



# SCALING UP DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS: A REVIEW OF UNDP'S COUNTRY PROGRAM IN TAJIKISTAN

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*Abstract:*

This study reports on a review of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) country program in Tajikistan in terms of how it addresses the opportunities and challenges to scale up successful development interventions. It assesses to what extent the UNDP pursued well articulated scaling up pathways in its overall program and in specific project areas, including its communities development program, its AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis and anti-malaria program, its support for aid coordination, its disaster risk management program and its energy and environment program. The study concludes that UNDP has incorporated key elements of a scaling up approach in its Tajikistan program, but also identifies additional ways to develop a more systematic approach to scaling up. This study is part of a broader program of research and analysis carried out under the auspices of the Brookings Global Economy and Development Program.

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# SCALING UP DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS: A REVIEW OF UNDP'S COUNTRY PROGRAM IN TAJIKISTAN

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## 1. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

A key objective of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is to assist its member countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). UNDP pursues this objective in various ways, including through analysis and advice to governments on the progress towards the MDGs (such as support for the preparation and monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies, or PRSs, in poor countries), assistance for capacity building and financial and technical support for the preparation and implementation of development programs.

The challenge of achieving the MDGs remains daunting in many countries, including Tajikistan. To do so will require that all development partners, i.e., the government, civil society, private business and donors, make every effort to scale up successful development interventions. Scaling up refers to “expanding, adapting and sustaining successful policies, programs and projects on different places and over time to reach a greater number of people.” (Hartmann and Linn, 2008a) Interventions that are successful as pilots but are not scaled up will create localized benefits for a

small number of beneficiaries, but they will fail to contribute significantly to close the MDG gap.

Ultimately local actors—governments, the private sector and civil society—need to scale up their successful interventions and ventures, but aid donors have a special responsibility to take a lead in assuring that their activities take on board and support the scaling up agenda. One of the reasons for the persistent disconnect between the results of studies on aid effectiveness in cross-country econometric research (which show little, if any beneficial impact of aid) and the results of project evaluations (which show that a great majority of aid financed projects are successful in reaching their objectives) is that individual projects tend to be one-shot interventions that do not lead to sustained and scaled up impact and hence fail to add up to a significant impact at the macro level. (Hartmann and Linn, 2008b)

Not all interventions can and should be scaled up. If a problem is localized and limited in scale or if evaluations have shown that a particular type of intervention or pilot is not successful, limited action or complete exit is appropriate. Scaling up, where it is pursued, must be done in the right way. We may distinguish two types

of errors in scaling up: Type I Error is to not scale up where it is needed; and Type II Error is to scale up inappropriately. Small and medium-size donors, such as UNDP, are more prone to Type I Error. Large donors, such as the World Bank, are more likely to commit Type II Errors. In any case, careful consideration of whether and how to support scaling up of successful development programs is a key challenge in the design and implementation of development assistance that is all too often neglected by small and large donors alike.

Based on their review of the scaling up literature and experience, Hartmann and Linn (2008b) conclude that donors need to systematically review their operational policies and approaches to scaling up, if they are to contribute effectively to the achievement of the MDGs. Recently, a team of experts carried out an institutional scaling up review for the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). This involved a systematic assessment of IFAD's mission, strategy, operational policies and guidelines. It also assessed selected country programs and sub-sectoral experiences to determine whether IFAD achieves its goal in serving as an organization that assists its clients in scaling up its successful innovations. Based on this experience, IFAD has begun to adapt its operational policies and processes to support enhanced scaling up. The IFAD review also can serve as a pilot for other donors who may wish to assess their own operational practices. (Linn et al., 2010)

This paper reports on an exploratory country study on scaling up by UNDP. It aims to assess whether and how UNDP is supporting scaling up in its programs in Tajikistan. The principal purpose of this assessment was to assist the country program director and his country team to enhance UNDP's approach to scaling up in Tajikistan. It also contributes to the growing body of evidence on scaling up of development interventions in developing countries.<sup>1</sup>

## UNDP and Scaling Up

This paper did not carry out a systematic review of UNDP's overall policies and practices. But from what could be gleaned in the context of the Tajikistan country study, UNDP does not yet appear to be systematically focusing on the scaling up challenge at the institutional level. A Google search of "UNDP scaling up" yielded no link to any document that systematically approaches the scaling up **through** aid (i.e., scaling up successful interventions), but mostly provides links to sources that refer to scaling up **of** aid (i.e., how to increase the amount of aid resources). However, there are various indications that UNDP is focusing increasingly on scaling up:

- At the corporate level, various recent documents refer to scaling up, particularly in response to the need to meet the MDG targets.<sup>2</sup>
- In 2010 UNDP initiated a new program entitled "Scaling Up Support for the MDGs at Local Level" which aims to take local initiatives to a larger scale in a quest to help poor countries achieve the MDGs by 2015.<sup>3</sup>
- The most recent (2009) version of UNDP's "Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results" refers explicitly—and repeatedly—to scaling up and the need to consider scaling up in evaluating UNDP's operational performance.<sup>4</sup>
- Some recent UNDP country program evaluation reports have addressed the question whether or not UNDP builds systematically on its successful pilot projects (e.g., the Turkey Assessment of Development Results (ADR), 2004 and the Tajikistan ADR, 2009). The Turkey ADR specifically noted that most UNDP-supported interventions in Turkey were designated as pilots, but only a few were evaluated in terms of their results and fewer still addressed replication or scaling up.

- The management of the UNDP's regional bureau for Europe and Central Asia is exploring whether and how to incorporate a scaling up dimension more explicitly into its operational approach.
- UNDP recently adopted an agenda of “transformational change” which sets out a vision for achieving nation-wide objectives of human development.<sup>5</sup> The scaling up agenda complements this vision by providing specific guidance for how to pursue it operationally.

Despite these efforts to consider scaling up in UNDP's operational work, it appears that UNDP has yet to adapt its institutional mission, approach, processes and incentives to ensure that the scaling up objective is systematically and effectively pursued.

## UNDP and Scaling Up in Tajikistan

UNDP is a sizeable donor in Tajikistan. It contributed about 6 percent of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the country in recent years.<sup>6</sup> From 2010–2015 UNDP's Tajikistan Country Programme Action Plan expects to raise a total of \$166 million in support of the country's development efforts.

UNDP's Action Plan 2010–2015 for Tajikistan prominently refers to scaling up as an operational objective in its Tajikistan country program. Additionally, important programs and projects explicitly pursue significant aspects of a scaling up approach, as this paper documents in some detail below. This is not an entirely new focus for UNDP in Tajikistan, as the Tajikistan Assessment of Development Results (ADR), which was prepared in 2008 and published in 2009, specifically refers to UNDP's efforts to scale up its interventions in selected instances. However, as the ADR also notes, in a number of areas, insufficient attention had been placed on scaling up at the time of the evaluation (2008) (Box 1).

### Box 1: Excerpts from Tajikistan ADR

“UNDP should take adequate efforts to strengthen micro-macro linkages. With exceptions such as district development plans, several projects were essentially pilots that were localized and were neither scaled up nor informed government planning and practices. UNDP should be selective in piloting new practices and ensure such pilots are linked to policies and strengthening government capacities.” (p. xvii)

“Efforts should be made to ensure that interventions such as demonstration of energy efficiency technology have sufficient linkages with the government programme to enable scaling up.” (p. xviii)

“The scale of operations of microfinance institutions created by UNDP is not yet adequate to access loan funds from commercial banks. With increasing competition in the area of microfinance, the outcome of UNDP measures to sustain regional institutions remains uncertain, although UNDP provided additional funding to extend the credit portfolio of the microfinance institutions.” (p. 28)

“There were dispersed interventions in the areas of environment and climate change. Besides providing support to the National Action Plan for Mitigation of Climate Change, UNDP piloted projects on renewable energy. Although the evaluation did not include environment and climate change interventions, there was no evidence of scaling up renewable energy interventions.” (p. 59)

*Source: UNDP, Tajikistan ADR, 2009*

As in the case of the Turkey ADR, the Tajikistan ADR also notes that insufficient attention was paid to the evaluation of interventions, without which it is not possible to make well-informed decisions about whether or

not, and how to, scale up: “The monitoring and evaluation systems should be strengthened for the entire programme. Except for the programme of the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF), baseline information was not available for other projects. Baseline data was also lacking for outcomes outlined in the country programme. Baseline information data should be prepared for all outputs and outcomes. (Tajikistan ADR, p. xviii)

It appears that since the Tajikistan ADR was prepared, and partly in response to its recommendations, UNDP has paid more explicit attention to the scaling up agenda in Tajikistan. Under the new programming cycle it has extended the time horizon to six years, made a special effort to reduce program fragmentation, and paid more explicit attention to achieving program impact at scale. The purpose of this report is to explore in greater detail UNDP’s approach to scaling up in Tajikistan.

## **The Approach to an Assessment of UNDP’s Scaling Up in Tajikistan**

Building on the analytical framework for scaling up developed by Hartman and Linn (2008a) the review assessed specific areas of development assistance provided by UNDP to develop a fuller understanding of the opportunities and constraints for scaling up. The assessment is exploratory in that it does not involve an in-depth review of all areas in the program, nor does it aim to fully evaluate the impacts and results of scaling up for the program areas which it does review.

**Why Tajikistan?** UNDP has an intensive and broad-gauged engagement in Tajikistan. As the poorest country in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with limited support from the international donor community and limited field presence by other donors

outside the capital city, UNDP has been able to serve as an important conduit for resources by other donors and thus provides a good case study for how UNDP can scale up by forging partnerships with other donors. As the Tajikistan ADR and this report demonstrate, the UNDP program in Tajikistan has both successful efforts of scaling up, as well as cases of insufficient scaling up. This variety of experiences allows a good assessment of success factors and constraints to scaling up.

**Approach of the Scaling Up Review.** Hartmann and Linn (2008a) provide an analytical framework for the scaling up process, consisting of “drivers” (i.e., forces pushing forward the process) and “spaces” (i.e., factors that create the space for initiatives to grow), which are briefly summarized in Table 1.<sup>7</sup> The way the drivers and spaces are organized over time to achieve the scaling up objective define what this report refers to as the “scaling up pathway”. According to Linn et al. (2010) a scaling up pathway “is the sequence of steps that need to be taken in the innovation-learning-scaling up cycle to assure that a successful pilot or practice is taken from its experimental stage through subsequent stages to the scale ultimately judged to be appropriate for the intervention pursued. In general, there are many possible pathways for scaling up a successful intervention. For each case an aid organization needs to explore potential pathways early on and take proactive steps to plan and prepare for scaling up—in terms of dimensions, desired ultimate scale, drivers and spaces, the agency’s operational modalities, intermediate results and monitoring and evaluation. In practical terms, this means developing a strategic approach to the aid intervention, by developing a country, sector or subsector strategy, in which the scaling up pathway is defined and the role of the project or intervention in helping the country move along the pathway is clearly identified.”



Table 1: Drivers and Spaces for Scaling Up			
Drivers		Spaces	
Ideas, Vision, Leadership	Need to recognize if scaling up of a (new) idea is necessary, desirable, and feasible. Successful scaling up is usually driven by champions.	Fiscal/financial resources	Fiscal and financial resources need to be mobilized to support the scaled up intervention; and/or the costs of the intervention need to be adapted to fit into the available fiscal/financial space.
External	Political or economic crisis, pressure from outside actors (including donors, NGOs, communities)	Policy	The policy (and legal) framework has to allow, or needs to be adapted to support, scaling up.
Internal	Government and UNDP	Institutional/ Organizational	The institutional and organizational capacity has to be created to carry the scaling-up process forward.
		Political	Important stakeholders, both those in support and those against the intervention, need to be attended to through outreach and suitable safeguards to ensure the political support for a scaled up intervention.
		Partnership	Partners need to mobilize to join in the effort of scaling up.
Incentives	They drive behavior of actors and institutions towards scaling-up; requires accountability.	Natural resources	Natural resource and environmental constraints may limit scaling up process.
		Cultural	Possible cultural obstacles or support mechanisms need to be identified and the intervention suitably adapted to permit scaling up in a culturally diverse environment.
		Learning	Monitoring and evaluation; knowledge management
		Cross-border/ regional	Scaling up may require development of cross-border/ regional approaches.

Drawing on this framework, this Tajikistan scaling up review assesses UNDP's Action Plan and selected ongoing and planned programs and projects to assess the extent in which interventions are based on a vision and lay out a scaling up pathway. It aims to define the critical elements within the Tajikistan country program that help to lay out the dimensions and pathways for scaling-up.

The review includes both an assessment of the horizontal (or quantitative) dimension of scaling up by ensuring that more beneficiaries be reached through the programs, and the vertical (or institutional and policy) dimension of scaling up by helping to build the institutional capacity and policy framework for broader impact. The review also assesses whether successive operations have contributed to create a pathway for scaling up. The review pays particular attention to whether designs of programs and institutional arrangements are suitable for scaling-up, and whether implementation arrangements, evaluation and monitoring processes and partnership arrangements provide the foundations for scaling up.<sup>8</sup> In short, the study explores whether and how UNDP is supporting the development and implementation of scaling up pathways

**Research method:** The review is based on a desk study of project and program documents and on two one-week visits to Dushanbe, which includes a field visit to project sites in one province, Khatlon Oblast, and also involves interviews with UNDP staff, govern-

ment officials, partners and other stakeholders. The review also involved discussions with senior managers at UNDP's headquarters in New York City. This and previous drafts of the report benefitted from detailed comments by managers and staff in the Tajikistan UNDP Country Office and the key findings were presented to stakeholders in Dushanbe in January 2011.

## Structure of This Study

Following this introductory section, the next section reviews the Country Program Action Plan 2010–2015 (CPAP). This is followed by sections assessing five selected programs and projects, including: (i) Communities Programme (CP); (ii) the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria eradication program; (iii) the project supporting aid coordination; (iv) the disaster risk management program (DRMP); (v) and the program supporting energy and environment with a special focus on a new renewable energy project. For each program/project, the report briefly describes the context and nature of the program, summarizes the assessment of available evaluations as relevant, explores the scaling up dimensions of the project/program (including a review of the drivers and spaces for scaling up) and provides a summary assessment from the scaling up perspective, followed by a list of sources for the review in each case. A concluding section summarizes the key findings of the review and presents a preliminary set of recommendations for UNDP.

## 2. COUNTRY PROGRAM ACTION PLAN 2010–2015

In December 2009 the Government of Tajikistan and UNDP signed the “Country Program Action Plan between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Nations Development Programme 2010–2015” (CPAP). This section reviews the Action Plan from a scaling up perspective.

### Focus on Scaling Up

The CPAP refers prominently to scaling up in introducing the new program on p. 19:

“Particular attention will be given to the scaling up of proven successful initiatives, utilizing best practices and lessons learned to inform policy reform...”

The theme is repeated later on the same page: “UNDP will scale up support to the MDGs...” And Output 2.1 is defined as: “To scale up HIV prevention, treatment, care and support interventions in Tajikistan...” (p. 22)<sup>9</sup>

In addition, many ingredients of a scaling up strategy are embodied in the CPAP, such as a focus on explicit results targets, on capacity building and policy reform, on partnerships, on monitoring and evaluation, on regional linkages, etc., although these are not explicitly presented as part of a scaling up strategy.<sup>10</sup>

### A Programmatic Approach

The CPAP takes a programmatic approach by bundling the many initiatives supported by UNDP into five umbrella areas: “(1) Poverty Reduction and Achievement of MDGs, (2) Reducing burden of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, (3) Good Governance, (4) Crisis Prevention and Recovery,

and (5) Environment and Sustainable Development.” (p. 5). Within these five areas the CPAP program is grouped under six outcome areas, with a total of 19 outputs and 37 targets. This gives the CPAP a thematic structure with a focus on a few key themes. It also provides UNDP with a managerial instrument to capture linkages and synergies among its program components. A programmatic approach provides a useful platform for a scaling up strategy.

### Longer Term Perspective and Focus on Continuity and Lessons Learned

The CPAP covers a six-year perspective (2010–2015), which is longer than the standard country assistance strategies of most development agencies. It is synchronized with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Tajikistan, which, in turn, has been synchronized with the MDG timeline. It also reflects a strong focus on continuity in programs, with key areas of interventions deliberately building on earlier programs (AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Community Programme; disaster preparedness; etc.). The CPAP is introduced by a retrospective with lessons learned, which provides the basis for a forward-looking program design, drawing on various program evaluations, including the Tajikistan ADR, 2009. These are essential elements of a scaling up strategy.

### Focus on Vertical Linkages

In line with the recommendations of the ADR, the CPAP reflects in many areas the intention to move from project level interventions to policy engagement with the government—which is essential for what is often called “vertical scaling up”. Vertical scaling up, across each programme area, is a key feature of UNDP’s new governance strategy in Tajikistan. The practical question in implementation will be whether UNDP has the capacity

to deliver on this intention and how it will assure effective cooperation with other donor agencies (esp. with Asian Development Bank and World Bank), which also are engaged in the policy arena.

### **Focus on Specific Results Targets**

The CPAP's focus on specific results targets is very helpful from a scaling up perspective. Most of the 37 target areas have quantified targets. Many of them are goals specified in terms of numbers of outputs (e.g., "train at least 80 staff in district-level tax departments" on p. 20); in others, they are expressed as percentages (e.g., "reach at least 60 percent of high risk groups with HIV/AIDS prevention programs by 2014" on p. 22); in one case, the CPAP states a target both in absolute and percentage terms: "To clear 11.800,000 m2 of land (79 percent of total contaminated land) [of mines], so that Tajikistan is in line to be compliant with the Ottawa Convention by 2019" (p. 28).

Quantification of the intended scale of intervention is a first step towards an explicit scaling up approach. However, a number of aspects need explicit consideration: (a) identifying the scale of the overall problem to be addressed; (b) stating the scale of the intervention, preferably in absolute terms since this will help define the design of the program needed and often gives a human dimension to the approach, and in percentage terms relative to the scale of the ultimate target to be reached; and (c) the time line for the intervention to reach its intermediate target, for example in the HIV/AIDS target cited above, and when the ultimate target is to be reached. The example of the demining target reflects the optimal approach, since it not only lists an intermediate target in absolute and relative terms, but also specifies what will be needed to reach the ultimate target by what time.<sup>11</sup>

In terms of the CPAP's retrospective of implementation of the 2005–2009 program, the stress is on absolute numbers (e.g., "rehabilitation of 20 sustainable energy systems ... that provide energy resources to 7,138 people"). There is generally no reference to the scale of the overall problem or to any targets that might have been set in the original program for that period.<sup>12</sup> For future program evaluation retrospectives, it will be important to assure that achievements are expressed in terms of how they relate to the targets set in the CPAP and to the overall scale of the problem that is being addressed.

### **Focus on Capacity Development and Implementation Modalities**

The CPAP stresses the importance of capacity development of governmental and civil society institutions at the national, district and local levels. This is an important aspect of any scaling up strategy. In this connection the plan of gradually switching from the now prevailing direct implementation modality (under which UNDP manages the implementation process) to a national implementation modality (under which national agencies implement) will be a critical part of any longer term scaling up effort.

### **Focus on Partnerships**

The CPAP has a separate section on partnerships that explains the main partners with whom UNDP plans to work in implementing the program for each outcome area. The development of an appropriate partnership interface is an essential part of a scaling up strategy and, hence, it is helpful that CPAP gives this aspect significant attention. To clarify the specific role that partners are expected to play in each area—including serving as (a) a source of a tested model that UNDP plans to scale up, (b) an agency to



which UNDP is planning to hand off a tested pilot for replication or (c) a partner in policy dialogue, source of funding, etc.—it might have been preferable to integrate more fully the discussion of partnerships with a description of each of the outcomes, outputs and targets. In any case, in implementing the individual programs of the CPAP, it will be important to ensure that the role of partnerships in supporting the scaling up pathways is clearly spelled out and monitored.

### **Focus on Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**

The CPAP also has a separate section on monitoring and evaluation, but it does not specifically address scaling up aspects. Effective M&E is critical for scaling up. In implementing the plans for internal M&E of each project and in the external mid-term and project completion evaluations, it will be important to focus explicitly on the scaling up dimensions of the projects (drivers and spaces) by asking systematically two questions: (a) What do we learn from the implementation of this project that will help us or others in scaling up the initiative, if it is successful? (b) Are we doing enough of the right things to assure that the project is ready for replication or scaling up when it is completed?

### **Regional Linkages**

In small countries like Tajikistan, scaling up will often require cross-border linkages, cooperation and integration to be explicitly considered a part of program design and implementation. It is therefore very welcome that for selected areas the CPAP recognizes the importance of regional linkages as an essential part of program design e.g., for trade facilitation through improved border crossings, for disaster preparedness and for malaria eradication.

### **An Ambitious and Complex Program**

Many of the specific activities that are envisaged under each of the 37 targets laid out in the CPAP do not appear to be directly connected with each other. This is particularly pronounced in the case of environment and sustainable development, where eight sub-target areas are specifically listed for two of the four targets. The result is a program that is very ambitious and complex, covering a great many areas of technical and policy engagement all over the country. It also raises the question whether, in fact, the CPAP has fully addressed the issue of fragmentation, which it identifies as a problem in the preceding program (2005–2009) (see p. 13).<sup>13</sup>

The current program was developed in close cooperation with the government and other partners and can be interpreted as representing a menu approach, which offers other donors the opportunity to fund specific projects in their priority areas. This understandably reflects UNDP's desire to be responsive to Tajikistan's many needs and the government's many priorities. It also is a way for UNDP to attract and bundle donor funding in view of its own limited resource base and it can be seen as an appropriate response, at the community level, to give communities a choice of their own priorities (e.g., the type of local physical or social infrastructure investments which they see as most important).<sup>14</sup> The risk inherent in this approach is that with so many initiatives in so many distinct functional and geographic areas of engagement there is a real challenge of ensuring quality, of exploiting synergies, of ensuring sustainability—including effective operations and maintenance (O&M)—and continuity and, ultimately, of scaling up successful interventions in a systematic manner.

A key challenge for the implementation of the program will be to provide for (a) an effective sequencing of interventions so that the government's and UNDP's ca-

capacities are not stretched beyond their ability to deliver; (b) an opportunity to monitor and evaluate progress and build on lessons learned; (c) assuring appropriate champions in government or among civil society and needed partnerships with other donors; (d) dropping lower priority items from the program<sup>15</sup>—the potential of scaling up for increased development impact should, in fact, be a key criterion for setting priorities in future; and, in short, (e) developing suitable scaling up pathways for each of the major program components.

## Pilots

In a number of areas, the CPAP specifies that interventions are intended to serve as pilots e.g., in the fields of micro-credit and public-private service delivery. Pilots are indeed important to test and evaluate approaches. However, pilots are useful only if they are understood as a first step in a scaling up process. Therefore, it is important that this role is explicitly specified and that deliberate steps are taken to design them as part of a scaling up pathway.

## Governance Reform Strategy

In reviewing an early draft of this report, UNDP staff commented that many of the issues of vertical scaling up—such as institutional reform, capacity building, policy reform, etc. at the national and provincial level—will be the subject of the newly to be formulated UNDP Governance Reform Strategy. By addressing the vertical scaling up challenge in each of the areas of UNDP engagement the strategy will also help provide a coherent scaling up agenda in each UNDP program cluster. (See Box 2) Since the strategy was not completed at the time of the preparation of this draft, no assessment could be made of its contribution to the scaling up agenda.

### Box 2: The Potential Role of UNDP's New Governance Reform Strategy—A Staff View

“The draft governance strategy is based on leveraging the strong local experience the UNDP has in development in Tajikistan (I believe it is seen by all players as having the strongest local presence of any agency) and its niche role in Public Administration Reform (PAR) and using them to initiate PAR within national Ministry counterparts. To date most of the interventions at the national level have been broad (the PRSP sponsored by the World Bank) or sectoral.

“Our strategy instead will look to pillar areas, such as Health, Disaster Risk Management, Poverty Reduction, to identify current policy or functional areas that require improvement, as proved out in their local programmes. Our methodology then identifies the key national counterpart areas to carry out a capacity assessment and propose a programme of reform, including players at all necessary national and sub-national levels and perhaps across Ministry lines. Both capacity development interventions on policy issues as well as on management skills will take place along with a chance for dialogue and cooperation. Organizational design, legislative mandate, etc. will also be part of the overall PAR.

“One of the important aspects of the approach is to base the reform on individuals and units that have discrete responsibility for particular issues or services, rather than a Ministry wide reform initiative. We propose beginning with a Ministry that has some responsibility for local government (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade) and focus on two units—one that has responsibility for Poverty Reduction Strategy, and another that has a Rural Development mandate. The purpose is two-fold: to begin reform that will support Rural Growth (linked to our CP unit) and to develop a methodology for all other pillar areas as we begin to scale up from technical and DIM projects towards the national level and NIM (a long-term hope, of course).”

*Source: UNDP Governance Programme staff*

## Summary Assessment

The CPAP has many strengths, among them being that it explicitly introduced scaling up as a specific focus for attention. Moreover, it contains many critical elements that are essential ingredients for a scaling up strategy for UNDP in Tajikistan—a programmatic approach; a long-term perspective and stress on continuity; a focus on results, on vertical linkages and capacity building; and a focus on partnerships, monitoring and evaluation and regional linkages.

Despite these many strengths, the CPAP does not—and probably cannot—represent a fully articulated scaling up strategy.

- a) The fact that it is an ambitious and widely dispersed program with a number of pilot interventions creates risks of fragmentation and insufficient focus on scaling up and follow-through in each of the many initiatives undertaken.
- b) With a couple of exceptions, the desired scale and the pathways of scaling up are not specified in the document. This is reflected, among other things, in the lack of monitoring implementation against scale targets in the retrospective and the lack of clear scale targets in the forward looking program. The two exceptional areas are the HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria program and the demining program.
- c) The section on partnerships, while helpful, is not focused on what is expected of key partners and what UNDP will do to help ensure that they contribute effectively to the scaling up pathways.

d) It is important to explain how pilots are expected to contribute to an eventual scaling up pathway, if they are successful.

e) More generally, it would be helpful in each main area of engagement to lay out what is the ultimate scale of desired impact and how UNDP expects to contribute towards reaching it, by briefly discussing the main drivers for the scaling up pathway and how the spaces will be created that will allow each initiative, if successfully implemented, to reach ultimately the desired scale.

The CPAP is a summary document and cannot describe the scaling up pathways for each program area in great detail. A separate, complementary document, focusing specifically on scaling up, might be better suited to trace out how UNDP pursues its scaling up agenda in specific priority areas. Indeed, much depends on how specific projects and interventions are conceived, designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated. The next five sections briefly review five specific initiatives, one for each of the major thematic areas in which the CPAP program is organized.

### 3. COMMUNITIES PROGRAMME

#### Description

**Context:** Tajikistan's Soviet legacy and centralized governmental structure post-independence have left it with weak local and community-level administrative and participatory capacities. This has limited the government's ability to respond to poor people's needs, especially in rural areas, and constrained the ability of people to help themselves through local and community-based collective action.

**The Program:** In 2010 the Communities Programme (CP) started on its third phase (2010–2015). It is now being scaled up to cover much of the country, with five area offices that cover 45 of 67 districts and at least 120 of 400 Jamoats (local administrations), meaning it is many smaller projects packaged under one big program. Key aspects include:

- **A platform for UNDP and other donor interventions at the local level:** The CP is designed to provide a platform for donor interventions in all five major programmatic areas of UNDP's engagement by offering its area offices as implementation institutions and its community organizations as participatory local delivery mechanisms for a wide range of services, including infrastructure, social services, micro-finance and business advisory services, etc.
- **Jamoat Resource Centers (JRCs):** JRCs were set up as community-based organizations to parallel the generally weak Jamoat administrations, with the intention to mobilize communities, raise their awareness and provide essential services on a participatory basis. There is now an issue of JRC sustainability, since they can no longer draw on the financial resources of the microloan fund operations that used to provide some funding out of their operating surplus (new micro fund regulations prohibit this). Not all JRCs may survive. According to the UNDP team, where JRCs are needed, they will

survive; where not, they will phase out. The JRC functions that are similar to those implemented or to be implemented by Jamoats can eventually be integrated with Jamoat functions.<sup>16</sup>

- **Support to Jamoats and Mahallas:** While not neglecting JRCs in the future, the current plan under CP is to change the approach to work more closely with the Jamoats and Mahallas (village level bodies) in order to develop their capacity to implement the new local self government law. This recognizes that, over the long term, the formal local government bodies need to be strengthened in decision-making process, planning, budgeting and monitoring of local development. One key instrument for doing so is the Rural Growth Program.
- **Rural Growth Program (RGP):** This is an area-based development program, based on a successful and evaluated pilot in Rafshan Valley. It is now being scaled up in Sugd province with participation by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and UNDP and extended into Khatlon with assistance from the Japanese government. The focus is on economic development including income generation and job opportunities, with a principal focus on agriculture-related activities, some construction and services, micro credit, vocational training, economic infrastructure, and capacity building. There's also a link with District Planning, since the RGP is designed as a key tool for implementing the District Plans (see next bullet). The Ministry of Economic Development is fully engaged and supportive; the financing link is being pursued with a trust fund that seeks to combine government, private and donor resources. Ultimately the goal is to scale up to a nationwide level.
- **Support for District Planning:** Districts have weak planning capacities; UNDP and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade have developed a district-level planning methodology, which is now being implemented in 15 districts and possibly up to 20, with use of the methodology by an additional five districts at their own initiative. Eventually the Ministry



is to take over sole responsibility for managing this initiative and rolling it out to all Districts. The idea is to also strengthen links between district and Jamoat planning approaches under the RGP.

- **National level policy:** At the national level, there are UNDP-initiated efforts to organize discussions for strengthening implementation of the new law on local self-government, including the issue of Jamoat budgeting and revenue sources, which currently are not yet provided for 2011. UNDP is also providing technical assistance to an interagency working group under the Agriculture Reform Initiative to analyze the agricultural administrative system at the local level and provide recommendations for its improvement. This would be another entry-point for UNDP to support systemic reform of local governance. Complementary donor activities involve a World Bank funded project supporting public administration reform, but the project is mostly organizing functional review processes for sectoral ministries. USAID provided support for local governance reform with Urban Institute involvement until 2009, which may be continued by the new Local Development Initiative project funded by USAID. OSI has an initiative on local government capacity building, involving support for small town planning. UNDP might wish to explore a way of bundling donor resources across these various initiatives for more effective impact.
- **National champion:** A key challenge is to get sufficient attention and engagement at the national level. There is no real champion in the national government for strong local self-government—there is no ministry specifically for local/self government and various ministries share responsibility. Indeed, the central government appears to be reluctant to support decentralization. As a result, there is currently no vision, no political driver for this initiative at the national level. A key question is how UNDP can get engaged to promote this agenda at the national level.
- **Donor Coordination:** UNDP is facilitating a working group of donors on local self-governance. The World Bank and IFAD are apparently not involved,

although they have important initiatives in support of local governments.

## Findings of CP Evaluation Report 2009

UNDP commissioned an independent evaluation of CP, which was published in June 2009.<sup>17</sup> The evaluation report identified many strengths of CP, including local capacity development, impact in terms of community participation, developmental benefits from local infrastructure, business advisory services and micro lending activities, etc. It also identified a number of limitations, relevant from a scaling up perspective, specifically the need to:

- Develop clearer long term visions and strategies for many of the components, especially as regards the future of “pilot” initiatives;<sup>18</sup>
- Implement effective monitoring and impact evaluation of individual components;
- Assure financial and institutional sustainability of initiatives;
- Develop stronger national ownership and vertical linkages to national policy formation and institution building;
- Identify the “driving forces” (p. 30) that would push and sustain the initiatives; and
- Explore stronger partnerships with other development partners.

## Findings of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Sustainable Land Management Project<sup>19</sup>

UNDP carried out a mid-term evaluation on the Sustainable Land Management (SLM) Project, which is being carried out in four Jamoats experiencing severe land degradation and implemented under the umbrella of the Community Programme.<sup>20</sup> According to

the evaluation report, the objective and content of the project are as follows “to demonstrate the potential to implement replicable Sustainable Land Management initiatives at the local level in Tajikistan and to build the capacity of local structures to do this” (p.10).

The evaluation gives the project generally high marks in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. One of the key objectives to be achieved under the project is to create conditions of sustainability, viability and replicability of local level SLM interventions. One of the intended outcomes is the development of improved and more accurate indicators of progress, but the evaluation report notes that the indicators developed under the project do not by themselves reflect on sustainability, viability or replicability. The report also notes that the monitoring system is not designed to monitor sustainability, viability and replicability (p. 29). Accordingly, it recommends “that the project establishes a good monitoring system for results/outcomes and defines a methodology for the up-scaling of activities once lessons learnt are established and the enabling conditions for best practices are clear” (p. 32).

From a scaling up perspective, the fact that the project specifically includes a replicability objective is clearly a positive aspect. But although the project is being implemented under the broader regional program of the Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management (CACILM) and replication of successful components of the SLM project are to take place under CACILM, it does not appear that the scaling up objective is built into the design of the project, in terms of laying out a pathway for scaling up beyond the initial pilot initiatives. A focus on replicability, while an important requirement for scaling up, is not sufficient. If ultimately the program is to support a scaling up objective, the project design document would

need to lay out how the pilots, if they are successful in terms of results and replicability, could and would be replicated (scaled up) to achieve increasing coverage over time in relation to a scale objective that is clearly identified at the outset. This would require identifying what UNDP and the project partners would need to do during project implementation to assess whether the various scaling up drivers and spaces exist for scaling up, how they can be created if they do not exist and what UNDP can do to help ensure that the pilots contribute effectively to progress along the scaling up pathway.

### **Assessment of the CP Project Document (ProDoc)<sup>21</sup>**

The most recent Communities Programme Project Document (ProDoc), which covers the period 2010–2012, refers to scaling up and has a number of references to replication of successful pilots. Most notably, scaling up is one of the five general principles on which the CP is based: “Orientation towards scaling up interventions and the replication of successful practices. Linking field experiences/lessons learned with the policy making process.” (ProDoc, p. 11) Moreover, some key elements of a scaling up approach are reflected in the document:

- Focus on long-term change in economic and social conditions at the community level;
- An explicit focus on sustainability, which is a prerequisite for scaling up;
- A programmatic approach, bundling manifold initiatives and providing a platform for all UNDP programs at the local level, as well as for programs funded by other donors;
- A focus on linking local interventions with interventions at the provincial and national level (vertical scaling up);

- Quantitative targets for program delivery for 2010–2012 in some of its areas of engagement;<sup>22</sup> and
- An explicit focus on monitoring and evaluation; the ProDoc itself draws very explicitly on the findings of the CP Evaluation Report 2009.

The ProDoc does not, however, develop explicit scaling up pathways for the various program components. These components would link longer-term scaling up objectives/targets with the necessary intermediate targets and steps, which are needed to achieve the longer-term goal, in terms of an explicit consideration of the needed drivers and spaces.

## Key Scaling Up Dimensions

**The idea:** Local self-government, participation of the communities, improved local and district planning and implementation capacities and effective implementation of the new law on self-governance are all essential for a broad-based bottom-up development process.

**The scale:** In principle, the goal is nation-wide development of local self-government capacities. The fact that UNDP has five well-staffed and well-functioning area offices gives it much greater capacity to support local organizations on the ground than other aid agencies.<sup>23</sup> The plan, therefore, is for the UNDP area-based implementation capacity to serve as an implementation platform for other aid agencies to use for their programs that involve local-level implementation.<sup>24</sup> However, individual components, supported by different bilateral donors, operate at varying scales—some being quite limited and without an apparent scaling up pathway defined or under consideration. Even for large programs, such as JRCs, there are significant gaps of coverage and rather than filling-in missing areas, there now is a good chance that in some cases JRCs will fold. Moreover, evidently some donors do not use the UNDP platform, even for programs that would naturally appear to lend themselves to do so, most notably perhaps IFAD (see page 14).

## Drivers and Spaces:

Table 2: Drivers and Spaces for Communities Programme <sup>25</sup>			
Drivers		Spaces	
External	UNDP, other donors	Fiscal/financial resources	Issue of sustainability of JRCs; issue of budget allocations for Jamoats under new law
	CSOs, NGOs	Policy	Lack of effective capacity to implement the new law; WB support sufficient?  Policy space for micro credit programs remains to be fully defined.
	Community interest generated by successful JRCs	Institutional/ Organizational	No clear ministerial-level responsibility for local self-government; weak local capacities being strengthened; sustainability of at least some JRCs in doubt; responsibility for O&M of infrastructure assets not clear.
Internal UNDP	UNDP management and staff <sup>26</sup>	Political	Need to deal with government sensitivity on decentralization.
Internal government	No real driver, no clear vision, some fears about decentralization	Partnership	UNDP's leads donor working group, but missing some important partners.
Incentives	Disincentives at the national government level	Natural resources	Natural resource constraints (water, pastures, etc.) limit rural development potential and may cause cross-border tension among neighboring communities.
	External funding	Cultural	Adaptation to local customs/sensitivities required; lack of history of local self-government

## Overall Assessment

UNDP's support for bottom up, local and community-based development with a long-term engagement is commendable. Its ability to develop regional offices with strong and dedicated local staff has given it an exceptional capacity among donor agencies to operate not only out of Dushanbe, but also from regional centers. The overall vision of a nationwide perspec-

tive and comprehensive programming approach, incorporating various initiatives under one multi-year program with a broad strategic intent and with an explicit focus on scaling up and replication, is very good from a scaling up perspective. In its ability to bridge the gap between local farmers, local community organizations and local administrations to national-level and international donor efforts, UNDP has developed



a very important capacity that needs to be preserved and utilized to greatest possible impact. There are, however, important issues regarding scaling up which need to be addressed.

“Vertical” scaling up remains a challenge, but also an opportunity: <sup>27</sup> So far UNDP’s engagement in national-level efforts to promote local self-government and local administrative capacity seems to be limited. One option would be to more explicitly link with the World Bank in developing a joint approach towards strengthening local government. Certainly it would seem that UNDP, with its strong engagement on the ground, has enough standing, insight and resource engagement to justify being a valuable partner in this regard.

In vertical scaling up, it will be necessary to find suitable champions in the national government, to overcome fears of decentralization and to help develop a national institutional structure to support local self-government. A key ingredient for this will be to develop a pathway of decentralization that gives the central government some assurances that it will not lose control of budgetary resource flows, be rendered unable to pursue broad development directions, or face unmanageable centrifugal political forces.

Aside from the vertical linkages, there are questions about horizontal linkages with other partners working at the local level. The working group of agencies hosted by UNDP is an excellent start. It is not clear, however, whether all relevant partners are participating. Particularly striking is the apparent absence and lack of cooperation and coordination with IFAD, which in 2009 initiated a new village-based program of rural development focused on Khatlon province, around Kulyab. From my contacts with the UNDP and IFAD teams, there has been little exchange on the respective approaches and possible complementari-

ties between IFAD and UNDP in the development and implementation of this project.

These vertical and horizontal coordination issues can perhaps best be addressed by developing a more inclusive working group and preparing a strategic concept paper for local and community based development, which would define the scaling up approach for the donors in cooperation with the government and civil society organizations (CSO). Such a strategy could also be helpful for further developing UNDP’s programmatic approach that currently places various individual initiatives under one umbrella. While this is certainly an important and helpful step, it is not clear whether (a) the various individual components have a scaling up pathway envisaged for them (e.g., what is the ultimate goal for coverage of districts in the district planning component and how would the scaling up process be financed and managed?); (b) the potential synergies among components are fully explored and realized (e.g., how will support for JRCs and Jamoat administrations be coordinated?); and (c) how can partnerships with others be used to achieve the defined scaling up goals.

For some components, especially infrastructure and micro credit, issues regarding sustainability and scaling up pathways need to be identified. The District Planning component appears to have the clearest definition of a scaling up pathway from the initial pilot through sequential roll out to more Districts and eventual hand-over to the ministry for countrywide coverage.

For the Rural Growth Program (RGP) some questions need to be addressed:

- Is the program to be extended beyond its current jurisdictions and eventually countrywide?

- What ministry would be in charge and what external donor might be a key partner beyond the current stage?
- Are the costs affordable and what might be sustainable financing modalities beyond the current project?
- Should the substantive components be retained or narrowed down/expanded?
- What would be the right models and partners to work with on specific components e.g., micro credit?
- What policy/institutional obstacles or support would be needed to go beyond the current level of operation?

The quantitative results metrics, especially in the ProDoc, are helpful monitoring tools for setting and monitoring short-term program goals, but they do not define long-term scaling up targets and, hence, do not serve as intermediate steps along well-defined scaling up pathways.

In short, UNDP's programmatic approach remains to be converted into an explicit scaling approach.

## 4. HIV/AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA PROGRAM UNDER THE GLOBAL FUND (GF)

### Description

**Context:** The disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet health system brought a serious weakening of the overall Tajik health system and a low capacity to respond to epidemics, including and especially HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria. Although not an agency specializing in health service delivery, UNDP is operating as principal recipient for the Global Fund (GF).<sup>28</sup>

**The Program:** The program started in May 2003 and has grown rapidly: In 2003, \$1.3 million was spent under the program, in 2010, \$10 million. Substantial progress has been made in the three key areas—AIDS, TB, and Malaria. For example, over four years, Malaria cases dropped from about 6,000 to only 165. Box 3 summarizes progress with scaling up the innovative model of voluntary HIV counseling and testing.

Since its onset, UNDP has focused on capacity development. Initially this effort concentrated on capacity building of implementing partners, but more recently, in line with GF policy shift, UNDP has focused also on

health sector capacity improvement more generally, mostly within the GF's three priority areas.

Discussions about a health-sector SWAp (Sector Wide Approach) have taken place among donors and with government in Tajikistan, but they are generally seen by the donor community as premature; a health sector strategy was approved in August 2010. At the same time, and despite serious continuing health threats according to World Health Organization statistics, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and DFID are phasing out of health; only the EU remains a major donor. This will place a potentially larger burden on UNDP for engaging in and leading donor support in the health sector.

Continuing GF funding depends not only on satisfactory performance, but also a long-term commitment.<sup>29</sup> This requires good M&E, with reporting on a semi-annual basis. In principle, the quick, unbureaucratic GF funding model is good, but according to UNDP staff and government clients, recently the GF has become more like a traditional donor. According to UNDP staff, while UNDP is supporting local capacity building, the Direct Implementation Model (DIM) continues to be needed in Tajikistan.

### Box 3. Voluntary HIV Counseling and Testing

One of the good examples of scaling up on HIV-related interventions is the introduction of routine provider initiated testing as well as voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) in all public health facilities and service delivery points. The table below shows the growth in number of people tested, number of testing and counseling facilities and relevant number of increases in new registered HIV cases. In 2007, the Ministry of Health within the framework of Global Fund grant piloted the integration of provider-initiated testing and counseling (PITC) into reproductive health centers and maternity homes in eight districts. Currently, 30 percent of territorial districts in Tajikistan offer PITC to pregnant women. Experience has shown that agreement to undergo HIV testing after being routinely offered is particularly high among pregnant women. HIV testing among pregnant women has significantly increased from 19,801 women tested in 2007 to 40,171 in 2008 and 76,297 in 2009.

Although routine testing does not replace the need for VCT, particularly in non-clinical settings there is a need to strengthen the capacity of health workers on VCT among most at risk population groups. A comprehensive communication campaign using mass media and interpersonal communications as well as integrated VCT services at delivery points for MARP will not only improve awareness about and uptake of VCT, but will also reduce HIV-related stigma and address barriers to VCT access, particularly among most vulnerable groups.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>People reached with VCT</b>	58,899	93,791	93,264	148,255	210,179	>280,000
<b>Number of labs</b>	9	9	13	13	21	21
<b>Points providing VCT services</b>		97	108	122	231	231
<b>New HIV cases registered</b>	189	204	339	383	431	1004

Source: Drafted by UNDP Tajikistan Country Office Staff

### Key Scaling Up Dimensions of the Approach

**The idea:** The GF scaling up model aims to achieve as much impact, as quickly as possible, in terms of combating specific epidemiological threats, through large-scale interventions targeted at the specific threats.<sup>30</sup>

**The scale:** Quantitative targets for outputs and outcomes, including ultimate goals, are usually defined for program components.

### Assessment

Scaling up is built into the GF model. Pathways for scaling up—including a definition of what is the desired ultimate scale, the sequence of interventions, intermediate targets, etc.—in each of the three illness areas of the GF are generally well defined, and there is a strong monitoring and evaluation approach in place. Indeed, the scaling up model of the GF may have broader application in other areas of UNDP's work. It has already been applied by UNDP country office staff to the Mine Action Program (see discus-



## Drivers and spaces:

Table 3: Drivers and Spaces for AIDS/HIV, TB and Malaria Program			
Drivers		Spaces	
External	Health crisis	Fiscal/financial resources	GF funding critical; without it the program is un-sustainable
	Global Fund	Policy	Policy dialogue for AIDS, TB and malaria subsector reform
	International/ local NGOs	Institutional/ Organizational	Currently depending on UNDP; effort to build up government capacity a long-term goal
Internal UNDP	GF funding opportunities	Political	Advocacy for ATM
Internal government		Partnership	Implementing partners; government
Incentives	Global fund financing strong driver	Natural resources	N.A.
		Cultural	Adaptation to local customs/ sensitivities required

sion of the CPAP above) and might provide useful lessons for other programs. Nonetheless, there are some issues in the design and implementation of the GF program which deserve further attention.

First, and most importantly, the financial and fiscal sustainability of the program depends on continued GF support and ultimately on the government developing greater fiscal capacity and giving adequate priority to the fight against AIDS, TB and malaria. Therefore, it is critical that UNDP work with its partners in Tajikistan to define the financial trajectory for sustainability of the GF supported programs at scale. Second, as long as UNDP remains a principal

recipient of last resort for the country, the implementation mode will be direct implementation (DIM) by UNDP. However, even while this is the case, the emphasis should continue to be on enabling the capacities of not only the government, but also civil society and other clusters, to take over implementation of similar grants or certain grants' components in the future. Early thought will have to be given to how to manage the transition and how to ensure that natural disincentives for hand-off do not prolong the DIM approach unnecessarily. Third, the issue of how and how far the GF should be engaged in broader health sector strategy beyond AIDS, TB and malaria remains to be addressed.<sup>31</sup>

## 5. AID COORDINATION<sup>32</sup>

### Description

**Context:** The State Committee on Investment and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan has been in charge of aid coordination and aid data management, and of foreign investment promotion. UNDP has provided support to the State Committee in each of these two areas.

**The Program:** UNDP's support for investment promotion complements the work of other aid agencies, such as ADB and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). A key objective is to help develop a set of regional investment strategies and help get pilots under way in two regions and/or sectors. This part of UNDP's support was not subject to review in this study.

UNDP's support for aid coordination involves a number of components:

*Support for the Donor Coordination Council (DCC) secretariat:* This is the committee of donors that meets regularly to address aid coordination issues. At the time of this study, a small team of international consultants, supervised by the chairman of the DCC, was reviewing the structure of aid coordination among the donors and with the government to assure a consistent approach. This continues work initiated under the Joint Country Partnership Strategy (JCPS), which was completed in 2009 by a group of donors in collaboration with government.

*Support for the development and strengthening of functional responsibilities for aid coordination and management processes in Tajikistan:* This work is based on the results of a review of the State Committee's aid coordination function, for which

UNDP provided support through the development of the "Guidelines of Foreign Aid Mobilization, Coordination and Monitoring in the Republic of Tajikistan."<sup>33</sup> This government resolution contains important guidance for government agencies and aid donors in the management of aid resources.

*Assistance to the State Committee on Investment and State Property Management in developing and implementing a system of aid data compilation:* This builds on a prior initiative of technical assistance from ADB; the system is to be completed and rolled out on-line in August 2010. A demonstration of the system showed an outstanding data management tool with these main features:

- Ease of data submission: submission of data by donors in a standardized format;
- Easy data access and analysis: the database is accessible on-line in a user-friendly format;
- Comprehensive: submissions are nearly complete for all major donors, including official bilateral and multilateral OECD-DAC<sup>34</sup> donors, non-traditional donors (including China, Iran, Russia, etc.);
- Sectoral tagging: data are sectorally tagged for aggregation as needed
- Geographic tagging: data can be sorted by geographic location of aid projects;
- Historical data series: some of the data series go back for a number of years and efforts have been made to allow for inter-temporal consistency;
- Multiple user languages: the data are accessible on the site in three languages: Tajik, Russian and English; and
- Regular publication of high quality, timely reports on aid flows to Tajikistan.<sup>35</sup>

## Key Scaling Up Dimensions of the Approach

**Idea and Scale:** The support for the Donor Coordination Council builds appropriately on the JCPS; but it is not clear whether UNDP and, more broadly, the donor community in Tajikistan and the Tajik government have a clear view of the longer-term strategy to increase the capacity of donors to cooperate and to increase the capacity of the government to coordinate aid. It will be important to link this component explicitly with the implementation and monitoring of the JCPS with the evaluation/updating/extension of it at some time in the foreseeable future, and with the notion that each aid agency and the government internalize the scaling up concept into their operating modalities, since this will facilitate a cooperative approach for all.

The support for data management represents an excellent example of a hand-off from one agency (ADB) to another (UNDP) and the production of what appears to be an outstanding, perhaps even unique aid data management instrument. The way the system is organized (based at the State Committee, run by national experts, very user-friendly, and relatively low cost) makes it very attractive. The key will be to assure that it is sustained over time, that it is widely accessible, and that it is used to input data into the OECD-DAC data base (in the past, there have been inconsistencies between data in the DAC series and data provided by local donor offices. There could be potential for replication/scaling up of the method to other countries.

## Drivers and spaces for the aid data management project:

Table 4: Drivers and Spaces for Aid Data Management			
Drivers		Spaces	
External	OECD-DAC	Fiscal/financial resources	Keeping costs low will minimize fiscal burden; eventual hand-off in funding to government will have to be managed carefully
	Donor HQs	Policy	High-level policy dialogue on aid transparency issues and global initiatives, such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative.  Guidelines on Foreign Aid Mobilization, Management, Coordination and Monitoring define current institutional set up for coordination processes.
	Local donor recognition of need for better coordination of aid	Institutional/ Organizational	Question whether committee is the right place for aid coordination in the longer term (Ministry of Finance may be better)
Internal UNDP	UNDP management and staff	Political	Mobilizing local and international stake holders for the data will sustain the effort.
Internal government	State Investment Committee and capable, committed local experts	Partnership	Embedding this effort in the DCC/JPCS process should help
Incentives	Government to name and shame non-compliant donors; demands from President, Minister of finance, State Investment Committee, CSOs for complete and usable data	Natural resources	N.A.
		Cultural	N.A.

## Assessment

Overall, UNDP's support for aid coordination responds well to the scaling up agenda. However, three issues of long-term scaling up strategy in the area of aid coordination need to be addressed going forward. First, UNDP and the government should consider how the activities of the DCC secretariat and Investment Committee link to JCPS and how they will be embedded in a longer-term strategy for having the government fully take over responsibility

for aid coordination. Second, while the aid data management initiative is a well designed and implemented effort, the main challenge will be to ensure longer term government commitment and funding, commitment by donors to submit timely and quality information and effective links to the international aid data improvement initiatives. The possibility of replicating the system elsewhere should be explored. Third, an effective M&E approach remains to be developed in this area.

## 6. DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

### Description

**Context:** Tajikistan, like its neighbors, is subject to a high risk of catastrophic disasters, including earthquakes, floods, droughts, food insecurity, harsh winters with lack of electricity, etc.

**The Program:** The Disaster Risk Management Programme<sup>36</sup> (DRMP) is now at the beginning of its third phase (2010–2015). The third phase is based on a strategy developed by the government with the support of UNDP over the two previous years. The program contains various components, including:

*Earthquake risk analysis and preparedness (including assessment of residential buildings and social structures such as schools and hospitals):* Under the third phase demonstration of mitigation efforts and pilot mitigation initiatives will be pursued and will eventually need to be taken to scale (as has been done in Tashkent).<sup>37</sup>

*Disaster risk management:* This involves a cluster of two complementary sets of activities: (a) A disaster risk management partnership in Tajikistan, called REACT, mainly constituted from international actors, but chaired by government and co-chaired by UNRC; REACT is a forum for coordination of disaster prevention and risk reduction as well as disaster response at all levels and particularly those focused on the community level. (b) Comprehensive risk monitoring such as water levels in reservoirs, food prices, fuel prices, electricity production, precipitation, etc. under the Risk Monitoring and Warning System; this is a national level initiative launched to support REACT and the government to identify and monitor risks and provide warnings for effective and on-time prevention and response to different types of crises. At the national level these

initiatives are well established with a much expanded monthly dissemination of relevant data and analysis; regional (sub-national) REACT groups are also active and cooperate with national-level REACT. The government will also take over secretariat role from UNDP.

*Capacity building:* The Committee of Emergencies (down-graded from ministry level three years ago) is UNDP's main counterpart on this activity and a multi-year (2008–14) effort is underway to strengthen its capacity and eventually be upgraded again to ministerial status. The challenge is how to ensure that Committee can effectively carry out its role.

*Early recovery:* An effort is now underway to integrate humanitarian crisis response with a longer-term development approach. The Kulyab flash flood in May 2010 served as a test case, where government set up a coordination platform, chaired by a deputy prime minister, including various ministries, U.N. agencies, international financial institutions, NGOs and the private sector. It demonstrated, among other things, that it is possible to integrate REACT, a non-governmental coordination platform, effectively with the governmental coordination and response structure under the State Commission on Emergency Situations, which is chaired by the chairman of the government.

*Regional (supra-national) initiatives:* Tajikistan's DRMP is linked to a broader effort in the international community to assist Central Asia in disaster risk management, considering the many regionally shared risks and need for regional preparedness and response capacity (see UNDP's Central Asia Human Development Report 2005). UNDP, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN-ISDR), the World Bank and others are engaged. For example, UNDP is pursuing its Central Asia Region Regional Risk Assessment (CARRA) initiative, which brings together

international donor agencies for regular annual events and serves as a platform for developing and coordinating various regional disaster risk management initiatives. In this context Tajikistan's DRMP is playing an important role as an example or pilot to be emulated elsewhere.<sup>38</sup>

The Tajik authorities and UNDP face a number of issues and challenges in this program area:

- According to UNDP staff, for earthquake risks the capacity for search and rescue needs to be strengthened. Five regional teams have been equipped and trained as a first step, but this needs to be expanded. Also, the Kulyab flood event showed shortage of emergency equipment, according to the committee.
- Committee staff feels that more seismic measurement centers are needed (there are currently only six) with a greater prognostic analytical capacity to assess changes in seismic risks.
- UNDP and committee staff feel that some aspects of risk mitigation needs more attention—for example, in Soviet days, millions of dollars were spent annually on river bank reinforcement, yet very little is done today and as a result there is a serious increase in

the risk from flooding. The government, with donor assistance (e.g., an ADB project, SDC funded initiatives and a DIPECHO<sup>39</sup> intervention) is carrying out localized repair, but this also needs to be expanded.

- While relations with the Committee for Emergencies are good, the government is reluctant to give the disaster risk issue prominence at the national and international level to avoid increasing domestic fears among the population and risk creating excessive expectations of the governmental capacities to address disasters.<sup>40</sup>
- Committee staff mentioned that a regional preparedness initiative in the Fergana Valley had to be discontinued due to political tensions with Uzbekistan and problems in Kyrgyz Republic.

## Key Scaling Up Dimensions

**The idea:** Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response capacity are critical for Tajikistan nation-wide.

**The scale:** The basic concept of DRMP is to operate at a national level with well-articulated linkages to sub-national institutional set-ups and with links to supra-national regional initiatives.



**Drivers and spaces:**

Table 5: Drivers and Spaces for Disaster Risk Management			
Drivers		Spaces	
External	High disaster risk exposure and history of serious disasters	Fiscal/financial resources	Compared to Soviet days, much constrained; sustainability of externally funded programs an issue.
	International disaster examples	Policy	Appropriate policy framework needed at national level.
	International community (e.g., UNDP Central Asia HDR)	Institutional/ Organizational	Issue of Committee versus Ministry; need for capacity building; Committee needs to take over responsibility for REACT.
Internal UNDP	UNDP management and staff	Political	Need to overcome government sensitivity to public discussion of the disaster risks.
Internal government	Committee is driving the process	Partnership	Apparently good cooperation among a few donors; need to get more attention also of other donors.
Incentives	Fear of potential political repercussions from poor response to major disaster	Natural resources	Exposure to Climate Change risks critical; this is being explored at regional (supra-national) level with UNDP engagement.
	External funding	Cultural	Adaptation to local customs/ sensitivities may be required.

## Assessment

In many ways this is a good example of scaling up in multiple dimensions; it is designed at a national scale, with sub-national engagement/platforms, as well as links to supra-national initiatives, in which the Tajikistan DRMP plays an exemplary role. Moreover, UNDP's stick-with-it attitude and longer-term approach are very laudable and essential for this initiative. Institutional capacity building initiatives are appropriately part of the initiative and designed to support the eventual assumption of full responsibility by the government. There is an effective partnership between UNDP and the Committee for Emergency. Partnerships with other international partners are also good, albeit limited, as some major other donors (e.g., the World Bank) do not appear to be fully engaged.

The key scaling up challenges in this program area are:

- High-level political support/leadership in this area has to be assured and the re-establishment of ministerial status for the Committee remains a distant goal.
- Fiscal constraints limit scaling up of various sub-initiatives and longer-term prospects of DRMP since it is unclear if and when external donors withdraw their support.
- More generally, UNDP has to think about the scaling up the potential for a number of its individual initiatives under this program area (e.g., for capacity building and early recovery).
- Regional cooperation is constrained by regional political rivalries.
- So far, there has been no systematic effort to evaluate the overall program.

## 7. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

### Description

**Context:** Tajikistan is blessed with abundant water resources that can be used for irrigation and hydro energy production, as well as for residential and industrial use. There are large irrigation and hydro energy systems in place from Soviet days with high O&M requirements, which often have been neglected after independence. The government's attention is generally focused on large-scale hydro power station development. There are many opportunities for small hydro-power investments that remain untapped. In addition, Tajikistan faces many environmental development opportunities and challenges, including threats from climate change.

**The Program:** The major interventions of UNDP in the energy and environmental area to date have included:

- Support for development of the first National Environmental Action Plan of Tajikistan;
- Support for development of the National Action Plans on Climate Change and Biodiversity Conservation;
- Support for preparation of the First and Second National Communications to U.N. Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity Conservation;
- A number of specific environmental initiatives, the biggest ones being the Gissar Biodiversity project, which targets changes in overall system of the governance of protected areas, and the Sustainable Land Management project in Shartuz (described under the Communities Programme);
- A number of initiatives in support of establishment of mini hydro power plants (HPP).

UNDP currently has 12 projects under implementation, funded by various donors, including the Global Environment Facility (GEF), mostly in response to

government requests. Some involve advisory work on systemic energy and environmental issues. As part of UNDP's effort to consolidate its activities more generally, it recently created an umbrella Environment and Energy Programme to avoid fragmentation and duplication of the actions implemented within different projects. UNDP has also begun to explore how to maximize synergies among its various energy and environment projects.

A major new initiative revolves around the development of a "Renewable Energy Strategy", which has its core ideas reflected in a technical paper by UNDP entitled "Renewable Energy Scaling Up Concept Note" (no date). The basic concept is to develop a model of integrated rural development around small and medium hydro schemes (33-500kW) providing electricity and water resources for commercial, agricultural and residential use by rural communities. UNDP has facilitated the establishment of an inter-ministerial taskforce for integrated rural development projects. The idea is to prepare district development plans for pilot districts. A first step has been taken in Vakhdat district, with 30 projects of small hydro power plants (sHPPs), which eventually could be scaled up to a national level. The concept note lays out some basic parameters for the overall strategy with three scenarios for a national program at different levels of electricity provision for individual households. It also stipulates that the technology of the sHPPs and mHPPs would be standardized nation-wide at levels that would allow local contractors to provide at least half of the components and services, thus creating local employment and assuring ease of O&M. Funding would be provided by the "Rural RES and EE Fund,"<sup>41</sup> by revenues generated from the sale of power to users in winter and of power to the national grid in summer,<sup>42</sup> and from contributions from local governments.

The design of this new program is still in the initial stages and raises a number of questions, including:

- Which river flows are accessible throughout the year? What is required in terms of year round availability of river flows to make it affordable?
- Where does the funding come for the O&M and capital investment purposes?
- What will be the institutional set-up?
- What is the timeframe i.e., when will the possibility for export be realistic, and until then, what are the options (i.e. five year timeframe)? Financial benefits should be carefully stated and separately analyzed for the timeframe before the possibility for electricity export is enabled, and upon the finishing of transmission lines that will enable export.

- What will be the relationship between price of electricity from sHPPs and large-scale HPPs?

These questions were under active investigation by the UNDP project team at the time of this study.

## **Key Scaling Up Dimensions (for RES)**

**The Idea:** Promote integrated rural community development schemes around the development of sHPPs and mHPPs.

**The Scale:** The scale envisaged is to create capacity for 200MW over five to seven years and to service one million people (at 1-3kW per household, depending on the scenario).

## Drivers and Spaces

Table 6: Drivers and Spaces for Renewable Energy (RES)			
Drivers		Spaces	
External	Pressing energy shortages (esp. in winter) for many rural communities	Fiscal/financial resources	Rural RES and EE Fund are to provide resources; but financial model remains to be fully determined.
	UNDP, other donors	Policy	Legal framework is in place but detailed regulations need to be established.
	CSOs, NGOs; community interest generated by UNDP and NGO outreach	Institutional/ Organizational	Responsibility for developing and implementing this program remains to be determined. Weakness of national power company (Barki Tojik) a potential problem.
Internal UNDP	UNDP management and staff.	Political	Need to ensure continued government support at highest level (risk is that focus is on large HPPs only).
Internal government	Law on RES provides legal basis; but despite Presidential directive in support of sHPPs, it is not clear that leadership is fully behind this initiative, given its focus on large HPPs.	Partnership	UNDP will have to enlist the support of other key official partners (international financial institutions, bilateral donors), of key NGOs, and assure adequate donor funding.
Incentives	External funding	Natural resources	Year-round water availability in small seasonal rivers may be a problem. Long-term availability of water flow under conditions of Climate Change may also be an issue.
		Cultural	Adaptation to local customs/ sensitivities required.

## Assessment

The energy and environment area is a fast growing part of UNDP in Tajikistan. Two general comments apply to this program currently under preparation: (a) 12 individual projects add up to be a high number of interventions. It is not clear how these can be effectively managed, monitored and evaluated with a small staff, how sustainability and scaling up potential can

be assured and how synergies can be maximized; (b) Bundling the various initiatives under an overall program and stressing synergies among them should help address concerns about potential duplication and allow for maximized benefits, but does not necessarily address the challenge of managing a large number of initiatives and assuring that each is part of a well developed scaling up pathway. The devel-

opment of a new Energy and Environment Program statement is an opportunity to explore the scaling up opportunities and challenges.

The RES program is specifically designed to apply a scaling up approach. The “Renewable Energy Scaling Up Concept Note” is an excellent start in defining potential pathways for scaling up. Being completed at the beginning of the initiative is critical, since it allows UNDP and the government and their partners to consider the relevant questions from the start. Among the questions arising from the drivers/spaces table above and deserving attention are the following:

- Who is the (potential) driver of this program in government and what can be done to assure political space/commitment?
- What is the financial model? How will this program be made viable beyond the pilot level? Currently UNDP is working with the government on the establishment of the Renewable Energy Fund, which is planned within the Law on Renewable Energy. There are significant questions that need to be addressed, including: While Barki Tojik is legally required to purchase the summer electricity of sHPPs, will it be able to pay for the take-off, even when it can't sell the power elsewhere given surplus summer energy

supplies in the short to medium term? Will communities be able to pay for the O&M costs of the program at least, and perhaps contribute to capital costs?<sup>43</sup>

- What is the government's institutional setup for organizing, implementing and monitoring this effort?<sup>44</sup>
- How can other key partners be mobilized to support this project? Working with the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will be critical here.
- Will the preliminary judgment on year-round water availability be confirmed and how will climate change affect the viability of the approach in the longer term?<sup>45</sup>
- The experience with comparable initiatives in Tajikistan needs to be compared with this program. Specifically, the experience of the Pamir mHPP project of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), the International Development Association (IDA) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) will be relevant.
- How does this program relate to other programs undertaken by UNDP in rural communities, especially the Communities Program, and how can environmental concerns and initiatives be mainstreamed and scaled up through the CP?



## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

Based on the analysis in the preceding sections, one can conclude that UNDP's approach in Tajikistan has many important elements of a scaling up approach:

- An explicit recognition of the scaling up challenge and need for replicability in its Country Program Action Plan and in some of its major programs and projects;
- A long-term perspective for many of its programs and projects that is based on a “stick-with-it” mentality;
- A programmatic framework for the many interventions that it supports;
- The capacity to deploy its and other donors' resources country-wide through regional offices staffed by Tajik experts;
- Strong linkages with local counterparts and therefore the potential for local ownership;
- An explicit partnership approach, by offering its implementation capacity to other development partners in their areas of interest and by engaging donor coordination;
- In some areas an explicit focus on vertical linkages, through policy engagement and institution building at the national and district level, which will later be reinforced by the Governance Reform Strategy currently under preparation;
- A recognition of the cross-border, regional dimensions of key development problems;
- An effort to define results targets explicitly; and
- A clear focus on monitoring, evaluation and learning.

All of these elements of a scaling up approach can be found in the Country Program Action Plan. They also are selectively reflected in the individual programs as-

essed for this review. For each of these elements, however, a more systematic and articulated approach to scaling up could and should be explored:

*Scaling up as a goal:* While scaling up and replicability appear as explicit objectives in the Country Program Action Plan and are mentioned in some program and project documents, they do not appear to play a central and pervasive role in the program and project design concepts, with the exception of the AIDS/TB/Malaria program and the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) program. A focus on replicability is helpful, but not sufficient to establish and implement a scaling up pathway for UNDP's program. A proactive approach to scaling up needs to go beyond demonstrating replicability. It needs to prepare the groundwork for assuring that the various drivers and spaces for scaling up, which define the pathway, actually materialize.

*Long-term perspective and engagement:* UNDP's long-term perspective is essential, but not sufficient, since by itself it does not assure a focus on the pursuit of well-articulated scaling up pathways, which UNDP programs might support.

*Programmatic framework:* The effort to place UNDP's many individual projects under the umbrella of a programmatic framework is an excellent starting point for a scaling up approach. However, it currently appears that some of the individual program components remain fragmented under the programmatic umbrella and it is not clear that there is sufficient selectivity and focus on synergies among projects. Moreover, the large number of interventions that are supported under each of the main thematic umbrella makes it difficult to develop systematic scaling up pathways for each of the initiatives (including defining the desired scale and results targets, exploring the drivers and spaces for scaling up and assuring appropriate monitoring and

evaluation). Over time UNDP may need to become more selective in its coverage of multiple issues, areas of intervention and initiatives. The scaling up potential of each program component would be a good criterion for selecting priority interventions.

*Organizational platform for nation-wide engagement at local levels:* The organizational capacity and implementation platform of UNDP's area offices is clearly a major institutional asset. In principle, it can serve also as a platform for implementing scaling up pathways at the local level for UNDP projects and programs funded by other donors. In practice there are cases where the area offices implement programs with a scaling up agenda, especially the AIDS/HIV, TB and Malaria programs. However, unless individual interventions implemented by the area office are systematically defined in terms of their scaling up pathways, the opportunity to use this institutional platform may be missed. The need to attract donor funding may well encourage indiscriminate acceptance of donor projects by UNDP and thus a proliferation of unconnected small initiatives scattered across the country. But if UNDP makes the development and implementation of scaling up pathways an explicit condition of accepting other donors' initiatives, it could well have a catalytic role—aside from helping with the effective implementation of donor programs—in disseminating the understanding and assuring a focus on also scaling up to other donor agencies.

*Linkages with Tajik counterparts and implementation modalities:* UNDP's reliance on high-quality national staff and its local presence in area offices provide an excellent basis for assuring ownership and effective implementation. However, UNDP's reliance on the direct implementation modality and on project implementation units limits the long-term sustainability of its programs and the development of Tajikistan's own institutional capacity to implement and scale up suc-

cessful programs. UNDP's Action Plan 2010–2015 has recognized this challenge and promises a gradual transition towards national implementation modality, which would also be in line with the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. The new Governance Reform Strategy will also address this issue. In any case, the goal of moving gradually to national implementation will need to be embedded explicitly in all program and project approaches and could become an element of appropriately defined scaling up pathways.

*Partnership approach:* UNDP's orientation towards working with other partners—official and non-governmental donors, as well as public and private local counterparts—is a corner-stone of UNDP's Country Program Action Plan 2010–2015 and is reflected in many of its interventions. Three aspects could be given further attention in connection with a scaling up agenda: (a) In planning and implementing pilot projects, UNDP should from the outset systematically consider which partners might be suitable and interested for scaling up the pilot approach if it is proven successful. UNDP should reach out to and involve these partners as early as possible in pilot preparation and implementation. (b) When serving as an institutional platform for the projects of other donors (especially with its Area Offices), UNDP should explore how these donor projects can go beyond isolated, one-time interventions and serve as a step towards an explicit scaling up pathway. (c) In some areas of UNDP engagement it appears that important potential partners are not involved or that UNDP has not reached out as much as might be desirable (e.g., the World Bank for disaster preparedness; IFAD for the CP program of rural community development).<sup>46</sup>

*Vertical linkages:* UNDP's increased focus on strengthening its policy dialogue, on institution building at the national level and on strengthening linkages between

local, provincial and national-level interventions is potentially a key element of a scaling up strategy. The new Governance Reform Strategy will develop a coherent and systematic approach in this regard. In pursuing this objective, UNDP should reach out for partners who can assist in different endeavors (e.g., the WB and the EU in the context of effective governance reform), be aware of possible resistance among important domestic stakeholders and look for strong champions, especially at the national level.

*Cross-border linkages:* In some areas (including trade facilitation, AIDS/TB/malaria and disaster preparedness) the UNDP program has pursued a regional approach. This is an important potential pathway for scaling up impact in small countries. The important challenge for UNDP is to stay abreast of the many donor-supported regional initiatives in each of their respective areas and ensure that its national-level strategy and interventions are linked effectively with the regional initiatives.

*Results targets:* UNDP employs a results-based management approach, as reflected in the results matrix attached to its Action Plan 2010–2015. As mentioned previously, this is very helpful. However, to support a scaling up approach results, targets and benchmarks should be defined for each area of intervention against a long-term scaling up objective. Moreover, intermediate absolute and relative targets should be defined, which are to be achieved by the specific intervention, as is already the case for some of UNDP's programs (e.g., AIDS/TB/malaria and demining see p. 10 above). Monitoring and evaluation methods should include an explicit reference to these short- and long-term targets.

*Monitoring and evaluation (M&E):* The Action Plan 2010–2015) has high expectations for M&E of UNDP programs and projects,<sup>47</sup> presumably in response to the critique in the ADR of past M&E practices.<sup>48</sup> This

scaling up review was not able to validate the critique of the ADR in the current program, but in the absence of a systematic scaling up approach in UNDP's current operational work in Tajikistan, it is likely that the M&E practices do not fully reflect the needs of such an approach. In particular, it is essential that M&E is designed to assess progress along a defined scaling up pathway; to identify what needs to be done to adjust the pathway; and to identify the steps for best scaling up results. At the same time, a systematic focus on scaling up will likely provide a strong incentive for more effective M&E.<sup>49</sup>

In addition to the points raised above the following important aspects need to be flagged: First, the financial and fiscal resource space is a potentially serious constraint to long-term sustainability and scaling up in each program area, and needs to be explicitly addressed. Second, natural resource constraints are clearly an issue for the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) program, and cultural constraints may be a concern for a number of programs, including the AIDS/TB/Malaria program and the disaster preparedness program. Third, incentives and accountability are important elements in the focus on results and M&E, but could be more generally explored for each program and project intervention.

In sum, for the future, UNDP in Tajikistan might wish to explore developing a systematic approach to scaling up. This would reaffirm the scaling up objective already embedded in its Country Program Action Plan 2010–2015, and would explore for projects and interventions ("interventions" for short) using the following questions:

- What is the scale of the opportunity/challenge/problem ("problem" for short) UNDP is trying to address?
- What is the scaling up pathway that UNDP envisages to help address the problem?

- How do the various drivers and spaces (identified in Table 1 above) support or limit a potential scaling up process?
- How and how far will the intervention help address this problem, with what instruments and over what time horizon?
- What are the results targets for the intervention (in absolute terms and relative to the ultimate scale of the problem)?
- How will the progress of the intervention be monitored and its success in addressing the problem evaluated in terms of the achievement of the results targets for the intervention, in terms of the establishment of the drivers and spaces needed for subsequent scaling up and in terms of the need to adjust the expectations for the scaling up pathway?

The answers to these questions, the process to arrive at them and the documentation demonstrating them can and should be kept simple. The most important objective is to sensitize the UNDP management and staff, the partners, and most importantly the local counterparts to the need to ask and address these questions for each intervention, so that the mind-set focuses on the scaling up challenge and not merely on the one-time achievement of limited project goals.

Simple benchmarks and monitoring approaches will be a good starting point for developing an M&E process that specifically supports the scaling up approach.

As a next step it might be best to develop specific “scaling up pathways/action plans” for interventions with the greatest scaling up potential, including more detailed analyses of the “drivers and spaces” matrix as well as an M&E framework. For the rest of the portfolio (including future interventions), UNDP could apply a set of principles and a checklist, which would test scalability of the initiative and determine the steps to use the scaling up potential to the extent possible.

Ultimately, it will be important for UNDP to take the scaling up agenda beyond its Tajikistan program. Having recognized the value of a scaling up approach for the implementation of its development mission, UNDP may wish to ensure that its corporate mission statement, its operational, human resource and budget policies and procedures, and its country program approaches in-country are fully aligned with the institutional goal of supporting the scaling up of successful development interventions in the countries and areas in which it works.

## ANNEX: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ADB</b> .....	Asian Development Bank	<b>JRC</b> .....	Jamoat Resource Center
<b>ADR</b> .....	Assessment of Development Results	<b>M&amp;E</b> .....	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>AKDN</b> .....	Aga Khan Development Network	<b>mHPP</b> .....	Medium Hydro Power Project
<b>CACLIM</b> .....	Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management	<b>MDG</b> .....	Millennium Development Goal
<b>CARRA</b> .....	Central Asia Regional Risk Assessment	<b>NGO</b> .....	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>CIS</b> .....	Commonwealth of Independent States	<b>NIM</b> .....	National Implementation Modality
<b>CP</b> .....	Community Programme	<b>O&amp;M</b> .....	Operations and Management
<b>CPAP</b> .....	Country Programme Action Plan	<b>OSI</b> .....	Open Society Institute
<b>CSO</b> .....	Civil Society Organization	<b>ProDoc</b> .....	Project Document
<b>DAC</b> .....	Development Assistance Committee	<b>PAR</b> .....	Public Administration Reform
<b>DCC</b> .....	Donor Coordination Council	<b>PITC</b> .....	Provider-Initiated Testing and Counseling
<b>DFID</b> .....	UK Department for International Development	<b>PIU</b> .....	Project Implementation Unit
<b>DIM</b> .....	Direct Implementation Modality	<b>PR</b> .....	Principal Recipient
<b>DRMP</b> .....	Disaster Risk Management Programme	<b>RBEC</b> .....	Regional Bureau for Europe and Central Asia
<b>EE</b> .....	Energy Efficiency	<b>REACT</b> .....	Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team
<b>EU</b> .....	European Union	<b>RES</b> .....	Renewable Energy Source
<b>GEF</b> .....	Global Environmental Facility	<b>sHPP</b> .....	Small Hydro Power Project
<b>GF or GFATM</b> ..	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	<b>SIDA</b> .....	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>GIZ (GTZ)</b> .....	Gesellschaft für Internationale (Technische) Zusammenarbeit	<b>SLM</b> .....	Sustainable Land Management
<b>HPP</b> .....	Hydro Power Project	<b>SWAp</b> .....	Sector-Wide Approach
<b>HQ</b> .....	Headquarters	<b>TB</b> .....	Tuberculosis
<b>IFAD</b> .....	International Fund for Agricultural Development	<b>UNDAF</b> .....	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>JCPS</b> .....	Joint Country Partnership Strategy	<b>UNDP</b> .....	United Nations Development Program
<b>IDA</b> .....	International Development Association	<b>UNICEF</b> .....	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>IFC</b> .....	International Finance Corporation	<b>UNISDR</b> .....	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
		<b>VCT</b> .....	Voluntary Counseling and Testing
		<b>WB</b> .....	World Bank
		<b>WHO</b> .....	World Health Organization

## REFERENCES

*Note: UNDP sources are identified in the text and footnotes and are not listed here.*

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Linn, Johannes, F., Arntraud Hartmann, Homi Kharas, Richard Kohl and Barbara Massler (2010). "Scaling Up the Fight Against Rural Poverty: An Institutional Review of IFAD's Approach." Global Economy and Development Program *Working Paper* No. 43. Brookings: Washington, DC.



## ENDNOTES

1. For research on scaling up carried out under the auspices of the Brookings Global Economy and Development Program see <http://www.brookings.edu/topics/scaling-up-development-impact.aspx>.
2. See for example: “What Will it Take to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals?” (2010) ([http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset\\_id=2620072](http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=2620072)); and “Strategy for Scaling Up Support to the MDGs” (2008) ([http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics1\\_mdg\\_scaling\\_up.shtml](http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics1_mdg_scaling_up.shtml)).
3. UNDP ProDoc “Scaling Up Support for the MDGs at Local Level” ([http://www.uncdf.org/english/local\\_development/uploads/project/GLOB\\_MDGs\\_PRODUC\\_13MAY10\\_EN.pdf](http://www.uncdf.org/english/local_development/uploads/project/GLOB_MDGs_PRODUC_13MAY10_EN.pdf)).
4. For example: “Replication and up scaling—Evaluation of pilot initiatives is a must before such initiatives are replicated or scaled up. Lessons on what has and has not worked should inform the replication process. Again, good documentation of lessons and their internalization in the replication and up scaling processes will help UNDP and its partners ensure that mistakes are not repeated.” (p. 183) Note that all official UNDP documents are cited in footnotes; only general references are cited in the Reference section at the end of this paper.
5. See *UNDP, Supporting Transformational Change*. New York, October 2011. [http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/supporting\\_transformationalchange.html](http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/supporting_transformationalchange.html)
6. UNDP, Tajikistan Assessment of Development Results (ADR), 2009.
7. For a more detailed discussion of the framework, see Linn et al, 2010.
8. The study was not able to assess to what extent the corporate policies and processes of UNDP support the scaling-up process on the ground. This requires a systematic review of UNDP’s corporate policies and processes, which was not feasible in a limited country study.
9. The scaling up theme does not appear explicitly in the Executive Summary or elsewhere in the CPAP, aside from these quotes.
10. The “UNDP Tajikistan Strategic Note—2010”, which distills the main planned activities for 2010 into a strategic document shows less of an explicit focus on scaling up than the AP. In formulating annual strategic and work plans it is important that the scaling up perspective not get lost.
11. This is reflected in an explicit notation in the text: *Note: To meet the Convention..., an additional 14,860,000 m2 must be cleared by 2019 (an annual target of 1,400,000 m2 from 2010–2015)*” (p. 28).
12. This comment also applies to the ADR.
13. This was also one of the key concerns of the ADR in its review of UNDP’s strategic positioning in Tajikistan: “UNDP projects were generally fragmented, with activities structured to suit the donor programme needs rather than following an integrated approach to local development.” (p. 51) However, one of the comments by UNDP staff in the Tajikistan Country Office was that “Tajikistan is one of the few countries where UNDP that has taken the issue of developing synergies and sustainability on a different scale. In fact, other countries can learn from the Tajikistan experience in these fields.”
14. The CPAP does not justify its approach in terms of offering a menu of options to either donors or communities, however.
15. For example, it is not obvious why UNDP should expect to play a significant supporting role in the area of creating an improved business environment that would lead to a better rating of Tajikistan in terms of the global “ease of doing business” ranking. Other partners, such as IFC, EBRD and ADB would seem to be better equipped to provide this kind of assistance.

16. However, UNDP Country Office staff has commented that “JRCs are Public Associations (NGOs). Therefore, their functions cannot be taken over by Jamoats (that are government institution).” An evaluation of the JRC program was to be completed in the summer of 2010. The results were not available at the time when this study was completed.
17. Ton de Klerk and Elena Krylova-Mueller, “Outcomes Evaluation report: UNDP Communities Programme in Tajikistan”, June 2009
18. “[M]any of the project activities have been defined as ‘pilot’ but without established preconditions for *monitoring and judging on the success of these pilots* (recording and monitoring of inputs/progress/results, cost-benefits analysis, documentation of lessons learned, or dissemination strategies for results and lessons learned.” (de Klerk and Krylova-Mueller, p. 17)
19. This project falls under the Environment and Energy program cluster. However, it is reviewed here, since it is implemented under CP and appears to be representative of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CP approach to bundling UNDP and other donor project implementation under the CP umbrella.
20. Kirsten Ewers Andersen and Gulbahor Djumabaeva, “Mid-term Evaluation of the UNDP-GEF Project: Demonstrating Local Responses to Land Degradation and Improving Sustainable Land Management in SW Tajikistan (SLM Project).” July 2009
21. UNDP, “Project Document: Communities Programme 2010–2012”
22. In its retrospective section the ProDoc also provides some quantitative metrics of achievements, but they tend to be mostly absolute numbers of outputs, not measures of progress relative to scaling up targets.
23. The quality of the staff in the Kulyab area office, which I met during my one-day field trip, was impressive.
24. Memorandums of Understanding form the basis for the cooperation, in terms of interventions to be implemented, modalities used, costs and funding. See for example the UNDP interoffice memorandum on “Proposed cooperation between UNDP/CP and GFATM PIU Programmes”, dated January 10, 2010.
25. In the program/project specific tables we have not included reference to regional and learning dimensions due to limited information and applicability.
26. In principle, it would be useful here to specify who in UNDP (at Headquarters as well as in Tajikistan) is driving the initiative. This could not be established during my first field visit.
27. Opportunities for vertical scaling up, i.e., reform of local government policies and institutions at national and provincial level are to be explored through the new UNDP governance strategy.
28. UNDP serves in this capacity in various low-income countries with low local implementation capacity.
29. There is some uncertainty about the future, since much will depend on continuing replenishments of GF funds by donors.
30. See Linn (2011) for an analysis of the GF approach to scaling up more generally.
31. For the GF there is an institution-wide debate to what extent GF resources should focus not only on capacity building for implementation capacity in the three core mandate areas of GF (AIDS, TB and malaria), but also health sector capacity building more generally. See Isenman and Shakow, 2010.
32. Aid coordination is part of the governance program cluster in UNDP country assistance program. As noted above, a new governance reform strategy is

currently under preparation and was not yet available for review in the preparation of this report. (See also Box 2 above.)

33. Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, No. 389, August 2, 2010.
34. These are the donors cooperating in the context of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC).
35. For example: State Committee on Investments and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan. "Foreign Aid Report 2009", Dushanbe 2010. It will be important that these reports are prepared and released in a timely manner for maximum usefulness and include forward looking aid program information.
36. For more information on DRMP interventions see: [http://untj.org/country\\_context/coordination\\_mechanisms/disaster\\_management/undp\\_drmp/](http://untj.org/country_context/coordination_mechanisms/disaster_management/undp_drmp/)
37. Specifically, UNDP supported the preparation of an inventory of earthquake resistance of buildings in the capital, Dushanbe, with a special focus on schools and hospitals. A pilot program of reinforcing schools against earth quake risks is now getting underway in two schools
38. The Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Center, which is being established in Almaty with the help of UNDP (funded by European Union's ECHO program), could in future play a role in sharing national experiences region wide.
39. DIPECHO is the disaster preparedness program of the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid D
40. The government may also wish to avoid creating a poor image among foreign investors and tourists.
41. RES stands for "renewable energy source" and EE for "energy efficiency".
42. According to UNDP staff comments: "The scheme is planned in such a manner that those facilities which will have grid connection will work on grid during the

summer—meaning they will be at the time selling all of the electricity to the grid, not the surplus, and the communities will be at that time buying the electricity from the grid at the price as determined by the Tariff System. Due to instability of the Tajik's power grid during the winter, those sHPPs will work off-grid during the winter providing electricity directly to the local community which owns them."

43. UNDP Staff commented: "The communities will be able to pay (and conduct) the O&M purposes of the project as they will earn from electricity sales during the summer. The issue of contributing to the capital costs is largely dependable on the each community's situation, and that is why the Fund financing scheme offers variable contributions to the capital costs of the project depending on the communities' circumstances. For the most vulnerable groups (which are planned to be targeted by this scaling-up initiative), the Trust Fund will cover 100 percent of the capital investment."
44. UNDP staff commented: "The Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Economy in collaboration with UNDP Tajikistan will provide institutional anchors at the national level. As the local community, or community based investors, will own the sHPPs, they will also be in charge of O&M of the facilities. They will earn from the electricity sales to the communities during winter and from Barki Tojik during the summer, so that the costs of O&M can be covered from proceeds of electricity generated. This is the key perquisite of project sustainability, as it is absolutely vital to empower communities to be take responsibility for operation and maintenance of the sHPP plants, and the projects as a whole. Thus it is important to have involvement of UNDP for *on-site* support throughout first few years of the running, to help train and develop necessary capacities. If the O&M services are merely provided by distant third parties and there is no dedicated budget for that, experience has shown, it is likely the project will not provide long-term desired results."

45. Comment by UNDP staff: "Although year round availability of the water in small seasonal rivers may be considered as a potential barrier to sHPPs in general, it is not the case for this project. As this project is based on community owned and operated sHPPs, and as extensive on-site discussions with the communities in the potential locations are conducted prior to start of each single unit's construction, this is not considered to be a threat or a barrier. The communities know the river flows, and often already use them for micro improvised sHPPs of their own construction."
46. It takes, of course, "two to tango"; in other words, the potential partners need to be willing to engage constructively with UNDP. Where this is not the case, it might be worth exploring circuitous routes to strengthen the engagement, e.g., by roping in headquarters or by getting the government to request the potential partner's involvement.
47. "UNDP will implement its programme based on best practices in results-based management. Internal monitoring and evaluation and external mid-term and end-of-project evaluations will be completed." (Action Plan 2010–2015, p. 6)
48. "One of the main limitations of the ADR was the lack of proper monitoring information on the intended outcomes and results. The baseline information crucial for evaluation of results was lacking for most programmes. The monitoring systems for the programme areas were weak, although there was sufficient information on the individual project activities and outputs." (Tajikistan ADR, p. 6)
49. Linn et al. (2010) point out that there is an important feedback loop from scaling up to M&E: Evaluation evidence shows that most donor and recipient agencies do not make a serious effort in implementing effective M&E in aid financed projects. One key reason is that when the focus is principally only on the project, not the scaling up pathway of which the project is an integral and critical part, M&E while costly does not contribute much to the success of the project by itself. However, once project managers buy into the importance of the scaling up pathway and recognize the contribution that the learning from the project experience can make to the successful pursuit of such a pathway, they will value the benefits of M&E and hence have an incentive to develop an effective M&E process."





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