# The Internal/External Security Paradox and the Reconstruction of Boundaries in the Baltic: *The Case of Kaliningrad*

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## *Introduction*[#]

In recent years the Russian ***oblast*** of Kaliningrad on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea has received growing scholarly attention, but importantly, has also made it onto the radar of the European Commission. Although small in terms of geography and population Kaliningrad is assuming increasing salience as a result of the ongoing process of EU enlargement. With the next round of enlargement likely to include both Lithuania and Poland, Kaliningrad is set to become a geographical enclave within the EU. As a result of this geographical location Kaliningrad will be considerably influenced by the policies of the EU as well as those of Moscow. Consequently, situated on the watershed between Europe's integrating and unintegrated, Kaliningrad is emerging as a rather unique in-between and overlapping entity that not only blurs the geographical borders between the EU and Russia, but also those of governance.[1] What all this means for Kaliningrad, the EU, and for the wider scope of EU-Russian relations has become a source of much conjecture. In particular, two central issues appear to have emerged, which although analytically distinct are also frequently conflated.

The first issue concerns the position of Kaliningrad following EU enlargement. Despite early (but also continuing) EU proclamations that EU enlargement will have beneficial effects for this economically depressed region, it is becoming increasingly evident to Kaliningraders and observers alike that such optimism may be misplaced. For reasons to be elaborated below, EU enlargement in fact looks set to result in the further impoverishment and marginalisation of Kaliningrad, whilst with the institution of the Schengen border regime Kaliningraders' freedom of movement will also be negatively affected.

Linked to this issue of the effects of EU enlargement on the economic and social development of Kaliningrad is the wider

[#] My thanks to Pertti Joenniemi, Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi (2002) 'The Identity of Kaliningrad: Russian European or a Third Space?', Paper presented at the ASN Special Convention, ***Nationalism, Identity and Regional Cooperation: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities***, Forli, Italy 4-9 June 2002

question of what this may mean for the character of EU-Russian relations and for the EU more specifically. Essentially this second issue is in fact highly EU centric. At stake here is the fact that with Kaliningrad's enclosure within its geographical borders, previously distinct borders between the inside and outside of the EU are likely to become blurred as Kaliningrad emerges as something of an overlapping space. This is seen as raising a paradox for the EU over its internal and external security needs. On the one hand, the logical demands of internal EU security are seen to support the need for a very strict border regime with Kaliningrad in order to prevent the infiltration of crime and illegal immigration from the Russian exclave. On the other hand, the negative effects of EU enlargement on Kaliningrad threaten to destabilise EU-Russian relations. In this respect, it is argued that in order to foster the Union's external security and enhance the EU-Russian relationship, the border with Kaliningrad should be open and porous with the semi-integration of Kaliningrad into the EU. On this reading, however, preserving external security through opening up the Union's external border is seen to undermine internal societal security, whilst maintaining a strict border regime in the interests of internal security, in turn, is seen to undermine external security.

This paper sets out to do two things. In the first instance, in the first two sections of the paper these two aspects to the Kaliningrad question will be highlighted and the problems of the region briefly illustrated. Making the distinction between the dilemmas facing Kaliningraders as a result of EU enlargement and the internal/external security paradox of the EU is crucial as it will be argued that the EU's concerns are predominately framed in terms of the second issue. The second argument, which is elaborated in the following section, deals directly with the framing of the Kaliningrad issue in terms of a dilemma over the internal and external security requirements of the EU. Whilst the EU approach and the comment of much academic analysis on this issue tends to focus at the level of implementation and practical politics by trying to work out how best to draw a balance between the assumed dichotomous positions of internal and external security, this paper focuses debate at the level of discourse and identity formation.

In particular, it will be shown that the focus on the internal/external security paradox is indicative of the extent to which the question of

Kaliningrad in fact represents a challenge to the very construction of EU subjectivity. In short, phrasing the question in terms of the internal/external security paradox pressupposes, and moreover contributes to, a particular vision of what the EU 'is' or 'should be' that draws on a very modern discourse of the EU as a state-like territorially sovereign actor. Framing the question in these terms also entails the reconstruction of a negative self-other binary from the very beginning. This is to say, when framed in these terms the Kaliningrad question becomes one of how best to manage the boundary, not how to overcome it. As such, the paper argues that the very discourse of the internal/external security paradox lies at the constitutive heart of many of the problems raised by Kaliningrad, whilst at the same time this discursive framework also circumscribes the options available for dealing with the very real problems Kaliningrad faces. Although this does not mean progress will not be made, constrained by conceptual barriers progress is likely to be difficult work.

The point, however, is that this modernist discourse stands in clear tension with the widespread view that the EU's ***raison d'être*** is that of securing peace within Europe, the achievements of which have been frequently applauded. With its initiation in the 1950s the European Community has actively worked to overcome the divisions that led to the Second World War. Central to this has been the promotion of cross-border networks and regions and the promotion of multiple overlapping local, regional and European identities to meliorate the exclusionary nationalisms of the past. Internally, the result has been the emergence of a 'neomedieval/postmodern' space in which nation-state divides between borders and governance have become increasingly fuzzy, the aim being to lock the peoples of the EU into a sense of common destiny.[2] Infused with this identity there has also been a constant motivation to spread the peaceful values of the EU to the wider world[3] and this has clearly

[2] For such 'neomedieval' descriptions of the EU see, James A. Caporaso (1996) 'The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?', ***Journal of Common Market Studies*** (Vol.34, No.1) pp.44-48; Nick J. Rennger (2000) 'European communities in a neo-medieval global polity: The dilemmas of fairyland?', in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds) ***International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, security and community*** (London: Routledge)

[3] To quote Commission President, Romano Prodi: "Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer." Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, '2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe', European Parliament

existed as one of the central motivations behind the enlargement process.

However, whilst the understanding of the EU as a peace project has resulted in a certain postmodernisation of the EU internally, in its external relations pursuing similar policies has always been contentious. This is not least because with the EU seen as a model society to be copied, the outside has often been characterised as unstable and potentially threatening the security of the Union. Consequently, the EU has tended to view its outer edge in rather modernist ways, with its borders understood in security terms as a first line of defence.[4] This is why the forthcoming members are being required to apply the Schengen ***acquis*** and to shore up their Eastern borders with non-members. Kaliningrad, however, brings this tension in the EU's external relations - between the EU's desire to fulfil its peace mission and the negative effects of its desire for modernist exclusionary borders to protect itself from external threats - to the fore, since as a result of its location it eludes such neat approaches. In this respect Kaliningrad exists as a challenge to the very subjectivity of the EU. If the EU is a peace project then the questions Kaliningrad asks are where does this end and are we included? As this paper argues, with the EU approaching the Kaliningrad issue largely through the modernist frame of the internal/external security paradox, the answer to these questions appears to be that the peace project ends at the borders of the EU and that Kaliningrad is therefore not included. The consequences of this perceptual frame, however, may actually be to undermine peace and stability in Europe.

The argument of this paper, therefore, is that if the Kaliningrad question is approached using different conceptual lenses, different solutions and opportunities will likely arise, that may enable the EU to reassert itself more convincingly in terms of its peaceful ambitions. As such the paper advocates adopting more postmodern/postsovereign conceptual lenses that undermine the traditional tight links between the understandings of sovereignty,

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(Strasbourg), 15 February 2000. Available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/00/41|0|AGED&lg=EN&display=

[4] Sven Arnswald and Mathias Jopp (2001) ***The Implications of Baltic States' EU Membership*** (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti & Institut für Europäische Politik) pp.60-61

territory, governance and identity that imbue the internal/external security dilemma through which the EU currently approaches the Kaliningrad issue. In this way the opportunity for creating a genuine border region, in which the EU's border will become reconceptualised as a contact zone and invitation for interaction rather than a line of exclusion, may well arise, a development, however, that would also entail a significant reconfiguration of EU governance and subjectivity more generally.

Finally, to set the Kaliningrad question in a wider context the paper also briefly looks at the issue from the Russian perspective. As within the EU, in Russia there is also a tendency to see the question in terms of finding the appropriate balance between questions of internal and external security. However, certain rather postmodern trends can also be identified in Russia, just as they can in the EU.

## *The Kaliningrad Dilemma*

As noted, the issues raised by the future enlargement of the EU to Lithuania and Poland, that will result in the inclusion of the Kaliningrad ***Oblast*** within the geographical boundaries of the Union, take two forms. In the first instance, for Kaliningraders the enlargement process is raising significant questions over their future economic and social welfare as well as over their freedom of movement.

Since the early 1990s hopes have existed in Kaliningrad that Kaliningrad's unique geographical position as a Russian outpost in the heart of Europe might be used to the ***Oblast's*** advantage. In particular, the idea that Kaliningrad could be a testing ground, a bridge or a pilot region for enhancing cooperation between Russia and the EU has been expressed.[5] In this view, the potential exists for the impoverished Kaliningrad region to become a thriving area of liberalised free trade between the EU and Russia. At its most

[5] See e.g., Victor Romanovsky, Deputy Governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast Administration (2000) Speech in, ***Conference on the Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad: European and Regional Integration, 17-18 May 2000*** (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) p.24. Or as Vladimir Yegorov, Kaliningrad's Governor, has stated: "We want Kaliningrad to become a bridge of cooperation between Russia and the European Union". Quoted in Marcin Grajewski, 'Russian Enclave at Crossroads before EU Expansion', ***Reuters***, 15/01/01. Available at http://virtual.finland.fi/reuters/

optimistic such hopes have touted the emergence of Kaliningrad as the future Hong Kong of the Baltic.[6] However, as the enlargement of the EU to Poland and Lithuania has drawn nearer increasingly the hopes of Kaliningraders have been replaced by concerns that enlargement will actually have predominately negative effects on their livelihoods. Whilst the problems facing the ***Oblast*** are multiple the situation can be clearly illustrated through some of the principal issues of contention.

The most controversial issue concerns the EU requirement that applicant countries institute the Schengen border regime on accession to the Union. The Schengen rules are designed to establish a common EU visa regime. Hardening the EU's external borders is the price to be paid for softening internal borders in the goal of freedom of movement within the Schengen zone. The effect for the EU's applicant states is, however, mixed. As Grabbe puts it, whilst on joining the Schengen regime the benefit of freer movement westwards will open up, this is to occur by curtailing movements eastwards.[7] Indeed, in the need to meet the demands of the ***acquis communautaire*** applicant states are not rewarded for avoiding creating new divisions with non-applicants, but actually penalised by the EU.[8]

For Kaliningraders, however, the need of Lithuania and Poland to sign up to Schengen to be eligible for EU membership will also have several negative consequences. In the first instance, the visa-free regimes that currently allow Kaliningraders to cross into Poland and Lithuania for limited time periods will end. Economically this will adversely affect the many shuttle-traders (estimated to be around 10,000 by the EU Commission) who make a living out of cross

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[6] This idea was first put forward in 1993 by Yuri Matochkin, who in 1991 was appointed head of the Kaliningrad administration. Ingmar Oldberg (1998) 'Kaliningrad: Problems and Prospects', in Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz (eds.,) ***Kaliningrad: The European Amber Region*** (Aldershot: Ashgate) p.9. The idea, however, continues to find resonance today. For example, see Anatoly Khlopetsky, Deputy Governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast (2001) 'Kaliningrad as a Special Economic Zone', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE) p.55

[7] Heather Grabbe (2000) 'The sharp edges of Europe: extending Schengen eastwards', ***International Affairs*** (Vol.76, No.3) p.527

[8] Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie (2000) ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle - A Russian Region within the European Union*** (The Baltic Institute of Sweden and the Åland Islands Peace Institute) p.20

border trade.[9] Also adversely affected will be all Kaliningraders wanting to travel to 'big' Russia by land who will now have to go through the lengthy and expensive process of acquiring a visa before they can visit other parts of their homeland - assuming their application is approved. As Victor Romanovsky of the Kaliningrad Administration has complained:

> In fact there could be a situation when a visit of an inhabitant of the Oblast to any region of Russia, for instance, to relatives, on a business trip, to funerals of relatives or friends will be dependent on the norms and rules of the Schengen States or the decisions of euro-officials responsible for visa registration. The visa regime for the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Oblast is the first really dividing line, which could turn the region into a large "reservation" inside Europe.[10]

In the opinion of the EU Commssion the Schengen visa regime will not necessarily have negative effects for Kaliningraders. On the one hand, it should be stressed that this visa requirement will not, of course, apply to Kaliningraders travelling to 'big' Russia either by boat or plane.[11] On the other hand, the Commission has been keen to emphasise the flexibility of Schengen, which "provides for the issuance of transit visas, short-term visas and long-term national visas allowing for smooth border crossing and the possibility of multiple entries".[12] However, as Fairlie points out, this still does not address the issue of why somebody should need (and have to pay for) a visa to visit their own country, let alone the fact that in principle

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[9] Commission of the European Communities, ***Communication from the Commission to the Council: The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.1.2001 COM(2001) 26 final.; Dmitri Trenin (2000) 'Security Cooperation in North-Eastern Europe: A Russian Perspective', in Dmitri Trenin and Peter van Ham, ***Russia and the United States in Northern European Security*** (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik) p.35

[10] Victor Romanovsky (2001) 'Geography Encourages Co-operation', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security. STETE) p.90

[11] In this respect Romanovsky's argument is overstated, and may reflect recognition that emphasising the issue in such either or terms gives Russia some political capital in the Kaliningrad question. At the same time, this should not belittle the extra costs of sea and air travel in comparison to that of land based journeys. Such increased costs will also serve as a ***de facto*** obstacle for many Kaliningraders wishing to travel to the rest of Russia without acquiring a visa.

[12] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.5

a visa could be denied, therefore complicating free movement of the individual within his/her own country.[13]

Also problematic is the fact that whilst Kaliningrad's neighbours are the recipients of large EU funds to assist them in developing their infrastructure up to EU standards, assistance to Kaliningrad is minimal, thereby exacerbating regional imbalances. To put it into figures, between 2000-2006 Poland will be eligible for up to 1.1 billion euro in EU assistance funds ***per year***. For Lithuania the figure is about 180 million a year. In contrast to its neighbours (and competitors for foreign direct investment) through the Tacis programme Kaliningrad only receives around 4-5 million a year.[14] As a clear normative, social and economic divide opens such imbalances have the potential to become self-reinforcing. This can be seen in that whilst Poland and Lithuania are moving ahead and using EU financing in constructing their contributions to the Trans-European Networks (TENs) of road and rail links, Kaliningrad has no resources also to take part in the project. This increases the likelihood that Kaliningrad will be bypassed by Europe's new transport corridors, thereby condemning Kaliningrad to the position of a backwater. Moreover, even if Kaliningrad does become linked up the question remains why through-transport would choose the Kaliningrad route with its timely visa, immigration and customs checks required by Schengen, rather than simply use what will be the visa-free route directly between Poland and Lithuania.[15]

Finally, Kaliningrad's problems resulting from the enlargement process are being compounded as Lithuania and Poland bring their social and economic production and distribution practices in line with EU norms and standards, a development that in turn is likely to reduce elements of Kaliningrad's bilateral trade with its neighbours. The EU appears particularly blind to some of the issues at stake

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[13] Lyndelle D. Fairlie (2001) 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', in Lyndelle D. Fairlie and Alexander Sergounin, ***Are Borders Barriers? EU Enlargement and the Russian Region of Kaliningrad*** (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik) p.12

[14] Stephen Dewar (2001) 'Kaliningrad Needs a Special Development Fund', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE) p.102. In comparable terms Arnswald and Jopp note that whilst cumulative FDI per capita between 1988-1998 in Kaliningrad was USD 70, in Lithuania it was USD 563 and in Poland USD 260. For Russia as a whole it was USD 63. Sven Arnswald and Mathias Jopp, ***The Implications of Baltic States' EU Membership***, p.111, cf.158

[15] Stephen Dewar, 'Kaliningrad Needs a Special Development Fund', p.102

here. Finnish Foreign Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, has laid out the EU position noting that the standardisation of trade practices and other economic cooperation will be beneficial to all and will promote increased trade. Russia, he notes, can also benefit from this by also adopting the same standards. The EU, he stresses, however, is not imposing its legislation on Russia. "The choice, whether to choose the European route or unique national solutions and thereby define its role in the European future is up to Russia".[16] Such statements, however, are rather disingeneous from the perspective of Kaliningrad. Soon to be almost surrounded by EU states Kaliningrad really has little choice in these matters, even if 'big' Russia may do so. As it is Russia has committed itself to approximating European norms and standards, however, this requires significant investment, money which Russia, let alone Kaliningrad, simply does not have at present. The technical and organisational standards required for Kaliningrad to engage in international and European integration for the most part simply do not exist at present, and without significant external investment are unlikely to do so for some time, irrespective of Kaliningraders' aspirations. Moreover, this issue does not simply apply to Kaliningrad, but to Russia's regions more generally.[17]

Notably, these negative elements concerning the process of EU enlargement to Poland and Lithuania have begun to raise a certain amount of resentment in both Kaliningrad and Moscow. For example, Arthur Kuznetsov of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Russia's Foreign Ministry representative to Kaliningrad, has complained that:

> It seems to be completely unreal, a fantastic situation that everything positive must disappear when Lithuania and Poland enter the EU. Is it because of the fact that the rules of the EU are different that all our negotiations of agreement [with Poland and Lithuania] must be denounced? Or perhaps we were mistaken arranging good relations with our neighbours? And that the European Council was mistaken when it awarded the City of Kaliningad with its honored flag for the development of cooperation?[18]

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[16] Erkki Tuomioja (2001) 'Kaliningrad Deserves Special Attention', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE) p.16

[17] Andrey S. Makarychev (2000) ***Islands of Globalization: Regional Russia and the Outside World*** (Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Working Paper No.2) pp.22-23

[18] Kuznetsov quoted in Lyndelle D. Fairlie. 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', p.78

Likewise, at the May 2002 Russia-EU summit in Moscow President Putin lambasted the EU's refusal to make any derogations on the Schengen visa regime as an affront to the 'civilised community' and stressed that the EU was in danger of flouting its adherence to the norms of human rights, a criticism that the EU with its norm driven peace project credentials is highly sensitive to.[19] Disaffection is also apparent in Poland and Lithuania. As Zbigniew Kruzynski of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs has pointed out, there is a certain contradiction with the spirit of European integration apparent in the enlargement process and clear signals need to be made that integration is not being premised on division from those outside the project.[20] However, as we will now see, for the most part the EU does not appear to conceive of the Kaliningrad question from the same perspective as Kaliningraders and despite benevolent intentions EU concerns actually are re-enforcing divisions between Kaliningrad and its neighbours and the EU at large.

## *European Union Approaches and the Internal/External Security Paradox*

As pointed to above, initial EU responses have been rather ignorant and to some extent dismissive of concerns that enlargement is likely to have a negative impact on Kaliningrad and such sentiment remains apparent. For example, the 2001 Commission report on Kaliningrad to a large extent marginalises the concerns of Kaliningraders. Indeed, to the contrary the report clearly sees enlargement as economically beneficial to Kaliningrad as it will leave Kaliningrad "well placed to take advantage of the new opportunities which will be created".[21] Not least, Kaliningrad will have easier geographical access to EU markets and will benefit from lower EU tariff levels for industrial goods.[22] Of course, this is dependent on

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[19] Ian Traynor (2002) 'EU and Russia clash over Baltic enclave', ***The Guardian***, 30 May 2002

[20] Zbigniew Kruzynski, Senior Advisor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Poland (2001) 'Why Kaliningrad and Why Cross-Border Co-operation?', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE) p.96

[21] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.2

[22] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.3. Or as Chris Patten recently put it in relation to enlargement: "Some

Kaliningrad conforming to EU norms and standards, the issues surrounding which have been noted.

Likewise, concerns over the Schengen regime are also treated as a red-herring. On the one hand, it is argued that visa requirements need not result in new dividing lines. On the other, the Schengen visa regime is presented as positively beneficial to Kaliningraders as it means one only needs to acquire a single common EU visa to visit the whole Schengen area. Again, this misses the point that the regime will also require Kaliningraders to buy a visa if they want to visit the rest of Russia by land.[23] In this respect, the 2002 report of the European Parliament on the Commission's communication on Kaliningrad appears more aware of the problems involved, asserting that the Schengen visa requirements will have a significant impact on Kaliningraders.[24] The somewhat ambivalent attitude, however, is most clearly summed up by the Commission's recommendation that an information campaign "be conducted to dispel misconceptions about the consequences of EU enlargement for the movement of both people and goods across the future external border of the EU".[25] As far as the Commission has been concerned, Kaliningrad is actually in a rather favourable situation and therefore any need for special treatment for the ***Oblast*** can be discounted.[26] This was reaffirmed at the recent Russia-EU summit at the end of May 2002, where the Commission once again asserted that no derogations to the Schengen rules could be considered. Consequently, although the Commission has actually felt the need to make a report on Kaliningrad, thereby indicating at least implicit recognition that the Kaliningrad issue is far from straightforward, the report clearly

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people fear isolation. Some fear further burden on the region. The reverse is true. Enlargement offers first and foremost new opportunities for more cooperation, for better mutual understanding and more prosperity for the people of Kaliningrad". Chris Patten (2002) Statement made at the 11th Ministerial Session of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Svetlogorsk, Kaliningrad Oblast, 5-6 March 2002. Available at http://www.baltinfo.org/documents/cbsspresidencies/10russian/11cbssministerialsession/

[23] Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', pp.16-17, 101, 107

[24] European Parliament (2002) ***Report on the communication from the Commission to the Council on the EU and Kaliningrad***, 25 April 2002. FINAL A5-0156/2002, p.14

[25] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.6

[26] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.3

downplays the Commission's responsibility for developments in Kaliningrad. In playing down the negative consequences that enlargement may have on those left outside the EU, all responsibility for Kaliningrad is instead passed onto Russia.[27]

Combined, one consequence of such thinking is that the EU remains rather unwilling to treat Kaliningrad as a special case that somehow blurs the borders between the inside and outside of the EU. Notably, the Kaliningrad question, for the most part, continues to be dealt with as one part of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (which came into force in 1997) or through the EU's Common Strategy on Russia (1999). As Joenniemi notes, both the PCA and CSR treat Russia as a homogeneous whole making no allowance for the specificity of Kaliningrad.[28] In one respect, the EU's reluctance to engage wholeheartedly with the Kaliningrad question, and to instead confine it to the bilateral agenda of the PCA and CSR, reflects the EU's wariness at getting involved in Russian centre-periphery federalism issues, the relationships between which remain sensitive in Russia (see below).[29] Germany is particulary cautious in this regard, and since the end of the Cold War has been keen to always deal directly with Moscow (rather than with the

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[27] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.2. Also see, Ragnor Angeby, Swedish Ambassador (2001) 'Developments During Sweden's EU Presidency', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE) p.26; As Leshukov notes, this parallels EU attitudes to Russia in general, Igor Leshukov (2001) 'Can the Northern Dimension Break the Viscious Circle of Russia-EU Relations?', in Hanna Ojanen (ed) ***The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*** (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik) p.120. A certain irony exists here in the fact that, as we shall see later, Russia would rather that responsibility for Kaliningrad could be shared with the EU in some way. This differs significantly, for example, with Russian attitudes to other border regions such as Chechnya and the Kurile islands, where Russia remains adamant that the international community should keep out, but where the EU (especially in the Chechen case) has sought to become engaged. I am indebted to Andrey Makarychev for this point.

[28] Pertti Joenniemi (2000) 'Kaliningrad, Borders and the Figure of Europe', in James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar and David Gowan (eds) ***The EU and Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement*** (London: Federal Trust) pp.164-165; Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar annd Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, pp.19-20

[29] Lyndelle D. Fairlie (2000) 'Will the EU Use the Northern Dimension to Solve Its Kaliningrad Dilemma?', ***Northern Dimensions*** (Finnish Institute of International Affairs Yearbook) pp.86-87

regions) in order assuage Russian fears of German revanchism.[30] On the other hand, and given its special geographical location, it should be clear that there is a certain amount of self-delusion taking place in thinking that EU enlargement is not going to have negative consequences for Kaliningrad, or that the EU can abstain from participation in federalist questions in Russia in the case of Kaliningrad.

To be fair, however, despite much of its content, the fact that the EU has seen it necessary to release a special report on Kaliningrad is illustrative that the EU has become aware that Kaliningrad raises certain problems for the Union. Indeed, the EU's External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten, has been at the forefront here. The issue, however, is what questions the Kaliningrad dilemma is seen to raise for the EU. Whilst genuine concerns for the welfare of Kaliningraders should not be totally discounted the answer can be found in the EU's assertion that enlargement will be beneficial, which reflects the desire not to become involved in Russia's internal politics. In short, at issue here is not Kaliningraders' welfare, but the security concerns of the EU.

To paraphrase Fairlie, the EU's concern in the Kaliningrad case has essentially become framed in terms of whether the conventional binary between internal and external security of the Union can be maintained. Traditionally, and building on the idea of the EU as a peace project, the EU's external security goals have been seen to require fostering peace through contributing to the prosperity and stability of neighbouring regions. This is seen to require breaking Europe's dividing lines and leaving the EU relatively open for cross-border interaction. In contrast, however, the goal of internal security is seen to require minimising soft security risks (e.g., illegal immigration, crime) by preserving tightly controlled external borders.[31] The big question that EU enlargement to Lithuania and Poland raises is whether it will be possible to adequately reconcile these seemingly contradictory demands - that is, to what extent is the EU peace mission compatible with the desire for modern exlusive borders? Or put another way, is it not the case that the

[30] Richard J. Krickus (2002) ***The Kaliningrad Question*** (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.) p.8; Sven Arnswald and Mathias Jopp, ***The Implications of Baltic States' EU Membership***, pp.90-91

[31] Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', p.14; Pertti Joenniemi, 'Kaliningrad, Borders and the Figure of Europe', p.166

assertion of borders as the EU's first line of defence actually threatens to undermine peace and stability within Europe?

Whilst we have seen that there are voices in the Union that argue that these worries are misplaced, because enlargement will ***de facto*** also benefit Kaliningrad, others are less certain. Indeed, increasingly concerns exist that with the Schengen regime the EU's external security is being sacrificed for internal security concerns, with the Schengen regime understood as merely pushing the EU's border further east and replacing the previous military Iron Curtain dividing Europe with a normative paper one of EU standards and the Schengen visa regime.[32] While the Schengen regime is valued in that it is presumed to make illegal immigration and the infiltration of criminal syndicates based in Kaliningrad into the EU more difficult, it is feared its negative economic and social consequences on Kaliningrad may destabilise the region and EU-Russian relations, thereby undermining external security.

To conclude this section two points can be briefly made. Firstly, it is notable how in EU discourse the referent object of security is inverted. From a concern with the welfare of Kaliningraders the focus is moved to a concern with the internal and external security of the EU. The question is no longer why EU enlargement may be problematic for Kaliningrad, but why Kaliningrad is a problem for the EU. Secondly, framing the issue in terms of a paradox between the assumed contradictory demands of internal and external security also circumscribes the options available for tackling the issues raised. Notably, the concern has become one of finding the right balance between internal and external security demands. Hence, the EU is keen to emphasise the flexibility permitted by Schengen. Indeed, even critics who have pointed out the way Kaliningrad has become presented in terms of this paradox essentially see a solution to be found in terms of pushing the balance towards greater flexibility.[33] In the following section a number of problems with this frame of reference will be made more explicit. On the one hand, it is hoped that this will add some conceptual clarity to current debates. On the other, this will also begin to point the way towards the development of contending approaches to the Kaliningrad question.

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[32] Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', pp.18, 20

[33] Particularly notable here is Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context',

## *Presuppositions and Implications of the Internal/External Security Paradox*

Problems with the EU approach to Kaliningrad largely stem from the presuppositions of the perceptual framework of the internal/external security paradox that is frequently invoked. As will be shown, these presuppositions play a significant role in constituting some of the problems of the Kaliningrad question, not least by maintaining negative distinctions between the EU-self and those outside the EU project. In turn this limits the options available for tackling the Kaliningrad issue. Most importantly, the framework of internal and external security presupposes the EU to be constituted in very modern terms by prioritising questions of sovereignty and territorial control that assumes the EU to be a traditional state-type actor with clearly delineated borders.

As Kelstrup and Williams have shown, debates about European integration have historically been dominated by the 'modern' idea that political legitimacy requires a centralised authority and territorial sovereignty. Thus, whilst the differences between federalists and intergovernmentalists can appear large, and their visions of a future Europe incompatible, such differences are not always as clear as they initially seem. Notably, in both, "state sovereignty remains the model of political legitimacy and provides the framing assumptions of authority".[34] This largely explains one of the cental ironies of European integration that although internally the EU is a champion of the post-modern politics of neo-medievalism,[35] with its embracing of multiple overlapping forms of governance and its promotion of processes of debordering, externally the conflation of identity with sovereign territoriality remains rather strong. This is to say that externally "the Union aspires at being consolidated, with clear distinctions between the included and the excluded".[36] This is clearly

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[34] Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (2000) 'Introduction: Integration and the politics of community in the New Europe', in Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds) ***International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, security and community*** (London: Routledge) p.8. Also see Noel Parker (2000) 'Integrated Europe and its 'Margins': Action and Reaction', in Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong (eds) ***Margins in European Integration*** (Macmillan Press Ltd) p.18

[35] John Gerard Ruggie (1993) 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations', ***International Organization*** (Vol.47, No.1) p.172

[36] Hanna Ojanen (2001) 'Conclusions: Northern Dimension - Fuel for the EU's External Relations?' in Hanna Ojanen (ed) ***The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*** (Helsinki:

illustrated in the Commission's desire to give the EU a unified political subjectivity in external affairs through the CFSP, which is to be coordinated by the Union's own foreign policy representative, and through the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy.[37]

As Williams points out elsewhere, the notion that in order to be an actor and subject in world politics one needs to have clearly defined boundaries, has a long heritage. This heritage at least goes back to the contractarian philosophers, Hobbes and Rousseau, who argued that in order to get out of the insecurity of the state of nature individuals would need to agree to a social contract establishing the sovereign state as the authority with the responsibility to enforce the contractual obligations of its members. At one and the same time, therefore, the state became seen as the prerequisite for community and security, but also as the limit of political life and order.[38] However, the social contract did not eradicate the anarchic state of nature, but raised it to the level of interstate relations. As such, the state has become understood as an institution that preserves its citizens' welfare by enforcing order on the inside, whilst concomitantly warding off threats emanating from the anarchic international system. As Campbell has argued, such understandings, particularly derived from Hobbes, have been central to dominant accounts of international relations theory. In this thinking, Campbell notes, foreign policy emerges as a boundary producing practice reliant on a discourse of danger that aims to protect the self from external threats. Premised on such terms, concomitantly foreign policy frequently has the effect of reifying a positive image of the self as representative of order and rationality ***vis-à-vis*** negatively depicted others representative of chaos, irrationality, as potentially threatening, and which therefore need to

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Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik) p.234. This paradox can be clearly seen in the EU's recent White Paper on Governance. Internally, the White Paper envisages enhancing multilevel governance within the Union, promoting decentralisation and flexibility. Externally, however, the paper envisages the Union as a unitary and coherent actor on the international stage speaking with a single voice. Commission of the European Communities (2001) ***European Governance: A White Paper***, Brussels, 25.07.2001, COM (2001) 428 final.

[37] For an overview of how the EU is constructing itself as a modern subject in international politics see, Christopher S. Browning (2001) ***The Construction of Europe in the Northern Dimension*** (Copenhagen: COPRI Working Papers 39) pp.11-17

[38] Michael C. Williams (2000) 'Modernity, Postmodernity and the New World Order', in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (eds) ***The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*** (Macmillan Press Ltd) pp.90-91

be excluded. Consequently, Campbell argues that foreign policy is in fact the very process in which identities are constituted by differentiating the self from others.[39] Moreover, one result of this quintessentially modern discourse is that boundaries between self and otherness are given highly positive connotations as central to maintaining internal security and unity.[40]

As Kelstrup and Williams note, the European Union has a somewhat ambiguous relationship to such thinking. On the one hand, they note that the EU has existed as an explicit attempt to overcome such a legacy and the security dilemma existing between states. On the other hand, when it comes to the EU's own external relations much the same logic is often reproduced.[41] Indeed, this logic is clearly being replicated in the way that the EU is approaching the Kaliningrad question through the internal/external security paradox. For the EU, Kaliningrad is troublesome because the issues raised by enlargement threaten to blur the boundaries between the inside and the outside of the Union, a point that gets right to the heart of EU subjectivity.[42] As Larsen puts it, in terms of this rather traditional discourse, "Europe can only be a state-like international actor if it has relatively firm borders and a clear inside and outside where there is no doubt about who is inside".[43]

The EU's preoccupation with differentiating the inside from the outside, which in the Kaliningrad case is framed in terms of the internal/external security paradox, is of course most clearly manifest in the insistence that the Schengen regime be instituted by new members. Through Schengen it is hoped the Union's homogeneity and territorial sovereign subjectivity will be preserved. However, it is important that the justification and rationalisation of Schengen is occuring through the characterisation of Kaliningrad and Kaliningraders in negative terms as a potential threat to the Union

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[39] David Campbell (1992) ***Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*** (Manchester: Manchester University Press). See chapters 3 and 4.
[40] Anssi Paasi (Forthcoming) 'Space, Boundaries and the Social Construction of Territorial Identities', in S. Chaturvedi (ed.) ***Geopolitics, Identities and Sustainability*** (New Dehli: Manohar Publishers)
[41] Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, 'Introduction', p.11
[42] Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar annd Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, p.23; Pertti Joenniemi, 'Kaliningrad, Borders and the Figure of Europe', p.170
[43] Henrik Larsen (2000) 'The Discourse of the EU's Role in the World', in Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (eds) ***The New World Order: Contrasting Theories*** (Macmillan Press Ltd) p.227

that therefore need to be excluded. The characterisation of Kaliningrad as a site of pollution, illegal immigration, disease, criminality and prostitution, and so on, is common in Union discourse. For example, in April 2001 External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten, wrote an article on Kaliningrad for ***The Guardian*** and ***Le Monde*** that appeared under the headline, 'Russia's hell-hole enclave', and that detailed the catastrophic conditions of the region as "a centre of organised crime".[44] Elsewhere Patten has articulated EU fears even more directly, stating at a meeting of the International Crisis Group in July 2001 that "Europe is ringed - from Kaliningrad in the north, to the Caucasus and Central Asia, to the Balkans - by an arc of danger and instability".[45] Likewise, the European Parliament, in a report on Lithuania's application for membership, characterised Kaliningrad as a site of 'soft security' hazards for the EU. Some of these problems, the report suggested, might be 'contained' through 'isolating' Kaliningrad - hence the desire for hard external borders. However, it was feared other hazards ultimately might prove uncontainable.[46]

This discourse of threat does several things. In the first instance, it establishes a clear hierarchical distinction between 'us' (the EU) and 'them' (Kaliningraders/Russians). In characterising Kaliningrad as a region of chaos and crime, pollution and disease, the EU in turn is reified as a site of order and health. In Campbellian terms,

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[44] Chris Patten (2001) 'Russia's hell-hole enclave', ***The Guardian***, 7 April 2001. Notably, such negative views have also appeared in the Russian press, with accusations being made of corruption within the ***Oblast's*** administration, and more particularly directed at Leonid Gorgenko who was Governor from 1996-2000. See for example, Igor Korolkov, 'The Black Hole', ***Izvestia***, 23.04.1999. It is worth noting that Kaliningraders have responded to such accusations, for instance, by insisting that contrary to common views Kaliningrad is not a centre of illegal drug production. Rather, the drugs smuggling operations apparent within Kaliningrad actually rely on those drugs being first smuggled into the ***Oblast***, usually through Poland and Lithuania. Since these will be future EU members this somewhat turns the logic of who is threatening who in EU discourse on its head. See NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Civil Dimension of Security, Visit to Kaliningrad 22-23 March 2002. Secretariat Report, International Secretariat, 28 April 2002. paragraph 18. Available at http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/trip/av063cc-kaliningrad.html

[45] Chris Patten (2001) 'EU Policy in the Balkans', speech to the International Crisis Group, 10.07.2001. Available at http://www.zeit.de/reden/Europapolitik/20132_patten.html

[46] European Parliament (2000) ***Report on Lithuania's membership application to the European Union and the state of negotiations***, 15 September 2000. FINAL A5 - 0240/2000, pp.13-15. Cited in Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', pp.94-95

identifying the 'threat' becomes a central way of constituting EU identity. Moreover, whilst illegality in Kaliningrad should be acknowledged, this discourse of threat also entails the danger of criminalising Kaliningraders as a whole. As Fairlie notes, in itself the Schengen visa regime is evidence of EU suspicion of the citizens of specifically identified countries.[47] This was made especially clear at the Russia-EU summit in May 2002 when an EU official, in defending the EU policy of strict adherence to the Schengen rules, stated that allowing visa free rail travel for Russians travelling across Lithuania to Kaliningrad would result in a situation akin to the Channel Tunnel between France and Britain, with immigrants clinging to trains trying to enter the EU.[48]

Secondly, the EU discourse of danger surrounding Kaliningrad in itself provides justification for the 'logical conclusion' that such a unitary policy maintaining the coherence of the Union is precisely what is needed. Trapped in a discourse of danger with Kaliningrad understood as a threat to its security, the EU has been rather unwilling to treat Kaliningrad as a special case that blurs the borders between the EU's inside and outside.[49] In such discourse, adopting regionalised and localised solutions is precluded as they are seen as potentially opening the EU subject to contamination from Kaliningrad. In this respect, it is also notable that the Union has placed Kaliningrad within the remit of the Directorate General for External Relations, not the DG for Enlargement where issues relating to Poland and Lithuania are tackled. Such a categorisation entails a certain conception of European politics and EU subjectivity that re-enforces the exclusion of Kaliningrad (and Russia) as the other.[50] At the same time, the categorisation as foreign policy further promotes the securitisation of the Kaliningrad issue. This also pushes Kaliningrad into the realm of high politics, thereby fostering bilateral approaches through the PCA and CSR and precluding

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[47] Lyndelle D. Fairlie, 'Kaliningrad Borders in Regional Context', p.97

[48] Ian Traynor (2002) 'EU and Russia clash over Baltic enclave', ***The Guardian*** 30 May 2002

[49] This approach has, of course, been further supported by the fact that it has only been recently that Russia itself began to raise the issue to the EU-Russian agenda.

[50] Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, p.22. On how processes of categorisation structure social reality, see Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (1997) 'Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations', ***European Journal of International Relations*** (Vol.3, No.2) pp.218-219

more localised solutions.[51] Moreover, these different categorisations of Poland, Lithuania and Kaliningrad within the structure of the EU also re-inforce the lack of coherence in Union approaches to the region as a whole.

However, whilst the idea of totally excluding and isolating Kaliningrad is clearly tempting in order to preserve internal security, as the European Parliament noted, simply isolating Kaliningrad is unlikely to work, whilst such a policy, it is understood, also threatens to undermine the EU's external security by damaging relations with Russia. Consequently, the Union is trying to couple a policy of preserving the hard Schengen borders with a certain level of engagement in Kaliningrad. In this respect, the EU hopes to foster the liberal democratic development of the ***Oblast*** in order to pre-empt the export of Kaliningrad's soft security hazards into the Union. As the Commission puts it, "As elsewhere in Russia there is a need for action to combat illegal activities, which are likely to affect neighbouring EU member states".[52] To be clear though, such a policy has little to do with an altruistic concern for the welfare of Kaliningraders, but is predicated on concerns of internal EU security.[53] For example, having categorised Kaliningrad as a security threat it is notable that those areas in which the EU has been willing to cooperate with Kaliningrad - organised crime, migration, smuggling, environmental pollution, border practices - are those areas of concern (but which also have a populist political

[51] For example, as one local Polish official has indicated, with Kaliningrad on the high politics bilateral agenda of EU-Russian relations, agreement on regional cooperation has become a matter of prestige. As they put it, "But now, after all the visitors to Kaliningrad, it will be impossible to get them [Kaliningrad] to agree to any regional co-operation unless we can provide an ambassador or EU commissioner". Quoted in Paul Holtom (2001) 'Kaliningrad: a pilot region for enhanced co-operation between Russia and the EU?', paper presented at 'Russia's Integration into Regional Structures', a workshop organised by Nordeuropa Institut , Humboldt University and the Centre for European and Transition Studies, University of Latvia, 11-13 October 2001, Riga, Latvia.

[52] Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission to the Council, ***The EU and Kaliningrad***, Brussels, 17.01.2001, COM (2001) 26 final, p.7

[53] Or as Chris Patten has bluntly stated: "Kaliningrad has problems. Organised crime, drugs, and a polluted environment. And we [the EU] want to help solve these problems. This is not an altruistic act: such threats will spread beyond the borders of Kaliningrad". Quoted in Paul Holtom, 'Kaliningrad'

dividend) for the stability of EU member states.[54] On the one hand, therefore, exporting EU norms of governance aims to pre-empt the threat of Kaliningrad by 'Europeanising' (civilising) it. On the other hand, Schengen represents the fear that this will not be possible and that the EU therefore needs a hard border in order to prevent infection - all of course implying that the very real problems facing Kaliningrad are somehow not also evident already within the Union.

To summarise, this section has argued that the EU's approach to Kaliningrad is plagued by conceptual constraints. In particular, it has been shown that the internal/external security framework presupposes a world of good insiders and potentially threatening outsiders. It also entails the conflation of subjectivity and actorness with the need for a territorial sovereignty with clearly defined borders. In this thinking the borders of the Union are inscribed as sites of fear that need to be strengthened in order to prevent contamination. As Joenniemi et al. argue, these "traditional statist and territorially geared concerns leave little room for new challenges of integration, and Kaliningrad thus tends to be locked in to the old agenda of security, exclusion, borders, territorial disputes and more generally classical power political rivalry".[55] All this is not to say that ***security*** is not an issue, it is, but ***whose*** security is the question. In EU discourse it is the security of EU citizens and more particularly the preservation of the EU's territorial sovereignty, that is prioritised over that of outsiders. Although the EU obviously has more obligations towards its own citizens than it does to non-members[56] its frame of reference is problematic for all concerned. Not least, this rhetorical move not only shifts the referent object of security from people to the Union as an institution, it also fails to recognise how the security of insiders and outsiders is intimately connected and inseparable from each other. In this respect, the point is that the EU discourse of internal/external security maintains an idea that the EU could, if necessary, isolate itself from negative developments in Kaliningrad. However, and as will be further argued below, as a result of Kaliningrad's geopolitical location and the spread of

[54] Paul Holtom (Forthcoming 2002) 'Kaliningrad in 2001: From Periphery to Pilot Region', in Paul Holtom and Fabrizio Tassinari (eds.,) ***Russian Participation in Baltic Sea Region Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad*** (Berlin: BaltSeaNet Working Papers)
[55] Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, pp.23-24
[56] Sven Arnswald and Mathias Jopp, ***The Implications of Baltic States' EU membership***, p.83

globalisation processes, this is simply an illusion. Moreover, the discourse also plays a central role in directing EU approaches down a bilateral road, whilst simultaneously raising significant questions about the EU's ability to live up to its ***raison d'être*** as the peace project of Europe. Ironically, this discourse is only likely to perpetuate insecurity within Europe through re-affirming self-other divisions in negative terms as the outside remains seen as potentially threatening.

In short, what this illustrates is the Union's inability to think in truly regional terms as the Union fails to treat all people in the European north as equal. Rather, Kaliningraders (and outsiders in general) can ultimately be sacrificed to the needs of the Union as a whole, a move that is not only to the detriment of Kaliningraders, but undermines peace and the development of a common space and shared identity in Europe more generally. Given the prevalent rhetoric of the EU as endowed with a peace mission to spread harmony throughout Europe, an idea that is central to the enlargement process, such a modernist securitisation of Kaliningrad is clearly ironic. Importantly, similar moves can also be seen in the much touted Northern Dimension initiative of the EU, which some people have seen as a potentially enlightened policy that proposes to separate out the northern region as a whole for special treatment, that can encourage plurality by giving outsiders a voice in European affairs, and which in turn might undermine the idea of the need for fixed borders and rather promote multiple overlapping forms of governance.[57] In practice, however, these innovative elements to the Northern Dimension have generally been sidelined by the EU. Instead, the Northern Dimension has been subsumed under the bilateral CSR and has become about managing and reinscribing

[57] E.g., Pertti Joenniemi, 'Kaliningrad, Borders and the Figure of Europe', p.166; Pertti Joenniemi (2000) 'Changing Politics along Finland's Borders: From Norden to the Northern Dimension', in Pirkkoliisa Ahponen and Pirjo Jukarainen (eds) ***Tearing Down the Curtain, Opening the Gates: Northern Boundaries in Change*** (SoPhi: University of Jyväskylä) p.128; Sergei Medvedev (2001) 'North and the Politics of Emptiness', Paper presented in the workshop, 'Identity Politics, Security and the Making of the Geopolitical Order in the Baltic Region', in Kuusamo, Finland, 14.6-17-6.2001; Sergei Medvedev (1998) 'Tertium datur est: North as the Third', ***OSCE Review. Special Issue on the Northern Dimension*** (Vol.6, No.2) p.8

borders, not transcending them through creating new regional spaces.[58]

## *Towards a New Agenda*

To tackle the questions raised by Kaliningrad more productively, in this section it will be argued that new conceptual frameworks are needed that move beyond the inside/outside, self/other distinction of the framework of the internal/external security paradox. Instead of making politicised policy prescriptions, however, the aim is only to open space for debate by showing how new solutions will likely emerge when different perceptual lenses are adopted. In particular, it needs to be stressed that if a truly regional approach can be adopted - where the security and well being of all is the point of reference, not EU security first - then this will also be of benefit to the Union and will also likely foster greater legitimacy for the EU project as a whole.

Of particular concern is to challenge three of the central assumptions underlying the current EU discourse of the internal/external security paradox. The first is the conflation of actorness/subjectivity with the need for territorial sovereignty. The second is the apparent assumption that has underlain much of the European integration process, and which is clearly apparent in the Kaliningrad issue, that subjectivity and loyalty requires uniformity.[59] In turn, both of these assumptions have been seen to require the need for uniform stable borders clearly demarcating the inside from the outside.

At least two sets of problems are entailed in these assumptions. In the first instance, purely ***conceptual problems*** may be identified. To take the third issue of the need for clear cut borders as an example, this assumption essentially understands subjects as isolated pre-social actors that occasionally bump against each other (i.e., the billiard balls of realist IR approaches). Borders, however, are not the impermeable edges of a pre-defined subjectivity, but sites of interaction where subjectivity is actually negotiated. Or as Paasi puts

[58] For such arguments see, Sami Moisio (2002 forthcoming) 'Back to Baltoscandia? European Union and geo-conceptual remaking of the European north', ***Geopolitics***; Christopher S. Browning, ***The Construction of Europe in the Northern Dimension***

[59] On this second point see Noel Parker, 'Integrated Europe and its 'Margins'', p.11

it, borders are not simply lines on the ground, but are also "manifestations of social practice and discourse".[60] Thus, borders are manifestations of process, not pre-givens, and as such can never irrevocably delineate the inside from the outside. Thus, despite the EU discourse on the need for clear cut borders Parker has noted that historically the edges of Europe have never been clear cut or stable, but have rather been characterised as shifting, overlapping and interlocking.[61] Similarly, and as we will see below, there is nothing necessary about the assumption that being an effective and legitimate subject/actor requires the achievement of territorial sovereignty, or that effective actorness requires uniformity and centralisation. To the contrary, it will be argued that embracing diversity and adopting a largely deterritorialised approach to the question of Kaliningrad is likely to enhance both the EU's effectiveness and its credibility.

The second set of problems are what we might call ***material problems*** and reflect the fact that the assumptions deriving from the EU discourse of the internal/external security paradox make it very difficult for the EU to embrace the interdependence and regionality that ***de facto*** already exists because of Kaliningrad's unique geographical location, and increasingly as a result of processes of globalisation/glocalisation. In a nutshell, Kaliningrad simply will not disappear and cannot be isolated from EU concerns - despite apparent wishful thinking that if the worst comes to the worst the Schengen borders could be used to such an effect. Summarising globalisation debates, the point is that globalisation represents a significant challenge to territorially based approaches to governance. On the one hand, with technological advances increasing the speed and mobility of a multitude of social and economic interactions territorial boundaries are becoming increasingly porous despite attempts to control them, like Schengen.[62] On the other hand, some of these processes do not simply threaten to overload those trying to uphold the principle of territorial sovereignty, but by-pass it altogether - the most obvious examples being the internet and environmental pollution. The point

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[60] Anssi Paasi (1998) 'Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in a World of Flows', ***Geopolitics*** (Vol.3, No.2) p.75

[61] Noel Parker, 'Integrated Europe and its 'Margins'', p.6

[62] For a brief overview of the current challenges facing the principle of territorial sovereignty, see Christer Jonsson, Sven Tagil and Gunnar Tornqvist (2000) ***Organizing European Space*** (Sage Publications Ltd) pp.86-90

is that, in a globalised world power and influence rely not so much on the ability to control one's borders and enforce territorial sovereignty, as on the ability to be flexible and innovative. In other words, the questions of borders and governance raised by Kaliningrad elude the logic of the modernist framework through which the EU has addressed the issue to date. In this respect, isolating the EU from Kaliningrad's problems by erecting the Schengen wall can only be a partial solution at best. This is to say that the problems of Kaliningrad are not particularly modernist in nature and require more inventive solutions to those currently on offer. Moreover, the EU is already tied in with Kaliningrad through other regional forums such as the CBSS (see below) that guarantee that Kaliningrad will remain on the EU agenda.

Summarising both sets of these problems Joenniemi has drawn the conclusion that in many respects territorial sovereignty as an organisational principle of governance is no longer always applicable, let alone always an adequate description of world politics. As Joenniemi puts it, "sovereignty no longer stands out as a cardinal constitutive principle of the new, increasingly globalised international system".[63] In Joenniemi's opinion, an organising principle of ***regionality*** can now be identified that challenges the historically dominant principle of territorial sovereignty. Whereas territorial sovereignty calls for clearly defined subjects and borders, regionality rather promotes ambiguity with borders no longer conceptualised solely as sites of difference, but also as zones of interaction and opportunity. Regions in this sense are not understood as (potential) states in the making, since regionality eschews essentialised notions of identity that tie identity to clearly demarcated territorial spaces. Instead, regionality builds on the globalised politics of networking and multiplicity, which many have seen as the characteristics central to an emerging 'postmodern' system and which are also evident in the EU's internal ordering.[64]

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[63] Pertti Joenniemi (2001) 'Kaliningrad - A Pioneer for the New Global Era', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE) p.56

[64] For a full elaboration of the concept of regionality, see Pertti Joenniemi (1995) 'Regionality: A Sovereign Principle of International Relations? In Heikki Patomäki (ed) Peaceful Changes in World Politics (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, No.71). Also see Ole Wæver (1997) 'The Baltic Sea: A Region after Post-Modernity', in Pertti Joenniemi (ed) ***Neo-Nationalism or Regionality: The Restructuring of Political Space Around the Baltic Rim*** (NordREFO) pp.300-303

The implication, however, is that depending on the conceptual frame utilised - that is, modernist territorial sovereignty or postmodern regionality - the EU will either be able to deal with its margins (and Kaliningrad more specifically) well, or it will deal with them badly. The contention of this paper is that with its approaches framed in the modernist terms of the internal/external security paradox, the EU's ability to deal effectively with Kaliningrad and the issues it raises, has been limited. Indeed, the modernist perceptual frame through which the EU tends to approach (and constitute) its external relations also undermines the Union's development as a subject of international politics. In short, caught in modernist discourse, the Union's consequent desire for centralised, coherent approaches and a unified impermeable external border, largely precludes the Union from capitalising on the expertise of its margins (in this case Lithuania and Poland) and of engaging in international politics more fruitfully. As Aalto puts it, the Union's soft security identity pre-occupations are ironically setting limits for the Union's geopolitical subjectivity.

> As said, by requiring accession countries like Lithuania and Poland to establish the Schengen regime on their borders with Belarus, Ukraine and Kaliningrad the EU is interfering into the existing co-operation between Lithuania, Poland and the Union's 'eastern partners'… In the end, by giving away a potential valuable asset like the accession countries' experience of co-operation with non-applicant countries, the Schengen geo-policy sets unnecessary limits to the Union's future involvement and influence in the 'East'. In short, the EU's display of geopolitical power turns against itself in this case.[65]

Put otherwise, some things may simply be better tackled at local, regional and national levels, than at the EU level. However, stuck in the modernist internal/external security paradox such de-centralisation tends to be seen as threatening EU subjectivity, rather than as a possibility for enhancing it. As both Parker and Hartnell point out, the margins and borders are actually sites where "bold innovation and nimble action are possible", however, capitalising on these possibilities will actually require the Union reconceptualising European integration as a decentred process.[66] At the same time,

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[65] Pami Aalto (Forthcoming 2002) 'A European Geopolitical Subject in the Making? EU, Russia and the Kaliningrad Question', ***Geopolitics*** (Vol.7, No.3)

[66] Helen E. Hartnell (2000) 'European Integration through the Kaleidoscope: the View from the Central and East European Margins', in Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong (eds)

the need for such an understanding is imperative because if the Kaliningrad question teaches us one thing it is that the EU is no longer in total control of the integration process or of agenda setting (if it ever was). Again, both Hartnell and Parker have also noted that the margins actually posses considerable resources and opportunities to set the agenda of European integration.[67] For example, in 1998, having become slightly disillusioned with EU approaches, in its preparations for its chairmanship of the CBSS Lithuania singled out the CBSS as the proper framework for tackling the problems of Kaliningrad. Not least, the CBSS is a regional forum aimed at building up local networks and giving local people a voice in their affairs.[68] One result of this was the joint Lithuanian-Russian 'Nida initiative', which aims at developing wide-ranging cooperation projects between Lithuania and Russia in the context of Kaliningrad. This has subsequently been pushed onto the agenda of the EU's own Northern Dimension initiative. Importantly, such things as the CBSS and the Nida initiative create overlapping spaces of governance, largely ignore established hierarchies, and break down distinctions between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', thereby creating space for equality in the region.[69] Stuck in modernist frames of reference, however, the EU's response to such instances tends to be reactive and slightly suspicious, rather than proactive and innovative. This is no better highlighted than in the rather guarded nature of the Commission's report on Kaliningrad discussed earlier, which whilst reflecting EU acknowledgement that Kaliningrad cannot be ignored, essentially construes the issue in terms of threats to EU subjectivity, not as an opportunity for exploring new forms of governance beneficial to the security and welfare of the region as a whole.

## *Kaliningrad in Russian Discourse*

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***Margins in European Integration*** (Macmillan Press Ltd) pp.29-30; Also see Noel Parker, 'Integrated Europe and its 'Margins'', whole chapter

[67] Helen E. Hartnell, 'European Integration through the Kaleidoscope', p.49; Noel Parker, 'Integrated Europe and its 'Margins'', pp.12-13

[68] Vygaudas Usackas (2000) 'Lithuania and Kaliningrad: Building a Partnership for the New Europe', in James Baxendale, Stephen Dewar and David Gowan (eds.) ***The EU and Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad ad the Impact of EU Enlargement*** (London: Federal Trust) p.145

[69] Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, p.17

To understand the issues of Kaliningrad it is of course also important to take into account Russian attitudes to its exclave in the heart of Europe. Important in this respect is that just as the EU's subjectivity has been put into question, Kaliningrad's unique position and problems are also raising questions about the configuration and construction of the future Russia. Similarly, Russian discourse on Kaliningrad also currently takes two forms. On the one hand, the EU's own modern discourse of the internal/external security paradox is replicated in Russia with Russia understood in archetypal Westphalian and realist terms as a sovereign state. This modern discourse calls for the strict control of Russia's territorial borders, thereby linking the nation (identity) to the territorial state.[70] It is this thinking that underlies the fears many Russians have of regionalisation and which supports calls for increasing centralised control. On the other hand, however, more postmodern approaches can also be identified in Russia. These encourage the development of Russia in more open terms that might facilitate its linking in with European integration by breaking down the nation-state elision. Arguably, these approaches have moved up the agenda in recent years, and which in turn are posing significant challenges to the EU to respond in like manner.

As Sergounin notes, modern-type approaches have dominated much of Russian thinking on Kaliningrad since the end of the Cold War, especially during the early 1990s. This thinking has been premised on realist and geopolitical worldviews that view the West as potentially threatening Russia's territorial integrity.[71] The historical legacy of Kaliningrad makes Russian sensitivities in this regard particularly keen. Formerly a part of Prussia the exclave was only annexed to Russia after World War II. For Russia, therefore, Kaliningrad is symbolic of the country's heroic war effort and the resultant expansion of Russian space. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Baltic States Kaliningrad is all that remains of this historic legacy, and few

[70] For an extensive analysis of this theme in Russian history more generally see, Dmitri Trenin (2002) ***The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*** (Washington, D.C., and Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

[71] Alexander Sergounin (2001) 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad: The Russian Perspective', in Lyndelle D. Fairlie and Alexander Sergounin, ***Are Borders Barriers? EU Enlargement and the Russian Region of Kaliningrad*** (Helsinki: Ulkopoliittinen instituutti and Institut für Europäische Politik) pp.142-143

Russians are prepared to countenance the loss of Kaliningrad in the future.[72] However, Russia's limited historical claim on Kaliningrad has made them especially sensitive to the claims of nationalists in Germany, Lithuania and Poland who in the early 1990s each professed some right to Kaliningrad.[73] Therefore, despite the fact that the governments of these states have generally rejected any interest in the territory of Kaliningrad, in the early 1990s the Russian government remained suspicious that foreign investment in Kaliningrad, especially land acquisitions, would be used as a surreptitious means to return the land to foreign control and to push Russia out of Europe once and for all. Consequently, land reforms were held back and Kaliningrad arguably missed out on significant foreign investment.[74]

In fact, the Russian administration has been rather suspicious of the concepts of globalisation and regionalisation more generally. Whilst globalisation has generally been a term championed in the West as an opportunity to break divisive borders, preoccupied with consolidating Russian sovereignty after the end of the Cold War many Russian leaders view globalisation as a form of US-led hegemony designed to further marginalise Russia in world affairs, and even as aimed at promoting its further disintegration.[75] Illustrative of these concerns is a comment made at a conference on Kaliningrad by A. Zmeyevsky, an ambassador at the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. As Zmeyevsky put it, cross-border

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[72] Pami Aalto, 'A European Geopolitical Subject in the Making?'. For an historical defence of Russian sovereignty over Kaliningrad see, Valentin Romanov (1995) 'Kaliningrad as an Integral Part of Russia', ***International Affairs (Moscow)*** No.6

[73] For example, in 1993 the Lithuanian Ambassador to the United States claimed Kaliningrad as Lithuanian territory. However, the Lithuanian government has subsequently retracted all such statements. Similarly neither the German or Polish governments has made a claim on Kaliningrad and are unlikely to do so. Richard J. Krickus (1998) ***US Foreign Policy and the Kaliningrad Question*** (Copenhagen: DUPI Working Papers 1998/18) pp.5-6. Also see, Christian Wellmann (1996) 'Russia's Kaliningrad Exclave at the Crossroads: The Interrelation between Economic Development and Security Politics', ***Cooperation and Conflict*** (Vol.31, No.2) pp.171-174; Ingmar Oldberg, 'Kaliningrad', pp.16-24; Ram_nas Janu_auskas (2001) 'The 'Kaliningrad puzzle' in Lithuanian and Russian political discourses', in Pertti Joenniemi and Jevgenia Viktorova (eds.,) ***Regional Dimensions of Security in Border Areas of Northern and Eastern Europe*** (Tartu: Tartu University Press) pp.224-229

[74] Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, p. 6

[75] Andrey S. Makarychev, ***Islands of Globalization***, pp.26-27; Hiski Haukkala (2001) ***Two Reluctant Regionalizers? The European Union and Russia in Europe's North*** (Helsinki: UPI Working Papers 32) pp.8-9

cooperation needs to be dealt with circumspectly and the process should not be forced.

> Otherwise, it will be difficult to draw a boundary between cross-border co-operation and ***the economic, demographic and cultural or religious expansion of contiguous countries***. It would be a great nuisance, if the established climate of trust and equal co-operation should be destroyed as a result of thoughtless, premature and controversial initiatives on cross-border co-operation. (emphasis added)[76]

Regionalisation and de-centralisation are also often viewed negatively, with the belief being that a strong centralised state is essential in order to keep Russia's diverse ethnic groups and territorial spaces together.[77] Throughout the 1990s concern was voiced in Moscow at the growing power of some regions ***vis-à-vis*** the centre and what this might mean for Russia. Fears of separatist tendencies in the regions have been widespread, and not always unfounded. For example, senior officials in the Kaliningrad administration have occasionally mooted such possibilities, thereby feeding talk that Kaliningrad could be a 'fourth Baltic State'. Indeed, in 1994 Yuri Matochkin, the governor general of the ***Oblast***, warned Moscow that unless it began to heed Kaliningraders' concerns a referendum on seccession might be called. As Krickus notes, all this was probably posturing rather than genuine sentiment on the part of Kaliningraders, however, it has played on Moscow's concerns.[78]

Notably, throughout the 1990s Moscow was clearly unsettled by Kaliningrad's status. Aware of Kaliningrad's economic problems, in 1991 Moscow designated the ***Oblast*** a Free Economic Zone (FEZ), thereby giving it special privileges in regard to foreign trade. However, by 1993, and the rise of nationalist forces such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Kaliningrad's status was put in question. Illustratively, the federal law passing through the Duma defining the status of the region, had its title changed from 'On Raising the Status of the Kaliningrad Oblast' to 'On Strengthening the Sovereignty of the Russian Federation on the Territory of the Kaliningrad Oblast'. In 1995 the FEZ status was scrapped, although the following year it

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[76] A. V. Zmeyevsky, Ambassador, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) speech in ***Conference on the Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad: European and Regional Integration, 17-18 May 2000*** (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) p.19

[77] Hiski Haukkala, ***Two Reluctant Regionalizers***? p.10

[78] Richard J. Krickus, ***US Foreign Policy and the Kaliningrad Question***, pp.6-7

became a Special Economic Zone (SEZ).[79] Even as late as March 2001 Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov felt it necessary to warn his colleagues in the Kaliningrad administration about being drawn into the surreptitious plans of the West. As he put it:

> At the same time it is necessary by common efforts to cut short bad faith attempts - and they, unfortunately, persist - to conduct affairs with the Kaliningrad region in circumvention of the federal center. It cannot be allowed that in questions of development of the external ties of the region somebody should be able to disturb the Russian power vertical [sic], to disunite and oppose us to each other.[80]

Likewise, many commentators have also seen President Putin's federal reforms, in which he has frequently referred to the need to strengthen "vertical power", as an explicit attack on the regions and as aimed at consolidating Moscow's control over Russia's territory.[81]

Finally, whilst modernist perspectives in Russian discourse have been most clearly apparent in these concerns over preserving the territorial sovereignty of Russia over Kaliningrad, they have also been evident in more proactive ways. In this respect, it is notable that some Russians have clearly seen Kaliningrad's unique position as a resource to reassert Russia's geopolitical presence in the Baltic region. For example, Russia tried to pre-empt NATO enlargement to Poland by arguing that such a move would make the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad imperative.[82] More recently, some people in the West have begun to argue that Russia's recent pro-active stance on Kaliningrad (see below) is actually driven by the very traditional geopolitical concerns of expanding Russian power in this former Soviet sphere of influence.[83] Similarly, one of Russia's most preferred solutions to the Kaliningrad problem, the idea that Russia should be granted a 'transport corridor' through

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[79] For an overview see, Ingmar Oldberg (2002) ***Kaliningrad between Moscow and Brussels*** (Zurich: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research. Working Paper 17) pp.51-55; Pertti Joenniemi, Stephen Dewar and Lyndelle D. Fairlie, ***The Kaliningrad Puzzle***, pp.12-15

[80] Igor Ivanov (2001) Speech at a Meeting with the Leaders of the Kaliningrad Region on March 8, 2001. Available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/

[81] Michael Emerson (2001) ***The Elephant and the Bear: The European Union, Russia and their Near Abroads*** (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies) p.20; Sergei Jakobson-Obolenski (2001) 'Kaliningrad - the Responsibility of Centralised Russia', ***Ballad Reports***, 01/02/2001. Available at http://www.ballad.org

[82] Richard J. Krickus, ***US Foreign Policy and the Kaliningrad Question***, p.23; Richard J. Krickus, ***The Kaliningrad Question***, p.70

[83] Paul Holtom, 'Kaliningrad'

Lithuania to Kaliningrad, also resonates strongly with a discourse of the imperatives of territorial sovereignty and reaffirms an image of a tightly bordered Russia, to some extent constituted in opposition to the West/Europe.[84]

Aside from such realist based discourses, however, more inventive approaches are also apparent on the part of Russia. Not least, as initial fears of EU imperialism have gradually subsided calls for multilateralism and greater integration of Kaliningrad into the EU have been aired. This has been most clearly expressed in a document released in Autumn 1999 outlining a medium-term strategy for the development of Russia's relations with the EU. Amongst other things this document envisages a special arrangement for Kaliningrad and suggests the ***Oblast*** should be seen as a 'pilot region' in the development of EU-Russian relations, particularly with regard to the other regions of northwest Russia.[85] These proposals have been paralleled by moves from within Kaliningrad that call for the internationalisation of Kaliningrad and its development into a linking space between the EU and Russia. The new governor, Vladimir Jegorov, has been especially active in this regard.[86]

Thus, regionalism is not only understood as a security threat to Russia, but also as a potential opportunity. Whilst regionalism is embraced in the regions of northwest Russia, there are also supportive voices in Moscow who essentially see regionalism as a

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[84] Burt Herman (2002) 'Putin Stands Firm on Kaliningrad Issue', ***The Moscow Times***, 11 June 2002. This proposal has been flatly rejected by Lithuania and Poland (and the EU) for whom the parallels with the ill-fated 'Polish Corridor', which provided Poland with access to the sea but which cut off East Prussia (Kaliningrad) from the rest of Germany and which contributed to the outbreak of World War II, are clear. Pertti Joenniemi (1996) 'Kaliningrad: A Region in Search for a Past and a Future', ***Mare Balticum 1996*** (Lübeck-Travemünde: Ostsee-Akademie) pp.85-86

[85] Marius Vahl (2001) 'The Northern Dimension as a Model for Relations between the European Union and its "Near Abroad"', paper presented at the Think-tank Seminar on the Northern Dimension and the Future of Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperatio, Kiruna, Sweden, June 14-17, 2001; Alexander Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad', p.148

[86] Vladimir Jegorov, Governor of the Kaliningrad Region (2001) 'International Relations Vital for the Kaliningrad Oblast', ***Kaliningrad - Isolation or Co-operation?*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Committee for European Security, STETE). For a detailed programme calling for greater internationalism and originating from Kaliningrad University, see A. P. Klemeshev, S. D. Kozlov and Gh. M. Fyodorov (2002) ***I Ostrov Sotrudnichestva*** (Kaliningrad: Kaliningrad State University Press) Summary in English, 'The Island of Co-operation', pp.300-325

way to tie Russia to the European economic project. Given that after the next enlargement the EU will account for around 50% of Russia's foreign trade the need to link in to European integration has become seen by some as imperative.[87] In this respect Sergounin notes that Russian liberals hope that Kaliningrad will become a 'gateway' and 'pioneer region' for foreign investment and in the process will draw Russia into European multilateral institutions.[88]

However, these approaches to Kaliningrad go beyond seeing Kaliningrad simply as an object of EU-Russian relations. Instead, proposals for Kaliningrad as a 'pilot region' envisage Kaliningrad as some kind of third space, a sub-region between the EU and Russia.[89] This is to say that at some level some Russians are thinking beyond the modern discourse of borders and sovereignty to embrace other constitutive principles of governance ressembling that of Joenniemi's regionality concept. Indeed, this notion of Kaliningrad as a 'third space', and Russia's understanding that in order to solve the questions raised by Kaliningrad international solutions are needed, has also been presented in other formats. For example, in 1998 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin made a proposal for a 'Baltic Schengen' that would over-ride the exclusionary practices of the EU's Schengen regime. In essence the Baltic Schengen would create an intermediary space that would link the EU and Russia, rather than separate them, and would provide Kaliningrad with an opportunity to integrate more closely with the EU, thereby overcoming some of the problems that the EU's Schengen regime threatens to bring. In short, the notion has been that if Norway and Iceland (but also Greenland and the Faroe Islands) can have special arrangements with the EU linking them to the European free trade area, then why could not Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea Region as a whole.[90]

More recently, these goals have been expressed in Russian criticisms that the EU's Northern Dimension has largely failed to break down borders by giving Russian partners an equal voice and creating effective linking sub-regional spaces. As Deputy Prime

[87] See, Igor Ivanov (2001) Speech at a Meeting with the Leadership of the Republic of Karelia in Petrozavodsk, May 10, 2001. Available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/
[88] Alexander Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad', p.145
[89] Alexander Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad', p.146
[90] Pertti Joenniemi, 'Kaliningrad, Borders and the Figure of Europe', pp.162-163, Alexander Sergounin, 'EU Enlargement and Kaliningrad', p.146

Minister, Viktor Khristenko, has put it, whilst the Northern Dimension can be seen as a "brave political experiment" calling for "unconventional decisions" promoting sub-regional cooperation that ultimately might develop into "a common European social and economic space", in practice Russia has been steadily excluded from decision-making in the initiative.[91] In turn Russia has renewed its interest in the CBSS, where Russia does have an equal voice, and hopes to develop it into a policy-framing institution which in turn might re-orient the Northern Dimension to its concerns.[92] As Joenniemi puts it, through such approaches "Russia is challenging the EU to restore the balance between positive cross-border cooperation and protection against risks" and is "advocating solutions that would add to the postmodern nature of the EU and change its own essence considerably".[93]

Importantly, what these initiatives illustrate is that for some Russians the conflation of the state's territorial sovereignty with national identity is no longer so tight. Indeed, it has been argued that the history of the relationship between the Russian state, Russian territory and Russianness has been markedly different to that of the tight linkages of Western Europe's modernist Westphalian heritage. As Medvedev has characterised it, there has never been any definitive notion of the extent of Russian space: Russia has rather emerged in a haphazard way, spilling out into its surrounding regions.[94] In some ways Russia better resembles the model of an archetypal Empire, rather than a strictly bordered nation-state configuration. What this has tended to mean, however, is that whilst Russia's expansion is freely accepted, the shrinkage of Russian space is perceived as a fundamental threat, as unlike other historic empires Russia has never had a specifically demarcated territorial

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[91] Viktor Khristenko, Vice Prime Minister (2001) Speech to the Northern Dimension Forum in Lappeenranta, Finland, 22 October 2001. Available in ***Results of the Northern Dimension Forum in Lappeenranta 22-23.10.2001*** (Helsinki: Prime Minister's Office; Publications 2001/14) pp.18, 20-21

[92] Igor S. Ivanov, Foreign Affairs Minister of the Russian Federation (2001) 'Baltic Sea Cooperation: Establishing a New Type of Relationship in Northern Europe', published in ***Baltinfo***, Official CBSS Newsletter, No.40, September 2001. Available at http://www.baltinfo.org

[93] Pertti Joenniemi (2002) 'Kaliningrad - A 'Little Russia' within the European Union', in Helmut Hubel (ed) ***EU Enlargement and Beyond: The Baltic States and Russia*** (Berlin: Berlin Verlag) p.434

[94] See Sergei Medvedev (1997) 'A General Theory of Russian Space: A Gay Science and a Rigorous Science', ***Alternatives*** (Vol.22, No.4)

area to fall back on as the essence of Russianness.[95] Consequently, it is not surprising that Russian fears of German, Polish and Lithuanian (and Western at large) expansionist ambitions in Kaliningrad and Russia's regions more generally, resulted in a rather defensive posture towards regional integration that continues to be reproduced in conservative discourses. In contrast, however, as such fears have faded this heritage has arguably also enabled some Russians to reappraise the merits of regionalisation and the new postmodern politics of regionality. Put another way, to the extent that Russians perceive opening borders, not as leading to a contraction of Russian space, but as consolidating it, then Russia is probably psychologically well prepared to embrace cross-border cooperation - and perhaps even more so than the EU with its modern Westphalian heritage.

## *Conclusion*

In conclusion it should be clear that the position of Kaliningrad in relation to EU enlargement raises many issues. Most important of these are the effects that enlargement will have on the welfare of Kaliningraders. In this respect, it was highlighted that there is a growing concensus that these effects are likely to be overwhelmingly negative as a result of the exclusionary practices the EU demands of applicant states - not least Schengen. The central argument of this paper, however, has been that the problems of the social and economic security of Kaliningraders have tended to be marginalised in EU discourse on Kaliningrad. EU approaches towards the Kaliningrad question are overwhelmingly framed in terms of a dichotomous discourse of the contradictary demands of the internal and external security needs of the Union. In this discourse concern shifts away from the needs of Kaliningrad to those of the EU.

More particularly the paper has illustrated that this discourse of the internal/external security paradox entails at least two constitutive moves. Firstly, the framework of internal/external security draws on and reproduces modernist understandings of subjectivity, central to which is the notion that subjects require clearly demarcated territorial spaces and borders over which they exercise sovereign

[95] Pami Aalto (Forthcoming 2002) 'Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the North of Europe', in Marko Lehti and David Smith (eds) ***Reinventing Europe: Northern and Baltic Experiences of Post-Cold War Identity Politics*** (Frank Cass)

control. Secondly, however, this conflation of identity, territory and sovereignty in turn tends to lead to the reification of selfhood to the negative characterisation of those outside the borders of the EU as potential threats to EU security. Thus, it has been shown how in EU discourse Kaliningrad has become clearly presented as a potential site of contamination for the EU, a site of chaos, criminality, disease and pollution in comparison to the ordered cosmos of the Union. With the issue framed in such ways EU approaches to Kaliningrad have tended to be limited, with the Union appearing remarkably unable to engage with the ideas of overlapping territories and spaces of governance that it so clearly endorses in its internal relations. In particular, in this discourse the EU becomes restricted in its ability to capitalise on the expertise of the applicant countries in conducting relations with the EU's near abroad, whilst in insisting on curtailing the previous local and regional cross-border links the EU also threatens to undermine its own legitimacy within the applicant countries. In short, constituted in very modern terms the EU tends to place major importance on the character and location of its external borders, seeing them as lines of differentiation and exclusion. In contrast, local and regional communities are more likely to play down the importance of borders, rather seeing them as contact zones and sites of opportunity.[96]

Ultimately, however, the inadequacy of the Union's exclusionary discourse becomes clearest once one takes into account the processes of globalisation, the networks of cross-border interaction and the overlapping spaces of governance already apparent in the Baltic Sea area. Stuck in modernist frames of reference in its external relations, this paper has argued the EU is unable to deal effectively with the situation it faces in Kaliningrad. This is because such frames are unable to adequately take account of the fact that, not only is the EU unavoidably getting entangled in intra-Russian relations, but that as a result of Kaliningrad's position as an EU enclave Kaliningrad is no longer simply a Russian space. By its very nature Kaliningrad escapes modernist categories of inside/outside, ours/theirs and rather occupies the position of being in-between and overlapping. At a theoretical level this points to a need to adopt different perceptual frames that reconceptualise the tight relationship

[96] This is an elaboration of a point made by Berg in relation to national and local perspectives. Eiki Berg (2000) ***Writing Post-Soviet Estonia onto the World Map*** (Copenhagen: COPRI Working Papers 32) p.10

between the concepts of territory, governance, sovereignty and identity entailed in modernist discourse. De-linking these concepts from each other will enable the Union to be much more versatile and effective in its approaches. It will also provide an opportunity to extend European integration without this being seen to occur at the negative expense and exclusion of those outside the project. On the one hand, emphasising more postsovereign frames may be one way in which the EU can reclaim and prioritise some of its heritage as a peace project in the broadest sense. On the other hand, of course, such a development entails a considerable re-envisaging of just what type of configuration, actor and subject the EU is, or professes to be. From aspirations to be a sovereign territorial subject with hard divisive borders excluding those left on the outside from European space, this is rather a vision of a softer Europe of multiple networks, overlapping spaces, decentralised patterns of governance and with borders understood as inviting interaction, not discouraging it.

Interestingly, the paper has also argued that to some extent Russia has stolen a march on the EU in this regard. Of course, given the prevalence of realist and geopolitical worldviews in Russia this move to a postmodern agenda clearly should not be overstated. After all, the fact remains that proposals for Kaliningrad as a pilot region and laboratory for a new type of politics have yet to amount to much concrete. At the same time, however, the fact that Moscow has begun to talk in terms of overlapping and common spaces is indicative of a substantial shift in the thinking of some Russians. Finally, a move away from unitary modernist concerns need not necessarily imply a weakening of either EU or Russian subjectivity. Strong states and international subjects need not be centralised or require the conflation of identity with a territorial space. In contrast, and as this paper argues, strength can also lie in de-centralisation, in embracing multiplicity and in breaking the tight territory-identity link that frequently becomes associated with a need for divisive borders and the negative characterisation of others.

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