



CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The Case of Bolivia

Jonas Wolff

DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW | MARCH 2011



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Summary

Bolivia offers a critical, but atypical, case for international democracy promotion. The ongoing political transformation initiated by President Evo Morales constitutes one of the few experiences in the world of a serious effort to build a democracy different from the existing Western liberal models. And this presents a significant challenge to democracy promotion efforts.

The United States and Germany—two main external actors in Bolivia—have been compelled to react to this challenge. In the case of the United States, an initial phase of wait-and-see escalated in 2008 into an open crisis in bilateral relations. Attempts to adjust U.S. democracy assistance to the evolving political situation in Bolivia failed and by the end of 2009 USAID's democracy program was closed on demand of the Bolivian government. The German government, on the other hand, explicitly supported the political changes initiated by Morales. Bilateral relations between Bolivia and Germany are characterized by general continuity and in terms of democracy assistance Germany largely adjusted its programs to the preferences of the new Bolivian government.

International democracy promoters often argue that they are not trying to impose a specific form of democracy from the outside and Bolivia has tested the U.S. and German commitments to this ideal. In fact, both governments have not stuck dogmatically to their particular models or concepts of democracy, but have shown some surprising flexibility. Negative reactions to Morales, especially in the case of the United States, were actually triggered by disagreements on specific policy issues.

Bolivia's ongoing democratic transformation suggests that the best external democracy promoters can do under such circumstances is to support processes of inclusive dialogue and constructive conflict resolution. Instead of focusing on a specific political *end point*—a given model of democracy—support should push for a peaceful and inclusive political *process* of constructing a model appropriate for Bolivia. This, however, requires external actors to unequivocally respect Bolivia's claim to democratic self-determination that encompasses not just the shape of its political system but also its foreign, economic, and narcotics policies.

Introduction

Bolivia presents an unusual and important case for international democracy promotion. The ongoing political transformation of this Andean country constitutes one of the very few experiences worldwide of a serious effort to try to build a democracy different from existing Western liberal models.

The precise shape and viability of the political system that President Evo Morales is trying to construct is still unclear. But his transformative political project clearly represents a serious attempt to fundamentally change the democratic regime and create a different sort of democracy.

International democracy promoters regularly reject the charge that they are trying to export a particular model of democracy. In Bolivia, they are having to live up to this promise—a task easier said than done. Bolivia’s attempted democratic reshaping is proving to be a contradictory, uncertain, and conflict-ridden process, one that has provoked sharp debates both within Bolivia and among observers of Bolivia abroad. In addition, the Bolivian government’s claim to enhanced democratic self-determination encompasses not just the shape of its political system but also areas—such as its foreign, economic, and narcotics policies—which touch many nerves in the region, Washington, and elsewhere.

Bolivia presents a challenge to international democracy promotion, as is shown by the democracy policies and programs of two main external actors in the country—the United States and Germany. Bolivia’s contradictory transformation to democracy after Morales’s election in 2005 resulted in changes in both the diplomatic and foreign assistance communities in both countries. In the case of the United States, an initial phase of wait-and-see gave way to increasing diplomatic conflicts, which, in 2008, escalated into an open crisis in bilateral relations. Attempts to adjust U.S. democracy assistance to the evolving political situation in Bolivia failed and, by the end of 2009, USAID’s democracy program was closed on demand of the Bolivian government.

In contrast, the German government explicitly supported the political changes initiated by the Morales government. Bilateral relations between Bolivia and Germany—which mainly consist of development cooperation—are characterized by general continuity; in terms of democracy assistance, Germany largely adjusted its programs to the preferences of the new Bolivian government.

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Bolivia's Contradictory Transformation of Democracy

At first blush, Bolivia represents an easy case for democracy promotion. It is part of a region that has been almost entirely democratic for years. The countries of the Western Hemisphere have institutionalized democracy and democracy promotion as relatively strong intra-regional norms. Compared to Africa and Asia, Latin America is culturally, socially, and politically close to and in many ways part of the West. Following a turbulent transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, Bolivia after 1985 became a much-lauded development model that successfully followed a path of democratization, stabilization, and (neo)liberal economic reform.¹

After the turn of the century, however, this “model” came under increasing pressure. Between 2000 and 2005, a series of political crises erupted, characterized by massive social protests that forced the resignations of both the elected president, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, in 2003, and his appointed successor, Carlos Mesa, in 2005.

During this period, Morales—a union leader, coca grower, and head of the Movement Toward Socialism (*Movimiento al Socialismo*—MAS)—established himself as the leading representative of the diverse protest movements. In December 2005, he was elected president by an absolute majority (54 percent) of the vote, becoming the country's first head of state of indigenous origin. Since then, Morales has led a process of profound political change that includes a profound remaking of the country's political system through constitutional reform as well as a change of course in economic, social, and drug/coca policies.

The “refoundation” of Bolivia via a Constituent Assembly (*Asamblea Constituyente*) that would represent the entire Bolivian population and give the country a whole new political order had been a long-standing demand of the country's indigenous movements. The assembly, elected in July 2006, finished its work on the new constitution in December 2007. After the congress revised the constitutional draft in 2008, 61 percent of the population approved the new constitution in a referendum on January 25, 2009. In general elections at the end of the year, Morales was reelected and the MAS won a two-thirds majority in the new Plurinational Legislative Assembly. Since then, parliamentary work has focused on developing a series of laws to implement the new constitutional framework.

In terms of economic and social policies, the Morales government has significantly increased the role of the state in the economy. In May 2006, Morales declared that the government would nationalize the country's gas resources. In the following months, international gas companies were forced into new contractual relationships, the control of the state (and the state-owned company YPFB) in the hydrocarbon sector was strengthened, and taxes on gas companies were increased. Further nationalizations took place in the mining

and telecommunications sectors, but were confined to individual companies. Using rising revenues from hydrocarbon (and mineral) resources, the government expanded social spending and public investment.²

In addition, the Morales government abandoned the U.S.-driven emphasis on coerced coca eradication.³ This change included recognizing the coca leaf's traditional role in indigenous cultures, increasing the level of legal coca production and trade, and pushing for coca's international legalization. The government did try to limit the amount of coca production via cooperative forms of social control at the community level while continuing joint military-police counternarcotics efforts to cut down on drug trafficking.⁴

Within Bolivia, these changes have been—and still are—heavily contested. Given a weak and fragmented opposition at the national level,⁵ the resistance against Morales has come primarily from regional autonomy movements based in the eastern lowland departments⁶ (the so-called *media luna*) and led by elected governors (*prefectos*) and “civic committees.” The conflict between the government and its allies and the regionally concentrated opposition centers on the distribution of revenues from gas fields concentrated in the southeastern departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija; the distribution of competencies between the central government in La Paz and the regional *departamentos* that demand more autonomy; on the land reform pushed by Morales, which threatens large landowners in the lowland region; and on the struggle between a government aiming to incorporate the indigenous majority and a “traditional” elite that tries to conserve at least some veto power over legislation and minority rights within the changing political institutions.⁷

All of these political changes are, of course, complex and multifaceted. But in relation to democracy promotion, five main characteristics of Bolivia's self-proclaimed “democratic revolution” stand out. Each poses serious challenges to those external actors—like the United States and Germany—which are engaged in promoting democracy.

First, the democratic legitimation of the government and its political project contrasts with a series of procedural irregularities and outright breaches of constitutional and administrative law that took place during the process of political change. While impressive electoral victories since 2005 have demonstrated that Morales and his MAS party can rely on clear majority support among the population, the process of constitutional reform has been accompanied by controversial decisions and irregular procedures.

In one highly disputed procedure, for example, the draft for the new constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly by a two-thirds majority of the *present* members of the Assembly—a majority that was only possible because the most important opposition groups were absent. Following some nine months of political struggle, a two-thirds majority in Congress agreed on

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a detailed revision of the constitutional draft; this procedure lacked any legal basis, but was crucial for enabling the constitutional reform to be accepted by important parts of the opposition and preventing a further escalation of the political conflict.⁸ The regional autonomy movements, for their part, promoted autonomy statutes that received significant popular support in the respective *departamentos*, but clearly violated the constitution.

Second, important improvements in the quality of democracy took place as measured by representation and participation, but these were accompanied by at least temporary deteriorations with a view to institutional controls, and transparent, effective, efficient, and rule-bound governance. There can be no doubt that both Bolivia's government and the new parliament are considerably more representative today than ever before, and political participation—measurable in, but not limited to, electoral events—has clearly grown.

At the same time, the restructuring of political institutions has meant that respect for the established institutional order was limited and that existing institutional controls and procedural rules were gradually dismantled while new ones had yet to be established.⁹ One example is the disputes between the government and the judiciary. After a series of resignations in 2009 that were not

followed by new appointments, the highest judicial organs were largely paralyzed.

Third, the profound restructuring of the political system generally corresponds to the usual standards of representative democracy and human rights, but includes important deviations from established liberal-democratic (and thus donor) conceptions. The new constitution includes the classical set of political and civil rights, and

the new political system is dominated by traditional mechanisms and institutions of representative democracy. But this liberal-democratic order has been modified to an important extent: Indigenous (customary) law is established as a second justice system to ordinary law, with equal ranking; indigenous collective rights provide for self-government in autonomous indigenous territories following indigenous customs and practices; and indigenous minority groups in rural areas elect their delegates to the national parliament through special electoral districts. In addition, the new constitution establishes mechanisms of direct democracy such as recall, other referendums, or popular legislative initiatives; the highest branches of the judiciary will be elected by popular vote; and “organized civil society” gains vaguely defined but potentially far-reaching rights to participate in the design of public policies and to control public administration. Finally, social and economic rights clearly go beyond anything usual in North-Western liberal democracies, possibilities for privatization (e.g., of public social services) are constrained, and property rights (e.g., in land) are delimited.¹⁰

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Fourth, changes in economic and social policies promoted by the new government—while in line with broad majorities of the Bolivian population—differ significantly from both U.S. and German concepts of sound development policies and economic interests. The most important example is nationalization. Another example of particular concern to the United States relates to the shift from coerced to cooperative coca eradication.

Fifth, the political inclusion of anti-systemic social movements contributing to political stabilization and conflict de-escalation has been accompanied by a political marginalization/alienation of former political and economic elites, thereby reinforcing regional-cum-ethnic cleavages, political polarization, and conflict escalation. After the toppling of Sánchez de Lozada's government in 2003, it has become almost impossible to govern Bolivia against the "popular sectors" as represented by the country's social and indigenous movements—thus the expectation that Morales's election would lead to political stabilization. In fact, although social protests led by a diverse spectrum of popular-sector groups continued throughout Morales's first term in office, Morales initially brought some relative stability to the country. But serious political disputes and social conflicts escalated again—mainly between the government and the regional opposition during the constitutional reform process. In September 2008, protests by the autonomy movements in the lowland departments peaked, blocking cities, streets, and gas pipelines, leading to occupations of central-state institutions, and increasing violence between oppositional and pro-government groups.¹¹

From the very beginning, the "democratic revolution" initiated by the Morales government has constituted a series of challenges to German and, especially, U.S. policies. The turning away from neoliberal economic policies and the U.S.-driven "War on Drugs" compromises the development strategies propagated by the United States and Germany and directly affects the economic and security interests of both countries (including individual U.S. and German companies). This evokes the well-known trade-off between interests and norms in democracy promotion.

At the same time, the political transformation outlined partially deviates from the model of democracy and good governance that both the United States and Germany adhere to. Bolivia's "democratic revolution" includes replacing the democratic institutions established since the transition to democracy in the 1980s—and actively supported by both the United States and Germany—with something new. That this process of change is happening under fundamentally democratic conditions poses difficult questions about how these external actors whose stated goal is to promote democracy should respond to it.

Changes in economic and social policies promoted by the new government differ significantly from both U.S. and German concepts of sound development policies and economic interests.

Democracy Promotion During a “Democratic Revolution”

Until the premature end of Sánchez de Lozada’s second presidency in 2003, U.S. and German relations with Bolivia were characterized by good diplomatic ties and explicit support to democratically elected governments. As regards U.S. foreign policy, close bilateral relations included general support to democratic governments and, in particular, to elected presidents in times of domestic political crises. U.S. support mainly consisted of diplomatic approval, trade preferences, and financial and technical assistance—all heavily focused

U.S. and German development aid to Bolivia included a range of projects explicitly intended to strengthen democratic institutions, processes, and actors.

on cooperation in the U.S.-driven “War on Drugs” and characterized by a high degree of direct political involvement in Bolivian domestic affairs.¹² Germany has been far less exposed and committed in Bolivia, but again, bilateral relations have traditionally been good and without major disturbances. German support to the democratic governments primarily included development assistance; German foreign policy toward this country mainly *is* development cooperation. As regards democracy assistance, U.S. and German development aid to Bolivia included a range of projects explicitly intended to strengthen democratic institutions, processes, and actors.

The U.S. Experience

Diplomatic Relations: From Troubles to Open Crisis

Directly following Morales’s election, the United States took a wait-and-see approach.¹³ Its official position was to “congratulate the people of Bolivia on a successful election and their commitment to democratic and constitutional processes” and express the will “to continue to work constructively with the new government.” But Washington also emphasized that the new government’s behavior would determine the course of bilateral relations. “It’s important that the new government govern in a democratic way and we’ll look to them to see what kind of cooperation they want to do on economic issues, as well,”¹⁴ the statement noted.

Even before the elections, the U.S. government had taken a low-key approach—an important difference from the 2002 presidential elections when then-U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha openly threatened to withdraw U.S. assistance if Bolivians would dare to elect the coca-supporter Morales. Now there was no negative reaction, even when the newly elected Morales called President George W. Bush a terrorist, visited Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, and appointed a cabinet widely perceived as close to the indigenous and social movements and critical of neoliberal economics and the United States. The U.S. embassy in La Paz even signaled its willingness to shift its policies on coca eradication to fight cocaine and “surplus” coca only.

Given the history of hostile relations between the U.S. government and Morales before his election, U.S.-Bolivian relations during his first two years as president were remarkably calm. To be sure, both sides made critical statements, increasingly so in 2007.¹⁵ But their impact on U.S. policies and bilateral relations was fairly limited.¹⁶

U.S. rhetoric criticizing Bolivia's new government included comments from both the development and intelligence communities. In June 2006, USAID Assistant Administrator Adolfo Franco said the Bolivian government had, "on several occasions, demonstrated inclinations to consolidate executive power and promote potentially anti-democratic reforms through the Constituent Assembly and other means."¹⁷ Earlier that year, then-Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte reported that Morales, since his election, "appears to have moderated his earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease coca eradication," although "his administration continues to send mixed signals regarding its intentions."¹⁸ One year later, Negroponte saw democracy "most at risk in Venezuela and Bolivia." He noted, "In both countries, the elected presidents, Chavez and Morales, are taking advantage of their popularity to undercut the opposition and eliminate checks on their authority."¹⁹

President Bush also expressed concern in September 2006 "with the decline in Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation since October 2005."²⁰ A year later, he acknowledged Bolivian interdiction and certain eradication efforts, but urged the government to resume comprehensive coca crop eradication.²¹ In return, the Bolivian government periodically rejected U.S. "impositions" and accused the Bush administration of using U.S. assistance to support the opposition and destabilize Bolivia.²²

In 2008, the situation changed dramatically from rhetorical tensions to "diplomatic breakdown."²³ That June, the *cocalero* movement and local mayors from Bolivia's largest coca-growing region, Chapare, declared they would not sign any further agreements with USAID and de facto expelled USAID from the region—a decision endorsed by the Bolivian government.²⁴

In September, amid a severe domestic political crisis provoked by the autonomy movements' protests in the eastern lowlands, Morales declared U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg "persona non grata," accusing him of supporting opposition forces. The U.S. government retaliated by expelling Bolivia's ambassador to Washington.

A few days later, Bush declared that Bolivia had "failed demonstrably" to adhere to her "obligations under international counternarcotics agreements"; Bush thus declared Bolivia's "decertification," but avoided the automatic withdrawal of U.S. assistance by deciding that "continued support for bilateral programs in Bolivia are vital to the national interests of the United States."²⁵ Bush, however, proposed suspending Bolivia's participation in the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA). The suspension became effective in December 2008—shortly after the Bolivian government expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from the country.

In addition, Bolivia lost access to funding from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a U.S. foreign aid agency that awards grants to reduce poverty in low-income countries committed to good governance. In 2004, Bolivia had been selected as eligible for the MCA, which included meeting conditions concerning “ruling justly,” “investing in people,” and “encouraging economic freedom.” In September 2007, the Morales government submitted a new proposal to the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), superseding its first proposal in December 2005.

But in December 2008, the MCC Board of Directors decided not to select Bolivia again as eligible for compact assistance. Bolivia’s scores on some of the indicators that MCC uses declined around that time, but a comparison with other MCC beneficiaries and interviews with relevant U.S. officials point to the conclusion that the gradual decline in Bolivia’s governance performance alone would not have triggered this suspension.²⁶ The main reason was the general crisis in the U.S.-Bolivian relationship and, in particular, clashes over drug policy and La Paz’s accusations that Washington meddled in its affairs.

When Barack Obama became president, he was initially inclined to try to rebuild bilateral relations with Bolivia as part of his effort to increase America’s overall diplomatic engagement. His administration launched a bilateral dialogue with the Bolivian government, with the first meetings held in May and October 2009. In addition, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met twice that year with her Bolivian counterpart, David Choquehuanca.

But Obama refrained from reinstating Bolivia’s trade preferences and, in September 2009, again “decertified” Bolivia. Bolivian authorities responded by continuing to accuse the United States of supporting opposition groups.²⁷ The negotiations that sought to form a new framework for bilateral cooperation thus made little progress in 2009.

Negotiations between the United States and Bolivia continued in 2010, without much success. Shifting signals made it difficult to forecast the future course of the dialogue. Both governments wanted to avoid an open rupture of bilateral relations but neither was willing to make significant concessions first.

The Obama administration again renewed Bolivia’s “decertification” in 2010. And the appointment of Mark Feierstein to head USAID’s programs in Latin America created controversy in Bolivia given his prior work as a paid consultant to Bolivia’s Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada during his 2002 presidential campaign against Morales.

U.S. Assistance: Conflict and Change

In general terms, declining U.S. foreign aid parallels the deterioration in overall bilateral relations. However, the reduction in assistance well preceded the series of expulsions in 2008. It started during Mesa’s interim government 2004–2005 and continued throughout Morales’ first term, 2006–2009. Total

U.S. foreign assistance per year declined from more than \$150 million per year 2002–2004 to less than \$100 million per year in 2008 and 2009 (figure 1).

U.S. assistance, however, remained significant and the United States, in 2009, was still the most important source of bilateral development assistance to Bolivia. The request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 even aimed at increasing aid flows—signaling an interest to remain engaged, if at a lower level than in the early 2000s.²⁸ In the end, however, U.S. aid flows to Bolivia in 2010 further decreased, and the request for FY 2011 is projected to continue this trend: from \$72.5 million in 2010 to \$66.8 million in 2011. This recent decline is due mainly to the phase-out of USAID democracy assistance activities in 2009—an action the United States took to accede to Bolivia’s demands (see below).

A closer look at the evolution of U.S. foreign assistance between 2006 and 2009—and the corresponding Congressional Budget Justifications—reveals that U.S. engagement in Bolivia rested on two different justifications. First, the U.S. government justified its continued aid to Bolivia as a response to ongoing Bolivian needs, especially regarding narcotics control, poverty reduction, and democracy promotion.²⁹ Second, the assistance was not only intended to help Bolivia, but also to serve U.S. political interests. Directly following Bolivia’s election “of a government that campaigned on promises that included decriminalizing coca and nationalizing private property,” Washington expressed the need to demonstrate “flexibility to protect our core interests.” Flexibility here meant trying “to engage with the new government (as circumstances allow),” but also with “the military and, particularly, the regional governments.”³⁰

Indeed, a new USAID program, Strengthening of Democratic Institutions (*Fortalecimiento de Instituciones Democráticas*—FIDEM), prioritized the *prefecturas*, that is, the regional governments. This change was a direct reaction to the first-time election of regional governors (*prefectos*) in December 2005. But while Morales and his MAS party won majorities at the national level in these elections, opposition candidates won six of nine *prefecturas*. As a result, when FIDEM was launched in October 2006, USAID was directly supporting Morales’s most important opponents—even as it also assisted departmental prefects from the MAS.

An additional instrument in the U.S. response to changing political conditions was assistance from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). OTI’s official mission is to seize “critical windows of opportunities” by providing “fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs.”³¹ In Bolivia, OTI responded to the political crisis surrounding Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation by launching a program in March 2004 “to help reduce tensions in areas prone to social conflict and to assist the country in preparing for key electoral events.”³² Given the importance of social protest in the city of El Alto during the so-called *guerra del gas* that ended Sánchez de Lozada’s presidency, OTI initially focused on “community based activities aimed at reducing conflict in El Alto and the *altiplano*.”³³


After the December 2005 elections, “OTI retargeted its program” toward “building the capacity of prefect-led departmental governments.” Between March 2006 and June 2007, OTI approved 116 grants for \$4,451,249, which included “technical support and training for prefecture staff” to “help departmental governments operate more strategically.”³⁴

Reflecting this new focus, U.S. aid for FY 2008 did not even mention the Bolivian government as a partner. Continued U.S. cooperation with the national government notwithstanding,³⁵ the stated general goal of assistance was now “closer ties between the United States, the Bolivian people, and the international community.” It specified that “partnerships will be developed with regional and local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO), the private sector, and other non-executive branch entities to prevent further erosion of democracy, combat cocaine production and trafficking, improve healthcare, and increase educational opportunities.”³⁶

Funding for democracy and governance assistance was to “be used to strengthen the Congress as well as state and local governments, encourage moderate national leaders, support legislation that complies with international standards to combat corruption and money laundering, and expand public diplomacy to emphasize the positive correlation between democracy and development.” But assistance was also provided “to support an active, credible civil society [...] and to strengthen political parties.”³⁷ Adding to this, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) more than doubled

Figure 1


Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to Bolivia




R= Request E= Estimate

Note: Data taken from U.S. Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJ 2002: 408, 2003: 398, 2004: 450, 2005: 470, 2006: 502, 2007: 538, CBJ 2008: 603, 2009: 659-600, 2010: 573-4, 2011: 658)

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Bolivia, By Program Area



Governing Justly & Democratically Breakdown



Note: Data taken from U.S. Department of State's Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJ) 2008: 605-6, 2009: 659-60, 2010: 573-4, 2011: 659

its grants for activities in Bolivia from around \$560,000 in 2007 to over \$1.3 million per year since 2009, reinforcing the U.S. shift toward civil society support, among other things (table 1).

The emphasis on regional governments—which were the bastion of the opposition—and “civil society” aligned perfectly with a strategy explicitly outlined by USAID: to focus assistance on “the support of counterweights to one-party control such as judicial and media independence, a strong civil society, and educated local and state level leaders.”³⁸ However, given a highly sensitive Bolivian government—which, on several occasions, denounced U.S. support for the opposition—this decidedly political mission was framed and implemented “in an apolitical, balanced manner.”³⁹ As a result, support for regional and local authorities included assistance for governments led by representatives from both the opposition and the ruling party;⁴⁰ and U.S.-funded programs that support political parties have been limited since late FY 2007 to “multi-party training events so as to ensure a clear public perception of apolitical ‘balance,’” putting on hold “[o]ne-on-one political party trainings and consultations, which were a key part of a political party strengthening program.”⁴¹

This latter move especially concerned the local offices of the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Until September 2007, IRI trained candidates for the Constituent Assembly and NDI organized debates between candidates across the political spectrum. From October 2007 to July 2008, IRI and NDI supported political parties (including the governing MAS party), citizen groups, and indigenous peoples via multi-party activities like events and workshops. Already before USAID decided to limit party support to multiparty activities, the U.S. party institutes had included MAS in their work. According to NDI, representatives of MAS participated in NDI’s training activities starting in 2004.⁴² Interestingly, however, when the U.S. government originally contemplated funding political party work in the earlier years of the decade, at least some on the U.S. government side

Table 1. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Grants to Bolivia

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
NED Grants to Bolivia	0	0	0	72,245	128,825	270,307	672,601	564,284	834,892	1,363,824
<i>thereof:</i>										
International Republican Institute				0	0	0	0	200,000	300,000	650,000
National Democratic Institute				72,245	0	197,445	200,000	50,000	0	0
Center for International Private Enterprise				0	128,825	0	265,870	0	0	169,920

Note: Data (\$) taken from NED Annual Reports 2000–2009 (NED various).

Source: Jonas Wolff, “Self-Determination and Empowerment as Challenges to Democracy Promotion: US and German Reactions to Bolivia’s ‘Democratic Revolution,’” PRIF Working Paper, September 2010.

intended the “planned USAID Political Party Reform Project” to “dovetail” with the (then-governing party) MNR and to “help build moderate, pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counter-weight to the radical MAS.”⁴³

In this context, the Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2009 declared Bolivia a “priority Freedom Agenda country” in the region. The U.S. Department of State requested “a substantial increase in rule of law, good governance, electoral processes and consensus-building, civil society and education,” while reducing the U.S. commitment “in health and economic growth programs.”⁴⁴

As a result, U.S. activities in the area of “Governing Justly and Democratically” not only continued but increased significantly. Requests for FY 2008, 2009, and 2010 all aimed to invest between 20 and 30 percent of U.S. foreign assistance in this sector, and actual flows reflected a continuous relative increase from around 10 percent in 2006 and 2007 to 13.2 percent in 2008 and 17.5 percent in 2009.⁴⁵ In addition, the number and total amount of NED grants to Bolivia increased, reinforcing the rising weight—and increasing civil-society orientation—of democracy aid in U.S. assistance overall.⁴⁶

The Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2010 confirmed the trend of an increasing emphasis on democracy and governance programs, but signaled important adaptations to official Bolivian preferences. First, the justification reintroduced references to “Bolivian government counterparts.”⁴⁷ Second, USAID requested a significant increase in funding to support Integrated Justice Centers,⁴⁸ a program implemented in direct cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. Third and most notably, a “new municipal strengthening activity” was announced. This “priority program” would “expand efforts to improve municipal performance” and support “approximately 100 out of the 327 municipalities” in Bolivia.⁴⁹

This announcement reflected a crucial adjustment in the U.S. democracy assistance portfolio. Since 1996, USAID had supported local governments in Bolivia. From 2006 onward, however, the new program FIDEM prioritized the departmental level over the municipal level. U.S. support for the departments met with fierce criticism from the Bolivian government—culminating in the expulsion of the U.S. ambassador. With the phase-out of FIDEM in 2009, the United States ended support for departmental governments and focused again on the municipal level—in line with the demands of the Bolivian government.

This decision predated Obama’s election as president so it cannot be explained by his new foreign policy approach. The desire to adjust U.S. democracy promotion activities to better fit official Bolivian preferences indicates a decision to adapt to a government that would likely remain in power for a while and signaled an interest in remaining engaged.⁵⁰ This pragmatic U.S. approach can probably be attributed to a “desire to continue to engage Bolivia on the drug front as well as to minimize Chávez’s regional influence.”⁵¹

The desire to adjust U.S. democracy promotion activities to better fit official Bolivian preferences indicates a decision to adapt to a government that would likely remain in power for a while and signaled an interest in remaining engaged.

However, the bilateral negotiations between the Obama administration and the Bolivian government, so far, have failed to establish a new framework for U.S. assistance to Bolivia. USAID democracy programs were all scheduled to end in 2008 and 2009, and new activities—like the Local Government Program—depend on a new bilateral agreement. In August 2009, the Bolivian government instructed USAID to close its democracy promotion activities (and reorient the aid to support other areas of development assistance). But it also signaled a willingness to accept the projected expansion of U.S. support for municipal governments.⁵² Accordingly, in 2009, USAID closed its democracy and governance programs, “with the exception of some municipal strengthening activities.”⁵³

NDI also closed its Bolivia program in 2009—after the Bolivian authorities rejected NDI’s application for registration. IRI—like NDI—lost USAID funding when USAID ceased its democracy and governance programs in 2009, but IRI continues to support good governance in four municipalities through a NED grant. In fact, NED funding is the only type of official U.S. democracy assistance that remains unaffected by the continuing crisis in bilateral relations.

For critics of U.S. democracy promotion, the story about U.S. assistance to Bolivia—and U.S.-Bolivian relations in general—is straightforward. Reacting to the political rise and success of Morales and the MAS, the U.S. government strategically began to support counterweights in civil society and at the subnational level to weaken—if not undermine or overthrow—a government decidedly acting against U.S. interests. Critics of Morales counter that Washington tried hard to remain engaged, cooperated with Bolivia, and supported democracy in an inclusive and pluralist way—but could not succeed given a Bolivian government that characterized the United States as an enemy for reasons of domestic politics.

The truth lies somewhere in the middle. The evolution of U.S. democracy assistance from 2005 to 2009 was ambivalent. U.S. aid during that time appears to have reflected an aim to support counterweights to the central government, Morales, and the MAS. Washington did not see Morales’s election as a crucial opportunity to deepen Bolivian democracy. Following his election, USAID basically continued what had been planned or begun before and did not react with any short-term measures to support a democratic and peaceful transformation of Bolivia’s democracy. Given the level of political polarization in Bolivia, prioritizing conflict prevention would have been much more promising than supporting counterweights.⁵⁴

However, U.S. assistance did not become overtly confrontational and was not limited to the opposition. Although the U.S. embassy and USAID mission in Bolivia made no obvious efforts to convince the opposition to adopt a more constructive stance, there is no strong evidence that the United States worked strategically to undermine the Morales government. Since early 2008, USAID has increasingly signaled its willingness to adjust democracy assistance to accommodate the demands and needs articulated by the Bolivian government.

This ambivalence in the U.S. reaction to Morales's election cannot be traced primarily to concerns about Bolivia's turning away from the conventional liberal model of democracy. Washington never questioned the general democratic legitimation of Morales, his government, and the new constitution. And although the United States did not directly support the political transformation project through democracy assistance, it did so indirectly by continuing general bilateral cooperation.

In addition, USAID was generally willing to support some of Bolivia's democracy efforts, such as the harmonization of the indigenous community justice system with the formal justice system.⁵⁵ To be sure, U.S. concerns focused on perceived losses in institutional checks and balances, the rule of law, and private property rights vis-à-vis a strengthened role of plebiscitary mechanisms, social movements, and indigenous law, as well as social, economic, and cultural human rights. U.S. officials also publicly worried about the state of Bolivian democracy and the democratic credentials of Morales and the MAS. They justified the decision to suspend Bolivia from the MCA by its deviance from certain World Bank governance standards. But Washington's negative reactions to Morales were triggered much more by disagreements on specific policy issues that directly affected U.S. interests, particularly Bolivia's changed policies on coca eradication.

From Bolivia's perspective, however, these specific policy concerns were directly related to the question of democracy, given that Morales was emphasizing the achievement of greater Bolivian sovereignty of the people vis-à-vis both internal elites and external powers. Bolivia's continued "decertification" by the U.S. government since 2008 is seen as showing disrespect for Bolivia's democratic self-determination.

Given the history of U.S.-Bolivian relations and the specific experience of Morales and the MAS with U.S. policies, an unambiguous U.S. attitude of respect for sovereign democratic decisions would have been crucial for U.S. democracy assistance to play a credible and constructive role in the ongoing transformation of Bolivian democracy. Under the given circumstances, however, the United States—and U.S. political aid—almost inevitably became part of and party to Bolivia's internal conflicts.

The German Experience

Diplomatic Relations: Getting Along

Bilateral relations between Germany and Bolivia—which center on development cooperation—have been far less affected by Morales's election than U.S.-Bolivian relations. In fact, official German reactions to Morales's victory were decidedly positive.

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In February 2006, then-Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul promised continued support for Bolivia.⁵⁶ Two months later, she traveled to La Paz to “signal that the Federal Republic [of Germany] is a reliable partner for Bolivia and that we support the new government’s efforts especially regarding poverty reduction, nature conservation and the strengthening of the rights of the indigenous population.”⁵⁷

The German Foreign Office was apparently not as enthusiastic as the Development Ministry, but did not take a public position. Still, the German Embassy in La Paz was rather sympathetic to the new Bolivian government,⁵⁸ and, officially, Germany’s position combined hope for political change with an offer to support it.⁵⁹

Compared to the United States, the German government saw much more opportunity than danger in Morales’s election, especially the chance to politically include the indigenous majority of the population and to work more seriously on poverty reduction.⁶⁰ On the issue of drug policy, Germany had traditionally been skeptical of coerced coca eradication, favoring a much more cooperative stance. As a result, the German government was much less alarmed by the changes in this domain announced by the new Bolivian government.

Morales’s decision to nationalize Bolivian gas prompted German concern, however. In fact, it was this topic only that provoked a public statement on Bolivia by the German Foreign Office: In an interview, then-German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed his “great skepticism” about the decision “to nationalize the Bolivian oil and gas industry.”⁶¹ Wieczorek-Zeul

responded directly by stating that every country should “have the sovereignty to decide how to organize its sector of natural resources.” She argued that it would be “wrong and counterproductive” to threaten a suspension of development cooperation in “business disputes about the status of energy companies.”⁶²

Regarding the one German company affected by the nationalization (Oiltanking), the German Embassy continuously engaged the Bolivian government to reach a negotiated solution, and Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed the topic at length with Morales at the EU-Latin

America/Caribbean Summit in Lima in May 2008. The German government also suspended a climate change and energy project as a direct sanction, but in general this dispute had no larger implications for bilateral relations. Upon leaving his post in June 2009, the German ambassador to La Paz, Erich Riedler, emphasized that diplomatic relations between the two countries were never seriously affected and remained “open and cordial on all levels”⁶³ since his arrival in 2005.

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German Assistance: Continuity and Adaptation

When the German government expressed its willingness to maintain cooperative bilateral relations with the Morales government, this meant that Germany wanted to continue development assistance along established lines. As a result, there has been much more continuity regarding German development assistance to Bolivia than has been the case with U.S. aid to the country.

With Morales barely six months in office, the two governments agreed to proceed with German development cooperation in the three established priority areas, including democracy assistance (“modernization of state and democracy”).⁶⁴ This continuity, however, was combined with some flexibility on the German side in responding to the priorities set by the new Bolivian government. For example, in the area of democracy assistance, Berlin promised support to the Constituent Assembly.⁶⁵

In a new country strategy adopted in June 2007, Germany’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development stated that the Bolivian government’s “new orientation of economic and societal policies” and, in particular, its aim to include the marginalized indigenous majority of the population offered “new chances for development cooperation.”⁶⁶ Although the document mentioned risks of “radicalizing political polarization” and raised “doubts” regarding the consistent commitment to “democratic rules” within the “very heterogeneous MAS movement,” the core problems highlighted were structural “deficits” that included socioeconomic inequality, poverty, weak institutional and administrative capacities, corruption, and a “deficient culture of conflict resolution.” All of these were problems the Morales government had inherited and, thus, needed support to address.⁶⁷

German Official Development Assistance (ODA) did not decline, either overall or in the absolute size and relative weight of democracy promotion activities (figure 2). In fact, in intergovernmental negotiations since 2006, Germany even committed to increasing development assistance to Bolivia (table 2). In 2007, the German government promised €52 million for 2007 and 2008, and two years later it committed to €62 million for 2009 and 2010.⁶⁸ In general, aid in the OECD category of “Government & Civil Society” accounted for between one-fifth and one-third of German ODA to Bolivia.


Between 2006 and 2008, around 75 percent of “Government & Civil Society” aid was channeled through the public sector, confirming Germany’s focus on strengthening governance capacities in Bolivia.⁶⁹ In 2008, new German ODA commitments to Bolivia went largely (60.7 percent) to the sub-sector “Government Administration,” with “Legal and Judicial Development” and “Strengthening Civil Society” accounting for 16.7 percent of aid each.⁷⁰

On the issue of drug policy, Germany had traditionally been skeptical of coerced coca eradication, favoring a much more cooperative stance.


Figure 2

German ODA to Bolivia


Total Commitments









Total Disbursements



Government & Civil Society Disbursements by Channel



Government & Civil Society Disbursements by Purpose Code



Note: Data (ODA commitments & disbursements) in constant 2007 USD millions (OECD 2010).

The most important German aid program in this area is “Decentralized Governance and Poverty Reduction Support” (*Programa de Apoyo a la Gestión Pública Descentralizada y Lucha contra la Pobreza*—PADEP). The program is executed by the GTZ, an organization implementing the bulk of official German technical cooperation.⁷¹ PADEP began in 2002 with a thematic focus on poverty reduction, decentralization and municipal development, and a regional focus on two particularly poor regions (Norte de Potosí and Chaco). The program is subdivided into between four and six components that change frequently. PADEP’s first phase ended in 2005 and the second phase (2006–2009) coincided with the change in the Bolivian government. A third and final phase (2010–2011) began last year.

Table 2. German Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Bolivia (millions)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Commitments	64.2	53.9	27.2	27.6	78.2	75.0	49.3	68.3	82.0	53.0	22.3	48.8	65.6	60.6
Disbursements	72.5	68.5	62.3	71.9	70.9	72.3	84.1	53.3	46.7	78.6	57.4	52.3	39.8	48.7

Note: ODA commitments and disbursements in constant 2007 USD millions, excl. debt-related action (OECD 2010).

Source: Jonas Wolff, “Self-Determination and Empowerment as Challenges to Democracy Promotion: US and German Reactions to Bolivia’s ‘Democratic Revolution,’” PRIF Working Paper, September 2010.

The adjustments to the program clearly reflect an adaptation to new Bolivian priorities and to the new political setting in general: Cooperation on the national level has grown in relevance (relative to subnational entities), with much more work on structural political reforms than first anticipated. Most notably, a new component was added to support the Constituent Assembly, the most important political initiative Morales promoted after taking office.⁷² This cooperation included support for the presidential entity (REPAC), established in March 2006 to prepare the assembly, as well as direct assistance to the assembly itself, including its directorate, technical unit, and commissions.⁷³

As the assembly ended, the relevant program component shifted its focus to support the constitutional transition process, the implementation of the new constitution, and the new parliament, the *Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional*. Regarding PADEP’s decentralization component, the GTZ worked closely with the Bolivian Ministry of Autonomies to support the new process of decentralization.

In addition, at the request of the Bolivian government, support to the national planning system was upgraded to an independent (sixth) component of PADEP.⁷⁴ That the Development Ministry, on its website, stated in 2009 that Germany “initiated” PADEP to promote implementation of Morales’s National Development Plan—when PADEP actually dates from 2002—nicely symbolizes the program’s alignment to the priorities of the new government.

Most of the general topics PADEP is addressing are not entirely new to the program (and correspond to what GTZ is doing in other countries). But the fact that PADEP explicitly supported the Morales government in dismantling (and then replacing) a series of important institutions and laws that GTZ, before 2005, had helped create is remarkable. The ongoing Bolivian process of establishing “autonomous” governments at various subnational levels is surely different from the 1990s model of decentralization. Similarly, Germany’s support to national planning capacities and technical assistance to public enterprises signal a departure from more conventional market-oriented policies in the past.

Another dimension of adjustment in German development cooperation is a stronger emphasis on crisis prevention and conflict resolution.⁷⁵ Within PADEP, one component now centers on “Constructive Conflict Resolution and Culture of Peace.” This component appears to reflect both an adjustment to the changed political situation of Bolivia under Morales as well as a broader evolution of German development cooperation.

Since 2007, German aid has applied instruments like “Peace and Conflict Assessments” and “Do No Harm.” Berlin also planned to introduce a common procedure for all German development programs and projects to identify and avoid conflict-aggravating effects. The sensitivity in democracy promotion activities to potential political and conflict-enhancing ramifications of supposedly “technical” cooperation seems to have grown.⁷⁶ Consequently, PADEP’s work with political institutions—central and subnational governments, parliament, the Constituent Assembly—shifted, at least partially, from technical advice to efforts to promote dialogue and cooperation.

One important example concerns the unofficial role that German development cooperation played in facilitating negotiations between the central government and regional opposition, which, in the end, led to a congressional agreement on constitutional reform.⁷⁷ In addition, in 2009, GTZ started a new program, “Strengthening Concertation and the Rule of Law” (CONCED), which is funded by the German foreign ministry and aims to support a consensus-oriented implementation of the new constitution. A further project, “Supporting the Development of an Intercultural Legal System in Accordance With the Rule of Law” (PROJURIDE), funded by the development ministry, assists Bolivia’s Ministry of Justice in establishing a new legal order where indigenous jurisdiction is to be given the same status as formal law as envisioned by the new constitution.

German democracy promotion as implemented by GTZ is, in large part, aimed at the Bolivian government at different state levels. In giving aid to the Constituent Assembly, the GTZ had a multiparty orientation to maintain “an image of neutrality.”⁷⁸ Germany’s political foundations, in contrast, traditionally take explicit political stances. The social democratic Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), for example, developed a relationship with the governing MAS party. Such an approach was not easy given the foundation’s previous

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engagement with former governments and other Bolivian parties. It represented a clear departure from Germany's prior position, apparently taken by the foreign ministry, not to cooperate with those opposition forces represented by Morales and the MAS. But it directly followed the German government's decision to engage the Morales government. FES's approach, however, did not

imply explicit political support for the MAS.⁷⁹ In its work with representatives of the government and the MAS, FES—just like the GTZ—aimed mainly to engage and strengthen those persons and groups seen as more moderate, accessible, and democratic.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS)—which is close to the German Christian Social Union—has openly supported the main opposition party PODEMOS (through the Bolivian political foundation FUNDEMOS). Meanwhile, the Christian democratic Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) in Bolivia, although critical to Morales in public statements, has adopted a relatively neutral stance in terms of its actual programs.⁸⁰

From these different angles, all three German political foundations present in Bolivia⁸¹ contributed to the debates surrounding the Constituent Assembly. FES, in fact, played an important role in preparing the groundwork for the congressional agreement on the draft constitution in October 2008.⁸²

This overall picture confirms the official statement that Germany supports the process of change initiated by Morales “in order to deepen democracy and strengthen the fight against poverty.”⁸³ Still, Germany has not shied away from mentioning problems that, from the German perspective, characterize the state of democracy and the rule of law in Bolivia, although it almost always does so privately.

Under certain circumstances, specific German assistance programs have been suspended—such as when irregularities and conflicts surrounding the Constituent Assembly peaked in December 2006 and again during its last months in 2007—as part of common European decisions. Reacting to the contentious adoption of the constitutional text by the MAS majority in the assembly, Germany stepped back from its original plan to support the public dissemination of the draft constitution.

Similarly, when in 2008 the oppositional departments adopted their “autonomy statutes” in referenda lacking any legal basis, GTZ/PADEP temporarily abstained from new cooperation initiatives with the prefectures, made their cooperation dependent on agreements with the central government, and limited support to areas that would not contribute to the process of regional autonomy. In general, interviews conducted with German organizations in Bolivia confirm that these German reactions were rooted in a conflict-related aim to “do no harm.” Considerations of empirical legitimacy or factual approval—

not formal legality and democratic correctness—led Germany to suspend or restart its cooperation.

In contrast to the United States, Germany directly supported the political changes initiated by the Morales government. German development agencies assisted the Constituent Assembly and have been engaged in implementing the new Magna Carta. This, however, does not mean that they had (and have) no major concerns about the state of and prospect for democracy in Bolivia.

German officials—if mostly in private—worry as much as their U.S. counterparts about what they see as excessive participation through street mobilization, weak respect for due process and the separation of powers, and an over-reliance on plebiscitary means. In this sense, German democracy assistance aims not simply to support Bolivia’s process of political change, but to moderate it by strengthening less radical forces within the MAS and the government, and by influencing the shape of the new institutions and laws.

In general, political polarization and the corresponding need for conflict prevention—as well as the Bolivian government’s uncertain administrative and technical capacity to implement policies—are at the center of German concerns, not democracy. The former points to the organizational self-interest of development agencies like the GTZ, which in the German development cooperation architecture have much more relative autonomy than in the case of U.S. aid. The remarkable flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances and priorities fits the preferences of the GTZ and PADEP to remain present and continue receiving funds.

But such flexibility depended on a German government willing to set a corresponding framework of continuing cooperation. The German embassy’s and even the chancellor’s intense efforts to protect the sole German company affected by “nationalization”—including the decision to suspend a minor development project—suggests they would have reacted much more harshly had Morales threatened wider German economic interests.

Conclusion

The U.S. and German reactions to political changes in Bolivia under Morales show democracy promoters in both countries applying some flexibility to their particular understandings of democracy. To be sure, both countries worried about the transformation of democracy in Bolivia; their concerns, very clearly, were based on the liberal model of democracy that U.S. and German democracy promoters consider universally applicable.

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Even Germany—which largely adjusted its democracy assistance to suit the priorities of the Morales government—has struggled to do two things at the same time: support the Bolivian approach to transforming democracy while at the same time tempering the ongoing changes to ensure they do not diverge too much from the liberal principles and standards Germany regards as a non-negotiable part of its “value-oriented development cooperation.”

The main consequence of German adjustment to Bolivia’s democratic change, however, is the shift toward supporting processes of inclusive dialogue and constructive conflict resolution. Viewed most favorably, this means German democracy support shifted from focusing on a specific political *end point*—a given model of democracy—to a peaceful and inclusive political *process* of constructing a model appropriate for Bolivia.

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The United States, very clearly, did not manage to play a constructive role in this process. But the crisis in bilateral relations that included the closure of USAID’s democracy program was due largely to specific disagreements on important policy issues exacerbated by a general mistrust between the two governments.

Washington did not, in principle, call into question the democratic legitimacy of Morales, the MAS, and the process of constitutional change. Any attempt by the Bush administration to support counterweights to the Morales government was most probably driven by U.S. concerns that Morales rejected coerced coca eradication, pursued socialist economic policies, criticized the U.S. government, and built international alliances with governments the United States saw as enemies.

Even when a critical stance toward the Morales government was justified on democracy and governance grounds—as in the MCA case—the basic motive driving the decision was arguably political retaliation for the government’s wider actions. Yet Bolivia sees Washington’s limited flexibility on its perceived national interests as directly related to the question of democracy: By emphasizing the need for coerced coca eradication, insisting on the status of the coca leaf being an illegal drug, and “decertifying” the country, the United States denied Bolivia’s right to self-determination in areas that many Bolivians consider part of their cultural heritage.

As long as the U.S. government rejects Bolivia’s right to determine its own counternarcotics strategy—just as Bolivia historically accepted largely ineffective U.S. efforts to fight drug trade and consumption at home—U.S. democracy assistance will be associated with a foreign-policy stance many Bolivians regard as fundamentally undemocratic. This will thwart even serious U.S. efforts to be flexible in supporting different models of democracy in the future.

Notes

This paper presents results of the research project “Determinants of democratic states’ handling of conflicting objectives in democracy promotion” conducted by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and the Goethe University Frankfurt, and supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). It draws on interviews and background talks in Bolivia, Washington, D.C., and Germany conducted in 2009 and 2010. Previous versions were presented at the 51st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), New Orleans, LA, February 17–20, 2010, and the 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR), Stockholm, Sweden, September 9–11, 2010.

- 1 See René Antonio Mayorga, “Bolivia’s Silent Revolution,” *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 1 (1997): 142–56.
- 2 See Clayton Mendonça Cunha and Rodrigo Santaella Gonçalves, “The National Development Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’s Bolivia: Accomplishments and Limitations,” *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 4 (2010): 177–96.
- 3 See Clare Ribando Seelke, “Bolivia: Political and Economic Developments and Relations with the United States,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, D.C., 2008. On the recent history of U.S.-Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation, see Eduardo A. Gamarra, “The United States and Bolivia: Fighting the Drug War,” in *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda*, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller Center for American Studies, 1999), 177–206; Kathryn Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences,” in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 143–84.
- 4 See Linda Farthing and Benjamin Kohl, “Social Control: Bolivia’s New Approach to Coca Reduction,” *Latin American Perspectives* 37, no. 4 (2010): 197–213.
- 5 By the time of the 2005 elections, the traditional political parties that had dominated Bolivia’s political system since the transition to democracy in the first part of the 1980s had all but disappeared.
- 6 Bolivia is divided into nine departments (*departamentos*)—subnational state entities governed by elected *prefectos* or *gobernadores*.

- 7 See *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present*, ed. John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008); Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Bolivia on the Brink,” Washington, D.C., Council on Foreign Relations Special Report no. 24, 2007.
- 8 See Carlos Romero, Carlos Böhrst and Raúl Peñaranda, *Del conflicto al diálogo. Memorias del acuerdo constitucional* (La Paz: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 2009).
- 9 See Franz Xavier Barrios Suvelza, “The Weakness of Excess: The Bolivian State in an Unbounded Democracy,” in *Unresolved Tensions*, ed. Crabtree and Whitehead, 125–44.
- 10 See Carlos Böhrst Irahola, “Cuarenta días que conmovieron a Bolivia y un pacto político forzado,” in *Del conflicto al diálogo*, ed. Romero et al., 49–105.
- 11 See Raúl Peñaranda, “Crónica del proceso constituyente,” in *Del conflicto al diálogo*, ed. Romero et al., 107–201.
- 12 See Gamarra, “The United States and Bolivia”; Ledebur, “Bolivia: Clear Consequences.”
- 13 See Gamarra, “Bolivia on the Brink,” 31.
- 14 White House, “Press Briefing by Scott McClellan,” Washington, D.C., December 20, 2005, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73534#axzz1G73Mf6u0> (accessed November 17, 2009).
- 15 Susanne Gratius and Thomas Legler, “Latin America Is Different: Transatlantic Discord on How to Promote Democracy in ‘Problematic’ Countries,” in *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies*, ed. Amichai Magen, Thomas Risse, and Michael A. McFaul (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 185–215, 207.
- 16 However, below official rhetoric and general bilateral relations, the U.S. reacted not only in cooperative ways: “After Evo Morales took office in early 2006, U.S. alternative development efforts in conjunction with Chapare municipal governments were put on hold for most of 2006 and the first half of 2007. Subsequently, USAID has returned to its policy of conditioning its assistance on prior coca crop reductions.” Kathryn Ledebur and Coletta A. Youngers, “Balancing Act: Bolivia’s Drug Control Advances and Challenges,” Cochabamba/Washington, D.C., Washington Office on Latin America, 2008, available at <http://www.wola.org> (accessed January 9, 2009), 5.
- 17 Statement of the Honorable Adolfo Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development, in “Democracy in Latin America: Successes, Challenges and the Future,” Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 2006, 14–21, 19.
- 18 John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Washington, D.C., 2006, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20060202_testimony.pdf (accessed November 16, 2009), 17.
- 19 John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence,” Washington, D.C., 2007, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20070111_testimony.pdf (accessed November 16, 2009), 9.
- 20 White House, “Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2007. Memorandum for the Secretary of State. Presidential Determination no. 2006–24,” Washington, D.C., 2006, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20060918-3.pdf> (accessed November 17, 2009).

- 21 See White House, “Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2008. Memorandum for the Secretary of State,” Washington, D.C., 2007, <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2007/September/20070917145915eaifas0.539303.html> (accessed November 17, 2009). On the one hand, Bush stated that the Bolivian government “has closely cooperated on interdiction, and operations and seizures have reached record levels”; Bolivia was even seen as “on track to reach 5,600 hectares of eradication this year, surpassing its goal of 5,000 hectares.” On the other, “these measures have been outstripped by replanting and expansion of cultivation in Bolivia” because Bolivia’s strategy of “zero cocaine, but not zero coca” has “focused primarily on interdiction, to the exclusion of its other essential complements, especially coca crop eradication.”
- 22 See La-Razon.com (September 13, 2006, August 31, 2007); Presidencia de Bolivia, “Gobierno denuncia que la cooperación de EEUU no es transparente y es utilizada contra la gestión de Morales” (Press Release, August 29, 2007).
- 23 George Gray Molina, “The United States and Bolivia: Test Case for Change,” in *The Obama Administration and the Americas: Agenda for Change*, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone and Laurence Whitehead (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 167–82, 171–76.
- 24 See La-Razon.com, June 27, 2008; LosTiempos.com, June 26, 2008.
- 25 White House, “President Bush Signs H.R. 7222, the Andean Trade Preference Act Extension,” Washington, DC, 2008, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081016-4.html> (accessed November 17, 2009).
- 26 Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Scorecard for Bolivia: FY09,” Washington, D.C., 2009, <http://www.mcc.gov/documents/scorecards/score-fy09-english-bolivia.pdf> (accessed December 14, 2009).
- 27 See Kathryn Ledebur and John Walsh, “Obama’s Bolivia ATPDEA Decision: Blast from the Past or Wave of the Future?” Cochabamba/Washington, D.C., Washington Office on Latin America, 2009, <http://www.wola.org> (accessed December 21, 2009); “Evo afirma que USAID financia la campaña de Manfred y ‘Leo,’” [Evo affirms that USAID is financing the campaign of Manfred and ‘Leo’] LaPrensa.com.bo, September 7, 2009, “MAS vincula a USAID con actos de racismo en Sucre” [MAS links USAID with acts of racism in Sucre] LaPrensa.com.bo, September 25, 2009, “Canciller dice que Obama es peor que Bush y ahonda tension,” [Chancellor says that Obama is worse than Bush and deepens tensions] LaPrensa.com.bo, July 8, 2009.
- 28 This and the following data are taken from U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations (various fiscal years), Washington, D.C. (in the following, the CBJ for FY 2009 is quoted as CBJ 2009). For a comprehensive collection of data on U.S. foreign assistance to Bolivia, see Jonas Wolff, “Self-Determination and Empowerment as Challenges to Democracy Promotion: U.S. and German Reactions to Bolivia’s ‘Democratic Revolution,’” PRIF Working Paper no. 5, http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/PRIF-WorkingPapier_no5-2010_Wolff.pdf, 23–25.
- 29 See CBJ 2010, 573; CBJ 2009, 659; CBJ 2008, 603; CBJ 2007, 538.
- 30 CBJ 2007, 538.
- 31 See OTI’s mission statement at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives (accessed December 22, 2009).
- 32 USAID, USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report Apr-June 2007, <http://www.usaid.gov> (accessed January 8, 2009).

- 33 USAID, USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report June 2004, <http://www.usaid.gov> (accessed December 22, 2009).
- 34 USAID, USAID/OTI Bolivia Field Report Apr-June 2007, *ibid.*
- 35 Indeed, such cooperation went beyond assistance in counternarcotics and socioeconomic issues and included democracy assistance. Rhetoric, here, was obviously stronger than the political practice on the ground. E.g., the Administration of Justice Programs that included the support for Integrated Justice Centers (IJC)s—which provide justice services to citizens in marginalized areas—were continuously implemented in close cooperation with the Bolivian Ministry of Justice. The United States was apparently disposed to continue this program (USAID, “Budget Scenarios for USAID/Bolivia Democracy Program,” available at: <http://www.jeremybigwood.net> [accessed August 31, 2009]), but the Bolivian government gradually took over the IJC)s, in 2009 decided to demand the closure of USAID cooperation in this area, and signed an agreement with Denmark that provides for Danish support for IJC)s (see *LaPrensa.com.bo*, September 29, 2009). U.S. assistance to the national parliament (in the framework of FIDEM) was closed on demand by the Bolivian government.
- 36 CBJ 2008, 603.
- 37 CBJ 2008, 604.
- 38 Statement of the Honorable Adolfo Franco, “Democracy in Latin America: Successes, Challenges and the Future,” 19.
- 39 U.S. Department of State, “Bolivia 2007 Performance Report,” Washington, D.C., 2007, 13.
- 40 Consequently, an official U.S. document, on the one hand, confirms that “USAID was the first donor to support the democratically elected departmental governments,” but on the other, emphasizes that decentralization programs “make every effort to include MAS and will continue to reach out to local MAS officials in various departments.” The only activity explicitly intended to “counter” the Bolivian government concerns the “public diplomacy program” which is “critical to counter attacks on the USG (including USAID) from senior levels of the GOB [Government of Bolivia]” and which, in 2007, consisted of “more than 100 public events with media [...], double from 2006.” USAID, “USAID/Bolivia Planned FY 2008 Program Overview,” available at <http://www.jeremybigwood.net> (accessed August 31, 2009).
- 41 U.S. Department of State, “Bolivia 2007 Performance Report,” 13.
- 42 Author communication with NDI representatives, February 2011.
- 43 U.S. Embassy La Paz, “Scenesetter: Bolivia’s August 6 Transition, the Challenges Ahead, and the U.S. Role” (Unclassified Document No. 2002LAPAZ02723), available at: <http://www.jeremybigwood.net> (accessed January 6, 2010).
- 44 CBJ 2009, 659, 661.
- 45 Wolff, “Self-Determination and Empowerment as Challenges to Democracy Promotion,” 23. Regarding counternarcotics assistance, the situation again is ambivalent. On the one hand, U.S. funding in this area since 2006 has declined significantly in absolute terms as well as in relative importance; on the other, counternarcotics cooperation remains operative, and funding levels still exceed all other programs by far (see CBJ, various fiscal years). In May 2008, a study concluded that “U.S.-Bolivian counterdrug collaboration remains strong” (Ledebur

and Youngers, 1), and even after “the tensions following the U.S. ambassador’s expulsion, the Bolivian government and the U.S. embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) have continued to coordinate closely on coca reduction and interdiction efforts” (Ledebur and Walsh, 2). In April 2009, both governments even “signed a new bilateral drug control agreement, entailing \$26 million in U.S. funding to support coca reduction” (Ledebur and Walsh, 2).

- 46 The largest NED-funded programs in Bolivia were carried out by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). NDI carried out political leadership programs, IRI promoted good governance and citizen participation at the local level, and NDI and CIPE supported inputs from civil society to the Constituent Assembly. In general, the number of organizations that received NED grants increased from five in 2006 to 14 in 2008 and 2009. The total amount of grants more than doubled from USD 564,284 in 2007 to USD 1,360,824 in 2009. See National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Annual Report, Washington, D.C. (various editions), <http://www.ned.org> (accessed January 26, 2010).
- 47 CBJ 2010, 573.
- 48 CBJ 2010, 575.
- 49 CBJ 2010, 576.
- 50 The planned municipal strengthening program is, for example, mentioned in a USAID document from February 2008: USAID, “Budget Scenarios for USAID/Bolivia Democracy Program.” This document identifies potential new activities for different budget scenarios and signals a clear willingness on the part of USAID/Bolivia to adjust democracy promotion activities, at least partially, to official Bolivian preferences: For example, it suggests launching “a much-needed management training program for GOB [Government of Bolivia] officials,” because “[t]his effort could enjoy strong GOB support and would greatly facilitate bilateral coordination and implementation of our program”; providing “additional funds for the justice program” that is conducted in close collaboration with the Bolivian Ministry of Justice; and—in the case of heavily increased funding—increasing “civil society activities related to harmonization of community justice systems with the formal justice system [...], which is a high priority for our GOB counterparts.”
- 51 Gratius and Legler, “Latin America Is Different,” 206.
- 52 See *LaPrensa.com.bo*, September 19, 2009; *La-Razon.com*, September 19, 2009.
- 53 CBJ 2011, 658.
- 54 See Gamarra, “Bolivia on the Brink,” 31. To be sure, there were U.S. activities in the area of conflict prevention. Yet the point here is about measures aiming at reducing political polarization and increasing dialogue at the national level—something quite different from the support to counterweights.
- 55 USAID, “Budget Scenarios for USAID/Bolivia Democracy Program.”
- 56 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (BMZ), “Wieczorek-Zeul sagt Bolivien weitere Unterstützung zu” (Press Release, February 27, 2006), <http://www.bmz.de> (accessed March 27, 2008).
- 57 BMZ, “Bundesministerin Wieczorek-Zeul trifft bolivianischen Staatspräsidenten Morales” (Press Release, 22 April 2006), <http://www.bmz.de> (accessed March 31, 2008).

- 58 Erich Riedler, “Ein Lotse geht von Bord. Ein Gespräch zum Abschied des deutschen Botschafters Erich Riedler,” *Monatsblatt des Centro Cultural Alemán La Paz* no. 2/2009, 12–16.
- 59 Bundesregierung, “Verhandlungen über die zukünftige Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit der neuen bolivianischen Regierung. Antwort der Bundesregierung,” Bundestag Drucksache (Printed Paper) no. 16/1047, 9–10; BMZ, *Länderkonzept Bolivien*, Bonn, 2007.
- 60 In terms of political ideology, the German government was at least not as distant from Morales as the Bush Administration. Germany was then governed by a coalition between the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), and it was the latter party that occupied both the Foreign Office and the Development Ministry (and Development Minister Wiczorek-Zeul belonged even to the SPD’s left wing). In addition, that Morales made no offensive statements directed at the German government (as in the case of the U.S.) surely helped.
- 61 “Die Erwartungen an uns sind groß’: Ein Gespräch mit Bundesaußenminister Steinmeier zum EU-Südamerika-Gipfel und der Rolle der Deutschen dort,” [Expectations of us are high: A conversation with Foreign Minister Steinmeier about the EU-South America summit and the role of Germany in the region] *Die Welt*, May 12, 2006, 5.
- 62 “Jedes Land muss souverän entscheiden’: Entwicklungshilfeministerin Heidemarie Wiczorek-Zeul, 63, über die Zusammenarbeit mit Bolivien, dessen Präsident Evo Morales die Erdgas- und Erdölindustrie verstaatlicht hat,” [Every country must decide for itself: An interview with Development Minister Heidemarie Wiczorek-Zeul about Germany’s cooperation with Bolivia, whose president Evo Morales has nationalized the country’s oil and gas industries] *Der Spiegel*, May 8, 2006, 19.
- 63 Riedler, “Ein Lotse geht von Bord,” 14.
- 64 The other two priority areas are water supply/sanitation and sustainable agricultural development.
- 65 BMZ, “Millenniumsziele und Verfassungsreform im Mittelpunkt der deutschen Unterstützung für Bolivien” (Press Release, June 26, 2006), <http://www.bmz.de> (accessed March 27, 2008).
- 66 BMZ, *Länderkonzept Bolivien*, 1.
- 67 BMZ, *Länderkonzept Bolivien*, 1, 8, 3.
- 68 Wolff, “Self-Determination and Empowerment as Challenges to Democracy Promotion,” 25.
- 69 Claudia Zilla, *Externe Demokratieförderung in Bolivien. Die Politik Deutschlands und der Europäischen Union*, Berlin, SWP-Studie no. 28, 2006.
- 70 The data is taken from the OECD Development Database on Aid Activities (Creditor Reporting System) available at <http://www.oecd.org> (accessed January 13, 2010). For a comprehensive collection of data on German foreign aid to Bolivia, see Wolff, “Self-Determination and Empowerment as Challenges to Democracy Promotion,” 25–26.
- 71 The other major player in German official development cooperation responsible for implementing the financial cooperation, the KfW, in Bolivia largely centers its work on the other two priority areas (water supply/sanitation and sustainable agriculture). A third “implementing organization,” the German Development Service (DED),

focuses on democracy promotion via the strengthening of civil society, namely of marginalized (indigenous, peasants and women) groups.

- 72 To be sure, PADEP's initial decision to support the preparation of a Constituent Assembly was taken at the end of 2003. In fact, GTZ—together with the German political foundations Friedrich Ebert (FES) and Konrad Adenauer (KAGTzs) as well as FUNDEMOS (the local counterpart of the German political foundation Hanns Seidel)—has contributed to the preparatory process since its initiation by the interim government of Carlos Mesa in November 2003. See Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), *Asesoramiento en contextos altamente políticos. Experiencia del PADEP/GTZ en el proceso Constituyente en Bolivia*, La Paz, 2008, 10–18.
- 73 See GTZ, *Asesoramiento*.
- 74 But only until the end of PADEP's second phase; for the third phase, PADEP's components were reduced to three: "Reform of State Structure," "New Public Management," and "Constructive Conflict Management." GTZ, "Bolivia: PADEP de la GTZ cambia para mejorar apoyo a reformas en nuevo Estado Plurinacional y Autonomico," La Paz, 2010, <http://www.padep.org.bo> (accessed January 21, 2010).
- 75 This emphasis, however, is only partially a recent reaction to the new government and more generally responds to the escalation of social protest since 2000 (and, additionally, mirrors a global trend in German development cooperation).
- 76 See GTZ, *Asesoramiento*.
- 77 This unofficial role was possible because former GTZ personnel were present both in the central government and in the prefecture of Tarija.
- 78 GTZ, *Asesoramiento*, 50.
- 79 FES activities, to a large part, were oriented at promoting dialogue across the MAS-opposition divide and, thus, included a broader political spectrum. In addition, FES was reported to support an initiative to build a new social democratic party in opposition to the government.
- 80 This, not least, resulted from the fact that the "traditional" partners of the KAS among the political parties (the MNR, in particular) were in open crisis, while the main conservative party in opposition to the MAS, PODEMOS, was already "occupied" by the HSS. In addition, the KAS has been hesitant to engage with the new regional opposition (especially in Santa Cruz) and, e.g., after some instances of cooperation until early 2008 retreated from supporting a Santa-Cruz-based political organization ("Autonomía para Bolivia").
- 81 The other three German political foundations—the Heinrich Boell Stiftung (close to the Green party), the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (close to the liberal Free Democratic Party) and the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (close to the leftist party DIE LINKE)—have no offices in Bolivia.
- 82 Between the end of the Constituent Assembly and the negotiations in Congress, FES supported a dialogue between individual representatives of the government and the parliamentary opposition. This dialogue generated good personal relations and specific proposals for revising the draft constitution—important starting points for the official negotiations. See Romero et al., *Del conflicto al diálogo*.
- 83 German Consulate, La Paz, *Trabajar Juntos*, Boletín de la Cooperación Alemana en Bolivia no. 9, 2007, <http://www.la-paz.diplo.de> (accessed August 31, 2007), 1.

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