



JORDAN: THE GEOPOLITICAL SERVICE PROVIDER

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Abstract:

Jordan is in the eye of the Arab cyclone. It remains stable while surrounded by chaotic political situations in Syria, Iraq, Palestine and the Sinai Peninsula. Jordan has not experienced the massive demonstrations aimed at regime change that have been seen elsewhere in the region, and its relative stability has enabled it to cash in on the geopolitical services it provides. These services include: hosting refugees from Palestine, Iraq or Syria; remaining a reliable ally for many international powers; featuring a strong army that plays a stabilizing role in the region; serving as an intermediary when neighboring countries need a host or a dealmaker; and providing qualified Jordanian workers to fill open vacancies for companies and countries, especially in the Gulf. The current stability in Jordan matches well its historic capacity to resist and adapt to shocks. However, the contemporary situation of the labor market reveals that the weaknesses observed in the countries having experienced revolutions (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt) are also present in Jordan; labor market participation is low with very few women active, and the unemployment rate of educated young people is worrisome. Both the number of Jordanians working abroad and the number of migrant workers in Jordan show the discrepancy between demand and supply of labor in Jordan. This could become problematic, since the economic situation has been worsening, notably with fewer public jobs available. Hence there is a need for international donors to keep supporting Jordan in a difficult regional environment, for the government of Jordan to wittily manage the balance between Transjordanians and West Bankers in the near future and for new workers to alter their expectations in searching for opportunities outside the public sector.

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INTRODUCTION

Jordan has been, for at least 60 years, a pivot country in the Middle East. Its proximity to Israel, Egypt, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq makes it a puzzle of influences and populations, especially since the creation of Jordan was already a response to a sense of geopolitical balance in the region. Since then, the country has been using its position on the international scene to trade geopolitical services. Consequently, its economy, which lacks domestic resources (most notably energy and water), depends on various external flows. These obstacles have led the leadership of the country to value and leverage its central position in the Middle East in order to support its economic development and maintain its regime.

Contrary to numerous countries in the Arab world, Jordan has not recently gone through massive demonstrations designed to topple its head of state. So far, the king has weathered the Arab revolutions and the earth-shattering political movements sweeping many of Jordan's neighboring states in the past couple of years. This stability in the eye of the cyclone has enabled the country to cash in on the geopolitical services it supports while remaining on the edge of

instability.

Indeed, the absence of a strong social movement does not mean that the frailties that appeared in other countries are missing in Jordan. The demographic trajectory, labor force participation and place of women and young people in the labor market share resemblance to those of other Arab countries affected by popular movements.

The macro tensions affecting Jordan from 2011 to 2014 have primarily had to do with the energy shock caused by sabotages performed on the pipeline coming from Egypt. The consequences on Jordan's current account, on the fiscal balance and on the public debt have been tremendous, with Jordan seeking and obtaining support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2012. Meanwhile, in the background, the situation of the labor market remains gloomy, and challenges for the stability and development of the kingdom abound. It appears that, in the wake of the Syrian civil war, Jordan retains its classical geopolitical service provider mantle; the country still exports influence and to some extent labor and works, and now that it is hosting thousands of refugees it is unknown how its fragile domestic market will respond.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

The Emirate of Transjordan became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, when Jordan gained independence from the British mandate authorities. The presence of British troops on Jordanian ground weakened the completeness of the independence process, which was promptly resolved by the signing of a new treaty sealing a military and political alliance with the United Kingdom (U.K.) that enabled it to use two air bases and maintain right-of-passage for its troops. Thus, the savviness of the king led to the peaceful independence of the kingdom while still maintaining good relations with its former colonizer. King Abdullah also asserted his power through the support of a strong army and the Bedouins.

During the 1948 war, Jordan occupied the West Bank, which voted to remain part of the kingdom in a 1950 referendum. The Jordanian parliament approved the union of the two sides of the Jordan River in one state, under the sovereignty of Abdullah. After the assassination of Abdullah by a Palestinian and domestic turmoil, King Hussein asserted his power. For instance, he created a national consultative council with only Transjordanians (who could be of Palestinian origin). The various links that the crown had established within the country's numerous groups have enabled the continuity of the power of the royal family since then, but those were testing times for the stability of the kingdom.

Jordan saw an opportunity to sever ties with the U.K. during the Suez crisis in 1956. The treaty between the two countries was repealed and British troops left the country. The Syrian army, present on Jordanian ground, threatened the kingdom, and the U.S. Navy was ready to intervene if necessary. Jordan then broke ties with Syria and Egypt, even though at

the same time its Arab union with Iraq and Hussein's cousin failed; this time the U.K. was acting as security insurance by sending parachutists to Amman. Jordan and the United States then became closer in the following years, and the relations of the kingdom with Egypt improved. In the meantime, Jordan's domestic turmoil was intensifying, and Jordan retracted its support from the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Israel occupied the West Bank as a result of the 1967 war, and Jordan felt humiliated as its army was humbled by the Israeli one (Jordan had signed a defense treaty with Egypt right before the war, but this did not prevent losing the West Bank). The morale of the Palestinians in Jordan was very low, particularly for the last waves that had arrived in Jordan (200,000 people), who struggled to integrate into the economic and political spheres. In addition, by losing the West Bank, Jordan lost its most resource-rich land in the process.

The years 1970 and 1971 were the epitome of the war between the Jordanian government and some maximalist Palestinian organizations. The government won this conflict with the support of the United States, a result which led to a rupture between the Palestinians and the Hashemite kingdom. Also, Iraq and Syria closed their borders and Syria, Algeria and Libya ended their diplomatic relations with Jordan.


Then the kingdom was "Jordanized," minimizing political responsibilities of West Bankers, and the king abandoned any claim on the West Bank. At this time, Jordan's relations with Syria had its ups and downs, and Jordan sided with Iraq in their war against Iran, while Syria sided with Iran. During those years Jordan's military cooperation with the United States remained important even though U.S. support for Israel was problematic for Jordan.

Eventually, King Hussein severed “administrative and legal” ties with the West Bank in 1988 and tried to get closer with many Arab states (e.g., Iraq and Egypt). Somehow, and reluctantly, the king supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War and paid a steep price for it (Saudi Arabia closed its borders to Jordan, for instance). However, the country was slowly and in part “democratized” by the king, and, combined with his support for Iraq the head of state was as popular as ever. The Jordanian cohesion came to revolve, and still revolves, around the king. The economic situation worsened, however. Jordan was highly dependent on

Iraq, and Jordan had to rely on structural adjustment programs backed by the IMF, the World Bank and the United States.

Since the peace agreement signed with Israel in 1994, the two states are no longer belligerent and Jordan has been expecting to collect peace dividends. Thus, financial support—through different channels and modes from the United States, the European Union, Japan and the World Bank—has enabled the country's economy to rebound and remain afloat. In addition, many Gulf countries also continue to aid Jordan.

Figure 1: External Flows Received by Jordan, 1973-2013



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

This short overview of the history of Jordan shows how, politically, the country has skillfully managed its environment by using its position as an opportunity for running alliances with countries from every angle. The external financial flows Jordan receives illustrate the fact that it needs the support of all sorts of actors and has to maintain excellent relations with both the countries of the peninsula and international donors to survive.

Among the external flows, the historical importance of both official development assistance (ODA) and

the size of remittances is clear. Remittances come from emigrants that probably did not find enough opportunities in the local labor market and so sought better situations abroad. Besides trading geopolitical services, it seems that Jordan has been trading workers as well. Considering the importance of the labor market environment in the Arab revolutions since 2011, this labor effect is an element worth considering as Jordan faces similar economic challenges as other neighbor economies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC STORY

The population of Jordan has skyrocketed since its independence,¹ and it has multiplied more than twelve-fold in 60 years thanks to both its natural increase and the inflows of population, a result of the various

periods of regional turmoil surrounding the country. From less than half a million people in 1950, Jordan's population rose to nearly 6.5 million in 2012 and is projected to keep growing substantially in the near future.

Table 1: Jordan's Population, 1950-2020

Year	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Population (in thousands)	449	889	1,655	2,281	3,358	4,767	6,455	8,087

Source: United Nations Population Division

If the pace of population growth has slowed down from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s, the demographic transition seems to have come to a halt.² The growth rate of the population is now below 3 percent and although the fertility rate has decreased from a high of 8 children per woman in 1960 to 3.6 in 2010,³ the decrease has indeed stalled. With the inherent inertia of the endogenous component of population

increase, it means that, in terms of population and demographic trends, the country faces other challenges than Tunisia (which has a fertility rate of 2 children per woman and a growth rate around 1 percent) or Egypt or Morocco (which have rates already below 3 children per woman and around a 1.5 percent growth rate). It appears unlikely that Jordan will soon reach the replacement level threshold of 2.1 children per woman.

Table 2: Evolution of Jordan's Population Growth Rate and Fertility, 1950-2020

Period	Population Growth Rate (%)	Total Fertility Rate (Children per Woman)
1950-1960	6.830	7.380
1960-1970	6.215	8.000
1970-1980	3.210	7.585
1980-1990	3.870	6.535
1990-2000	3.505	4.715
2000-2010	3.030	3.745
2010-2020	2.255	3.125

Source: United Nations Population Division

On top of this population growth, the Syrian crisis has prompted more than 600,000 refugees to move to Jordan since 2011 (and some accounts put it above one million).⁴ This inflow will have a formidable economic impact in the short and medium term for the country.⁵ Such a shock (i.e., the arrival of close to 10 percent of the population in a three-year span) will undoubtedly alter the labor market and the country as a whole. To some extent, Jordan is already a mosaic of populations and a political puzzle.

Another important aspect of the Jordanian population is that estimates put the share of people with Palestinian origins between 50 and 70 percent (as opposed to East Bankers, also called Transjordanians). The immigration population coming from the West Bank has had a lasting impact, with immigrants coming after 1948 and 1967 granted citizenship, and oth-

ers arriving in 1991 and 2003 after fleeing Iraq (or Kuwait) during the two Iraqi wars. As mentioned earlier, black September in 1970 and 1971 strongly divided West and East Bankers by stigmatizing Jordanians of Palestinian origin, leaving an important rift between the two in the economic activity of the country. This rift is not to be overstated, but it bears monitoring as testing times can bring back some tension.⁶

The shape and speed of growth of the Jordanian population are such that, depending on the way the demographic dividend evolves, the growth of the labor force could be either an asset or a burden to the economic and social development of the country. The extent of the consequences of the Syrian crisis on Jordan is unknown at this time, but it will be tremendous and will probably reshape the country's equilibrium.

THE WORKING-AGE POPULATION AND THE WORKERS

Jordan's age distribution shows that the proportion of the very young population (under 15 years old) has been declining since the early 1980s, when it reached almost 50 percent of the population. This demographic remains the bulk of the population but is now closer to one-third, which implies that the great-

est labor-oriented challenges are currently related to the large percentage of young adults. People under 25 still represent 55 percent of the country, and the working-age population is above 60 percent. At the same time, the number of young people is still growing in absolute terms, and the need for the economy to create opportunities will only increase. Jobs are and will still be needed at a high rate.

Table 3: Age Distribution of Population in Jordan, 1950-2010 (thousands and %)

Year	0-14		15-64		64+		15-24		Total	Total Dependency Ratio
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%		
1950	205	46%	222	49%	22	5%	78	17%	449	102.2
1955	286	44%	331	51%	29	5%	125	19%	646	95.4
1960	386	43%	465	52%	38	4%	178	20%	889	91.2
1965	503	45%	574	51%	42	4%	214	19%	1120	94.9
1970	759	46%	842	51%	54	3%	298	18%	1,655	96.6
1975	937	47%	987	50%	61	3%	344	17%	1,985	101.1
1980	1,117	49%	1,090	48%	73	3%	447	20%	2,281	109.2
1985	1,311	47%	1,372	49%	100	4%	569	20%	2,783	102.8
1990	1,552	46%	1,696	50%	111	3%	737	22%	3,358	98.1
1995	1,757	41%	2,433	56%	130	3%	962	22%	4,320	77.6
2000	1,877	39%	2,742	58%	149	3%	1,045	22%	4,767	73.9
2005	1,986	38%	3,087	59%	167	3%	1,103	21%	5,239	69.7
2010	2,265	35%	3,971	62%	219	3%	1,279	20%	6,455	62.6


Source: United Nations Population Division

Given the continued growth of Jordan's working-age population, the country's dependency ratio⁷ has been steadily decreasing since the early 1980s. Appropriately handled and embraced, this trend could be a good opportunity for Jordan. If well exploited, it can yield demographic dividends (i.e., when dependents are few compared with a booming working population). The output produced by such an economy could dramatically increase productivity gains. Ill-used, a low dependency ratio can burden a

country when opportunities are lacking and people are out of work at an age when it is a necessity and an aspiration. It can lead to tensions or vicious circles of inactivity.

Handling the labor force and the rapid growth of young adults is undoubtedly one of the country's main challenges. Helping provide jobs and opportunities will remain a core mission for public policies in a country such as Jordan.

Who is Working?




The working-age population⁸ of Jordan is currently above 4 million. However, economically active people only represented around 40 percent⁹ of this population in 2012 (a figure relatively stable over the past two decades). This implies that approximately 60 percent of working-age people do not even look for a job. This number includes students who normally finish their secondary education at 18, and retirees (many segments of the public sector enable early retirement). Hence, when considering the number of people actually working (excluding the unemployed and economically inactive), only 1.4 million people

support a population of 6.5 million. The picture this paints differs greatly from the raw dependency ratio of Jordan and hints at the possibility to improve the wealth of the country.

Labor force participation has not been increasing over the medium term. After plateauing in the late 1990s, it shrunk by 2 percent by 2005 and since then has been regaining ground. The participation rate for people above 15 years is estimated at 41.5 percent by the World Bank, a level that is very close to what it was 20 years ago.

Figure 3: Labor Force Participation, 1990-2011 (% total population)




Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

Since it compares so poorly to other countries or regions, the Jordanian economy faces the challenge of improving the participation rate of the active work force. Jordan's youth participation in the labor force is lower than the average in MENA countries and below the rates of both Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. This poor participation rate is a major weakness for Jordan, even more so than for most other MENA countries. The fact that it has been able to reach its current level of wealth (Jordan is an upper-middle-income country) does not hide the weakness of the labor participation, which hinders any potential for long-term development, especially in the absence of natural resources.

Therefore, economic inactivity and unemployment, in addition to people not of working age, make up the bulk of the population. Though the dependency ratio appears to be very favorable, in truth the ratio of those working in Jordan to those dependent is worrisome. It is not so much the strictly defined "working-age population" but the population actually working and producing that matters for Jordan. As mentioned above, this ratio is close to 22 percent, meaning that on average one person supports more than four. It becomes interesting to study the inactive population in order to get a sense of who is out of the workforce, besides young children.

Figure 4: International Comparison of Labor Force Participation Rates, 1990-2011 (% total population above age 15)



Source: Ecwin, World Development Indicators, World Bank

Who is Inactive?

	Men	Women	Total
Total	31.68	68.32	100
Illiterate	2.25	7.83	10.08
Literate	29.43	60.49	89.92
Less than Secondary	18.41	37.02	55.43
Secondary	7.70	13.22	20.92
Intermediate Diploma	1.02	5.39	6.41
Bachelor's & Above	2.29	4.86	7.15

Source: Author's calculation based on Department Of Statistics

The inactive population (i.e., outside the labor force) is overwhelmingly made up of women. There are more than twice as many inactive women as inactive men. It is striking that 60 percent of the inactive population is made up of women with more than a high school degree¹⁰ and over a quarter is men with the same level of education. Thirty percent of the inactive are students, a share that partially explains the level of the inactivity rate for the whole country; the population is young and there are still numerous students.

Also, when comparing inactivity with education, one notes a decreasing inactivity as the level of education rises, except for in the case of men at the bachelor's degree level; generally, more educated people participate in the labor force. Nonetheless, the percentage of women with a bachelor's degree who are out of the workforce is twice that of men. Women with an intermediate diploma are five times more likely to be out of the workforce. The bulk of inactive people remain those with a lower education though, in particular, children and young adults who have not completed their education.

A Detour by Immigration and Emigration

The picture of the labor market in Jordan would not be complete without looking at foreign workers in Jordan as well as Jordanian workers abroad since immigration and emigration¹¹ are important factors in the dynamics of Jordan.

The actual figure for foreign workers in Jordan is unknown, but estimates put it between 400,000 and 500,000 people. The Jordanian Ministry of Labor announced that there were 235,000 legal foreign workers at the end of 2012 (down from 335,000 in 2009), two-thirds of them Egyptian; and there are

between 150,000 and 250,000 undocumented workers.¹² Overall, they represent roughly one-third of the working population of Jordan. The main characteristics of foreign workers are that they are almost all in the private sector, are mostly low skilled and are more likely to work in the informal sector. In short, it seems that they perform jobs Jordanians do not fill, and the economy is heavily dependent on their role in the agricultural and service sectors (Mrryan 2012).

Jordan emigrants are highly educated. Sixty percent have a university degree and the large majority of them were employed before leaving, particularly in the private sector. They tend to remain in the private sector abroad. They are also numerous. The Migration Policy Centre estimates that there were close to 350,000 Jordanian migrants in 2009, 140,000 in oil-producing countries and close to 70,000 in the United States. The first Gulf War from 1990 to 1992 and the economic crisis of 2008 have led to some return migration (11 percent of the households have some return migrants); nonetheless, migrants remain better educated than those returning and those who stayed, and are an important element of the political economy of the country.

The number of Jordanian workers abroad could be above 500,000,¹³ approximately one-third of Jordan's domestic labor force. A third of those migrants left in the two years before the survey, and 80 percent had visited Jordan in the previous two years.¹⁴ Wahba (2012) finds that 38 percent of Jordanian migrants in Arab countries had professional occupations in the same proportions as sales and services in Western countries in Europe and North America.

The size and the level of Jordanian emigrants shows how, in the absence of opportunities for well-educated nationals, emigration is a way to get jobs better suited

Table 5: Jordanian Emigrants' Level of Education, 2010 (%)	
Illiterate	1.15
Read and Writes	6.89
Basic	5.75
Secondary	17.24
Post-Secondary	9.20
University and higher	59.77

Source: *Wahba (2012)*

to their skills and demands and with often higher wages. It is possible that a high proportion of emigrants are Palestinian, since they are mobile and often well-educated.

The value of remittances (at least 12 percent of Jordan's gross domestic product) shows the importance of workers abroad for the country's financing. It seems that emigration serves as a safety valve for Jordanians, offering openings when the domestic

job market is blocked up, and allowing them to send remittances to help relatives. Wahba also notes that remittances are mostly sent to households with female heads (half of them above 40), with 3.3 percent of Jordan households receiving some in 2010 (Wahba 2012). It is then likely that many men are working abroad to send remittances back to Jordan.

However, there is no formula for "re-nationalizing jobs" in Jordan in the short term. Unskilled labor occupied by foreigners is often due to the lack of enthusiasm by Jordanians for these jobs, which they could potentially fill skill-wise. On the other side of the spectrum, there is a lack of opportunity for skilled Jordanians and a relative brain-drain hampering the endogenous growth of the country. Finding a way to have Jordanian emigrants contribute to the domestic economy, besides remittances, is a topic that should be high on the agenda of the government even though it has no easy solution.

THE LABOR FORCE, JOB CREATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The dynamic of unemployment results from the difference between the growth of the labor force, and the net number of jobs created. The matching of the demand for jobs and available offers determines the capacity of the economy to fulfill the aspirations of would-be workers. Data for Jordan are difficult to come by and are not always consistent, but are still very instructive in this regard.

The Growth of the Labor Force

According to the World Bank, the labor force of Jordan was the fastest growing in the world between 1990 and 2003. In a little more than 20 years, the size of the labor force grew by a factor of 2.5. The volatility of the labor force growth—i.e. the year-to-year inconsistency in its growth rates—is to be noted, especially in the past 10 years, showing that there are more than mechanic trends at stake; the population entering and leaving the labor force is rather stable year in and

Table 6: Labor Force Growth in Jordan by Total, Men and Women, 1990-2011

	Total			Women			Men		
	Total Labor force	Labor force growth		Women Labor force	Labor force growth		Men Labor force	Labor force growth	
		Number	%		Number	%		Number	%
1990	663,272			71,031			592,242		
1991	777,486	114,214	17.22	84,525	13,494	19.00	692,961	100,719	17.01
1992	842,023	64,537	8.30	97,829	13,304	15.74	744,194	51,233	7.39
1993	917,163	75,140	8.92	110,930	13,100	13.39	806,234	62,040	8.34
1994	988,526	71,362	7.78	124,199	13,270	11.96	864,326	58,093	7.21
1995	1,045,166	56,641	5.73	137,166	12,966	10.44	908,000	43,674	5.05
1996	1,089,579	44,413	4.25	145,352	8,186	5.97	944,227	36,227	3.99
1997	1,129,223	39,644	3.64	153,568	8,216	5.65	975,654	31,427	3.33
1998	1,164,876	35,654	3.16	159,342	5,774	3.76	1,005,534	29,880	3.06
1999	1,183,243	18,366	1.58	164,624	5,281	3.31	1,018,619	13,085	1.30
2000	1,212,988	29,745	2.51	172,682	8,059	4.90	1,040,306	21,686	2.13
2001	1,244,332	31,344	2.58	174,152	1,469	0.85	1,070,181	29,875	2.87
2002	1,267,107	22,775	1.83	188,842	14,690	8.44	1,078,265	8,085	0.76
2003	1,282,239	15,132	1.19	180,126	-8,717	-4.62	1,102,114	23,849	2.21
2004	1,307,927	25,688	2.00	170,596	-9,530	-5.29	1,137,331	35,218	3.20
2005	1,364,267	56,340	4.31	197,581	26,986	15.82	1,166,686	29,355	2.58
2006	1,393,811	29,544	2.17	209,386	11,805	5.97	1,184,425	17,739	1.52
2007	1,481,499	87,687	6.29	261,737	52,351	25.00	1,219,761	35,336	2.98
2008	1,517,472	35,974	2.43	263,011	1,274	0.49	1,254,461	34,700	2.84
2009	1,591,950	74,478	4.91	286,319	23,308	8.86	1,305,631	51,170	4.08
2010	1,613,065	21,115	1.33	293,365	7,046	2.46	1,319,700	14,070	1.08
2011	1,677,855	64,790	4.02	308,453	15,088	5.14	1,369,402	49,702	3.77

Source: *Ecwin, World Development Indicators, World Bank*

year out, but it seems that people choose to enter or not depending on the year, which explains why rates of labor force growth vary so much. There are even years with a negative number of entries for women.

The labor force growth only captures those entering the job market, but, if everyone was participating in the workforce, Jordan would need to create approximately 100,000 jobs per year for the next few years to accommodate the number of people that need to enter the workforce. Matching this potential demand is probably the greatest challenge yet for the Jordanian economy. Recent figures of net jobs created do not suggest that the economic growth required for such job creation¹⁵ is likely in Jordan.

Net Jobs Created in Recent Years

Between 2007 and 2011, there have been between 50,000 and 75,000 jobs created per year. This performance is impressive and actually surpasses the

growth of the labor force shown above. If Jordan's economy could consistently maintain this high level of job growth, it could alleviate pressure on job markets. In comparison, Assaad (2012) estimates the net jobs created between 2005 and 2009 were only between 35,000 and 45,000 per year.

The data on net jobs created in Jordan reveal that the private sector has accounted for approximately two-thirds of those jobs in recent years, while the public sector has accounted for a third of total employment. The formal private wage sector represents one-fifth of employment; the informal private wage, one-fourth; and self-employment, under one-fifth.¹⁶ Assaad also studied the long-term changes in the structure of the job market and noted that Jordan had managed to substitute formal private sector employment for government employment while avoiding informalization (government hiring has dropped since the 1980s and only went up again in the 2000s).

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total	70,356	69,092	76,316	62,813	52,888
Men	50,688	51,124	49,714	39,336	36,062
Women	19,668	17,968	26,602	23,477	16,826

Source: Department Of Statistics

	2007		2008		2009		2010		2011	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total	70,356	100	69,092	100	76,316	100	62,813	100	52,888	100
Public Sector	22,230	31.6	26,820	38.8	26,760	35.1	18,402	29.3	18,248	34.5
Private sector	47,427	67.4	41,893	60.7	49,168	64.5	44,044	70.1	34,088	64.4

Source: Department Of Statistics

The mismatch between net jobs created and the expectations of the labor force leads to unemployment. This is particularly true in a country with a good education record, where the demand of highly skilled workers hardly finds appropriate answers. It is important to keep in mind that unemployment only captures people actively looking for jobs, but that numerous people have been discouraged and do not appear in the data.

Unemployment

According to Jordanian authorities, unemployment has been fairly stable at less than 13 percent since 2008. It has slowly been trending downwards over this past decade, but contrary to data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators dataset, Jordanian data suggests that the impact of the 2008

crisis is almost nonexistent. The level of unemployment remains high, especially since it adds up to an already large inactive population, but does not appear to be significantly worsening in the short term.

The unemployed population is 70 percent men and is overwhelmingly young (under 39). Less than 10 percent of the unemployed are over 40 (which to some extent amplifies the general patterns of the repartition by age of the population). Nonetheless, there is an important difference between men and women, since almost 50 percent of unemployed men are under 24, while 50 percent of unemployed women are between 25 and 39; the bulk of unemployed men are younger than the bulk of unemployed women. A possible reason for this could be that men enter the workforce younger than women, while many women remain inactive after they finish school.

	Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	Unemployment, female (% of female labor force)	Unemployment, male (% of male labor force)
1983	6.6	22.8	4.8
1986	13.3	22.3	12.4
1987	14.8	25.4	13.6
1993	19.7	30	18.1
1995	14.6	29.9	12.1
1996	13.7	24.3	12
2001	15.8	19.7	15.1
2002	16.2	19.6	15.6
2003	15.4	19.7	14.7
2004	12.4	16.5	11.8
2007	13.1	25.9	10.2
2008	12.7	24.3	10.1
2009	12.9	24.1	10.3
2010	12.5	21.7	10.4
2011	12.9	21.2	11

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank¹⁷

Major Age Groups	Sex		
	Total	Men	Women
15-24	48.8	49.7	46.7
25-39	41.3	37.5	50.4
40+	9.9	12.9	2.9

Source: Department Of Statistics

The data also show that the percent of educated people in unemployment is staggeringly high in Jordan, in line with what is observed elsewhere in the region. Indeed, graduates with bachelor's degrees represent 37 percent of the total unemployed, and an astonishing 70 percent of unemployed women. Eighty percent

of unemployed women have more than a secondary education, but only 30 percent of men do. Thus, for men, the largest contribution to unemployment figures comes from the uneducated. The unemployment field really seems two-tiered: educated women and less-educated men.

Education Level	Sex		
	Total	Men	Women
Illiterate	0.9	1.3	0.1
Less than Secondary	44.4	60.3	7.3
Secondary	8.2	10	3.8
Intermediate Diploma	9.5	5.4	19.1
Bachelor's & Above	37	23	69.6

Source: Department Of Statistics

The Jordanian economy seems to have been creating jobs at a decent pace, but it still misses the mark if it wants to include all the new members of the labor force. While unemployment remains fairly stable, the pace of job-creation should probably be doubled to try to increase the rate of participation in order to include new entrants. Also, the high level of unemployment

for men and for highly-skilled women can only have deterrent effects on the economic development of the country. The focus of policies on young and skilled people remains necessary; the efforts made to improve education have been successful, but the labor market remains to be translated into a dynamic one, especially for women.

WOMEN: MORE EDUCATED, MORE INACTIVE, MORE UNEMPLOYED

As previously mentioned, the labor participation rate in Jordan is low, even by regional standards—and especially for women. Jordan has the 5th lowest female labor participation rate in the world (only Algeria, Iraq, Syria and the West Bank trail within a percent).

Women make up only a small portion of Jordan's working population; less than 20 percent of the total workforce is made of women, and only 16 percent of Jordanian women participate in the workforce. This

is a structural element of the Jordanian economy of concern as it basically excludes women from the economic and productive process. It has undoubtedly some roots in the cultural background of the country, as a list of the countries with the lowest women's participation illustrates.

It is also to be noted that the labor participation for men above age 15 has been decreasing since the late 1980s, a development that bears attention because it reflects very poorly on the overall prospects for the Jordanian economy.

Table 12: Participation Rates in the Labor Force in Jordan, 1990-2011

	Total Labor force	Women in the Labor Force (% of Total Labor Force)	Women's Labor Participation Rate (% of Female Population Aged 15+)	Men's Labor Participation Rate (% of Male Population Aged 15+)
1990	663,272	10.7	8.9	65.3
1991	777,486	10.9	9.3	67.0
1992	842,023	11.6	10.0	66.6
1993	917,163	12.1	10.6	67.5
1994	988,526	12.6	11.2	68.1
1995	1,045,166	13.1	11.8	68.5
1996	1,089,579	13.3	12.0	68.7
1997	1,129,223	13.6	12.2	68.7
1998	1,164,876	13.7	12.2	68.7
1999	1,183,243	13.9	12.3	68.4
2000	1,212,988	14.2	12.5	68.2
2001	1,244,332	14.0	12.2	68.4
2002	1,267,107	14.9	12.8	67.1
2003	1,282,239	14.0	11.8	66.9
2004	1,307,927	13.0	10.8	67.0
2005	1,364,267	14.5	12.1	66.9
2006	1,393,811	15.0	12.4	65.9
2007	1,481,499	17.7	15.0	66.0
2008	1,517,472	17.3	14.6	65.8
2009	1,591,950	18.0	15.4	66.6
2010	1,613,065	18.2	15.3	65.4
2011	1,677,855	18.4	15.6	65.9

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

The perceived increase in women's labor force participation could be the result of a change in the sample used by the Jordanian Department Of Statistics to measure the labor force participation in 2007,¹⁸ with the level measured being at a different "equilibrium" before and after, but remaining relatively stagnant be-

fore and since 2007. It probably means that the level of women's participation is indeed stable and close to 15 percent today. It should also be noted that the share of women in the labor force rose in the early 1990s, showing a slight change in the willingness and acceptance of women to participate in the labor force.

	Men	Women	Total
Illiterate	3.5	10.0	6.7
Read and Write	3.0	3.2	3.1
Elementary	9.7	8.8	9.2
Preparatory	18.0	15.7	16.9
Basic Education	25.5	20.7	23.2
Secondary	17.2	17.6	17.4
Intermediate Diploma	6.4	9.8	8.1
Bachelor's & Above	16.1	14.2	15.2


Source: Author's calculation based on the Jordanian Department of Statistics

To be more precise, the labor force participation rate of women by age suggests that, until their late 20s, women's participation increases, but contrary to men, it then decreases. The contrast is striking since almost all men are part of the workforce between 25 and 40. It means that from the beginning of their work lives, women lag men in the job market (in terms of experience and date of entry).

There are at least two ways to look at the fact that women are lagging in the labor market: using a contemporary analysis that primarily examines marital status and education levels, and using a study over the medium term to see patterns. That is what Assaad et al. (2012) did. Data from 2012 and early 2013 do not change the conclusions they made.

Indeed, participation in the labor market dramatically increases for women with diplomas; in 2012, less than 6 percent of women with less than a secondary education participated in the workforce, while 31 percent and 57 percent of women with an intermediate diploma and at least a bachelor degree respectively, participated. For men, the added value of an intermediate diploma or higher degrees is important, but even illiterate men participate in the workforce at more than 20 percent. Assaad et al. (2012) state that the ability of more educated women to get jobs in the government, or in the private sector to a lesser extent, is probably the reason for the discrepancy between education levels. Only for women with more than a bachelor's degree is the economic activity above 50 percent, while it is almost marginal for any woman with at best a secondary education.

Figure 5: Activity Rate in Jordan by Sex and Age, 2013 (% total population)



Source: Department Of Statistics

However, women's unemployment rate rises systematically with education, more strongly than for men (for whom the correlation is weaker). While there is almost no unemployment for women with low qualifications, the share of jobless women with secondary education and above who are in the labor force is very large.

Many authors emphasize that marriage¹⁹ seems to push women to drop out of the workforce (the opposite is true for men). Whatever their level of education may be, married women are indeed less present in the labor force. This trend is particularly true for educated women. Half of the married women are out of the labor market, while only 21 percent of unmarried women are. This pattern holds true to a lesser extent

for women with a secondary degree, while the difference for less-educated women is marginal. Moreover, the group of women with the highest unemployment rate is made of unmarried, educated women, 26 percent of whom are unemployed.

In comparison, men are more active when married, except for those with higher degrees (for those with higher degrees, there is no variation in employment between the married and unmarried). However, for men too, the educated, unmarried are the most unemployed group as a share of the population. Also, unmarried people are more unemployed than married ones, probably because they need to be in the labor force to support themselves.

Table 14: Economic Status in Jordan by Sex and Education, 2012 (%)						
Sex and Educational Level	Percentage	Economically Active			Not Economically Active	Unemployment Rate
		Total	Employed	Unemployed		
Total		38	33.4	4.6	62	12.2
Illiterate	100	6.8	6.2	0.6	93.2	9.3
Less than Secondary	100	34.8	30.9	3.9	65.2	11.2
Secondary	100	25.4	23.2	2.2	74.6	8.6
Intermediate Diploma	100	50.7	45.2	5.5	49.3	10.8
Bachelor & Above	100	70.8	59.6	11.2	29.2	15.9
Men						
Total		61.3	54.9	6.4	38.7	10.4
Illiterate	100	21.9	19.6	2.3	78.1	10.4
Less than Secondary	100	60.4	53.6	6.8	39.6	11.2
Secondary	100	45.2	41.4	3.7	54.8	8.3
Intermediate Diploma	100	80.3	74.9	5.4	19.7	6.8
Bachelor & Above	100	82.6	73.5	9.1	17.4	11
Women						
Total		14.1	11.3	2.8	85.9	19.9
Illiterate	100	1.3	1.3	0	98.7	2.1
Less than Secondary	100	3.8	3.4	0.4	96.2	11
Secondary	100	5.6	5	0.6	94.4	11
Intermediate Diploma	100	30.9	25.4	5.5	69.1	17.8
Bachelor & Above	100	57.1	43.4	13.7	42.9	24

Education is the main economic activity for women (more than 40 percent of working women are employed in that sector). The health and public administration sectors follow, with just under 15 percent of

women working in these sectors in 2012. This illustrates the fact that besides the public sector, there are few economic activities where women are present.

Table 15: Distribution of Working-Age Population in Jordan by Gender, Employment Status and Marital Status, 2010 (%)

	Below Secondary			Secondary and Above			University and Higher			Total		
	Never Married	Ever Married	Total	Never Married	Ever Married	Total	Never Married	Ever Married	Total	Never Married	Ever Married	Total
Women												
Employed	7	5	5	15	12	13	53	43	46	15	12	13
Unemployed	2	1	1	7	2	4	26	8	14	6	2	4
Out of Labor force	92	95	94	78	85	82	21	50	40	78	86	83
Men												
Employed	42	80	61	41	84	64	72	85	80	45	82	65
Unemployed	10	5	7	6	4	5	16	3	8	10	4	7
Out of Labor force	48	15	32	53	13	31	12	12	12	45	14	29

Source: Assaad et al. (2012)

Assaad et al. (2012) use the panel data gathered in 2010 to study the dynamics of female employment over the past 40 years. They find that “women new entrants were much more reliant on government jobs in the 1970s and 1980s than their men counterparts”


(over 60 percent of women relied on public sector jobs until 1985). The amount of working women who were in the government sector then fell to 25 percent in the 1990s and rose to 30 percent in the 2000s. Women faced the possibility of fewer government jobs, and

Table 16: Top 10 Economic Activities for Women in Jordan above Age 15, 2012 (%)

Economic activity	Kingdom	Rural	Urban
Education	41.8	47.9	40.6
Human health and social work activities	14.3	15.4	14.1
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security	12.1	17.7	11.1
Manufacturing	6.4	5.9	6.5
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	5.5	3.4	5.9
Financial and insurance activities	3.2	0.7	3.6
Professional, scientific and technical activities	3	0.9	3.4
Other service activities	2.8	1.6	3.1
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods and services-producing activities of households for own use	2.5	0.6	2.8
Information and communication	1.9	0.4	2.2

Source: Department Of Statistics (Employment and Unemployment Survey)

Figure 6: Distribution of Employment of Women and Men New Entrants in Jordan by Type of First Job and Year of Entry into the Labor Market, Ages 15-64, 1970-2010 (%)



Source: Assaad et al. (2012)

new hiring primarily benefitted men. The job status of women subsequently became more precarious because they had to take either informal wage employment or temporary jobs (Assaad et al. 2012). Studying the trajectories of young women entering the labor market, Assaad et al. confirm the fact that many women drop out of the workforce in the first 10 years, especially women with less family-friendly jobs (i.e., outside of the government). The only mobility appears to be from formal private jobs to government jobs.

Labor opportunities for educated women are declining since the environment of private sector jobs is not as family-friendly and the public sector has a some-

what diminished capacity to absorb young graduates.²⁰ This trend is a development worth following in light of the tighter margin for public jobs; the public budget is very much constrained, which means that job openings will have to come via the private sector. The need for private sector dynamism should be the driving force of the labor market. Even if they are overall better educated, women's economic activity remains very weak, and their unemployment rate is systematically higher than men's. They are either inactive, unemployed or work in formal employment.²¹ Encouraging the private sector to employ women is therefore another important challenge for Jordan.

YOUNG JORDANIANS: HOW TO ENTER THE LABOR FORCE?

The balance of the young population (under 30) has recently shifted towards young adults, with their overall share of the population having decreased at a slower pace than that of young children. Almost

two-thirds of the population remains under 30, with a little less than 50 percent under 20. This shift creates tremendous pressure on the economy to provide jobs now and in the short term, especially since the improvements of school enrollment and educational attainment have been remarkable.

	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
2000	13.30	13.90	12.60	12.30	10.30	8.10
2002	12.00	13.10	12.50	12.50	10.90	8.00
2004	12.00	12.40	12.80	12.20	10.70	7.80
2006	11.70	12.20	12.90	12.00	10.30	7.90
2008	12.20	12.00	12.60	11.10	9.90	7.90
2010	12.50	12.00	11.90	11.40	9.70	7.70
2012	12.10	12.00	11.40	11.10	9.30	7.50

Source: Department Of Statistics (Employment Survey)

	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
1971	102.67	47.15	3.06
1980	107.64	77.43	14.80
1990	101.48	76.09	20.41
2000	97.96	84.23	28.32
2010	91.99	86.93	37.74

Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

Despite a changed environment, younger educated generations continue to expect interesting and high level jobs, though first jobs of a precarious and informal nature are becoming more common while more secure public jobs have been harder to get.²³ This is a very important development, since public employment had been the goal of qualified, young graduates—especially Transjordanians—as part of the social contract with the state. The rupture of this

kind of tacit social contract appears to have been an important factor in the contestations in some Maghreb countries, and Jordan has yet to experience this backlash. In short, the public sector will not be able to absorb highly educated Jordanians in bulk anymore; they will not be able to follow their elders' career paths and will have to look for other kinds of opportunities.

	Men	Women
Currently enrolled	54.48	58.05
Employed	28.20	4.60
Unemployed	9.50	4.40
Economically active	37.70	9.00
Economically inactive	62.30	91.00

Source: Department of Statistics

It is interesting to note that women outnumber men in school by more than 3 percent. A little less than 60 percent of women between 15 and 24 are enrolled in school. However, this fact does not explain the discrepancy in economic activity, with men being four times more active than women. The share of young

women neither active nor employed dwarfs the share of young men, a development that is undoubtedly harming the economy (see below). This statistic confirms the fact that women stay away from any economic activity at a rate that is considerable—only 9 percent of women aged 15 to 24 are active.

	Illiterate	Less than secondary	Secondary	Intermediate diploma	Bachelor's & above
Total	0.63	65.91	11.65	6.01	15.80
Men	0.62	72.49	12.29	4.03	10.59
Women	0.67	18.62	7.66	19.81	53.22

Source: Department Of Statistics Employment and Unemployment Survey

For young women working, it seems that they are mostly employed when they have a higher degree of education, while men with a lower education are prevalent in the workforce. Among the young workforce, women with higher education are more likely to be employed than men with a similar degree or than less-educated women. This suggests that women are opting out of participating in the working world. Roughly, women with a low education decide not to take part in the economy and instead to take their chances with better education.

The “share of formal private employment in the employment of new entrants to the Jordanian labor market has more than tripled from 10-12 percent in the mid-1980s to 36-38 percent in 2010.”²⁴ Indeed, after unemployment, the most prevalent sector entered after school is formal private employment, both for men and women.²⁵ It is an encouraging fact, since growth of the formal private sector is the best way for the country to economically and socially develop over the long term.

Table 21: Distribution of First Employment Status after School in Jordan by Education Level and Sex, 2010 (%)

	Men				Women			
	Less than Secondary	Secondary	Post-secondary and University	Total	Less than Secondary	Secondary	Post-secondary and University	Total
Public	11.6	21.7	22.1	15.6	0.2	1.5	10.9	4.1
Private, formal	12.4	16.2	29.9	17.2	1.6	3.9	18.5	7.8
Private, Informal	31.9	18.8	9.8	24.6	2.8	2.9	3.8	3.2
Employer/ Self-employed	1.9	1.8	3.1	2.2	0	0.4	0.1	0.1
Unpaid worker	6.3	3	2.2	4.8	0.3	0	0.6	0.4
Unemployed	27.8	31.7	31.1	29.2	4.4	5.3	29.6	13.2
Out of labor force	8.2	6.8	1.9	6.5	90.7	86	36.5	71.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Amer (2012)

The mismatch between young graduates and jobs available should be investigated in more detail. However, the increasing importance of private employment after school is interesting for the future, since the private sector has to take over some of the public sector's traditional role as the main prospect

for young Jordanians. Nonetheless, the 35 percent of young men and 85 percent of young women who are either inactive or unemployed after schooling cannot be overlooked. The gap between men and women is already very wide for young people, and only young qualified women try to bridge it.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Syrian crisis has exacerbated long-standing issues for Jordan. Jordan has welcomed migrants from many different areas since its independence and remains a political jigsaw puzzle, but the country's economy is fragile and needs external support. The arrival of numerous refugees is probably going to dramatically alter the economic environment of Jordan and its labor market dynamics. The changes could also severely impact the political equilibrium between Transjordanians and West Bankers. Hence, Jordan continues to skillfully try to financially and politically leverage its position in the Middle East as a buffer zone, even more in times of regional turmoil.

Rather than looking at micro measures that would be of little avail in the current situation, below are a few points worth stressing when working with Jordan. Even though Jordan has managed to avoid the informalization of Egypt, for instance, the current situation is only conducive to a deterioration of the job market situation. However, it is also an opportunity for Jordan to create endogenous development since the main exports of Jordan (skilled workers and geopolitical influence) are highly volatile.

Support of International Donors to Keep the Economy Afloat

Jordan is at the center of the storm in the Arab peninsula, between political upheavals in Egypt and Syria, a resurgent civil war in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian standstill; even though it has weathered the storm and its collateral effects remarkably so far, and stands as a country with resiliency, the international support it receives from all ends is as necessary as ever to avoid the downfall of the state. Jordan has received various types of much-needed financial aid since early

2011. For instance, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members have agreed to fund up to \$5 billion worth of projects over five years,²⁶ but have faced difficulty implementing them since the funds are often earmarked toward 'mega projects' that might take long to implement. Europe, France and the United States have also been channeling bilateral and multilateral funds to help the Jordanian economy. An IMF program has helped Jordan remain economically stable since 2012 with macroeconomic conditions that do not allow the country much flexibility in its fiscal policy. Central as it is, politically speaking, Jordan will try to continue gathering as much support as it can from Europe, the United States, Japan and GCC donors. Overall, the macroeconomic imbalances are such that international donors must remain committed to the stability of Jordan by supporting it. Smaller or medium-sized projects would serve both purposes of improving the infrastructure and compensating for the low level of economic activity. This would also help the economy prepare for better days.

Tightly Manage the Balance between Transjordanians and West Bankers

As the budget constraints reappear as a very important element in the political economy of Jordan, the government and international donors have to acknowledge different ways to deal with the long-time balance between Transjordanians and West Bankers. The division of labor between public jobs for Transjordanians and private sector activities for West Bankers does not seem sustainable with the public job glut Jordanians face. The implicit social contract that has held that public sector jobs would be available for educated Transjordanians will slowly evolve, as Transjordanians look for more private sector jobs. In the meantime, the West Bankers' demands to be part of the public policymaking could be growing.

Intriguingly, Transjordanians might be the first to be discontent because of the changes in their expectations and aspirations, with the number of public jobs available shrinking. Also, the number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin means that the value of the assets they own is tightly linked to that of Palestine, which means that any economic or political problem in Jordan could potentially have dramatic consequences for Palestine.

Support Economic Sectors Conducive to the Employment of Women and Graduates and the Return of Skilled Migrants

Active labor market policies have been implemented on an upward trend, but according to a 2012 evaluation by the World Bank, wage subsidies and soft skills do not seem to have had “large impacts on generating sustained employment for young, relatively educated women in Jordan.” The wage subsidy helped graduates gain work experience, and training for soft skills ameliorated “positive thinking and mental health,” but 16 months after the experiment there were no lasting impacts on employment.

The number of jobs being created means that Jordan needs to find more niches to create some traction; its skilled workforce and emigrants could thrive in sectors such as information and communications technology, financial services or pharmaceutical products. The government could implement incentive schemes to build competitive sectors in those areas.²⁷ So far, it seems that poorly-educated Jordanians enter the workforce mostly because they have to, while educated people prefer to wait and see.

Social protection programs that help with childcare and motherhood could be improved—since public jobs with comfortable benefits are increasingly scarce—in order to better engage women in the job market outside the government. There is great room for improvement in the economic inclusion of women, and incentives for companies and individuals could improve it. Since younger women are more educated than men, their relative exclusion is a tremendous loss for Jordan.

Alter Expectations

Matching young people’s expectations and skills with potential jobs or exciting challenges remains elusive, which means that expectations have to be altered. The improvements in the general levels of education among Jordanians needs some counterpart in the job market, otherwise it will continue to lead to the brain-drain Jordan has been experiencing. A young booming population is usually creative and entrepreneurial, and it can yield demographic dividends. The government and international donors could further encourage the development of economic niches in the private sector with ad hoc incentives to attract skilled Jordanians off the waiting list for public jobs. The mindset will need to evolve, which can only happen in the long run through incremental changes. But altering the expectations of Jordanian graduates is paramount when it comes to changing the political economy of the country and enabling a future economic takeoff. Also, the prejudice against women is detrimental to the well-being of Jordan; including women and supporting their participation in the labor force would benefit Jordan socially, politically and economically.

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ENDNOTES

1. The Emirate of Transjordan became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, when Jordan gained independence from the British mandate authorities. During the 1948 war, Jordan occupied the West Bank, which voted to remain part of the kingdom in a 1950 referendum. Israel occupied the West Bank as a result of the 1967 war. King Hussein severed administrative ties with the West Bank in 1988 and signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1994. (Source: Crisis International)
2. Is fertility stalling in Jordan? By Valeria Cetorelli, Tiziana Leone. Demographic Research. Volume 26 - Article 13. Pages 293-318
3. According to Courbage (2011), Population Changes and Perspectives for Arab South Mediterranean Countries in 2011, in IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2011, 487 p., IEMed, Barcelona <http://www.iemed.org/observatori-en/arees-danalisi/documents/anyuari/med.2011/canvis-i-perspectives-de-la-poblacio-dels-paisos-arabs-del-sud-de-la-mediterrania-l2019any-2011>
4. Jordan has installed refugee camps for Syrian refugees like it has for Palestinians, while, for instance, Lebanon has not.
5. Their presence is visible in Amman, particularly in the informal sector for now.
6. See Stateless Again. Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of their Nationality, Human Rights Watch (2010).
7. Ratio of population aged 0-14 and 65+ per 100 population 15-64.
8. The International Labor Organization and the Department of Statistics (DOS) of Jordan consider people above 15 as the working-age population, while the World Development Indicators (WDI) only includes people between 15 and 64. The former will be used except if mentioned.
9. The WDI has labor participation at 41%, while DOS has it at 39% (2011)
10. Source: National Employment Strategy (NES)
11. For a detailed description of these groups using the panel data of 2010, see Wahba (2012)
12. Source: National Employment Strategy (NES)
13. According to Mryyan (2012)
14. According to Wahba (2012)
15. The World Bank has calculated that the elasticity of employment to growth has dramatically shrunk from 1.16 in the 1990s to 0.53 in the 2000s.
16. Assaad (2012)
17. Data as available.
18. As shown by Assad et al. (2012)
19. And childbearing most probably.
20. Assaad et al. (2012)
21. Cf. Amer (2012)
22. According to the WDI, the gross enrollment ratio (GER) is the total enrollment in primary/secondary/tertiary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education age. GER can exceed 100 percent due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.
23. Assaad (2012).
24. Assaad (2012)
25. According to data gathered by Amer (2012)
26. The GDP of Jordan was approximately \$30 billion in 2012.
27. The qualified industrial zones have not given traction to the rest of the economy, and also employ many foreign workers.



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