

THE CHANGING GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN INDIA

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1. Introduction

India's higher education system is under pressure from the State and an increasingly educated youth population to achieve multiple objectives, such as growth, quality and equitable access. To reach these political targets, national and provincial policymakers take an activist approach, such as providing adequate resources, enabling private provision of higher education, and so forth.

Burton Clark's classic study of university organization (Clark, 1983) stressed the "triangle" of coordination— "market-like" coordination, i.e., a response to market demand from students and their families; state-induced coordination; and academic-professional coordination (the influence of the professoriate and the professional administration of universities). Later work by Clark (1998) and Kirp (2003) discussed the rapid transformation of U.S. higher education institutions into "entrepreneurial universities" concerned with their "bottom line." This gradual shift to increased focus on an "altered" version of market coordination, one in which the university not only tries to attract students, but also becomes business oriented, mostly within the framework of state coordination, is highly relevant to current governance issues in India.

More recently, higher education analysts have focused on globalization, its impact on the role of the nation-state, and how this translates into the relationship between the nation-state and universities (for example, Enders, 2004; Altbach and Teichler, 2001, Marginson and Ordorika, 2010). Many of these same writers are concerned with the internationalization of universities—the movements across borders by students and faculty, and even by branches of universities—and their impact on university systems.

All of these elements are present in the Indian case, but as we shall suggest, despite a growing tendency for the market axis of Clark's triangle to play a major role in the Indian university system, and the increased impact of the globalizing economy on higher education through the labor market—rapidly increased demand for engineering and business graduates, and the boom in private college provision in those fields—the government still dominates the shape of higher education governance. Indeed, the most “internationalized” parts of the system are the elite central government controlled universities, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology and the Indian Institutes of Management. Unlike in Europe, the model is not exhibiting change from “state control models” to “state supervisory models,” or to the “rise of the evaluative state” (Enders, 2009). Rather, the federal government in India and state governments under the federal government have slowly changed the governance of Indian universities mainly through changing the mechanisms of state control, and the use of these mechanisms as they vary from state to state.

In the past two years, with increasing interest in India's economic surge, some excellent analyses and critiques have also been made of India's universities, the manner in which they have been expanding, and their quality (for example, Kapur, 2009; Sundar, 2010). However, one of the problems with much of the research, including the discussion of general trends in university organization, and the more specific work on Indian universities is that they do not adequately deal with university systems' overall objectives, and especially how governance could be impacting those goals.

In this paper, we focus on this issue. We ask how the governance and objectives of Indian higher education have evolved, and whether changes in governance are

consistent with changes in the system's social objectives, and, in their turn, how the governance system, which is a "layered" product of past structures heavily influenced by a series of historical reforms, may impact how current social objectives are realized. These social objectives have included, at various times, at the least, equity, quality, cost effectiveness, and access.¹ For private colleges and universities, historically always part of India's higher education system, operating financial self-sufficiency is also an objective (a private objective).

The social objectives, in turn, reflected both national and provincial priorities of the time – the law mandates the provincial government to be the entity responsible for the provision of education, while policymaking is shared (post-1976) with the national government. The objectives potentially compete with each other, and incentives to achieve them differ depending on the governance model. Access and quality are usually considered the objectives most likely to conflict.² Financial self-sufficiency may also conflict with quality.

The priorities of national and provincial governments have not always been congruent. The national government, from colonial times, gave quality its highest

¹ The objectives are put forth in various policy documents. For example, the Central Advisory Board of Education, the apex policy making body of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, stated, at a meeting of the body in 2010, the goal of "achieving equity, access and balanced development of higher education." (CABE Minutes, June 19, 2010, www.education.nic.in, accessed December 25, 2010). For a review of the objectives of higher education and concerns that they are generally not being met, see Government of India (2008).

² Concerns about the failure of the system to meet its objectives and potential conflicts among objectives are widespread. A report by the National Knowledge Commission, an advisory body to the Prime Minister, noted in 2006 that, "If we have to move towards a knowledge economy and society, we need to revisit the prevailing model of undergraduate colleges in terms of quantity as well as quality. It is widely recognized that colleges in different parts of the country are of varying standards with indeed a few which can compete with the best, internationally. However, with honesty one should also accept that the vast majority only serves the needs of "academic squatters" ... India faces today two exciting challenges in Higher Education: to increase the access to higher education and to provide educational institutions of academic excellence. It may seem that these are contradictory challenges and that we can only address one of them at a time." (Government of India, 2006, p.1).

priority. The provincial government post-independence prioritized access and, later, equity over quality.

We organize the paper by the types of national government that dominated India in various historical periods. Section 2 deals with the colonial period. Independence in 1947 marked a break with colonial rule and the establishment of a federal democracy. In common with other scholarly analyses,³ the post-independence period is divided into three periods reflecting three distinct styles of national government – Nehruvian (1947-1966), Indira Gandhi (1966-1984) and the reform period (1984 onwards). The Nehruvian period is characterized by federalism and state-led industrialization. This is analyzed in Section 3. The Indira Gandhi period marked a shift towards centralization of power, emphasis on equitable growth and reduced importance for industrialization (Section 4). A period of reform that steered the country towards a market economy and greater decentralization of power to the provinces began thereafter. This is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides a concluding discussion.

2. Higher Education Governance in the British Colonial Period

India's contemporary university system started in 1857 with the establishment of three public universities in the 'presidency headquarter' cities of Chennai, Kolkata and Mumbai.⁴ Subsequently, several state-owned universities started operations under the guidance of provincial governments.

The governance system introduced by the colonial government⁵ replicated the University of London 'federal university' system, founded in 1836 to regulate the quality

³ For eg., see Kohli (2010)

⁴ <http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/W/16/0W160301.htm>, accessed December 8, 2010. The presidency in colonial times referred to an administrative subdivision.

⁵ The colonial government was represented by the East India Company till 1857.

of existing colleges,⁶ in which the university is an affiliating body and reports to its local government. Similarly, in India, the role of the university was to support the educational goals of its constituent colleges by designing curricula, holding examinations and awarding degrees. The role of the colleges was largely to prepare Indians for work in the British colonial bureaucracy.

The government was not interested in providing education through the university, nor paying for higher education in the colleges.⁷ The colleges were largely privately owned.

The affiliated privately owned colleges primarily taught subjects in the arts and sciences, as well as the English language, to students who had completed their secondary education in the vernacular. Engineering colleges were later affiliated as well, and started awarding degrees from 1864.⁸ Their graduates usually sought employment in the state's railroads and other civic departments.⁹

⁶ <http://www.london.ac.uk/history.html>, accessed December 13, 2010. It initially began as an examining body for constituent colleges.

⁷ As Charles Wood, the author of a key government report of the time noted, education was "to be mainly supported by those who are anxious for it". Wood added: "He added that "if they (Indians) choose to educate themselves, well and good, but I am against providing our own future detractors, opponents and grumblers". The University of London was the explicit model for India. Woods noted that "the form, government and functions of the University of London are best adapted to the wants of India". The proposed university was to consist of a Chancellor, a Vice-Chancellor and Fellows who would constitute a Senate. The Senate would have the authority to manage the funds of the university and to frame regulations for examinations. The functions of the university would be to hold examinations and confer degrees. (Wood's Despatch to Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General in India: <http://www.caluniv.ac.in/About%20the%20university/Some%20Defining%20Events.htm>, accessed December 14, 2010). Schenkman (1954) notes that universities were not to be themselves "places of education" but were to test "the value of the education given elsewhere." (p.24).

⁸ INSA, 2001, Ch. 6, p.85

⁹ A memorandum on education prepared by the state in 1886 noted that there were four (private) colleges offering technical education, in Chennai, Pune, Kolkata and Roorkee with 318 students, and 17 survey and industrial school with a total enrollment of 1844 students. Reiterating the colonial state's attitude to higher education that was first expressed in Wood's Despatch, the memorandum noted that the policy of the government was to accept the desirability of technical education with no financial responsibility to spread it.

Despite some later experiments with direct university education, the federal structure remained largely intact through the colonial period.¹⁰ In 1921, the government established the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) to bring consensus on policy matters among provincial governments.¹¹ With some interruptions, CABE continues to be the primary policy making body for education to the present time. Its first report, in 1937, recommended the establishment of post-secondary technical institutions, termed polytechnics. In 1945, a committee formed by CABE, under N.R.Sarkar (popularly known as the “Sarkar Committee”), recommended the establishment of one higher technical institution in each zone of the country—north, south, east and west. The All India Council of Technical Education was formed in 1946, to supervise tertiary-level technical education.¹²

¹⁰ In 1882, a state education commission reemphasized the federal role calling for the withdrawal of the state from the management and direct financial support of higher education in favor of self-financed private colleges. In 1886, another government report noted that “low grade technical and industrial schools were opened and were run variously by education departments, district boards and privately.” (INSA, 2001, Ch. 6, p. 86 op cit). In response, a University Commission of 1902 recommended “a much more strict and systematic supervision of the colleges by the university; and the imposition of more exacting conditions of affiliation; a much closer attention to the conditions under which students live and work; the assumption of teaching functions by the university within defined limits; substantial changes in curricula and in the methods of examination.” This change in direction was probably influenced by trends towards greater university control in Britain at the time. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_London, accessed December 13, 2010). The Universities Act of 1904 sought to implement these recommendations. The Act defined the powers of universities thus: “The University shall be ... deemed to have been incorporated for the purpose (among others) of making provision for the instruction of students, with power to appoint University professors and lecturers, to hold and manage educational endowments, to erect, equip and maintain University libraries, laboratories and museums, to make regulations relating to the residence and conduct of students, and to do all acts, consistent with this Act, which lead to the promotion of study and research”. <http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/n/2D/3P/2D3P0501.htm>, accessed December 10, 2010. Despite this, private colleges proliferated – this was attributed to the reluctance of the colonial state to spend resources. Likewise, unitary private institutions funded by citizens and recognized by acts of Parliament or other vesting powers were established. These included the Indian Institute of Science, in 1910, Banaras Hindu University, in 1915, and Aligarh Muslim University, in 1920.(INSA, 2001, p.86.) The number of technical institutions grew to 21 by 1939. Enrollment is recorded as 126,000 by 1936-37.

¹¹ CABE was, however, not operationalized till 1935. Source: Government of India, 2005

¹² INSA, 2001, p.87

In summary, the colonial government created the federal university system, in which the lead institution—the university—was owned and operated by the state. The provincial administrations played the primary role in governing universities in their provinces. The focus of governance was on regulating quality standards. The constituent colleges were largely privately owned and lightly regulated regarding costs, access and equity. Since colonial government jobs—the ambition of most graduates—gave a relatively tiny group of college-educated Indians high status and relatively high income, they were willing to pay for it.

3. Higher Education Governance in the Nehruvian Period (1947-1964)

The 1947 draft Constitution of independent India recommended the transfer of all responsibility for education to the provincial governments. Since the provincial governments already managed education, this merely legally ratified an existing situation. However, it significantly affected the prioritization of objectives: the post-independence provincial governments were interested in improving access as a first priority, even if it meant sacrificing quality. To ensure this goal, they increased the level of political control over the universities by provincial-level governments.

Fairly quickly after independence, though, moves toward centralizing the state's control of higher education under the national government were initiated by Nehru. Under CABE, two reports—the University Education Commission of 1948 and the Secondary Education Commission of 1952—proposed national entry standards into the university system, standardized (nationally) the time periods for transition to university and completion, and called for the promotion of technical education to meet national standards. The 1948 Commission also recommended the establishment of a national

standards regulator. The 1952 Secondary Education commission recommended the establishment of technical education programs, located near appropriate industries, with the intent that they would “function in close cooperation with the industry concerned.”

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Sarkar Committee and the Education Commissions, and the formation of AICTE, the first Indian Institutes of Technology began as nationally governed unitary institutions, near centers of industry, between 1950 and 1961. At the recommendation of the Education Commission, the curriculum in the first year was standardized across all branches of engineering. General education and basic physical and engineering sciences were included in the core.

In 1956, Parliament established the University Grants Commission as a national regulator of standards and a provider of finance.¹³ Following the UGC’s establishment, the national government provided financial support to create new unitary professional institutions, a large number of which were established. Unitary regional professional colleges, jointly promoted by state and central governments, were also established.¹⁴

The governance of the university system in the first two decades after independence thus shifted away from provincial state control towards centralization under the national government. The change was led by India’s first post-independence

¹³ The UGC was empowered to: (1) promote and coordinate university education; (2) determine and maintain standards of teaching, examination and research. This included defining teachers’ qualifications, standards of instruction and fee scales; (3) financially aid the universities, both those created by the federal government and others (the latter from 1972); (4) advise universities on implementing actions for maintaining standards; (5) inspect universities for financial and educational standards; (6) recognize and de-list colleges within a university system for not meeting financial standards. This would be done upon the recommendation of the university. Prior to the formation of UGC, universities were responsible for recognizing and de-listing colleges. (Government of India, Education Commissions and Committees in Retrospect). In practice, the universities continued to control the recognition of constituent colleges since they were not obliged to obtain UGC permission.

¹⁴ The growth in professional enrollment was low for many decades. Compared with 1947, when 211,894 students were enrolled in technical institutions, the intake had risen by just 58% by 2000 (INSA, 2001, p.89).

Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's strategy of state-led industrialization required the universities to produce the technicians to work in large state-owned enterprises. Nehru questioned whether higher education's provincial governance structure would produce such technicians. Hence, his government established well-resourced, nationally regulated, unitary institutions with a focus on specific technologies and with access to collaborations with the best foreign universities; and, jointly with provincial governments, established regional professional unitary institutions. The establishment of the IITs, NITs and unitary agricultural universities are witness to this. These were created in disregard of the constitutional division of responsibility, through the device of using special acts of Parliament.

Nehru brought the existing provincial universities under indirect central control, though the UGC. However, the UGC, though responsible for setting national quality standards, was not empowered to implement them by accrediting universities or through financial incentives. In practice, its remit over quality standards was ignored by the provincial universities. Since funding for state universities was provided by provincial governments, there was no other lever that the UGC could use.

It is notable that Nehru did not interfere in provincial university governance, perhaps as a political trade-off for being allowed to pursue his centrally controlled unitary professional institution strategy.

Whereas enrollment grew significantly during this period (see Table 4 and Figure 1), the quality of education by the end of the Nehruvian era was bi-modally distributed: a small clutch of well-funded, high quality technical institutions at the top managed by the Education Ministry in New Delhi, catered to the best-educated high school graduates; and

a mass of largely non-technical, poorer quality universities catered to the rest (though still to an elite population located in the larger urban areas).

The governance model of the upper tier was the state-owned unitary specialized institution: a teaching institution specializing in a certain field of study, such as engineering. The central government appointed the board of governors and the director (equivalent to an American university president). The institutions controlled admissions, faculty recruitment and assessment. They raised only a small portion of their operating financial requirements on their own, primarily through tuition fees, and were reliant on the national government to fund them via UGC. The objective of quality of the nationally controlled unitary institutions was achieved due to adequate funding and the absence of conflicts with other objectives.

The governance model of the lower tier was initially unchanged from colonial times. The provincial government controlled the university's budget and funding, approved senior staff appointments, staff salaries and tuition fees. Through its membership of the university's senate, the provincial government influenced academic policy as well. The university affiliated colleges, prescribed curricula and standards of admission, held examinations and awarded degrees. The colleges recruited students and faculty, built the infrastructure and provided the education.

In contrast to colonial times, the provincial university actively promoted the formation of new state-owned colleges. This was in response to the state's new (post-independence) objective of expanding admissions, at the expense of other objectives, such as quality, if necessary. This changed the ownership and governance of colleges from a largely privately owned and managed system to a largely public system during

Nehru's tenure. The new colleges, like those from colonial times, were located largely in urban areas and offered a general education to the urban elite. The objective of quality of the provincial universities suffered due to the higher priority given to access. The administration of the universities and colleges became more politicized during the Nehruvian period as compared to colonial times.

In summary, in comparison with colonial times, the common objectives were a focus on the elite and, within a new and numerically minuscule category—the national government controlled unitary institutions—on quality. In contrast with colonial times, the provincial universities prioritized access over quality. The governance model of provincial universities was largely unchanged from colonial times at the apex. In contrast with colonial times, in which the colleges were largely privately owned, ownership was largely with the state at the end of Nehru's tenure.

4. Higher Education Governance in the Indira Gandhi Period (1966-1984)

The period after Nehru's rule ended in 1964, and up to 1984, coincides largely with the Prime Ministership of Indira Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi centralized governance generally, thus challenging the federal nature of India's democracy. Unlike Nehru, her focus was on rural and poverty issues.¹⁵ Accordingly, national education policy shifted from addressing the needs of large-scale industrialization to creating skills for rural occupations and small-scale industries.

The Education Commission report of 1966 and the subsequent National Policy on Education, of 1968 (NPE-68), reflected these priorities, with a new stress on multi-lingual instruction, agricultural education and adult education, while noting the

¹⁵ Nagaraj, 2010.

continuing importance of scientific and technical education.¹⁶ The national government also sought to control the rush of the provincial universities into expansion of general education for the elite. NPE-1968 recommended that states charter new universities only after considering funding and quality requirements. In 1969, the UGC created a committee on University Governance.¹⁷ It recommended that universities be granted autonomy from the provincial governments. This was to be done in two ways. First, it recommended increased powers for faculty through increasing the role of the Academic Council.¹⁸ Second, the report called for long-term operational funding of the university in the form of five-year “block grants” rather than the more politically intrusive annual system then in operation. However, the recommendations of the University Governance committee were not converted into official policy.

¹⁶ <http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/g/W/16/0W160501.htm>, accessed December 10, 2010. The Commission reaffirmed the role of English as a “link-language in higher education for academic work and intellectual inter-communication.” While NPE-68 encouraged the use of regional languages over time for higher education, the Commission noted the role of Hindi as the “link language”. Given the political conflict at the time between those arguing for Hindi as a national language and those against, not surprisingly, the Commission’s recommendations seem ambiguous. As if the confusion about local languages and English was not enough, the Commission also called for “special attention to be given to the study of Russian.” None of these language policies was implemented seriously.

¹⁷ The Committee was headed by an academic, Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, the Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University. It was mandated to “to consider the structure of universities, the functions, responsibilities and powers of the various statutory bodies, and student participation”. <http://www.education.nic.in/cd50years/n/2D3P0501.htm>, accessed December 10, 2010. See also Kumar, 1975, pp 215 ff. The Committee recommended changes in order to encourage innovation, experimentation and change. It noted that “In order that the universities may perform their functions properly, their autonomy should be scrupulously respected by the legislatures and the executive...though there would be some spheres in which the State may exercise supervisory authority over the administration of the universities, ..., that should only be through the Visitor (usually, the Governor of the State).”

¹⁸ The report recommended that the three-tier governance system of the university, consisting of Senate, Executive Council and Academic Council be reformed, with the Senate (which included external and internal stakeholders) playing a largely consultative role compared with its then overriding authority over the actions of the internally constituted Executive and Academic Councils. The Academic Council would continue to deliberate on academic affairs and make recommendations to the Executive Council for implementation. The Executive Council was recommended to be the normal body for governance, whose actions would always require the prior recommendation of the Academic Council. The Academic Council would be autonomous except in student affairs relating to admissions, discipline, scholarships, and residential issues. In such cases, it would need to obtain the advice of a duly constituted Student Council.

Further, a key policy change, the Constitutional Amendment of 1976, included education in the Concurrent List (i.e., it became a joint responsibility of the national and provincial governments), whereas earlier it was the sole responsibility of the provinces (states). Under the amendment, the central government's role was to maintain quality and standards, while the states would remain responsible for the provision of education.

Thus, the State, during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure, made strong efforts to reprioritize higher education towards greater equity. Corresponding changes in governance were sought – higher national control over university priorities and higher academic control over university administration. Some new programs in agriculture and vocational education were introduced in consequence, but these were not substantial. In addition, the earlier rush by provincially controlled universities to create new spaces for general education was controlled. This slowed the system's rate of growth to less than half of that achieved under Nehru (see Table 4 and Figure 1), though the deep involvement of provincial governments in the provincial universities remained intact.

5. Higher Education Governance in the Reform Period (1984-2011)

The period that began in 1984, with the end of Mrs. Gandhi's rule, is widely identified as the start of economic reforms and liberalization, and the advent of a new political era consisting of coalition governments that included provincial parties nationally, and greater devolution of political power to the provinces (Chibber, 2010; Dossani, 2007). As power devolved to the provinces, the provincial universities reverted to their earlier strategies of promoting access by expanding supply. Due to the rising political power of “disadvantaged groups,” greater attention was paid to more equitable access through reservations of seats and lower pricing of reserved seats. Meanwhile,

education policy at the national level was increasingly driven by the need to counterbalance the ill-effects of politicization at the provincial universities by instituting *national* regulations to improve quality, control costs, and increase the supply of higher education places.

A key component of national regulation was greater autonomy for colleges.¹⁹ In 1986, the government published the second national policy on education (NPE-1986); it was updated in 1992.²⁰ The policy promoted, officially for the first time, the idea of autonomous colleges.^{21, 22} It noted concerns on the declining quality of higher education, attributing it to a proliferation of universities. Since the universities were under provincial control, this also implicitly referred to the politicization of university governance and a consequent weakening of standards of admission and teaching. NPE-86 proposed limiting the growth of universities and shifting more responsibility for standards to colleges through greater autonomy.

¹⁹ Globally, a collegial, faculty-centered approach is observed to positively impact quality. See Santiago, et al, 2006.

²⁰ NPE-1986 noted the need to protect the system from degradation through unplanned expansion. The policy noted that future expansion should be within existing institutions rather than via an expansion of the number of institutions.

²¹ As the document noted, "In view of mixed experiences with the system of affiliation, autonomous colleges will be helped to develop in large numbers until the affiliating system is replaced by a freer and more creative association of universities with colleges. Similarly, the creation of autonomous departments within universities on a selective basis will be encouraged. Autonomy and freedom will be accompanied by accountability." Raising fees as a strategy was also mooted for the first time, marking an expansion in the objectives to include cost-effectiveness. (NPE-1986, p.18)

²² The 1992 amendment to NPE-1986 noted that AICTE, which was given statutory status by the Act of 1987, would be responsible for planning, formulating and maintaining standards. An Accreditation Board would be created. AICTE was earlier an advisory body without statutory powers, but the 1987 Act, pursuant to the recommendation of NPE-1986, established it as a statutory body. AICTE's mandate covered engineering, management and other professional fields (though excluding healthcare education). As initially designed, it mirrored UGC in its functions of financing and regulating the standards of education in its domain, setting fee scales, approving new programs and institutions, and granting autonomy to colleges. In practice, the finance function continued to be retained by UGC.

Following NPE-1986's call for greater autonomy for colleges, UGC published a plan to enable autonomous colleges. Under this plan, autonomous colleges were to be granted their status upon application to UGC. Once approved by UGC and the state government, approved colleges were to be granted the following autonomies:²³

1. They could develop and propose new courses of study to the university for approval.
2. They could prescribe rules for admission in consonance with the reservation policy of the state government.
3. They were fully responsible for the conduct of all examinations.

The final degree would be awarded by the umbrella university, but would include the name of the college.²⁴

The UGC plan was never implemented as official policy. Undeterred perhaps, in 1990, the UGC published a report on "Alternate Models of Management"²⁵ (informally known as the Gnanam Committee Report, after its chairperson). It discussed the adverse impacts of the deep politicization of university governance.²⁶ The report called for

²³ http://www.ugc.ac.in/financialsupport/autonomous_13.html, accessed December 18, 2010

²⁴ <http://www.education.nic.in/higedu.asp>, accessed December 18, 2010

²⁵ Government of India, 1990. The Gnanam Committee Report followed a report on "Alternate Models for the Management of Universities", prepared by a Government of India body, The Educational Consultants, in 1986. The Gnanam Committee Report's contents indicate an intellectual debt to the 1969 UGC-commissioned report on University Governance, though, curiously, this is not acknowledged in the 1990 report.

²⁶ The report noted that: 'Promoters of a college, to start with, have to seek the government approval as a pre-condition and then approach the University for the grant of affiliation. Normally, after the government have approved the establishment of a college, it is too "embarassing" for the University to deny affiliation to it. Hence, the University is constrained to satisfy itself with whatever facilities are available and "baptize" the college / institution academically within the University's fold. Thus, after granting affiliation, the University has to just carry on with its affiliated colleges. In spite of the University having the power to inspect and monitor the infra-structural facilities of the affiliated colleges from time to time, given the socio-political constraints, disaffiliation or de-recognition of a college for non-compliance of the prescribed norms is hardly resorted to even as the last resort. Either the government is pressurised to take over the college or the University is compelled to tolerate such sick bodies in the system. This is the reality in the case of many private affiliated

greater autonomy for universities from government and greater involvement of “teachers, students and society at large” in running universities, including the positions at the top of the hierarchy.²⁷

The report recommended decentralization within the university hierarchy, including empowering university deans, shifting responsibility for course regulation, examinations and degree awards to affiliated colleges, and recommending that universities concentrate on “postgraduate education and research programmes.”

The report also recommended that UGC’s activities be shared with State Councils for Higher Education. It suggested that most of the powers for regulating universities should pass to the State Council, with UGC playing an advisory role. It asked that the Council’s composition be primarily academic. It recommended that the power to affiliate or disaffiliate a college should rest with the university.

The report noted that the university system was excessively centralized and unable to manage the growth of affiliated colleges. As it stated, “A number of Universities are groaning under the weight of affiliated colleges and the burden which it imposes on their meager facilities. On the other hand, many of the affiliated colleges are experiencing difficulty because they feel that the links with the University are far too tenuous, and the University is an obstacle in their progress.”

The report further noted that the existing organization structure of universities was a problem. The organization structure typically consisted of the following elements:

colleges. The University's affiliation-control over the government colleges is only formal. The University can never dream of dis-affiliating even a worst managed and ill-equipped government college, lest it should incur the displeasure of the government and the very existence of the University may be at stake. Such situations develop when in the first instance, the college was opened under regional political pressure, specially at election times.”

²⁷ The appointment of the Registrar and the Finance Officer required state approval.

1. An elected Senate, consisting of academics and other stakeholders (including local bodies, staff, union representatives, students, alumni, etc.). The Senate is the most important rule-making body.
2. A Syndicate or Executive Council, consisting of representation of college principals, teachers, senators, members of the Academic Council and some government and ex-officio nominees. The Syndicate may be elected or nominated.
3. A non-elected Academic Council consisting of faculty representatives and university heads of departments.

It found large overlaps in the functioning of these three bodies, with decisions taken by one body typically requiring approval of the other two. The Syndicate was supposed to supervise administration while the Academic Council dealt with academic issues; but, the regulations required that the Academic Council obtain the Syndicate's approval.

According to the report, the primary external stakeholders in the colleges were the state and the university. The university governed academic standards through prescribing physical and financial standards, teachers' qualifications, course content and textbooks, examinations and, in some cases, were on the selection committee for teachers and principals; the university might also nominate a representative on the college's governing body, as might the government. The state appointed representatives to the managing committees, but with no obvious role.

In practice, the external stakeholders paid little attention to teaching. The report noted that quality often suffered due to a large proportion of temporary teachers, underpaid teachers and overcrowded classrooms. In this context, the report noted the

‘mushroom growth’ of private engineering colleges, with ‘poor facilities, poor framework and poor conception.’

The report recommended that colleges should adopt uniform structures built around academic affairs, student affairs, business affairs and development.

The Gnanam Committee report made provincial politicians very uncomfortable, since they ran the universities largely as fiefdoms for their political benefit. They used their rising political power to, in essence, suppress the report.

In April 1992, the Education Ministry published its review of the Gnanam Committee report through CAGE. It accepted most of the report, and rejected some parts (See Table 1).

[Table 1 here]

Subsequently, a few states set up State Councils of Higher Education.²⁸ Other than that, and like its predecessor of 1969, the Gnanam report was consigned to the shelf.

National regulators, meanwhile, continued to push for reform, under the initiative of the national government. In 2003, the UGC finally published guidelines for autonomous colleges, based on the National Policy on Education, 1986. Similar to earlier proposals, an autonomous college would:

- Determine its own courses of study and syllabi;
- Prescribe its own rules of admission, subject to the reservation policy of the state governments;
- Evolve its own methods of evaluation and conduct examinations;

²⁸ As of 2010, these were Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh.

Further, the autonomous colleges would be regulated by the UGC rather than state universities.²⁹ The Academic Council of an autonomous college would be expected to manage curricula and admissions of existing programs. Its members were to consist of the principal, heads of departments, faculty chosen on the basis of seniority, outside experts nominated by the Governing Board and university nominees.

The responsibility of an autonomous college's governing board, whose membership was to include UGC, state government and university nominees, would manage the finances and the introduction of new programs of study, upon reference from the Academic Council.³⁰

In 2005, CABE published a policy paper on autonomy of higher education institutions (HEIs), making an emphatic argument for autonomy.³¹ It noted that some

²⁹ In March 2009, UGC considered an action plan for academic and administrative reforms that followed up some of the recommendations of the 2005 CABE report. The topics included reduced emphasis on external assessment in favor of internal assessment by the college. http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:a3V1JGOTjflj:www.ugc.ac.in/policy/cmlette2303r09.pdf+ugc+action+plan+for+academic+and+administrative+reforms&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESihSixQFnOaRGflp2QBbnkN1YwdU6bz3NnEbZkVnaGgbsLjIM4K00sDMT-Ji1Ay46dSSsQDb3_BmWhGea-j4WACyiDXS0uHijn6Nm-KM9tm-xE5YUEJ9D_-3p6Dp3M3esDWQ2Xf&sig=AHIEtbTtvD1zofg6sXZ0biszp5MxkaofkQ&pli=1, accessed December 18, 2010

³⁰ http://www.ugc.ac.in/financialsupport/autonomous_13.html, accessed December 18, 2010

³¹ Government of India, 2005. The logic for autonomy, echoing the Gnanam Report, is noted as: Higher education is continuing to expand, mostly in an unplanned manner, without even minimum levels of checks and balances. Many universities are burdened with unmanageable number of affiliated colleges. Some have more than 300 colleges affiliated to them. New universities are being carved out of existing ones to reduce the number of affiliated colleges. Under these circumstances, our dependence on autonomy as the means to improve quality of such a huge size of higher education system poses serious challenges. (p.19) The delegation of responsibility with accountability for the academic as well as the associated management functions is essential for the success of autonomy. For understandable reasons, there has been a great deal of reluctance on the part of the higher echelons to delegate these responsibilities to decentralized units. At the same time there are hesitations on the part of the functional units to undertake the decentralized responsibilities. Those who have successfully instituted autonomy consist of visionary leaderships with stable foundations and creditable track records. Others are afraid of treading untested waters. This is a constraint that should be overcome sooner than later. (p.20).

autonomous colleges already existed, but that there was need for many more.^{32,33}

CABE's recommendations are presented in the table below (Table 2).

[Table 2 here]

Over the next six years, i.e., to the time of writing this article, progress on autonomy remained limited. There are about 250 such colleges (less than one percent of the 25,951 colleges as of 2011), a small change from the 204 in 2005 when the CABE report was published.³⁴ In other words, the “victors” of the struggle between national regulators and provincial politicians on autonomy were the provincial politicians.

Meanwhile, the national government also promoted other measures to improve quality. These included measures to enable foreign providers to set up unitary institutions in India and the creation of a new national regulator with powers over provincial colleges and universities, including the power of accreditation. Due to provincial political opposition, these proposals, too, have not, as of 2011, been enacted.

Meanwhile, under the umbrella of provincial universities and, initially hardly noticed by regulators, there was a shift of ownership of colleges from the nearly complete public ownership that was dominant from the time of Nehru until 1984, to a growing role for private colleges. This was made possible by the devolution of power to the provinces during the reform period. Facing a shortage of funds to achieve expansion, provincial politicians encouraged private providers.

³² It is remarkable that, just like the Gnanam Committee's failure to acknowledge its intellectual predecessor of 1969, the 2005 CABE report on the autonomy of higher education institutions does not even refer to its contents. The CABE report contains a section (Section 3.1, History of Efforts Towards Autonomy) that reviews past reports on the subject. The Gnanam Committee Report of 1990 and CABE's review of it in 1992 are not mentioned. In the report's introductory section, the Gnanam Committee report is mentioned in passing without its contents being noted. Perhaps one could infer a desire among the Committee's members to appear 'autonomous' of the past?

³³ The report notes that, as of 2005, there were 204 autonomous colleges. (Government of India, 2005, p.8)

³⁴ http://www.ugc.ac.in/policy/auto_coll_b.html

From a negligible presence in 1984, private colleges accounted for 8% of enrollment by 1996, the latest year for which official data is available (Government of India, 2008, p. 286). The subsequent years have seen a further rise. As the 2008 report notes, “the expansion in enrollments in India is underestimated due to the poor data base regarding private unaided education.” (p.291)

The combination of private provision and the expansion of publicly owned colleges led to a higher rate of growth, more than double that achieved during Mrs. Gandhi’s tenure.^{35,36}

[Table 3 here]

The rise in the number of colleges has put increased pressure on the managerial resources of the university. Some of the larger university systems manage, as of 2011, over 300,000 students with average enrollment of about 1,000 students per college.³⁷ The difficulties of managing such a large system are evident and not surprising.³⁸ The University Grants Commission suggests a norm of between 20,000 and 30,000 students

³⁵ Government of India, 2010, pp. ix and 28. Officially, total enrollment as of the start of the academic year 2009-2010 was 13.6 million, making for a 12 percent gross enrollment ratio (GER). Of total enrollment, 6.9 percent is estimated to be in engineering (Government of India, 2008, p.36), or 940,000 students. This appears to be a significant underestimation and consequently underestimates GER as well. An indication of the underestimation may be seen in data published on technical education by AICTE (<http://www.aicte-india.org/adgeneral.htm>, accessed December 27, 2010). According to the AICTE data, 1.06 million students entered engineering colleges in 2010, compared with the number of 940,000 enrolled over all four years. Since 95 percent of the engineering students are enrolled in private colleges, this may be the source of undercounting. The Government of India report of 2008 seems to acknowledge this as the source of undercounting, noting that the enrollment in technical and professional education (of whom the majority are engineering students) is projected to reach thirty per cent of total enrollment by 2011. It also notes that, “Private (unaided) education has also grown at a rapid rate in the last several years. However, no firm estimates are available of the share of private in total enrolments.” (p.286)

³⁶ The growth in the number of engineering colleges and enrollment in them is not known, so this estimate is based on a doubling of intake over four years, for a total enrollment as of 2010 of 3 m students.

³⁷ For example, as of November 2010, the number of students at JNTUH, the affiliating university for technical programs in the state of Andhra Pradesh, was 350,000, spread over 486 colleges (Author’s interview with JNTUH Vice Chancellor, Dr. D. N. Reddy, November 30, 2010)

³⁸ The difficulties were predicted in a report in 1990 (Government of India, 1990)

per university, with an average of 1,000 students per college (Government of India, 2008, p. 53).

In summary, the reform period is notable for the beginnings of discussions on governance reform that were led by the national government and its regulatory bodies. They backed reforms that would depoliticize the university and strengthen the autonomy of colleges. Provincial politicians opposed these initiatives. Due to a greater devolution of power to the provinces and due to their participation as coalition partners in the national government, provincial politicians were powerful enough to prevent meaningful governance reform.³⁹

6. Governance and Objectives: A Discussion

The following table shows the key institutional changes caused by governance reforms, the role of the provinces and the impact of the provinces on achievement of objectives over time.

[Table 5 about here]

The table shows that the importance of provincial governance on the system's objectives varied with time, and is, as of 2011, at a peak. The provincial governments began, during colonial times, to positively influence quality for a limited, elite student body. This was in support of national policy, i.e., there was a congruence of objectives between the national and provincial governments. After independence, the provincial governments prioritized access over quality. They achieved this by promoting new public colleges, whose governance and the governance of the affiliating university, were

³⁹ Commenting on politicization within the affiliated college, the Knowledge Commission (Government of India, 2006, p.14) noted that: "More often than not, there is political control/interference in management, recruitment of teachers and admission, leading to dilution of academic standards."

tightly controlled by the provincial governments. The rapid growth and the politicization of governance negatively impacted quality. The Nehruvian period saw a 26 percent growth in the number of HEIs (see Table 4 and Figure 1). The quality of higher education, by the end of the Nehruvian era, was bimodal: a small clutch of well-funded, high quality professional institutions at the top managed by the Education Ministry in New Delhi and catering to the highest achieving high school graduates; and a mass of largely non-technical, poorer quality universities catering to a second tier of socio-economically elite students with lower levels of academic achievement.

The importance of this period was that it sought to “resolve” the dual objectives of expansion and improved quality by dividing responsibility for the objectives into two separate forms of governance: the central government—through a few newly created autonomous institutions recruiting the very best students in the country—focusing on “improving quality;” and the states, largely through governance by local politicians (although ostensibly maintaining standards through academics at the state universities) satisfying local demands by the upper middle class for places in higher education by expanding the number of colleges in each state with little or no attention to the capacity of those colleges to deliver quality education. In practice, the autonomous, nationally governed institutions were too small to offset declining average quality driven by the growth of enrolment in the provincial institutions.

During Mrs. Gandhi’s tenure, the national government made two key changes: (1) Through a constitutional amendment, it jointly took responsibility with the provincial governments for higher education; and (2) It introduced equity as a national objective of higher education. Continuing concerns about quality led the national government to halt

the expansion of the provincial universities. The rate of growth of HEIs fell from the 26 per cent rate under Nehru to 10 per cent (see Table 4 and Figure 1). The states refocused their mission on equity through what the central government believed were more relevant programs of instruction, such as agricultural programs, vocational training and adult education. These changes, introduced within the existing federal university governance model, failed to improve equity and quality. One reason for this failure was that the national government did not attempt to change the university's governance model, which continued to be led by provincial politicians, though with less power than before. A second reason was that even though the expansion of numbers of provincial universities slowed down, the number of colleges boomed and student enrollment increased rapidly, expanding from about 1 million to 4.5 million students, an almost five-fold increase in 20 years (see Table 4, data for 1965-66 and 1985-86). In effect, the central government had little control over what happened at the state level, except to insist on the expansion of more agricultural and technical colleges, in keeping with the Mrs. Gandhi's ideal of local development and more vocational education. Yet, given the governance structure in the hands of local politicians, the main incentive at the state level was for continued expansion, with little regard for either equity or quality.

A new set of governance reforms began in 1984 in response to these failures. Blame for the failures was laid on politicization of the provincial university arising from state interference. The goal of equity was redefined: it changed from defining what could be taught, e.g., more agriculture-oriented programs, to improving the access of underprivileged groups through affirmative action in access to all programs, and this shift occurred because of the increasing political power of "disadvantaged" castes and classes

in the national and provincial governments. Expansion was promoted as a strategy to meet both access and equity. To control rising public costs, independent private colleges were allowed, in which fees paid by students were the sole source of revenue for the college.

The national government and its regulators sought increasing authority and responsibility for quality. The chosen strategy for improving quality was to increase the autonomy of colleges and transfer their regulation to national regulators and away from the provincial universities. In practice, there was little increase in national governance over quality standards or in autonomy.

In the provinces, two changes occurred: first, the provincial governments re-assumed full responsibility for the equity objective, and increased affirmative action requirements and funding; and second, independent private colleges were established, and they were governed differently from existing colleges. While public and aided (dependent) private colleges were governed jointly by the state, the university, college trustees and college academics, unaided private colleges were governed by trustees from the private sector.

Like in the Nehruvian period, the new governance model sought to “resolve” the dual objectives of equitable expansion and improved quality by dividing responsibility for the objectives into separate forms of governance: the national regulators took responsibility for quality, and the provinces took responsibility for equity and access. The differences from the earlier period were that, first, the responsibility of the national government shifted from provision to regulation, with a focus on increasing the autonomy of colleges in order to improve quality; second, at the provinces, the provision

of education was increasingly shared with private colleges. As in the Nehruvian period, the national government's initiatives were too limited to make any meaningful impact, due to the power of provincial politicians.

As of 2011, autonomy remains the national government's key strategy for achieving the quality goal. In addition to regulations that enable the creation of autonomous colleges, new laws to increase central power over universities, notably the Higher Education and Research Bill, and the National Accreditation Regulatory Authority Bill (See Table 7 below) are being proposed. If enacted, the national government has indicated that it will use the new powers to grant autonomy to the higher quality colleges. The university system would then, the government hopes, become irrelevant over time, or, at best, an incubator to help strengthen the weakest colleges.⁴⁰ Provincial politicians oppose these new powers, and it is not clear as of 2011 that they will become law.

[Table 6 about here]

The resumption of provincial control over expansion, meanwhile, beneficially impacted equity (via affirmative action and funding),⁴¹ access (via private and public college growth), and cost-control (via private college efficiency). In private colleges, demand for places expanded rapidly, though largely in professional fields such as engineering. The state's cost burden fell with the shift of tuition costs to students—on average, private institutions charge significantly higher fees.⁴² Whereas this has reduced

⁴⁰ As the Higher Education and Research Bill of 2010 notes, an objective of regulation is to: "gradually enable colleges affiliated to universities to function in an autonomous manner independent of such affiliation." (Section 25(3) of revised HER, Government of India, 2010)

⁴¹ Government of India, 2008, pp.95 and 123

⁴² In 1996, average tuition at unaided private institutions was Rs.3331 compared with Rs.1198 for the system as a whole (for general education). (Source: UGC, 2008, p.284)

affordability, state funding for affirmative action beneficiaries (in some states) and state controls on fees charged to students in underprivileged groups protected the enrollment of these groups in private colleges. The growth rate of HEIs accelerated to 23.5 percent per year during the reform period (see Table 4 and Figure 1), with most of the growth occurring in the latest decade (28.2 per cent between 2000 and 2009).

The impact on quality has varied, although, on average, quality probably declined. The public colleges continued to perform poorly. Some of the new private colleges offer a better quality of education than the best public colleges (though not the state-owned unitary institutions), a consequence of less politicization and efficient management.⁴³ However, many of the private colleges have done much worse. This variation is because some private colleges have chosen to increase financial surplus by under-spending on infrastructure, increasing teaching loads, and otherwise spending less than required on instruction.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, they face constant pressures to improve quality as well. This is because they offer education in professional fields, and the market value of their graduates affects the fees that they can charge.

The above review indicates that the key influence on the governance of higher education is the locus of political governance and the objectives of politicians, rather than academics or civil society at large. At various times, power to change governance of education has shifted between Delhi and state capitals. While provincial politicians' objectives were relatively consistent over time and focused on expansion of the system to

⁴³ See, for example, the 2010 rankings of Karnataka engineering colleges at: <http://www.educationindia.world.com/2010/05/28/top-ranking-engineering-colleges-in-karnataka-best-engineering-colleges-in-karnataka/>, accessed December 27, 2010

⁴⁴ According to Government of India, 2008, the number of unfilled faculty positions at unaided private colleges, as of 2008 was 52% at the entry (Lecturer) level was 52%, and for Readers (the next level up), it was 28%. This compares with 41% and 18% respectively for all colleges.(p.17)

meet the objective of access and, in the reform era, also of equity, national politicians' objectives varied, starting with educating the elite for government employment (colonial times), to employment in large, publicly-owned industries (Nehru), to educating the underprivileged (Indira Gandhi), and to improving quality (the reform period).

The ever-deeper politicization of the provincial university system was an outcome of these shifts in power. For Nehru, it was a trade-off to obtain support for his experiment with unitary institutions. Indira Gandhi tolerated it in order to introduce socially relevant education in the provincial universities. Post-1985, political power shifted to the provinces quite generally, so provincial control of the university system followed despite regulatory efforts at the national level to depoliticize the university.

During the reform era, the focus of the national government is on regulating quality. This is evident in a number of regulators' and HRD Ministry reports that explicitly or indirectly call for less politicization of the university. It is not clear that national regulators, supported by the Ministry of Education, will succeed in the current era of devolution. They have not, as yet, succeeded despite over two decades of effort. But, at least, over the past two decades, national regulators are in place to provide checks and balances on provincial politicians.

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Table 1. India: CABE's Review of the Gnanam Committee Report, 1992

Gnanam Proposal	Details	CABE Response
<i>Depoliticization</i>	Abolish elections as a method of selecting faculty & student representation in university governance	Accepted for student representation only
	Ban professional politicians from positions in university governance	Accepted
	Ban university staff from seeking political office	Rejected
	Discourage on-campus political activity by students and political parties	Accepted
<i>Decentralization</i>	Ban state representation in academic & administrative governance	Accepted, except for appointment of CFO & Registrar
	University teaching departments to be autonomous	
	End university affiliating role and make all colleges autonomous	Accepted. CABE proposed that federal universities should only manage examinations.
	Shift UGC functions to State Councils	Accepted
<i>University reorganization</i>	Universities to receive state endowments	Not accepted. CABE proposed, instead, higher fees and private endowments
	University decisions on college affiliation/de-affiliation to not require government approval	Accepted
	UGC to approve new universities	Accepted
	Syndicate/Board of Management to be the sole executive body, with one-third representation of academics. The Senate's role to be advisory	Accepted
	Academic Council to determine academic issues	Academic Council to be the sole advisor, but Senate ratification necessary
	Create independent committees for Finance, Research, etc.	Accepted – 5 Committees: Planning & Monitoring, Finance, Evaluation,

		Admission & Academic Calendar, Teacher & Principals Recruitment. The last committee to include a nominee each from the state, university and college. The VC to chair every professorial recruitment committee; the pro-VC to chair all other faculty recruitments.
<i>College reorganization</i>	Remove tenure restriction on the principal	Not accepted, but 5-year renewable term proposed

Source: Government of India, 1992.

Table 2. India: CABE Recommendations on HEI Autonomy, 2005

<i>Areas of Proposed Autonomy</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Grant of autonomy	All UGC A+/A++ colleges to be given autonomy right away; A++ to be eligible for deemed university status
Admissions	National entrance examinations to be established; HEIs to voluntarily use them, along with high-school exit scores
Introduction of self-financed programs, selection of research fellows, electives (termed “choice based credit courses”), curriculum design and assessment/evaluation	Transition to autonomous evaluation via a mixed system of college and UGC-approved evaluators in the interim
Voluntary accreditation to continue	Non-government accreditation agencies to be allowed, along with state agencies
Abolish fixed ratio of professors, readers & lecturers	
“Mostly” academic representation on HEI governance bodies	Include all stakeholders and allow for both elected and nominated representatives
University-affiliation to be free from state control	The guidelines for affiliation should be approved by the state, but implementation should be with the university only
Finance for aided-colleges via long-term “block grants”	This would replace the existing systems of annual, line-item grants

Source: Government of India, 2005.

Table 3. India: Number of Universities, by Type, 2002-2010

Year	Type of University						Total
	Central	State	Deemed	INI (State)	INI (Center)	Private	
2002	18	178	52	5	12	a.	265
2010	40	243	130	5	33	53	504

Source: Government of India, 2010, p.27, and Government of India, 2008, p.29

Notes:

1. Definitions of university types: a) Universities: These are established by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature and are of unitary or affiliating type. They are called Central Universities and State Universities respectively. b) Deemed to be Universities: These institutions are given deemed to be university status by the Central Government on the recommendation of the UGC in terms of Section 3 of the UGC Act. Some of these institutions offer advanced level courses in a particular field or specialization while others award general degrees. c) Private Universities: These are established by various State governments through their own legislation. d) Institutes of National Importance : These Institutes are declared as such by the Government of India by an Act of Parliament and are empowered to award degrees. In some cases, such Institutes are also set up by the Government through an Act of State Legislation. e) Premier Institutes of Management : These are the Institutes that have been set up by the Central Government and are outside the formal university system. They offer Post-Graduate Diploma Programmes which are equivalent to Master's Degree Programmes in the area of management. This category is excluded in the above table. (Definitions from Government of India, 2005).

2, a. Included in *Deemed*.

Table 4: India: Growth of Colleges for General Education, Colleges for Professional Education, and Universities, 1950-51 to 2009-2010

Years	Colleges for General Education	Colleges for Professional Education	Universities/Deemed Univ./Institutes of National Importance	Total Number of Institutions	Total Number of Students Enrolled (x 10 ³)
1950-51	370	208	27	605	262

1955-56	466	218	31	715	438
1960-61	967	852	45	1864	645
1965-66	1536	770	64	2370	1054
1970-71	2285	992	82	3359	2904
1975-76	3667	3276**	101	NA	4615
1980-81	3421	3542**	110	NA	6016 ^a
1985-86	4067	1533**	126	NA	4471
1990-91	4862	886	184	5932	4951
1991-92	5058	950	196	6204	
1992-93	5334	989	207	6530	
1993-94	5639	1125	213	6977	
1994-95	6089	1230	219	7538	
1995-96	6569	1354	226	8149	5696
1996-97	6759	1770	228	8757	
1997-98	7199	2075	229	9503	
1998-99	7494	2113	237	9844	
1999-00	7782	2124	244	10150	
2000-01	7929	2223	254	10406	9404
2001-02	8737	2409	272	11418	
2002-03	9166	2610	304	12080	
2003-04	9427	2751	304	12482	
2004-05	10377	3201	364	13942	11777 (05/06)
2009-10	18590	7361	504	26455	13700

** Includes institutions for Post-Matric courses.

Sources: Educational Statistics 2004-2005.MHRD 2007 ; Government of India, 2010, p.28 for total institutions = 25951; 2009-10 number of professional and other colleges = 7361 is based on AICTE, 2010, <http://www.aicte-india.org/adgeneral.htm>, UGC figures differ somewhat from these : according to UGC, the number of colleges in 2001 was 12,806 (Government of India, 2008, p.31) and total enrollment was 8.63 m (Government of India, 2008, p.34).

Note: a. Until 1980, enrollment includes all students in former British India (also Burma). After 1980, only India.

<http://www.cscsarchive.org/dataarchive/textfiles/textfile.2008-05-06.5333577190/file>, accessed December 29, 2010

Table 5. India: Types of Higher Education Reform, by Roles, Outcomes, and Period

Roles & Outcomes	Major Education Supplier	Other Important Suppliers	Provincial Government's Objective	Impact of Provincial Government on Objectives			
				Quality	Equity	Access	Public Cost-Control
<i>Colonial</i>	Affiliated private colleges	N/A	University regulation for quality	Positive for elite quality	None	None	Positive
<i>Nehru</i>	Affiliated public colleges	Unitary national institutions	Expansion of universities & public colleges	Negative	None	Positive	Negative
<i>Indira Gandhi</i>	Affiliated public colleges	None	None	None	None	None	None
<i>Reform period</i>	Affiliated public colleges	Private & autonomous colleges	Expansion of public colleges and enabling private colleges	Negative	Positive	Positive	Positive

Source: Authors' compilation

Table 6. India: Higher Education Reform Proposals, 2011

Reform	Key Governance Implications
Higher Education and Research Bill, 2010	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A National Commission on Higher Education and Research (NCHER) will replace UGC and AICTE, with the goals of creating an “enabling environment for universities to emerge as autonomous and self-regulatory bodies.” (Sec 25(3) of revised HER) and for “gradually enabling colleges affiliated to universities to function in an autonomous manner independent of such affiliation.” (Section 24(2)(j) of initial NCHER draft Bill) 2. All new universities, colleges and degree programs need NCHER approval to begin operations, either directly or through meeting NCHER-set standards of operation 3. Appointment of Vice-Chancellor of state universities needs to be consistent with NCHER standards.
National Accreditation Regulatory Authority for HEIs Bill, 2010	Accreditation will be made mandatory for all HEIs

Source: HRD Ministry, Government of India

Figure 1: India: Number and Growth of Higher Education Institutions

