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Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology

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Summary

Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology is the fourth paper of the ongoing series on Islam in Central Asia. It provides a historical overview of religious education in Central Asia, focusing on the *hujra* system and its founders, and assesses the efforts of the Uzbek government to define the content of Islam that has been presented in public life since independence was obtained in 1991. It examines the presentation of Islam in the schools—especially in Tashkent Islamic University, seen as the premier training institution for secular teachers of Islam—and the presentation of Islam in the mass media.

Like all post-Soviet states, Uzbekistan confronts the challenge of creating politically loyal citizens, a task complicated by the Uzbek leadership's unwillingness to introduce meaningful democratic reforms. True to their Soviet upbringing, Uzbek leaders have turned to ideological indoctrination rather than political participation as the foundation for building national unity and political loyalty. The USSR was a highly ideological system that sought to permeate public life. Many Central Asians rejected substantial parts of this ideology, especially those aspects that pitted the state against the region's religious tradition. However scornful Central Asians were about some aspects of Soviet ideology, the population did absorb large parts of it into their own belief systems, and many have even passed on to their children the expectation that a good or beneficent state helps its population to meet its basic needs by providing free education and health care as well as benefits for large families and pensioners.

The task of creating a new ideology is complicated by the fact that the Uzbeks won independence rather than struggling for it. The degree of Uzbek popular involvement in late Soviet-era political protest movements (in the late 1980s and 1990) was relatively limited, despite the latent anger that many Uzbeks felt about Russian domination.

The Uzbek government has applied a great deal of energy, and in some cases resources, to try to cast a new ideology for the Uzbek people. The current ideology is based heavily on the idea that Uzbek nationhood—and even Uzbek statehood—is centuries old, with statehood dating back to the time of Timur. The ethnohistorical basis of this is less important than the vigor and consistency with which the argument is presented.[1]

Because Islam was at the core of society in Uzbekistan down through the centuries, the historic approach taken to building political loyalty has meant that the Uzbek government is forced to return Islam, in some form at least, to

public life. The collapse of Soviet rule has indeed brought Islam much more emphatically back into public life, in large part because the Uzbek population demanded it in the immediate aftermath of independence.

Following independence, public interest in religion grew to an almost insatiable level, with hundreds of unsanctioned, locally organized madrassas and mosques appearing seemingly overnight. There was a demand for Qurans in Uzbek, and any other kind of religious book sold quickly as well, often to an audience with little grasp of theology. Some, including many young people, began experimenting with religion by adopting Islamic dress, beards, no ties for the young men, and *hijab* or some modification of it for women. Public observance of religious holidays increased, including the fast at Ramadan when whole communities would gather at *iftar* celebrations at nightfall to break the daily fast.

Religion has thus become an important, albeit potentially fluid, component in the evolving state ideology, with its message and acceptable messengers changing over time, depending on Uzbek leaders' perception of the threat that uncontrolled or unregulated Islamic actors are believed to constitute.

Nonstate actors are also trying to define the role of religion in Uzbek society, and their purpose is often more all-encompassing than that of the government. Some of these nonstate actors, both religious leaders and schismatics, seek to enhance the role of religion in the state and, in some cases, even make religion the yardstick by which state actions are judged. For this reason, the Uzbek state is fearful of using religious leaders to spread its message, but at the same time the state realizes that without at least measured use of such leaders, the public's loyalty will not be secured.

Therefore, the regime of Islam Karimov has always sought to identify and then work with sympathetic clerics, whom the government believes will espouse a message fully supportive of the state. This would be a message that draws on Hanafi traditions that have long been popular in Central Asia,[2] traditions that are generally associated with religious tolerance and subordination to state authorities who are not of the faith but who demonstrate respect for Islam.

Even the most sympathetic clerics pose a potential risk to the state as members of Central Asia's Islamic establishment are no longer willing to be as obsequious as they were in Soviet times. The relative autonomy of religious actors from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s led to a long and unprecedented religious dynamism. Scores of insufficiently trained imams began to run their own congregations, while opportunities for travel, study, and pilgrimage brought ordinary citizens and clerics alike exposure to interpretations of Islam that were far more radical than they had encountered earlier.

Both the secular state and the religious elite believe Islam must play a key role in the evolving national ideology. The population (especially youth) that longed for spirituality and order to help them deal with the chaos of the 1990s now turn to their faith to compensate for the disappointments in the corporeal world.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to provide a historical overview of religious education in Central Asia, focusing on the *hujra* system and its founders, and to assess efforts of the Uzbek government to define the content of Islam that has been presented in public life since independence. It looks at the presentation of Islam in the schools—most especially in Tashkent Islamic University, which is intended to be the premier training institution for secular teachers of Islam—and at the presentation of Islam in the mass media, including on the World Wide Web. The paper largely ignores the topic of state-sanctioned religious schools under Soviet authorities and since independence, although Appendix 1 provides an overview of this system. We will address this issue further in subsequent publications.

As we detail in the paper, the end of communism brought with it a much greater degree of interaction between Islamic groups in Uzbekistan and their coreligionists abroad, and it has opened lines of communication through travel and through the Internet (despite official efforts to limit it) that have created multiple sources of information about religion.

Unlike during the Soviet period, religious authorities are not formally the enemy, although some specific representatives may well be viewed that way. Religious education in Uzbekistan, in secular institutions as much as religious ones, has invariably come to reflect the divisions within the Uzbek religious community, almost to the same degree as these divisions are reflected in the mosques and religious schools themselves.

Similarly, the clerics put their credibility at stake if they totally divorce themselves from the state. Whatever the unpopularity of President Islam Karimov and his entourage, Uzbek citizens have a love-hate relationship with the state. They both distrust it and are conservative enough to believe that state support confers a degree of legitimacy.

As this paper shows, much competition exists in Uzbekistan's marketplace of ideas for who will speak for Islam in schools, in private settings, and in media both sanctioned and unsanctioned by the state. The main competition is between those who are seeking to propagate traditional Hanafi ideas and those with a more radical Salafi or neo-Salafi orientation.[3]

Should the Salafis be successful and continue to gain greater popularity in educational institutions and communities, the nature of Uzbek society would likely eventually be transformed, as much of Uzbek traditional culture is based on Hanafi ideas. And it is possible that the competition between Hanafi and Salafi or neo-Salafi interpretations could even trigger a social explosion that would threaten the very fabric of Uzbek society. This is something that many pro-Hanafi or secular students in Uzbekistan fear, although we are not convinced that their fears are grounded in reality.

Thus, this paper looks at how religion is presented in public life and the growing effort by Salafi thinkers, most of whom are home-grown and not educated in the madrassas of Saudi Arabia, to edge out ideas associated with the

local Hanafi tradition. This paper also explores the role of the Uzbek government in this process: how aware or complicit the government is in the process and the degeree to which those interested in advancing Salafi thinking have managed to gain access to, or control of, state institutions and reform them to facilitate their mission.

Part 1: Islamic Education

The Uzbek government has been struggling with the challenge of how to reintroduce religious education and do so in a fashion that is seemingly in accordance with the past and not in conflict with the state building goals of the present.

Religious education in Uzbekistan historically has been rooted in the region's Hanafi legal tradition, but centers of religious learning lost their dynamism after the Timurid period (1370–1506) of Uzbek history.[4] Despite the region's earlier rich theological tradition, especially in the field of *fiqh,* by the middle of the eighteenth century the study of religious law and theology in Central Asia had become dominated by a narrow scholastic approach.

The Russian conquest in the nineteenth century brought Central Asia's Muslims into contact with religious debates and changing trends in religious education. This included access to fundamentalist ideas, *al-Islahiyya,* or what would later be termed *Salafiya. Salafiya*, the smaller movement in Central Asia, was largely centered on the interpretation of the Quran and Sharia.

The second group, more prominent at that time, was the *usul-isautiyya jadidiyya,* better known as Jadid, or Jadidlar reformers, who were concerned with reform of the educational system.[5] They identified religious education, not religion, as the source of what they saw as the backwardness or at least the inability of Central Asian society to be competitive. The Jadidlar reformers argued that their approach would bring more rigors to religious education because of a new emphasis on mastery of materials and on systematic Arabic language instruction. These techniques, they maintained, would also be applied to a broad range of courses, including in secular subjects in a new kind of madrassa to be called *muhandasalik madrassalar,* or technical madrassas.

Despite some similarity in curriculum between these technical madrassas and the state schools, most Russian authorities remained suspicious of the movement to reform madrassa education, believing that it could become a source of the spread of seditious political ideas like those of pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism, ideas that were in fact also supported by many Jadidlar reformers.

Only a small portion of the religious community had contact with the new-method ideas. Most remained loyal to the dominant Hanafi clerical establishment, and most who received religious education did so in schools that adhered to a centuries-old curriculum. Even fewer Central Asians were exposed to the curriculum of the Russian-native schools that enjoyed some popularity in the Kazakh steppe.

The Soviet takeover sharply limited opportunities for religious debate and religious education, and from 1920 until the time of World War II, local interpretation of Hanafi theology was essentially frozen. During World War II, the creation of the Muslim Religious Administration allowed a very limited opportunity for theological debate. When Soviet rule began decaying in the late 1980s, these constraints were eased, and some were reintroduced in more muted form in the mid-1990s.

The Early Soviet Period and the Stalin Years

The Soviets decided to make use of the Jadidlar reformers in their initial efforts to transform the educational system into a wholly secular one. The main *vaqf*[6] administration of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created,[7] and *vaqf* property was legal in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic from 1923 to 1926. Educational institutions that opposed reforms were deprived of their *vaqf* properties and often were simply closed. Parallel to the state efforts were those of moderate Jadid clerics such as Munavvar qori Abdurashidkhanov,[8] who sought to reform the local system of confessional education. Instruction in religious subjects was conducted in the local languages, either Uzbek or Tajik (that is, the vernacular), and used the new system of Arabic orthography, *usul-u jaded,* instead, of the traditional Persian or Chagatai. Many prominent theologians were persecuted, especially those in Bukhara, which was newly incorporated into the Russian–Soviet empire.[9]

The theologians from the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent proved more adaptive. The liquidation of the Kokand khanate in 1876 had led to a slow deterioration of the system of religious education because of the theologians' reduced financial base: The madrassas no longer received direct financial support from the government, and income from *vaqf* properties was also reduced by government restrictions. As the madrassas began to decline, *hujra*—unofficial schools that often were nothing more than a system of private tutoring—developed and eventually spread throughout the Ferghana Valley. During the Soviet period, *hujra* spread well beyond the valley.

Because of the targeted campaign against religious institutions and the clerics associated with them in the traditional centers of Muslim confessional learning (Bukhara, Samarqand, Kokand, and Khiva), Tashkent began to emerge as a center of religious learning, albeit a much smaller and more clandestine one than its predecessors.

The Stalin years were the grimmest for religious education, and virtually none of the surviving clerics was willing to take on pupils until conditions eased somewhat after World War II. Even then, most were only willing to work with students who were either relatives or drawn from a circle of close family friends.

The religious education that continued was carried out in families in what was termed *qori pochcho hujralari* or *hujra qori-pochcho.*[10]

Nonetheless, even in the 1920s and 1930s, some theologians still sought to reform local practices and viewed the teachings of Islam critically, and their efforts had an impact on the religious environment in Tashkent. They included Shami domullah at-Tarablusi (an emigrant from the Lebanese city Tarablus who was active from 1919 to 1932 and who died in 1936 in exile), Turk domullah (an emigrant from the Ottoman Empire who was active during the period 1920–1930), and Khasan-hazrat Ponomaryov al-Kizldjari (who was exiled from Petropavlovsk and was active during the period 1933–1937 and who died in 1937).

Shami domullah[11] and those who approved of his religious teachings actually supported some aspects of the Soviet antireligious policy. In particular, they welcomed the destruction of shrines around burial places (*mazar*) of revered Central Asian religious figures. Although Soviet authorities saw this destruction as rooting out the source of religious prejudice, Shami domullah viewed it as eliminating religious practices that undermined the "true" faith of Islam.

Shami domullah was the formative figure for Ziyauddin Khan ibn Ishan Babakhan, who served as mufti of SADUM (Muslim Spiritual Administration of Central Asia) from 1957 to 1982. Babakhan's approach to the formulation of fatwas was similar to the approach of his theological mentor in that it was based on the Quran and hadiths, which gave him a theological grounding from which to attack traditional local religious practices, so-called household or everyday Islam. For Babakhan it was an issue of doctrinal purity, but like Shami domullah, the Soviet mufti understood that this made his fatwas seem more in line with the regime's social policies.[12] While often viewed as a compromised figure because of his support of Soviet social policies, Babakhan's defenders argue that his position was formed from a sense of religious purity.

Ziyauddin Babakhan spent much of his youth in exile, fleeing after the arrest of his mentor, Shami domullah. In 1933–1934 he hid out among relatives in Sayram, now in southern Kazakhstan; then he went to Bekabad city, and then to neighboring Khujand, where he worked as a cook on a collective farm (*kolkhoz*). He returned to Tashkent only after his father, Ishan Babakhan, was appointed as the first mufti of SADUM in 1943. His father's earlier position, as judge of religious law (*qadi*) of Tashkent, may have been a source of protection for the younger Babakhan when, in 1938, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs dismissed its case against him after the elder Babakhan allegedly promised to cooperate with local security forces. Others claim Ishan Babakhan signed a similar document early in his tenure at SADUM, but his defenders maintain that, if Babakhan did that, it was in the interests of ensuring the perpetuation of Islam.

The Post-Stalin Period

Hanafi *hujra*. *Hujra* of the post-Stalinist period served as the foundation for modern-day Hanafi scholarship in Uzbekistan. The most famous of these was Muhammadjan Hindustani's *hujra* in Tajikistan.[13]

Nodirhon-domla, from Tashkent, established an important *hujra* that existed from 1962 through the mid-1970s. Nodirhon spent 1928–1932 in hiding in a remote part of Syr Darya oblast, working in a rail car repair shop. He was invited to join SADUM in 1943, and he worked there until his death in 1976, starting as head of the fatwa department but moving over to be librarian after Ziyauddin Babakhan took over, largely because the two clashed on the content of the fatwas that the former had drafted.

Khazrat Baba Muhammad ran an important *hujra* in Surkhandarya, in Sarasiya, in the southeastern part of the oblast, which was both his place of birth and place of death (he died in 1968). Khazrat Baba Muhammad studied in Bukhara before the revolution, returning home and seeking work in a *kolkhoz* to blend into the community and thus avoid persecution. Baba Muhammad was in contact with Hindustani and at one point even provided him with a safe haven. For a short time after World War II, Baba Muhammad served as imam of Surkhandarya's only legally sanctioned mosque in Termez (near the Afghan border and a stone's throw from Tajikistan and its capital in Dushanbe).

After Stalin's death, Baba Muhammad began a small *hujra* with a curriculum largely limited to instruction in *ilm ul-faraiz*[14] and *Furu' al-fiqh*.[15] Baba Muhammad generally sent his advanced students on to study with Hindustani, and reportedly Hindustani also sent students to Baba Muhammad to study *fiqh,* the latter's particular strength.[16]

Qozi-domulla (Abdurashid-domulla) ran an influential *hujra* in Dushanbe. Qozi-domulla was born and grew up in the city of Ferghana. He died in 1985, at the age of 96, and is buried in Dushanbe. He, too, studied in Bukhara and returned to Ferghana after the Russian Revolution; he fled in the early 1930s to Hissar. In 1954, with the support of Hindustani, he moved to the outskirts of Dushanbe. In 1956 he was named *qadi,* the senior representative of SADUM, in the republic of Tajikistan, but allegedly he was removed from his post because of disagreements with Ziyauddin Babakhan. Qozi-domulla then served as imam in a small mosque on the outskirts of Dushanbe.

Qozi-domulla began accepting students in 1956, and his *hujra* was as well known as the *hujra* of Hindustani, although Qozi-domulla's curriculum was said to have been less rigorous. Qozi-domulla taught an introduction to Arabic syntax and grammar, the dogma *Sharh 'Aqa'id an-Nasafi,* and commentaries to the Quran (such as *Baydavi*).

Mahdum Bobo-vi Andaqi (Abd ar-Rahmanjon Bobo) was born and died in the village of Andaq, approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Samarqand. He was from a *sayyid* family.[17] He studied first in Samarqand and then in Bukhara;

he fled and spent the late 1920s and early 1930s in Hissar. He returned to his native village during World War II. Mahdum Bobo-vi was a Sufi, and in addition to more traditional Hanafi religious instruction, he taught his pupils Sufi poetry as well as the ritual bases of internal or silent *ziqr* (*dtikr-i batin*), which he practiced.

Salim-hojji Khujandi (born in the 1890s, died in 1983) ran a *hujra* school in Bekabad. He took up residence there in 1931, four years after fleeing Bukhara to avoid arrest. Salim-hojji offered sanctuary to Ziyauddin Babakhan in 1933–1934, a decision for which he would eventually reap a reward. Salim-hojji is said to have later told his students that, although he was "bowled over by Ziyauddin's Wahhabi arrogance,"[18] he couldn't turn him into state security, choosing instead to fight (seemingly unsuccessfully) to purge his soul of his Wahhabi ideas, to turn him away from the teachings of Ahl al-Quran, a group that accepted only the teachings of Quran."[19] Ishan Babakhan later (in 1948) appointed Salim-hojji as the imam of Bekabad's only mosque. In 1954 Salim-hojji opened his *hujra,* teaching both Uzbeks and Tajiks. Salim-hojji maintained close ties with Hindustani, and the course of instruction in his *hujra* was close to that in Hindustani's. Both men focused on medieval Hanafi texts, and both excluded texts of Sufi mysticism.[20]

Salim-hojji wrote several theological essays; the best known, "Regarding the Limits of Matters on Reading the *Sunnat* in Homes,"[21] was written in the 1960s. This twenty-page essay circulated in manuscript form and highlighted the theological rift between Hanafi tradition and its critics.

Salim-hojji belonged to the old generation of clerics, *taqlidchi.* The term comes from the Arabic word *taqlidid,* or *taqlidiya,* meaning to follow or to imitate; it means following the authoritative decisions already made when writing a fatwa or in one's reading of the Quran or the hadiths. *Taqlid* is practiced in one form or another in each of the four Islamic schools of religious law and has formed the basis of religious decision making in Central Asia for more than a half millennium. But it has come under strong criticism from reformist elements, from the time of the Jadid through to the present. Both Salim-hojji and Muhammadjan Hindustani even more prominently were concerned about the prospect of a doctrinal split within Islam, between the older generation and new innovators (*mudjaddidiya*). The latter argued that "true Islam" and Sharia could be implemented only in an Islamic state.[22]

For Hindustani and many other Hanafi clerics, the focus was on *idtirar* (*iztiroriy holat*), maximizing adaptation in highly unfavorable conditions, with the goal of preservation of religion, and in this case, ensuring the transmission of knowledge by trying not to irritate the atheist government.

The "new wave" theologians, like Rahmatulla-alloma and Abduhvali qori,[23] were initially influenced by these discussions with their elders and by the theological vigor with which they defended their positions, positions that the younger generation recognized were supported by the majority of believers. In

the late 1970s and early 1980s, they continued to emphasize their loyalty to their own legal school (*mazhab*), to Hanafi interpretation of religious law, but with the idea of purifying it from any new additions (*bid'at*).

At the same time the new wave of reformers—clerics like Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf, who was already beginning to achieve prominence in the mid-1980s—increasingly supported a much more radical idea: that a community could be considered truly Islamic only if Islam had a formal legal or political status in the state.[24] He occupied something of middle ground between the two groups, arguing that Islam cannot gain political status until some remote point in the future, after society had embraced Islam more fully.

Sufi *hujra* and their leaders.[25] The Sufi *hujra* or *khalqa* (circles, or communities of religious believers) were generally found in provincial or remote areas and, thus, were invisible to the representatives of the state security. The majority of Sufi sheikhs have come from traditional Sufi family clans, and the sheikhs were the center of a highly individualized approach to their education, as is in keeping with the nature of the Sufi intellectual tradition, which looks to the teacher as the guide to Sufi-style worship; the teacher is not simply a source of introduction to religious text.

For much of Soviet rule, well-organized or structured study groups were rare, but teachers took on students, or *murid,* as they saw fit and taught them independent of a structured program of study. The common curriculum incorporated the studies of Sharia (the Quran, hadith, *fiqh*) and some rituals, and it was designed to help the students themselves to become sheikhs. From the mid-1980s onward, beginning with the Gorbachev reforms, the role and presence of Sufi *khalqa* increased, so that by now, at least according to Bakhtiyar Babadjanov,[26] there are *khalqa* and *hujra* with approximately 30,000 *murid* and students.

Shaykh Abd al-Vahid Turkistani (died in 1940 or 1941), also known as Eshon Bobo, was the founder of the largest Naqshbandiyya–Mujaddidiya brotherhood in contemporary Central Asia. This group claims its origin from the Indian Naqshbandiyya sheikh, Ahmad Sirhindi (died in 1624), also known as "Mudjaddid alf as-sani," and from the well-known Bukhara Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiya sheikh, caliph Husajna (died 1833 or 1834).[27]

The Sufi lineage of Abd al-Vahid Turkistani is somewhat contested, as some of Turkistani's contemporaries such as Madjzub Namangani make sole reference to Muhammad-Amin, who was Turkistani's teacher. In fact, there are few written resources upon which to reconstruct his biography, and most accounts of his life seem to liberally mix fact with fiction in ways designed to enhance his spiritual authority. For example, some maintain that the Bolsheviks failed to arrest Turkistani because at key moments he was able to render himself invisible.[28]

It is known that Abd al-Vahid Turkistani came from the Kush-ata village;[29] that he belonged to Mujaddidiya–Husayniya, one of the local Naqshbandiyya brotherhoods; and that sometime before 1910 (during the rule of Ahad-khan,

1855–1910) he received *irshad* from Bukhara sheikh Muhammad-Amin.[30] Abd al-Vahid Turkistani is said to have followed his teacher's example and did not participate in political activities, even during the Soviet period. He also warned his students and relatives to avoid politics, a philosophy that helps explain his survival and how the Husayniya brotherhood survived Soviet rule.

Qori Abd Allah (who died in 1976), Eshon Bobo's successor, lived with his teacher for approximately 33 years and was eventually buried next to him in the village of Kush-ata. Abd Allah was wary of security authorities; it is said that he never addressed his students in writing (*irshad-nama*) as was traditional, but limited himself to giving simple oral instructions during private meetings.

Despite this constant pressure from the authorities, Qori Abd Allah trained a number of students who, since independence, have trained their own *murid* (followers or disciples) who are now found throughout the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent, as well as in other cities of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and even Russia.

Eshon Abdurahmonjon was another important Soviet-era Sufi Mujaddidiya leader. Abdurahmonjon was born in the Kala-ji nav (Qala-iy naw) settlement near Dushanbe, and he died there in 1984 at the age of 99. Abdurahmonjon studied in the Ko'kaldosh madrassa in Bukhara, where he established a lifelong relationship with Muhammadjan Hindustani.

In about 1956, Abdurahmonjon established his own *hujra,* a Sufi *khalqa.* According to Sufi tradition, he never accepted students who lacked basic knowledge of Sharia, and he warned his students to follow strictly the rules of Sharia first and only then to practice the mystic paths of Sufism, and then to never expose their knowledge of Sufism to the crowd (*amma*). Abdurahmonjon's *hujra* offered studies of the rituals (silent *ziqr—khafi;* psycho-physical concentration—*tavajjuh* prayers), as well as studies of mystical poetry, including works of Jalal ad-Din Rumi and Bedilya (a seventeenth-century poet).

Haji Isma'il Pirmuhammad-zadeh, the imam of a mosque in the Gissar region of Tajikistan, is the leader of the Naqshbandiyya–Mujaddidiya brotherhood. He had few students during Soviet rule but now is said to run a large *hujra* at his mosque. He is supported by Khoja Akbar Turajon-zade.

Khaja Ahmadjon Makhdum Khanafi-Naqshbandi Mujaddidi, born in 1939, is a well-known Sufi sheikh in Uzbekistan's Surkhandarya oblast. He received his first religious education from his father, Shoh-Murod Mukhdum, and then studied with a number of prominent Sufis as well as with Muhammadjan Hindustani. Mujaddidi runs a *hujra,* considered by many to be an elite religious institution as only those who have had prior education in Sharia sciences are accepted into it.

There were also *hujra* of sheikhs who practiced loud *ziqr* (*jahr*), who believe their spiritual succession comes from Yasawiyya or Qadiriyya sheikhs.

Ghulom-ota Normat was one of the best known of these sheikhs. He was born in 1916 and still lives in his native town of Ku-yi Girvan, near Namangan.

He received his religious education from, and was introduced to, the Sufi rituals by his father Narmat-Muhammad. His knowledge of religion, as well as his command of Arabic, are said to be limited.

During World War II, Ghulom-ota served in the army and was badly wounded. After the war, he joined the Namangan *halqa* and accepted a small group of students to whom he taught basic Sufi practices, primarily *ziqr.* At present, he is said to accept two or three students per year.

Dowud-khon is from of the Qadiriya brotherhood.[31] He was born in 1929, still resides in Namangan, and has a more thorough religious education than Ghulom-ota. He believes that *dhikr* and ritual dance, *raq,* gave him both physical and spiritual strength. In 1983 Dowud-khon opened a *hujra* whose curriculum includes lectures on the proper reading of the Quran (*qira'at, tajwid*), on mystical poetry written in Persian (including works of Ab al-Qadir Jilani), and on Sufi rituals (*dhikr, jahr*).

Salafi *hujra.* Following the death of Stalin, the Ahl-i Quran restored the number of its *hujra* and continued their traditions. The most important of these was the *hujra* of Abduhakim-qari Abdulvosiy o'ghli (also known as Hakimjon qori Vosiev), a native of Marghilan and considered by many to be the "father" of political Islam in Uzbekistan.[32] He is said to have been born in 1890, which is questionable given his longevity, and to have been a student in a small, local madrassa, where he received a relatively minimal religious education. Between 1927 and 1930, he studied at the *hujra* of the Ahl-i Quran in Tashkent and was the last surviving member of this group. From 1933 to 1945, he was in hiding, moving from Osh to Uzgen and then to Batken (in Kyrgyzstan). In 1945, he returned to Uzgen and later went back home to Marghilan. In 1955, he started a *hujra* but, perceiving the limitations of his own education, went to study at Muhammadjan Hindustani's *hujra* in Dushanbe from 1957 to 1959,[33] where he paid special attention to increasing his Arabic skills.

Hakimjon qori later reopened his *hujra* and developed a curriculum that mirrored what was taught earlier by those study circles organized by members of Ahl-i Quran. He explicitly rejected many folk practices usually labeled as Islamic practice, and he revived discussion on the need to purify Islam. Hakimjon qori's library reflected this interest as it included a collection of essays by Ibn Taymiya (1263–1328) and the writings of Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979) as well as commentaries on the Quran by Sayyid Qutb (*Fi Zilali Quran*). Some of his books seem to have been gifts of grateful hajjis, whose journeys were financed at least in part by Abduhakim qori.[34]

Rahmatulla-alloma, who died in 1981 in a car accident, was one of Abduhakim qori's best-known students; Rahmatulla-alloma also studied with Muhammadjan Hindustani. Rahmatulla-alloma established a *hujra* in 1978, where Abduhvali qori Mirzaev served as his assistant. Students were taught Arabic, the Quran, hadiths, and the basics of *fiqh,* but the curriculum also included

essays by Taymiya, Maududi, and Quran commentaries (*tafsirs*) by Sayyid Qutb (*Fi Zilali Quran*). The curriculum stressed that Muslims were to be bound by Sharia principles. The most trusted students were allowed to study politics, the status of Islam in the world, and the religious history of local khanates. Textbooks on the history of Islam, brought to the *hujra* by the Arab students, gradually became a part of the curriculum.

Rahmatulla-alloma was searching for new interpretations of Islam, and he developed his ideas in an essay, "Musulman-abad" (The country of Muslims' prosperity),[35] which offered his own interpretation of Islam's holy texts and emphasized *ijma* instead of *ijtihad.*[36] The content of this essay was one of the causes of Rahmatulla-alloma's break with Hindustani. Rahmatulla-alloma's ideas found support among some younger believers, a distinct minority compared with the much larger numbers who were satisfied with a simple resurgence in religious rituals and practices, such as pilgrimages (*ziyarat*) to graves of local saints and saints' tombs (*mazar*). Following Rahmatulla-alloma's untimely death, Abduvali qori continued Rahmatulla-alloma's work in the *hujra,* expanding the curriculum to include the history of the caliphate and in general becoming the major voice in the re-Islamization movement during the 1980s and early 1990s.

As the USSR collapsed, Abduvali qori began to spread his message more publicly, talking to crowds at midday prayers and in mosques. He preached the principle found in his fundamental work, *Tafsir,*[37] focusing on key doctrinal and social issues. His lectures were attended not only by his students but also by many devout Muslims who wanted to know more about Islam.

In his sermons, Abduvali qori railed against pilgrimages (*ziyarat*) to graves of so-called saints and evening prayer gatherings (*tahajjud*),[38] except during Ramadan. He also objected to most Sufi rituals, which earned him the term of opprobrium, "Wahhabi," by local clerics.

Isma'il Sattiev (who died in 1976) ran another Salafi *hujra,* or at least an untraditional Hanafi *hujra.*[39] Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf was the father-in-law of Sattiev, who was born in Namangan, where his father, Mullo Sotti Okhund, was an imam. Isma'il Sattiev studied with Ghofur qori and with Sobit-khon tora Saghuni (who died in 1976 in Mecca). In 1927, Sattiev joined the Ahl-i Quran, and from the 1930s until 1942 he was in hiding in Karasu and Batken.

Conclusions regarding the *hujra* system. The existence of *hujra* allowed devout Muslims living in the Soviet Union to meet their obligation by the laws of Sharia to transmit their knowledge of Islam and its laws and to be engaged in Islamic missionary work (*davat*). While this system of education represented an obvious decline from even the colonial-era religious education, it represented sufficient theological vitality to keep Islam alive in the region's religious centers, and, once restrictions were loosened—first during the Soviet

period and then after the area secured independence—allow it to interface with a larger religious world.

Despite the illegal status of many theologians, Islamic clerics continued to have a special status in society and the respect of their communities, although they did not occupy the same central social roles that they had when religious institutions were not only supported by the state but at the center of state power, as was the case until the Russian conquest.

In Central Asia there were never really two kinds of Islam, parallel and official, as has often been depicted in Western writings about religion in the Soviet Union. Rather, there was Islam, a single faith with important theological distinctions dividing clerics who propagated it. But, according to the evidence, SADUM clerics not only interacted with those who were providing religious education not sanctioned by the SADUM, but these clerics in fact sometimes even advanced the careers of the clerics who were providing that education. Whether a cleric was inside or outside of the SADUM system—and sometimes clerics even conducted unsanctioned activities while they earned salaries from the SADUM—was less important than their support of certain sides of major theological questions of the day.

The fact that SADUM clerics did not largely view those who ran *hujra* as enemies helps explain why the institution of *hujra* was able to survive for so long.

Part 2: Islam in Public Life: Efforts to Create a National Ideology

Islam and the Creation of a National Ideology

In the 1990s both the government and the secular opposition saw Islam as offering them a potential source of legitimacy as long as they, rather than the clerics, set the framework for discussion. Both groups believed that incorporating some of the vocabulary of Islam into their political rhetoric would enhance their popular base, leading more devout elements in society to identify with their goals. The fact that secular intellectuals were committed to resurrecting and glorifying Uzbek culture was seen as very positive by much of the white-collar class in society, whether they supported or opposed the government.

Much like the party elite whom they were opposing, the secular intellectuals believed that they were better placed than the clerics to help society interpret Islam. They believed that they could be cultural mediators, able to provide social space and protection for religion, but not allowing the prejudices or inwardly directed priorities of religion to hamstring socioeconomic development of society. The intellectuals took Turkey (of the early 1990s) as their model, believing that it was possible to intellectually embrace Islam without faith dictating social practices but rather influencing them through the judicious application of Sharia norms supporting the sociopolitical ideals of the state.

Like many of their Tajik and Kazakh contemporaries, Uzbekistan's intellectuals viewed Sufism as a source of cultural and spiritual renaissance in the society; in this they again found parallels with the situation in late-twentieth-century Turkey, but here, too, they were invoking a tradition they barely understood.

The intellectuals' political paradigm was defined as a shift from purely secular government to the "presence of Islam." The clerics, of course, rejected the intellectuals' notion that man could somehow pick and choose among the teachings of the faith, deciding which were appealing and which were not useful. The clerics believed that the Quran, hadiths, and, for the Hanafi clerics, the body of literature that interpreted them provided all the guidance that a Muslim needed, with the clerics providing believers with the guidance they needed to try to make their way through these writings. In the eyes of Uzbekistan's clerical elite, it was those learned in Islam, rather than those learned in the secular world, who were the only fit religious guides.

Uzbekistani intellectuals claimed the Jadid reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as their forbearers because they, too, sought ways to balance religious traditions with the tenets of modern society. For the same reason, they also took inspiration from the "Kokand Autonomy," the provisional government organized by Turkestani intellectuals during the interval between the October and the February revolutions. This government also included many Jadid reformers in its membership.[40] This comparison was part of an effort to make late-twentieth-century independence appear as statehood restored. There were differences, though. Most of the early Jadid reformers, especially those active in the prerevolutionary period, came from a religious tradition, but the late Soviet-era reformers were clearly secular figures. The primacy accorded religion by the Jadid has given Uzbek authorities trouble deciding how to evaluate the Jadid figures.[41]

President Karimov and his inner circle recognized that the task of inculcating political loyalty among the citizens of their newly independent country would be a difficult one, but they had substantial resources—more than anyone else—to bring to bear in trying to solve this problem. Despite the government's weakness in the early days of independence, it still controlled critical governmental and nongovernmental institutions, including most of the country's mass media. But the challenge was in what to do with them. Those close to the government during that period have noted that the regime believed itself to have two options: to embrace nationalism or to use Islam as a kind of spiritual-ideological glue that could hold society together.[42]

In the end, Uzbekistan's ruling elite opted for a kind of synthesis between the two. They tried to recast Islam as an alternative ideology for the new government, using the slogan "Our (national) Islam." The new state ideology was put forward as the antithesis of what had been done in communist times when "Moscow in its cruelty" used a repressive economic and social policy that "destroyed the Uzbek people as a historical nation, its culture and sacred religion

of Islam."[43] The depiction of Russia's negative role in the Uzbek past was consistent with Uzbekistan's early foreign policy objectives, when Tashkent sought to reach out to new foreign partners, and relations between Tashkent and Moscow were relatively strained.

The Uzbek government recognized that even after seven decades of anti-religious propaganda, respect for Islam and some identification with Islamic traditional practices remained deeply rooted in Uzbek society. Islam, both its doctrinal teachings and its ritual practices, had survived the Soviet experience, but with strong local variations in religious practices, which in turn served to strengthen the local or regional identities and to broaden the gap between the national center and its peripheries.

The government tried to use the notion of "Our Islam" to create an overarching national identity that would be bolstered by stronger local identities, and for that reason government officials advanced both Islamic (*Islamiylik*) and nationalistic (*Ozbekchilik*) slogans in the first years of independence. To raise the consciousness of Islam, the government resurrected and strengthened the neighborhood communities within cities and towns (*mahalla*), which served as building blocks of regional, or *viloyat,* identities.[44] The regime feared that without its efforts at remediation, these regional identities would lead to the reinforcement of Islam rather than of an Uzbek identity.

Just as the Soviets did earlier, Uzbek government authorities have repackaged history to legitimize secular control and a highly centralized political system headed by a strong executive and to depict both as in accordance with the country's Islamic traditions and practices. Unlike their Soviet predecessors, however, the Uzbek government has sought to do this in the presence of a legal and increasingly more dynamic clerical elite.

Even before Soviet rule, most Uzbeks understood religion as a definer of cultural values; they did not view the faith as being at the core of their lives. Despite formal legal restrictions, most Uzbeks continued to view religion as a source of cultural definition, and that created a hunger to learn and practice Islam when communism fell. In the two decades since, many decided that they were more comfortable with a loose practice of religious traditions than with the imposition of the rigid moral code that would occur if Islamic clerics were to gain political power.

People wanted the freedom to practice Islam, but most seemed to want it on their own terms. Given this evolution in popular sentiment, especially among the older generation, the state policy to press for an "Uzbek Islam" and the state's fight against "extremism," which has led to the closure of many unregistered mosques and religious schools since the mid-1990s, have evoked strong popular resistance. But the state has never been able to determine the content of religious doctrine, or even strongly influence it. Nor has the state been able to fully modify public behavior: It has not been able to change either those who enthusiastically embrace public presentation of religious devotion by wearing

pious religious attire (sometimes termed "Wahhabi manifestations") or those traditional believers who, after large "gifts" to prominent imams to preside over weddings, perform pilgrimages to local holy sites.

Although it is hard to know whether this feeling of Uzbek patriotism dominates over local and primordial ties, the government seems to have succeeded in reinforcing an ethnic identity based around the idea of Uzbek statehood, which, for all the flaws of the current government, does appear to be an accomplished fact. But the regime seems to have failed to integrate into this sense of "Uzbekness" an Islamic identity that is of its own making.

Partly, this inability has been the product of how the regime spread its message. The government pressed many Soviet-era intellectuals to write, for the popular audience, historical exposés and other publications that stress the importance of the Uzbeks' Islamic heritage for Uzbek society. This task was more complex than the secular authorities initially granted, as few intellectuals had the necessary grounding in either traditional Hanafi Islam or local Sufi teachings to execute the task successfully.

Instead, the government-supported writers simply used rationalist and other philosophical arguments to support their writings.[45] This made their texts almost undifferentiated from earlier Soviet antireligious propaganda, reinforcing the already deeply rooted assumption of believers that the state was their enemy. In one particularly telling example of the clumsiness of the state's efforts, Professor A. Askarov, who served as director of the Institute of Archeology and who in Soviet times headed the Uzbek Republic Institute of Scientific Atheism, has during the past decade sought to popularize in the press the idea that the Quran offers refutations of Darwin's theory of evolution. Askarov has become something of a public joke for his efforts.[46]

The Uzbek state has had less success than the preceding Soviet one in nurturing an intellectual class that has achieved public acclaim. Thus, the messenger as well as the message have often lacked credibility. Somehow, the population seems to have sensed that it was much more difficult to rise to the top of the multiethnic Soviet intellectual elite than it has been in the much-narrowed Uzbek national one, so those Uzbeks who had succeeded under the Soviets were revered as having accomplished something substantial, especially if the content of their work struck a public chord as well.

The regime's efforts at defining a role for Islam were also undermined by the corruption that has been rampant in the bureaucracy and by its lack of professionalism. One example of this was the effort by noted Uzbek film director Nazim Tulyakhodjaev, who sought to do an animated film portraying some of the history of Islam but was forced out of the Uzbek film industry because he was only half-Uzbek, as he had an Armenian mother.[47]

Government initiative has sought to use religion in a variety of ways to serve the creation of a new national ideology. These components included the publication of religious literature, an active promotional campaign on television, and

the organization of events to commemorate religious figures of the nation's past. The idea was to do battle against the ideas of the so-called Wahhabis—those who preached a politicized form of Islam—by reemphasizing the importance of "Our (Uzbek) Islam." Numerous slogans, fatwas, and articles were devoted to the theme of asserting patriotism through defeating terrorism: "Let's protect our religion!" (O'z dinimizni himoya qilamiz!), "Let's protect our religion from all enemies!" (Dinimizni yot kuchlardan saqlaylik!), and "We shall never give up our sacred religion!" (Biz muqaddas dinimizni hech kimga bermaymiz!).

Part 3: Islam in Today's Uzbek Education System

Religious education in state secular schools. Beginning in the early 1990s, elementary and middle schools introduced education about Islam into the curriculum. Instruction in "enlightenment and spirituality" (*manaviyat va marifat*) replaced Soviet-era training in "scientific atheism." During these mandatory classes, students were exposed to some basic teachings of Islam in a curriculum that, in the early years of independence, often reflected the wishes of parents rather than that of the central government. As a result, in many areas imams were brought in to provide the instruction, turning many of the classes into Islamic missionary work (*davat*), effectively state-sponsored *hujra.*

This was generally most common in rural areas, and in the Ferghana Valley in particular, where reportedly up to 50 percent of the parents kept their children from attending classes on Fridays.[48] This was particularly true of children in grades five through ten, who were old enough to participate in weekly prayers at the mosque.

It did not take long for the central authorities to become concerned that they were losing control. In 1997–1998, Royiq Bahadirov, President Karimov's adviser on religious affairs,[49] worked on a number of decrees to make sure that the instruction about religion (in primary schools, in particular) would be exclusively secular in nature.

After the 1999 bombings in Tashkent,[50] the state took a further look at how instruction about religion was being approached in the schools. Hamidulla Karamatov and Zuhriddin Husniddinov, serving as first deputy prime minister and the president's adviser on religious affairs, respectively, took the lead in proposing new initiatives "against fundamentalists, extremists, and terrorists."[51]

Instruction relating to Islam was recast to be part of a curriculum on the history of world religions, as policy makers decided that well-rounded youths would be less likely to become extremists. However, those charged with executing this policy often had very different interests at heart.

Rather by chance, coauthor Martha Brill Olcott had the opportunity to meet with the *viloyat* official charged with supervising religious affairs in Ferghana in April 2005, and she was surprised to learn that he had studied in the Al-Azhar

in Cairo.[52] Rather than being focused on spreading a secular-based ideology, he seemed more concerned about making sure that local youth received the "right" exposure to religion. He explained that in Ferghana *viloyat,* at least, local imams provided most of the instruction in the program concentrating on the history of the world's religions, and that these religious leaders were also being called upon to organize a variety of after-school activities in local schools. This official took his own religious inspiration, he explained, from Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf, and he presented Olcott with a gift of some of the mufti's writings.

It is perfectly legal, in fact, to invite clerics to teach in the schools, assuming that they are graduates of the Higher Islamic Institute, which is administered by the Muslim Religious Administration of Uzbekistan. This new policy is one of the changes that Husniddinov made: The government now recognizes the qualifications of religious education institutions' graduate degrees as identical to those from secular institutions with regard to eligibility to work in the primary and secondary schools and in institutions of higher learning.

The general history curriculum also includes a lot of material on the lives of prominent religious figures of the past, and it seeks to explain their legacies in ways that emphasize national values over religious ones. In Soviet style, the state has held elaborate celebrations commemorating landmark birthdays of various religious leaders of the past—Imam al-Bukhari, Imam al-Maturidi, Baha ad-Din Naqshband, Khoja Ahrar, and Abd al-Khaliq Ghijduvani. Commemorative events are held in universities, in public schools, and in academic research institutions. Students and staff have been required to attend, although the state only rarely enforces the attendance requirement.

The educational officials charged with organizing the events have been given only limited information about the historical significance of the religious leaders chosen for commemoration. Not eager for more work, they have often delegated the task of elaborating the legacy of those being commemorated to whoever seemed eager to take on the task. So, once again, the message has often been shaped by clerics or by historians who are themselves devout Muslims.

Overview of institutions teaching Islamic studies. In general, the Uzbek government's effort to introduce a secular view of Islam into the curriculum of schools and institutions of higher learning has been hampered by a shortage of teachers with a secular worldview. The primary secular institution offering instruction in Islamic studies is the Tashkent Islamic University, discussed at length below. In addition, instruction in Islamic studies is offered at the Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies[53] and at Tashkent's Nizami State Pedagogical Institute.[54]

In the early 1990s, the Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies introduced a department of Islamic Studies, which was a degree-conferring program.[55] This project was conceived by the then rector Nematjon Ibragimov,[56]

but the department lacked secular specialists able to serve as professors. Instead, the department brought in young graduates of madrassas and other religious institutions, ranging from graduates of *hujra* to alumni of early educational exchange programs in Saudi Arabia.

Tashkent's Nizami Pedagogical Institute served as something of a magnet for students from religious families, as much by accident as by design, because it is easier to gain admission there than to Tashkent State University. Nearly 70 percent of the students studying there come from the provinces, where teaching is considered a prestigious career option. Rural youth are also much more likely to come from religious families, and even those who are not devout have spent most of their lives living in close proximity with people who are.

More than 80 percent of the members of the faculty teaching Islamic studies at Tashkent's Nizami Pedagogical Institute are employed part-time, and many of them are also employed at Tashkent Islamic University. Roughly 70 percent of the Nizami graduates in Islamic studies go on to become teachers of religion in secondary schools.

Since the early 1990s, numerous philanthropic foundations from Arab countries, secular as well as religious, have sent religious textbooks to academic institutions throughout Uzbekistan. As a result, advanced students with good Arabic language skills have been able to gain exposure to Salafi literature in a completely legal fashion. Salafi religious texts are found in a number of secular institutions, not only in the madrassas.

According to Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, the curricula of both the Department of Religion and Islamic Studies in Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies and the department of Islamic Studies at Tashkent's Nizami Pedagogical Institute include works by authors from the Arab world who are generally considered to be supportive of the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood or other Salafist or radical Islamist authors.[57] Similarly, some of these works are taught in the humanities departments of several provincial universities and even in advanced classes in some secondary schools. In addition, some of this material is taught in courses at several secular higher secondary institutions throughout Uzbekistan.

The Tashkent Islamic University (TIU) was designed to be a secular alternative to the Higher Islamic Institute, which is maintained by the Muslim Religious Administration of Uzbekistan (formerly SADUM). TIU was created as the result of an April 7, 1999, presidential decree calling for the establishment of a "secular education institution that prepares specialists in Islamic studies and Islamic law."

But it has not really served that purpose, and official fears about the spread of Islamic radicalism were so great that the institution was substantially reorganized in 2006.

Initially, almost all members of the faculty at TIU had backgrounds of teaching in religious institutions or were graduates of madrassas and had no teaching experience. This included those teaching secular as well as religious subjects. As

a result, the content and style of the instruction is said to have been frequently far closer to preaching than to secular higher educational instruction. Even more problematic was the lack of supervision of the content of lectures and seminars by the administrators, who never asked faculty members to submit anything resembling lesson plans.

Part of the problem was that the architects of TIU, Hamidulla Karamatov and Zuhriddin Husniddinov, themselves had little understanding of how a Western-style educational system operates, and it was rumored that they took commercial advantage of their posts.

In May 2006 the Uzbek authorities decided to relieve them of their responsibilities and put TIU under the leadership of Shuhrat Akmalevich Yovkochev.[58] Since taking over, Yovkochev has sought to bring in more secular university teachers, largely from other Uzbek universities, and he has promoted secular faculty to positions of responsibility within the university. The new faculty is being brought in largely to replace imams and Al-Azhar graduates.

TIU's curriculum has been revised to reinforce a secular approach to teaching religious texts. Courses taught in the Department of Islamic Studies have been revamped, and a new Department of Religious Studies, where the curriculum is strictly based on secular courses with nonreligious methods of teaching, has been introduced. Yovkochev has also sought to eliminate proselytizing by the faculty and among both male and female students.

According to Bakhtiyar Babadjanov who has taught at TIU,[59] early in his tenure Yovkochev witnessed several female students wearing the black *hijab,* the kind usually worn in Iran but that is not traditional in Uzbekistan. Yovkochev sought to make use of the more liberal members of the teaching staff to offer counterpropaganda, to encourage young women to at least change the *hijab* to a traditional Turkish scarf. The change has been evident; Babadjanov maintains that TIU's female students no longer wear the black *hijab.* Most important, the transformation was made without any pressure and without Soviet-style propaganda meetings. Yovkochev has also placed more weight on the admission interviews and is said to be making an explicit effort to identify pious students and to redirect them to madrassas or to the Higher Islamic Institute under the Muslim Religious Administration of Uzbekistan.

Islam and the Media

Following the bombings in Tashkent in February 1999, Uzbek officials renewed efforts to control the media environment in Uzbekistan, but of course they had difficulty regulating more private aspects of public or semipublic space.

Many clerics see *davat* as the central focus of their religious responsibility, and the most organized of them have prepared audio cassettes for distribution. The content of the cassettes has varied and has included interpretations of Quran and lessons about how to make one's everyday life correspond with the teachings of Islam. These themes are also repeated during Friday sermons and also

when clerics speak at weddings, funerals, and circumcision ceremonies. A key element to the underlying message has been the idea that someone who lives in an Islamic way can enjoy spiritual wealth even without material wealth.

The tapes are designed to create spiritual followers out of the audience of listeners, and only a few so-called extremist clerics have called on the population to move against the secular state. But some among the secular elites have found these sermons to be threatening, believing that the linkage between morality and religion that the clerics have been preaching could lead the secular elites to be judged by believers as unfit for having despoiled spiritual space through their presence in positions of power.

The government has issued decrees that regulate what religious materials are permitted to be sold, but there has been very little follow-through by the authorities. In addition, since the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, the government has sought to regulate the content of the media more closely, and new programming has been designed to combat the ideas of what Uzbek state officials deem Wahhabism and materials of Islamic extremists and terrorists.

Television. According to Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, the quality and popularity of religious programs on television have been slowly decaying during the past few years, and some shows have even been recycling old material from Soviet-era antireligious propaganda materials. Babadjanov also maintains that much of the programming is very static, and even gratuitous, so that both the attacks on religion and its defense are difficult for viewers to identify with, leaving viewers to go elsewhere, to less-controlled environments to get their messages about religion.

Certainly state television sends conflicting messages. For example, it offers programs on science, but at the same time, it offers other programs that maintain that natural phenomena are, in fact, holy creations. Babadjanov believes that these conflicting messages create tension between believers and nonbelievers. He feels that nonbelievers grow more critical of religion, while some, especially provincial youth with very little access to foreign television broadcasts, may be inspired to practice Islam and to follow its canons. It is just as likely that some of the broadcasting merely leaves people confused about the state's intent and more distrustful of the media.[60]

Throughout 2006 and 2007, live or prerecorded religious programming aired on national television for forty-five minutes twice a week, on Tuesdays and Fridays, with additional broadcasting during religious holidays and during the month of Ramadan. Much of this programming featured Anvar qori, the imam-hotib of Tashkent, who discussed moral and ethical issues in Islam.

It is difficult to gauge the appeal of this program because the show rarely discussed social issues of concern to ordinary Uzbeks, such as an individual's relationship to religion and the state; parent-child relations; the impact of friendship; and promotion of more modest weddings, rituals, and religious ceremonies. Many of these issues, though, are covered in local television

programming, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, where live religious programming used to be broadcast almost daily. Since 2003, however, Babadjanov notes that much of the provincial local television programming on religion has been either suspended or sharply reduced.

In Tashkent, ZIYO studio, which is part of Tashkent Islamic University, also prepares television programs for broadcasting, especially during the month of Ramadan. Much of this broadcasting is straightforward Hanafi proselytizing, advising people to follow the norms of Islam and to believe in the existence of an afterlife. Again, it is difficult to gauge audience response.

Radio. Religious themes are discussed in several national Uzbek radio programs that broadcast live and include the opportunity for audience participation. Frequently these shows broadcast questions from listeners trying to get the "straight" answers on religious issues. In addition, one station has had a daily ninety-minute show on Islam. There are similar live programs in several provincial centers, including a very popular program in Urgench that broadcasts discussions of Sufi poetry.

Radio Oriat Dono—FM 106.5 MHz—is a national broadcaster that offers programming only in Uzbek. During the month of Ramadan, the station prepares several religious enlightenment (*dini-ma'rifi*) programs, including "Ramazon Fonusi" (Lighthouse of Ramadan) and "Ko'ngil Hilvati" (Paradise of the Soul). It also offers readings from the Quran, Muslim legends, and even Sufi tales. In late 2006, Radio Oriat Dono broadcast "Ihyo-ul-ulum ad-din," an essay written by Gazali (1058–1111), a well-known Sufi philosopher and prominent cleric of his time. The target audience for the program was between the ages of 25 and 40. Ramadan broadcasting is offered twice a day after fasting [*iftar*]. The program has been hosted by Sanjar Saddulayev and Muhammadali Abduqunduzov, a former deputy minister of culture of Uzbekistan.

Radio Zamin—FM 105.4 MHz—is another national broadcaster. It offers the program "Tazarru" (Confession), which features readings of suras from the Quran. The program tries to deliver a message of repentance but in a manner that is consistent with Islam's rejection of violence. One of the broadcasts from late 2006 featured a speaker who presented a talk on the importance of people's gratitude for the goods they are given. "Tazarr" is a thirty-minute show, which also takes place twice a day before *iftar* during the month of Ramadan. The program has been hosted by Afzal Rafikov, a well-known Uzbek singer.

Radio Navruz—FM 88.4 MHz—is a national station broadcasting almost exclusively in Uzbek. It has offered a program on religion called "Holislik" (Fairness), with former mufti Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf as host. Muhammad-Sodiq usually addresses family-related issues and how people can find answers within Islam for their daily worries; he often refers directly to the Quran and the hadiths. Muhammad-Sodiq has provided his interpretation of the suras and has encouraged the pious to be content with fate; he disavows violence as contrary to the teachings of Islam.

The Internet. Several religious websites in Uzbekistan are popular among a small number of youth. These include the website of Muhammad-Sodiq, www.islam.uz, that was introduced in summer 2003.

The website has featured Muhammad-Sodiq's slogan on *mazhab* unification, which also serves as an opening remark for most of his essays. He generally begins with the following:

> Based on *mazhab, Ahli Sunna va-l-djamaa,* let us all aspire to true religious doctrines [*'akida*], to the purity of Islam, learning of Quran and sunna, and follow its teachings, sharing Islamic enlightenment, conforming to the will of our godly forefathers, the greatest mudjahideen, strengthening our (mutual) tolerance and brotherhood.
>
> Let us seek to destroy a religious illiteracy, cease discrepancies and schism, overcome fanaticism, novelties, and superstitions.

This website was initially sponsored by grants Muhammad-Sodiq received from the embassies of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in Uzbekistan. The website has featured promotional materials on educational opportunities in the Middle East, exchange programs, and academic advancement courses.

Several local Uzbek businessmen have also been contributing financially in order to maintain the website, which is run by Muhammad-Sodiq's son. In return, the website has frequently featured promotional campaigns for their private businesses.

Young Muslim men and women make up the majority of the website's audience, or at least they are the majority of participants in the site's discussion forum. Most of the questions relate to the application of religious doctrines to daily life.

When we monitored the forum in late 2006, the participants asked a wide variety of questions: How can true Muslims properly run a business in a secular state? Is it appropriate to pay the *zakat* tax to mosques? Why does Ramadan start one day later in Central Asian states than in Arab countries? Is it permissible to stop fasting while traveling? Is it abnormal to marry a divorced woman if you have never been married yourself?

The range of questions was very broad, and most of them were derived from the daily routine faced by Uzbek men. Young women, who often prefer to remain anonymous on open forums, also shared their household concerns, raising questions about the relationships within their families or anxieties regarding their marriages. All comments were screened before posting.

Muhammad-Sodiq's website rarely includes discussions on the nature of the relationship between religion and politics, except to offer positions that are supportive of Uzbek government policy. For example, several members of Hizb ut-Tahrir complained that they had sent harsh open letters to Sodiq's website, but the letters were never published.[61]

Tashkent Islamic University also maintains a website, www.tiu.uz, a government-monitored resource with mostly an undergraduate student audience. The website aims to increase religious awareness among young people and provides insightful materials on the general study of Islam. It is accessible within Uzbekistan but does not appear to be particularly popular among the majority of Muslim youth in the nation.

The Muslim Board of Uzbekistan is currently working on developing its new website.

Uzbek Muslims are also drawn to websites outside of the country. One reportedly popular website is Islam Nuri (www.islamnuri.com), which had been maintained by ʻAbd al-Quddus ben ʻAbdu Wali qori, the recently deceased son of Abduvali qori, who was also the nephew by marriage of Rafiq qori Kamolov, a prominent cleric of southern Kyrgyzstan who was killed by Kyrgyz security forces under mysterious circumstances in August 2006. The website has existed since 2000 and has become more politicized in recent years.

Some Uzbek websites that are hosted outside of Uzbekistan also offer discussions of religious themes. For example, www.uzmetronom.com provides a weekly overview of the news published in all local and national press in Uzbekistan. The administrators of the website reside in Moscow and recruit people throughout Uzbekistan to share this information via e-mail. There is a special section on the website devoted to the extracts on religious issues featured in print media. The news is usually brief and concise.

Some Concluding Thoughts

In the past, the Hanafi education system developed in the Central Asian region had several distinctive features. It was theologically conservative, that is, it was averse to change and reinterpretation, and in this regard it sought to distance religion from politics. The curriculum was fairly difficult to master, which meant that the number of Hanafi experts was limited and the state could influence a community of believers more effectively.

Since independence, access to religious education has been made easier. In 2008, though, access is by no means as easy as it was in the early 1990s, and the content is more regulated. But during the past fifteen or so years, the elite status of religious education has largely been lost. So many more state-sanctioned places now teach Islam that the state has had difficulty keeping track of the content of the classes; even when the government is aware of the curriculum, those charged with supervision often lack the ability to make knowledgeable choices about what is in the interest of the state to be teaching. Similarly, the state has found it difficult to eliminate unsanctioned religious instruction, especially if it is offered without much public fanfare. Informal religious study circles (although they are often not called that) do continue to exist, and the state is

almost completely unable to influence the content of this kind of religious education. All of this creates an environment in which there is a continuing risk of the politicization of Islam.

In this environment of relative religious tolerance, at least in comparison with most of the years of Soviet rule, many ordinary Muslims have begun to use a religious yardstick for considering many issues in their everyday lives, including economic, political, social, and even personal affairs. Some—although it appears that very few people yet fit in this category—have begun to think about social and political rules set down by the state as an infringement on the Sharia norms and have come to consider secular forms of government obstacles to the embodiment of a fair Islamic governance.

Thus, the situation in Uzbekistan resembles that of other Muslim countries where founders or leaders of politicized Islam in Muslim countries, and especially leaders of extreme or radical groups, have generally not been classically trained theologians. Instead, they have been individuals who received secular education and renounced the elitist and specific nature of theological education.

In general the system of religious education in Uzbekistan has lost its sense of succession as well as its general systematic character. The Higher Islamic Institute admits applicants with only secondary education, and in most cases these students do not have any special religious training. This same system of admission is being practiced in madrassas. As a result, levels of these educational institutions have become identical, and in some madrassas—Andijan, for example—the level of teaching has generally been higher than at the Higher Islamic Institute.

Religious education in modern Uzbekistan, offered in madrassas and at the Higher Islamic Institute, has lost its exclusively Hanafi orientation and is influenced by teachings from contemporary Arab authors, writings from other juridical schools, and authors who reject the need for maintaining the distinct schools of Sunni Islamic interpretation. This transformation is partially the result of Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf's writings but also reflects the exposure of many other Uzbek clerics to training in, or writing from, the Arab countries and the Islamic world more generally. Young Higher Islamic Institute instructors continue to serve as interns at centers for religious education in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other Arab countries.

In addition, the use of textbooks and manuals written by local Hanafi authors has been reduced, and these materials have been replaced with books written by Suyuti,[62] Sayyid Muhamma 'Id Abbasi, Mahmud al-Istanbuli, Ibn al-Kasir, Nasir al-Albani,[63] and other proponents of fundamentalism and politicized Islam. Moreover, because of limited funding, heads of some institutions for religious education turn to endowments in Muslim countries for financial support, which sometimes comes in the form of textbooks by non-Hanafi authors, and state authorities are generally lax about performing required

inspections of curriculum and libraries. In addition, government officials responsible for the state's policy on religion often lack professional training about Islam and are prey to advisers who may seek to transform the way Islam is practiced in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan is a multilayered society of different regional identities and religious beliefs. So far, the government has failed to popularize a version of religion that stabilizes the social environment in support of the regime. Islam itself, however, has not been discredited, and many practicing Muslims turn to religion in order to find salvation from desperate living conditions. They are willing to listen to nonstate and antistate actors who define Islam in a way that distances their faith from the increasingly unpopular state.

The Uzbek regime is not ignorant of this development and has sought to develop policies that restrain "unsupervised" practices by reintroducing the organized version of Islam. This is a risky strategy, however, as the government must do this in a way that does not increase the discontent of religious believers, especially those in the Ferghana Valley.

The government's choice to use Islam as part of the national ideology means that it will be further judged by its protection of the constitutional guarantees provided for religious believers. Although advocates of Hizb ut-Tahrir[64] or Akromiya[65] have been labeled by civil authorities as violators of Uzbek law because of their commitment to introduce a theocracy, Uzbek Salafi and neo-Salafi clerics are operating fully within the bounds of the law. It is proving increasingly problematic for the government to isolate them without fully recasting the current legal relationship between religion and the state. Failing to isolate these people does not put the Uzbek state at risk, although it may lead to a changed understanding of Uzbek national values in the direction of increasing emphasis on religion and away from asserting the primacy of secularism for the Uzbek nation.

Notes

1 Although Western scholars such as Edward Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present: A Cultural History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990) would take issue with this, the Uzbek government's history books (A. Askarov, *O'zbekiston xalqlar tarixi* [Tashkent: Fan, 1993]) assert the "truth" of this in no uncertain terms.

2 Hanafi is one of the four schools of thought (*madhab*) or jurisprudence (*fiqh*) within Sunni Islam and has been the dominant school in Central Asia. Founded by Abu Hanifa an-Numan ibn Thabit (699–767), it is often depicted as the school most open to modern ideas, although there have also been fundamentalist strains founded by those trained in Hanafi teachings.

3 Salafis are Sunni Muslims who insist that their beliefs are simply pure Islam as practiced by the first three generations of Muslims praised by the Prophet Muhammad in the hadiths.

4 The Timurids were the dynasty to emerge from the Central Asian steppe. In 1370 the eponymous founder, Timur (Tamerlane), who belonged to a Turko-Mongol tribe, settled in Mawara'an-nahr, became master of this province, and established Samarqand as his capital. Within thirty-five years, he subjugated all of Central Asia, greater Iran, and Iraq as well as parts of southern Russia and the Indian subcontinent. After Timur's death in 1405, the empire was divided among his sons, and eventually only Khorasan and Mawara'an-nahr remained Timurid. During the remaining years of the dynasty (until 1506), these territories were ruled by separate branches of the Timurid family.

5 Jadid is the name given to Muslim reformers in the territory of Central Asia in the late nineteenth century. They normally referred to themselves by the Turkic terms *taraqqiparvarlar* (progressives) or simply Yaslar or Yoshlar (Youth). One of their principal aims was the introduction of the *usul i-jadid,* or new methods of teaching, in the *maktab* (schools) of the region. Thus, the term *Jadidism* is normally used to describe their program.

6 *Vaqf* (an Arabic word) means "pious foundation"; it also means "property set aside for religious purposes."

7 The Turkestan ASSR (initially the Turkestan Socialist Federative Republic that existed from April 30, 1918, until October 27, 1924) was created from the Turkestan Krai of Imperial Russia.

8 Munavvar qori Abdurashidkhanov was born in 1878 in Tashkent. Munavvar qori was one of the leading figures of a new reformist movement, called Jadidism, then gaining a foothold in Central Asia. The movement derived its name from its advocacy of the *usul-i jadid,* the new method of teaching the Arabic alphabet to children in the *maktab.* Munavvar qori believed that the enlightenment and

modern education would solve the problems of the community, but the community and its members would have to reorganize themselves in order to achieve this goal. Munavvar qori was executed in 1931.

9 The emirate of Bukhara was a Central Asian state that existed from 1785 to 1920. It occupied the land between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. It was a protectorate of the Russian Empire and was contemporaneous with the khanate of Khiva and the khanate of Kokand.

10 A *qori pochcho* is a relative who is able to read the Quran. This instruction was generally restricted to learning some basic prayers and some *ayyat* from the Quran, normally the first *sura*, the last *ayyat* from *ayat ul-kursi* (Quran 2:251), and some prayers of personal supplication (*du'a*).

11 For detailed discussion on Shami domullah, see Martha Brill Olcott, "Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia," Carnegie Paper no. 77 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2007).

12 Fatwa is an Arabic word that means a legal opinion.

13 *Ibid*.

14 *Ilm ul-faraiz* refers to laws on inheritance and rules for the distribution of inheritances.

15 *Furu' al-fiqh,* or branches of jurisprudence, is one of the major genres of juristic literature and is constituted primarily by rules (positive law).

16 Hojji Ahmadjon Mahdum (Hanafi-Naqshbandi Mujaddidi), from Sarasiya, who was student of Bobo Muhammad, provided information for this paper.

17 *Sayyid* is an honorific title that is given to males accepted as descendants of the prophet Muhammad through his grandsons, Hasan ibn Ali and Husayn ibn Ali, who were the sons of his daughter Fatima Zahra and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib.

18 Babadjanov says this was in fact the term that Salim-hojji himself used.

19 Wahhabism is an orthodox Islamic movement, named after Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703–1792). The term Wahhabi (*Wahhabiya*) is rarely used by members of this group today; the currently preferred term is Salafism. Wahhabism accepts the Quran and hadiths as fundamental texts, interpreted upon the understanding of the first three generations of Islam.

20 We wish to thank students of Salim-hojji (Abdullah-mahsum [age 76]; Ghafformahsum [age 83] from Buke in Tashkent oblast; and the latter's son, Salohiddinmahsum [age 49], imam of the Katar-tal mosque in Tashkent) who were introduced by Babadjanov.

21 *Sunnat* (an Arabic word) is a prayer that is read before the beginning of the formal prayer session in the mosque. Hanafi Muslims believe that this prayer is mandatory, while their Salafi critics believe that it should be omitted.

22 This is discussed at length in Olcott, "Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia," 11–13.

23 Rahmatulla-alloma and Abduhvali qori lived in Kokand and studied with both Hakimjon qori and Hindustani, and each of these men went on to form his own *hujra* (Abduhvali qori's was in Andijan) in which dozens of men from throughout Uzbekistan, and even other parts of Central Asia, were trained.

24 Martha Brill Olcott, "A Face of Islam: Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf," Carnegie Paper no. 82 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2007).

25 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, please refer to Martha Brill Olcott, "Sufism in Central Asia: A Force for Moderation or a Cause of Politicization?" Carnegie Paper no. 84 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2007).

26 Babadjanov, "Sufi *Khalqa*" (unpublished manuscript).

27 The ancestors of Abd al-Vahid Turkistani include: Ahmad Sirhindi (died 1624), also known as "Mujaddad alf as-sani" or "the Reformer of the Second Millennium," as he lived at the beginning of the second millennium of the Muslim chronology; Sayyid Muhammad; Shaykh 'Abd-Allah; Mawlana Miyan 'Abid Shaykh; Muhammad Musa-khan Dahbidi (died 1789); Khalifah Siddiq (died 1795); Khalifah Husajna (died 1833 or 1834); Khalifah Abd al-Sattar ibn Khalifa Husayn; Khalifah Muhammad-Salih; and Khalifa Muhammad-Amin.

28 Babadjanov, "Sufi *Khalqa.*"

29 Kush-ata, also known as Kushchi-ata, is located 15–17 kilometers northeast of the city of Turkestan, which is part of today's Kazakhstan.

30 *Irshad,* in Arabic Sufism, is instruction or guidance (of an adept by a master).

31 Dowud-khon is described in detail in Olcott, "Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia."

32 Olcott, "Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia."

33 In these years, Muhammadjan Hindustani's *hujra* was located inside of Mavlan Charhi mosque in Dushanbe.

34 Babadjanov, who knew some minor members of Abduhakim qori's household, claims that the latter was viewed as wealthy by local standards, and that his sons owned some local stores. One of his sons chaired a silk-processing guild, while another—Abdulbosit Vosiev, the youngest son—followed his father's footsteps. The latter teaches at Kukaldosh madrassa in Tashkent.

35 The essay was written in approximately 1977–1978. Bakhtiyar Babadjanov shared with us an account of this, which he heard from a former student of Rahmatulla-alloma. The essay describes an ideal country, "Musulman-abad," where Islam prospers and people are equal and "worship only to God, but not to any parties, living or dead leaders." Generally, the essay (this is a conditional name) reminds us of a famous essay by Tomazzo Campanella, "The City of Sun."

36 *Ijma* and *ijtihad* are both Arabic words. *Ijma* means consensus, general agreement of legal experts (considered a principle of Islamic law); *ijtihad* means interpretation, independent reasoning (in jurisprudence and theology) on the source texts of Islam.

37 His work *Tafsir al-furqan* was written at that time.

38 *Tahajjud* (an Arabic word meaning ritual), in this sense means the night prayer, which is generally not considered obligatory and not counted among Islam's five daily prayers.

39 For a detailed discussion, see Olcott, "A Face of Islam."

40 The political agenda of the Kokand autonomous government was similar to that of *Shura'-yi 'ulama* (Ulamas Union, 1917, which had branches throughout the Muslim regions of the Russian Empire). The Kokand Autonomy had its own army and local currency yet still remained part of Russian Empire. It was governed by the nationalist wing of local Jadid activists and was defeated by the Bolsheviks after roughly a year of existence.

41 These figures were largely expunged from Soviet history. See G. Hidoyatov and V. Kostetskiy, *O'zbekiston Tarixi* (Tashkent: Fan, 1998).

42 Babadjanov, interviews shared with the author.

43 Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan (speech to the special meeting of the Oliy Majlis (Parliament), August 1991.

44 There are twelve *viloyatlar* in Uzbekistan—Ferghana, Namangan, Andijan, Tashkent, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, Kashkadarya, Syrdarya, Khorezm, Navoi, Samarqand, and Bukhara—as well as the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic.

45 Babadjanov, who is familiar with these tracts, put forward this argument in a communication with authors.

46 Babadjanov, communication with authors.

47 Andrei Kudryashov, "Director Nazim Tulyakhodzhayev is Back in Uzbekistan, Working on a New Film," Ferghana.ru, September 27, 2005, <http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=1063>; and Nazim Tulyakhodjaev, "Krik Dushi ili Razmyshleniya o Sud'be Uzbekskogo Kinematografa," Ferghana.ru, March 1, 2004, www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2625.

48 Babadjanov, based on interviews during the period 2002–2006, communication with the authors.

49 Royiq Bahadirov was born into a secular Uzbek family in Tashkent in 1953. Bahadirov graduated from Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies, he is fluent in Arabic, and he worked in Syria and Egypt. Both of his postgraduate dissertations were on the history of Muslim science. Since 1990, he has worked in the presidential administration, and from 1996 to 1999, he served in an appointed position as the president's adviser on religious affairs. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999.

50 On February 16, 1999, six bombs exploded in Tashkent, killing sixteen people and injuring more than one hundred. Several religious figures suspected of extremism were arrested in the aftermath of this event.

51 Karamatov was first deputy prime minister from 1999 until 2003, and during part of that time he concurrently occupied the post of deputy minister of culture. He then served as ambassador to France. According to Babadjanov, he informally directed religious affairs for the president and organized important commemoration ceremonies. Husniddinov was appointed as the president's adviser on religious affairs immediately following the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, and he served in that post until the end of 2005.

52 Al-Azhar University in Cairo is often described as the "world's oldest university" and "Sunni Islam's foremost seat of learning"; see <www.islamfortoday.com/alazhar.htm>.

53 See Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies. Available at <http://www.tdshi.uz/index.php?newlang=en>.

54 See Tashkent's Nizami State Pedagogical Institute. Available at <http://www.tdpu.uz/index.php?til=2>.

55 The Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies was founded in 1995 and was established on the basis of the Soviet-era Oriental Institute.

56 Nematjon Ibragimov was born in 1964 in Marghilan. He graduated from the Oriental Department of Tashkent State University and worked as an interpreter in Syria before defending his doctorate degree in Moscow. In 1988, he was appointed as rector of the Oriental Department at Tashkent State University. In 1995, he took part in establishing the Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies and remained its rector until 2005. Currently, he is the head of the Islamic Studies department at the Institute.

57 Babadjanov, communication with the authors.

58 Yovkochev was born in Tashkent in 1964, and he graduated from the Oriental Studies Department of Tashkent State University and worked for several years as an interpreter in Egypt. From 1991 to 1996, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was subsequently appointed as first secretary of the embassy of Uzbekistan in Egypt. Beginning in 2000, he worked in the Department of International Relations at Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies while he defended his Ph.D. dissertation on the topic of radical Islamic organizations in Egypt. During 2004–2005, he worked as the director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies, under the auspices of the president's office. Beginning in October 2005, Yovkochev served for ten months as presidential adviser on religious affairs. Yovkochev's academic research was on the challenge of reformation in Islam, particularly on the conflicts between the reformers and conservatives in Islam; this was the subject of his dissertation and is likely one of the reasons that he was given this job.

59 Babadjanov, communication with the authors.

60 *Ibid*.

61 Babadjanov, communication with the authors.

62 Imam Jalaluddin Al-Suyuti (circa 1445–1505), also known as Ibn al-Kutb (son of books), was an Egyptian writer and teacher whose works dealt with a wide variety of subjects in Islamic theology. He was precocious and was already a teacher in 1462. In 1486, he was appointed to a chair in the mosque of Baybars in Cairo.

63 Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani (1914–1999) was an important and influential Islamic scholar of the twentieth century; he specialized in *hadith* and *fiqh* and was a prodigious writer and speaker.

64 Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international, Sunni, pan-Islamist vanguard political party whose goal is to unite all Muslim countries in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate, ruled by Islamic law and headed by an elected head of state (caliph).

65 Akromiya is an Islamist organization founded by Akrom Yo'ldoshev that has been designated as terrorist by the government of Uzbekistan. Appendix 1: System of Official Muslim Higher Education.

Appendix 1: System of Official Muslim Higher Education

The Department of Education, established by the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan in 1992, is responsible for the selection of applicants to institutions for Islamic education throughout the country.* The department also assists the Higher Islamic Institute and secondary special Islamic educational institutions in organizing methodological, cultural, and spiritual seminars; recruiting teaching staff; updating databases; developing curricula; and providing general technical support.

The department also provides textbooks to institutions for religious education. During 2002–2003, these materials included *Mukhtasar-Ul-Vikoya, Shifohiya, Durusun nahviya, Nurul Yakin, Sharhu Aqa 'idut-Tahoviya, Tajvid,* and *Balaghat.* Subjects of textbooks range from history to politics, cultural development to religious education. The curriculum includes instruction on the Holy Quran and *Tajvid,* interpretation of the Holy Quran, *fikh* of Islam, *Aqa'id,* the Holy Quran in Uzbek poetry, Arabic, the ancient Uzbek language, and the history of religion.

Mir-i-Arab Madrassa (Islamic secondary school)

The Mir-i-Arab Islamic secondary special school in Bukhara, well-known in the Muslim world for preparing qualified theologians, was established by Sheikh Mir-i-Arab in 1530–1536 with financial support from Ubaidullokhan, the emir of Bukhara. The school was named after Sheikh Mir Arab Said Abdulla al-Yamaniy, a famous Sufi figure.

The school, located in ancient Shahriston in the central part of Bukhara, occupies a two-story building with 144 *hujra.* Its mausoleum holds graves of Sheikh Mir Arab and Emir Ubaidullokhan of Bukhara as well as others.

Although the school was shut down during the early period of the Soviet colonization, it was reestablished in 1945 and began admitting students in 1946. Virtually all muftis of the Soviet Central Asian republics pursued their education at this academic institution.

Nonetheless, the confessional education offered at the Mir-i-Arab madrassa in Bukhara in the early years of its reestablishment was relatively limited. Many on the teaching staff were only minimally qualified, and the curriculum also included the introduction of Jadidlar methods of combining secular and religious sciences, unacceptable in the confessional education system, plus the even more problematic lectures in the pseudo-patriotic principle of "faithfulness to socialistic ideals."

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* This appendix is based on information from the publication by Jaloliddin Nuriddinov, "The Educational System of Muslim Board of Uzbekistan" (O'zbekiston Musulmonlari Idorasi Ta'lim Tizimi), published in Tashkent in 2003.

In fact, in the first years of its existence the quality of religious education at Mir-i-Arab was lower than education offered in the *hujra,* leaving the authority of those who had received this illegal education, at least those from certain *hujra,* intact. Attempts were made to raise the quality of education offered within the SADUM system. Studies of the Quran and its interpretations (*tafsir*) were augmented with courses on famous collections of *hadith* by Imam al-Bukhari (who died in 870) and Imam Muslim (died in 875) although the courses of instruction reflected the theological preferences of Mufti Ziyauddin Babakhan (served as mufti during 1957–1982). He went so far as to try to adopt courses offered at al-Azhar or other Muslim universities. From 1956 to 1961 there was also an effort to launch a supreme madrassa of "a new kind," which was established in the building of the old Barak-khan madrassa.

The activities of the madrassa were expanded after independence. In 1998 it was reregistered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan and certified by the Committee on Religious Affairs.

The school admits to its three-year program students between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five who possess a basic secondary education. Since Uzbekistan's independence, the number of graduates has been steadily increasing. Only 990 students graduated between 1951 and 1990, but more than 719 students graduated from 1992 through 2001.

Imam Bukhari Tashkent Islamic Institute

The Imam Bukhari Islamic Institute in Tashkent is the only other official religious institution to date its existence from the Soviet period. It commenced its activities in 1971. In 1998 it was officially registered by the Ministry of Justice and received accreditation by the Board of Religion in the Committee of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The institute has two departments—the Department of the Foundations of Religion and the Department of the Law and History of Islam—and three chairs—the chair of religious sciences, the chair of social sciences and humanities, and the chair of foreign languages. There is also a women's group that trains teachers for secondary religious schools.

The institute's programs were designed by the Department of Education, and they incorporate courses on secular subjects, including the history of Uzbekistan, ideals of national independence, philosophy, basics of Uzbek culture, economics, history, critique of religion and politics, foreign languages, computer science, ecology, pedagogy, and a number of other disciplines as well as courses on the history of Islam, readings of the Quran, *fikh,* and Arabic. The institute continues to modify its curriculum to bring it closer to state educational standards.

The institute started by accepting only twenty applicants a year, and the number of students has gradually increased, with more than two hundred young people presently studying at the institute. Graduates of the institute find

employment in government (including in the committees on religion in various ministries), the private sector (for example, the Mawara'an-nahr publishing group), and in secondary institutions for Islamic education throughout the country. Other graduates continue to advance their religious education at the Tashkent Islamic University, the Tashkent State University of Oriental Studies, and at many other institutions for higher education.

To augment their expertise, the institute's faculty is presented with opportunities to travel to Medina and Al-Azhar in Cairo.

State Secondary Schools or "Colleges"

Since independence, the Uzbek government has allowed for the creation of a number of state-sanctioned Islamic secondary schools, often called "colleges." The idea behind these schools is to satisfy increased public demand for religious instruction, yet keep it under state supervision. Most of what follows below comes from materials prepared by Uzbekistan's Muslim Religious Board. It obviously portrays the schools in the most favorable light possible. In reality the quality of instruction is quite uneven, and the degree of state supervision is imperfect.

Ko'kaldosh Islamic Secondary Special School. The Ko'kaldosh Islamic Secondary Special School occupies the building of the Ko'kaldosh madrassa, previously known as the madrassa of Darveshkhon, in Tashkent. Founded in the sixteenth century, the school has gone through several reconstructions, particularly after it was partially destroyed by the earthquakes of 1866 and 1886.

The school has a faculty of twenty-eight highly qualified instructors. The curriculum includes courses on the Quran, *hadith,* calligraphy, and other religious subjects. Students also study literature, English, environmental sciences, geography, physics, mathematics, astronomy, computer science, and a number of other secular disciplines.

In 2001–2002, 179 students were enrolled in the school, and fifty-nine graduates continued their education at the Institute of Islam.

Khadichai Kubro Islamic Special Secondary School for Girls. The Khadichai Kubro Islamic Special Secondary School for Girls, located in the building of the Ahmadjon Qori mosque in the Sobir Rahimov district of Tashkent, was registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan, decree no. 26, on April 25, 1997, and commenced its activities on September 2, 1997.

The name of this educational institution comes from Ummul Mu'minin, the mother of the all faithful and the honored wife of the Prophet Muhammad, although originally the school was named after Eshon Bobo. In 1998 the school was reregistered and given a new name, Khadichai Kubro.

The primary purpose of the school is to provide the women of Uzbekistan with knowledge of the Quran, *tajvid, fiqh, aqa'id, hadith,* and Arabic. In 2003,

114 female students were enrolled at the school. This was a significant increase; in prior years the enrollment did not exceed seventy-five students.

In the academic year 2000–2001, the school augmented its curriculum with secular subjects, including chemistry, physics, astronomy, biology, mathematics, and computer science. The quality of the teaching staff is said to have also improved, with twenty-six out of thirty-three members of the faculty holding university degrees. Fourteen female teachers, graduates of the Tashkent Islamic Institute, have become the first women in Uzbekistan to pursue higher education in religion.

Imam Al-Bukhary Islamic Secondary Special School. The Imam Al-Bukhary Islamic Secondary School, named after Muhammad ibn Ismail who was born in 810 in the city of Bukhara, was built in the Pay-Arik district of Samarqand. On January 22, 1999, the school was certified by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan and was licensed to become a *hadith* center.

There are 90 students enrolled in academic programs at the school. The curriculum includes courses on *hadith* and the Quran as well as the history of Uzbekistan, mathematics, physics, and foreign languages.

Khoja Bukhoriy Islamic Secondary Special School. The school is named after Said Akhmad Vali Kulakduz Khoja Bukhoriy, one of Naqshbandi's close relatives who came to Kitab, the city in Kashka Darya oblast where the school is located, to popularize Naqshbandi *tariqat* and settle there. The school commenced its activities on September 2, 1992, and was authorized by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan on November 6, 1998.

The primary purpose of the school is to train professional imam *hatib* and teachers of Arabic. The curriculum includes general and special courses on *tafsir,* the Quran, *aqoid,* and *hadith* teachings as well as the secular subjects of mathematics, physics, chemistry, English, and Arabic. The school is well equipped with modern technologies. In 2001, in order to increase the quality of education offered at this institution, the school's administration introduced a grading system.

By 2002 more than 500 students were enrolled in the school, and 339 of them had graduated from it.

Mulla Kirghiz Islamic Secondary Special School. Mulla Kirghiz Islamic Secondary Special School in Namangan was established in 1991. It was named after Mulla Kirghiz Okhund, born in Namangan in 1850 and known as an agricultural expert, particularly in the specialties of silkworm breeding and growing cotton. Mulla Kirghiz Okhund, an excellent reader of the Quran who was devoted to his religion and belief system, died in 1922 at the age of seventy-two.

The school has six classrooms, a library, a computer class, a dormitory for fifty students, and additional study rooms.

Sayyid Mukhyiddin Makhdum Islamic Secondary Special School. This Andijan school, named after Hazrat Sayyid Mukhyiddin Makhdum, was established in 1992 on the initiative of the Jalabek (from the Oltinkul district of Andijian) village activists. In 1998 the school was registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan and given license no. 14. On January 22, 1998, it secured special license no. 7, which allowed the school to continue its activities.

The curriculum consists of more than twenty disciplines, including both religious and secular subjects such as the Quran, *hadith*, Arabic language, Islamic jurisprudence, the history of Islam, Uzbek literature, geography, mathematics, and computer science.

The school's building, equipped with electricity, gas, water, and central heating, has thirteen classrooms, a medical room, a cafeteria, and other administrative units.

Juibori Kalon Islamic Special Secondary School for Girls. The Juibori Kalon Islamic Special Secondary School for Girls in Bukhara was opened on September 2, 1992, and registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan on August 10, 1998. The school specializes in training teachers of Arabic and ethics. The curriculum includes courses on the history of religion, foundations of Islam, the Quran, *fiqh, hadith, tafsir,* the history of Uzbekistan, ideas of national independence, basics of a spiritual life, foreign languages, literature, chemistry, and other disciplines.

The school, located in a seventeenth-century building, has a library containing more than 1,500 books in Uzbek and in foreign languages, more than 500 books on specialized subjects, and a reading hall.

Mukhammad Ibn Akhmad-Al Beruny Islamic Secondary Special School. The school, named after Aby Rayhon Mukhammad ibn Akhmad al Beruny (973–1048), occupies the building of the Mukhammad Imam Ishan mosque in Nukus, capital of Karakalpakstan. It was registered by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan on October 15, 1998.

The curriculum of this school, aside from religious classes, includes a course on the secrets of hairdressing, available only to second- and third-year students. Students also have an opportunity to study works of famous philosophers, including essays by Akhmad Yassaviy, Sufi Alloyor, Navoi, Saadi, Khodjjniyoz, Berdakh, and Makhtumquli.

Imom Fakhriddin ar-Roziy Islamic Secondary Special School. The school, named after the well-known scientist, Imom Fakhriddin ar-Roziy (1148–1210), and located in the city of Urgench in the Khorezm oblast, takes pride in its library of more than 3,500 books on religion and world literature.

Appendix 2:
Ko'kaldosh Islamic Secondary Special School*

APPROVED

by rector A. Matqulov, "Ko'kaldosh" Specialized Education Institution, Tashkent 2004

O'zbekistan Muslims Board

The list of textbooks currently available on religious courses in the library of "Ko'kaldosh" Specialized Islamic Education Institution

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Author	Notes
Qur'oni karim (*Holy Qur'an*)	65		17 out of 65 copies are new
Tajvid (*book of rules for proper pronunciation in Qur'an recitation*)	100	A. Bahromov	
Tajvid (*book of rules for proper pronunciation in Qur'an recitation)*	40	Munavvar qori	
Tafsiri jalolayin (*Commentary on Qur'an)*	16	Imom Mahalliy va Suyuti	
Mishkotu sharif	1–20 2–2. 3–2	Tabriziy	
Manhal hadis	500	Musa shohin. Abuloli	
Aqoid	120	D. Nasriddin	
Shahr aqoid tahoviy	60	Tahoviy	
Fiqh ul-akbar	700	Abuhanifa	
Nur ul-yaqin	90	Huzariy	
Tarixi muhammadiy (History of Muhammad)	29	Alixonto'ra sog'uniy	
Nur ul-basar	75	Sayyid Mahmud tarozi	
Muxtasar	18	Tojish Sharia	
Tashil az-zaruriy	5	Muhammad oshiq	
Islom maz. Oqim yo'nalish (Course on Islam)	200	Z. Husniddinov	
Durus un-nahv	27	Azhar shayxlari	
Mabdaul qiroat – 1	100	S. Bekpo'lat	
Mabdaul qiroat – 2	85	S. Bekpo'lat	
Shifohiya (Treatment, esp. by means of Qur'an recitation)	95	Ahmad hodiy maqsudiy	
Mukammal sarf darsligi (Course on complete morphology [as an Islamic science])	145	D. Nasriddin	

* These tables are exact reproductions of materials we received from faculty member of Tashkent Islamic University.

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Author	Notes
Balog'at fanidan maruza mathi (Report on the subject of the legal age)	93	Z. Sharipov	
Mustalah hadis fanidan maruza mathi (Report on Mustalah *Hadith*s)	19	J. Hamroqulov	

APPROVED

by rector A. Matqulov, "Ko'kaldosh" Specialized Education Institution, Tashkent 2004

O'zbekistan Muslims Board

The list of textbooks currently available on secular courses in the library of "Ko'kaldosh" Specialized Islamic Education Institution

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Author	Notes
Ideas of National Independence and basics of spirituality	18	M. Qarshiboyov	9th Grade
Literature	15	M. Mahmudov	For College level
Information Science and Information Technologies	28	A. Sattarov	For College level
Information Technologies	48	A. Abduqodirov	For College level
Physics. Lab work	29	J. Nurmatov	For College level
Biology. Lab work	40	B. Ismoilova	For College level
Chemistry	40	S. Masharipov	For College level
Geometry	30	M. Sayfullayev	For College level
Inorganic Chemistry	19	S. Teshaboyev	9th Grade
History of Uzbekistan	4	N. Jo'rayev	11th Grade
World History	5	G. Hidoyatov	10th Grade
History of World Religions	16	T. Jo'rayev	10th Grade
Algebra	7	O. Alimov	10th–11th Grade
Uzbek Literature	18	B. Qosimov	10th Grade
Practical Geography	7	A. Rafiqov	9th Grade
Physics	13	M. Shaxmayev	11th Grade
Russian Language	24	S. Karimov	7th Grade
English	4	Bonk	2nd Part

Head of "Kukaldosh" Special Islamic Education Institution Library — J. Xolmo'minov

APPROVED

by rector A. Matqulov, "Ko'kaldosh" Specialized Education Institution, Tashkent 2004

O'zbekistan Muslims Board

The list of textbooks currently available in the library of
"Ko'kaldosh" Specialized Islamic Education Institution

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Translation of Holy Qur'an	5		A. Mansur
Islam Encyclopedia	9		
Mug'niy	1	Fiqh (Islamic Law)	New
Avnul boriy	4	Hadith	
Tafsiri hilol (Hilol Commentary)	49	Commentary	
Hadith (sahihul Buxoriy)	2	Hadith	New. Available in Uzbek
Tarojimul abhor	4		
Manhalul Hadith		Hadith	
Tashilul bayon	2	Commentary	2-Volume Edition
Sahihul Buxoriy	1	Hadith	2-Volume Edition
Fathul qodiyr	1		3rd Volume
Zodul maod			3rd, 4th, and 5th Volumes
Tafsirun nasafiy	2	Commentary	2-Volume Edition
Tasfisi ibni kasir	1	Commentary	4th Volume
Tafsiri fotiha (Commentary on prayers [*sura*s])	2	Commentary	
Tafsiri no'moniy	1	Commentary	
Naylul author	1		1st Volume
Riyozus solihiyn		Hadith	
Al muvolatu val muodatu	2		1st Volume
Musnadu Ishoq ibn Ibrohim	4		
Kitobu sayril kabir	1		
Kitobus siqot	1		9th Volume
Kofiy	1		1st Volume
Kafvul asari fiy sofvi ulumil asar	1		
Majmaul bahrayni fiy zavoidul mu'jamayni	1		6th Volume
Mavsuatu asaril ulamoi val mutaxas-sisiyna fish shariy'atil islomiyya	1		
Al istiqomatu	1		2nd Volume
Nahv va sarf	1		
At tabaqotul kubro	9		1st Volume

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Tarhut tashriybi fiy sharhit taqriyb	1		
Devonul Buxoriy	1		
Al azkaru	1		
Ma'rifatus sahobati	2		1st and 3rd Volumes
Ravzatun naziyr va jannatul munzir	3		
Nashrul munudi ala maroqisiq suudi	1		Books 1–2
Tafsirul Qur'on (Imom Abdurazzoq)	2		Books 2 and 3
G'azavotul kubro	2		Books 3 and 4
Sharhul aqiydatut Tahoviy	1		Book 2
Iqtizous sirotil mustaqiym	1		Book 2
Vujubu luzumil jamoati va tarkit tafarruqi	1		Book 9
Vifoqul mafhum	1		
Siyratu xotamin nabiyyin	2		
Manozilul ibod minal ibod	8		
Bizkim o'zbeklar… (Who are we, the Uzbeks?)	2		
Diyanet	3	Magazine	In Turkish
Al qiroatul arabiyya	5	Mutolaa	conscientious reading
Unmuzaj	37	Mutolaa	conscientious reading
Al qiroatu bal anoshiyd	13	Mutolaa	conscientious reading
Uzbek-Arabic-Russian Dictionary	11	Dictionary	
Learning the Constitution of Uzbekistan	5	Literature	
Physics. Exercise book	4	Handout material	
Veterinary Science	3	Literature	
Uzbekistan	3	Magazine	
Imom Bukhoriy	8	Magazine	
O'zbekistan mustaqillik yillarida (Uzbekistan during the years of Independence)	3	Literature	In English
Islom ziyosi o'zbegim siymosida (Light of Islam in Uzbekistan)	3	Literature	
Chag'oniyon tarixi	3	Literature	
Mustaqil O'zbekiston Respublikasi (Uzbekistan – Independent Republic)	2	Literature	
Rivojlanishning O'zbekiston modeli (Uzbekistan's development model)	3	Literature	
O'zbekiston XXI asrga intilmoqda (Uzbekistan, setting sights on the XXI century)	2	Literature	

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Olti asr adolati (Justice of six centuries)	4	Literature	
O'zbekiston tarixiy burillish pallasida (Uzbekistan on turning period of history)	2	Literature	
O'zbekiston buyuk kelajak sari (Uzbekistan towards the great future)	2	Literature	
Biz uchun xalqimiz, vatanimiz manfaatidan ulug' maqsad yo'q (There is no greater goal for us than the prosperity of our people and the motherland)	7	Literature	
Vishiy zakondatelniy organ respubliki Uzbekistan (Supreme legislative branch of the Republic of Uzbekistan)	1	Literature	In Russian
Ozod va obod vatan… (Free and well-ordered motherland…)	2	Literature	In English
Uzbekistan	5	Literature	In English
Uzbekistan	10	Literature	In Russian
Rodine — kajdiy iz vas v otvete (Everyone has responsibility to his motherland)	2	Literature	In Russian
Nasha bolshaya sel — nezavisimost (Our greatest goal is the Independence)	1	Literature	I. A. Karimov
Adolat, vatan va xalq manfaati har narsadan ulug' (Justice, motherland, and peoples' prosperity are, above all, the greatest priorities)	3	Literature	I. A. Karimov
Ideology the uniting principle of nation	3	Literature	I. A. Karimov
Uzbekistan. The road of…	2	Literature	I. A. Karimov
Tinchlik uchun kurashmoq kerak (Peace requires fighting for it)	1	Literature	I. A. Karimov
Bizdan ozod va obod vatan qolsin (Let the free and well-ordered motherland be left after us)	1	Literature	
O'zbekiston qahramonlari (Heroes of Uzbekistan)	1	Literature	
Proteolititeskiy ferment rastitelnoy prirodiy (Mineral ferments of vegetation)	5	Literature	
Jahongashta Boburnoma	1	Literature	
O'zbekiston o'zligi (Uzbekistan as it is)	1	Literature	
Buyuk siymolar (Great heritage)	1	Literature	About scientists
Buxoro xalqning xasrati tarixi (A history of the tragedy suffered by the Bukharian People)	1	Literature	

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Sharof Rashidov	1	Literature	
Shahidlar shoxi (Sheikh of freedom fighters)	1	Literature	
Sanga ko'ngil bersam… (If I give you my heart…)	1	Literature	
Ulug'bek	1	Literature	
Parrandachilikdan amaliy mashg'ulot (Poultry-keeping manual)	2	Literature	
Oriyat va matonat (Honor and resistance)	1	Literature	
Futvvatnomai sultoniy…	12	Literature	
Jaloliddin va O'yto'lin	3	Literature	
O'zbekiston qadimgi gidrotexnika inshaotlari (Uzbekistan historical water engineering constructions)	2	Literature	
Hikmatli latifalar (Wisdom in expressions)	2	Literature	
Fantamas	1	Literature	
Shijoat va ijod (Courage and creativity)	2	Literature	
Dil faryodi (a cry from the heart [cri de coeur])	1	Literature	
Tib qonunlari (Laws of medicine)	1	Literature	
Hofiz Xorazmiy	1	Literature	
Ahmad Yassaviy	1	Literature	
Kunbotardagi bog' (Sunlit garden)	1	Literature	
Qo'rg'onlangan oy (A month that passed by)	1	Literature	
Shamol o'yini (Game of the wind)	1	Literature	
Farzandlar jannat rayxonlari (Children are the flowers of life)	3	Literature	
Qahrli kunlar (Days of fury)	1	Literature	
Oq fotiha	1	Literature	
Qafasdagi qush orzusi (Caged bird's dreams)	1	Literature	
Yunusobod	1	Literature	
G'oyalar kurashi (Struggle of the ideas)	4	Literature	
Adabiyot nodir (Rare literature)	1	Literature	
Sprut	1	Literature	
Oydin kechalar (Moonlit nights)	1	Literature	
Temuriylar davri yozma manbalarida Markaziy Osiyo (Central Asia during the Temurids)	2	Literature	

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Oydin orzular (Moonlit dreams)	1	Literature	
Iblisning qasosi (Revenge of the Devil)	1	Literature	
Ibrohim G'ofurov	1	Literature	
O'rozjonning qismati (Fate of hopes)	1	Literature	
Yoz kuni (Summer day)	1	Literature	
Zulfiya	3	Literature	
Baxor (Spring)	1	Literature	
Muhabbat (Love)	1	Literature	
Fidoiylik hayot mazmuni (The meaning of life found in self-sacrifice)	1	Literature	
Petun zik untuk haji dah umrah	1	Literature	
Kashful-karbat	1	Literature	
Momoguldiroq	1	Literature	
Al-xushu' fis-solati	1	Literature	
G'oyaviy immunitet (Immunity for ideology)	1	Literature	
Kelajakka maktub (Message to the future)	1	Literature	
Furqat she'riyatidan	1	Literature	
Tirilish (Reviving)	1	Literature	
Biz kim o'zbeklar… (Who are we, Uzbeks?)	5	Literature	
O'zbek adabiyoti masalari (Excercises on Uzbek literature)	1	Literature	
Vafodor	1	Literature	
So'z san'ati gultoji (The art of self-expression)	1	Literature	
Buxorolik bir yigit (One young man from Bukhara)	1	Literature	
Kelajak ko'zgusi (Mirror of the future)	1	Literature	
Lisonut-tayr	1	Literature	
Xusumat (Enmity)	1	Literature	
Adabiyot va zamon (Literature and time)	1	Literature	
Hamid Ziyoyev	2	Literature	
Saylanma (Selections)	1	Literature	
Turkiston qayg'usi (Grief of Turkistan)	1	Literature	
Meros (Heritage)	3	Literature	
Yulduzli tunlar (Starlit night)	1	Literature	
Alisher Navoiy	1	Literature	
Tirilish (Reviving)	1	Literature	
Qur'on va mauzer	1	Literature	

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
O'zbekiston Respublikasi (Republic of Uzbekistan)	1	Literature	
Hamza	1	Literature	
Xazinalar jilosi (The beauty of treasures)	1	Literature	
Kevontlar uylanishi	1	Literature	
Behbudiy	1	Literature	
Temurnoma	1	Literature	
Jaloliddin Rumiy	1	Literature	
Chet adabiyoti tarixi (History of world literature)	1	Literature	
Yangi Xamsa (New Xamsa famous piece by Alisher Navoi)	1	Literature	
Judolik diyori (Motherland of separation)	1	Literature	
Boburnoma	1	Literature	
Bozor	1	Literature	
Sug'diyona	1	Literature	
Xamsa	1	Literature	
Pol Anderson	1	Literature	
Islom huquqshunosligi (Jurisprudence of Islam)	6	Fiqh (Islamic Law)	In Uzbek
Usuli fiqh (Foundations of Islamic law)	47	Fiqh	In Uzbek
Muxtasar	7	Fiqh	In Uzbek
Hidoya	1	Fiqh	In Arabic
Niqoya	1	Fiqh	2nd Volume only. In Arabic
Izhorul haq	2		
Shamoili muhammadiya	2	History	
Shayx Ziyovuddin ibn Eshon Boboxon	3	History	In Uzbek
Qadimgi Arabiston va ilk Islom	1	History	
Hamma hayron (Everyone is surprised)	2	Literature	
Tarix va badiiy talqin (History and artistic sermon)	1	Literature	
Muhabbat shevasi (Love dialect)	2	Literature	
Aholi uchun yuridik ma'lumotnoma (Public law directory)	6	Literature	4th, 5th, and 6th edition
O'zbekcha-arabcha so'zlashgich (Uzbek-Arabic phrase book)	2	Dictionary	

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Gullarning ra'nosi (Beauty of flowers)	2		
Amir Temur va uning jahon tarixdagi o'rni (Amir Temur and his place in world history)	3	Literature	
Mushuklar saltanati (Kingdom of cats)	2	Literature	
Paxmoq (Flannel)	2	Literature	
Ehtirom (Respect)	2	Literature	
Ot kishnagan oqshom (Evening with horse neighing)	1	Literature	
Quvonch kaliti (Key from the joy)	1	Literature	
Luqmoni Hakim	1	Literature	
Azim Suyun	1	Literature	
Oybek	1	Literature	
Kitobi haj	2	Literature	
Jangoh lolalari (Tulips of battlefields)	2	Literature	
O'qish kitobi (Book of learning)	2	Literature	
Arabcha o'rganamiz (Let's learn Arabic)	2	In Arabic	2nd Volume only
Siyratun nabiy	3	History	
Qisasun nabiyyin	3	History	Book 4
Muqarrarul hadis	5	Hadith	2nd Volume (4 books); 3rd Volume (1 book)
Muqarrarut tafsir	1	Tafsir	Book 3
Suvarun min hayotis sahoba	6	History	4th Volume
Hadis	2	Hadith	In Turkish. Book 1
Al-mamlakat S.A.	2	Literature	
Mahabbatur rasul	2	Literature	
Evrikaga qarshi fitna	1	Literature	
O'zbekiston Milliy ensiklopediyasi (National encyclopedia on Uzbekistan)	1	Literature	
Anglo–Russkiy slovar (English–Russian Dictionary)	1	Dictionary	
Islom ziyosi (Light of Islam)	6	Literature	
Ta'limimiz ist. Haq	1	Literature	
Shox va shoir (The Sheikh and the poet)	1	Literature	
Mashrabi mu'tabar o'zim	1	Literature	
O'rta maxsus o'quv dasturi (Secondary special education program)	1	Literature	
Qasida (Ode)	1	Literature	

Name of Textbook	Quantity	Type	Notes
Korolevstvo S. Araviya (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)	5	Literature	
O'zb. Ala tariqqil mustaqbalil aziyym	1	Literature	
Dalilul hajji val umrati	2	Literature	
Huququl insoni fil Islomi va tatbiqotuha	1	Literature	
Ar-rihobut tohirun	2	Literature	
Manozilul ibodi minal ibodati	3	Literature	
Bednie lyudi (Poor people)	1	Literature	F. M. Dostoevsky, In Russian
Pod belimi kupolami (Under the white dome)	1	Literature	In Russian
Sailut targ'ibi va anvoihi fiy da'vatin nabiyyi	2	Literature	
Tanmiyatun va hazoratun	1	Literature	
Talhizul fiqhi sifati solatin nabiyyi	1	Fiqh	
Mutoalatul arabiyya	3	Literature	Book 3
At-ta'birul lug'aviy	2	Literature	
Aqidatul yahud	2	Literature	
Eski o'zb.yozuvi (Old Uzbek written language)	1	Literature	
Fiy xizmati zuyufir rohman	1	Literature	
Islom va dunyoviy-ma'rifiy davlat (Islam and enlightened countries)	55	Literature	In Russian, Uzbek
Al-moturidiya va Samarqand sunniylik ilohiyoti (Al-Moturidiya and Samarkand Sunni theology	30	Literature	
Materiali mejdunarodnih konferentsiy (Documents from international conference)	10	Literature	
Imlo lug'ati (Spelling Dictionary)	1	Dictionary	
Mirzo Ulug'bek	1	Literature	Odil Yoqubov
Javomil kalim	57	Literature	
Turkiston qayg'usi (Grief of Turkestan)	140	Literature	
Islom ma'rifati (Enlightenment from Islam)	140	Literature	
Quron qissalari (Stories for Qur'an)	9	Literature	
Inson ko'rki-odob (Well-accomplished human being)	9	Literature	
Ustozlar davrasida (In the circle of teachers)	1	Literature	

Ko'kaldosh Islamic Secondary Special School

The number of admitted and graduated students

Academic Year	Total number of admitted students	Total number in graduating class
1999–2000	62	59
2000–2001	58	35
2001–2002	25	37
2002–2003	48	59
2003–2004	22	51
2004–2005	39	34

Advanced students class enrollment

Academic Year	Courses							Total
	Arabic	*Tafsir*	*Fiqh*	*Hadith*	*History of Islam*	*Qur'an*	*English*	
2002–2003	2	3	3	3	2	6	3	**22**
2003–2004	4	2	4	4	2	7	4	**27**
2004–2005	4	33	4	5	4	8	4	**32**

Specialized courses curriculum

Name of the Course	Total amount of hours taught
Qur'oniy Karim va Tajvid (Holy Qur'an)	562
Aqoid	260
Fiqh	540
Tafsir	440
Hadith	540
Islom Tarixi (History of Islam)	224
Dinlar Tarixi (History of religions)	76
O'zbek mumtoz adabiyotida Qur'on mavzulari (Selected Uzbek literature on issues of Qur'an)	76
Mazhablar va yonalishlar (Factions and parties)	64
Arab tili (Arabic)	664
Hatoba	64
Eski O'zbek Tili (Ancient Uzbek language)	40
	3516

General Courses Curriculum (in details)

Name of the Course	1st Year		2nd Year		3rd Year		4th Year		Total number of hours
	Semesters								
	1	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	*1*	*2*	
Uzbek Language and Literature	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	**120**
Russian Language	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	**120**
Foreign Language	*40*	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	**160**
History	*40*	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	**160**
Individual and Society	-	-	-	*40*	-	-	-	-	**40**
Mathematics	*40*	*40*	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	**200**
Information Technology	-	-	-	*40*	*40*	*40*	*32*	*32*	**184**
Physics	*60*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	**140**
Astronomy	-	-	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	**40**
Chemistry	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	-	**80**
Biology and Ecology	-	-	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	**80**
Economic Geography	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	-	**80**
Physical Education	*40*	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	**160**
Foundations of Government and Law	*40*	*40*	-	-	-	-	-	-	**80**
Foundations of Spirituality	-	-	-	-	*40*	-	-	-	**40**
Pedagogy	-	-	-	-	*40*	*40*	-	-	**80**
Family Psychology	-	-	-	-	-	*40*	-	-	**40**
Aesthetics	-	-	-	-	-	*40*	-	-	**40**
Professional language for government	-	-	-	-	*40*	*40*	-	-	**80**
Language study	-	-	*40*	*40*	*40*	*40*	-	-	**160**
TOTAL	**420**	**400**	**400**	**320**	**240**	**240**	**32**	**32**	**2084**

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