



DOES FAIRNESS MATTER?

Hakan Altınay

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INTRODUCTION: DOES FAIRNESS MATTER?

Hakan Altınay

Worldwide, there has been a recent increase in expressions of cynicism. We are reminded that all power is hard power, and that being loved or respected is no substitute for being feared. The great power game of nations always continues, we are forewarned, even when a higher goal or rhetoric is evoked. Superpowers are selfish, arbitrary, and dangerous nations, and they should not be embarrassed to be so and not feel constrained by international legitimacy and laws.¹ We are cautioned against assuming that the rise of the world's emerging powers is doing anything to the status of United States as the sole superpower. Naturally, it would be a folly to think that global public opinion is in effect a "second superpower," or even a crucial factor. Such concerns are the Lilliputians binding an unsuspecting Gulliver. Anyone harboring naive views needs to be told that good intentions are at best a distraction and a nuisance, and at worst a recipe for disaster, given their imprudence. Cynics prefer to be unconcerned about the achievements of transnational normative action, such as abolishing the slave trade or establishing the International Criminal Court.²

The advocates of these views would readily conclude that fairness does not matter—only power does. And these cynical views are not advanced only in the hard

center of the international system. In a fascinating twist, many on the various peripheries of the international system also agree with this depiction. They argue that might makes right, and this absolves those without formidable power of any responsibility for solving global problems or even articulating their potential contributions if something other than the law of the jungle were to prevail. Thus the hubris of the powerful triggers irresponsibility among the not so powerful, which in turn is used by the cynics to argue the need for unadulterated power, given the rampant irresponsibility in the world at large.

This working paper, however, is based on a hypothesis that the cynics may be wrong. Its central conjecture is that fairness does matter today, and will matter more in the future. Long-term projections are notoriously and predictably difficult. The forecast that the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the Next 11 group of emerging nations will overtake the Group of 7 may not materialize for a very long time. Yet it is evident that power disparities are less severe today, and are likely to be even less so in the near future. At the same time, the current level of global interdependence and the very nature of the imminent global problems we face have clear repercussions for the constellation of

minimum alliances that are necessary to overcome these problems. Climate change is the most obvious case in point; unless all the major players *and their citizens* willingly and proactively cooperate, it is unlikely that human civilization as we know it will survive. It is clear that Commodore Matthew Perry's body language will not secure the proactive and willing cooperation of citizens around the world. Hubris and cynicism will also not embolden those who witness emerging threats and plots, as diverse as those by Osama bin Laden or Abdul Qadeer Khan, to speak out. And thus both notions and perceptions of fairness will be central to developing the master narrative about our epic interdependence and our responsibilities toward each other. Without a sense of fairness that appeals to many and a corresponding framework of global civics, we cannot navigate the treacherous waters of global interdependence.³

The world's architecture of power is not the only vector that is becoming more democratic. Through the rapid proliferation of transborder broadcasting, we have become increasingly aware of each other's grief and bliss. We are not yet a global village, but we are significantly more aware of each other's predicaments than a decade or a century ago, and as a result, public opinion has come to matter even in the previously manderin realm of foreign policy. Yet it also so happens that public opinion around the world is more multilateralist than the views of policymakers. For instance, a recent survey by the organization World Public Opinion shows that when given the option between "Our nation should consistently follow international law; it is wrong to violate international law, just as it is wrong to violate laws within a country" and "If our government thinks it is not in our nation's interest, it should not feel obliged to abide by international laws," 57 percent of all the people in 24 countries choose compliance with international law and 35 percent choose national opting out.⁴ Countries that are

often assumed to be unilateralist, such as China, India, and the United States, were in line with the global trend. A total of 74 percent in China, 49 percent in India and 69 percent in the U.S. favor compliance with international laws, with 18 percent, 42 percent and 29 percent, respectively, wanting national opt-outs.

The same survey also showed how people systematically underestimate to what a large extent their multilateralist preferences are shared by their compatriots, and feel solitary in their support for international law. A total of 48 percent said that they personally were more supportive of consistently abiding by international law than the average citizen; 28 percent said they were less supportive. This optical illusion can possibly be explained by the hegemonic discourse of the cynics, and may itself present an opportunity for enhanced multilateralism. It is not difficult to observe the disdain that cynical policymakers have for popular preferences for international norms, in the complaint that "Americans do not want their power raw; it has to be sautéed in the best of causes."⁵ A similar survey has shown that 55 percent of the people in 24 countries wanted their governments to be more ready to act cooperatively to achieve mutual gain, as opposed to the 39 percent who felt that their governments tend to be too willing to compromise and are often taken advantage of.⁶

The working paper is not a blanket indictment of cynicism. Idealists have been called cynics who have not yet been mugged by reality, and there is a significant degree of truth in this assertion. Yet one can also argue that cynics are moderate idealists who yearn to be rescued from their excessive pessimism. The task of balancing the feasible and the ideal has never been easy, and it has certainly defied timeless prescriptive formulas. The conjecture of the contributors to this paper is simply that fairness matters more than cynics would have us believe, and it will matter more in

the future as power disparities further decrease, and larger alliances that are more based on society become necessary.

This paper includes essays by authors analyzing the situations in nine countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Africa and Spain. Each analyst was asked to answer whether the policy elites and public opinion in their country view the international order as essentially predatory (sometimes referred as Hobbesian) or essentially fair and rule based (sometimes referred as Kantian). Each analyst was also asked to address the events in the particular country that were central in informing these assessments, and whether the policy elites and public opinion would be more supportive of enhanced national contributions to overcoming global problems, if they were convinced that a fairer international order was possible.

There are both convergences and divergences among the nine analyses. We see that countries that have benefited in the past from international solidarity and normative action, such as South Africa and Spain—considered here, respectively, by Siphamandla Zondi and Jordi Vaquer—have then become responsible international actors. We also see that there are cases of, as in Egypt, profound disappointment with the current international system. In the essay on Indonesia, Hadi Soesastro and Evan Laksmana remind us of the centrality of national politics as the link between national public opinion and global problems. In considering the situation in Japan, Motofumi Asai points toward the centrality of political culture. Rakesh Batabyal, in examining the situation in India, depicts how the ethos of decolonization had shaped his nation's proclivities on the world stage. We are told that global norm entrepreneurship is viewed as a soft power tactic to advance national interests in Brazil and Indonesia.

With respect to Italy, Ettore Greco and Nathalie Tocci convincingly argue that concerns about the nation's relative decline in prominence in the international system need not be an obstacle to being a good global citizen.

Most of the analysts agree that public opinion in their countries is more multilateralist than the opinions of the policy elites. They also concur that perceptions of a fairer international order would boost the appetite for national contributions to global problems. Daniel Fung's depiction of China is the exception. He argues that Chinese public opinion is markedly more nationalistic than the opinions of the nation's elites, and that China is a risk-averse member of the international community, more interested in stability and order than adventurous redesigns. In the case of China as well as the other countries, the art of aspirational aggregation seems critical. Will we be able to acknowledge with genuine sincerity the legitimate disappointments of many with the international system and yet still harness their readiness to take a realistic leap of faith for a better world where they share in the responsibility? This remains a key question for our time.

In his thoughtful Afterword to this volume, Brian Urquhart observes that global fairness and civility are vast and simultaneously glorious objectives. While they may never be altogether realized, they are an indispensable guide to decent behavior. Urquhart notes that because a universal tradition of fairness and public spirit will not be created quickly or easily, the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible. It is difficult to disagree with him.

In the true spirit of a working paper, we plan to discuss the pertinent issues raised here both online and offline for six months, and then we will publish a second and final version of this volume in October 2010.

BRAZIL

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The many possibilities that studies of identity can generate to explain countries or cultures and their behavior in the international arena are one of the great things about the recent comeback of subjectivity in the social sciences. In fact, there is no doubt that what we do and create says a lot about what we are and how we think about the world where we live, and vice versa. Thinking about how we see the other and the unknown gives us an effective window into ourselves.

Thus, I argue here that Brazilians' ideas about the world were traditionally informed by their country's historical economic development model, followed between 1930 and 1989, which was based on a nationalist ideology and a political consensus about national objectives. In 1989, however, this framework underwent significant changes with the turn toward internationalism and the end of the Cold War, and the country's stance toward the world at large moved from relative isolation to compulsory participation.

The result of this historical path is the combination of a nationalist perspective on the world with a vision of the international arena as a fearful one, where the country should fight for its interests while seeking to be part of the everyday building of the international system. This mixture has produced a notion that blends the perception of an unfair international environment, constructed on unequal terms, with the Brazilian myth of working hard and being victorious against harsh realities.

In this sense, fighting for a fairer international politics is not only in the country's national interest, as a middle-range power, but also a way to create a fairer international environment, where middle-range (and smaller) powers can be heard. In addition, Brazil expects to receive the support of weaker nations, assuming that it represents them against the rigidities of the international order. Since 1989, arguing for international justice has become a way of realizing Brazilian national aspirations for greatness. Given all this, here I consider the best way to convince Brazilian decisionmakers, elites and citizens of the need to cooperate internationally in order to radically democratize international institutions and the global framework for cooperation.

The Brazilian industrialization process started in the 1930s and was based on the need to break the chain that connected the country to the world as an agricultural exporter. It represented an ideological rupture with the liberal arguments for free trade and productivity, along with an embracing of the interventionist idea of a very strong state running the country's whole industrialization process. From a nationalist perspective, the economic process put in place could also break Brazil's dependence on foreign production and would position it side by side with the industrialized nations and the great powers.

In combination, Brazil's economic development model and nationalist ideology led to some very peculiar foreign policy positions. For instance, until 1989 Brazil was not part of the most important international initiatives concerning trade, nuclear proliferation and intellectual property. The country praised "independence" in relation to the United States during the Cold War, and it fiercely competed against Argentina for regional hegemony.

This historical path led to the 1980s debt crisis, a huge inflationary process, one of the world's worst income concentrations and a terrible neglect of public services in social areas such as education, health care, public security and access to justice. But it also enabled Brazil to become one of the 10 strongest economies on the globe. In addition, it consolidated the idea that the international arena should be a place for the country to act in a limited fashion, or not to establish any commitments that could negatively influence its economic development plan and the process of strengthening its relative position. Joining a nuclear initiative—for example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—was perceived more as a limitation on progress than a peacemaking policy.

The Brazilian political, social and economic crises of the 1980s and the global changes during the last quarter of the 20th century—the fluctuation of the dollar, the rise in international interest rates, oil shocks, economic globalization and the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the old Eastern European regimes—contributed to noteworthy ideological changes in Brazil. The year 1989 turned out to be a very special one. While communism was crumbling behind the Iron Curtain and social catastrophe was knocking on Brazilians' doors, the country was also experiencing its first democratic presidential elections since the military coup in 1964. Twenty-two candidates were running for president at that very moment, including the current president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, and the elections took place in November (the first round) and December (the second round) 1989. Unsurprisingly, the presidential campaign generated a political debate of gigantic proportions. The whole situation and history of the country were questioned. This was the Brazilians' "revolution"—their yellow-and-green revolution.

After 1989, Brazil radically changed its international profile—and in my view, together with the democratization process, this is the seed for the country's widely praised current situation. Brazil slowly committed itself to the international initiatives for free trade, nuclear nonproliferation, the environment and intellectual property, even though sometimes in a limited or critical way. It opened itself to international finance and radically diminished the state's direct role in its domestic economy. A huge privatization process generated multinational corporate stars such as Embraer, the aeronautics exporter, and the giant of the mineral sector Vale do Rio Doce (now called simply Vale).

Among all these changes, one of the main notions that this "revolution" has put in place has been "international participation." Brazil could no longer be excluded from the political debate concerning international initiatives, just as it could no longer be excluded from the globalization process. On the contrary, the country should participate in as many forums as possible, defending its interests and exceptionalist behavior. At this very moment, Brazil's nationalist tradition and desire to participate have created a mixture of a realist fight for selfish interests and a need to have more of a voice in the system. This behavior has been deeply linked to the discourse in defense of democratizing the decisionmaking process at the international level, and the strategy adopted aimed at fulfilling Brazil's self-interest as a middle-power country as well has served as a mechanism to gain foreign support from the numerous nations in similar positions and those with even more limited capabilities.

Brazil's role in the World Trade Organization's Doha Round negotiations exemplifies this point. As a leader of the developing world, Brazil represents its own interests by calling for the wider liberalization of international agricultural markets and an end to subsidies.

At the same time, Brazil advocates for a fairer trade system, in which less-developed countries could also profit from international commerce.

Brazil's plea for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council follows the same logic, as do the country's positions concerning global environmental rules and intellectual property—for example, in the breaking of patents on HIV medicines. All these moves tie Brazilian interests with the intention to fracture what is seen as an elitist framework of international politics and economics. Hence, wealthy and powerful nations must make material and political sacrifices for the world to become fairer and more equal. Even Brazil's timid and controversial defense of Iran's nuclear program fits this model, because, for Brazilian decisionmakers, the issue is perceived as an intervention of the great powers in a middle-power national project.

In conclusion, my argument is that Brazil's historical path led the country to a perception of the international environment as an unfair arena where a nation should work hard and struggle for its interests and survival, and that this same struggle is perceived by Brazilians as a way to build a fairer and better world.

Curiously, this representation fits very well with the characters in the most famous contemporary Brazilian movies—*Central do Brasil* and *Cidade de Deus*—which are particularly praised in Europe.

The only way that Brazilian decisionmakers and political elites could favor more cooperative behavior for the country in the international realm would be if there were to be a radical transformation of the international institutional framework so that the global political environment could be perceived as more democratic. And this would surely need to be shared by public opinion used to seeing the world as a very unfair place, where the rich and great powers are always trying to get ahead at the expense of the weaker peoples. The materialization of this idea would include, for example, reforming the UN Security Council, new efforts by the United States and European nations concerning the developmental agenda of the Doha Round, new postures within the environmental debate that take into account the situations of late developers and, unlikely and radically, global nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, in my view, this is the only way to secure important Brazilian cooperation in addressing global issues.

CHINA

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The question of whether China's foreign policy is infused with a Hobbesian or a Kantian vision is an important one that embraces a philosophical paradox. This arises from the fact that the respective political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant do not differ as fundamentally as they might first appear to do.

Hobbes is often regarded as a premodern cynic who presented to posterity in the *Leviathan* a bleak vision of human nature left to its own devices leading to a state of war, where every state is pitted one against the other and people struggle to survive in a jungle where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Kant, conversely, is portrayed more sympathetically as a "modern" German Enlightenment philosopher who, on the eve of the Napoleonic convulsion that engulfed Europe in the late 18th century, advocated in his last major treatise *Perpetual Peace* (published in 1795) that human salvation lies in establishing a federation of free states that subscribe to an international covenant forbidding war.

Received wisdom can often be an oversimplification, if not a fallacy, of which the above dichotomy is an example. Far from believing in war, Hobbes sought order so as to check humanity's self-interested desire for power. He perceived the solution to be the establishment of civil society presided over by a sovereign who would impose such order but advocated that this sovereign be voluntarily chosen by the majority. To understand Hobbes, one must remember that he lived at a time of wrenching political upheaval when his sovereign, Charles I of England, was executed. Kant

lived in the shadow cast by the French Revolution and yearned for peace conferred by an international covenant forbidding war.

In reality, neither thinker was all that different from the other, at least in the realm of political philosophy. Both Hobbes and Kant wrote under the shadow of their respective reigns of terror. Both were suspicious of democracy, and argued that order should be imposed vertically from above by a sovereign and subscribed to by people or the state of their own free will, conceding power to that sovereign.

In reality, therefore, China's vision of the ideal international order is neither strictly Hobbesian nor strictly Kantian, given that no sovereign state today, let alone China, would argue in favor of a world government run by a universal sovereign. Indeed, China, long the rhetorician castigating the U.S. for its real or perceived hegemonic tendencies, is the last state wishing to see world government led by, say, the unipolar superpower the United States, which China knows it has little or no chance of realistically surpassing in the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, China is not even interested in playing deputy sheriff to the United States, this position having been vacant and begging since Australia gave it up shortly after John Howard's electoral defeat in December 2007, and because the European Union does not have the capacity, inclination, interest or taste to assume it.

In truth, the specter of China bestriding the globe as an insatiable colossus—gobbling up natural resources in Africa and companies in the United States and Europe; hoarding rare earths within its own borders; building missiles to shoot down satellites, stealth submarines to challenge the U.S. 7th Fleet and an aircraft carrier or two to augment its budding blue-

water navy; and nurturing a secret army of hackers to wage a cyberwar against the United States—reminds one of nothing so much as a fairy tale or moral fable. No doubt the West, in particular the United States, which has the greatest reserves of power for renewal and reinvention seen in modern history, will bestir itself from slumber and reach for yet greater heights, in much the same way as the specter of Sputnik spurred the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations to put the first man on the moon, and the angst generated by Ezra Vogel's 1980s thesis of "Japan as Number One"—with the Japanese *keiretsu* buying such treasures of Americana as Columbia Studios and Rockefeller Center—spurred the United States to launch the dot-com revolution in the 1990s.

China has only just begun its long and painful climb back to normality after turn-of-the-century humiliation by the great powers. It is little wonder that China yearns for a bit of peace and stability.

China's vision for the future is far more prosaic. As every Chinese leader for the past thirty years, from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, has emphasized, China needs to focus above all else on domestic economic modernization and on maintaining its momentum to attain real annual growth of close to double digits, so that it can continue lifting a fifth of humanity out of abject poverty to a state of modest, lower-middle-class prosperity (currently hovering around \$3,200 in terms of per capita gross domestic product). And for this to happen, China needs a stable international environment, so that oil keeps flowing to East Asia through the twin Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as a world economy that recovers at least to the extent of maintaining the rude health of China's export markets and its appetite for Chinese-made consumer products. In pursuing this course, China freely acknowledges

and will continue to acknowledge the status of the United States as the world's sole superpower for at least the next generation, because China will certainly not be ready to take over anytime sooner—if at all. And if that superpower wishes to play international global police officer, China would be reasonably tolerant, subject only to the NIMBY (not in my own backyard) principle which applies as much to international as to domestic politics. In other words, so long as no invisible tripwires are crossed such as the Seventh Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait or US spy ships sucking up electronic signals within spitting distance of China's submarine base in Hainan, China will turn a blind eye, if not be openly supportive.

All the actions that China has taken over the last decade underscore this fundamental perception of its needs. Its entry into the World Trade Organization in 1999, and its support for other multilateral institutions—in particular, the United Nations and the entire Bretton Woods architecture, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—constitute eloquent testimony to this old-fashioned vision. Indeed, China is so "retro" in its outlook that it even went out of its way to host the Summer Olympic Games in 2008, an event regarded as so irrelevant by the jaded developed world that the irony was not lost on China in 2000 when Beijing, in its second bid, finally succeeded in securing the Olympics for 2008 and held a massive public celebration on the streets of the capital, while its erstwhile rival Osaka held a public demonstration celebrating its failure to secure the Olympics!

Are there any differences between China's policy elites and Chinese public opinion on the nation's foreign policy or approach to foreign relations, and if so, what are they? Even the most cursory surf through the hyperactive Chinese blogosphere reveals that the nation's public opinion is anything but homoge-

neous. By definition, therefore, the view of Chinese public opinion is different from that favoring consensus-based policies embraced by China's policy elites, which are developed through a laborious process of consultation and consensus building strikingly different from the vociferous partisan debates in the West enacted dramatically on the public stage known as the marketplace of ideas and covered assiduously by the media. At the risk of making a gross generalization, however, it is tolerably clear that Chinese public opinion on issues of foreign policy can be more stridently nationalistic and iconoclastic than the position adopted by the nation's policy elites, who tend to support a much more traditional, conventional and multi-lateral framework.

On questions of territorial integrity, cross-Straits relations, Taiwanese unification, Tibet and Xinjiang, the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese public are at least as trenchantly nationalistic as the position of the policy elites. On Sino-Japanese relations, however, the nation's public opinion is unquestionably more strident and anti-Japanese than the position adopted by the policy elites. On China-U.S. relations, the country as a whole as well as individual Chinese citizens remain endlessly fascinated by the U.S.—and this long-standing, star-struck infatuation remains unabated for the present generation of Chinese youth, who have been seduced by the freedom, openness, optimism and dynamism of the American socio-economic system to the extent that the U.S. remains far and away the destination of choice for both higher education and migration.

However, on broad questions of Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis America, Chinese public opinion is not noticeably less nationalistic or hostile toward the U.S. than are the policy elites. On the contrary, China's rapidly increasing national pride in its achievements

since 1979 not just economically but also socially, politically and militarily has led to the situation of Chinese citizens not wishing to be bullied or cowed by the United States in matters of foreign policy or military confrontation. Only in the areas of public and corporate governance, the rule of law, property rights and human rights, including the right to freedom of information and free expression—all more important as issues of domestic than foreign policy—is Chinese public opinion noticeably more liberal than that of the policy elites. Indeed, in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress scheduled for October 2010 triggering the Fifth Generation's succession to the helm, with Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai's jockeying for inclusion on the Politburo Standing Committee alongside the anointed ones being current Vice President Xi Jinping and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, no one in this current collective leadership of nine would risk appearing craven in foreign policy, more particularly vis-à-vis the United States.

The billion-dollar question, which is more difficult to answer, is still whether Chinese public opinion or that of the policy elites would more readily support an increase in national spending to build a fairer international order—at least, one that is fairer to China from its perspective. Although Chinese public opinion would certainly welcome the nation attaining a higher and more favorable international profile, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that public opinion would necessarily support greater overseas spending just for the sake of building a fairer international public profile.

On the contrary, given that China's economy is, like that of the U.S., predominantly continental, and China is, even more than the U.S., a universe unto itself, and given also that China exists at a much lower stage of development, a broad swathe of Chinese public opin-

ion would likely prefer to see such expenditures take place domestically. The adage that “charity begins at home” could well become a Chinese domestic political slogan in the first half of this century.

As for China’s policy elites, however, there is little question that they would be prepared to countenance a higher and more favorable profile for the country on the international stage and to see it at least partially spend its way to achieve that goal. Witness China’s policy in Africa and the spreading of largesse in such forgotten corners of the world as Moldova, not known for being endowed with a cornucopia of natural resources.

Given the turmoil and tragedies experienced by China during its recent history—and more particularly since its dramatic relative decline, from contributing close to 30 percent of the world’s gross domestic product

in 1820 to only 4 percent in 1900—the country has only just begun its long and painful climb back to normality after its turn-of-the-20th-century humiliation by the great powers, its occupation by Japan and its self-inflicted disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The goal of China’s trajectory is, of course, to regain its legitimate position as a regional leader in Asia, which it has held for 18 of the past 20 centuries. It is little wonder that China yearns for a bit of peace and stability, both domestic and international, so it can pick up and glue together the shards of its old civilization, like a broken Ming vase, and hopefully regain at least a semblance of its previous glory. China subscribes to the old-fashioned notion of a classical Westphalian architecture of nation-states suspended, in Metternich’s delightful expression, in “a chandelier balance.” Little wonder that China regards Metternich’s most famous modern pupil, Henry Kissinger, as an “old friend.”

EGYPT

Mohamed Elmenshawy

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Most Egyptian citizens and policymakers view international institutions with great skepticism—fueled by the widely held belief that the Western powers, specifically the United States, manipulate international bodies to maintain power over the political and economic landscape of the developing countries. Specifically, most Egyptians see the international legal system as a by-product of World War II, and they feel that this 60-year-old arrangement does not represent today's geostrategic reality.

The Egyptian perception of the United Nations is ambivalent at best. There is popular support for the UN to assume a more active role in Egyptian domestic affairs. Yet conversely, the UN cannot escape its image as a U.S. proxy, and dissatisfaction over the body's handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has further damaged its credibility. A poll conducted among Egyptians by the World Public Opinion Program of the University of Maryland on December 2, 2008, demonstrates this ambivalence. When asked whether they believed the UN to be under U.S. control, 68 percent of those asked responded yes. However, because political freedom in Egypt has often been promised but is long overdue, 63 percent of those responding still would like UN observers to monitor elections in Egypt.

There are three major contributing factors to Egypt's divided opinions about international law: what I call the Israeli Exception, the Iraq invasion, and Farouk Hosni losing the race for the UNESCO directorship. It is useful to briefly examine each.

The Israeli Exception

The establishment of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli conflicts have shaped the Egyptian view of international law for the worse. Disgruntled Egyptians have arrived at a conclusion that I call the "Israeli Exception": Under the auspices of international law, Israel is allowed to redraw its borders at will, and at the expense of its Arab neighbors. Dozens of UN Security Council resolutions designed to deter such Israeli expansion have been vetoed by the United States. Moreover, no steps have been taken through international law to prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons, while every step imaginable is being taken to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal. Egyptians, who have not forgotten recent regional history, believe that the international system observes a double standard for Israel vis-à-vis the other states of the Middle East.

Even when international nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issue reports condemning Israeli aggression against Palestinians, they have little effect on the international community. So far, international bodies have done little to prevent Israel from constructing a wall through the West Bank, dividing thousands of Palestinians from their families and their livelihoods. Many Egyptians would take international bodies more seriously if they were able to deter Israel on such issues.

After Israel's latest "hot" conflict in Gaza ended in early 2009, the United Nations established a fact-finding mission to investigate whether human rights abuses had occurred or international law had been transgressed by either side. The resulting document, the Goldstone Report, elicited hope in Egypt that Israel might be forced to change its ways. This hope grew to an expectation after the UN's Human Rights Council

fully endorsed the Goldstone Report. However, despite the report's accusations of war crimes, and possible crimes against humanity, Israel faced no major repercussions from the Gaza War. In Arab minds, this confirmed the Israeli Exception.

Even if UN resolutions were followed, there is a lingering fear in Egypt that allowing the UN a greater role (either domestically, or in the Arab-Israeli peace process) would amount to yielding authority to the U.S. When President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in the summer of 2009 that Israeli settlements on the occupied West Bank are illegal and should be stopped immediately, the Israeli government simply chose to ignore them. This kind of empty rhetoric only furthers the impression, held by 60 percent of Egyptians according to the World Public Opinion Program, that the U.S. has no intention of helping to create a Palestinian state. When it comes to Israel, it is nearly impossible for an Egyptian leader to be diplomatic and maintain any credibility with the domestic population.

The Iraq Invasion

Egypt, one of America's strongest regional allies in the 1990-91 Gulf War, was dismayed by George W. Bush's "unilateral diplomacy" leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. Like many citizens in the Middle East and throughout the world, Egyptians saw the American invasion of Iraq as proof of international law's inability to counter the will of a superpower. It appeared, as it has for much of history, that great powers will do as they please.

When Bush's claim of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction failed to materialize, his justification for the conflict quickly shifted to democratic reform. Most Egyptians cynically rejected this new explanation, and they continued to believe that America's inter-

est in Iraq centered on gaining access to its oil. What Egyptians perceive as the illegitimate war in Iraq continues to jeopardize the ability of the nation's citizens to trust a system of international law.

Farouk Hosni Loses the Race for the UNESCO Directorship

Egypt exploded in collective outrage when its cultural minister, Farouk Hosni, lost the race to become UNESCO director-general in September 2009. Egyptians had hoped that the election of Hosni as UNESCO's first Arab-born head would advance the visibility and authority of Arabs in the international arena. When the UN elected a Bulgarian diplomat, Irina Bokova, over Hosni, the Egyptian press cited the event as evidence of a cultural war between the Arab world and the West.

In 2008, while serving as Egypt's minister of culture, Hosni pledged to burn any Israeli book he found in an Egyptian library. This statement, an attempt to bolster domestic support for his programs, returned to haunt him during his UNESCO campaign. He was met with accusations of anti-Semitism, and he faced strong opposition from the U.S. and Europe. Elie Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, declared that appointing Hosni would shame the global community.

After Hosni's defeat, the Egyptian press condemned the Israeli-Western alliance and framed the allegations of anti-Semitism as a pragmatic tool to marginalize Arabs. No one was willing to say that Hosni had made a political gamble and lost; his "book-burning" comment had played well at home but poorly in an international setting. Rather, the day after the election, *Al Masry Al Youm*, a leading Egyptian newspaper, proclaimed, "A clash of civilization determines the UNESCO fight," adding that "America, Europe and

Jewish lobby brought down Farouk Hosni after honorable competition by the Egyptian delegation.”

This line of reasoning was largely accepted by citizens and policymakers alike. The failed election, and its exaggerated retelling in the press, went largely unnoticed in the American and European news media, but reinforced the Egyptian view of the UN as an anti-Arab. After returning to Cairo, Hosni gave his own version of events: “The U.S. ambassador to UNESCO acted very strongly, and did everything possible to prevent me from winning.” Regrettably, this is still what most Egyptians will continue to believe.

In the End . . .

Despite its disagreements with the United Nations, Egypt continues to contribute to UN-led peacekeeping efforts in Darfur and the Balkans, and 57 percent of Egyptians believe their country should play a greater roll in UN operations. Realistically, given that it is a developing country, Egypt’s ability to transform inter-

national bodies is limited. Still, Egypt has a large presence in Africa and in the Islamic world, and if the UN made an effort to appear more sympathetic to Arab concerns, Egypt would be more likely to participate in UN programs. For instance, Egypt could take a leading role in combating East African piracy or the water shortage crisis, and in coordinating humanitarian work in Afghanistan, Darfur and Yemen.

Egypt’s stance on Israel and its perception of international law are inescapably threaded together. The more frustrated Egypt becomes with Israeli policy, the more unjust international law appears to Egyptians, and the less warmth Egypt receives in international settings. Conversely, if these strands could be delicately untangled, a breakthrough in the Israel-Palestine crisis could restore a tremendous amount of Egypt’s faith in international law. But such a breakthrough will not be likely unless Egypt makes a commitment to the Israel-Palestine peace process.

INDIA

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The driving force of Indian polity and its normative horizon are premised on the ideas of *equality, justice, secularism* and *democracy*. The experience of fighting a national freedom movement against colonial rule and the deepening and expansion of democracy in post-Independence India have meant that these four ideas have become part of the larger public consciousness. The leaders who molded public consciousness starting in the early nineteenth century were open to the world and articulated their support for democracy, equality and world peace. The interplay of these ideals within India as well as outside the national boundaries has provided a very dynamic template both for the leaders who guide policy and for public opinion, which expresses and also molds this worldview among the leaders. The world is not seen as inhabited by predatory or exploitative states, but instead there has developed a philosophical horizon, in which the expansion of peace, prosperity and democracy is seen as desirable and possible. The shared universal horizon of public opinion and the political leaders is in many senses a Kantian one. Both agree that there should be a peaceful world order based on a normative structure constituted of equal nations and rule-based organizations.

India's colonial experience and strong opposition to a hierarchical social order have made both its leaders and the public sensitive to the issue of equality. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion or nationality has been strongly resented ever since Independence.⁷ Thus Indian leaders had wide support from the people when they decided to raise the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa, and in fact did

not agree to have even diplomatic relations with that nation until it ended its policy of apartheid. And this desire for a democratic world order has also been in tune with the expansion of democracy inside India. In this sense, the Indian contribution to world events will continue to deepen and expand in the future as this internal expansion of democracy continues.

Since the early decades of the twentieth century, India's leaders have held a very strong belief about the efficacy and significance of international organizations for establishing democratic norms for global governance and leading the way toward world peace. This in turn has led India to play an active part in world forums. For instance, it was this belief that led Jawaharlal Nehru to approach the United Nations when Kashmir was invaded, an act for which he is still criticized by a large section of public opinion because the issue became enmeshed with the anti-India position of the erstwhile colonial power, Britain. Consequently, public opinion of many shades became suspicious of the commitment expressed by many developed countries to equality and impartiality while they played their part in the institutions of global governance. To their credit, however, Nehru and his successors did not allow this pervasive suspicion to dictate India's foreign policy. Instead, engagement with states, institutions and polities through dialogue and negotiation, and not distrust, remains the defining feature of Indian foreign policy—and therefore, with the evolution of the nation's economy and polity to a more mature shape, India will achieve, all indicators suggest, even more global engagement.

The U.S. attack on Iraq in 2003 seems to be a watershed for the way India's leaders and public opinion have tried to relate to each other in a rapidly changing world. The government's readiness to send troops for peacekeeping in Iraq was met with strong rejection by

public opinion. Notwithstanding complete disapproval of Saddam Hussein's undemocratic regime by all sections of popular opinion, they were not convinced by the justification for the attack given by the U.S. government. This came in sharp contrast to the support of the government's decision in 1983 to airdrop humanitarian aid for the Sri Lankan Tamils in Jaffna, where they were trapped by their own army. Likewise, public opinion was not averse to sending military aid at the request of the president of the Maldives, M. A. Gayoom, when mercenaries tried to attack that nation's capital. In pursuance of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, in 1987 India also sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force to help demilitarize the Sri Lankan separatist movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. There was opposition from different quarters. But the leadership decided to call off the operation only when public opinion at home had turned almost hostile against the continuation of the operation after news began pouring in about the killing of IPKF troops by the LTTE. In a different situation, today a large number of Indian personnel are engaged in Afghanistan in peacekeeping and humanitarian work. They are also being regularly targeted and killed by different terrorist groups. However, in India there has been no public opposition to this intervention. It appears, therefore, that neither the country's leaders nor public opinion are prisoners of a principle of no intervention. What would define the public response, one would presume from experience, is how people see the intentions behind such interventions. And here a sense of equality and the sharing of the global responsibility for peace will definitely be the two constants.

Indications of altered self-awareness could also be seen in India's nuclear behavior. India was one of the original members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the nation's leaders have from the beginning been committed to world disarmament. And

there has also been strong popular support for it. However, Chinese aggression in 1962 and wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 increasingly led public opinion on this issue to politically range from the extreme right to the centrist and socialist, demanding efforts to arm India with nuclear weapons. While negotiating under this pressure, the nation's leaders did not give up their advocacy and work for global disarmament. This has quite often been ridiculed as moralistic rhetoric and a hypocritical stance. India's leaders, however, did not give up this commitment, and in the 1980s, when talk of the U.S. Star Wars defense strategy and the Russian reaction to it dominated the strategic sphere, then-prime minister Rajiv Gandhi initiated the Six-Nation Declaration for Disarmament.

India has held a strong belief about the efficacy of international organizations for establishing democratic norms for global governance and leading the way toward world peace.

Following this same trajectory, India's leaders have left their traditional position and in fact have voted against Iran's effort to construct nuclear weapons on two recent occasions—February 4, 2006, and November 28, 2009.⁸ This was a very big political risk, because it gave a lever to the forces busy consolidating popular opinion around the theme that India is part of the U.S.-Israel-India axis. And this also has serious ramifications for the Indian polity and society because it could become the locus for a communal, fundamentalist mobilization against the secular Indian state. The anti-Americanism of such a mobilization would also be a foregone conclusion. It was in this atmosphere that India's leaders went ahead and entered into a nuclear deal with the United States. Public opinion seemed to have gone against the government on this. However, the

government won a majority in the ensuing general elections to the House of the People, the Lok Sabha, indicating that public opinion, though divided, can be supportive of the government if it perceives, as in this case, that such moves go in the direction of making India a responsible global power of equal status. This also can explain why public opinion will not support any move by the nation's leaders to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is viewed as unequal and discriminatory.

India's leaders and public opinion therefore appear to have reached a new stage; there are expectations from the former that the nation should become a leading voice on human rights, environment, trade and globalization issues. However, on terrain where the rules are still unequal, India's leaders seem to be saddled with two simultaneous responsibilities: expectation of sharing more global responsibilities, and doing this while struggling to establish the principle of equality. Public opinion, too, seems divided broadly along these two different trajectories. Though a vocal majority would like India to be a major actor in world affairs, a silent but ever-watchful minority will not allow the country to withdraw from the fight for

equality for both itself and other poor and developing countries.

This dilemma was most visible at the Copenhagen meeting on climate change in December 2009, where India's leaders, notwithstanding popular objections back home, announced that their nation would make voluntary cuts in greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate the effects of global warming. However, the news of the unequal and nontransparent move to get the heads of state present in Copenhagen to assent to a resolution angered both the nation's leaders and public opinion of almost all shades.

One can argue, therefore, that the constitution of a new world order based on the shared universal values of peace and prosperity will need to emphasize the context of equality. Thus, international institutions need to follow Kantian democratic principles of governance, interpreted through norms and rules, to enlist increasing commitment to their goals. Otherwise the quest for such an order will be liable to marginalize a substantial section of public opinion, which will be its real guarantor against attempts by those with predatory sensibilities.

INDONESIA

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Indonesia seems to be making a comeback in world politics lately—from its regional leadership in Southeast Asia to its global role in the UN Security Council and the Group of 20—all suggesting that the nation seems on its way to “create a better world” in conjunction with its long-held doctrine of pursuing an “independent and active” foreign policy. Scholars argue that such growing role hinges on Indonesia’s status as the world’s third-largest democracy, with its largest Moslem population. In a sense, these unique qualities, especially when seen in the perspective of the country’s highly strategic location, do give the nation a significant regional and global presence. But to say that Indonesia has the capacity to play a global role and that it is willing to do so are two different things.

Why is Indonesia trying to take on the mantle of global prominence? Is it simply because of normative ideals—a belief that the world is generally benign and that therefore Indonesia’s ideals and values could help make it a better place? Or is it because the world is simply seen as a hostile place, and that therefore Indonesia must take a proactive role in shaping global politics?

Indonesia and the World: Aligning Global and Domestic Interests?

Indonesia’s worldview is perhaps best described by the constant feature of an “independent and active” foreign policy that came out of the country’s struggle for independence from the Dutch during the throes of

the Cold War. This policy, first promulgated by then-vice president Muhammad Hatta, essentially outlined the need for Indonesia to have an independent policy in charting its own course—based on its own national interests and free from the dictates of others—as well as being active in shaping, not just sitting idly by, the global arena.⁹

This policy further carries a mixture of ideal or normative goals, such as anticolonialism and independence, and a strong sense of pragmatism. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, though under different guises, this paradox of wrapping realpolitik-style pragmatism with a strong brand of idealism (such as the “Non-Aligned Movement”) has continued to underline the worldview of Indonesia’s foreign policy elites. Specifically, the world is seen to be an unfair arena of competition among states that has often provided both opportunities and threats to Indonesia—and thus the country needs to be not only independent but also actively seek to shape international events.

However, given Indonesia’s continued domestic problems, and its lack of military and economic power, such views can only be implemented using the nation’s “moral force,” as Hatta put it—or what the world now sees as the country’s “soft power,” including its democratic credentials. Put differently, though Indonesia sees the world as a hostile environment, it still seeks to engage in international affairs through normative instruments rather than power politics per se.

Today, however, for Indonesia to translate this view into concrete policies is more complicated and challenging than one might expect. For one thing, it seems that there is ultimately no wholehearted consensus on the basic foundations of foreign policy among the country’s policymakers, including what constitutes its “national interests,” or from where the threats to

those interests might come. Any appearances of unity in foreign policy have often reflected only a temporary alignment of the elites' domestic political interests.

Since the advent of democracy in 1998, the making of foreign policy has become further complicated as new actors have emerged, especially in the National Parliament. In fact, constitutional amendments have empowered the Parliament to endorse or reject presidential nominees for ambassadorial posts, start a legal inquiry into the president's foreign policy and block or pass any international agreements that the government has signed. The problem here is that legislators have occasionally framed foreign policy issues as part of a "neonationalist" agenda. Many legislators in charge of foreign affairs have also often lacked the necessary expertise and experience.

Arguably, therefore, despite the relatively constant interplay of pragmatism and idealism in Indonesia's worldview, domestic political calculations still take precedence over international interests. Consequently, the specific pronouncements of Indonesia's foreign policy—whether it becomes a global player pushing normative ideals (for example, the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s) or an inward-looking power trying to restore domestic stability (for example, during the first two decades of Suharto's New Order)—depend largely on how its policymakers align domestic and international interests, with the former being most important.

World Peace: How Indonesia Chips In

Indonesia's first moment of global prominence was perhaps the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian leaders attended by developing countries, which then led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Though taking place under the shadow of what President Sukarno described as a "struggle between

the Old Established Forces versus the New Emerging Forces," this initiative came on the heels of the domestic battle between the Indonesian military and the National Communist Party (known as the PKI).

Another crucial mark was the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which President Suharto took the lead in creating in 1967. He also ensured that the organization would help defuse various regional conflicts under the rationale of ensuring regional stability, while Indonesia focused on internal consolidation and economic recovery. Only after the dust settled did he begin to bid for global leadership—leading to Jakarta's chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1992.

Following Indonesia's recovery from the 1998 democratic transition, it again tried to reassert its regional leadership upon assuming the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2003, especially through its proposal to create a regional security community. This proposal, totaling more than 70 specific ideas when it was first announced, actually calls for the promotion of democracy and human rights, for a commitment to free and regular elections and for the building of open, tolerant societies.

Additionally, Indonesia also continued its international peacekeeping operations under UN auspices by participating in Lebanon's peacekeeping forces. In fact, as a regular contributor since 1957, Indonesia by 2009 had sent sixty-five different contingents to UN peacekeeping missions.

The Yudhoyono Paradox and Foreign Policy

Interestingly, however, on the global stage, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has recently taken a rather moderate stance. Many feel that he is not making use of Indonesia's favorable position, especially as

a member of the Group of 20. Such moderation, he has argued, is appropriate mainly because other countries were already voicing more progressive or radical views, and therefore Indonesia is wise to simply act as a bridge between the developed and developing countries. This position was stated again in Copenhagen in December 2009.

Such a stance cannot be entirely explained without referring to Yudhoyono's domestic weakness in recent years. Despite the fact that he was directly elected twice—for the first time in Indonesian history—and with a large parliamentary coalition, he still remains subject to the “Yudhoyono Paradox”: feeling insecure despite being at the apex of power.¹⁰

Additionally, public opinion begins to feature prominently in Yudhoyono's image-conscious administration. This does not mean that the president is more amenable to public opinion per se, but rather that he would prefer policy options based on how much they could elevate his favorability ratings.

Indonesian public opinion is volatile, and this can partly be explained by the overall low education level of many Indonesians, and as partly due to the minimal overseas travel that is often the privilege of the few. In fact, when asked in 2005, only 1 percent of the public said that they had traveled overseas in the pre-

vious five years.¹¹ Given these hurdles, therefore, the nation's political elites, including the members of the president's administration, often use the pursuit of foreign policy goals or achievements for domestic political purposes—an established tradition in Indonesian politics since the 1950s. As such, the main concern is not how much the public can be persuaded that there is a hostile or benevolent world order that could allow Indonesia to take a more active role in global initiatives, but how receptive and stable domestic politics are and how well the president can align competing domestic interests and public opinion with foreign policy goals.

Conclusion

For all Indonesia's potential as an emerging world power, its entanglement of domestic and global politics in its foreign policy remains. Consequently, any foreign policy goals and initiatives will often depend on how the nation's policymakers, especially the president, can engage public opinion and cajole domestic forces in its favor. Thus, the key question here is not so much whether Indonesia's global profile will continue to rise—or in what portfolio—but whether or not President Yudhoyono can overcome his “inferiority syndrome” and rally domestic support needed for his foreign policy goals. Perhaps Tip O'Neill's old saying that “all politics is local” remains the logic underlying Indonesia's quest for a better world after all.

ITALY

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Do Italians believe that the international order is essentially predatory or fair and rule based? This fundamental question can be unpacked by answering three further questions. First, do Italy's policies suggest an underlying Hobbesian or Kantian worldview? Second, to what kind of world order would Italians aspire and be ready to contribute? Third, if there is a gap between the answers to these first two questions, why does it exist and how could it be bridged?

Italy remains solidly anchored in the European and transatlantic structures of cooperation. No political party or movement with a significant following challenges Italy's membership in the European Union and NATO. Both Italy's decisionmakers and public opinion also attach great importance to the country's role within international organizations, notably the United Nations. For example, in the last 15 years Italy has been one of the major contributors to UN-mandated peacekeeping missions. However, particularly under the center-right governments led by Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's foreign policy has been characterized by an increasingly assertive defense of "national interests" and vocal complaints about the constraints posed by international cooperation. A vivid example is the anti-EU rhetoric of the Northern League, a populist party, which is a minor but influential partner in Berlusconi's governing coalition. Further examples include the reluctance of the center-right government to accept EU commitments on immigration and climate change.

Berlusconi himself has made no mystery of his unease with the EU's rules and obligations, which he views as excessively rigid and bureaucratic. He has preferred

pursuing international relations by cultivating personal ties with leaders ranging from George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Muammar Ghaddafi and Vladimir Putin, even when his acquiescence to them has risked tarnishing Italy's international image. As this attitude takes root, Italy may find itself entrapped in a Hobbesian vicious circle: The more it acts as an international and European outlier, the more other countries seek to marginalize it; and the more Italy is marginalized, the more ammunition is given to those seeking to rid the country of its international and European obligations, which they see as hampering its pursuit of its "national interest."

Does this frame of mind coincide with the way the public views the world and Italy's role in it? The answer is an unambiguous no. A cursory glance at the results of opinion polls such as the World Values Survey and Transatlantic Trends suggests that Italians are characterized by anything but cynicism. Italians feel strongly about a wide variety of global problems—such as poverty, climate change and conflict—and they manifest a clear willingness to help in solving them through multilateral rules and action (World Values Survey 2005-8, Online Data Analysis, Italy, available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org; and Transatlantic Trends 2009, Topline Data, available at www.gmfus.org).

When it comes to development, not only do 80 percent of Italians consider the fight against poverty the most serious global problem, but a majority would be willing to pay higher taxes to increase Italy's development aid. This stands in contrast to the nation's dwindling contributions to development aid, which have sunk to shamefully low levels compared with those of other Western countries. Turning to climate change, Italians are deeply concerned about the problem (86 percent), calling for action at individual (40 percent), state (60 percent) and international (77 percent)

levels, and accepting to do what it takes, even if this means doing more than other countries (87 percent). As for questions of war and peace, Italians manifest a strong belief in soft power as a recipe for dealing with global conflicts, with 81 percent of respondents considering economic instruments more effective than military ones, while decisively shunning the claim that war may be necessary to achieve justice (80 percent). More generally, Italians remain committed to multilateral rules and institutions, with approximately 70 percent of the public expressing confidence in the EU and 60 percent in the UN.

So what explains the disconnect between popular attitudes and the emerging tendencies in foreign policy conduct? The main reality underpinning Italy's retrenchment, nationalism and flamboyant unilateralism is a deep sense of unease with a changing world that is viewed as hindering the country's ambition to act as a midsize power with a prominent regional and international role. Italy's many structural weaknesses, which have worsened during the last two decades, make its foreign policy challenges all the more daunting. They include an economy that for many years has recorded the lowest growth rate in Europe (even before the 2008-9 global financial crisis), worrying demographic dynamics and a volatile political system that has been unable to rejuvenate itself.

Three examples highlight this growing sense of unease. The first is Italy's unsuccessful attempts to revive the moribund Group of 8, of which it has been a member since the mid-1970s. Italy's futile resistance to transfer global governance responsibilities from the G-8 to the Group of 20 during its G-8 presidency highlighted its difficulty in adjusting to major international developments. The rise of the G-20 has been a source of embarrassment for Italy. During the final press conference of the G-8 summit in July 2009,

Prime Minister Berlusconi expressed deep reservations about the G-20, which he described as too large to be effective, just two months before the Pittsburgh summit sanctioned the G-20's primacy in global economic governance. What haunts Italian elites is the specter of their nation's continuous loss of relative weight on the international scene. Hence, the shift from the "exclusive" G-8 club to the broader G-20 is perceived as resulting in a loss of prestige for Italy and a downgrading of its global status.

Italians feel strongly about a wide variety of global problems, and they manifest a clear willingness to help in solving them through multilateral rules and action.

The second example is Italy's exclusion from key EU decision-making structures. Italy has always struggled to be accepted as an equal partner in the restricted structures within the European Union composed of the biggest member states—France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Yet in recent years, it has been almost regularly excluded from them. Most vividly, the emergence of the "EU-3" (made up of these three biggest member states) as the lead group in European foreign policy has been perceived as a blow to Italy's ambitions. This is partly attributable to Berlusconi's erratic attention to, and limited interest in, the EU and the fact that he is seen as a controversial figure in many European capitals. However, these problematic aspects of his foreign policy have only exacerbated the much more structural problems undermining Italy's international role.

The third, more generally applicable, example of this growing sense of unease is Italy's perplexed and perplexing reaction to the emergence of a multipolar world—particularly to the rise of powers such as

China, India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Whereas concern about multipolarism and its consequences is no higher in Italy than elsewhere, the nation has often stuck its head in the sand. It risks succumbing to the temptation to embark on shortsighted policies to defend the status quo and its immediate national interests rather than devising new strategies for adapting to a changing world.

Given the glaring gap between Italy's aspirations and conduct in practice, what can be done to reassert the nation's role as a value-driven world citizen? First, following from the discussion above, Italy would need to engage in a painful adjustment process to preserve its international role and consequently contribute to fulfilling the values advocated by its citizens. This vital link between domestic reforms and international projection is rarely acknowledged in the country's foreign policy debate. Second, Italy should accept the need to change the rules of the game and contribute to the ongoing international efforts to do so. The nation is well versed in playing such a role, as evidenced by its diplomacy within the UN to promote a reform model aimed at preventing the consolidation of a new, rigid international hierarchy. Third, Italy's political elites must take heed from the public and refocus their energies on the EU. The precondition for an effective Italian contribution to the world is a strong, more coherent European Union. Only if the EU succeeds in becoming one of the pillars of the new international system can Italy hope to avoid being marginalized and avert the risk of a Hobbesian retrenchment. The

Lisbon Treaty opens the possibility for the EU to play such a role, but its ability to seize this opportunity is not a foregone conclusion. Italy's challenge will be to reacquire its traditional role at the heart of Europe, pushing for a rapid implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and thereafter participating in shaping EU solutions to global challenges. Only by regaining its central place within the EU can Italy reverse its current trend toward irrelevance, which is widening the gap between its international conduct and its people's Kantian aspirations.

If these reforms were to be carried out and Italy could fulfill its potential in the international and European realms, a virtuous circle would be created, whereby the Italian belief in and willingness to contribute to a fair international order would most likely increase. In other words, much of the cynicism that characterizes the Italian political debate today is strictly correlated with the country's perceived weakness on the international stage. This said, Italy's enhanced international ability to exert its power is unlikely to be sufficient to fundamentally alter the public's perception of the current international order. Italians are aware of their country's limited capabilities, as a midsize power, to bring about a just international order. Only if the interactions among the major powers—such as the U.S., China, India and the EU—were to point in a more value-based direction would Italians be persuaded that a just international order is possible and imminent, and then be willing to concomitantly increase their own contribution to such a new global situation.

JAPAN

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In Japan, as in other nations, cynicism about the international order, outside the hard core of those involved in working with this order, originates in the still-dominant view that this order can only be maintained by the rule of power—power politics—not the rule of law, as far as international affairs are concerned. This view is also based on the assumption that people are resigned to the fact that the international system is fundamentally and unchangeably so anarchic that no human efforts could transform it.

Revisiting the history of humankind, however, we can easily trace the growing recognition of the notion of human dignity as *the* essential universal value. As a result of World War II, basic human rights and democracy have become the minimum norms for any state seeking to claim legitimacy as a responsible member of the society of nations—standards that were unimaginable as recently as before the war. Why, then, can we not transform the perceived anarchic and power-dominant international system into one that is friendly to, if not based on, the rule of law and the universal value of human dignity? The day has come in this 21st century when idealistic realism needs to take the place of power-driven realism as the guiding principle for international relations. In this essay, I use the term “idealistic realism” in the sense that we must realistically recognize that the fundamentally anarchic nature of the international system comprising nation-states will last indefinitely into the future, but that this system is destined to be transformed into a society where human dignity and the rule of law increasingly prevail, replacing power politics, as has been the case for individual states.

Recognizing that the course of human history and the international order is positive and progressive, therefore, we may be freed from cynicism and regard investments to maintain international peace and order based on human dignity and the rule of law as necessary and constructive, not just an opportunity cost.

Japan’s Peace Constitution is an early materialization of such idealistic realism in human history. The provision of its Article 9 is as follows: “(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Furthermore, the preamble to the Peace Constitution states the national resolution “that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government” and the nation’s determination “to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” It also states that “[w]e desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression, and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.” Article 97 also makes it clear that the Peace Constitution is in line with the history of the gradual universalization of the notion of human dignity, when it states that “[t]he fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future

generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.” As such, the Constitution has gained the support of the majority of the Japanese people and has formed the main pillar of informed public opinion throughout Japan’s postwar political history.

Japan’s policy elites stubbornly believe that the international order is unchangeably predatory, whereas its public opinion is in a state of flux between Hobbesian and Kantian views.

The dominant intellectual current of Japan’s policy elites, however, has been heavily imbued with power-political thinking throughout Japanese history since the nation’s opening to the world in 1868. The U.S. policies, which gave birth to the Peace Constitution, were quickly abandoned in favor of fortifying the country as an outpost of anticommunism and rehabilitating the prewar policy elites, who now avowed their commitment to anticommunist pro-Americanism policy without having sincerely repented of their criminal past. One important politico-military result was the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as a price of Japan’s recovery of independence in 1952, in contravention to the pacifist spirit and provisions of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. During the postwar period, successive conservative governments have accommodated escalating U.S. military demands by repeatedly reinterpreting the meanings of Article 9’s words and phrases, thus hollowing out the very pacifist spirit of the article.

Maruyama Masao, an outstanding political thinker and scholar of the history of Japan’s political thought, once characterized the concept of Japanese “reality” as having three strong political biases: It is submissive to, rather than challenging, the given; it is one-dimensional, and therefore ossified rather than multifaceted

and flexible; and it is subservient to the strong and coercive against the weak. In sum, resignation imbued with cynicism to power politics has thus been a part of the national character. The introduction of pacifism and individualistic democracy onto Japan’s political soil by the Peace Constitution led, for the first time in its history, to the emergence of civil public opinion. Now, however, after more than 60 years’ experience with constitutional democracy, Japanese public opinion has still not yet established itself as an independent political force against the power-oriented, conservative political establishment. With this historical background in mind, I would argue that Japan’s conservative policy elites stubbornly believe that the international order is unchangeably predatory, whereas its public opinion is still in a state of flux between Hobbesian and Kantian views.

Japan’s conservative political elites have consistently maintained that its Peace Constitution is a foreign document that must be revised so that Japan can become a “normal,” rearmed country and thus adapt itself to the power-driven international system, and they have also maintained that the Constitution’s “excessive” human rights guarantees must be restricted in favor of what they call the “national interest.” The fundamental contradiction between the Constitution, which is based on Kantian idealistic realism, and the U.S.-Japan Security Pact, which is driven by considerations of Hobbesian power-politics, should be settled in favor of the latter. Japanese public opinion, conversely, has been divided between believers in the Kantian international order and those of Hobbesian convictions. Incidentally, the Democratic Party, the governing party since the fall of 2009, includes a mixture of policy elites who share the conservative Hobbesian roots of the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party and grassroots members who by and large mirror mixed public opinion.

According to Japanese political elites' Hobbesian view, the U.S.-Japan military alliance should be a precondition and central pillar, not a policy option, for maintaining not only Japan's security but also the international order in general. The provision of military bases for free U.S. use is regarded as a necessary opportunity cost. However, Japanese public opinion of a Kantian persuasion looks at the bilateral military alliance and U.S. bases differently. The root causes of international disorder should be addressed not militarily but by nonmilitary means. Especially since the end of the Cold War, according to such public opinion, the alliance and U.S. bases have become not only a net liability for Japan as it seeks to pursue its Constitution-based Kantian diplomacy but also a serious destabilizing factor for the international order.

The Cold War mentality and Hobbesian worldview of Japanese policy elites is specifically manifest in their belief in and reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence for the country's security against what they term "nuclear threats" from China and North Korea. Antinuclear sentiment is very strong, however, among many Japanese people, based on the national experiences of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and the *Happy Dragon* incident, in which a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to heavy radiation caused by a U.S. hydrogen bomb experiment in the Pacific Ocean. The policy elites could have hardly ignored such strong national antinuclear feelings, when in the late 1960s they promised a national policy of the so-called Three Non-Nuclear Principles: not possessing, not producing and not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons onto Japan's territory. To bridge the gap between reliance on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and this avowed policy of not allowing the entry of nuclear weapons, secret agreements were reached between the U.S. government and Japan's policy elites. Incidentally,

the public exposure of the existence of such secret agreements in 2009 inflamed public opinion, forcing the new Democratic Party government launched a full investigation.

Such global issues as climate change, poverty and hunger have a common thread: They threaten human dignity, the essential universal value. A Hobbesian, power-driven worldview is fundamentally indifferent to and even hostile to this value. Market capitalism, by the way, should be understood as an economic expression of Hobbesian philosophy. Since the 1980s, Japan's policy elites have pushed, together with their U.S.-led Western peers, such politico-economic policies, which have aggravated the effects of climate change and jeopardized living standards. Without external interference, these negative consequences will continue unchecked, accompanied by increasing international disorder.

Japanese informed public opinion has increasingly reflected alarm about this deterioration of the Earth's environment and worldwide living standards, along with encouraging signs of a desire to look to international cooperation to stop this decline. The guiding principle for public opinion has been the preamble of the Peace Constitution. A hopeful sign for public opinion is the push, for the first time in Japan's history, for the nation's traditionally power-driven policy elites to seriously address global environmental and humanitarian issues. The latest example is Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's widely reported political commitment regarding climate change.

For Japanese political elites of a Hobbesian inclination, including the leaders of the ruling Democratic Party, the question whether the international order should be fair is fundamentally irrelevant. Bluntly put, whatever the United States claims is white is white

to them, and whatever it claims is black is black to them. They are ready to pay the opportunity costs of maintaining and strengthening the U.S.-Japan bilateral military alliance, but they will act on global and humanitarian issues only under strong external pressures to which the United States, the very patron and guide of Japan's political elites, cannot help but succumb.

Japan's informed public opinion stresses the nation's nonmilitary roles in overcoming global problems, guided by its Peace Constitution, which identify its peace and prosperity with those of international society. The day will hopefully come when people who hold such opinions become a political majority and fundamentally transform Japan's political thinking and behavior, departing once and for all from a cynical resignation to the Japanese style of "reality."

SOUTH AFRICA

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South Africa's attitude toward international relations, and therefore its foreign policy, exhibit a profound belief that the international order can be reformed to create a better world. Since 1910, when the Union of South Africa was declared, there has been much evidence of South Africans' strong trust in the international system as an antidote to misrule, both domestically and internationally—particularly in that South Africa's policy elites have seen the international order as capable of progressive reform. The consistent faith in the positive role of the international order is an artifact of the coexistence of neoliberal and neo-realistic doctrines of international relations among political elites in South Africa.

The Eclectic Perspective of the International Order

This coexistence in South Africa of faith in the international system and commitment to the creation of a new world order is heavily influenced by the eclectic ideology of the nation's current governing party, the African National Congress. The ANC is the oldest liberation movement in Africa, born out of the African elites' quest for a progressive platform to express their yearning for a policy space and for modernizing South Africa. From the outset, the ANC's leadership—made up of African elites educated in Christian missions, mainly teachers, pastors and lawyers—linked their struggle to the evolving cosmopolitan values of equality and freedom. And when national efforts failed, they took their appeals to key international actors like the United Kingdom and the League of Nations. In fact, the ANC's leaders attempted to pro-

pose a global human rights charter in the early 1920s, one that would link national unity and international solidarity.

Of course, given the ANC's situation now as the governing party, and earlier as a deeply entrenched mass opposition movement under apartheid, it has evolved over the decades from an African liberal nationalist platform to a more militant and radical organization, especially after its marriage with the South African Communist Party in the 1940s. This has given the ANC a pluralist political philosophy combining conservative and liberal doctrines. Yet its leaning toward progressive liberalism has remained intact.

The ANC took the lead in the struggle against apartheid on the international stage in 1961, at the same time it launched the armed and underground strands of the struggle. This reflected continuity with the internationalist tradition in the ANC, which was founded on strong faith in the utility of the international order. There was unanimity among the forces fighting apartheid that the time was ripe to mobilize the international community and institutions of global governance to isolate and put pressure on the apartheid government to agree to negotiations with the freedom fighters. They did not see the international order as a state of anarchy, as did the realists; nor did they see it as essentially fair, as from a Kantian perspective. Instead, they saw it as capable of protecting the vulnerable and weak, while evolving into a more democratic and just order. Today, it is seen as a bastion against misrule and abuse by the powerful against those possessing limited or no power at the nation-state level.

This eclectic ideological position on the international order informs the ANC's long-standing commitment to a new world order, where this means reforms of

the power structures that underpin the current institutions of global governance. This has always been seen by the majority as an extension of the national and continental quest for freedom and newness, typified by the motto "A better South Africa, better Africa and better world." The neorealist idea of reform coexists with the liberal faith in international institutions as well as cosmopolitan values and norms. A radical quest for the democratization of the international system to reflect post-World War II realities was marked by increased membership from the global South. The policy elites were also committed to bridge building between the North and South through consensus and cooperation.

This view of the international order as credible but in need of further reform pervades general public opinion in South Africa. If election results and opinion polls conducted over the past decade are anything to go by, then the majority of South Africans subscribe to a mixture of ideological perspectives on all matters of public policy, including international relations. This is underpinned by a profound belief in the evolution of an ideal global order, with tectonic changes that coincided with decolonization in the 1960s and end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Three Cases That Inform the South African View

Three cases epitomize this eclectic view of the international order in South Africa. The first is the role of the international community in the struggle against apartheid. Both the policy elites and sections of the public constantly recall how the internationalization of the struggle led to a gradual shift in the power of forces within South Africa in favor of prodemocracy movements led by the ANC. This moment in South African history is told as a narrative about the victory of multilateral cooperation, nonstate solidarity and

public diplomacy over the connivance of some with the apartheid state. The disinvestment by major multinational companies and the freezing of diplomatic ties with South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s are seen as evidence that the international community espouses and promotes cosmopolitan values of human rights, democracy, equality and good governance.

The second case is the spread of democracy in Africa, which has been used by South African policy elites to frame the international order as an effective instrument for the creation of a more democratic and egalitarian world. The international order was seen to be gradually transforming during the 21st century, and the new South Africa and Africa are simply epitomes of this evolution of a new world. Policy practitioners and decisionmakers see progress, even if piecemeal, toward a new world order. This has inspired the idea of an African Renaissance, which has been reconceptualized to mean both the resurgence of self-confidence and self-reliance, on the one hand, and the political stabilization and democratization that prepare Africa to participate fruitfully in what is envisaged as a democratic world system, on the other.

Finally, the third case is the growing power and influence of emerging democracies like India, Brazil and South Africa, among other large emerging nations, which has newly inspired the South African political elites' faith in the international system and optimism about its transformation. They recognize that the rise of what are commonly called the "emerging powers" is an artifact in part of the elasticity of the international system that allowed it to cope with both unipolarism and multipolarism in the 1990s. These new significant actors in the international system are able to establish issue-based alliances in multilateral forums to counterbalance the power of the few globally dominant states. The belief is that this asymmetric power

imbalance will provide a stimulus for the incremental reform of global institutions with respect to economic and political power.

South Africa: A Norm Entrepreneur?

The dismantling of South Africa's nuclear arsenal on the eve of democracy, which was driven more by white fears than a strategic calculus on the part of the black-led government after 1994, projected the nation as an exemplary actor in the growing pursuit of a nuclear-free world. This gave the country moral authority to position itself as a bridge builder between various power blocs during the negotiations that led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to intervene in tensions between the contentious nuclear states India and Pakistan in the mid-1990s. South Africa used the force of its example and the iconography of the reconciling Nelson Mandela to position itself as a major actor on nuclear questions, a tradition it sought to continue during its bid for the position of director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2009.

South Africa's extensive involvement in peacemaking diplomacy in various parts of the world has been informed by a moral duty to replicate its "miracle" of democratic transition in other parts of Africa. For this reason, whether in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire or Northern Ireland, the country has pushed for a formula for conflict resolution that replicates its successful transition from apartheid. In doing this, it has sought to spread democratization, peace and stability in the belief that these are necessary preconditions for development. The country's enthusiastic push for the reengineering of the United Nations' human rights architecture, leading to the Human Rights Council, was designed to project the country as a champion of human rights at a time when the "war on terror" had relegated issues

of values to a lower priority as matters of security and interest have become prominent.

Conclusion

The challenge for South Africa is that crude power politics and tension in the international system are more prevalent than is generally assumed. This situation, then, is bound to push the country into one or the other camp in the global power struggles, which will weaken its capacity to act as a global norm entrepreneur and bridge builder. Another challenge is the growing domestic pressure for the government to project the country's national interests more sharply in international affairs. This suggests that public attitudes toward international relations are changing toward guarded optimism, if not downright pessimism, which may gradually transform South Africa into a state with a realistic perspective on its conduct of international relations.

However, in the end, it is likely that a number of factors will reenergize South Africa's search for a reformed global governance system—including incremental successes in multilateral negotiations on climate change and multilateral trade, a continuing focus on a global development agenda epitomized by the Millennium Development Goals, the growing importance of the Group of 20 and the increasing global efficacy of the emerging powers. A new international order holds out the promise of beneficial partnerships and political clout for Africa, and South Africa's ability to defend and advance Africa's collective interests means that the continent will thrust upon South Africa, in the absence of a fitting alternative, the responsibility to lead its engagement with the world for some time to come.

SPAIN

Jordi Vaquer

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In late 1985, weeks before Spain became a member of the European Communities, a major Spanish television show popularized a sentence that caught the spirit of the moment: “Finally, we are Europeans!” At last, the country could turn the page from the international isolation it had endured since 1945 under the dictator Francisco Franco, when it had been excluded from the United Nations and the emerging Western European order. But now, after the tyrant’s death, Spaniards embraced the post-1945 international system with the enthusiasm of new converts. And since then, Spanish public opinion has by and large remained essentially pacifist and positive toward a rule-based idea of international relations.

Spanish public opinion on international issues can be monitored through two main national sources: the poll of the public Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas; and the poll of the Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano, which is commissioned by this independent think tank that focuses on international relations. However, the opinions of the elites are not systematically surveyed in any comparable manner. Spain is also included in several international surveys, which makes possible some interesting comparisons. These international surveys that regularly include Spain among the countries they study include the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, and Transatlantic Trends. Additionally, both the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas-CIS and the Real Instituto Elcano have included in their own survey questions that can be compared with those of other international surveys, such as Latinobarómetro. As a result, there is a wealth of materials for comparison

between public opinion in Spain and in other countries, particularly European ones. This aggregated picture shows that, within the general trends in European public opinion on international affairs, Spanish public opinion has kept some characteristics of its own.

By and large, Spaniards declare themselves more in favor of international law and multilateral solutions, against hegemony (in particular American hegemony) and for a stronger European role than most Western European societies. Spaniards’ enthusiasm for multilateral solutions, however, stops at the military option; they stand out as being considerably less inclined to using military force in almost all cases (66 percent of respondents vs. 42 percent in Western Europe and 10 percent in the U.S.), whether or not Spain is involved. In the wake of the administration of George W. Bush, when the exceptional anti-Americanism prevailing in Spain was first matched by the deterioration of the U.S. image elsewhere in Europe, and then reversed after the election of Barack Obama, Spaniards have been closer to the Western European average in support and/or sympathy for the U.S. In this new context, it becomes clear that Spain’s opposition to unilateral action and preference for solutions more in line with international norms and under the leadership of international institutions was not a simple product of anti-American feelings. In fact, the source of these positions runs deeper, as a part of a general understanding of how the international system should work that is prevalent in Spain. We could explain this pacifist and normative view of international relations as related to three major processes that have affected Spain’s international standing: isolation, integration and politicization.

The exclusion by the winners of World War II reduced Spain to a peripheral position and deprived it from participating not just in the design of the new international system but also in almost every major interna-

tional event for four decades. Resolution 39(I) of the UN Assembly (December 12, 1946) sealed the isolation of Spain, which would only be fully overcome 40 years later. The will to break this marginalization and to participate in the new international order became a crucial part of any program for democratization. As a result, adherence to international law, participation in international institutions and the contribution to the solution of global issues seems, to many Spaniards, a natural consequence of their nation's new democratic character. Spain's late reintegration into the international order spared its citizens the disappointment with international mechanisms that had eroded other countries' confidence in them during those three decades. Whereas situations where international law and institutions were powerless to avoid large-scale violence and even genocide, such as Cambodia or Rwanda, remain relatively obscure to even the most internationally oriented sections of the public, other situations where UN resolutions are at stake, in particular in Western Sahara and Palestine, remain central in Spain's foreign policy debates. This might explain why Spaniards often have a traditional and relatively static view of international law, and why concepts such as the responsibility to protect have been questioned unless they are applied with the full backing of UN mechanisms. The latest example of this attitude can be found in Spain's refusal to recognize Kosovo's declared independence, on the grounds that it breaks international law.

A second event that explains Spanish attitudes constitutes, in a way, the total reversal of the effects of UN General Assembly Resolution 39(I): Spain's accession to the European Communities in 1986, the most symbolic moment in a series of accessions—to the Council of Europe in 1977, to NATO in 1982 and to the Western European Union in 1989. The Euro-enthusiasm of Spanish civil society, which has eroded but still

remains stronger than the Western European average, also extends to the vision of a world that should become a sort of wider version of European integration as experienced by Spain's public opinion: norm based, driven by economic and not military means and highly beneficial, in particular to those most in need, but also devoid of major controversy on the overall objectives and paid, by and large, by others. In fact, even the last point has become less controversial when the one paying is the public budget, and Spanish society has kept a constant pressure on its governments, which has translated into considerable growth in development aid. This kind of solidarity, however, does not apply when jobs and personal (and corporate) income, rather than aid from the state budget, are at stake—as reflected by the government's largely unchallenged positions on agricultural subsidies and international fisheries. Spain's integration into Western institutions was seen in the first years of democracy by parts of the country's political left wing as contradictory to its more universalist positions—some even advocated integration into the Non-Aligned Movement—however, since a referendum in 1986 confirmed Spain's NATO membership, its full participation in Western institutions and commitment to a law-based international order have by and large been understood as two sides of the same coin.

The broad consensus on the benefits of belonging to the European family and on the global objectives of Spanish foreign policy was broken in the foreign policy cycle that followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the U.S. The Spanish government, led at that time by José María Aznar, decided to realign itself more closely with the American position, to the point of the country's becoming one of the most ardent supporters of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, this support went against two primary international instincts of Spanish public opinion—pacifism,

and the nation's attachment to the United Nations and international law—and was pursued in the face of opposition from a staggering 92 percent of polled citizens. The subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which left 200 dead and hundreds more injured, were thought to be related to Spain's position on the war in Iraq by 64 percent of its citizens. The mismanagement of the aftermath of these attacks is widely seen as the main factor for the later victory of the Socialist opposition. And once they had entered office, the Socialists reversed Aznar's foreign policy course and began to strongly emphasize international law, starting with a speedy withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. In the aftermath of its overcoming isolationism and embracing the Western model of integration into the world, Spain has arguably entered a phase where competing understandings of how international relations work (a more Hobbesian view embraced by Aznar's Popular Party vs. a Kantian one defended by the Socialists under Rodríguez Zapatero) are behind several fundamental disagreements in international issues. This politicization of Spain's foreign policy can be interpreted as a normalization after

the years of consensus on its aspirations to regain its place among Western nations.

Given these realities, then, could Spanish public opinion be persuaded to increase the national contribution to organizations and initiatives seeking to solve global problems? Spanish citizens have so far supported international military involvement, the acquisition of global commitments (which have not always been respected, as shown by Spain's paltry performance in meeting its Kyoto Protocol targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions) and an increase in development aid. This would not necessarily automatically translate into a readiness to make further, more substantial contributions. An explicit link to international norms and to the United Nations and other global institutions and agreements would almost certainly be required. A significant European dimension would in all likelihood help. But even then, the support of public opinion could not be taken for granted in cases of offensive military operations, or global contributions which have negative effects on jobs and other economic interests within Spain.

AFTERWORD

Brian Urquhart

Advocates of global fairness, or more formally, of global civics, face a less-than-encouraging picture in 2010. In many countries, let alone the world at large, there is a querulous and ungenerous political and social mood; while international relations, freed from the monstrous hazards of the Cold War, are for the most part anxious, cool, quarrelsome and uncertain. Within the United Nations, the world's most universal forum, there is little evidence of enthusiastic solidarity or forward-looking leadership that is needed to resolve threatening global problems successfully, let alone to seek fundamental changes in human attitudes or behavior. While the international humanitarian response to disasters is relatively strong, and the realization of human rights has many active supporters all over the world, the vital concept of fellowship of the human race is honored more in rhetoric than in practice.

Nonetheless, since World War II, much progress has been made toward a more equitable and just world. The Human Rights conventions, decolonization, international law, care for the environment, concern with large-scale poverty, the spread of democracy, international peacekeeping, and the proliferation of international non-governmental organizations in every walk of life, would have been inconceivable 70 years ago. Such achievements are indispensable to fairness and civic conscience both nationally and internationally; but until the actual inhabitants of the planet develop a stronger feeling of mutual responsibility and mutual pride, and communicate such feelings to their rulers, the necessary popular pressure to move us into a new era of global civics will be lacking.

It is not surprising that the contributors to this volume tend to be more concerned with governmental policy than with popular opinion or influence. The quest for fairness needs tangible goals in order to succeed. Solidarity and cooperation can sometimes be mobilized to face common dangers or threats, provided that those threats are perceived in time, but they tend to evaporate quickly when the danger is past. A universal tradition of fairness and public spirit—a glorious objective—will not be created quickly or easily; This is why the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible.

A universal tradition of fairness and public spirit will not be created quickly or easily; This is why the foundation from which it can grow needs to be established as soon as possible.

What are the elements of such a tradition? Motofumi Asai suggests what I believe to be the essential starting point in any advocacy of global civics and fairness, the “recognition of the notion of human dignity as *the* essential universal value.” That is one of the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in the storm and stress of both public and private affairs in the last sixty years, it has very often been forgotten. The universal recognition of human dignity is, of course, actively denied by any form of bigotry and by ethnic or religious fanaticism. It is often the first casualty of violence or war. Until the recognition of the notion of human dignity becomes universal rather than a distant aspiration, progress in establishing universal respect for human rights will remain partially unfulfilled, and the growth of a universal tradition of fairness will be stunted.

Anyone who has worked for many years in an admittedly flawed international system becomes accustomed to being called deluded, naïve or unrealistic. In

the end, however, it is possible to look back on a surprising degree of progress that was difficult to discern at the time, sometimes toward objectives that were previously thought to be hopelessly unattainable. Fairness and civility are vast objectives even for a single state, but if we pride ourselves on having achieved globalization and a revolution in human communication, why should fairness and civility not also be global objectives? Such vast objectives may never be altogether realized. They stand as a guide to behavior, a great work in continual progress in which leaders, teachers, NGO's, the media, artists and intellectuals can play their part. Human nature *can* develop and change, and not always in the wrong direction.

In his introductory essay, Hakan Altinay asks: "Will we be able to acknowledge with genuine sincerity the legitimate disappointments of many with the international systems and yet still harness their readiness to take a realistic leap of faith for a better world where they share in the responsibility?" I would answer that unless and until the peoples of the world, whom the UN Charter names in its opening words, associate themselves actively with the higher aspirations of the international system, the best hopes of our human civilization will remain to some extent unfulfilled.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Kagan makes an unabated defense of this argument in *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
2. For examples of dismissive treatment of transnational movements, see Walter Russell Mead, "The Death of Global Warming," and Walter Russell Mead, "Blowing Hot and Cold," both available in *American Interest Online*. Incidentally, not everyone is as dismissive as Mead. The National Intelligence Council has a scenario where nongovernmental organizations increase in number and strength due to the capacity of individuals and groups to affiliate with each other using the Internet, and member states of the United Nations feel compelled to allocate 20 seats at the UN General Assembly to NGOs with the same voting rights as nation-states; see National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 91.
3. For a discussion of global civics, see Hakan Altınay, *The Case for Global Civics*, Brookings Global Working Paper, March 2010.
4. World Public Opinion, "World Public Opinion on International Law and the World Court" (www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/nov09/WPO_IntlLaw_Nov09_quaire.pdf [November 2009]).
5. Leslie Gelb, *Power Rules* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 72. In this book that purports to rescue American foreign policy, there is an astonishing and total neglect of climate change.
6. World Public Opinion, "World Public Opinion on International Cooperation" (www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/dec09/WPO_Cooperation_Dec09_quaire.pdf [December 2009]).
7. Rakesh Batabyal, *Penguin Book of Modern Indian Speeches* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007). For a detailed historical treatment of the range of issues see Bipan Chandra et al., *India's Struggle for Independence* (New Delhi: Viking, 1989); and Bipan Chandra et al., *India After Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2009).
8. In 2009, countries like Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt and Turkey abstained from voting, and Cuba, Venezuela and Malaysia opposed the resolution.
9. See Muhammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 3 (1953): 441-52.
10. See Evan A. Laksmana, "The Yudhoyono Paradox," *Today*, January 30, 2010.
11. Anthony Leiserowitz, *International Public Opinion, Perception, and Understanding of Global Climate Change*, Human Development Office Occasional Paper (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2007), 8.



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