

Occasional Papers

**The US and Yemen:
A Half-Century of
Engagement**

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The US and Yemen: A Half-Century of Engagement

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There are times when it is more productive to speak softly and gain confidence than only brandish a big stick and thereby maintain an atmosphere of misunderstanding, resentment, and festering hostility.

—J.E. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens and Superpower*

Involvement

Yemen has rarely played a prominent role in America's foreign policy or in its national discourse. In fact, until the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the Yemeni port city of Aden, statements on Yemen often elicited the question: "Where is that?" Yemen is a conservative, Islamic, tribal, Arab nation located in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula. Although Yemen currently produces 438,500 barrels of oil per day, it is considered one of the world's twenty-five least developed countries,¹ with an estimated per-capita GDP of \$508 in 2003 and a literacy rate of only 50 percent.²

Yet notwithstanding Yemen's poverty and perceived unimportance, since 1946 the United States has maintained varying levels of contact with it. Several factors have contributed to this continued engagement, including strategic location, Cold War realities, regional stability, and terrorism. As with the rest of the Middle East, external influences have been a significant force in shaping Yemen. According to Avi Shlaim, "the key to . . . Middle East [development] lies in the relations between outside powers and local forces."³ As the United States has been an important actor—and is now a primary actor—in Middle East affairs, an understanding of US policy toward Yemen is therefore essential in understanding its contemporary history, culture, and politics.

This paper aims to delineate the nature of US engagement in Yemen over the span of said bilateral relationship and, in particular, the goals and effects of US policy toward Yemen. Has the United States followed a consistent policy line toward Yemen, or has US policy been haphazard and unevenly applied? What effects, intended or unintended, has our engagement had upon Yemen? Has it strengthened our bilateral relations? What form should bilateral engagement take in the future?

This paper is organized as follows. After defining the various levels and types of engagement, I outline the recent history of Yemen to provide an appropriate context for the reader. In the main section of the paper, which follows, I examine in depth specific programs and activities through which the United States has sought to influence the Yemeni government on matters of local and regional policy. In the final section, I analyze American-Yemeni relations with regards to major issues of the post-World War II political landscape and assess the effectiveness of US policies. I conclude with recommendations for future policy approaches to engage Yemen.

I. DEFINITIONS

Terms such as “influence” and “economic assistance” are often used indiscriminately and ambiguously. It is essential therefore that these terms be defined and consistently used and applied. In the following section, I establish clear and concise definitions for the major terms and concepts used in this paper to describe international engagement.

Engagement may be defined as a foreign policy approach that uses “involvement and interaction as opposed to isolationism.”⁴ This definition implies that a nation-state may, in order to shape the perceptions and influence the behavior of other nation-states, opt to use various forms of interaction, including diplomacy and economic and moral suasion. Engagement may be used as a primary foreign policy strategy or may be combined with more negative approaches, such as sanctions.

Levels of Engagement

This paper distinguishes three different levels of engagement: influence, involvement, and intervention. *Influence* usually connotes normal diplomatic interaction between nation-states and may be defined as the attempt to arrive at a consensus. It also implies the absence of direct interference in the affairs of another state. As such, influence is the mildest form of engagement. Howard Wriggins sees influence as a necessary and ever-present means of international interaction among nation-states.⁵

Involvement can be defined as a close, working relationship between two (or more) states, as often happens when states work together to achieve a specific common goal. The cultivation of one country’s natural resources, such as oil, by another, more advanced state, qualifies as an example of involvement. Involvement may be relatively benign when pressure is applied that can benefit the target country (for example, a recipient of development or economic aid). Often, however, involvement may result in unfavorable terms for, or even exploitation of, the weaker country.

Intervention has the most negative implications of the three forms of engagement. It connotes action on foreign territory, but where purposes diverge and a threat is implicit. Two states are involved, but not in mutually acceptable activities. Intervention may be characterized as an effort to manipulate the internal affairs or foreign policy activities of another state; and is generally accompanied by the threat of hostile action.⁶ Israeli and Syrian actions within Lebanon’s boundaries are conspicuous examples of intervention. Although interventions are frequently conducted in the name of protecting minorities, in the Middle East they have tended to be more opportunistic in nature as external powers vie to enhance their positions and power.⁷ As Fulbright observed, in the long run, interventions often harm the interests of the intervener as well as intervened.⁸

Types of Engagement

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In addition to levels of influence, involvement, and intervention, a country may engage other countries in various formal and informal ways. The major types of engagement considered here include development assistance, economic assistance, military assistance, and educational/cultural exchange.

Development assistance encompasses a wide-ranging category of programs from basic education projects, public health projects, and road building, to water and environmental conservation schemes. In the United States, the agency primarily responsible for administering development assistance programs is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which extends assistance for both idealistic and pragmatic reasons. When aid is given to relieve the suffering of illiterate and malnourished populations, the goal is idealistic. But insofar as poverty, high birth rates, and illiteracy foster conditions of social unrest, political instability, and perhaps terrorism, development assistance is pragmatic in seeking to mitigate such causal factors. The US government's Economic Support Funds, although a separate US government budgetary line item, are administered by USAID and are most often focused on development assistance projects.⁹

In contrast with development assistance, economic assistance may be offered to help integrate a nation's financial markets into the global economy, stabilize a currency, launch fiscal initiatives such as loans and grants, provide for debt relief, or to embark upon large infrastructural development projects designed to enhance a nation's economic capacity.¹⁰ It may also seek to build relationships between countries through the encouragement of trade and business contacts.¹¹ Although the United States does not have a specifically designated economic assistance agency, the US has played and continues to play a dominant role in the international organizations—most notably the World Bank and International Monetary Fund—responsible for developing and administering economic assistance and structural adjustment programs.

Military assistance may take the form of weapons transfers, International Military Education and training programs, basing or pre-positioning agreements, and access agreements. This form of engagement can be especially effective because in many developing nations the military is a “key institution in political and social life”¹² and thus, military assistance allows the United States to exert its influence through an important institution. Such engagement, which is exercised by the Department of Defense, allows the United States to influence the receiving military in the present as well as the future.¹³ One drawback of this, however, is that the recipient population, especially a repressed population, may view such assistance less favorably.

Educational/cultural exchange is an important but often overlooked and underfunded instrument in the engagement tool box. In contrast with economic aid such as currency restructuring or military aid such as port access agreements, both of which are “invisible” and may even be perceived as harmful in the short run by local citizens,¹⁴ educational assistance not only brings long-term benefits to local citizens and society, but is also highly visible.¹⁵ Furthermore, it is less likely to be directly beneficial to a regime that is considered repressive or an ideological opponent.¹⁶ No other form of aid permits citizens such broad and close contact with another culture—instilling understanding if not love, empathy if not agreement, for differing cultures and value systems. As one scholar notes, “even if [exchange programs] do not always promote positive feelings, they probably do promote more realistic mutual perceptions.”¹⁷ Senator Fulbright saw education as one of the key components in contemporary human and international relations: the “attributes of...empathy and understanding between cultures” are

essential for the kind of leadership demanded in contemporary times.¹⁸ It is important to note, however, that some Islamic fundamentalists fear penetration of their societies by Western education and values and do not readily support educational and cultural exchange.

Until October 2000, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was responsible for administering educational and cultural exchange programs at which time, an act of Congress eliminated the agency and integrated it into the Department of State under the name Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Assistance programs may overlap two or more spheres. A good example of this in Yemen is the US Humanitarian Demining Program, established in 1998.²⁰ The title might lead one to classify it as a development assistance program; indeed, it included funds to generate public awareness about mine safety and to establish a physical therapy and prosthetics center. However, it was implemented by the US military's Central Command (CENTCOM) and involved military training and cooperation between US liaison officers and the Yemeni military. The program also had an educational exchange component in that Yemeni demining trainees were sent to the offices of America-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST), an American nongovernmental organization (NGO), for English language training. One can also argue that it had an economic dimension: a major initial focus was to clear the area that surrounds Aden's planned free trade zone; an area, that once cleared, will hopefully to bring business and investment following the example of Dubai's Jebal Ali Free Zone.

II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

One millennium before the Christian era, the region now known as Yemen hosted a flourishing maritime and caravan trade. This trade fueled the establishment and growth of fabled ancient Yemeni kingdoms, including Saba, Ma'in, Hadramawt, Ausan, and Qataban. Following the spread of Islam to Yemen in 629 AD, Yemen's commercial and political fortunes fluctuated, and the region was rarely united under one governing entity. Before discussing US engagement with Yemen, it is therefore necessary to consider the separate experiences and disparate internal political developments of what were commonly known as North Yemen (formally referred to as the Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) before they unified in 1990.

The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen)

For more than a millennium a unique theocratic regime based on the Zaidi sub-sect of Shia Islam ruled North Yemen. The first of the Zaidi imams, al-Hadi ila'l Haqq, arrived in Yemen in 893 AD and established what was to become one of the longest-lasting dynasties in

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the Middle East. His line of rulers governed a kingdom comprising varying portions of what is now modern Yemen until 1962.²¹

In 1962, Colonel Abdullah al-Salal headed a military coup that overthrew the last of the imams, Muhammad al-Badr. Al-Badr, who managed to escape, rallied many of the conservative northern tribes and began an opposition movement against the new, military-dominated republican regime. Thus commenced a protracted civil war, which affected not only Yemen but several other Arab states as well. The Egyptians, under President Gamal Abdul Nasser, supported Salal and the republicans by sending tens of thousands of troops to fight the royalists under al-Badr, who, in turn, received political and financial support from Saudi Arabia.²² The war finally ended in 1970, more than two years after the Egyptians had withdrawn from Yemen and after the revolutionaries had managed to coopt a number of conservative tribes.²³

President Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, who had replaced Salal in 1967, presided over the state until 1974. During his tenure, an era of “national reconciliation” was initiated,²⁴ through which royalist opposition groups were integrated into the government, thereby broadening its base of support. However, discontent fueled by internal rivalries and economic hardships remained a primary source of instability.

On June 13, 1974, a bloodless military coup led by Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi overthrew the Iryani regime. Hamdi proved to be a popular leader and initiated numerous reforms and development measures, which were not wholly successful, but his efforts succeeded in extending the authority of the central government over some of the northern tribal areas.²⁵ His overtures toward South Yemen, however, antagonized influential military and tribal leaders in Yemen and their Saudi supporters.²⁶

Hamdi was assassinated on October 11, 1977. The assassins were most likely army officers who disagreed with some of his policies and who feared being purged by him; they decided to act before he became too suspicious.²⁷ Colonel Ahmad Husayn al-Ghashmi, the former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, succeeded to the Presidency and held the office only until June 24, 1978, when he too was assassinated by a bomb delivered by a reportedly unwitting South Yemeni emissary.²⁸

From 1978 until 1990, North Yemen was ruled by Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although Saleh initially had difficulty stabilizing his regime,²⁹ by the 1980s his power situation had improved.³⁰ Oil was finally discovered in Yemen in 1984,³¹ and in 1988, North Yemen produced the Arabian Peninsula's first elected assembly,³² the *Majlis al-Shura* (Consultative Council), in what foreign observers called “authentic elections.”³³ President Saleh presided over the unification of the two Yemens in 1990 and has, since that time, been president of the unified republic.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)

The history of South Yemen before the nineteenth century is basically a compendium of internecine tribal disputes and localized wars. Aden, the only city of any significance in South Yemen, had reached its commercial zenith long before the British arrived there. In fact, by the time the British established a colony in Aden in 1839, the “city” had long since fallen into decay and had become “a village of less than two thousand permanent inhabitants.”³⁴

The British ruled Aden for nearly 130 years, and they maintained it as a telecommunications link, a coal depot for steamers on their way to and from India, and later,

a major bunkering facility and transshipment hub in the Middle East. Under British rule, Aden rapidly developed once again into a sizable town,³⁵ but the tribal hinterland was ignored by the British until the twentieth century. In the early 1900s, the British began negotiating a series of alliances and treaties with local rulers, with the aim of bringing the various neighboring sheikhdoms into their sphere of influence.³⁶ Aden continued to gain importance and in 1937 the British formally declared their complete sovereignty over Aden. They made the city a Crown Colony, administering it from London rather than India.³⁷

As political changes, including nationalism and Nasserism, began to grip the Middle East, the British sought to integrate Aden with the hinterland functionally and politically.³⁸ To accomplish this, they spawned the ill-fated South Arabia Federation in the early 1960s. The Federation crumbled because—the rural south Arabian tribes were politically and socially incompatible with the urbanized and Westernized Adenis.

Meanwhile, two internal dissident groups had begun to challenge British rule: the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY, a Nasser-supported nationalist party) and the National Liberation Front (NLF, a broad coalition of organized left-wing dissidents against British rule). During the 1960s the two groups began to carry out insurgent activities against the British and each other. Concurrent with an escalation in NLF- and FLOSY-sponsored violence, political changes in London made Britain less willing to support her remaining colonies, especially where British blood was being spilled. In 1967 Britain finally withdrew, allowing the NLF to fill the power vacuum.

Initially, the NLF (called the “National Front” after independence) was a nationalist movement with leftist tendencies. However, in 1969, a radical Marxist faction within the party seized power from Qahtan al-Shaabi, South Yemen’s first president and a relative moderate, and tilted South Yemen even further to the left. Coups and assassinations continued, and in 1979 internal tensions were compounded by external ones: a border conflict flared up with North Yemen that required mediation by the Arab League.³⁹ Although the war ended with a treaty and an agreement on unity, few practical steps were actually taken to implement the agreement, and until the late 1980s, unification seemed a remote possibility.

Ironically, a further move toward radicalism by the extreme leftist faction in South Yemen in January 1986 set in motion a chain of circumstances that proved favorable to unity between the two Yemens. The subsequent internal power struggle resulted in a bloody civil war, the exile of the former president, and the death of numerous factional leaders. In the span of less than twenty years, the government of South Yemen had attempted to impose a Marxist ideology on an ancient tribal system. The attempt proved unsuccessful; during the 1986 coup, tribal disputes shattered the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s thin veneer of Marxism and became the primary motivating force behind the violent upheaval.⁴⁰

As the country recovered from this period of turmoil, new policies gradually emerged in Aden. Since the civil war in 1986 the new government in Aden [headed by Haydar Abu Bakr al-Attas]—an uneasy coalition of factional groups reflecting tribal and ideological differences—had committed itself to improving relations with its neighbors, furthering the process of unification with the YAR, and establishing better relations with the West in its quest for greater international respectability and increased foreign aid.⁴¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union and many affiliated communist regimes in 1990-91 not only left South Yemen without an ideologically-compatible patron state, it also left South Yemen without the subsidies and assistance that the East Bloc had provided and on which the impoverished nation had relied.⁴² Thus, external political and economic pressures, as well as national mythos, drove the two Yemens on the path to unity.

Unity

Yemeni unity was officially proclaimed on May 22, 1990, and North Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the ruler of the new entity officially known as the Republic of Yemen. Despite the widespread rejoicing, however, there were many signs that pointed to a difficult transition period. North Yemen had a much larger population than South, North Yemen was capitalist and the South was socialist, North Yemen dominated the new government (both the executive and legislative branches),⁴³ complaints persisted over the distribution of government revenues and services, and many structural aspects of unity had not been implemented. Furthermore, the two countries' former currencies were both in use, the militaries were largely separate, and many ministerial positions were redundant.

The unification of the two Yemens was strained significantly by the second Gulf War, precipitated by Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Yemeni public opinion and official Yemeni policy refused to support Western-led intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. This stance prompted Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries to expel nearly one million Yemeni expatriate workers, who returned jobless and often homeless to the newly unified country. Similarly, donor nations and agencies significantly reduced their presence and funding levels in Yemen.

By 1993, the Yemeni political situation had deteriorated, and Vice President Ali Salem al-Baidh (the former president of South Yemen) holed himself up in the former southern capital of Aden and refused to return to Sana'a. The discovery of oil and, beginning in 1993, its export from the southern province of Hadramawt,⁴⁴ gave southern leaders more confidence that they could "go it alone." Consequently, in May 1994, civil war broke out. From the outset however, the southern "secessionists" were on the defensive and the war lasted only two months. Northerners proclaimed victory on July 7, 1994, and Yemen remained unified.

Following the civil war, economic issues came to the forefront as Yemen faced the costs of the war and began working with the IMF to implement a structural adjustment program.⁴⁵ Although some of the adopted policies (such as eliminating the bread subsidy) caused urban riots and popular discontent, Yemen moved forward to bring its economy in line with those of other nations.⁴⁶ Yemen was also plagued with kidnapping incidents as disgruntled Yemeni tribes sought governmental concessions by kidnapping local citizens, tourists, expatriate workers, and diplomats. Rising international petroleum prices and a government crackdown on kidnapping helped improve the economic and political situations by the end of the decade. However, Yemen was catapulted into international notoriety on October 12, 2000 when a suicide attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in Aden's harbor killed seventeen sailors and wounded dozens more. This event and subsequent incidents served to highlight the growing presence of international terrorism in Yemen, a country whose control over much of its hinterland and tribal structures remains weak.⁴⁷

III. US ENGAGEMENT IN YEMEN: PAST AND PRESENT

North Yemen, an isolated, mountainous, and authoritarian country, remained insulated from most outside contacts until the latter half of the twentieth century. Its xenophobic rulers pursued a policy of isolationism perhaps (qualified just in case there were other reasons) to quell internal discontent and maintain strong control over their population.⁴⁸ The coming of the Cold War, however, and the search for surrogates by the superpowers, as well as some minor moves by Imam Ahmed to open doors to assistance, education, and trade, meant that Yemen's isolationism was increasingly challenged.⁴⁹

Colonial Aden was by all definitions a city-state and not a nation, and unlike North Yemen, the latest products, ideas, and movements circulated freely among the multinational inhabitants of the city, including British colonialists, non-Adeni Arabs, Indian bureaucrats, and Somali laborers. The tribal hinterland, however, like North Yemen, remained almost entirely impervious to developments in Aden and to international political trends.

Imamate Era in North Yemen (1918-1962)

The United States was a latecomer to the Arabian Peninsula. Unlike a number of European nations and companies that had established formal relations, colonies, treaties, and trading posts there by the seventeenth century, official and sustained American involvement in Arabia, and Yemen in particular, did not begin until well into the twentieth century.⁵⁰ The United States established diplomatic relations with North Yemen only in 1946, and even then, the US opted not to set up a permanent US presence there.⁵¹ Relations slowly developed as the United States, worried that Marxism was gaining a foothold in the developing world and specifically in North Yemen, began to make friendly overtures toward the regime of Imam Ahmed.⁵² A variety of US missions—oil, research, and archaeological—were initiated, despite opposition from Europe and China.⁵³

In the late 1950s, the United States sent an economic mission and a diplomatic mission to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine and assess foreign assistance prospects.⁵⁴ Military aid was not considered at the time, despite Yemeni requests.⁵⁵ In 1959, ostensibly to gain more information and to offset developing Yemeni-Soviet relations, the United States opened a legation in the then capital of Taiz.⁵⁶ An aid program was initiated at the same time under the US International Cooperation Administration, and drought relief was provided in the form of food assistance.⁵⁷

Throughout this period, the US presence in Yemen may be characterized as one of influence. Contacts slowly expanded following the establishment of diplomatic relations, but US engagement did not at that time approach the level of involvement.

Colonial Era in the South (1839-1967)

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American relations with the Southern portion of this country are more appropriately considered bilateral relations with Britain, because Aden had become a Crown Colony in 1939 and was administered directly by London. The United States maintained a consulate in Aden, which performed routine consulate duties as well as reporting on the Southern tribal sheikhdoms, North Yemen (before a US embassy was established there), and the Arabian Peninsula in general.⁵⁸

North Yemen's Revolution and Civil War (1962-70)

The United States recognized the Yemeni republic on December 19, 1962, three months after the September 26th revolution that ended the rule of the Zaidi Imamate and installed a republican regime.⁵⁹ Harold Ingrams, British resident adviser in Mukalla, and others interpreted US "recognition as an instrument of policy," whose aim was to further stability in the region and to protect US paramount interests in Saudi Arabia.⁶⁰ Zabarah, on the other hand, viewed the recognition as primarily a response to offset potential communist influences and to give the United States the ability to mediate all parties in the ensuing civil war.⁶¹ All motives likely had merit;⁶² what is significant is that the United States decided that recognition of a revolutionary Arab regime with ties to Nasser was more important to US interests than acceding to the wishes of its monarchical, pro-Western, Arabian allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Jordan.⁶³

The revolution spawned an extended civil war in Yemen between royalist and republican forces and developed into a regional conflict involving Egypt and Saudi Arabia on opposing sides. The United States attempted to mediate an end to Egyptian and Saudi involvement,⁶⁴ and to encourage acceptance of its mediation efforts, it instituted development assistance projects under the auspices of the newly established USAID.⁶⁵ These projects included the building of the 225-mile, \$22-million Sana'a-Taiz—Mocha highway, the \$33-million Kennedy Memorial Water Project in Taiz and other water systems, the funding of scholarships and technical training missions, and the provision of surplus food stores for hunger alleviation.⁶⁶ In 1966, the embassy was also moved to Sana'a, the capital of the new republic. President Abdullah Salal nevertheless expressed dissatisfaction with the aid package, saying that he had "expected greater generosity from such a rich country."⁶⁷

The United States was firm on not granting military aid to Yemen. It did, however, seek to reassure Saudi Arabia and to demonstrate to the Egyptians and the Soviets its interest in preserving the stability of the Kingdom.⁶⁸ To that end, a US Air Force squadron was dispatched to the Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force was augmented, and a small over-the-horizon naval presence was maintained.⁶⁹

Eventually, regional politics intervened to help alter the matrix of players involved in Yemen. The 1967 June war with Israel prompted Egypt to reassess its intervention in Yemen and to begin withdrawing its troops.⁷⁰ Also as a result of the war, on June 6, 1967 the Yemeni regime severed relations with the United States in the name of Arab nationalism.⁷¹

Throughout this tumultuous period, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the primary external actors in North Yemeni affairs and intervened extensively in the fighting, by providing funds, equipment, and (in Egypt's case) troops.⁷² In effect, they fought each other physically and ideologically by proxy.⁷³ Other nations, including China, the Soviet Union, and Germany, refrained from military involvement but did have significant aid programs.⁷⁴ By contrast, US engagement was not extensive and ended with the severance of diplomatic relations in 1967.

South Yemen's Revolutionary Era (1967-69)

The British left Aden in 1967, taking with them not only their officials and their support for local rulers and sultans, but also their economic and development aid.⁷⁵ Local groups vied to fill the power vacuum; the NLF ultimately succeeded. Despite the violence and the factional infighting immediately preceding Britain's withdrawal, the United States maintained its consulate in South Yemen.⁷⁶ Shortly after South Yemen declared its independence, the United States recognized the fledgling country on December 7th and upgraded its consulate to an embassy.⁷⁷ The British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 and from the Persian Gulf in 1971 presaged an increasing American involvement in Arabia as protector of the region's vast oil supply and as counterweight to communist influence.⁷⁸

Bilateral US-South Yemeni relations were strained, however.⁷⁹ South Yemeni officials, facing economic and political crises, were unable to secure any foreign assistance from the United States and further accused it of attempting to undermine the new republic.⁸⁰ Then, on October 24, 1969, following a coup that moved the regime farther left, South Yemen broke relations with the United States as it increasingly sought to ally itself with other radical Arab states.⁸¹ At this time, however, it did not ally itself strongly with the USSR. Thus during this time period, bilateral relations with South Yemen began with normal and minimal diplomatic influence, but ended with complete disengagement and the severance of all official ties.

North Yemen (1970-90)

Diplomatic relations between the United States and North Yemen were reestablished in 1972 following an official visit by Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Sana'a in June of that year.⁸² A new USAID agreement was signed the next year and from 1973 to 1990, development assistance focused on health, education, agriculture, and water resources.⁸³ The USAID program was further reinvigorated by a Peace Corps presence. Moreover, according to David Ransom (Deputy Chief of Mission 1975-78), the United States sought to encourage the Saudis to support the central government and to limit their support for the independent tribes in the north. North Yemen, suffering from a weak central regime, did its best to steer a middle course between the "Scylla of the South [South Yemen] and the Charybdis of the North [Saudi Arabia]," both of whom sought to influence events in North Yemen.⁸⁴

For the first time, educational and cultural exchange programs were implemented on a large scale in Yemen. In the late 1970s, several initiatives began and were expanded upon, many of them coaxed to life by Marjorie Ransom, the Public Affairs Officer.⁸⁵ During her tenure, two US-government-supported institutions specializing in educational and cultural affairs were established or formalized: The Yemen-American Language Institute (YALI), and the American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS). Two years later, a third organization, AM-IDEAST, was also established.⁸⁶

According to Bill Helz, YALI director of courses:

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YALI has been an integral component in the US's public diplomacy efforts in Yemen over the past 28 years, with many Yemeni government leaders having received their English language training from YALI and with requests for subsidized seats in the program ever growing. As such, YALI has gained a great deal of respect in the Yemeni community.⁸⁷

YALI has grown significantly and now trains 1,500 Yemenis during each of its eight, five-week sessions. YALI is also significant in that language training introduces Western cultural concepts to Yemenis in a moderated environment quite different from that afforded by the currently ubiquitous satellite television or Internet cafes.

AIYS was established in 1978 to facilitate and promote research by American scholars in Yemen.⁸⁸ Since its inception, it has arranged for and overseen a wide variety of research projects, ranging from archaeological digs to zoological investigations. It also maintains links with the Yemeni government and the Yemeni academic community, administers a hostel, and coordinates the programs of American Fulbright scholars.⁸⁹ AIYS has helped document, preserve, and disseminate information about Yemen's unique cultural and environmental heritage through publications, lectures, and symposia.

AMIDEAST, although a private organization, officially established its presence in Yemen in 1981 with support and funding from USIA. AMIDEAST receives federal funding to coordinate a variety of US-sponsored programs, including the Fulbright scholarship (for Yemeni scholars) and other educational exchange programs, development aid projects, and advising services for students wishing to study in the US. During the 1980s, AMIDEAST administered scholarships on behalf of USAID; both the Department of State and the scholarship recipients claim that they were the "best" investment that the United States ever made in Yemen.⁹⁰ All three institutions have continued to provide their services to Yemeni citizens to the present day.

American assistance, however, went beyond development aid and educational exchange. In 1975 the United States established a trilateral military aid arrangement, whereby Saudi funds purchased US weapons to equip and strengthen North Yemen's military forces.⁹¹ In this way, the United States provided North Yemen with training, aircraft, and ground-based material.⁹² Saudi Arabia, always nervous about the potential threat from the radical regime in Aden, made sure that South Yemen did not gain the upper-hand in the conflict and endanger the Kingdom's southern flank.⁹³ The United States also initiated an International Military Education and Training program for North Yemen in 1976, under which Yemeni officers attended US Armed Forces service schools.⁹⁴

During the 1979 border conflict with South Yemen, President Carter approved \$400 million in military sales to the Northern regime in what represented a significant expansion of trilateral aid.⁹⁵ Washington, viewing the conflict within the global context of the revived Cold War and fearing potential victory by the Marxist regime of South Yemen, sought to bolster the ability of the North to withstand any Southern onslaught. Accordingly, the Carter administration provided these arms to North Yemen through Saudi Arabia on an emergency basis under the Arms Export Control Act without receiving congressional approval.⁹⁶ The main concern here was that a Southern victory could directly threaten Saudi Arabia and the entire Arabian Peninsula. That the United States minimized its contacts with Yemeni officials and worked primarily through Saudi officials indicates that the primary US concern was for Saudi and not Yemeni stability.⁹⁷ To further help assuage Saudi fears, an aircraft carrier task force was also sent to the Red Sea as a deterrent.⁹⁸

At the end of the short-lived border conflict, however, the Saudis reduced the large aid package to Yemen, fearing that a significant expansion of the North Yemeni military could

have unintended repercussions for the Kingdom.⁹⁹ The Yemenis resented the manner in which the Saudis controlled the arms transfers and decided to assert partial independence from their wealthy patron.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, the Saleh regime renewed its friendship with the Soviets despite US pressure and South Yemeni attempts to end the relationship.¹⁰¹ Between 1979 and 1981, the Soviets supplied the North Yemenis with \$600 million in military aid on easy credit terms (unlike the United States, which wanted payment in full).¹⁰²

North Yemen entered a period of greater stability with the accession of President Ali Abdullah Saleh to the presidency in 1978. Diplomatic relations were strengthened through a bilateral exchange of visits by Yemeni and American leaders. In 1986, Vice President George Bush visited Yemen; a few months prior to Yemeni unity in 1990, Saleh visited the United States.¹⁰³ Saleh also attempted to maintain amicable relations with Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, and the Soviet Union, which proved a delicate political juggling act.¹⁰⁴ Although American military engagement had diminished sharply, by 1990 educational exchange was flourishing and the United States was officially providing the Saleh regime with about \$42 million in development assistance annually.¹⁰⁵ Unofficially, Washington also maintained involvement in Yemen through the presence of the Hunt Oil Company and other private businesses operating in the country.¹⁰⁶ During the two decades preceding Yemeni unification, the United States had rapidly moved from a position of influence to one of involvement. In general, however, the multifaceted, ongoing, and expanding involvement was benign in nature and according to AMIDEAST Yemen's Country Director, Yemenis fondly remember that period as a highlight of Yemeni-American relations.¹⁰⁷

Marxist South Yemen (1969-90)

For a twenty-year period there were no diplomatic relations or official contacts between the United States and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.¹⁰⁸ The interests of the two nations were diametrically opposed: South Yemen was engaged in spreading Marxism and promoting radical Arab nationalism, whereas the United States, which had moved to fill the void in the Gulf left by the departing British, was focused on containing the spread of communism and assuring the stability of the region.¹⁰⁹ The United States considered South Yemen to be a state sponsor of terrorism; South Yemen, in turn, was threatened by American moves such as a naval deployment in response to a blockade of the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb, the establishment of a large naval base at Diego Garcia (March 1973), the expansion of American military interests in Oman, and its steadfast support for Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, although South Yemen had not initially been a Soviet satellite, by the late 1970s the USSR had incorporated South Yemen into its sphere of influence.¹¹¹ Relations, such as they were, were hostile at best between the two nations, with Aden denouncing America as "the sweetest enemy of the Arab revolution."¹¹²

US Congressman Paul Findley did make two unofficial visits there: once on behalf of an imprisoned constituent and once as a stop-over several years later. On his first visit, Findley carried with him two "diplomatic 'feelers'" from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Alfred Atherton indicating a general American desire to establish stronger ties with the Arab world.¹¹³ Findley met with President Salim Rubayya Ali on this first visit and left feeling convinced that Ali was also trying to put feelers out to Washington; however, the US administration did not even attempt to establish a dialogue at that time. Indeed, a variety of events served to push the two nations

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farther apart following Findley's initial visit.¹¹⁴

South Yemen's interest in reestablishing dialogue with the United States was strengthened by regional events, including Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's opening to the United States, the more active US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the shifting conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977-78).¹¹⁵ A subsequent meeting between Ali and Findley at the UN headquarters in New York in 1977 produced a promise for exploratory talks between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Foreign Minister Mohammed Motie, but these talks did not materialize by the time of Findley's second visit to Aden in 1978.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, Findley left South Yemen with the following message from President Ali:

*Please extend my warm greetings to President Carter. Kindly inform him that we are eager to maintain smooth and friendly relations between Democratic Yemen and the United States. We recognize that President Carter is concerned about maintaining friendly relations with all countries. We feel that it is a positive policy. We believe our relations should be further strengthened.*¹¹⁷

Carter responded by establishing a date for talks. However, Marxist hardliners succeeded in removing Ali from power and executing him the same day that the US delegation under Joseph Twinam arrived in Sana'a.¹¹⁸ The mission was aborted and the delegation returned to the United States, despite requests by South Yemen to reconvene.¹¹⁹ In fact, the US position further hardened toward the Marxist state as detente faltered between the United States and the USSR.¹²⁰ The subsequent border conflict, in which the United States supported North against South Yemen, effectively ended any attempts at normalizing relations.¹²¹

It was also during the Carter administration that terrorism became an important item on the US policy agenda. The United States accused South Yemen of aiding and abetting groups it considered to be terrorist, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Findley's pleas notwithstanding, the administration refused to consider altering its stance toward South Yemen. The stance of the United States was partly influenced by Saudi Arabia's perspective on the issue, as Robert Pelletreau of the US State Department noted.¹²² Pleas for the United States to remove its Cold War goggles fell on deaf ears:

*The [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] is not the preying wolf of the Gulf, but a small, poor, undeveloped country surrounded by what it perceives as hostile neighbors. . . . Even the possibility of any personal expression of the American viewpoint in Aden, no matter how slight its chances of successful persuasion, would seem preferable to the appearance of total hostility.*¹²³

Following the 1986 coup, South Yemen began cautiously to court nations outside the Soviet bloc, but both Aden and Washington had little incentive to reestablish diplomatic ties.¹²⁴ Halliday claims that although the United States did not involve itself in this crisis, it developed a better understanding about the extent of the Southern regime's weakness and about how this might be exploited.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, the United States continued to view South Yemen primarily within the context of its role as a Soviet proxy.¹²⁶

It was only on 30 April 1990—after the Cold War had all but ended and unity was imminent between the two Yemens—that the United States and South Yemen formally reestablished diplomatic relations, but no move was made to reinstitute an embassy. In summary, US contacts with South Yemen during the twenty years of Marxist rule were minimal and inchoate. For all intents and purposes, there were no bilateral relations and thus no engagement.¹²⁷

Unification Era (Phase I: 1990-94)

The initial period of Yemeni unification was difficult. Not only did the new state have to integrate two different political systems, two different economic systems, and two populations, but it had to contend with an unexpected international crisis: the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. Yemen, which by chance held one of the UN Security Council's rotating seats that year, voted "no" in a resolution authorizing the "use of force" to expel Saddam's forces from Kuwait. Essentially, Yemen opposed the Iraqi invasion, but it did not support the US approach to reversing it. The consequences of this *de facto* support of Saddam's regime were swift and dramatic. Regionally, nearly one million Yemeni expatriate workers were expelled from neighboring Gulf states, which regarded Yemen's stance as a form of treachery against their monarchical regimes.¹²⁸

The newly unified country not only had to absorb the massive influx of these returning workers, but it had to do so in the face of reduced regional and international aid. Saudi Arabia terminated its extensive aid to the Yemeni government and began funding opposition groups including Northern tribes and Islamist organizations.¹²⁹ US aid of nearly \$50 million annually was almost completely terminated except for humanitarian assistance (PL-480 food assistance programs continued through 1994).¹³⁰ USAID's budget was slashed to \$2.9 million in FY 1991, although funding was increased slightly in subsequent years until the USAID mission was terminated completely in 1996.¹³¹

Nonetheless, the United States gave verbal support to Yemen's "watershed" 1993 parliamentary elections; and, through funding allocations to the National Democratic Institute (NDI), it continued to support Yemen's incipient democratization process.¹³² Educational exchange programs such as the Fulbright scholarship were sustained and YALI and AIYS maintained their presence in the country as well. Furthermore, during the civil war that erupted between Northern and Southern Yemen in May 1994, the United States issued appeals for negotiations and for the preservation of a unified nation. It did not recognize the "Democratic Republic of Yemen" proclaimed by the southern governorates, nor did it intervene in any way, despite Saudi pleas to assist the secessionist regime.¹³³

It is worth noting here that President Saleh relied on and used Islamists and returned "Afghani" Yemeni *mujahideen* in his bid to purge southern Marxists and to capture the key city of Aden during the civil war.¹³⁴ As a result, following the civil war, conservative Islamists enjoyed a modicum of political acceptance and respectability. More significantly, as hardened and trained fighters with probable links to Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, their influence on Yemen's politics and internal social trends would have a lasting impact.¹³⁵

This tumultuous period witnessed a significant decrease in US involvement. In contrast to 1990 when the United States fronted a large, albeit benign, presence, by 1994 it had a minimal level of involvement. US policy shifted from a multifaceted engagement to a tactic of isolating and weakening the Yemeni regime, with a few carrots thrown in. This policy was amplified by the withdrawals of other Western donors and Persian Gulf states, most notably, Saudi Arabia.¹³⁶ Such a dramatic reduction in aid and the reduction in presence were to weaken the central regime and create a vacuum of influence that other state, non-state, or domestic actors could exploit.¹³⁷

Unification Era (Phase II: 1994-2000)

The years following Yemen's civil war were just as difficult as the initial period of unity. Yemen had to face the difficult task of reconstructing the south and beginning in 1995, it started to implement a series of IMF-sponsored initiatives designed to help its economy transition to the global economy.¹³⁸ In addition to floating the Yemeni currency, the government slashed subsidies on staples such as bread, milk, and petrol. Riots in major cities ensued as angry citizens protested a five-fold increase in the price of bread.¹³⁹ Tribal kidnapping of foreigners, though not usually politically-motivated at the time, became rampant as varying groups competed for attention, assistance, and concessions from the central government.¹⁴⁰

During this period, the United States continued to reduce the scope and depth of its engagement with Yemen, especially in the field of development assistance. The Peace Corps presence had been terminated with the commencement of civil war and it was subsequently decided that the internal security situation did not permit its reestablishment. USAID terminated its mission in 1996; however, residual funds for a Global Training for Development (GTD II) project from 1990 were administered by a USAID representative based in the US Embassy. AMIDEAST managed the final portion of these funds from 1998 to 2000; in September of that year, the USAID representative office was closed and the last USAID programs terminated.¹⁴¹

The US government maintained limited educational exchange programs, including the Humphrey Fellowship and the Fulbright Scholarship.¹⁴² ESF grants helped fund an expanded Fulbright program and Ambassador Barbara Bodine (1997-2001) was able to utilize 416(b) revenues for limited assistance programs.¹⁴³ Additionally, the US government's educational advising center at AMIDEAST continued operations. A few cultural exchanges took place through 1999; however, a deteriorating internal security situation after that period brought cultural programming to a halt.

Engagement in the form of military aid and cooperation, however, increased dramatically. Mainly as a result of Ambassadors David Newton and Barbara Bodine's efforts to recreate the Yemeni-US relationship, the United States set up a de-mining project and negotiated a refueling agreement for US Navy ships in Aden Harbor.¹⁴⁴ The de-mining project was to provide the Yemeni military with funds, equipment, and training through 2005.¹⁴⁵ The US government saw several benefits in such an arrangement: it kept its engagement with Yemen limited as it sought to deflect some of its critics for its failure to support the 1997 International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The de-mining program also brought in additional donor nations and agencies; UNDP and Germany used it as a vehicle to expand their engagement with Yemen.¹⁴⁶

The 1999 naval refueling agreement was urged by Ambassador Newton (1994-97), promoted by General Anthony Zinni (head of the US Central Command), and implemented during Ambassador Bodine's tenure (1997-2001). Refueling—a minor source of income for Aden's port, an opportunity to “show the flag,” and a way of boosting strategic bilateral relations—was not done extensively,¹⁴⁷ but it was to have serious and unintended repercussions when suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole in October 2000 while she was refueling in Aden's harbor (see the next section).

In summary, Yemen experienced severe economic and political strains and reduced

regional and American aid and engagement throughout the 1990s. Yemen was no longer a proxy in the Cold War, but it was not to be easily embraced following its stance during Operation Desert Storm. In this period of political and economic unrest, other actors began to play a role and exert influence in Yemen. An Islamist network set up its own school system, the brand of Saudi export-Wahhabism known as “Salafism” gained adherents, and terrorist cells infiltrated the country with relative impunity.¹⁴⁸

The retrenchment of religious conservatism throughout the country was best illustrated in Aden. Before unification (and up to the civil war), Aden’s women could move about with their hair uncovered wearing modest Western dress, and students attended co-educational classes throughout their academic careers. A local brewery made a rich, dark German brew known as “Sira Beer.” Dance clubs and bars were common. However, after the civil war and by the mid-1990s, women covered their hair with scarves and their bodies with black abayas. The brewery was destroyed, bars were closed, and primary and secondary students were segregated by gender. More ominously, new and darker forces were at work and, in the absence of attractive alternatives, were gaining footholds in darkened bazaar alleys and lofty mountain villages throughout this rugged country.

The New Millennium and the Rise of Transnational Terror (2000-Present)

Yemen burst dramatically into the international news when the USS Cole, an American destroyer refueling at Aden under an agreement enacted in 1999, was attacked in Aden’s harbor by a suicide boat. Seventeen sailors were killed, nearly forty were wounded, and the Cole was so seriously damaged that she had to be returned to the United States aboard the Blue Marlin, a Norwegian ship designed for transporting oil derricks.¹⁴⁹ American military and other investigative forces arrived quickly on the scene in a manner that upset Yemeni authorities and may have contributed to subsequent difficulties that the investigation would encounter.¹⁵⁰ American investigators remained in Aden for several months but eventually evacuated after receiving credible security threats. Although the web of involvement in the Cole bombing may never be fully known, eventually some individuals associated with it were brought to trial and American authorities believe that al-Qaeda played a role.¹⁵¹

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and in response to Bush’s proclamation that “you’re either with us or against us,” President Saleh proclaimed his support for America in its war on terrorism.¹⁵² Initially, however, Yemen did little to combat potential terrorism. US policymakers saw the country as a minimally useful ally because of the government’s inability to extend its control to all portions of the country. Indeed, the country’s rugged terrain and porous borders made it an ideal hiding place for al-Qaeda cells (believed to be present in Yemen). Finally, President Saleh could not easily or quickly alienate jihadists and their bases of support as he had previously enlisted them in his civil war. Notably these “Afghan Yemenis,” as they are known, were well represented in the ranks of detainees in Guantanamo Bay.¹⁵³

Nevertheless, during the tenure of Ambassador Edmund Hull (2001-2004), a substantial amount of aid was allocated to help Saleh combat terrorism and since 2002, he seems to have ratcheted the war on terror. During the latter half of 2002, the United States deployed FBI experts, Special Forces units, and military advisors to train security forces, improve border security, and establish a coast guard.¹⁵⁴ Pressure was put on Saleh to stop subsidizing Islah-run schools and to expel expatriate Muslims studying at Yemen’s religious institutions.¹⁵⁵ In

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November 2002, Saleh acquiesced in a covert US operation in which a CIA-operated *Predator* (an unmanned aerial vehicle or “UAV”) destroyed a Land Cruiser carrying suspected Bin Laden associate and al-Qaeda operative Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harhi. By the end of 2002, the United States had helped Yemeni ports implement computerized tracking systems for passengers and cargo that were networked to American command facilities for monitoring arrivals and departures.¹⁵⁶ The exact monetary value of the security assistance is difficult to determine because an unspecified portion of it is covert. The amount of \$400 million, quoted in several press reports, is described by US Ambassador Edmund Hull as pure “fiction.”¹⁵⁷ With regards to military assistance, open sources indicate that Foreign Military Financing was a modest \$1.9 million in FY 2003, but has increased to an estimated \$15 million in FY 2004, with a similar request pending for FY 2005.¹⁵⁸

Notwithstanding the increased assistance, there have been some setbacks in the war on terror during this time period. A suicide attack near the Yemeni port of Mukalla on the French supertanker *Limburgh*—believed to have been carried out by an al-Qaeda cell¹⁵⁹—resulted in a drastic reduction in shipping and a sharp increase in maritime insurance rates. A diplomatically embarrassing incident occurred in December 2002, when Spain apprehended a freighter carrying SCUD missiles from North Korea to Yemen. Yemen protested that it had ordered these missiles some time ago and promised that it would not be ordering any more. The United States, unable to find a suitable legal precedent for apprehending the cargo, reliant on Yemen as a partner in the war on terror, and busy cultivating local support for action against Iraq, asked Spain to release the ship.¹⁶⁰

US involvement in Yemen has not been limited to strictly military and security assistance. In June 2003, USAID reestablished its mission in Yemen (closed since 1996). Charged with administering a \$10-20 million annual budget, USAID Yemen is focusing on primary health care, basic education initiatives, food and health care security, and democratization and civil society initiatives.¹⁶¹

In December 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell officially announced the creation of the “Middle East Peace Partnership Initiative” (MEPI). Currently administered by Alina Romanowski, the goal of MEPI is to strengthen the position of Arab and Islamic moderates in the Arab world through a series of partnerships and associations between the American government and private and public Middle Eastern organizations.¹⁶² MEPI seeks to build a more peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Middle East by focusing on four specific areas or “pillars:” the economic pillar, the educational pillar, the political pillar, and the women’s pillar.¹⁶³ Although originally funded at a modest \$29 million, MEPI funds were boosted by an additional infusion of \$90 million in FY 2003, an estimated \$90 million in FY 2004, and a request for \$150 million in FY 2005.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, most USAID funding to Middle Eastern countries now falls within the domain of MEPI and is thus subject to Department of State approval.¹⁶⁵

In Yemen, MEPI funds have been spent on a variety of fronts, including literacy projects, training programs, and democratization reforms. Within the rubric of the educational pillar, MEPI funds have been allocated on a pilot project to establish e-learning classrooms in twenty-four schools throughout Yemen. The goal of this \$1.5 million project is to establish a connectivity network among the Internet-linked schools in Yemen and, eventually, with sister institutions in the United States. Another initiative, a \$2 million pilot project to improve women’s literacy in Yemen, falls within the framework of both the women’s and educational pillars.¹⁶⁶

The US State Department’s Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau also continued to support (with non-MEPI funds) its official educational advising centers throughout the

Middle East and in Yemen. A major bureau effort launched after the September 11 attacks, the “Partnership for Learning” (P4L), has contributed to a variety of educational exchanges in the Middle East. These exchanges include an expanded Fulbright scholarship program, an undergraduate exchange program (PLUS), and the Youth Education and Study Program. The latter provides funding for students from a number of Arab countries, including Yemen, to study for one year at the high school level in the United States. Currently, nineteen Yemeni students are pursuing their studies in the United States through this program.¹⁶⁷

It is evident that US engagement with Yemen has increased dramatically since 2001 and has been both more extensive and more varied than at any previous time. A US Embassy Sana a publication reports that US government assistance to Yemen for the years 2001-2004 exceeded \$290 million, making the US the largest national development provider in Yemen.¹⁶⁸ Unfortunately, America’s invasion of Iraq served to diminish some of the potential goodwill that might arise from this multifaceted involvement. A majority of the world’s population, including Yemenis, were strongly opposed to the invasion and continue to express their opposition today.¹⁶⁹ Although the United States has won over the Saleh regime, the “hearts and minds” of Yemeni citizens have, if anything, been hardened. It will require a substantial and sustained effort to redirect current perceptions of the United States in Yemen.¹⁷⁰

The war on terror, in addition to expanding American engagement with Yemen, has had unanticipated consequences as well. Most notably, Saleh has been able to leverage US support for counter-terror operations into silencing internal opposition, co-opting tribes with payments, and strengthening his political base.¹⁷¹ For example, by 2003, over two-thirds of all senior government posts in the port of Aden were held by northerners allied with Saleh. As a result of this consolidation of power, Saleh has effectively marginalized some of the democratic strides that Yemen took in the 1990s.¹⁷² Thus, America seems to be acknowledging that regime maintenance—not democracy—better serves US interests at this time.¹⁷³ In 1990, Yemen lost its role as Cold War proxy state; however, like Pakistan, it has found a new role as one of America’s partners in the war on terror.¹⁷⁴

IV. US FOREIGN POLICY AND US-YEMENI RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS

For more than fifty years, the United States has maintained a sporadic presence in Yemen, and its Yemeni policy has been haphazard or fomented by regional or global concerns rather than by internal Yemeni needs or domestic American political concerns. For example, American engagement with Yemen has been far more modest than that with Saudi Arabia or even with the Netherlands.¹⁷⁵ The rationale behind the bilateral engagement with Yemen, however unfocused it may have been, merits review.

During the Cold War and in the years immediately following, scholars argued that US policy in the Middle East was shaped by American attempts to assure the survival of Israel, contain Communism, protect its supply of oil, and advance certain principles such as rule of law and self-determination.¹⁷⁶ However, recent trends augur for a reassessment of those policy goals. Assuring the supply of oil and maintenance of support for the state of Israel certainly remain paramount principles in American policy. America continues also to promote principles of democracy and constitutional liberalism, such as rule of law, educational reforms,

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and self-determination, insofar as these principles do not upset stability in the region. President George W. Bush's recent commitment to transforming the Middle East into a democratic showcase has highlighted US interest in this aspect of US Middle East policy.¹⁷⁷ However, with the diminution of the communist threat has come the rise of a new threat: that of the transnational terrorist organizations exemplified most prominently by al-Qaeda. The "War on Terrorism," accelerated in the wake of September 11, has therefore added a new dimension to US policy in the Middle East and complicated the pursuance of US goals in the region. That is, democracy and counter-terror efforts may at times directly conflict with one another, so the concurrent promotion of both may present policymakers with an unresolved dilemma.¹⁷⁸

In its bid to contain the spread of Communism in southern Arabia, the United States made concerted efforts to assure that the Soviet Union did not enjoy freedom of action in North Yemen.¹⁷⁹ Yet it made only dilatory efforts to counter the Soviet presence in South Yemen, the only Marxist state in Arabia, and initiate dialogue with its leaders. This stance may have been determined by a desire to maintain a conciliatory approach with the Soviet Union, or at least to avoid a direct confrontation with it, and by the sense that a non-Marxist North Yemen could balance the south and obviate direct US engagement there.

Yemen's oil exports and reserves, only recently exploited, remain modest, so the preservation of Yemeni oil flows was not a critical component of US policy during the Cold War. However, Yemen is adjacent to the largest oil reserves in the world and figured prominently in the US policy of maintaining the stability and integrity of Saudi Arabia and the other oil-exporting Gulf states.¹⁸⁰(175) Both Yemens represented anti-monarchical forces on the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula that could threaten to destabilize the region and, by extension, jeopardize continuity in the supply and pricing of oil.¹⁸¹ Although North Yemen had a "republican" government that was theoretically at odds with the traditional monarchies of the Gulf, the greater threat in Saudi and US eyes lay in the revolutionary Marxist regime of South Yemen.¹⁸² Statements by Joseph Sisco, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, confirm that the United States was sensitive to Saudi security concerns, and thus, by supporting North Yemen to a certain degree, it bolstered a counterweight to South Yemen and assuaged the anxiety of the Gulf monarchies.¹⁸³ However, US aid was kept modest to assure that North Yemen did not become so strong that it could threaten Saudi Arabia or other Gulf monarchies.¹⁸⁴(179)

Another reason for US engagement with Yemen related to the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb. This strategic waterway controls all shipping into and out of the Red Sea. Bordered by Djibouti on one side and Yemen on the other, this narrow waterway, if closed, could seriously disrupt commercial shipping and also interfere with a US naval presence in the region. In fact, during the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, South Yemen and Egypt did cooperate in blockading the Straits for several weeks, and the United States did send an aircraft carrier task force as a "visible demonstration of US presence and interest."¹⁸⁵ Although no military encounters between American and South Yemeni forces occurred, positive relations with Yemen were seen as helping to maintain unrestricted access to the Straits and to avoid the potential for a military confrontation.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the abrupt termination of the Cold War had a significant and almost immediate impact on US engagement with Yemen.¹⁸⁶ First, this event may have prompted Saddam Hussein to try to assert himself as a regional hegemon. His invasion of Kuwait and Yemen's vote of "no" in the UN Security Council created an immediate rationale for the United States to reduce or terminate its engagement with Yemen. Second, the collapse of the USSR and the unity of the two Yemens ended the threat that Marxism posed to the Gulf's traditional monarchies. Thus, Yemen ceased to be a strategic concern to US poli-

cymakers. In fact, one could argue that a weakened Yemen was in US interests as a united and resurgent Yemen could pose a greater threat to the Gulf states.¹⁸⁷ Finally, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the creation of the CIS countries, and the sharp rise in humanitarian interventions throughout the 1990s, funds for Yemen had to be factored in an increasingly competitive foreign policy environment.¹⁸⁸ Yemen, being a low priority, witnessed a steep decline in US funding and engagement for more than ten years.

The attack on the USS *Cole* was a wake-up call that was only partially acknowledged at the time. In hindsight, the *Cole* incident served more to reconnect Yemen and America than it did to seriously redirect American policy toward Yemen. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, counter-terrorism operations and concerns did not leap to the top of the policy agenda; it would take an attack on the US homeland to significantly shift US bureaucratic priorities. Only then was Yemen no longer seen as “marginal,” but rather as a “breeding ground for terror that could lead to attacks on the US homeland.”¹⁸⁹

The abrupt American awakening to the dangers of international terrorism following the September 11 attacks has, more than anything else, sparked a renewed interest and a commitment on the part of US policymakers to engage the Arab world, including Yemen. Fighting terrorism has rapidly become institutionalized as one of the United States’ primary policy pillars in the Middle East. In Yemen this policy has produced funds for port security, coast guard development, special forces training, reproductive health and literacy campaigns, public diplomacy initiatives, and increased intergovernmental cooperation. It is likely that as long as al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks remain in Yemen, American support will continue. However, should the war on terrorism shift elsewhere, the future of US-Yemeni policy remains less certain. If past Yemeni engagement is any guide, however, it is probable that the United States will once again limit its engagement with Yemen.¹⁹⁰

US and regional neglect of Yemen and other Cold War proxies such as Pakistan during the 1990s, coupled with the withdrawal of Soviet aid, may have made them fertile ground for the emergence and proliferation of extremist groups and terrorist networks.¹⁹¹ Yemen, faced with a dramatic decline in US and regional aid, ostracized for its support of Saddam Hussein, and bearing the burden of unity, was left without sufficient funds and other resources to limit the rise of alternative and often extremist viewpoints. Abrupt US disengagement in 1990 helped create a vacuum that other actors including terrorist organizations were quick to fill.¹⁹²

There is no unanimity on this point. Ransom says that it is impossible to “pin that tail on the US donkey.”¹⁹³ (186) Charles Schmitz, a Fulbright scholar during the 1990s, sees events in Yemen at that time as being “driven [primarily] . . . by domestic struggles for hegemony” in a weakened nation-state.¹⁹⁴ However, others perceive a lack of external engagement as aggravating negative internal trends and influences by narrowing governmental spending options, weakening reforms, and, in essence, depriving citizens of alternative narratives of discourse and development. USAID specifically identifies its renewed development program in Yemen as being a “component to the War on Terrorism.”¹⁹⁵ The FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification highlights the importance of assuring continuing funding to Yemen in order to directly and indirectly combat terrorism and promote internal reform.¹⁹⁶

The United States was not the only source of aid to Yemen; the international community gave billions of dollars to fund development there. Saudi Arabia, for instance, was a major donor and has always exercised a heavy hand in internal Yemeni affairs.¹⁹⁷ It is therefore likely that the withdrawal of aid to Yemen by the international community as a whole weakened the regime and created a situation conducive to the rise of opposition and extremist groups.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert that a reduction of engagement, at the

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minimum, means a diminution of empathy and understanding on the part of the recipient nation's population, making it susceptible to exploitation by radical groups.

V. WHITHER ENGAGEMENT? POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This study recommends a policy of engagement at the level of involvement, a policy to which the United States has now returned. Routine influence is not sufficient to counter the strong forces of fundamentalism and extremism extant in Yemen and the region. America needs to engage Islamic moderates and offer a viable, reasoned, and attractive alternative to the vision proffered by the likes of Osama Bin Laden.¹⁹⁹ As Bronson notes, “deterrence is easier, and often cheaper, than compellence. By the same token, conflict prevention is easier, and often cheaper, than conflict resolution.”²⁰⁰ According to Hoyt, “It is ultimately in the enlightened self-interest of the West to pay greater attention to the developing world, to develop a better understanding of the causes of instability, and to craft long-term responses to these problems.”²⁰¹ Through a policy of positive involvement, it is necessary to ensure that the Yemeni government and population see the benefits of a relationship with the United States. Failure to engage moderate Arab regimes such as Yemen's will likely “exacerbate” current problems and affect regional US policy.²⁰²

Heavy-handed engagement or intervention, on the other hand, is forewarned by both experience and contemporary trends.²⁰³ The Middle East has, for too long, perceived itself as a victim of foreign power intervention. If America wishes to win the “hearts and minds” of the majority of moderate Arabs, then direct intervention in Arab affairs is to be scrupulously avoided.

Furthermore, involvement must be multifaceted.²⁰⁴ Emphasizing one kind of involvement—especially the less visible and ever unpopular military aid—at the expense of others should be avoided.²⁰⁵ In the 1990s, US involvement with Yemen had a significant military component. This involvement did not resonate with the population and may have created more hostility than amity. It is critical to balance military aid with other forms of aid, such as economic, developmental, and educational.²⁰⁶ As Cronin notes:

*The more effective policy instruments in the long run will be nonmilitary. The United States needs to expand and deepen its nonmilitary instruments of power: intelligence, public diplomacy . . . economic assistance and sanctions. . . When faced with a long-term threat, American power is most strongly bolstered by political, economic, and military elements, in that order.*²⁰⁷

US and third party economic and development aid to Yemen should continue. However, there are three important caveats. First, in the past, most foreign aid was spent on infrastructural projects such as buildings, dams, roads, and power facilities. But the real needs in Yemen lie in human capacity and rural development.²⁰⁸ According to Yemen's deputy minister

for planning, Hisham Sharaf, Yemen needs “more trained managers and administrators; more capable workers—not more roads and buildings. We have enough buildings.”²⁰⁹ David Ransom concurs, adding that with nearly three-quarters of the Yemeni population living in villages and engaging in agriculture, it is critical that the needs of rural citizens be addressed. This would be best accomplished through literacy training, public health programs, and through such simple investments as generators and the provision of disease-resistant crop strains.²¹⁰

Second, the proffered aid has often been controlled by one side, with the provider deciding how and in what manner it will be spent. There is limited coordination with Yemenis at the official and unofficial levels in assessing needs and wants. The typical international aid organization decides to allocate funds in a specific region for a discrete task. Yemenis may disagree with this allocation, but in fact they have little chance to alter the course of the project once it has been approved. The subsequent difficulties that many aid organizations face may be due in part to recalcitrance on the part of government officials who view the project implementation as the phase in which they might be able to influence the process and thereby recapture some of their damaged pride and, by extension, what they view as infringed sovereignty.²¹¹

Damaged pride aside, this leads to the third caveat: too often, officials expect to benefit financially from any aid or economic projects. In Yemen, as in many developing nations, a sizeable bureaucracy has sprung up to administer these projects and informally ensures that a significant amount of the proceeds stays in the hands of wealthy, urbanized elites. Corruption is so widespread and acknowledged in Yemen that many Yemenis shrug off new development or economic initiatives. They sense that these initiatives at best only help those who do not need help; and, at worst, are borne on the backs of average Yemeni citizens when the initiatives are financed by loans that must be repaid. Thus, actors engaging in development and economic assistance should be aware of the unintended consequences of their aid and do their best to mitigate such effects.²¹² Aid can, if indiscriminately awarded and poorly monitored, serve to reinforce the very patronage networks that stifle democracy and stymie the development of free markets.

It is well to keep in mind that economic and development aid does not always translate quickly into political capital that the donor nation can build upon or exploit. PL-480 food aid, for example, is designed around a fairly complicated mechanism that transfers surplus grain to a foreign government, which pays for the grain; these funds are then returned to the foreign nation in the form of a loan.²¹³ Clearly, it is not easy for foreign nationals to perceive the impact or even be aware of the indirect benefits of such types of aid.

The more visible and higher impact education and cultural exchanges are therefore essential, but here too, they must be undertaken carefully. The benefits from such programs accrue in the long-term, but their funding is often short-term and prone to politicization. It is therefore critical that efforts be directed to assuring that these projects have time to mature. It is also essential that the range of educational exchange programs be broadened. As one long-serving, former USIS officer noted, shorter term (nondegree) programs are often just as useful and productive as long-term ones and the former allow many more people to benefit. Given the scarcity of funds, Marjorie Ransom advocates a mix of undergraduate, graduate, short-term training, and international visitor programs. Two-way exchanges remain all too rare: It is as useful for US students, scholars, and English teachers to work in Yemen as it is for Yemenis to come to the United States.

Needless to say, it is crucial that these educational and cultural exchanges not alienate those targeted for engagement—after all, these programs are specifically designed to promote empathy and understanding.²¹⁴ Yet there is the very real danger in the current

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political and security environment that these programs may “backfire.” First, there is the sense among Yemenis that only elites are awarded such scholarships and that those without “wasta” (connections) stand no chance. It is essential, therefore, to assure objective and transparent selection processes and to encourage participation of individuals from outside Sana’a. Second and more significantly, America has enacted stringent new visa and immigration procedures to stop terrorists from entering the country.²¹⁵ Yet according to officials who run scholarship and exchange programs, these procedures have led to long waits, repetitive requests for information, and brusque encounters with consular officials—even though the State Department’s Educational and Cultural Affairs has actually selected the individuals in question for USG programs.²¹⁶ Regrettably, it is also common for individuals selected by the US government to receive prestigious grants or partake in important seminars to face extended waits and harassment upon arrival in the United States.²¹⁷ For example, a Yemeni delegation taking part in a US-government-sponsored cultural symposium suffered harsh treatment—including the handcuffing of one of its members, upon arrival.²¹⁸ The right hand does not know what the left is doing, and there is the very real danger that such exchanges, designed to promote greater understanding and empathy among peoples, will backfire if the US government does not handle them carefully and responsibly.²¹⁹ There is also the very real potential to reduce severely the number of foreign students studying in the United States, thus putting US universities at a competitive disadvantage.²²⁰ The Institute of International Education’s annual “Open Doors” survey reveals that enrollments of foreign students at US universities has leveled off after years of growth. More pointedly, the statistics state that enrollment of Arab students in US universities has fallen by 10 percent since last year.²²¹ There is thus a clear need for improving and streamlining the processing of visitor visas—especially for those visitors who have been awarded US government scholarships.

Improving America’s image and engaging Yemenis, Arabs, and other populations is critical. To effectively deal with terrorism, the United States must recognize that although few Arabs are terrorists, terrorism cannot exist without at least tacit support by larger segments of the population.²²² Among the broader population in the Middle East, there is a sense that American policies are unjust, and this sense gives terrorism the veneer of legitimacy in the eyes of many.²²³ America’s strong support for Israel and the perception by many Muslims that the United States is waging a war against Islam antagonizes significant sections of the Arab and Muslim peoples.²²⁴ Furthermore, America’s support for corrupt or illegitimate regimes, its stationing of troops in the Arabian Peninsula, and its “pollution” of Muslim culture with its own cultural values anger militants and moderates alike.²²⁵ America must recognize that its goals of promoting democracy and stability in the region may come directly into conflict with its fight against terrorism, for stable regimes in the Middle East are often repressive and authoritarian. It is easy to see how domestic resentment of these regimes carries over to the foreign powers that keep them in power.²²⁶ Over fifty years ago in the context of the Cold War, the following advice was given to policymakers: “There is only one way of meeting and neutralizing Soviet influence and expansion and that is by outbidding her in decency and winning with deeds, not words, the friendship of the billion awakening Africans and Asiatics.”²²⁷ The same advice, in the setting of the war on terror, rings true today.

One last caution: there is the danger of seeing al-Qaeda behind every bush in the Middle East. Prior administrations fell into a similar trap as they zealously pursued an anti-communist agenda in the Middle East and elsewhere.²²⁸ By seeing events through a “global lens,” they tended to dismiss or disregard local movements and issues that were often quite distinct from communist ideology—or even diametrically opposed to it.²²⁹ In some cases, this distortion may well have pushed state and non-state actors into the Marxist embrace and

kept them there—perceptions became a self-fulfilling prophecy.²³⁰ A similar caution applies to Western perceptions of Islam, which seems to have simplistically replaced the bugaboo of Communism in many policymaker's eyes. Islam is far from being a monolith, and there exist both strong, divergent trends of fundamentalist retrenchment and reformism.²³¹ Yet all too often these distinct tendencies are misunderstood and lumped together into a dangerous, unwieldy, and unlikely conception of “political Islam” or “Islamic fundamentalism.”²³² Not only is this perception simplistic, but it can be counterproductive or even dangerous by undermining support for Islamic moderate and reformers and driving more into the camp of extremist “neo-Islamic totalitarianism.”²³³

In conclusion, it is important to note that US relations with Yemen have not been strictly determined by on-the-ground realities in Yemen. Rather, they have been shaped and influenced by the exigencies of global politics. Global concerns—the Cold War—initiated and sustained US engagement with Yemen in the past, a case in point being the 1979 border war between the two Yemens.²³⁴ Today, global concerns (now in the form of transnational terrorism) give impetus to a reinvigorated US presence in Yemen. Whether US engagement continues into the future will likely be determined, in large part, by the course that the international system takes.²³⁵

A more active consideration of the internal politics of foreign nations is warranted. The United States needs a multi-pronged, sustained, and consistent policy in dealing with terrorism's roots rather than a haphazard one dealing with its symptoms and driven by short-term tactical concerns.²³⁶ The United States should appreciate further that its perceptions of strategic trends in the Middle East are often limited, that its emphasis on fighting terror often obscures the real causes of terror, and that there are many things that are beyond its capacity to control.²³⁷ Consequently, our nation must develop more refined analyses of longer-term challenges and threats in the Arab world.²³⁸ For starters, it should recognize the impact that its policies and support for politically repressive regimes have in creating negative perceptions of America among citizens of the Middle East²³⁹ and that, without grappling with the “demand side” of terrorism (that is, the conditions that give rise to it), America will be engaged in a losing battle.²⁴⁰ For, in a region currently experiencing unprecedented population growth rates, diminished sustainability, divisive social change, repressive political systems, anger, and despair, terrorists will be made much faster than we can hope to eliminate them.²⁴¹●

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2. Department of State, “Background Note: Yemen,” online
3. Avi Shlaim, *War and Peace in the Middle East*, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 3-4.
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5. Zabarrah, *Yemen*.
6. *Ibid.*, 71.
7. Rachel Bronson, “Cycles of Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), 214.
8. William J. Fulbright with Seth P. Tillman, *The Price of Empire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 153-173.
9. FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 435.
10. Michael E. Brown and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “Internal Conflict and International Action,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), 173-74. Many use the term “economic assistance” loosely to mean “all for of non-military financial assistance”—including development aid and educational exchange. See for example: Mark N. Katz, *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 196. It is more narrowly defined in this paper.
11. Haass and O’Sullivan, *Honey and Vinegar*, 17.
12. *Ibid.*, 174.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 24.
15. Cohen, “Jihadist Threat,” 24; Marjorie Ransom, interview by author, 6 November 2003.

16. Haass and O'Sullivan, *Honey and Vinegar*, 172.
17. Robert Sutter, "China and Japan: Trouble Ahead?," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2003), 39. Additionally, educational exchange programs have the pragmatic function of improving international business and academic ties that benefit individuals, institutions, and nations. Lee Hockstader, "Post-9/11 Visa Rules Keep Thousands from Coming to US," *The Washington Post*, 11 November 2003, A17.
18. Fulbright, *Price of Empire*, 232.
19. David J. Kramer, "No Bang for the Buck: Public Diplomacy Should Remain a Priority," Department of State Archives, www.state.gov/r/adcompd/kramer.html; accessed on November 26, 2003.
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21. Robin Bidwell, *The Two Yemens* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 9. Yemen was subjected to two periods of Ottoman control in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.
22. At the height of Nasser's involvement, over 60,000 Egyptian troops were stationed in North Yemen. David Ledger, *Shifting Sands: The British in South Arabia* (London: Peninsular Publishing, 1983), 10. A variety of attempts—local, regional, and American—were expended to terminate Egyptian and Saudi involvement in the Yemeni civil war. For several years, however, all ended in failure. Stanford Research Institute (SRI), *Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), 49.
23. Detailed descriptions on the civil war include the following books: Dana Adams Schmidt, *Yemen: The Unknown War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968) and Edgar O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971). Nasser withdrew his troops from Yemen following Egypt's disastrous performance in the June 1967 war with Israel. SRI, *Area Handbook*, 50.
24. Robert W. Stookey, *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 252-271.
25. *Ibid.*, 386 (map).
26. David Ransom, interview. It is likely that, among the rationales for northern overtures to Aden was that North Yemen sought to offset Saudi pressure by improving ties with South Yemen. Fred Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 165.
27. Robert D. Burrowes, *The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 87. According to David Ransom, US Deputy Chief of Mission at the time, Hamdi's assassins acted with tacit Saudi consent. David Ransom, interview.
28. There is much mystery surrounding Ghashmi's death. However, it is thought that his death was a direct consequence of a South Yemeni power play between opposing factions of the Marxist government in Aden. Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 278.
29. Along with severe economic hardships, North Yemen had to put down a group of discontents, the National Democratic Front (NDF), which was conducting an insurgency movement within North Yemeni territory. This group was sponsored by the South Yemeni government. *Ibid.*, 322.
30. Burrowes, *Politics of Development*, 94-117.
31. *Ibid.*, 134; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.
32. "The Two Yemens: Coming Closer Together," *Middle East International*, 5 January

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1990, 15.

33. Ramez Maluf, "North Yemen takes Guarded Steps toward Democracy," *The Middle East Times*, 18-24 July 1989, 11.

34. Robert W. Stookey, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 33.

35. By January 1856, Aden's population had increased twelve-fold to 25,000 inhabitants. Captain R L Playfair, *A History of Arabia Felix or Yemen, from the Commencement of the Christian Era to the Present Time*, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, No. XLIX (Bombay: The Education Society's Press, 1859), 13.

36. Stookey, *South Yemen*, 37-50.

37. Aden, which had previously been governed by the Bombay administration, was now turned over to the British Colonial Office.

38. The British had established the "Eastern" and "Western Protectorates" through a series of mutual defense treaties with sheikhs and sultans of the numerous tribes found within the hinterland. However, political integration and British contacts with the tribes of the protectorates were not extensive.

39. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

40. Hugh Leach, interview by author, 20 December 1989.

41. Ibid.

42. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online. Oil would not be discovered in the southern provinces until after unity.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. War costs were an estimated \$11-13 billion dollars. SABANET, "Structural Reforms," Saba News Agency, July 22, 2003, www.sabanews.net/view.php?scope=2fb3f69&id=45235.

46. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

47. A recent *Yemen Times* headline, for example, touts the arrest of the "Number 1 Al-Qaeda suspect in Yemen;" *Yemen Times*, www.yementimes.com/index.shtml?; accessed on November 26, 2003.

48. SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 54.

49. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 1.

50. Eric Macro, *Yemen and the Western World* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1968), 127.

51. A. Farougy, *Introducing Yemen* (New York: Orientala, 1947), 97; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online. The American mission in Jeddah was initially responsible for maintaining relations with Sana'a. Macro, *Yemen and the Western World*, 127. For the full text of the agreement, see Farougy, *Introducing Yemen*, 118-123.

52. Farougy, *Introducing Yemen*, 97-98. "Department [of State] believes that King Saud [of Saudi Arabia] also would have reason to be gravely concerned if Yemen were to add itself to procession of countries closely neighboring on Saudi Arabia that have permitted themselves to fall under real threat of Communist penetration and direction." "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia," 26 March 1956, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1988), 750.

53. The first archaeological expedition to Marib, Yemen (the alleged home of the Queen of Sheba), under the leadership of Wendell Phillips, did not result in a positive encounter between darkness, fearing bodily harm. Yemenis, meanwhile, complained about how the Americans had "comported" themselves during the expedition. A dispatch at the time shows

that the US was concerned about the potential damaging effects of this encounter. Ibrahim Al-Rashid, *Yemen under the Rule of Imam Ahmed* (Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications, 1985), 56-57.

54. Military aid was not considered at the time. Macro, *Yemen and the Western World*, 122-23.

55. Al-Rashid, *Yemen under the Rule*, 68; and Macro, *Yemen and the Western World*, 122-23.

56. Official correspondence during that era is rife with concerns about Soviet “imperialism” in Yemen and throughout the Arabian Peninsula. See Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988), 748-73; and Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 796-819.

57. The aid program was agreed upon but not implemented. The USSR and China also initiated aid efforts around this time. Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Vol. XII*, 815-16; SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 61; Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 18; and Ali Abdel Rahman Rahmy, *The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World: Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1967 Case Study* (Washington: University Press of America, 1983), 114.

58. Al-Rashid, *Yemen under the Rule*.

59. SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 56; Department of State, “Background Note: Yemen,” online; and Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 117-18. Apparently, the new Yemeni government made threats to terminate American interests in Yemen if it was not recognized. Macro, *Yemen and the Western World*, 128. For the full text of the recognition agreement, see Schmidt, *Unknown War*, 301-302.

60. Harold Ingrams, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions* (London: John Murray, 1963), 140; Stookey, *Yemen*, xiv; Saeed M. Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 62; and Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 114-15; 118. Ingrams further notes that the United States extended recognition to new republic quickly while Britain withheld its recognition. In this, he saw the gradual expansion of American influence in Arabia and the concomitant withdrawal of British influence from the region. Ingrams, *The Yemen*, 140.

61. Zabarrah, *Yemen*, 78-79; and Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 115; 118.

62. A State Department “Contingency Planning Paper” issued in 1965 states: “The United States has a long-standing and often-reiterated commitment to protect Saudi Arabia from foreign aggression. Behind this commitment lies our interest in the continental free flow of Saudi oil to Western Europe, the security of air transit facilities across the Peninsula, and the survival of a regime which is one of our best friends in the Middle East and a staunch foe of communism.” Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Vol. XXI* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), 721.

63. The Saudi government was opposed to US recognition of the new Yemeni regime, and King Hussein of Jordan said that the United States was “undercutting her friends” (although he later changed his opinion). Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 62; and Zabarrah, *Yemen*, 80. The deposed Imam (Mohammed Al-Badr) told an American military officer that the Russians were planning to infiltrate the Arab world indirectly, on the backs of Egyptian expansionism, with Yemen being a case in point. The Imam may have believed this statement or, cognizant of American sensitivities to the Soviet threat, may have devised this explanation in hopes of extracting US support for royalist forces. Ingrams, *The Yemen*, 141-42.

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64. Christopher J. McMullen, *Resolution of the Yemen Crisis, 1963: A Case Study in Mediation* (Washington: Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1980); Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 62-64; Ingrams, *The Yemen*, 141; SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 56; Macro, *Yemen and the Western World*, 128-30; Zabarah, *Yemen*, 79; Schmidt, *Unknown War*, 269; and Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 116.

65. President Kennedy created USAID on 3 November 1961, following passage of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. USAID, "About USAID," www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html.

66. Many of these projects were agreed upon in 1959, when the US Embassy was established in Yemen. However, they were not started until after the September 1962 revolution. Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 114; David Ransom, interview by author, 6 November 2003; Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online; SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 61; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 631; and Burrowes, *Politics of Development*, 27.

67. Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 63.

68. Ibid., 64; Zabarah, *Yemen*, 78-79; and Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 115-16.

69. Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 64; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 79; and Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68; Vol. XXI*, 705.

70. Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 84; Zabarah, *Yemen*, 101.

71. SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 56; Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 235; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online. By April 1967, relations were already turning sour, with crowds sacking the Embassy and demonstrating against Americans, and Yemeni officials accusing USAID employee of carrying out a bazooka attack in April 1967. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68; Vol. XXI*, 826-28; 838-39.

72. Zabarah, *Yemen*, 72-77; SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 56; and Schmidt, *Unknown War*, 273.

73. O'Ballance, *The War in the Yemen*, 8; Zabarah, *Yemen*, 89; and Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 90-91; 123.

74. SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 61-62.

75. Ledger, *Shifting Sands*, 220.

76. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 80.

77. Ibid., 80; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

78. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 79.

79. Ibid., 61-62.

80. SRI, *Area Handbook Peripheral*, 89; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 80-81; Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online; and Laurie Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges," RAND Corporation, December 1983, 66.

81. This coup was labeled "the 22 June Corrective Move." Helen Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen: Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia* (London: Ithaca Press, 1985), 60-61; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 81; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 63; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

82. David Ransom was Yemen desk officer at the Department of State at that time and helped coordinate Roger's visit to normalize bilateral relations. David Ransom, interview; Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online; and Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 235.

83. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

84. At the time, Saudi Arabia was one of the "twin pillars" (the other, Iran) that the US envisaged were holding up the order of regional security. David Ransom, interview; Joseph

Kostiner, *South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy: 1970-1985* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 58-59; Burrowes, *Politics of Development*, 82; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 165; Stookey, *South Yemen*, 96; Bengt Knutsson, Viking Mattsson, and Magnus Persson, eds., *Yemen—Past and Present* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1994), 19; and Stookey, *Yemen*, 276; Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 9-10.

85. The United States Information Agency (USIA) was known as the United States Information Services overseas because of the negative connotations associated with the word "Agency." The PAO was the senior in-country USIA representative.

86. AMIDEAST, www.amideast.org/offices/yemen/default.htm.

87. Ibid.

88. Thomas B. Stevenson, "President's Address," *AIYS Update: Bulletin of the American Institute for Yemeni Studies* 45 (2003): 5.

89. AIYS, www.aiys.org.

90. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online; Sabrina Faber, personal correspondence; Dr. Ahmed Al-Kibsi, meeting, March 2003; and Department of State, "Saving the American Scholarship Program in Yemen: A Good Investment for the US," Cable Reference: Sana 'a 004017.

91. US Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present, and Future*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, Committee Print, p. 76; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 84-85. Stookey, *South Yemen*, 98; Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 283; and B.R. Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 201. David Ransom notes that the United States used the threat from the South to pressure Saudi Arabia into providing funding for North Yemeni arms transfers. This trilateral arrangement, in turn, alienated the South Yemenis further. David Ransom, interview.

92. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

93. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 82; David Ransom, interview; and Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence," 1. A local joke that hinted at the lesser threat that North Yemen presented to Saudi Arabia was that the Saudis provided the northerners with guns that would only "shoot southwards." Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 296.

94. Col. (Ret.) Alfred Prados, interview.

95. Kostiner, *Revolutionary Strategy*, 72; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 86-87; Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 283; Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 202; Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *The Yemens: Country Studies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986), 206; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 29-30.

96. Kostiner, *Revolutionary Strategy*, 72; Burrowes, *The Yemen Arab Republic*, 107; Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 202; and David Ransom, interview. Carter had signed a waiver on the arms sale, citing the Marxist threat. Halliday ascertains that although Carter had exaggerated the Soviet threat in order to seize the opportunity to make a strong stand against the USSR, there was indeed a South Yemeni threat. That Carter administration National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski does not even mention the crisis in his book *Power and Principle* leads Halliday to conclude that the event was of "symptomatic rather than intrinsic significance." Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 86-87; 93; and Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 36-37.

97. Nyrop, ed., *The Yemens*, 206; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 2; 28-29.

98. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 87-88; Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 202; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 29.

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99. Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 202; and Nyrop, ed., *The Yemens*, 206.

100. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 87; Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence," 63-64; Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 38-39; Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 327-28; Burrowes, *Politics of Development*, 105.

101. Following the Yemen Arab Republic's 1979 border war with South Yemen, the Soviet Union made a successful bid to attract Saleh's interest and favor by supplying him with large quantities of arms. Lt. Col. John J. Ruskiewicz, "How the US Lost its Footing in the Shifting Sands of the Persian Gulf--A Case History in the Yemen Arab Republic," *Armed Forces Journal* (September, 1980): 62-72; David Ransom, interview; Kostiner, *Revolutionary Strategy*, 73-74; Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 38-39; Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 203; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 30.

102. Arms sales fueled something of an arms race between the two Yemens, both of whom the Soviet Union was supplying with military aid. John T. Haldane, "Arabia Without Oil: A Tale of Two Yemens," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* (24 February 1986): 7; Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 44; Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 202-203; and Nyrop, ed., *The Yemens*, 195; 206-207. One journalist referred to the spectacle of "seeing Russian technicians training pilots on MiG 21s at one end of Sana'a airfield while at the other American instructors demonstrated the use of F5s." Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 283.

103. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

104. Nyrop, ed., *The Yemens*, 187; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

105. Haldane, "A Tale of Two Yemens," 6; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

106. Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 283; and Burrowes, *Politics of Development*, 134.

107. Sabrina Faber, personal correspondence.

108. By contrast, during the 1970s, the Soviet Union quickly moved to the level of controlling intervention, sending thousands of advisors, initiating arms transfers and education programs, and helping stage coups. Stephen Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9.4 (Spring 1985): 3.

109. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 79-80; 82; and Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence," v.

110. Kostiner, *Revolutionary Strategy*, 32; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 82-83; 91; Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen*, 99; and Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 234-35.

111. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 27.

112. Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 234; 284; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 80-82; and Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen*, 99.

113. Paul Findley, *They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1985), 3; and Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 83.

114. Findley, *Dare to Speak Out*, 6-9; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 83, 85.

115. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 85.

116. Findley, *Dare to Speak Out*, 9; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 85; Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 285.

117. Findley, *Dare to Speak Out*, 10.

118. In a complicated turn of events, the North Yemeni president, Ghashmi, had been killed by a briefcase bomb borne by, most observers believe, an unwitting South Yemeni envoy who had traveled to Sana'a to discuss unification. Ali's opponents, who may have well planted

the bomb, immediately accused him of the intrigue. Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen*, 73-78. The plane which bore the South Yemeni emissary to Sana'a remains at Sana'a airport—a rusting testimony to this brief, violent interlude.

119. Findley, *Dare to Speak Out*, 11; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 85; Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen*, 99; and Stookey, *South Yemen*, 97.

120. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 86; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 28.

121. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 87.

122. *Ibid.*, 88-90.

123. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 32-33.

124. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 98; and Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence," 67. There were those who urged a policy of engagement with the southern regime, however, their voices went unheard in Washington. Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 196-97.

125. He says that statements made with "exiguous regard for accuracy" were put forth by US government officials in order to exploit the crisis for propaganda purposes. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 95-96.

126. Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence," 1-2.

127. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online. There were covert CIA attempts to destabilize the southern regime beginning in 1981. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 87; 91; 93; and Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen*, 99. Eric Rouleau claims that the United States, having seen the utility of using mujahideen in Afghanistan, promoted similar operations in countries such as South Yemen. Eric Rouleau, "Trouble in the Kingdom," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 82. According to Adeni citizens, religious elements and mujahideen began to affect society after the 1986 civil war; before that time, religious conservatism was rare in the city. Lackner, *P.D.R. Yemen*, 110.

128. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

129. USAID, "Yemen," online. Mark N. Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda Tied to Domestic Repression," *Eurasia Insight* (8 January 2002): www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010802a.shtml.

130. Ransom, working in the State Department at that time, claimed that President Bush felt "betrayed" by Saleh's stance and a snubbing of Baker helped terminate much of our foreign assistance to Yemen. David Ransom, interview; and Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online.

131. "Background Note: Yemen." Yemen's ambassador to the UN, after voting 'no,' was told "that will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast," and Yemen lost its entire US aid budget. Phyllis Bennis, "UN Security Council Vote on US Occupation," Action and Communication Network for International Development, October 17, 2003, www.alternatives.ca/article898.html.

132. Sheila Carapico, "Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen," *Middle East Report*, November/December 1993, accessed on the site "Yemen Gateway," www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/scarap.htm. "Background Note: Yemen," and National Democratic Institute, "Middle East and North Africa: Yemen," www.ndi.org/worldwide/mena/yemen/yemen_pf.asp.

133. Sabrina Faber, personal correspondence; Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online; David Ransom, interview.

134. Yemen was a important supplier of religious fighters against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. When the conflict ended, "Afghani" fighters from a number of Arab countries were treated as fugitives by many of their own homelands. Accordingly, a number settled

in Yemen and were given refuge by Islah, Yemen's Islamist party. Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, "Arab Veterans of Afghanistan War Learn New Islamic Holy War," October 28, 1994, www.fas.org/irp/news/1994/afghan_war_veterans.html; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 163; Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda," online.

135. The CIA and British SAS trained and funded thousands of Arab "Afghanis" to help defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. Among those receiving funding and support was Osama Bin Laden, whose family originally hails from former South Yemen. Federation of American Scientists, "Arab Veterans of Afghanistan," online.

136. David Ransom, interview; Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda," online.

137. Michael E. Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview," in Brown, ed., *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, 22; Bronson, "Cycles of Conflict," 205-206; 233; and US National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2015, December 2000, 50. This vacuum is a persistent danger wherever state institutions are weak and non-state actors may either exploit them or provide parallel services for political ends. Michael Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," *Washington Quarterly* 25 no. 3 (Summer 2002): 157-59.

138. Nadir Mohammed and Maria Handal, "Yemen Economic Update," The World Bank Group, Sana'a Office, Fall 2003, 8; International Monetary Fund, "Press Release: Republic of Yemen Accepts Article VIII Obligations," 26 December 1996; and International Monetary Fund, "Press Release: IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Yemen," March 20, 1996, accessed at www.imf.org/external/country/YEM/index.htm; and Maye Ostowani, "Turmoil in Yemen," *Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line*, no. 383, July 1, 1998; www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/383/re3/htm.

139. Ostowani, "Turmoil in Yemen."

140. Most kidnappings, which occurred in the former northern governorates, were resolved peacefully after varying amounts of time. However, in December 1998, an Islamist group known as the "Aden-Abyan Islamic Army" captured a large group of Western tourists in the southern governorates. Yemeni army forces surrounded them and shooting broke out. Four hostages were killed during the firefight and a number wounded. This was Yemen's first, although not last, fatal kidnapping. Kenneth Katzman, "Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002," *CRS Report for Congress* (13 February 2002), 20.

141. Jozlyn Kalchthaler, "Middle East Peace Corps Pioneers," *Peace Corps Online*, July 5, 2001; www.peacecorpsonline.org/messages/messages/467/3475.html; USAID, "Yemen," online; Sabrina Faber, personal correspondence.

142. *Yemen Times*, "Honoring a Great Gal," Vol. VIII, Issue 31 (August 3, 1998); www.yementimes.com/98/iss31/report.htm.

143. Edmund Hull, interview by author 22 December 2003.

144. Holly, "Humanitarian Demining Program," Edmund Hull, interview; and CNN.com, "US Navy Defends Using Yemen as Refueling Stop: 1999 Report Dubbed Aden a Terrorist 'Safe Haven,'" (October 15, 2003), www.cnn.com/2000/US/10/15/cole.refuel/.

145. Holly, "Humanitarian Demining Program," online.

146. Edmund Hull, interview; and International Campaign to Ban Landmines, www.icbl.org; accessed on 22 January 2004.

147. Edmund Hull, interview. Only twenty-five US Navy ships had previously called at Aden to refuel. CNN.com, "US Navy Defends Using Yemen," online.

148. Shelagh Weir, "A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen," *Middle*

East Report, July-September 1997, www.merip.org/mer/mer204/weir.htm; Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda," online; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 163.

149. Department of Defense, "The USS *Cole* waits for the M/V Blue Marlin to maneuver under the destroyer off the coast of Aden, Yemen," *DefenseLink*, www.defenselink.mil/photos/Oct2000/001030-M-0557M-006.html.

150. There were many charges that the Yemeni government was not fully cooperating with US investigators during the investigation, although some claim that the media exaggerated these claims. Andrew J. Pierre, *Coalitions: Building and Maintenance—Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, War on Terror* (Washington: Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2003), 59; and Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda," online.

151. "US closes embassy in Yemen citing terrorist threat," *Agence France Presse*, June 10, 2001; www.yemenmonitor.com/a28.html; Pierre, *Coalitions*, 59.

152. Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda," online; Edmund Hull, interview.

153. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 163; and Pierre, *Coalitions*, 58-59.

154. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 163; Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "US Warships May Return to Yemeni Ports; Further Support for Coast Guard Development Promised," *Yemen Observer*, 10 April 2004, 1-2; and Pierre, *Coalitions*, 58

155. Islah, which means "reform," is Yemen's conservative, religious, political party. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 163.

156. *Ibid.*, 163, 164. President Saleh came down to Aden during the period preceding and following this attack. Security surrounding his visit was unusually tight, and most locals confided to the author that the President sought to "ride out" the elimination of Al-Harithi from a convenient distance.

157. Edmund Hull, interview; and Nasser Arrabyee, "Yemen Softens Its Stance," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, 27 December 2001, Issue #566, www.weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/566/re3.htm. It is possible that the figure of \$400 million in military assistance promised during the Carter administration erroneously found its way into contemporary news reports citing the same figure.

158. FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification, 435.

159. Pierre, *Coalitions*, 59.

160. *Ibid.*; Michael Hudson, "Professor Michael Hudson Discusses the Political Implications of Interception of Missile Shipment from North Korea to Yemen," interview by Michelle Norris, *All Things Considered* (11 December 2002), 1-2; Jofi Joseph, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?," *Arms Control Today* (June 2004), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Joseph.asp; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 164.

161. US Department of State, International Information Programs, "USAID Reopens Mission in Yemen," 2 May 2003, USAID, www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/texts/03050200.htm; accessed November 22, 2003.

162. Department of State, "Middle East Partnership Initiative," www.mepi.state.gov; accessed November 25, 2004; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 178.

163. Elizabeth Cheney, "The Middle East Partnership Initiative: Supporting Voices of Change," *Arab Reform Bulletin*, October 2003, online.

164. Department of State, "Middle East Partnership Initiative," online; International

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Institute for Strategic Studies, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations; *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 178; and Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, Listserv News, 7 November 2003. Hawthorne claims that, despite the increases, funding is not sufficient to attain the program's ambitious goals. Amy Hawthorne, "The Middle East Partnership Initiative: Questions Abound," *Arab Reform Bulletin*, September 2003, online.

165. Hawthorne, "The Middle East Partnership Initiative," online.

166. Department of State, "Background Note: Yemen," online. Department of State, "Middle East Partnership Initiative," online. Yemen received more MEPI funding in FY 2003 than any other country in the MENA region.

167. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, "Key Initiative: Partnerships for Learning (P4L)," www.exchanges.state.gov/education/P4L/; accessed on November 26, 2003; Sabrina Faber, personal correspondence.

168. US Embassy Sana'a, "The US-Yemeni Partnership for Security and Development: US Assistance to Yemen, 2001-2004" (Sana'a, Yemen: US Embassy, 2004), 12; and Kareem Fahim, "First the Guns, Now the Butter," *The Village Voice* 19 October 2004, www.villagevoice.com/issues/0442/fahim.php; accessed on 31 October 2004.

169. Steven Kull, "Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War" (Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks, 2 October 2003), 10.

170. Michael E. Brown, "Security Problems and Security Policy in a Grave New World," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003), 323-34. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey*, 343; and "Four Killed in Sana'a Protests," *Yemen Times*, Vol. 13, no. 627, March 17, 2003, www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=627&p=front&a=1; accessed on November 26, 2003.

171. At this point, "the Yemeni central state shared a common goal [with the US] of centralizing state control. . . In the long run, of course, external resources are important and this is precisely why the Yemeni regime is cultivating an alliance with the US." Charles Schmitz, personal correspondence; and Abdul-Aziz Oudah, "Money to Tribes Buys out Terrorist Support," *Yemen Observer* (10 April 2004), 1-2.

172. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2002/3*, 164. There continues to be a strong dichotomy between the more tribal northerners and the formerly Marxist southerners. This dichotomy is reflected in the label of "dihbashi" that southerners apply to northern Yemenis.

173. Ibid., 164; Robin Wright, "Idealism in the Face of a Troubled Reality," *The Washington Post*, 7 November 2003, A1; and Charles Schmitz, personal correspondence.

174. FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 435; and Rajan Menon, "New Great Game in Central Asia," *Survival* 45, no. 2 (year): 195.

175. USAID, "Yemen," online.

176. Michael C. Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal* 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 329; Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 50-51; Shlaim, *War and Peace*, 38; and Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 4.

177. Dana Milbank and Mike Allen, "Bush Urges Commitment to Transform Mideast," *The Washington Post*, November 7, 2003, A1. However, Hawthorne argues that the United States is still reluctant to fund democratic programs that could be potentially destabilizing in the region. Hawthorne, "The Middle East Partnership Initiative," online.

178. Brown and Oudraat, "Internal Conflict," 191; Fahim, "First the Guns," online; and Wright, "Troubled Reality," A1. Carapico quotes a State Department official, visiting following Yemen's 1993 elections, as saying: "I don't think you should look on what you do here as a model for anyone else to follow." Sheila Carapico, "Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen," *Middle East Report* (November/December 1993), accessed on "Yemen Gateway" site, www.al-bab.com/yemen/pol/scarap.htm; November 22, 2003. A USAID publication attempts to resolve this dilemma by stating: "thus [USAID is] serving the US strategic interest of maintaining stability while supporting an indigenous democratic movement to achieve sustainability." USAID, "Yemen," online.

179. Refer to Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes on the Arabian Peninsula.

180. David Ransom, interview; Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 79; Stookey, *Yemen*, xiv; and Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68, Vol. XXI*, 721.

181. Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence," 63-65; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, 98; and Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 196-97.

182. Kostiner; *Revolutionary Strategy*, 73; David Ransom, interview; Mylroie, "Politics and the Soviet Presence"; Stephen Page, *The USSR and Arabia* (London: Central Asian Research Center, 1971), 117; Bidwell, *Two Yemens*, 296; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 2.

183. Sisco addressed prior South Yemen actions, including its threat to North Yemen, its involvement in the Omani Dhofar rebellion, and attacks by South Yemeni MiGs upon a Saudi border post. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 82.

184. The Saudis did not wish North Yemen to become too strong. Pridham, *Contemporary Yemen*, 198.

185. Halliday, *Revolution and Foreign Policy*, 82-83.

186. Brown, "Causes of Internal Conflict," 22-23.

187. The Saudis felt this way. David Ransom, interview.

188. Brown, "Causes of Internal Conflict," 23.

189. Edmund Hull, interview.

190. Fahim, "First the Guns," online.

191. Brown, *Causes of Internal Conflict*, 22-23.

192. Bronson, "Cycles of Conflict," 205-206.

193. David Ransom, interview.

194. Charles Schmitz, personal correspondence.

195. US Department of State, International Information Programs, "USAID Reopens Mission in Yemen," May 2, 2003, www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/texts/03050200.htm; accessed November 22, 2003.

196. FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.

197. Katz, "Yemen's Connection with Al-Qaeda," online.

198. Bronson, "Cycles of Conflict," 233. Some Yemeni opposition groups were further strengthened by direct funding by Saudi Arabia, as part of its two-track policy of maintaining contacts with northern tribes while providing modest support to the Yemeni central government.

199. Shibley Telhami, "Understanding the Challenge," *The Middle East Journal* 56, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 15-17.

200. Bronson, "Cycles of Conflict," 233.

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201. Timothy D. Hoyt, "Security and Conflict in the Developing World," in Brown, ed., *Grave New World*, 226.
202. Charles Schmitz, "Transnational Governance: Yemen in the American War on Terror," Towson University, 2003, 28-30; Bronson, "Cycles of Conflict," 234.
203. Fulbright, *Price of Empire*, 153-73.
204. Hoyt, "Security and Conflict," 227.
205. Katz makes similar recommendations for US policy toward North Yemen during the Cold War. Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 196.
206. Haass and O'Sullivan, *Honey and Vinegar*, 172-74; and Katz, *Russia and Arabia*, 196.
207. Audrey Keith Cronin, "Transnational Terrorism and Security," in Brown, ed., *Grave New World*, 298-99.
208. Fahim, "First the Guns," online.
209. Hisham Sharaf, Meeting, 6 March 2003.
210. David Ransom, interview.
211. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 2.
212. Dealing with corruption is a critical aspect of foreign aid; however, a full discussion of this is outside the scope of this paper. Chege, "Sierra Leone," 156; 159.
213. Rahmy, *Egyptian Policy*, 122.
214. Fulbright, *Price of Empire*, xi.
215. Alliance for International Educational and Cultural Exchange, *Listserv News*, 24 October 2003.
216. Sabrina Faber, Correspondence; Michael Dobbs, "Foreign Enrollment Levels off at US Schools," *The Washington Post*, 3 November 2003, A2.
217. Cohen, "Jihadist Threat," 24.
218. Caryle Murphy, "Intense Airport Scrutiny Angers Muslim Travelers," *The Washington Post*, 14 September 2003, A8.
219. Cohen, "Jihadist Threat," 24; and Hockstader, "Post-9/11 Visa Rules," A1.
220. Hockstader, "Post-9/11 Visa Rules," A17.
221. Dobbs, "Foreign Enrollment," A2.
222. Cronin, "Transnational Terrorism," 297-98; and Jessica Stern, "The Protean Enemy," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 4 (July-August 2003), 39.
223. Telhami, "Understanding the Challenge," 12-15.
224. Menon, "New Great Game," 199; Telhami, "Understanding the Challenge," 18; James A. Bill and Rebecca Bill Chavez, "The Politics of Incoherence: The United States and the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal* 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), 572.
225. Menon, "New Great Game," 199; and Associated Press, "Arabs Bristle at Bush's Speech," *The Washington Post*, 8 November 2003, A16.
226. Wright, "Troubled Reality," A1; and AP, "Arabs Bristle," A16.
227. Farougy, *Introducing Yemen*, 101.
228. Fulbright decries the "anticommunist paranoia . . . [that] made it impossible to find out" if we could have "tolerable relations with new revolutionary regimes." Fulbright, *Price of Empire*, 171.
229. Shlaim, *War and Peace*, 31; and Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 2.
230. Fulbright, *Price of Empire*, 171-72.
231. Shlaim, *War and Peace*, 143-44. Bill and Chavez, "Politics of Incoherence," 569-70.
232. Bill and Chavez, "Politics of Incoherence," 571; and Telhami, "Understanding the

Challenge,” 15-17.

233. Bill and Chavez, “Politics of Incoherence,” 569; Telhami, “Understanding the Challenge,” 15-17.

234. Peterson, *Conflict in the Yemens*, 29.

235. Thus, Fulbright argues for multilateral, UN-directed aid programs that transcend what are often myopically-conceived and self-serving bilateral aid programs. Fulbright, *Price of Empire*, 172-73.

236. Bill and Chavez, “Politics of Incoherence,” 570-75.

237. *Ibid.*, Cronin, “Transnational Terrorism,” 299.

238. Shlaim, *War and Peace*, 146; and Bill and Chavez, “Politics of Incoherence,” 572.

239. Cronin, “Transnational Terrorism,” 299; Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 39; Bill and Chavez, “Politics of Incoherence,” 573; and Rouleau, “Trouble in the Kingdom,” 75-89.

240. Telhami, “Understanding the Challenge,” 12-15.

241. *Ibid.*, 13; and Bill and Chavez, “Politics of Incoherence,” 562-563 566-567.

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