



# GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AUDIT

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# WHY A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AUDIT?

Hakan Altinay, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

**W**e frequently treat the changing constellation that has come to be referred to as global governance as a lackluster fait accompli. Nobody has masterminded it. Nobody is really in charge. Almost everybody has reasons to be unhappy about what they view as its current suboptimal state. As such, global governance is not an easy phenomenon to assess or audit. The benchmarks and scales to be used are not obvious. Yet an audit attempt is nevertheless necessary, if for no other reason than to start to form a deliberated assessment, to develop some benchmarks, and to refine our questions for the future.

With this goal in mind, I, along with David Held of the London School of Economics, Miguel Maduro of European University Institute, Eva-Maria Nag of the *Global Policy* journal, and Kalypso Nicolaidis of Oxford, set out to organize such an audit and formulated three questions designed to assess the achievements of, impediments to, and imminent challenges for global governance. Throughout 2011, these questions were channeled to students and the younger generation of academics at universities and think tanks around the world. Many of the submissions we received were by single authors. Australian National University (ANU), Fundacao Getulio

Vargas in Rio de Janeiro, Global Relations Forum in Istanbul, Hong Kong University, New Economic School (NES) in Moscow, Sabanci University in Istanbul, and Yale University ran workshops and submitted reports on their discussions and conclusions. Accepted submissions are available at the *Global Policy* website, and a subset is included in this working paper.

Several points emerge from both the content and the geographical origin of the responses to our audit. For starters, interest in global governance is not uniform across the world. Europeans seem most comfortable with, and fluent in, the global governance debates, which is not surprising. Europe, with the European Union (EU), has been functioning with pooled competencies and sovereignties for decades and is used to thinking about solutions to global problems and changing power architectures through the prism of international law and organizations. Zang reports a rapidly growing interest and debate concerning global governance in China<sup>1</sup>. For much of the rest of the world, issues of global governance seem alien and have high entry barriers. Many in the South have been excluded for too long from the real deliberations. Both interest and familiarity seem to have suffered as a result.

A bigger challenge is the fact that global governance is too *sui generis*. It is neither a world government nor is it a global version of the nation-state competencies. The EU cannot be looked to as an example of its most advanced form. It is, in actuality, the total sum of the things we do to manage the transnational externalities and challenges in the absence of a world government, within the confines of a given consciousness of global situatedness and a finite appetite for cross-border solidarity and coordination. A world government is not only unfeasible but it is not even desirable. Insisting on comparing global governance to nation-state competencies and finding it failing blinds us to the advances achieved by this messy phenomenon: In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it took several decades to develop a system to send telegrams across national borders. And yet, today owners of 4 billion mobile phones have a reasonable expectation that their phones will work seamlessly when they travel to another country. World GSM operators have agreed to sensible standard practices, such as every operator dedicating the number 112 to emergency services. No coercion was needed to achieve this coordination and harmonization. With SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, money can be wired across countries with tremendous speed and little inconvenience; we expect our credit cards to work wherever we travel. We cooperate around the internet actively and every day. Vast amounts of data, information, and knowledge are available to all 7 billion of us. Encyclopedists of the 18<sup>th</sup> century would be awestruck by what is available through Wikipedia, JSTOR, Google Scholar, and the like. Popular VoIP facilities such as Skype have rendered international telephony, a facility not available to Napoleon or Genghis Khan, practically cost free for billions. The Creative Commons is becoming a popular alternative to conventional trademark practices. We all have access to transborder broadcasting through satellite TVs, which makes diverse ideas and varied lives

and suffering accessible to a great many, nurturing awareness and a feeling of common humanity along the way. Furthermore, we have a way to allocate satellite orbits, and the system is working with relatively little discontent. Another area with a significant potential for discord, underground water supplies, now enjoys the norms and rules being established through the new Law of Transboundary Aquifers. We have, to take another example, managed to cooperate to protect the genetic diversity of our main crops, have established the Global Crop Diversity Trust, and have a global seed vault in Svalbard. Small pox has been eradicated through global cooperation, and malaria and polio may be next. It is often assumed that traditional sovereign competencies of national states, such as law and order, have been more resistant to international cooperation schemes. However, countries have the facility to seek cooperation through Interpol, which has coordinated in excess of 31,000 arrests in a decade.

Sensible methods to assess global governance would need to start with its *sui generis* nature and not succumb to implicit or explicit comparisons to how nation states manage their affairs with their monopolies on legal coercion. Actual motives for cooperation or sanctions for lack of cooperation turn out very rarely to be related to coercion, in any event.

## Responses

When asked to identify the achievements of global governance, the auditors themselves pointed to an impressive menu. David Leon argues that the elimination of small-pox should be featured in the asset column; Carla Brandi calls attention to the Global Fund to Fight TB, AIDS and Malaria as an effective and innovative global governance instrument. Brandi also points to lesser-known instruments, like the Nagoya Protocol on biodiversity. Colleagues at Sabanci University concluded that if it was

not for the nonproliferation regime, we would have had a bigger nuclear arsenal and many more nuclear states in the world.<sup>2</sup> Workshop participants at Yale chose the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions as remarkable achievements, both in the tangible results they have produced and also in giving us a new moral plateau to operate from. Workshop participants at the ANU have concluded that “individuals all over the world now recognize that people have rights and duties towards each other, simply by virtue of being human” and “that cosmopolitan norms and values are being internalized by individuals living in societies all over the world in an unprecedented way,” as demonstrated by “the growing interest in subjects such as global justice and global civics at universities across the world.” The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the grass roots campaign to establish the ICC have been identified as key achievements by Brandi and Monkelbaan. The Montreal Protocol has often been highlighted as a success story around a key collective action problem, and Brandi and Duff have picked it up. It is interesting that effective disaster relief has also been identified as a success, as this is a paradigm example of global governance as insurance policy and for generalizing risk.

The financial crisis of 2008 has colored many discussions of achievements of global governance. Brandi calls attention to the Financial Stability Board as a key advance in the global economic governance toolkit. Ayse Kaya applauds both the coordination at the G20 level and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms in making room for rising powers. Teams in Rio and Leuven agree and see the reforms of multilateral institutions as a testimony to their flexibility and resilience. Monkelbaan gives credit to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for preventing a trade war and a race towards protection.

Poverty emerged as an interesting point of disagreement; colleagues at Leuven posit the drop in poverty

as possibly related to global governance, while workshop participants at Yale argue that the persistence of poverty in the age of abundance is a failure of global governance. Nganje has a tough verdict on WTO, and capitalism in general. Nganje’s pessimism is echoed by the workshop participants at the NES in Moscow with regards to what they call superpower oligarchy and the impunity that comes with that oligarchy.

When questioned on the breakthroughs that the auditors would like to see, mechanisms to limit greenhouse gases and manage climate change was mentioned by some, but not as many as one would have expected. The auditors, partially self-selected by their interest and familiarity with the issues, chose to zoom in on more systemic interventions. Workshop participants at ANU identified a global tax, preferably on financial transactions rather than on sales, as a potential key breakthrough. Brandi experimented with a UN Parliamentary Assembly. Duff asked for impartial referees and an ombudsman. There is at least one non-governmental organization (NGO), *The Elders*, whose mission includes serving as the elders of the global village and providing guidance and referee functions. In several submissions, we saw a persistent call for a common moral language, as in Glencorse; a global civics of sorts, as in Kolata et al. and Terlazzo et al.; as well as a new education paradigm that makes room for discussion and sensibilities that foster global awareness and engagement. These seem to me to be crucial. The common thread throughout most of the responses was the mismatch between cross-border interdependencies and externalities on the one hand and the consciousness of those interdependencies and the associated moral and rational imperatives on the other. Elsewhere, I have argued that the web of cross-border interactions and interdependencies has grown too thick for us to navigate without an explicit and thoughtful discussion of our responsibilities toward

each other and the global civics that will emerge as a moral compass from that discussion. Several of the auditors seem in agreement.

The third and final area where we wanted to take the pulse of our auditors was on impediments to better global governances. There were multiple references to weak global solidarity, but the overwhelming diagnosis pointed towards intransigence by status quo interests. These interests were capitalist ones for Nganje and nationalist ones for others. There were also critiques of the particular way that sovereignty was exercised. Auditors such as Kaya lamented about short-sightedness. The workshop participants at Hong Kong University asked us to “see beyond ourselves.” Some have identified a leadership deficit; that diagnosis can also be read as the inability to translate the requirements of managing our current global interdependence into a compelling narrative and actionable proposals—in other words, a problem of translation and aspiration aggregation. The NES workshop concluded, in turn, that “global governance will become efficient and robust only if it is underpinned by a global civil society.”

In keeping with the same diagnosis, Yale workshop participants call for a global agora and a sustained exchange of ideas. Evan de Riel calls for a global vernacular for global governance and a break from the technocratic speak.<sup>3</sup> Monkelbaan is explicit on the values question; he proposes that we start by realizing the interconnectedness of our prosperity and challenges and seek shared values based on oneness of mankind. Hong Kong University participants suggest that it is the semblance of a common enemy that will be the force to overcome impediments.<sup>4</sup>

The responses to the anticipated breakthroughs and impediments identified are related. Global governance schemes are not, and cannot be, unrelated to our own

appetite to cooperate across national borders. And that appetite, in turn, is a function of our comprehension regarding the effects of others’ actions on us and vice versa. A number of auditors insist that comprehension has not caught up with the underlying realities; they seek fresh and inclusive inquiry and deliberation on the extent of our interdependence, as well as the normative and rational responses to that interdependence. They seem convinced that we need to shuttle more fluently between the diagnosis of our interdependence and our global governance scheme that represents our reasoned response to that diagnosis.

## Conclusion

We do not have a world government. It is not obvious that we need one. Nation states, by and large, have demonstrated their ability to harness allegiances and deliver effective results. Global governance is the evolving menu of mechanisms we have as our response to cross-border interactions, interdependencies, and externalities. It can best be relied upon to deliver two distinct clusters of goals. First, we need a vast range of rules and mechanisms to facilitate the increasing movement of ideas, people, and goods across borders. Trade regulations, flight and maritime coordination, information technology standards are such issues, and a bewildering array of schemes are needed to facilitate seamless functioning and low transactions costs. The other key cluster is global governance as insurance. Global public health measures, rules concerning development and proliferation of nuclear arms, a regime to contain climate change, an oversight mechanism for international finance, and prevention and punishment measures for genocide are in that second category. Global governance can and does deliver on these two tracks; what it cannot do is deliver a “good” life. The definition of a worthwhile life may be as diverse as the different cultures and pre-



dicaments on our planet. We should be open and curious about each other, but a strong consensus on the meaning of a good life is not necessary for a great deal of the cooperation we need. The global social contract and the global civics we need to manage our global interdependence and guide future global governance advances need not be predicated on a strong consensus about the meaning of good life.

Ours has been a story of trial and error and slippages as we found ways to cooperate across borders, a process we began thousands of years ago with modest and piecemeal steps, such as the Rhodian Law of the Sea, the Hawala system, and the Hanseatic League. The audit of the current state of international cooperation and global governance patterns shows that perseverance, creativity, pragmatism, and vision are the answer, not maximalism, despair, or cynicism.

Benedict Anderson masterfully helped us to realize the extraordinary effect the ritualistic reading of the morning paper had on all of us, especially in our imagining of other fellow citizens doing the same and our communion as members of one nation. Can ubiquitous availability of global news through satellite television, as well as the crescendo of our global interdependence, have a similar effect on our imagined community of fellow humans? Optics and the vernacular of a global community and global civics is still very much a work in progress. Kwame Appiah calls attention to how we seek the regard of our peers, or at least try to avoid their loathing. Can this human faculty, interlaced with the increasing awareness of our global situatedness and interdependence, lead to a norm osmosis and a norm convergence? To deepen our understanding and enable comparisons, we need to repeat the audit of our global governance menu at regular intervals. These issues above may merit inclusion and probing in the next audit.

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## Endnotes

1. See Zang (2011).
2. See Özel (2012).
3. See De Riel (2011).
4. See Leung and Chui (2011).

## PILLARS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

**Androsov et al.<sup>1</sup>**  
***New Economic School, Moscow***

**W**hen discussing global governance, it is failures that come to mind rather than achievements. Never-ending wars in the Middle East, humanitarian interventions turning into humanitarian catastrophes, the remaining enormous North-South gap, a sequel to the 2008 financial crisis at the gates—these all bear witness to the fact that the current system of global governance does not quite work as it should. However, despite all the drawbacks, it is hard to challenge the fact that global governance institutions have experienced significant development in recent decades. This essay argues that the genuine and most important changes in the field of global governance, current and future, have taken place not at the surface of the system of global governance but in its internal mechanisms.

### **Spurious and Genuine Developments**

It seems that developments and drawbacks have been going hand in hand in all spheres of global governance. In the sphere of international security, there has been the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, together with a significant increase in international peacekeepers' activities. Notwithstanding these developments, the world has hardly become more secure since, on the one hand, superpowers like the United States abuse humanitarian rhetoric to invade other countries, and, on the other hand, the international community fails to resolve many basic issues, such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden. In the sphere of international justice, there has been the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the cases per year ratio of international dispute-settling institutions

such as the International Court of Justice has almost doubled compared to Cold War times. However, these institutions have hardly provided more of a sense of international justice since these institutions are seen as biased and unable to deal with cases involving superpowers' interests. In the sphere of international cooperation on environmental protection, there was an enormous amount of initiatives, programs, and conventions. Even the World Trade Organization (WTO) joined the global fight for saving the planet by recognizing environmental concerns as legitimate causes for restriction on free trade. Notwithstanding these developments, the failure of the Copenhagen forum has made it clear how far away the international community is from establishing a true commitment on the issue of sustainable development.

Along with these controversial developments, two less obvious, but perhaps more important, trends have emerged. The first one is the rise of global civil society, reflected in the increasing influence of international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and cooperation between ordinary people from different countries. Although cooperation may take different forms, like alterglobalists' movements or Wikileaks, it is important to note that more and more people around the globe have become concerned with global issues and have begun to perceive themselves as members of a global civil society. This is very important because, in modern democratic countries, voters' preferences determine the behavior of states, including in the international arena, and if there is no strong support for international solidarity among voters, states may easily divert from executing international obligations in order to run more popular self-interested policies.

The second important trend is the revelation of effective mechanisms for international law enforcing. In international systems lacking centralized institutions and

comprising highly unequal subjects, law enforcement has been a major problem for centuries; there has even been speculation on whether effective mechanisms of enforcement of international law are possible at all. Nowadays, WTO arbitration and the collective-trade sanctions system have proven that effective mechanisms for international law enforcement are possible. The WTO mechanism provides instruments for facilitation of cooperation among countries in pursuing collective actions against those that violate WTO rules. In an interdependent world, such coordinated actions of small countries may force even a superpower to step back and change its policies.

## **Demand for Fundamental Change**

It is hard to imagine a decent national governance system without the rule of law and civil society behind it. Similarly, global governance will become truly efficient and robust only if it is underpinned by a global civil society and embodies operable mechanisms of law enforcement. Therefore, desirable breakthroughs in the field of global governance should first of all address these pillars of the global system.

As for global civil society, it should become more active, more united, and more involved in constructive political dialogue. So far, the development of global civil society has been driven mostly by developments in communication technologies, such as the internet, with little contribution from institutions of global governance. This should change. Global institutions should recognize international NGOs and political movements as their allies as carriers of the international cooperation agenda.

As for international law enforcement, WTO-like enforcement mechanisms should expand to other fields of global cooperation. There are two requirements

for increasing efficiency of coordinated sanctions of international law enforcement: democratization of institutions and equalization of the bargaining power of states. The modern system of global governance was built on the Yalta conference's blueprints, as an oligarchy of superpowers. Not surprisingly, there are problems with rule of law in that system. Democratization will result in the participation of a much larger share of states in international decision-making processes and the gradual abolition of oligarchical rules like veto power of chosen countries. Equalization of bargaining power involves lowering the dependence of developing countries on developed ones, mostly in the economic sphere. To achieve that, international economic institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, should become more independent from their major contributors.

## **A Thorny Way**

Unfortunately, the development of internal mechanisms of global governance will face large obstacles. A major obstacle for the development of global civil society is that international communications may in fact lead to increased nationalistic and skeptical views. Recall, for example, how the public burning of the Koran by an American priest led to violent riots in Afghanistan or how Anders Breivik's terrorism was supported by nationalist organizations all over Europe. Opponents of globalization of all kinds are active in global informational space, and this poses a significant threat from the perspective of constructive development of a global civil society.

A major obstacle for the creation of more democratic and efficient international institutions is the reluctance of states, especially major ones, to sacrifice sovereignty for the sake of creating more efficient institutions. This problem will be solved once global civil

society has enough political capital. However, even in the case of low popularity of the international cooperation agenda in internal politics, there are at least two persuasive arguments to weigh the scales in favor of participation in efficient international institutions.

First, the inevitable restrictions of sovereignty may actually provide benefits for states, not losses. This happens when international institutions work as commitment devices against disruptive state policies driven by political considerations. The WTO as an institution and protectionism as a disruptive policy are good examples here. What is important for this mechanism to work is sending clear messages to member countries on the benefits of respecting commitments. While the value of constitutions as commitment devices against abusive policies is widely appreciated by scholars, politicians, and the general public, there is no such appreciation of the benefits of international institutions. Developing and communicating these messages could be an important point of the research agenda for scholars of globalization.

Second, as participation of major international players is crucial for the successes of international institutions, regionalism may be a solution. The major players are often the drivers behind organization of regional institutions because they believe they would easily maintain leadership in such institutions and, thus, are not afraid of giving up sovereignty. Regional institutions may effectively provide equal rules for international interactions in the region and thus contribute to global governance. The example of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) shows that this may be the case even if the regional institution was created through the overwhelming domination of one player. One may object that regional institutions and global institutions are substitutes in the sense that regional integration lowers the incentives for countries to par-

ticipate in global integration; however, modern studies support the view that regional and global integration are complementary.

## Endnotes

1. Workshop participants include Ilya Androsov, Kirill Borusyak, Vladimir Gusev, Imil Nurutdinov, Vladimir Pimkin, and Alexander Zasorin.



## THE STATE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES, AND THE WAY FORWARD

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In today's world, there are numerous notable achievements in global governance and global cooperation. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for example, constitutes the most significant reform of international law since the foundation of the United Nations in 1945: It gives teeth to both human rights and humanitarian law.

The establishment of the Financial Stability Board in 2009 added a fourth pillar to the architecture of global economic governance. Working alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Financial Stability Board monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system and represents the G20 leaders' first major international institutional innovation.

The earth's ecosystems are by now governed by an array of organizations and international treaties, including the United Nations Environment Programme and the Montreal Protocol. The Montreal Protocol led to a substantial decrease in the emission of ozone-depleting substances and is the most successful example of international environmental cooperation to date.

The recently concluded Nagoya Protocol, part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, adds an additional important system of global rules and ends a long-standing point of contention between developed and developing countries. The Protocol governs access to genetic resources, such as wild plants to make medi-

cines, cosmetics, and other products. It also calls for a fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of such genetic resources, many of which are found in developing countries.

In the past decade, revolutionary changes in global health governance have taken place. New regimes have been established to address specific problems, especially HIV/AIDS, international public health emergencies, and the pandemic of tobacco-related diseases. Moreover, policy makers, activists, and philanthropists increasingly regard global health as a foreign policy issue of utmost importance, and funding for global health has increased in unprecedented ways, for example, through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

Yet, crucial challenges remain—above all in terms of global environment and health questions. One of the most pressing issues on the list of central tasks for the global governance agenda is climate change. If the negotiations for a post-2012 climate agreement fail, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will steadily increase; it is estimated that, by 2100, average temperatures could rise by up to 4.5°C, such that the face of our planet would change so drastically as to make it almost unrecognizable.

Is it possible to find a new framework that can help to overcome this deadlock and provide the basis for global cooperation before it is too late? One promising option is flexible global carbon pricing (FGCP), which requires that every country put a price on carbon. Like caps, the FGCP approach is cost efficient, but FGCP has several additional advantages over caps: Instead of focusing mechanically on emission targets, countries can achieve the carbon price flexibly—with a cap, a tax, or an emissions trading scheme. Allowing this choice can help accommodate

national political realities, which in turn enables broad coverage and fosters real commitment. Moreover, a global carbon price treats nations equitably in the sense that a poorer country automatically pays less, roughly in proportion to its income. Consequently, a global carbon price automatically provides “common but differentiated responsibilities.”

The second urgent challenge for future global governance is providing better access to affordable medicines. Every year, 6 million people die worldwide from communicable diseases, most of them in the less developed countries of the world. One major source of this immense problem is the current set-up of the intellectual property (IP) system. The system provides incentives that encourage the pharmaceutical companies to invest very little in research and development (R&D) on diseases endemic to developing nations because there is no commercial market from which they can recover R&D costs through patent-based monopoly pricing. Malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea, and tuberculosis, which together account for around 20% of the global burden of disease, receive less than 1% of all public and private funds devoted to public health research.

The Health Impact Fund, proposed by Thomas Pogge, Aidan Hollis, and their colleagues, envisages a new mechanism that challenges the existing IP system as the exclusive instrument to incentivize and reward research and innovation. The main idea of the Fund is to reward innovators of pharmaceuticals not via monopoly prices but based on the health impact of their products, if they consent to sell them at affordable prices. Innovators would give up the freedom to price at monopoly prices in exchange for payments from the Fund, based on health impact. Products would be rewarded strictly in proportion to their health impact, and consumers would benefit from the availability of

new drugs at low prices. Low prices would be further encouraged because rewards will hinge on the actual health effect of the medicines, so innovators will additionally be incentivized to ensure their medicines are extensively accessible to those who need them.

The number of tasks that can be solved only jointly by the international community is continually increasing. These tasks do not only include tackling climate change and addressing the global disease burden but also strengthening human security, reforming the regulation of international financial markets, and fostering economic and social development. These tasks are global—yet, politics is not. There should be better equivalence between decision makers and those whose interests are affected in relevant ways by these global tasks. One way to address this challenge is to increase citizen’s representation beyond borders, for example, at the United Nations (UN).

A UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) would provide citizen representatives, rather than just states, the opportunity to play a direct role in global policy making. Supporters of the UNPA proposal envision the participation of national and possibly regional parliamentarians and, ultimately, direct election of parliamentarians by citizens worldwide. These parliamentarians would promote a reform of the current system of global governance and put forward novel and innovative policy suggestions for assessment by UN bodies and the Bretton Woods institutions. In the longer run, the UNPA could be transformed from an advisory body to a world parliament with rights of information, participation, and control. Over time, direct citizen representation could foster a better sense of solidarity as a global community.

One of the major obstacles to strengthening multilateral cooperation is the lack of trust in the international

community. Fostering cooperation can therefore best be achieved by a newly created and consolidated mutual trust and by attaining a better understanding of the reasons behind disagreement. In essence, this requires us to work towards approaches to global governance that are not only effective but also inclusive and equitable. The key task ahead is thus to address climate change, the global disease burden, and other global challenges such as security, trade, finance, and energy issues. The progress made to date shows that, as with the International Criminal Court, if a few countries go ahead, considerable modifications at the international level are, in fact, achievable. As Al Gore puts it, “We have all we need to get started, save perhaps political will, but political will is a renewable resource.”<sup>1</sup>

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## **TEMPERATURES RISING: CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS AS A MICROCOSM FOR BROADER ISSUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE**

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In recent years, focus on the international regime of climate change negotiations, notably represented by ongoing deliberations surrounding the United Nations Frame Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has amplified dramatically due to increased understanding of the ramifications of global warming. Using the climate change negotiations as a case study, this paper identifies the strengths and weaknesses of global climate governance and examines how the contentious issues of consensus, enforcement, and regulatory control are reflective of broader concerns in global governance. Ultimately, it is posited that the creation of consensus and enforcement mechanisms in international institutions, as well as regulatory bodies to oversee compliance, would serve to strengthen global governance by ensuring accountability and a platform for genuine, robust action to address problems that affect the global commons.

### **Why Can't We all Just Get Along?**

The regime of climate change negotiations highlights both successes and challenges of global governance. No event better encapsulates a landmark success in global climate governance than the Montreal Protocol, originally signed in 1987 and amended in 1990 and 1992. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was designed to phase out substances believed to be responsible for depleting the stratospheric ozone layer<sup>1</sup>. Since its inception, its effects have clearly illustrated the world's capacity to unite in order to address a common concern, and it has

strengthened global governance by proving that states are capable of reaching consensus to resolve an issue that affects the global commons. Former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan has described the Protocol as "perhaps the most successful international agreement to date".<sup>2</sup>

Yet, little significant action has been effected in the realm of climate change governance since the Montreal Protocol. Efforts to secure a legally binding agreement on climate change have been entirely overshadowed by the myriad agendas promoted by different states. Developed states have generally been slow to implement the changes necessary for significant mitigation (ensuring that global temperatures do not rise above 2°C), often citing the negative economic impacts they would sustain. The United States was a vehement opponent of the Kyoto Protocol, which attempted to set specific emissions-reduction targets for industrialized nations. Emerging economies have been equally unwilling to compromise on their own development, arguing for the adherence to the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities.

The climate change negotiations have highlighted the changing geopolitical dynamics in the global governance landscape: the rising influence of developing nations. As a result of the perceived obstinacy of the West regarding emissions targets, emerging powers have mobilized into groups, such as BASIC (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa), and are steadily redefining the architecture of global governance. The BASIC bloc signed an agreement in November 2009 that committed all four countries to joint action at the Copenhagen COP 15 summit, including the potential for a walk-out if their common minimum position was not met by other parties, most specifically developed nations.



This particular example, however, proves that the rise of emerging powers in global climate governance is a double-edged sword. Previous COP meetings of the UNFCCC, most especially COP 15 in Copenhagen, proved unsuccessful in aligning all parties under a common, legally binding international treaty. Despite “consensus” being labeled as a core pillar of the UNFCCC negotiations’ framework, a last-minute deal that excluded the majority of participant nations was brokered between China, South Africa, India, Brazil, and the United States. The case for multilateral cooperation was thus significantly weakened, as established goals were abandoned by the agreement in a move that “disappointed African and other vulnerable countries”.<sup>3</sup>

The discord in international climate talks reveals that the principal obstacle to global climate governance (i.e., a lack of consensus) stalls discussion and hinders progress. The inability to draft and ratify an international treaty at Copenhagen and Cancun that commits states to emissions reductions illustrates the difficulty of managing a negotiations process that demands 100% consensus among member states. The same phenomenon is evident in both the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) trade “rounds” (most recently Doha). The UNSC’s five permanent members are notorious for blocking potentially constructive resolutions regarding international peace and security. Likewise, the WTO’s Doha Round talks have stalled because of substantive differences between developed and developing states on major issues such as agriculture, industrial tariffs, and nontariff barriers.

It follows that to streamline efforts for reaching agreement in these international forums, a mechanism for breaking deadlock could be introduced to avoid filibustering during debate (or discarding debate altogether,

as in the case of the UNSC). Such a procedure might involve a quorum vote of 75% among member states, which would override any disruptive action taken by a minority of renegade states.

### **Empty Threats: Weakness in Enforcement Mechanisms**

As demonstrated by previous climate change agreements, the achievement of consensus lacks impact if enforcement measures are not implemented swiftly at the first sign of trouble. The dire consequences of a lack of enforcement mechanisms are continuously illustrated through both the UNSC and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Even when the UNSC reaches consensus, the body has no particular recourse to punish noncompliant states, as was the case in 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq as a pre-emptive strike against weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), even though the UNSC advised that any such action needed to be channeled through the UN system (and subsequently deemed the invasion illegal). Similarly, the perception of the ICC as a toothless body is only reinforced by its inability to bring Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, despite an arrest warrant being issued in March 2009.

Enforcement is a problem even within various governance structures themselves, as illustrated by the UNSC’s noncompliance with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the Nicaragua case. The United States was ordered by the ICJ to refrain from deploying the unlawful use of force against the government of Nicaragua but immediately vetoed a resolution to force compliance. The ICJ does not enjoy a full separation of powers; despite the P5 consenting to be bound by these judgments, they can still exercise their veto regarding enforcement.

To hold rogue member states accountable, international bodies such as the COP, ICC, and UNSC must have recourse rights if any particular state/s renege on a mutually ratified agreement in order to ensure a fortified global governance architecture.

## The Need for an Impartial Referee

A remedy to facilitate the strengthening of global climate governance measures is the creation of a body that would act as a compliance board/ombudsman for states party to international agreements. The debacle of the 2009 COP 15 talks in Copenhagen demonstrates the need for states to be regulated to a degree to ensure compliance with a treaty. During Copenhagen, it was revealed that states were using different sets of data to inform their climate targets, which led to confusion surrounding the accuracy of joint goals.

In an ideal world, an authoritative advisory ombudsman, perhaps in the form of a panel, would serve to arbitrate difficulties in climate policy implementation. Countries are currently charged with drafting their own legislation to comply with UNFCCC agreements. Some states can claim that their policies conform to the expectations of the climate agreement, without recourse available to other states that might question how these policies were determined and are executed. Thus, if challenges are raised (either domestically or internationally), this body could act as the authoritative voice to determine which strategy should be pursued, ensuring policies are *de facto* compliant with the treaty and related to consistently measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV) mitigation measures.

The WTO and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could conceivably benefit from such an arrangement. The failure of these institutions to anticipate the international banking crisis that led to a global recession

in 2008/9 indicates the need for more oversight over member states and their constituent elements. The WTO and IMF ombudsmen could be charged with insuring these institutions function as mandated and provide sufficient regulatory control to prevent crises, such as the recent global recession, the greatest recession since 1929.

## Conclusion

Climate change negotiations serve as a useful case study to highlight the challenges facing global governance, which has been marred in recent years by flagrant discord in the negotiations process. Consensus within global governance structures is still the most pressing challenge to international cooperation. While some progress has been achieved, international climate governance structures are still falling short of achieving the required goals. This is largely reflective of global governance as a whole: International institutions governing everything from environmental management to international legal principles face a daily battle to ensure consensus and compliance. Indeed, global governance institutions could be strengthened by the introduction of ombudsmen to regulate and manage the affairs of member states, which would serve to benefit the global commons as a whole.

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## GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AUDIT

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**T**he current wave of globalization is unprecedented in terms of the collective governance, integration, and cooperation it has generated. While the politics of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century led to terrible levels of destruction and suffering, the period since 1945 has led to unparalleled flows—of information, ideas, funds, and people—that have allowed for the rapid expansion of prosperity and stability. Several notable achievements are worth mentioning.

First, global economic integration. The Bretton Woods design for the world financial system provided a negotiated framework for a monetary and trade order that has supported global wealth and value creation for over 60 years. Carefully crafted rules and various institutions have acted as a “visible” hand, providing boundaries for market interactions and a platform to deal with economic externalities. Transactions have multiplied, innovation has blossomed, and competition has flourished. Standards of living have increased exponentially for billions of people. While the recent financial crisis is calling the current arrangements into question, from a historical perspective, these achievements are hugely significant.

Second, collective political decision making. In 1945, the statesmen of Europe and the United States—the likes of Acheson, Marshall, Schuman, and Monnet—demonstrated supreme imagination in their efforts to design a new, rules-based global order in which North America was engaged, Europe was united, and Asia was prosperous. Communism ultimately collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions, and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have

provided frameworks for participatory decision making on global issues. However imperfect, these institutions have played a role in preventing a return to the violence and crises of previous times.

Finally, the consolidation of universal norms. These include the legal and practical prominence given to human rights and dignity as cornerstones of our shared civilization, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the International Criminal Court (ICC). A common moral language has pervaded international discourse, and the notion of sovereignty has come to be defined as a responsibility, not a right—with the idea that the *de facto* actions of states towards their people should align with their *de jure* sovereignty. This has guided global behavior, governance, and cooperation and made much of the injustice and brutality of the past almost inconceivable today.

Despite the progress made, antiquated global systems are now in a process of fundamental change, with new paradigms only slowly evolving to fill critical gaps. Governance is a matrix, and it is essential that we consider not only the functions but also the layers of governance. Progress will not come from cooperation at the global level alone. Major breakthroughs in the next 5 to 10 years, therefore, will require change along the following lines:

First, at the international level. Global power dynamics—political and economic—are shifting, and it is imperative that this change is reflected in the decision-making and rule-setting procedures of international institutions and regulatory bodies, or these organizations risk decreasing relevance. At the same time, the financial crisis has made it clear that states will have to agree to cede further aspects of sovereignty to new collaborative international processes if joint responses to difficult problems are to be predictable and effective.



This deepening and broadening of supra-nationalism does not necessarily mean the creation of more multi-lateral bodies, but rather their adaptation.

Second, at the regional level. Regional identities are more salient today than in previous times as Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and East Asia are more able and willing to drive globalization. A major breakthrough would be for regional groupings to collaborate to a greater degree on economic issues, trade and investment in particular, as a means towards political ends, as Europe did after World War II. This would expand economic possibilities, allow for a focus on areas of agreement rather than areas of disagreement, and serve as the basis for strengthening regional organizations, such as the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) or Mercosur in South America, which tend to suffer from lack of capacity and commitment.

Third, at the national level. The crises we face—from economic instability and humanitarian disasters to environmental degradation and security concerns—are global and regional in nature, yet the response mechanisms also need to be national in character. Therefore, we must work to strengthen the ability of all states, in the developed and the developing world, to carry out their core functions, mitigate the negative effects of change, and prepare for unexpected events. Populations are also better informed than ever before, meaning that citizenship is now global. Over the next 5 to 10 years, governments must become much more responsive to their people, working with the private sector and civil society, from rural villages to capital cities, to provide a more useful governance framework for political, economic, and social citizenship.

Shifting dynamics provide not only significant opportunities but also sizable constraints to further de-

velopment of global governance, cooperation, and solidarity. From a systemic perspective, again, three obstacles require simultaneous attention as globalization gathers pace:

First, the new global economic terrain must be recognized and used as the basis for contextualized decision making. The current financial crisis has made it clear that the social compacts of the past are no longer affordable, and the rights and duties of citizenship must therefore be renegotiated. This has serious domestic implications but will also fundamentally affect the extent to which all countries are willing to participate in cooperative programs (e.g., on issues such as global trade) that may have international benefits in the long term but no clear results on the national political level in the short term.

Second, key global trends, such as demographic transitions and climate change, are evolving more rapidly than ever before, posing fundamental questions about the ability of the international community to respond in a constructive fashion—individually and collectively. These problems are manifesting themselves in a variety of ways, from the youth bulge in the Middle East to natural disasters in Asia to food security issues in Africa. It is essential that we find ways to avoid zero-sum competition over control of diminishing resources and cooperate on an agenda for sustainability.

Third, the effects of globalization, both positive and negative, are not felt equally across space and time. A core set of countries live in relative peace and prosperity, while peripheral regions remain mired in conflict and poverty. Data indicate that global income inequality is greater than ever before and that democracy is in decline. Complex issues, such as those of state fragility and terrorism, require more imaginative approaches if they are to be substantially mitigated. On a

macro-level, tools must be found to make the benefits of globalization more inclusive, or trust in the process will be further undermined.

These collective challenges are calling into question the future of globalization—a process that the United States initiated and participates in but can no longer fully control. Shared solutions must be based on greater leadership, imagination, and political will, not as empty platitudes but as concrete efforts to forge a new, rules-based global system that responds to current realities. All of this will not be easy but is the very least we owe to past and future generations.

## REVIVAL OF MULTILATERALISM AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

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**T**he Great Recession resulted in a renewal of faith in multilateral institutions. First, it acted as a catalyst in 2008 for the reinvention of the G7 as the G20, which witnessed its transformation in membership and its transition from a forum for finance ministers and central bankers to one of heads of state. The crisis solidified the notion that today's challenges cannot be addressed without the participation of emerging markets, and thus the G7 was expanded to include some key emerging markets, including Brazil, China, India and South Korea. Though the G20 is not yet able to address destabilising forces in the global economy, such as global imbalances between surplus and deficit countries, the G20's reinvention nonetheless was a positive step for global governance. The group was initially useful in getting the world's major economies to provide coordinated fiscal stimuli to their economies, which prevented the deepening of the 2008 crisis. The group also prevented beggar-thy-neighbour policies in trade and currency, although the Global Trade Alert has exposed the G20 member states as engaging in some trade protectionism. Furthermore, during the crisis, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) member states, with the steering of the G20, agreed to boost the IMF's lending capacity by about threefold. Similarly, member states boosted the World Bank's (and the regional development banks') capital through both general and selective capital increases. As I discuss below, the crisis also accelerated the reform in voice and governance in both the IMF and the World Bank. These were imperfect and inadequate reforms, but they ultimately pointed to the necessity of relying on multilateral institutions as lenders of last resort and as platforms for knowledge genera-

tion and exchange. Overall, the Great Recession has reminded policymakers of the importance of multilateral cooperation to govern cross-border phenomena, including financial crises, and the necessity of global institutions to facilitate that cooperation. This is no small matter, as history reminds us that the alternatives of retreat to sub-multilateral blocs or isolationism are unpalatable at best.

Despite these improvements, the primary breakthrough needed in global governance is the amelioration of the remaining political inequalities, namely asymmetries in voice, representation, and influence, in key global economic institutions. By 2010, both the IMF and the World Bank had agreed to reforms with the aim of adapting their governance structures, particularly voting weights of member states, to the changed global economic landscape. Specifically, after these reforms in the IMF, China, Brazil, India, and Russia will be among the top 10 quota holders, which means they will be in the top 10 in terms of their voting power. They have similarly enhanced their voting power in the Bank. Yet, these institutions still need to substantially improve and rethink asymmetries in member-state representation. It certainly no longer makes sense to think of the developing world as a single unit (if it ever did). The very dynamics—the rapid growth of certain emerging markets—that compelled the aforementioned reforms in the political architecture governing the global economy also suggest that the voice of emerging markets and low-income countries need to be addressed as separate issues. While the latest reforms in the IMF and the World Bank aimed to preserve the voting power of the low-income countries, assessing power asymmetries at these global institutions involves more than an analysis of voting power and requires the institutions to develop proper accountability mechanisms for a range of shareholders.

These institutions still contain features that are more relics of the past than features they would include if they were being created today. For instance, the United States continues to maintain its *de facto* veto power over critical decisions in both the IMF and the World Bank. The veto power perhaps serves useful domestic purposes, such as convincing the US Congress to provide funds for the multilateral institutions, given that the veto power affirms the notion that the United States remains on top at these institutions (it is already the member state with the largest voting power in both institutions). One could also make the argument that this veto power is becoming increasingly symbolic in that the costs of the United States exercising it are ever increasing. Nonetheless, by holding on to the veto, the United States is likely detracting from these institutions' legitimacy, which to some degree rests on taming the existing power asymmetries within the institutions. This negative effect on legitimacy, in turn, undermines the US's long-term interest in maintaining these global institutions at the core of global governance. However, these institutions help ease the provision of global public goods, such as global financial stability, and help in burden sharing, such as through the leveraging of US aid money. Moreover, as John Ikenberry of Princeton University has written extensively about, the maintenance of a global institutional order permits the orderly accommodation of rising powers, particularly China, within the existing system. Considering that this system has by and large (though not exclusively) served US interests handsomely, the price of retaining the veto needs to be considered.

Moreover, interstate economic inequalities as well as inequalities between individuals across the world remain significant; therefore, any step taken to ameliorate this situation would be important for global governance. The Great Recession has increased the challenge of delivering economic development. A World Bank estimate fore-

sees 20 more million people in extreme poverty in Africa by 2015, due to the latest global financial crisis. Along with other indicators of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in which many sub-Saharan African states are lagging, these levels of extreme poverty suggest that the region will be behind in meeting the MDGs. Add to this problematic picture the challenges posed by climate change, where a breakthrough in negotiations would be a great step forward for global governance. Furthermore, given that we do not know what the so called new normal will be for capital flows into developing countries, especially those that are low income, global development efforts will need to be stepped up. Regarding global economic development, it is likely that there will be no one breakthrough but continual, sustained efforts at knowledge sharing—learning from the experiences of different countries, subnational groups, and individuals—and at improving global institutional efforts, such as through the World Bank and the IMF, in assisting developing countries.

There are two broad, monumental challenges for global governance going forward. First is shortsightedness, especially by state actors. Myopic behavior foregoes long-term stability and gains for short-run fulfillment of narrow goals. We see this in the realm of international trade (e.g., the Doha Round of negotiations have gone nowhere), where certain states covetously protect their own industries. Second, it is difficult to generate global solidarity or even regional solidarity when gross inequalities, not just in terms of income but also in terms of health and education and other indicators of life, mark the experiences of individuals across the world and within regions. While today, thanks to technology, we have more ways than ever before to learn about the plight of strangers, this global awareness does not transform into solidarity seamlessly, and the prevalence of gross inequalities among states and individuals further impedes this solidarity.

## **GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

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**T**he most obvious achievement in global governance is the peaceful rise of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries. Roughly a billion people have been lifted out of poverty, without causing major international turmoil. Destructive nodes left behind by the Cold War in the Pacific, the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Latin America also did not generate mass conflicts. Earlier similar jumps out of poverty on the European and American continents often coincided with major revolutions, repressions, and havoc. Arguably, the system of global governance made a difference this time, presenting an important constraint on the behavior of elites and leading global nations. While there was a violent confrontation between Al Qaeda and the West on 9/11 and a tenacious subsequent string of retaliatory conflicts, the recent Jasmine revolutions has shown that the Arab people do not generally support the kind of violent behavior promoted by extreme Islamist groups. The recent coordinated efforts to strike at Gaddafi add to the thought that global cooperation efforts tend to prevent mass violent conflict in difficult times. The absence of conflict in recent decades in big parts of Europe provides another example of how integration and growing interlinkages deter countries from engaging in violent confrontations. For precisely this reason we would like to see a deeper integration of the African continent in the world economy, as peace there is hardly sustainable.

The “openness” left behind by the collapse of the Soviet Union was furthermore maintained, so that nonstate actors could enter the international scene.

Associations of all kinds, such as corporations, regulatory bodies, advocacy groups, and international courts, started to flourish outside the confines of a national consciousness. This evolution has been enhanced by the intensification of global communications, where consumer technology and the internet are now shared globally. This is a significant evolution because it has put the need for a strong global sovereign in finding solutions to collective action problems in a different light.

We would, however, like to see three further breakthroughs for global governance in the next 5 to 10 years. The first is a more equal spread of global development. While absolute poverty has dramatically decreased over the past 20 years, inequality has grown tremendously. From a global perspective, the least-developed countries are continuously losing terrain to fast-growing economies. Rather than falling behind, these countries risk falling outside of the global economy. And even within countries, inequality is exploding. In countries as diverse as India, China, and the United States, the poor are caught in a trap from which there is no easy exit. Although balancing growth and distributive justice is a difficult exercise, global governance should urge countries to undertake such an exercise.

The second urgent breakthrough needed for fostering global governance is to reduce greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and halt global warming. Our temperatures are still rising, while biodiversity is decreasing at a dangerous pace. The oceans and jungles are losing biological richness, and the Arctic is still on schedule to be without ice by the year 2100. Some small island states and countries are already feeling the heat, as they are slowly turning into either deserts or water parks. These threats of global warming are created by human activity, and solutions lie within our reach. Taming the problem with cap-and-trade regimes has proved to be a feast

of perverse incentives, so governments should step in more forcefully to internalize damaging energy policy externalities. The main problem is that even climate change has distributive consequences, hitting some harder than others. And while energy subsidies have enabled the quick growth of new industries, now that these industries are becoming mature, it is time to enhance the energy tax systems. More energy taxes instead of more energy subsidies should be among the global priorities. Taxing the polluters will give a stronger incentive for these polluting industries to refocus their activities, while at the same time increasing tax revenues. We should not let water scarcity and climate change increase the risk of violence, both between and within states. Without action, such a situation might arise sooner than we think.

In order to achieve a more equal spread of global development and a reduction in greenhouse gases, we would thirdly like to see global cooperation become more representative. Being unable to take into account the interests of people living in weak or failed states is not just a failure of the domestic system but more so of the global governance architecture, in which these people only have a minor say. If nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or companies move into political vacuums, they become the designated representative agencies whether they like it or not. Like states, their accountability is not only to their donors or customers but also to the people in the area as well as to the international community. Furthermore, if financial instruments such as the Euro or (parts of) the banking system represent a collective interest, they should be held collectively accountable. In the United States, this means a stricter regulation of Wall Street, and in the European Union (EU), stricter control over the integration process by the European Parliament.

In order to address these challenges, plenty of obstacles to the development of global governance and global cooperation need to be overcome. Primary among them is nationalism. National interests still often block collective solutions, as proven by the World Trade Organization's Doha Round and the Copenhagen negotiations, and there are signs that nationalism is on the rise once again. Different national or local preferences (often amplified by strong lobbies) make states less inclined to give in, reducing the possibility of coming to a globally superior outcome. On the positive side, there's proof that countries can overcome this obstacle, as seen with the recent reform at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where developing countries are slowly gaining more power. Yet, the doubt whether this reform is too little and too late continues to prevail. It is furthermore troubling that civil society and national medias often neglect the international scene. Objective information and international watchdog NGOs hold enormous potential to increase the public awareness of the global scene. Citizens should know what their country does at the international level. Overcoming this obstacle means discovering benign forms of nationalism that remain open to supranational decision making and to internal minorities. This involves a precarious balancing act between the local pull of democratic decision making and the global pull of human rights governance. At present, there is unfortunately an unwillingness by leaders to look beyond the national interest but also unwillingness by many internationalists to recognize the integrity of local communities and their commons.



## GLOBAL AGORA FOR A GLOBAL CIVICS

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**T**he emergence of increasingly interdependent economic and social orders requires that we engage in deliberations about the nature and feasibility of civics in a global context. Undoubtedly, our cross-border interactions with other nation states, ethnic groups, and individual actors will proliferate and intensify in a variety of socioeconomic spheres, including trade, interlinked business interests, social development, and the globalization of economic orders. Accordingly, the philosophical and instrumental principles of ethics within the domain of global civics must also be conceptualized, evaluated, and implemented. In order to adapt to the substantial social changes introduced by modernity, it is morally incumbent upon us to collaborate to redefine ethics in the global context. Global civics is promising as a concept in that it requires that we speak in tangible terms about universal, or at least broadly shared, concepts of responsibility, accountability, and fairness. In order to use the idea as an effective means of multifaceted, multicultural cooperation, a principled evaluation of past successes and shortcomings must be undertaken before we can discuss the possibility and potential efficacy of a robust concept of global civics.

We must exercise caution when discussing prior achievements of global civics. There is a significant concern that we may validate global civics concepts that seem logically compelling and progressive but the results of which have yet to be fully understood, fulfilled, or evaluated. Post-World War II, a plethora of documents and treaties were generated in a collaborative spirit by numerous nation states. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and

the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are two inspiring, landmark achievements. Yet upholding their principles and implementing their stringent demands falls into a political and legal gray area that is not easily determinable. Nevertheless, these two declarations and conventions set the bar high and also exemplify that seemingly idealistic ethical concepts can generate multicultural agreement. In a similar vein, the Montreal Protocol may be considered a qualified success, even in the context of failure on the part of most nation states to adequately confront climate change. One of the more recent global achievements has been the emergence of advanced, yet accessible, and highly distributed technologies such as the internet, which have helped drive social change. The Arab Spring is a relevant, recent example of the manner in which ideas can go viral, become shared globally, and stimulate the demand for basic domestic rights in autocratic or repressive regimes. This extraordinary burgeoning of cross-cultural, technology-driven dialogue makes global civics conceivable.

The world, however, is in an unprecedented state of crisis. Environmental degradation and climate change threaten our individual existence, incapacitating poverty persists, and socioeconomic inequality is rising exponentially in both developed and developing countries. Climate change and severe global poverty are arguably the two most pernicious problems that threaten our social order. Their effects are unparalleled in terms of intensity and geospatial reach. Although we have the technical capacity and material resources to radically reduce their prevalence and impact, we seem socially and politically incapacitated to do so.

Many of these problems are perpetuated on a global scale because of unjust international institutions. Addressing global poverty, for example, means rethinking the structure of the World Trade Organization

(WTO), which privileges developed countries' economies at the price of developing economies, dramatically contributing to cycles of pervasive poverty.<sup>2</sup> A clear challenge is the darkly ironic dichotomy of unjust international political and corporate structures that are widely deployed but inadequately questioned versus almost universally accepted treaties and declarations that are honored more in their breach than in their implementation. The ethical aspirations of these treaties and declarations are publicly embraced, but their application is erratic, uneven, and contingent upon multiple, self-serving strategic interests. Political inaction has stifled innovation in addressing systemic problems of injustice. Anthropogenic disasters, which are by no means inevitable metaphysical truths, are conceived of as such to justify wasteful, but exceptionally profitable, production systems that do not fully take into account inherent negative externalities in both social and environmental terms.

Viable global civics concepts require fundamental shifts in social consciousness. Global civics education appears paramount in facilitating this shift in consciousness by equipping youth with the necessary awareness, intellectual skills, and theoretical frameworks from which to effectively challenge an imperfect reality. Not only must concrete educational programs be implemented in primary, secondary, and higher education curricula, additional outlets for public civic engagement to facilitate positive exchange of ideas and values are required. In sum, our globalized world requires a modern-day agora.

Engaging in sustained civic education will not only make younger generations informed citizens of their country and the world, it will stimulate the innovation and creativity necessary to address these seemingly intractable problems. Furthermore, global civics education must be accompanied by empirical inquiry and

social contact in a form more personal than electronic exchange or token community service activities. That is, we must seek to broaden our culturally shaped perspectives of the world through sustained personal interactions with diverse peoples.

A shift in consciousness stimulated by education may lead us to rediscover classic philosophical questions, such as what it means to live a good life and what encompasses human happiness. Political and nationalistic rhetoric, cynicism, and cultural misinformation prevent us from realizing that we share more in common than we believe. Above all, humans strive to survive, reproduce, and flourish, and global problems such as climate change and destabilizing poverty threaten this deeply ingrained desire.

Envisioning the structure and philosophy behind a public agora seems critical to developing a pragmatic, lived global civics. A strong, unified, and informed public voice focused on strategic points of consensus would challenge embedded power structures.

Such a forum would be democratic in the most profound sense of the term. In a world in which we often unknowingly and almost unavoidably perpetuate embedded power structures through our consumption patterns, in a world where corporations have been given the legal status of persons, it is easy for individual actors to feel disillusioned, disempowered, and detached from making individual moral decisions. Propagating global civics requires that we re-engage the public through broadly distributed instruments of education, that we invest in the sustained exchange of ideas, and that we encourage a sense of solidarity rather than the current state of unprincipled competition that, in Lord Tennyson's lyrical terms, reveals, "Nature, red in tooth and claw." Global civics requires advances in the individual and collective conscious-

ness that surpass in moral strength and pragmatic force this primordial mentality that defines the current global political climate.

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## SMALLPOX AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

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**O**n May 8, 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the world rid of smallpox, which thus became the first disease eradicated by human effort. Of all achievements in global governance and cooperation, this one stands unquestionably head and shoulders above the rest.

In the 20th century alone, smallpox killed between 300 and 500 million people, leaving most survivors scarred or blinded.<sup>1</sup> By contrast, Zbigniew Brzezinski estimates that in the 20th century, between 167 and 175 million deaths were caused by “politically motivated carnage,” which includes all deaths caused by war, genocide, and human-caused famines (as in the case of failed agricultural collectivization).<sup>2</sup> Bassiouni estimates 203 million such deaths.<sup>3</sup> Considering that the last naturally occurring case of smallpox was diagnosed in 1977, the contrast becomes even more staggering: In three-quarters of the past century, smallpox killed perhaps twice as many people as did war, genocide, and famines combined over the course of the entire century.

This success of global governance and cooperation becomes even more staggering when we look at how low the costs were relative to the gains. Overall, international donors provided \$98 million, while \$200 million came from countries where smallpox was endemic.<sup>4</sup> The United States, the single largest international donor, recovers its investment every 26 days, considering the funds saved from vaccination programs and healthcare.<sup>5</sup> By way of contrast, in terms of cost effectiveness, the US Treasury has spent more than \$845 billion directly on the war in Iraq, and estimates of the war’s total cost to the US economy have surpassed the \$3 trillion mark.<sup>6</sup>

The bottom line is this: For a tiny fraction of government expenditures, WHO and its member states were able to accomplish a feat that, in terms of the human costs, was greater than the elimination of war, genocide, and famine combined.

What is truly mystifying is that this successful cooperative effort to eradicate smallpox, which incontestably achieved so much good at such a minimal cost, almost failed due to a lack of funding and political initiative. In the words of the WHO team that led the effort, the “lack of resources constituted a serious, continuing problem and, even in the concluding years of the program, those that were made available barely sufficed to maintain momentum. . . . Success was never a certainty, even during the years immediately preceding the last-known cases”.<sup>7</sup>

If cooperation toward such a positive, achievable public good proved this difficult, how much more difficult must it be when there is less convergence of international interests? The difficulties that this landmark achievement faced lead us inevitably to the question of what could possibly have stood in its way.

In researching this question, a Columbia University professor, Scott Barrett, took a game-theoretical approach, and he concludes that the problem facing the international community was twofold.<sup>8</sup> First, although smallpox eradication was indubitably in the interests of the developed countries that were called upon as international donors, the problem of free-riding led each of them to expect that it could withhold resources while another developed country covered the cost. Second, the absence of any strong lobbying groups campaigning for smallpox eradication meant that governments did not have a domestic political reason to prioritize extra foreign aid to accomplish the task.

Both these aspects of the smallpox eradication problem point to one broad conception of the key obstacle to global solidarity overall: the absence of an institutional structure that encourages international cooperation. On the one hand, no global institution has the power to sanction selfish behavior, such as that typified by the free-rider situation. On the other hand, the basic accountability of democratic governments to the electorates within their own territories means that they are incentivized to follow a course of action that is at variance with the global good if it will enhance their chances for re-election.

Critiques of this sort usually highlight the lack of a global sovereign with coercive powers. But this is not central to addressing the problem. It is true that a globally sovereign institution could enforce the provision of global public goods, but much the same function could be served by strong global and national public opinion. If the general public of a democratic state manifests sufficient support for prioritizing the interests of people within other states, then individual states would be incentivized to do so. This is particularly relevant for humanitarian concerns, which typically entail a much greater benefit for those in need than it would cost those who could provide aid and, as such, have the capacity to elicit sympathetic and moral sentiments in the publics of developed countries.

Now, global governance is not entirely about the provision of public goods; there is a whole normative and cultural dimension to the concept, with problems such as global solidarity, justice, and tolerance. But most concrete policy problems can be usefully conceived of as problems of global public goods.

At any rate, these problems are most easily mitigated when there is a clear convergence of global interests and when the costs to those who will benefit least

are minimized. As such, in keeping with the lessons learned from the successful global campaign to eradicate smallpox, I believe that it is reasonable to hope for similar breakthroughs in the following areas:

*Nuclear nonproliferation:* The nature of modern warfare means that the risk of conventional wars against a nuclear-capable state is probably less of a danger than is the risk of nuclear terrorism, particularly when existing stockpiles of nuclear arms more than suffice to function as a deterrent. As such, nuclear-capable states should hopefully recognize their common interest in reducing and securing existing stockpiles.

*Infectious diseases:* As was the case with smallpox, there can be no question that the eradication of infectious diseases serves the interests of everyone. As such, there should be the possibility for renewed efforts by WHO and regional programs to eradicate the seven diseases that the Carter Center's International Task Force for Disease Eradication has identified as potentially eradicable: measles, mumps, rubella, poliomyelitis, lymphatic filariasis, pork tapeworm, and guinea worm disease. In particular, the project to eradicate guinea worm disease was halted several years ago because of the insecure situation in Southern Sudan; hopefully, its forthcoming secession will allow the program to be restarted.

*Global institutions to incentivize the provision of global public goods:* The main problem facing global governance, in my view, is that the current institutional framework is simply not constructed to encourage the tackling of worldwide problems. A concrete example of how this situation could change is the proposed Health Impact Fund. As has been highlighted by the economist Joseph Stiglitz<sup>9</sup> and the philosopher Thomas Pogge,<sup>10</sup> pharmaceutical companies currently have no market incentives to de-

velop cures for diseases that affect the global poor, and the strict enforcement of intellectual property rights means that a medicine that has already been developed cannot be distributed unless the owners of the rights to it opt to produce it themselves for no market gain. Instead, the proposed fund would incentivize previously unprofitable research by providing remuneration commensurate with the needed medicine's impact on the global poor to those pharmaceutical companies that provide these medicines at low cost to those who need them. The Fund thus would serve as a model for the kind of framework necessary to encourage continuing significant achievements in global cooperation and solidarity.

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1. Bailey (2006) and Koplow (2004) p. 1
2. Brzezinski (1996) p. 17
3. Bassiouni (1997)
4. Barrett (2007) p. 186
5. Fenner et al. (1988) p. 1365
6. Trotta (2008)
7. Fenner et al. (1988) p. 423
8. Barrett (2007)
9. Stiglitz (2006)
10. Pogge and Hollis (2008)



## TRADE, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE ROLE OF VALUES IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

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**W**hen the financial crisis erupted in 2008, there were alarming signals that the kind of protectionism that triggered the Great Depression was on the rise. Thanks to the multilateral trading system, embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the protectionism trends did not get a chance to play out. The WTO, in fact, actively contributed to overcoming the recent economic turbulence by monitoring increased economic uncertainty and by avoiding protectionism. This example underscores the importance of the multilateral trading system and confirms it as the most notable historical development in global governance and global cooperation.

The WTO hosts multilateral trade negotiations in a democratic way that allows weaker countries to pool their collective influence and interests—as opposed to bilateral negotiations in which they have virtually no negotiating clout. Any country can defend its rights in the WTO's dispute-settlement system, which is often recognized as the most effective and respected international conflict-resolution mechanism. The need for coordination and screening of preferential trade agreements is only growing in a regionalizing world, and the WTO is perfectly equipped with the tools for ensuring all regions' synchronicity.

Another notable achievement in global economic governance is the integration of emerging economies in global governance through the G20. The concerted actions of the G20 helped the world deal with the economic downturn, broadened the scope of financial regulation, and put the phaseout of fossil fuel subsidies and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank reform on the table.

### Challenges

Notwithstanding its achievements over the past few decades, global economic governance should take linkages with environmental sustainability better into account. The most important contributing factor to the stalling of international climate talks is undoubtedly economic competitiveness, so trade-related issues should get more priority at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, vice versa, climate topics should be on the agenda at the WTO.

The global economic benefits of the Doha Development Round are sometimes estimated to be \$300 billion USD annually. But now that the Doha Round as it was originally conceived is on life support, some say it is time for negotiators in Geneva to pick and serve the pieces of the wider trade negotiations that are ripe for harvest, such as an agreement on clean energy. Political investment in the Doha Round has been substantial, so, acknowledging that the negotiations have become too complicated in a multipolar world and in a US election year, negotiations on some specific 'non-Doha' items could be held until the sky clears. The strategy of identifying Doha with the WTO has been costly and is eating away at the reputation of an otherwise successful institution that deserves strengthening. But if even the WTO and the Doha Round with all its benefits are in decay, what does this say about the outlook for global governance in general?

What does this say about the prospects for governments to put short-term minority interests aside in order to reach a global deal on climate change, transition to a sustainable economy, and find new growth paradigms?

Tackling increasingly complex and integrated global governance issues, such as trade and climate change, will require support beyond governments. To get civil society more involved in global governance, globaliza-

tion needs to be more of a “bottom-up” enterprise and requires electoral support.

A good example of bottom-up action is the Caucus for the International Criminal Court (ICC), a coalition of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that promoted the ICC by disseminating information and promoting programs about the Court to their respective communities and by successfully advocating for the ratification of the Court by countries throughout the world.

As long as negligence and indifference about globalization are rampant, though, governments have simply no incentive to improve global governance. A first step towards combating this negligence and indifference is a well-informed public that will be aware of the long-term benefits of international cooperation and more willing to share the benefits of globalization and defy narrow interests in order to maintain wide support for globalization. Secondly, partnerships should arise between countries to facilitate the transition to a socially, economically, and, especially, environmentally more sustainable global economy. As a serious international agreement on climate change appears to be years if not decades away, practical short-term solutions need to be explored. The best option for preventing global conflicts on subsidies for renewable energy would be to establish a rules-based framework on energy and natural resources at the WTO, either within or beyond the faltering Doha Round.<sup>1</sup>

Thirdly, there should be a push towards a more inclusive United Nations (UN) Security Council. This would not only mean granting (semi-)permanent seats to the country with the fourth most powerful army in the world (India) and other major contributors to the UN regular budget and peace missions but also limiting veto power and thus starting to address the democracy deficit and relentless politicization of the Security Council so that it is equipped

for tackling 21st-century concerns. The increasing number of conflicts over natural resources, for example, has forced the Security Council to discuss climate change recently as a threat to peace and security, but some of its members declined to accept climate change as such.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, a global facilitator that can connect an increasingly regionalizing world would be useful. The European Union (EU) was a major achievement of international cooperation in the 20th century, but it has been slumbering for the past decade. The only possibility for preventing further deterioration of the standing of the EU in the world is the realization of its potential role as experienced facilitator for cooperation between different countries. Despite the short-term challenges, the current fiscal crisis in the eurozone is, in fact, an excellent opportunity to strengthen political unity in Europe and its global role in the long run.<sup>3</sup>

## The Way Forward

Today’s challenges to governing climate change, trade, and security at the global level are merely indicative of a much wider moral crisis that goes beyond a lack of political will and leadership. Why, given the dramatic increase of mechanisms and forums for cooperation, is the world at times so deeply divided against itself? Which values are capable of guiding governments and their citizens out of the chaos of competing interests and ideologies towards a world community capable of inculcating the principles of justice, equity, and sustainability at all levels of society?

First of all, a new paradigm should take hold—that of the interconnected nature of our challenges and our prosperity. Whether the issue is poverty, the proliferation of weapons, health, global trade, religion, environmental sustainability, human rights, corruption, or the rights of minority populations, it is clear that none of the

problems facing global governance can be adequately addressed in isolation from one another.

Secondly, the search for shared values is paramount for effective action. Economic and technological resources are critical for sustainability transitions, but concern with exclusively material considerations will fail to appreciate the degree to which ideological and cultural variables shape diplomacy and decision making. In an effort to move beyond a community of nations bound by primarily economic relationships to one with shared responsibilities for one another's well-being and security, the question of values must take a central place in deliberations, be articulated, and made explicit.

Emphasizing multilateralism, while a step in the right direction, will not provide a sufficient basis for community building between nations; collaboration alone does not confer legitimacy or ensure benevolent outcomes for the greater good.

The emerging global order, and the processes of globalization that define it, must be founded on the principle of the oneness of humankind. This principle provides the practical basis for the organization of relationships between all nations. The increasingly apparent interconnectedness of development, security, and human rights on a global scale confirms that peace and prosperity are indivisible—that no sustainable benefit can be conferred on a nation or community if the welfare of the nations as a whole is ignored or neglected. In addition, no effective and peaceful international order can be founded and sustained unless it is firmly grounded in the principles of justice and the rule of law, respect for human rights, equality of men and women, and democracy.

What is needed is a consultative process—at all levels of governance—in which individual participants strive to transcend their respective points of view in order to

function as members of one body with its own interests and goals.<sup>4</sup>

With respect for different cultures, a bottom-up participatory development approach can take root instead of the current overwhelmingly top-down, expert-driven approach. This will require enormous changes in attitude and a system of education that promotes global citizenship, a world-embracing vision, and engagement with current affairs. Until these values have been established and widely implemented in global governance, it is hard to imagine how the change to a safe, sustainable, and prosperous world can be established as the result of a managed transition rather than through the effects of multiple crises.

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1. E.g., the US and China wind power subsidies case, which has recently been resolved.
2. UN Security Council (2011)
3. Also see Leonard (2005) and Rifkin (2004)
4. Bahai International Community (2005).

## **GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OR TRANSNATIONAL ELITE BARGAINING?**

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**W**ith the ever-increasing tide of interdependence among nations, the need for concerted efforts across territorial borders to address contemporary threats and challenges has never been more urgent. The very ubiquity of the concept of global governance suggests a shared recognition of the common destiny of humankind and the corresponding imperative to forgo unilateral and self-serving tendencies in favor of more collaborative approaches to satisfying needs and solving problems. However, one only has to take a cursory look at where we currently stand with regard to cooperation on major global issues to come to the conclusion that, like domestic efforts to engender more open and accountable governments in some states, global governance has more or less become a stalled enterprise, having been hijacked by vested capitalist interests.

### **Superficial Cooperation Underpins Progress in Global Governance**

It is true that there have been noticeable advances in the drive to foster cooperation at the global level over the years. First of all, sovereign states, whose consent remains vital in global decision making and who for centuries had preferred self-serving approaches in pursuing their national interests, have become increasingly inclined toward multilateralism. Today, the global policy space is crowded with a myriad of formal and informal institutions and coalitions that have spurred unprecedented cooperation among states. In addition, recent decades have witnessed the legitimization of the role of nonstate actors in the global arena, with the effect that concerns about human security and social

justice have started competing with the narrow interests of states and big businesses, which nonetheless continue to dominate the global policy agenda. The rise in coalitions between transnational civil society organizations and middle-power states, in particular, has been credited with generating the impetus that has produced groundbreaking agreements and institutions such as the 2002 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the 2008 Convention banning cluster munitions.<sup>1</sup> Optimists about global cooperation would also not hesitate to point to the newfound solidarity among the emerging powers of the Global South as another positive development that portends well for global governance. The increasing tendency of these states to harmonize their positions in global forums has arguably contributed in diffusing power in the international system and has rendered such cooperation a little more attractive for even the most powerful states, like the United States.

It would, however, be naive to make an unqualified case for meaningful progress in global governance based on these developments—if by global governance one means transnational efforts dedicated not to serving the interests of certain privileged constituencies but to improving the quality of life for all, irrespective of race, class, or nationality. There is no gainsaying that, thanks to the activism of global civil society organizations and to some extent middle-power states, global policy making has occasionally produced results that, to varying degrees, have responded to broader social concerns about equality, justice, and the promotion of human dignity, which, in my view, should be the focus of governance at the global level. Even so, the bulk of the cooperation that has been made possible by the developments outlined above, as well as by the governance arrangements they have fashioned, still remains essentially oblivious to the demands and aspirations of the ma-

majority of the world's people, making it a mockery to talk of the emergence of a global neighborhood, as suggested by the Commission for Global Governance.<sup>2</sup>

## **Global Capitalism Undermines Genuine Global Cooperation**

This brings us to what I consider the fundamental obstacle to genuine cooperation on most transnational issues. The propensity for states to continue to act in their own narrow interests and the absence of a morally persuasive hegemon to inspire and champion cooperation, along with the lack of a global civic ethic, are just some of the factors that are often cited as undermining effective governance at the global level. However, it is my contention that these seeming constraints are merely symptoms of the larger challenge that confronts effective global cooperation. The root of the problem is global capitalism, with its attendant profit-making logic and entrenched culture of self-centeredness, which have transformed the institutions and processes of global governance from people-centered spaces to conduits for the promotion of capitalist interests and agendas.

The preeminence of these market forces in the current wave of economic globalization has not only undermined the autonomy and decision-making capacity of governments within states but has also transformed state machineries into promoters of capitalist interests. So, while current challenges such as poverty, insecurity, climate change, and the burden of disease have ostensibly forced states to overcome their prejudices and cooperate in searching for common solutions, the multistate governance arrangements that have emerged to assist in these efforts nonetheless reflect the designs of transnational elite networks, which undermine meaningful progress in addressing these challenges. In this context, what

currently parades as global cooperation is largely a reflection of the political bargaining of transnational capitalist elites who, by virtue of their power to regulate access to the formal and informal institutions and networks that shape the global policy agenda, tend to prioritize profit maximization over broader societal concerns such as equitable development, justice, human rights, and protecting the environment.

The emphasis on market access that underpins global trade arrangements illustrates this reality. From the perspective of governance with a developmental end, one would expect the World Trade Organization (WTO), as the institution managing global trade relations, to take the lead in spreading the gains of trade and making it more amenable to the fight against global poverty. However, as the current deadlock in the so-called Doha Development Trade Round suggests, the desire to amass excess wealth on the part of big businesses, often disguised by the rhetoric of the benefits of free trade, has reduced the WTO's structure and processes to a forum for bargaining market access, often at the expense of human development objectives. The elitist nature of the current global governance architecture is such that even the governments of developing countries—most of which bear the burden of trade liberalization, including inequality, labor rights violations, and environmental degradation—engage with the system not necessarily to challenge its antidevelopment foundations but often to seek concessions that satisfy their respective domestic business communities.

## **An Inclusive Approach to Global Governance Is Required for Genuine Progress**

In the face of the scheming, hypocrisy, and self-seeking that currently underlie global policy making in most areas, the only meaningful breakthrough for

which one can hope is a paradigm shift that enables all the actors with a stake in global governance—including states, private individuals, businesses, and civil society organizations—to truly conceive of cooperation as a way to better the lot of humankind everywhere in the world. But insofar as efforts at global cooperation continue to be informed largely by the narrow interests of transnational elite capitalist networks, the supposed breakthroughs in creating new institutions and “reforming” old ones will, at best, qualify as cosmetic alterations to a project that has lost its *raison d’être*.

However, given the pervasiveness of global capitalism and its divisive and exploitative tendencies, it is highly inconceivable that global governance will one day be approached by all concerned parties with a common understanding that prioritizes equality and distributive justice. As global discontent with inequality rises, one can hope that transnational civil society networks will in the future become more vigorous in their efforts to open up the global policy space. The same, however, cannot be said of the other major actors involved in global decision making. Concerned primarily with outwitting one another and controlling the direction of surplus accumulation, states, alliances of states, as well as networks of companies and corporate lobbies are guaranteed to be permanently locked down in relationships of competition, leaving multilateral processes highly hierarchical and less amenable to popular concerns.

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1. For a detailed discussion of the growing partnership between middle powers and global civil society organizations, see Bolton and Nash (2010).
2. See Lamb (1996).



## GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND CIVICS

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**T**here have been many achievements of global governance, ranging from specific treaties and international laws to major intergovernmental organizations. However, many of the more specific achievements can be encompassed by four major breakthroughs in global governance.

The first of these breakthroughs was the establishment of the United Nations (UN). Although the UN has major flaws and is widely believed to have contributed to injustices throughout its existence, it is the closest thing we have to a global government capable of overriding state sovereignty to enforce globally agreed-upon rules and norms. The UN and its subsidiaries are essential platforms for international dialogue, and the UN system will play an essential role in the future of global governance and cooperation.

The second breakthrough was the establishment of the global international financial system through the emergence of the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF). While these organizations have contributed to serious harm throughout their existence (some have argued that these organizations have worsened global inequality and poverty), they represent the economic interdependence of the world and the need for global institutions to supervise and support global trade and economic cooperation. Although these institutions have failed in this role thus far, reformations could see them harness the power of economic interdependence as a force for global development and cooperation.

The third breakthrough in global governance was the emergence of regional treaties, bodies, and partnerships, such as the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South African Development Community (SADC), the African Union, and Mercosur. These regional agreements have been a driving force behind global cooperation. If regional bodies began to supplant the significance of nation states in the international system, global governance could become easier. Some are not so optimistic about this potential outcome, but regionalism is still seen as a positive trend towards better global cooperation.

The final achievement in global cooperation was the emergence of international human rights norms. Individuals all over the world now recognize that people have rights and duties towards each other, simply by virtue of being human. Although it's not clear what single event, act, or organization gave rise to this spirit of universal cooperation, it is clear that cosmopolitan norms and values are being internalized by individuals living in societies all over the world in an unprecedented way. One need only look at the growing interest in subjects such as global justice and global civics at universities across the world to see evidence of this.

Although there are a number of concrete breakthroughs that could be achieved in global governance, there are a set of three "umbrella" breakthroughs that could facilitate more specific recommendations. Two of these breakthroughs can best be understood as movements towards the increased institutionalization of global governance practices, while the other is a process of reform that would be a prerequisite for the desirability of this further institutionalization.

The first step in reforming global governance structures is to make them fairer and to make their decision-

making procedures more inclusive of those whose interests are most directly affected by the issues in question. Some possibilities include reforms to the UN Security Council veto system and reform of the governing structures of the WTO.

As the first of two steps towards institutionalization, there should be development of mechanisms for the enforcement of treaties, conventions, and other global governance outcomes. One such mechanism could be the formation of some body that could monitor the compliance of individual states and either require or permit the use of sanctions on the part of other states when some state violated the requirements of a global governance measure.

As the second step towards institutionalization, an international form of taxation should be introduced that could serve to fund outcomes proposed by global governance institutions. This tax should have a greater impact on rich countries and individuals than poor ones, and so something like a financial transactions tax over, for instance, a global sales tax would be preferable.

These last two measures should work in concert: The tax could, in part, provide budget support to countries that lacked the means to fulfill the duties that global governance arrangements assigned to them. For instance, tax revenues could help to fund the outcomes of an enforceable agreement on climate change or a Global Fund for child and maternal health. These two measures could also be used to place pressure on states to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and provide states with the necessary budget support to do so. The two measures could also be used to make state-building resources available to states in the wake of humanitarian interventions and to clarify and fairly enforce the criteria for humanitarian intervention in the first place.

There are three major obstacles to global governance, cooperation, and solidarity. The vested political and economic interests of those currently in positions of power will always pose an obstacle to the reform of the global system. Powerful individuals, corporations, and lobby groups working to maintain the status quo, and using their vast resources in order to achieve this, will always obstruct the development of better global governance and greater global solidarity. Breaking these power structures is one of the first steps towards achieving more effective global governance and cooperation.

The second obstacle closely relates to the first: global inequality. As long as global inequality prevents large segments of the world's population from participating in the global order, global cooperation, solidarity, and fair governance will never be achieved. Although there's no real consensus on what "equality" means (What levels of equality are required? What kinds of inequality are posing obstacles to global governance? Do we need more equality between individual people or more equality between states?), global inequalities in income and capabilities pose massive obstacles to achieving effective global governance.

The lack of enforcement for international laws, treaties, and cosmopolitan duties is a final obstacle to global governance. Initiatives to improve the global system and achieve more effective global governance are almost always thwarted by a lack of power to enforce or implement these initiatives. Some interesting suggestions for how international laws and treaties could be enforced include committing troops to a UN army or, as stated earlier, introducing a global taxation system where revenue could be used to implement global governance initiatives and deter states from violating international agreements.

## Endnotes

1. Workshop participants include Rosa Terlazzo, Luke Ebbs, Galvin Chia, Daria Delnevo, Garry Earl-Spurr, Adam Gastineau, John-Peter Glavimans, Aliza Levy, Andrew James Klassen, Brendan McCafferie, Chanroeun Pa, Josh Sidgwick, James Spence, Sophie Stibbard, Bradley Sutton, Helen Taylor, Karen Tindall, Sarah Wardell, Scott Wisor , and Pichamon Yeophantong.







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