. Indeed, through this formula, the author agrees with existing academic work that posits Chinese nationalism is continually used as a method for the CCP to promote its own political agenda and academic work that links the formation of Chinese national identity with Chinese historiography is also found to be relevant to the development of this movement. However, in conclusion, this study also suggests that including all mass movements in China under an umbrella of nationalism is arguably misleading as, without further scrutiny of the manner in which online networks and social media are used to propagate such causes, we run the danger of misinterpreting all popular unrest as aggressive nationalism.

FREE CORSICA !

A Study of
Contemporary Chinese Nationalism

By James Pearson*

Introduction

On Monday 7 April, 2008, disabled Chinese fencing pro Jin Jing 金晶 went from being a somewhat unknown Paralympian to a household name on the Chinese mainland. Chosen as torchbearer for a short stretch of the torch relay's Paris leg, Jing found herself ringed by countless security guards and French gendarmery, sandwiched between the hoards of pro-Chinese and Free Tibet activists lining the route. Following a repeat of what were described as "chaotic scenes"[1] in London just twenty four hours earlier, protestors and Free Tibet activists made several attempts to extinguish the torch and disrupt the procession. Despite some activists getting within very close proximity, Jin held on to the Olympic flame before local and Chinese security services were, just as had been the case in London, forced to put it on a bus for the remainder of the route. In the days that followed, Jin's apparent determination to tightly hold on to the torch despite her relative immobility became the talk of many Chi-

nese wangmin 网民 (netizens), leading some to dub her the *zuo zai lunyi shang de weixiao tianshi* 坐在轮椅上的微笑天使 (smiling angel in a wheelchair). [2]

Some days later, similarly chaotic scenes unfolded as uncontrollable crowds overwhelmed and outnumbered security personnel in what would later turn out to be a related event. Whilst the setting was once again French, the protestors were Chinese. Thousands of miles away from the events of the Paris torch relay, the Chinese branch of the French supermarket chain Carrefour was the target of their demonstration. In a somewhat blurry mobile phone video that surfaced days later, large numbers of protestors can be seen entering the supermarket and swarming the checkout area of the shop.[3] Fists in the air and determined in their tone, an impassioned crowd answered the rallying cry of a lone protestor, leading repeated chants of “Dizhi Jialefu! Dizhi Jialefu!” 抵制家乐福! 抵制家乐福! (Boycott Carrefour! Boycott Carrefour!) in front of bemused shoppers and worried-looking Carrefour employees. Yet, strange as such a case may seem, it was by no means unique. All across the country, Chinese people received text messages and read BBS[4] posts that read *buyao qu Jialefu gouwu* 不要去家乐福购物 (don't shop at Carrefour).[5]

In Wuhan, Hubei Province, protestors blocked the streets outside a branch of Carrefour and once again rallied behind chants of *Dizhi Jialefu!* and anti-French sentiment. Some protestors covered the French tricolour flag with deliberately provocative slogans such as “Jeanne d’Arc = Prostitute, Napoléon = Pervert, FRANCE = Nazi, FREE CORSICA!!! [sic].”[6] Over two hundred miles away, at a Hefei branch of Carrefour, local lorry drivers used their vehicles to form a blockade around the shop’s entrance, severely restricting access to the store.[7] Indeed, similar protests were developing all across the country as hundreds of people demonstrated in Beijing, Kunming, Qingdao, as well as Hefei and Wuhan.

As anti-French sentiment and calls to boycott Carrefour continued across China, it became clear that the government was growing increasingly nervous about the direction the movement was heading in. In an odd twist, the word *Jialefu* 家乐福 (Carrefour) became a sensitive term and was censored

by China's biggest search engine Baidu (百度) — a procedure normally reserved for highly political and sensitive topics.[8] Some users trying to search for anything Carrefour-related were surprised to receive the message “results that may contain content that does not conform to relevant laws, legislation and policy have not been displayed”[9] instead of the thousands of advertisement-filled results for discounted shopping deals such a search would normally return.[10] It became apparent that, fearing such vocal nationalism had the potential to damage China's national image in the face of worldwide attention, the government had stepped in. On April 22, 2008, in an “exclusive interview”[11] with state press agency Xinhua Tongxunshe 新华通讯社 (Xinhua News Agency), Carrefour chairman Jose Luis Duran both condemned the disruption of the Paris torch relay and affirmed his and Carrefour's support for the Beijing Olympics.[12] Described as “timely”[13] by some, Duran's interview marked a consciously government-endorsed attempt to quell the growing unrest amongst Chinese netizens and protestors. In an arguably equally timely interview in the more liberal weekly newspaper Nanfang Zhoumo 南方周末 (Southern Weekend), former Chinese ambassador to France Wu Jianmin 吴建民 denounced the boycotts as “self-proclaimed ‘patriotic’ actions that have damaged the interests of the [Carrefour] employees, damaged the interests of China and damaged China's national image.”[14] Indeed, at a time when the focus of world attention was on China and patriotic fever was running high, nationalist sentiment looked set to grow at a faster rate than the government deemed comfortable. The fine line between portraying an open, friendly and welcoming China and maintaining firm political stances was becoming more and more difficult to tread as demonstrations against Carrefour grew.

These events raise some questions. What happened in those days between the Paris torch relay and the Carrefour boycott? Why did Carrefour and not other French brands become the target of nationalist hatred and patriotic criticism? Why did the government prevent people from searching for Jialefu on the internet? And, most curiously, how did cries of “Free Tibet!” kickstart a small Chinese campaign to “Free Corsica!”? This study will aim to analyse relevant primary sources to shed some light on the events surrounding the Carrefour boycott and, in the process, highlight some of the recurring themes and issues within contemporary Chinese nationalism.

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Theories of Nationalism

In order to better understand the state of contemporary Chinese nationalism, other academic works on nationalism (both within and outside the realm of Chinese Studies) are helpful in constructing a framework for analysis. Indeed, the debate surrounding the nature of nationalism in China has been of great interest to the media and academic world for some time, particularly in latter years as China has adjusted to its newfound prominent position in international politics — a role that has arguably created a new and more measured dynamic in the tone of China’s diplomatic rhetoric. Nationalism has consistently been a notable feature of recent Chinese history and, although some conflicting theories as to its nature do emerge, there are a few salient commonalities worthy of discussion.

In *China’s New Nationalism: Pride Politics and Diplomacy*, Peter Gries argues that the allegedly anti-Western nature of Chinese nationalism that was once instigated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since been independently adopted by a new generation of Chinese.[15] Using events such as the US bombing of the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo War as a model, he cites how “the Belgrade bombing, in this Chinese view, was not an isolated event; rather, it was the latest in a long series of Western aggressions against China.”[16] Gries goes on to argue that the influence of Marxist thought on the 1949 revolution has led many Chinese analysts to suggest that nationalism in China is more accurately described as a ‘popular’ movement, led by the masses who were “by their very definition, an anti-imperialist social force.”[17] This, he argues, is in contrast to the idea of an exclusively top-down, elitist or state-led nationalism that many Western observers seek to propagate, a view he contends would be a “grave mistake”[18] to hold. Indeed, Gries concludes that this popular form of nationalism now undermines the monopoly the CCP once had over political discourse in China[19] and, to avoid threatening regime stability, it can rarely be seen suppressing or quelling such outbursts. [20]

Similar theories were raised earlier by Thomas J. Christensen in his article *Chinese Realpolitik* which portrays nationalism as being “the sole ideological glue that holds the People’s Republic together and keeps the CCP govern-

ment in power”[21] and, therefore, a key factor for the governments legitimacy. This point, in common with Gries’ theories of popular nationalism, further highlights the potentially sensitive and volatile nature of the relationship between the Chinese people and government — again evident in Gries’ case study of the Belgrade Bombing in the 1990s. Usefully, sinologist Zhao Suisheng 赵穗生 offers another link between the theories of Gries and Christensen, arguing that this apparently spontaneous rise in late 1990s nationalism was a result of the “vigorous official propaganda campaign in patriotic education [and] could not easily emerge without Communist state sponsorship.”[22] Furthermore, mirroring Christensen’s metaphor of nationalism in China as ‘ideological glue’, Zhao posits that, according to the likes of Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 and Jiang Zemin 江泽民, nationalism “remained the one bedrock of political belief shared by most Chinese people in spite of the rapid decay of Communist official ideology.”[23]

This state sponsorship and propagation of nationalist sentiment, therefore, should not be ignored when trying to understand Chinese nationalism at a grassroots level. In a comprehensive historical study of the Chinese state China: Inventing the Nation, Henrietta Harrison points out that, in the days of Deng Xiaoping, the primary use of nationalism was as a unifying tool for the encouragement of the masses to adhere to party policy and to “counter the idea that because of government mistakes such as the Cultural Revolution, the ancestral land is not worthy of love.”[24] Harrison goes on to conclude that nationalism in China has meant more than simply showing allegiance to one’s state as “ever since the late nineteenth century Chinese nationalism has been a means by which people made claims for political power at both the lowest and the highest levels of Chinese politics.”[25] Expressed in such a way, Harrison’s analysis would be compatible with both theories that promoted popular and state-led nationalisms. Indeed, it would also imply nationalism in China is both a tool of the government for influencing the masses and a tool for the masses to have influence over the government. In this sense, nationalism also acts as a device for countering Chinese regionalism – essential for the unification of such a vast country of diverse peoples and languages.

The creation and preservation of this state-wide national identity is arguably a crucial cornerstone of Chinese nationalism. In a separate paper, Gries et al.

argue that “nationalist historical beliefs are integral to the structure of Chinese national identity”,^[26] a reference to China’s self-professed *bainian guochi* 百年国耻 (century of humiliation). Discussing this point further, William A. Callahan argues: “national humiliation unproblematically dots texts (in both Chinese and English) about Chinese identity and politics”,^[27] drawing attention to the Chinese perception of history in the formation of Chinese national identity — a factor which is clearly a recurring theme in the discourse of Chinese nationalism. Additionally, nationalism, in this capacity as a nationwide propagator of state identity, would also be compatible with Benedict Anderson’s concept of Imagined Communities. Anderson proposes a definition of a nation that is “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”^[28] The nation, he argues, is an imagined community “because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”^[29] This comradeship, it could be argued, applies to theories and observations of nationalism in China as it chimes with both Gries’ observations of mass movements and Harrison’s observations of Chinese leadership cultivating love for the country despite the government’s past mistakes. Furthermore, cultural and political manifestations of the ‘oneness’ of China, be it the *yi ge Zhongguo yuanze* 一个中国原则 (one-China principle), or Olympic slogans such as *tong yi ge shijie, tong yi ge mengxiang* 同一个世界，同一个梦想 (one world, one dream), further illustrate what could be perceived as one of many conscious attempts by the government to propagate a unified Chinese people and, arguably, an Imagined Community.

As can be seen above, previous debate surrounding Chinese nationalism has often resulted in the discussion of whether or not it is a top-down state-sponsored movement or a more popular, grassroots movement. However, without the likes of Anderson’s concept of an imagined community in place to contextualise Chinese nationalism within a broader debate, theories of purely popular or grassroots nationalism paint an incomplete picture. This being the case, Jeffery N. Wasserstrom argues that identifying Chinese nationalism as a single, consistent entity is deceiving as “the tale of Chinese nationalism, or rather Chinese nationalisms, decidedly in the plural, is one that needs to be told in a manner that focuses not just on black and white defini-

tions but makes room for many shades of gray.”[30] However, others would criticise such an approach. Allen Carlson writes “new literature on Chinese nationalism has tended to be grounded by an ongoing series of attempts to categorise the type of nationalist sentiment that is emerging in China today.”[31] Whilst he acknowledges the merits of Carlson’s conclusion, he posits that by working hard to categorise Chinese nationalism into an already existing framework, such an approach has “led scholars to tailor their research in particular constraining directions.”[32] That said, on the topic of Chinese national identity, Carlson does imply that the existence of so many dissatisfied parties in China may suggest that such a field may be “more contested than we often imagine it to be (particularly within the prism of the study of Chinese nationalism).”[33]

Therefore, as the title of Carlson’s work would suggest, approaching the study of Chinese nationalism is inherently limited. Nevertheless, if one is to take heed of the conclusions found in critique of the above-mentioned literature, it should be possible to develop a more multifaceted and robust framework within which to discuss contemporary Chinese nationalism. This approach, however, would be best served if one were to take a recent occurrence of Chinese nationalism as a case study and put the theories of others to the test to determine if a model, complete with phases, can be produced. By creating such a model, it could be argued that a more pragmatic and ad-hoc tool for the observation of the emergence of Chinese nationalist sentiment would be available. Furthermore, by measuring if such a model could be applied to past outbursts of Chinese nationalism, issues raised by Carlson as to whether or not Chinese nationalism is “on the rise”[34] or affected by “technological innovation”[35] could potentially be addressed. This study, therefore, will use the intriguing events of the 2008 boycott of the Carrefour supermarket chain in mainland China as its case study to assess if the aforementioned assessments of Chinese nationalism can be applied to a more contemporary event. Three years have passed since the boycott; nonetheless its position in recent history as preparations for the Beijing Olympics drew the focus of international attention presents an interesting and rich example of nationalist sentiment in a time that saw patriotic fever and national pride run high.

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- The minimum length for Articles is 1000 words.
- Quotations should be placed within double quotation marks (“.....”). Quotations larger than four lines should be indented at left margin and single-spaced. Use footnotes (not endnotes). Dates should be in the form 3 November 1996; 1995-1998; and 1990s.
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Patriotism vs. Nationalism: The Concept of “Aiguo” 爱国 (to love one’s country)

Zhao Suisheng draws our attention to the fact that “the concept of nationalism is often expressed in Chinese as aiguo zhuyi [爱国主义] (patriotism).”[36] Therefore, before addressing the superficially unrelated events of an Olympic torch relay and the consequential boycott of a popular French supermarket, this study will briefly discuss the semantic differences between minzuzhuyi 民族主义 (nationalism) and aiguo zhuyi 爱国主义 (patriotism).

The concept of aiguo 爱国 (to love one’s country)[37] has, according to some Chinese analysts, become an excuse to justify nationalist behaviour, as former dean of the politics department at Zhongguo Renmin Daxue 中国人民大学 (Renmin University of China) Zhang Ming 张鸣 notes: “Under almost any circumstances, ‘patriotism’ seems to be some kind of magic word. Regardless of who you are, as long as you claim to be a patriot, you immediately occupy the moral high ground — to the extent that whatever you say or do is perfectly justified.”[38] Zhang’s criticism of self-proclaimed patriots continues: “For any issue, patriotism has become a kind of veil for ugliness and evil and, so long as you hide behind the banner of patriotism, you’re free to act as you please.”[39] Such sentiment was also expressed around the same time as the Carrefour boycott, following clashes between Free Tibet and Pro-Chinese protestors at an American university in April, 2008 when Wang Qianyuan 王千源, an overseas Chinese student, attempted to mediate between both sides.[40] In an apparent effort to encourage dialogue between the two parties, Wang’s endeavours were deemed traitorous by a nationalist group of wangmin 网民 (netizens) who found and posted Wang’s personal details[41] on internet portals Sohu 搜狐[42] and Tianya 天

Table 1: Academic Articles

| Year | Patriotism (爱国主义) | Nationalism (民族主义) | Notable Events |
|------|----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| 1995 | 3102 | 320 | Taiwan strait exercises |
| 1996 | 1999 | 457 | |
| 1997 | 1951 | 345 | Hong Kong returns to Chinese control |
| 1998 | 1270 | 336 | |
| 1999 | 1532 | 441 | NATO bombs Belgrade Embassy |
| 2000 | 1398 | 467 | |
| 2001 | 1221 | 520 | American spy plane collision |
| 2002 | 1179 | 581 | |
| 2003 | 1248 | 555 | Launch of China's first manned space craft |
| 2004 | 1296 | 651 | |
| 2005 | 1707 | 585 | Anti-Japanese protests |
| 2006 | 1776 | 715 | |
| 2007 | 1823 | 682 | |
| 2008 | 2281 | 769 | Beijing Olympics, Tibetan riots |
| 2009 | 2614 | 775 | 60th anniversary celebrations |
| 2010 | 2076 | 648 | Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波 wins nobel peace prize. |

涯.[43] culminating in an alleged attack on the Qingdao home of her parents.[44] In the online commotion that followed, the homepage of China's state broadcasting service Zhongguo Zhongyang Dianshitai 中国中央电视台 (CCTV) described Wang as China's "ugliest overseas student"[45] and an article on a Sohu 搜狐 column usually reserved for parenting advice was published suggesting that Wang's generation lacked sufficient moral education.[46] So how does a seemingly normal student peacefully mediating between fellow Chinese and American compatriots suddenly become the target of national hatred and earn the title of China's 'ugliest overseas student' from a major state broadcaster? The circumstances surrounding the case of Wang Qianyuan may be unusual but the means by which her actions were reported across the Chinese internet is arguably a growing trend[47] as self-proclaimed aiguo-zhe 爱国者 (patriots) utilise recent phenomena such as the Renrou Sousuo 人肉搜索 (Human Flesh Search)[48] to obtain and publish information on individuals deemed to be a threat to national pride.

Such seemingly nationalist outbursts under the veil of patriotism, however, are arguably not a recent phenomenon at all. Indeed, one of the many methodological issues with the study of nationalism is that those who would be deemed nationalist by

external observers would arguably refer to themselves as patriotic, not necessarily nationalist. Furthermore, a 1989 study found that nationalism and patriotism are “not only statistically distinguishable but, more importantly, the data indicate that they are functionally different psychological dimensions.”[49] Such a study, however, is limited in application given the subtly different connotations between the terms in English and Chinese. Additionally, these differences mean understanding the nature of such outward displays of patriotism/nationalism such as the pro-Chinese demonstrations show that “further research is needed to answer such questions.”[50] Indeed, in an attempt to address such commonalities in Chinese and English-speaking cultures, some have concluded that “expressions of Chinese patriotism and nationalism should not be assumed to have the same meaning or consequences as expressions of American patriotism/nationalism.”[51]

There is certainly no shortage of discussion in Chinese academic circles surrounding both patriotism and nationalism. A mechanical search of the Zhongguo Zhiwang 中国知网 (Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure, or CNKI)[52] database for articles that contain the terms *aiguozhuyi* and *minzuzhuyi* produces an interesting insight into the evolution of the debate (Table 1). Articles that included the word *aiguozhuyi* are highest during the 1995 Taiwan crisis, a time that almost saw the full potential of the US’ Taiwan Relations Act come into realisation, as Sino-Taiwanese diplomatic relations came under great strain. Articles including the word *minzuzhuyi* at this time are, incidentally, fewest in number across the whole fifteen-year period. Concomitantly, articles that include *minzuzhuyi* as a term are highest in 2009 as discussions on Xinjiang and Tibetan riots become a feature of academic debate. Therefore, from this it could be posited, at least within academic circles, *minzuzhuyi* seems to be more closely associated with outbursts of domestic separatism or unrest yet has nevertheless as a trend become increasingly more discussed, as can be seen in fig.1. Within the Chinese media, a similar story is evident. A Baidu 百度 (Baidu) search[53] of Chinese language news articles that include *minzuzhuyi* in the headline returns over 5000 results yet articles citing *aiguozhuyi* are over three times as many in number at just under 17,000. [54]




Fig. 1 Graphical representation of data collected in Table 1

However, it should of course be noted that such simple and mechanical searches are ultimately flawed if they are to paint a true picture of the nature of the debate. By not including other terms similar to *aiguozhuyi* such as *aiguojingsheng* 爱国精神 (patriotism [lit. 'patriotic spirit']) and *aiguoxin* 爱国心 (patriotism [lit. patriotic feeling]), the above results are very limited in what they can usefully tell us. These results are also likely to inaccurately reflect the year group they belong to as, very often, academic work on some topics will not necessarily have been produced immediately. It also goes without saying that some events (and the associated aftermath) may have overlapped new year boundaries. Nevertheless, the results are included in this study to indicate, at least, the existence of academic discussion on the issue and provide a snapshot of Chinese academic work on the matter. Links between notable events and the number of articles in a certain year may suggest interesting correlations but should not be taken as definitive signs of cause and effect.

The Carrefour Boycott

In order to better analyse the events surrounding the boycott of Carrefour, the following sequence of events will be broken into phases, so as to identify the evolution of the expression of Chinese nationalism from the events that act as a catalyst to the mass-hysteria that often ensures. Fig 2 shows this progression graphically:

Fig 2 Graphical representation of the phases of Chinese nationalism



PHASE ONE: CATALYST

External or foreign criticism of Chinese policy or social affairs

At phase one, events unfurl with the familiar scene of a foreign leader receiving accusations from the CCP of *ganshe Zhongguo de neizheng* 干涉中国的内政 (meddling in China's internal affairs). In an effort to coax the Chinese government into talks with the Dalai Lama following unrest and riots across Tibet in March 2008, French president Nicholas Sarkozy is reported to have

“said that ‘all options are open’ when asked about the possibility of boycotting the [Olympic] games in protest at the Chinese decision to use violence to deal with protests in Tibet.”[55] Consequently, already strained Sino-French diplomatic relations were under even greater stress in the days and months preceding the Paris torch relay.

Indeed, following Sarkozy’s very public discussion of an Olympic boycott he (and therefore France) had, from a Chinese perspective, not only interfered with China’s internal affairs, he had done so at a time that in China that was, for many, perceived to be a major milestone in its modern development and events in Paris exacerbated this. Additionally, as is outlined by Gries in *China’s New Nationalism*,[56] occurrences of Western powers criticising Chinese policy or “meddling” in internal affairs are more often identified as part of a “long series of Western aggressions against China”[57] as opposed to being judged on their policy merits alone. Gries argues that such criticism is, in fact, often taken as an infringement of China’s own sovereignty, a pattern that has existed ever since the signing of the “unequal treaties” of Nanjing (1842) and Shimoneseki (1895).[58] Indeed, Gries suggests that the so-called *bainian guochi* 百年国耻 (century of humiliation) is a “continuously reworked narrative about the national past [that is] central to the contested and evolving meaning of being ‘Chinese’ today.”[59] Consequently, not only do Sarkozy’s comments present us with a suitable “catalyst” for the first phase, Gries’ analysis sheds some light as to why the following reactions to his comments and events in Paris appear to be basing their rationale on the French nation as an aggressor in its entirety rather than a small area of Sarkozy’s foreign policy (or French-based pro-Tibetans) being held to blame.

PHASE TWO: REACTION

Popular post-catalyst discussion and mass-planning

It is possible that, had Sarkozy not already unwittingly sowed the seeds of anti-French sentiment by threatening a boycott, the events in Paris would not have escalated in the same way. Indeed, a diplomatic bonfire had already been prepared all that was needed was a spark to light it. In the days following, some *liuxuesheng* began to post their thoughts on China’s big-

gest online forum Tianya, sharing their views on France's involvement in the Olympics to date. In one post, Tianya user 'aaqq88' writes repeated copies of the sentence Aoyunhui kaimushi na tian, yiqi wei Faguo dui hedaocai![60] 奥运会开幕式那天，一起为法国队喝倒采! [sic][61] (Let's all boo the French team on the day of the Olympic opening ceremony!). Minutes later, user 'navis_wb' responds "[I] support [that]!!! Use Sarkozy's words to greet them! 'Cass toi pauvre con!'"[62] Although some users dismiss the idea, calling it a "stupid thing to do",[63] one user mirrors the style of the original post by copying multiple sentences that say "when France enter the stadium, the whole stadium [should] start singing the Chinese national anthem." [64] The debate continues as those in favour and those against share reasons why, with some pointing out the similarity between singing the national anthem inappropriately and Hitler's 1936 Olympics.[65]

Then, towards the end of the string of comments at 8.42pm, one user, Tianya Zhuchong 天涯蛀虫, posts what seems to be the first mention of a boycott on Carrefour on the Tianya community website:

On 7 April, when the sacred Olympic torch that represents the peaceful and bright nature of humanity was passed on to France, the sacred torch relay was, thanks to the French government's connivance, cut short numerous times. In the hometown of the father of the modern Olympics Pierre de Coubertin, the sacred torch was profaned by France. It's not us [China] who should feel humiliated, it's France! Despite this, as Chinese people, we still have the need to protest against France, protest rationally, to our advantage and with restraint. We must start from the full extent of what each person is capable of doing:

1. Don't travel to France and, as much as possible, encourage friends and family not to go to France too.
2. Don't buy French products such as Peugeot[66] cars, Danone foods, Martel and Hennessy cognacs, Chanel perfume, Cartier jewellery and watches etc and, as much as is possible, don't go to Carrefour to shop.
3. In every online community, post pictures of Jin Jing being attacked by thugs and French police delighting in her misfortune. Let more people know this is the 'Human Rights' France flaunts.[67]

To illustrate just how quickly such a post can travel between Chinese netizens, Tianya Zhuchong duplicates the post on another forum minutes later, at 8.45pm[68] and at 9.12pm, a user by the name of Pangzi Tianjin 胖子天津, creates a new thread called Women dizhi Faguo 我们抵制法国 (We're boycotting France).[69] Below, he and other users copy Tianya Zhuchong's original post.

However, it is unclear as to whether or not Tianya Zhuchong was the first to post the above text, as it is just as likely it was copied from another source. Discussion on a general boycott of France had already been under way since the April 7 torch relay. On April 8, a blog entry on popular internet portal Sina was posted with the title "Don't drink French wine, don't wear Louis Vuitton bags!"[70] It includes the below text that appears on many other posts, including Pangzi Tianjin's:

Since France wants to 'Boycott' (boycott) the Beijing Olympics, then why can't we give them taste of their own medicine? Let's also boycott: it doesn't take much, [if] Chinese people all over the world don't drink French alcohol (50% of French produced cognac is sold to the Chinese market) don't wear Louis Vuitton bags, [it would] make the French people [listen] to the voice of China.[71]

Whilst differing slightly in origin, there are clear commonalities between all of the above posts. Sarkozy's threat to use a boycott as a political tool is clearly interpreted as a personal attack on China, therefore prompting calls to yi ren zhi dao, huan zhi qi ren zhi shen 以其人之道，还治其人之身 (lit. to use an opponent's own methods to obtain retribution).[72] Although Sarkozy's words were made in relation to Chinese policy on Tibet, the lines between the position one's government chooses to adopt and the very country, people and culture itself could be said to be far less well-defined in China than Western, multi-party democracies would assume.

How exactly, therefore, did this apparently long list of 'French products to avoid' transmogrify into a single boycott on the Carrefour supermarket? According to an article in the Nanfang Dushi Bao 南方都市报 (Southern Metropolis Daily)[73] on April 15, "following the events that occurred at the Paris

torch relay, web-users first started to [call for a boycott on] Louis Vuitton then, over the last few days, changed targets to the more easily-accessed Carrefour.”[74] Many original posts on the internet that called for initial boycotts of French goods have since been *hexie le* 和谐了 (harmonised)[75] so, whilst it is possible to identify some of the earliest posts and roughly pinpoint the day boycott calls began, most original primary sources have since disappeared. However, as the Southern Metropolis Daily points out, since French holding company LVMH (Moët Hennessy • Louis Vuitton) was “suspected of having once given funds to support the Tibetan independence movement, webusers proposed a boycott.”[76]

A few days after initial online discussions and posts on a boycott of French goods, large numbers of mainland Chinese mobile phone users began receiving the same text message, worded much like the internet posts, from an unknown source:

May 8th - 24th, exactly 3 months before the Beijing Olympics. Everyone must not shop at Carrefour. The reason is that Carrefour’s majority stockholder donates vast sums to the Dali Lama and there are many who support the Tibetan separatists in France, so much so that even the French president has therefore declared a boycott on the Beijing Olympics. So, let’s now boycott Carrefour for the 17 days that the Beijing Olympics are on. Make them see the power of the Chinese people and the Chinese network. Please forward [this message].[77]

Its origins unclear and circling mainly between friends, one Chinese netizen writes in their English-language blog that, in their case, they were surprised to receive their copy of the message from a “very senior executive of a major multi-national corporation.”[78] Demonstrating the power of the “Chinese network” as the message intends, people all across the country were either receiving the message or posting an exact copy on an online forum, mostly from April 14, 2008 onwards. Not restricted to mobile phones, the exact same message made frequent appearances on online message boards as wangmin everywhere worked to spread the message. A Google search of the first line of the text still returns almost 14 000 instances of websites that include that text somewhere on a page.[79]

However, to what extent is it accurate to label those that were seeking to propagate a boycott as nationalists? Although at this stage a boycott against French products in retaliation to a perceived French boycott of a Chinese “product” is hard to classify as an exclusively nationalist movement, calls to sing the Chinese national anthem at the French team could be put forward as expressions of nationalist sentiment. Such an aggressive response towards France as a country and allegations of “humiliation” in some of the propagated messages are indeed likely to be related to Chinese national identity. As Callahan notes: “the Chinese ‘nation’ was ‘humiliated’ by foreign aggression and domestic corruption. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the master narrative of modern Chinese history is the discourse of the century of national humiliation.”[80] Furthermore, although a much broader concept, Anderson’s theory of an “imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”[81] carries some relevancy here as French calls to boycott the Olympic games, a symbol of Chinese national pride, are evidently interpreted to contradict the sovereignty and the carefully-constructed historiography that define Chinese national identity.

PHASE THREE: POPULAR ACTION

Popular post-catalyst discussion and mass-planning

The speed at which the boycott calls spread from a handful of online forums to nationwide text messages accurately demonstrates how effective the internet and social media has become as a tool for nationalists to propagate a cause. A lone boycott outside a Beijing branch of Carrefour by a webuser by the name of “Kittys Shelley” helped instigate the first mass protests. Writing in her blog, Kittys Shelley describes the “humiliation” and “harm” that the pro-Chinese demonstrators endured and the allegedly biased treatment from the Western media. She claims her actions were motivated by what she had seen in Paris as “those Chinese students [away from home] practically went through war yet, can we just sit here and do nothing?”[82] A boycott on French goods, she posits, will “make foreigners understand Chinese sovereignty is not to be infringed upon.”[83] On April 13, Kittys Shelley stood in front of a Beijing branch of Carrefour holding a placard in French reading “Tibet etait, est, sera, TOUJOURS une partie de la Chi-

ne!" (Tibet was, is and always will be a part of China).[84] At her feet stood a larger poster with images of Jin Jing guarding the olympic torch from protestors. English text above read "This is so-called Human Rights in France! [sic]" flanked by more pictures of Jin Jing in her wheelchair. She therefore became the first wangmin to begin a public protest of Carrefour.

Kittys Shelley's actions are interesting to note as they were evidently independent of the larger boycott movement. That is to say, contrary to the timeframe as stated in the mass text message of a 17 day boycott,[85] Kittys Shelley decided to take action herself based on what she perceived to be the humiliation of China and foreign infringement of China's sovereignty. This is again in line with theories of Gries and Callahan which argue that such responses are as a result of the Chinese perception of modern history, as is China's national identity in the international community. Whilst it is hard to ascertain whether or not Kittys Shelley is responding to the events in a such a way based on any government direction, information on her blog suggesting that she is a 25 year old graduate would certainly class her as product of the post-Tiananmen education system that Zhao Suisheng argues is the instigator of the last decade's rise of Chinese nationalism.

Significantly, Kittys Shelley's blog post reporting her lone boycott generated over 29 000 views within 24 hours and more than 550 comments, mainly saying zhichi! 支持 (support!) followed. Days later, the mass movement started to become more visible as the protests in Beijing, Kunming, Qingdao, Hefei and Wuhan as detailed in this study's introduction gained momentum. Meanwhile, on forum websites like Tianya, a quiet campaign was growing online to "Free" Corsica from French rule. In what was deemed to be an immensely hypocritical stance by Sarkozy's government to support Tibetan independence, Chinese netizens began to threaten the mobilisation of a Chinese-led Corsican independence movement if Sarkozy chose to visit China.[86] On other boards, some users began to produce satirical "Free Corsica!" images, including one montage of the French tricolour with a naked photo of Sarkozy's wife Carla Bruni in the centre behind text reading "Corsican independence needs our naked support."[87] Whilst the movement was largely tongue in cheek, it echoed general feelings amongst Chinese netizens that Chinese sovereignty had been infringed and, therefore, so should France's.

PHASE FOUR: INTERVENTION

Popular post-catalyst discussion and mass-planning

By mid April, mass protests had already gained popularity across China and international media had also started to report the demonstrations. Until April 15, the government had issued very few statements or concerns relating to the boycott until foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu 姜瑜 told Western journalists at a press conference: "...we hope the French side can listen to the Chinese people's voices concerning the recent problems and adopt an objective position"[88] regarding the boycott movement. On 20 April, apparently fearing the level of growing unrest, government censors had begun filtering search results of Jialefu and "all major online forums started to delete systematically delete all posts that called for a boycott on Carrefour." [89]

Whilst the government may have feared levels of civil unrest on the scale of the Carrefour boycott (particularly with its close proximity to the Beijing Olympics), letting nationalist sentiment grow to the extent it did had also suited its own political agenda. Gries and others argue that the government can't be seen to quell or stop large outbursts of nationalist sentiment for fear of damaging its own legitimacy. Yet, in this case, the government had apparently carefully chosen to intervene after nationalist sentiment had propagated its own retort against Sarkozy's calls for a boycott. That is to say, it avoided a major diplomatic row by allowing a certain amount of "steam" to be released from an over-boiling nationalist movement. It had, as is discussed in Chapter 2, enabled both the government elite and the masses to satisfy their political aims in a movement that is neither top-down nor clearly bottom-up in its structure.

Conclusion

The four-part phases as identified in chapter 4 present us with a model for analysing and anticipating the manner in which similar events unfold. Past examples of mass nationalist outburst such as the US bombing of the Belgrade Embassy in 1999 also fit this model. With the bombing itself represen-

ting a suitable catalyst whereby a foreign power has “meddled” in China’s affairs (phase one), the Chinese reaction followed by the “popular action” of demonstrating and stoning the American Embassy in Beijing (phases two and three), the government was able to deliberately intervene at a later stage after allowing its people to further propagate its own political aims (phase four).

However, the Carrefour boycott is perhaps a better reflection of the power of mass movements in China rather than Chinese nationalism itself. New technologies and the power of the internet in China have meant that such movements, for whatever cause, can clearly gather momentum at an impressively fast rate. Phenomena such as the “human flesh search” and mass movements that don’t necessarily carry nationalist undertones are testament to this. Therefore, it is possibly more beneficial to approach the study of contemporary Chinese nationalism by paying careful attention to the way in which information is passed between Chinese citizens via social media and large online networks. Additionally, including all mass movements in China under an umbrella of nationalism is arguably misleading and such analysis could potentially explain the culture of “hyphenated” Chinese nationalism that the likes of Carlson fear has “led scholars to tailor their research in particular constraining directions.”^[90] Therefore, it is strongly recommended that a deeper understanding of how these networks operate is crucial, not only for observers of China but also for the Chinese government itself. Fortunately, the nature of the internet means that, for the most part, such networks are comparatively transparent thus providing a rich area of access for research.

Nevertheless, whether the sentiments be nationalist, patriotic or revolutionary, the events surrounding the Carrefour boycott clearly illustrate the potential of a younger, technologically savvy generation of Chinese to rally around a cause and mobilise a large number of sympathisers. That said, some online campaigns launched in April 2008 have lost momentum — it still remains to be seen whether or not the CCP will succumb to domestic pressure and dispatch troops in a campaign to “Free Corsica!”

Notes:

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- 2) "'Yilun shang de weixiao tianshi' Jin Jing jiangshu baohu hujingli" '轮椅上的微笑天使'金晶讲述保护火炬经历 ('Smiling Angel in a Wheelchair' Jin Jing Talks of Her Experience Guarding The Torch), Beijing 2008 nian Aoyunhui Huojing Jieli Guanfang Wangzhan 北京2008年奥运会火炬接力官方网站 (The Official Website for The Beijing 2008 Olympic Torch Relay), April 10, 2008, <http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/cn/torchbearers/headlines/n214299075.shtml> (accessed April 16, 2011).
- 3) Chinese and interference with one's business to French supermarket [sic], Live Leak Video, 3:44, posted by SSR999, April 22, 2008, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=092_1208849005 (accessed April 16, 2011).
- 4) BBS, or 'Bulletin Board System' is a somewhat archaic term for online forums but is used in its abbreviated form in Chinese as a term for a portal or forum style website.
- 5) Zhou Shuguang, "MSN he SMS shang biaoqian gaozhang de aiguo re qing" MSN和SMS上表现出高涨的爱国热情 (Patriotic Passions Run High on MSN and SMS), Zhou Shuguang de Wangluo Rizhi 周曙光的博客 (Zhou Shuguang's Online Journal) (blog), April 16, 2008, <https://www.zuola.com/weblog/2008/04/1029.htm> (accessed April 16, 2011).

- 6) See Annex B.
- 7) Che du Hefei Jialefu 车堵合肥家乐福 (Vehicles Block A Hefei Branch of Carrefour), YouTube video, 0:27, posted by tanceetv, April 18, 2008, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aO0bygEBUM8> (accessed April 18, 2011).
- 8) For example, a similar message still appears when using Baidu to search for Tiananmen datusha 天安门大屠杀 (Tiananmen massacre), omitting any results that deal with events surrounding the 1989 student movement. In this case, a combination of results regarding the area of Tiananmen itself and the Nanjing Massacre appear instead (accessed April 18, 2011).
- 9) See Annex A for original Chinese.
- 10) "Ruci hexie" 如此和谐 (So Harmonious), Oh My Media: Meijie yu chuanbo yanjiu Oh My Media: 媒介与传播研究 (Oh My Media: Media & Communication Research) (blog), April 26, 2008, <http://ohmymedia.com/2008/04/26/788/> (accessed April 18, 2011).
- 11) See Annex A.
- 12) Li Xuemei 李学梅, "Faguo Jialefu zongcai Dilang biaoshi quanli zhichi Beijing Aoyunhui" 法国家乐福总裁迪朗表示全力支持北京奥运会 (France's Carrefour Chairman Duran Shows Full Support for Beijing Olympics), Xinhua Wang 新华网 (Xinhua Online), April 22, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-04/22/content_8030024.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).
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- Online), April 23, 2008, <http://www.infzm.com/content/trs/raw/43699> (accessed April 19, 2011). See Annex A.
- 15) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
 - 16) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 17.
 - 17) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 117.
 - 18) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 134.
 - 19) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 125.
 - 20) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 120.
 - 21) Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (1996): 46.
 - 22) Suisheng Zhao, "A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no.3 (1998): 300.
 - 23) Suisheng Zhao, *A State-led Nationalism*, 289.
 - 24) Henrietta Harrison, *China: Inventing the Nation* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2001), 252.
 - 25) Henrietta Harrison, *China: Inventing the Nation*, 267.
 - 26) Peter Hays Gries, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson and Huajian Cai, "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity," *The China Quarterly*, 205 (2011): 16.
 - 27) William A. Callahan, "National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism," *Alternatives* 29 (2004): 204.
 - 28) Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006), 6.
 - 29) Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7.
 - 30) Jeffery N. Wasserstrom, "The Many Faces of Chinese Nationalism," *Harvard Asia Pacific Review* 11, no.1 (2010): 8.
 - 31) Allen Carlson, "A Flawed Perspective: The Limitations Inherent Within the Study of Chinese Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 15, no.1 (2009): 24.

- 32) Allen Carlson, "A Flawed Perspective," 25.
- 33) Allen Carlson, "A Flawed Perspective," 32.
- 34) Allen Carlson, "A Flawed Perspective," 25.
- 35) Allen Carlson, "A Flawed Perspective," 24.
- 36) Suisheng Zhao, *A State-led Nationalism*, 290.
- 37) The English term 'patriotism' is deliberately not used in translation here so as to distinguish between and emphasise the Chinese concept of *aiguo* 爱国 from the more scientific *aiguozhuyi* 爱国主义.
- 38) Zhang Ming 张鸣, "Guojiazhuyi de yinhun" 国家主义的阴魂 (The Spirit of Nationalism)," Zhang Ming: Boke Zhuanlan 张鸣: 博客专栏 (Zhang Ming: Guest Blogger) (blog), April 23, 2008, <http://www.blogchina.com/20080423518384.html> (accessed April 4, 2011). See Annex A.
- 39) Zhang Ming 张鸣, "Guojiazhuyi de yinhun." See Annex A.
- 40) Shaila Dewan, "Chinese Student in U.S. Is Caught in Confrontation," *New York Times*, April 17, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/us/17student.html> (accessed April 4, 2011).
- 41) This was mainly propagated by users commenting on blogs, discussion portals and video sites. After coming across such a post that included her details, I ran a mechanical Baidu search of the same terms (see Annex A) that still returns over 8000 instances of the information being published (accessed April 8, 2011).
- 42) "Sohu - Zhongguo zuida de menhu wangzhan" 搜狐-中国最大的门户网站 (Sohu - China's Biggest Portal Website), <http://www.sohu.com/> (accessed April 4, 2011).
- 43) "Tianya Shehuiqu - quanqiu Huaren wangshang jiyuan" 天涯社区_全球华人网上家园 (Tianya Community - Online Homestead for the Chinese People), <http://www.tianya.cn/> (accessed April 4, 2011).
- 44) Shaila Dewan, "Chinese Student," *New York Times*, April 17, 2008.

- 45) "Wenge zaixian? CCTV wangzhan shouye: 'zui choulou de liuxuesheng'" 文革再现? CCTV网站首页:'最丑陋的留学生' (Recreating the Cultural Revolution? CCTV's homepage: 'Most Hideous Overseas Student'), Wanwei Duzhe Wang 万维读者网 (Creaders.net), April 16, 2008, <http://news.creaders.net/headline/newsViewer.php?nid=341208&id=793556> (accessed April 4, 2011).
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- 47) For more regarding the birth of online nationalism in China see: Xu Wu, *Chinese Cyber Nationalism* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007).
- 48) The so-called 'Human Flesh Search' is internet slang that refers to a large amount of netizens covering a wider search area for details or personal information of a specific individual or organisation. For more information see: Hannah Fletcher, "Human Flesh Search Engines: Chinese Vigilantes That Hunt Victims on the Web," *Times Online*, June 25, 2008, http://technology.timesonline.co.uk./tol/news/tech_and_web/article4213681.ece (accessed April 4, 2011).
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- 50) Peter Hays Gries, Qingmin Zhang, H. Michael Crowson and Huajian Cai, "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity," *The China Quarterly*, 205 (2011): 16.
- 51) Peter Hays Gries, et al, "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy," *The China Quarterly*, 205 (2011): 16.
- 52) See: Zhongguo Zhi Wang 中国知网 (China National Knowledge Infrastructure)," <http://www.ckni.net> (accessed 20th January, 2011).

- 53) Given that Baidu is the most dominant search engine in China, it was chosen as the most suitable candidate for these searches.
- 54) Source: Baidu Xinwen 百度新闻 (Baidu News), <http://news.baidu.com> (accessed 26th January, 2011).
- 55) Andrew Sparrow, "Sarkozy Threatens Olympic Boycott," *The Guardian*, 26 March, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/mar/26/foreignpolicy.nicolassarkozy> (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 56) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*.
- 57) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 17.
- 58) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 47.
- 59) Peter Gries, *China's New Nationalism*, 47.
- 60) Aaqq88, post on Tiyu Jujiao: Tianya Shequ 体育聚焦: 天涯社区 (Sports Focus: Tianya Community), "Aoyunhui kaimushi nation, yiqi wei Faguo dui hedaocai!" 奥运会开幕式那天, 一起为法国队喝倒采! (Let's all boo the French team on the day of the Olympic opening ceremony!), April 9, 2008, <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/sport/1/103526.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2008).
- 61) The author, presumably as a result of a typing error, mistakenly uses the character cai 采 (pluck) instead of cai 彩 (applause) in the word hedaocai 喝倒彩 (to boo or jeer).
- 62) See Annex A. The phrase "Casse toi pauvre con!", roughly meaning "piss off you bastard!" became infamous after it was once said by Sarkozy to a crowd member who refused to shake his hand at a political rally.
- 63) See Annex A.
- 64) See Annex A.
- 65) See Annex A.
- 66) The author writes biaozi 标致 (sign) in place of biaozhi 标致 (Peugeot), presumably because they are unaware of the correct characters for Peugeot and therefore use a phonetically similar word.

- 67) Tianya Zhuchong 天涯蛀虫, post on Tiyu Jujiao: Tianya Shequ 体育聚焦: 天涯社区 (Sports Focus: Tianya Community), "Aoyunhui kaimushi nation, yiqi wei Faguo dui hedaocai!" 奥运会开幕式那天, 一起为法国队喝倒采! (Let's all boo the French team on the day of the Olympic opening ceremony!), April 9, 2008, <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/sport/1/103526.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2011). See Annex A.
- 68) Tianya Zhuchong 天涯蛀虫, post on Tiyu Jujiao: Zhenjing! Jingran shi Bali ZF [ZF=Zhengfu] mousha le Aoyun shenghuo! 体育聚焦: 震惊! 竟然是巴黎ZF[ZF=政府]谋杀了奥运圣火! (Shock horror! The Parisian government actually goes so far as to murder the Olympic flame!), April 9, 2008, <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/sport/1/103814.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 69) Pangzi Tianjin 胖子天津, post on Tiyu Jujiao: Women dizhi Faguo 体育聚焦: 我们抵制法国 (We're boycotting France), April 9, 2008, <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/sport/1/103814.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 70) Pan Qiang 潘蔷, "Bu he Faguo jiu, bu bei LV boa Boycott French wine and LV bag!" 不喝法国酒, 不背LV包 Boycott French wine and LV bag! [sic] (Don't drink French wine, don't wear Louis Vuitton bags 'Boycott French wine and LV bag!' [sic], Pan Qiang 潘蔷 (blog), April 8, 2008, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_519f074601008urs.html (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 71) See Annex A.
- 72) For the sake of flow and clarity, I chose to translate this as 'give them a taste of their own medicine' when interpreting comments written in an environment of internet memes and colloquialisms.
- 73) The Southern Metropolis Daily is a daily newspaper in Southern China and is well known for its investigative journalism and commentary on social and political issues.
- 74) Zhang Dongfeng 张东锋, "Wangyou haozhao dizhi, Jialefu hanyuan" 网友号召抵制家乐福喊冤 (Webusers call for a boycott, Carrefour cla-

ims injustice), Nanfang Bushi Bao 南方都市报 (Southern Metropolis Daily), April 15, 2008, http://epaper.oeeee.com/A/html/2008-04/15/content_440326.htm (accessed April 10, 2011). See Annex A.

- 75) A subtle poke at the government's internet censorship and the Hexie Shehui 和谐社会 (Harmonious Society) signature policy of Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, many Chinese netizens refer ironically to their censored internet posts as being hexie le 和谐了 (harmonised) so as to avoid being they themselves censored for using the word shencha le 审查了 (censored).
- 76) Zhang Dongfeng 张东锋, "Wangyou haozhao dizhi, Jialefu hanyuan," Nanfang Bushi Bao. See Annex A.
- 77) See Annex A. A photo of the text is included in Annex B.
- 78) Sun Bin, "What Matters is People Understand California is the Most Powerful State in the World," Sun Bin: A Blog on Strategies and Applying Strategic Perspectives on Business-related Issues, and on Miscellaneous Discussions About China (blog), April 13, 2008, <http://sun-bin.blogspot.com/2008/04/carrefours-suppliers-beware.html> (accessed April 10, 2008).
- 79) The search was done using the Chinese version of Google at <http://www.google.cn> on April 10, 2008 and yielded exactly 13 600 results. The search term was "5月8日-24日，正好是北京奥运会的前三个月。所有人都不要去家乐福购物，理由是家乐福的大股东捐巨资给”。 The quotation marks were included in the search so as to conduct a search of exact matches of the phrase (not including the quotation marks would be a keyword search and yield quite different results). Whilst the search may also include news reports of the message itself, this is still a small margin of error compared to the vast number of search results that were returned. Both UK and US versions of Google produced the same amount of results (13 600) as the Chinese site.
- 80) William A. Callahan, "National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation and Chinese Nationalism," *Alternatives* 29 (2004): 204.
- 81) Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

- 82) Kittys Shelley, "Bu shi yi ge ren de Aolinpike" 不是一个人的奥林匹克 (It's not one person's Olympics), kittys Shelley (blog), April 14, 2008, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3f487373010095ch.html#comment (accessed April 10, 2011). See Annex A.
- 83) Kittys Shelley, "Bu shi yi ge ren de Aolinpike," kittys Shelley (blog), April 14, 2008. See Annex A.
- 84) See Annex B.
- 85) Other dates were suggested for the boycott, particularly the May 1 holiday. For more information see: "Sanbaiwan ke hong xin' wangyou dizhi Jialefu beihou" '300万颗红心' 网友抵制家乐福背后 ('Three Million Red Hearts' Behind the Webusers' Boycott of Carrefour), Renmin Wang 人民网 (People Online), April 17, 2008, <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14549/7131652.html> (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 86) Qingshibanban 青石板板, post on Tianya Fatan 天涯杂谈 (Tianya Miscellaneous Discussion), "Qianglie zhichi Kexijia fankang Falanxi de duli shiye, yaoqiu Zhongguo paibing chichi" 强烈支持科西嘉反抗法兰西的独立事业, 要求中国派兵支持 (Strongly support the cause of Corsica rebelling against France, demand the dispatch of Chinese troops to support), Tianya Fatan 天涯杂谈 (Tianya Miscellaneous Discussion), April 7, 2008, <http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1354028.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 87) See Annex B for image.
- 88) Ian Ransom, "Chinese Demand Carrefour Boycott For Tibet 'support'," Reuters, April 15, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/15/us-china-tibet-carrefour-idUSPEK24412820080415> (accessed April 10, 2011).
- 89) Zhang Dongfeng 张东锋, "Wangyou haozhao dizhi, Jialefu hanyuan," Nanfang Bushi Bao. See Annex A.
- 90) Allen Carlson, "A Flawed Perspective," 25.

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Appendix A

Original Chinese of Translated Sources

Footnote 9

搜索结果可能涉及不符合相关法律法规和政策的内容，未予显示。

Footnote 11

新华网巴黎4月22日电（记者郑甦春 李学梅）法国家乐福集团总裁迪朗22日在接受新华社记者专访时表示，抵制奥运会的呼吁是别有用心的行为，家乐福将全力支持北京奥运会。他同时否认了家乐福支持“藏独”势力的传闻。

Footnote 14

南方周末：您赞成抵制家乐福的行为吗？

吴建民：我不赞成。某些自认为是“爱国”的行动，损害了这些员工的利益，损害了中国人自己的利益，也损害了国家的形象。

Footnote 38

几乎在任何条件下，爱国两个字，都有某种魔力。不管什么人，只要宣称自己是爱国的，马上就占据了道德制高点，说什么，做什么，都理直气壮，甚至可以肆无忌惮。

Footnote 39

爱国成了一种遮羞布，无论什么事，只要遮上爱国的旗帜，就等于替天行道，一路畅通。

Footnote 41

姓名 王千源 出生日期 19880220 性别 女性 曾用名 王佳妮 身份证号码 370205198802204025 民族 汉 家庭住址 山东省青岛市市北区镇江路32号6号楼1单元502户 单位名称 青岛二中 所属派出所 北仲

路派出所 王德玉户主男性37020319611025031X青岛港务局外轮理货
公司山东省青岛市市北区镇江路32号6号楼1单元502户 韩云芝妻女性
370204196209013943市税务事务所山东省青岛市市北区镇江路32号6
号楼1单元502户 王千源女女性370205198802204025青岛二中山东省
青岛市市北区镇江路32号6号楼1单元502户。

Footnote 62

支持!!!!!!!!!!!!就用萨克奇的话招呼他们!!! cass toi pa-
uvre con!!!!

Footnote 63

Username: snail_net

很S的做法，原因就不说了

Translation note: the use of the letter 'S' here in place of the character *sha* 傻 (stupid) is a contraction of 'SB' which is internet slang for *shabi* 傻逼 (stupid cunt). Whilst the user may not be calling anyone a *shaibi*, the letter 'S' is occasionally used as short hand for *sha* 傻 (stupid) online and in text messages.

Footnote 64

Username: 某人a

法国出场的时候, 全场开唱中国国歌

Footnote 65

Username: 收集问题

“绝对不可以!!!!!!!!!!!!你们晓不晓得1936德国奥运会，他们让整个赛场都是他们的声音，在全世界留下了多么恶劣的印象！！”

Footnote 67

4月7日，代表人类和平光明的奥运圣火传递到法国时，由于法国政府的纵容，圣火传递被迫数次中断。在现代奥林匹克之父顾拜旦的家乡，圣火被法兰西亵渎了，感到丢脸的不是我们中国而是法兰西自己！尽管如此，作为中国人，我们仍很有必要抗议法兰西，有理有利有节地抗议，就从我们每个人身边力所能及地开始：

- 1、不去法国旅游，并尽可能地动员亲朋好友们都不去法国；
- 2、不买法国产品，比如”标志“汽车、达能食品、“马爹利”酒、“轩尼诗”酒、“香奈儿”香水、“卡地亚”珠宝、手表等商品，也尽量不去“家乐福”购物。
- 3、在各网络社区转贴金晶在法国被暴徒袭击，而法国警方幸灾乐祸的照片，让更多人知道这就是法兰西标榜的“人权”。

Footnote 70

不喝法国酒，不背LV包，Boycott French wine and LV bag! [sic]

Footnote 71

既然法国要Boycott（抵制）北京奥运，那我们为什么就不能“以其人之道，还治其人之身”？我们也来Boycott吧：不用多，全球华人都不喝法国酒（法国生产的XO超过50%销往了中国）不背LV包，让法国人也知道来自中国的声音。

Footnote 74

...加上巴黎奥运圣火传递时发生的事情，网友们先是开始抵制LV，这几天则换了“靶子”，选择了更容易接触到的家乐福。

Footnote 76

...涉嫌曾予以“藏独”资金支持，网友发起了抵制

Footnote 77

5月8日-24日，正好是北京奥运会的前三个月。所有人都不要去家乐福购物，理由是家乐福的大股东捐巨资给达赖，法国支持藏独者甚众，甚至法国总统也因此而声言抵制北京奥运会。那我们现在就抵制一下家乐福，为期与北京奥运会同长，前后17天。让他们看看中国人和中国网络的力量。请转发

Footnote 82

...看了法国4月7日火炬传递的境况，我心里很难受，留学生们在国外几乎经历了一场战争，而我们坐在这里，难道可以什么都不做么？

Footnote 83

...家抵制法国货；使外国人明白中国主权不可侵犯

Footnote 89

各主要网络社区论坛开始大面积删除号召抵制家乐福的帖子

Appendix B


Photographs and Images

Footnote 6



Protestors hold a French national flag during a demonstration against Carrefour supermarkets and French goods on a street in Wuhan, Hubei province April 19, 2008. (Source: Reuters)

Footnote 77



A photo taken by a Chinese mobile phone user shortly after receiving a text calling for a boycott of the Carrefour supermarket chain. The time reads 15.03 on April 4th, 2008. (Source: Zhou Shuguang, "MSN he SMS shang biao xian gao zhang de aiguo re qing")

Footnote 84



"Kittysheley" boycotts a Beijing branch of the Carrefour supermarket. The images to the right and below are the original files used to create the placards in the above picture.



**Tibet etait, est, sera,
TOUJOURS une partie de la Chine!**



Stop Violence! Stop Media Distortion!

Footnote 87

One of the many satirical images produced around the time of the Carrefour boycott that called for the support of the Corsican independence movement.

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