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**A Vote of Confidence?
Voting Protocol and Participation in China's Village Elections**

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Abstract

The goal of our paper is to provide an empirical basis for understanding progress (or stagnation) in the evolution of China's village committee elections. To meet this goal, we pursue three specific objectives. First, we seek to identify patterns (and trends) of voting behavior and develop ways to measure participation in the voting process. Second, we analyze who is voting and who is not (and document the process by which their votes are cast). Finally, we seek to understand the correlation between propensity to vote and the quality of village elections.

To meet our objectives, the rest of the paper relies on a unique set of national representative, household- and village-level data collected by one of the authors. Using the data, descriptive analysis and multivariate analysis are used to demonstrate that while voting protocol differs across villages and over time—despite progress and despite high nominal voting rates—there are still gaps in coverage of groups of individuals in rural China. Some of the largest gaps occur in the case of women and migrants and migrant women. In many cases, large shares of individuals in these groups are being systematically excluded from truly participating in the process of voting. Policy-wise, the paper concludes that China's government needs to increase its effort to promote more regular voting procedures to insure that true participation in village committee elections is more widespread and does not systematically exclude groups of individuals.

A Vote of Confidence? Voting Protocol and Participation in China's Village Elections

Officials in China claim that voting rates in rural village committee elections are high. According to the White Paper on “Democracy Construction in China” on average, more than 80 percent of voting aged adults in China voted during the latest round of village committee elections; in some regions the voting rates is claimed to exceed 90 percent (State Council, 2005). During a recent national conference on the Analysis of Village Committee Elections officials from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) reiterated the praise for the high turn out in voting (Guangxi, 2005). The national average voting rate was reported to be at least 80 percent—and was often greater than 90 percent—during the 2005 round of village committee elections. In some provinces, for example, Zhejiang Province, MoCA’s website reports that the voting rate in 2005 exceeded 95 percent (MoCA, 2006).

If voting rates in China are in fact as high as reported, this is an important finding since in the political science literature it is generally acknowledged that even when elections systems in developing countries are imperfect, the process of voting itself can be constructive (Diamond and Myers, 2000). In assessing the quality of village committee elections in China, few scholars will contend that the current set of elections are perfect (that is, they may be less than competitive and may be subject to manipulation—Chen and Zhong, 2002; Shi, 1999; O’Brien, 1994; 2001). However, according to many scholars, such as Manion (1996), Horsely (2001), Liu (2000) and Diamond and Myers (2000), regardless of the overall nature of an election, the process of voting itself can be a good thing. In communities with elections that do end up playing a legitimate role in choosing a leader (henceforth, *villages with good elections*), when

people vote they are exercising their right to choose the community head and are gaining voice in the process of managing their lives. In communities with elections that do not matter (i.e., when the election was marked by actions that could be construed as illegitimate, unfair and/or uncompetitive; or in *village with poor elections*), despite the absence of a direct and immediate influence on local governance, it can be argued that since most people are voting, going through the motions of an election is at least still a process that is creating “experience with elections.” In the long run, the process of voting itself is thought to be useful in some cases in bringing about change to the way the communities choose and replace their leaders and creating an electorate that will be able to gradually begin to participate in the governance of their own communities.

Unfortunately, the reported high voting rates are assumptions, and not facts. While there has been a lot of work on village committee elections in China, almost none has been based on large scale, systematic and national representative datasets. It is even noted in the literature that one of the problems with many studies on China is that they use small samples and often rely on case studies and anecdotes for their evidence (Pastor and Tan, 2000). Most studies that have been done by sociologists or political scientists tend to be carried out in several villages or in a single province—for example, a small set of villages in the Beijing area (Chen and Zhong, 2002); 15 demonstration villages in Liaoning and Fujian (O’Brien, 1994); 34 villages in Shaanxi (Kennedy, 2002); or case studies in Zhejiang (He and Lang, 2000).

In most previous studies, the natures of the samples also do not provide researchers a basis for gauging voting rates and overall participation. When scholars have collected data on voting rates of village committee elections (e.g., Shi, 1999; Chen and

Zhong, 2002), they tend to use simple counts of votes and rarely try to get data on the detailed process of who actually fills out the ballot, whether the person whose ballot was filled out by another person is consulted about their opinion, who actually physically put the ballot in the ballot box and what is the nature of the procedure followed for casting a proxy vote. Arguably, however, it is just as (or more) important to understand how a person voted (i.e., to document the entire process of voting) as it is to understand the ratio of the ballots that end up being cast to the voting age population of the village.

The need to understand the nature of the process of voting in the village—both how the votes are cast and who is actually casting them—is important for the same reason that the voting process itself is inherently important. If the voting process in villages that have seemingly good elections in fact is flawed, then the legitimacy of a community’s leaders may only extend to part of the voting population or a small minority of those that cast valid ballots. Likewise, if the voting process in villages that have poor elections is flawed, then the basic argument for even carrying out the elections is undermined; people are not gaining experience in a constructive way, but instead are learning about a corrupted process. Since it may be possible to use some set of policy measures to design and execute better voting procedures—if they are found to be flawed, it is important for the future of China’s village elections that scholars and officials have a clear understanding of the voting process.

The goal of our paper is to provide an empirical basis for understanding progress (or stagnation) in the evolution of China’s village committee elections. To meet this goal, we pursue three specific objectives. First, we seek to identify patterns (and trends) of voting behavior and develop ways to measure participation in the voting process. Second,

we analyze who is voting and who is not (and document the process by which their votes are cast). Finally, we seek to understand the correlation between the propensity to vote and the quality of village elections.

Because these are such ambitious objectives, we necessarily must limit the scope of our work in this paper. While there are many different steps in the procedures that constitute an election in rural China (from the setting up of election committees to the nomination process to ballot counting), in this paper we only focus on one part—the process of voting. That is, in this paper our analysis is focused on village committee elections in China from the time the ballot is distributed to the voters until the time that it is placed in the ballot box. To simplify the analysis further, we assume that there are three steps in the process: filling out the ballot; being consulted about the vote (when ones ballot is being filled out by others); and casting the ballot (or the actual physical act of placing the ballot in the ballot box). We also examine the process by which those that are not in the village on election day are able (or not able) to cast a proxy ballot.

To meet our objectives, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we introduce the survey data. In the third section we use our data to describe recent progress in the emergence of village committee elections in China. In the next sections, we present the results of the analysis. The final section concludes. While the results are highly nuanced and differ across villages and over time, the fundamental finding of our study is that—despite progress and despite high nominal voting rates—there are still gaps in coverage of groups of individuals in rural China. Some of the largest gaps occur in the case of women and migrants and women migrants. In many cases large shares of individuals in these groups are being systematically excluded from

participating in the complete process of voting. Policy-wise, China's government needs to increase its effort to promote more regular voting procedures to insure that true participation in village committee elections is more widespread and does not systematically exclude groups of individuals.

Data

The data are from a survey led by the Center for Chinese Agriculture Policy in collaboration with the University of California, Davis and the University of Toronto. The survey was conducted in early 2005 using a randomly-selected, almost nationally representative sample of 101 rural villages in 5 provinces of rural China (Jiangsu, Hebei, Jilin, Sichuan and Shaanxi). The sample provinces were each randomly selected from each of China's major agro-ecological zone. Five sample counties were then selected from each province by a two-step procedure. In the first step the enumeration team listed all counties in each province in descending order of per capita gross value of industrial output (GVIO). GVIO was used on the basis of the conclusions of Rozelle (1996) that GIVO is a good predictor of standard of living and development potential and is often more reliable than net rural per capita income statistics. In the second step, the five sample counties were selected randomly from each list.

After the county selection was completed, the team then chose the sample townships, villages and households. Within each county, the survey team chose two townships by dividing each county's townships into two income categories ("well off" townships and "poorer" townships—also based GVIO). One township was then selected randomly from each group (that is, we chose one well-off township and one poorer

township in each county). Within each township, two villages were also chosen following the same procedure that was used in selection of the townships. Finally, the survey team used village rosters and the survey team's own counts (of households that were living in the village but not on the roster) to choose randomly eight households within each village. The survey included a total of 808 households.

The survey form was designed to collect information on many aspects of a village's governance, including each individual's participation in the most recent village committee election, the exact procedure by which an individual cast his/her ballot and a comprehensive assessment of the "quality" of the village election. Questions were asked about when the most recent election was held, whether or not each voting-age household member participated, and if not, whether or not s/he knew about the election, and if the individual was in the village on the day of the voting. At the conclusion of each day's survey activities (which also included intensive survey-based interviews of the village leadership—e.g., party secretary; village leader and accountant); small group leaders; and key informants, the enumeration team made an assessment (by providing a score) of the nature of each sample village's election, including an assessment of the election's degree of competitiveness, fairness and strictness (in the adherence to election protocol). We use this information to create a single variable called the *Nature of the Village Election*.

For this paper we asked a series of question in a special block of the survey that focused on collecting information on each individual's voting behavior.¹ In particular, if the individual voted, s/he was asked if s/he filled out his/her own ballot. If the answer was no, two additional questions were asked about who filled out the ballot and whether or not the individual was consulted about his or her opinion. Regardless of who filled out

¹ In the household survey, although information on the voting participation was asked

the ballot, each individual was also asked whether or not s/he cast his/her own ballot (that is, whether or not s/he physically placed the ballot into the ballot-box). Finally, if the person did not vote, we asked whether or not s/he authorized others to vote for him or her (that is, cast a proxy vote for him/her) as well as how the proxy vote was authorized and whether or not the individual was consulted about his/her opinion. In other words, in assessing the nature of each individual's participation, instead of asking if an individual nominally voted, we broke the voting process into three components: the act of filling out the ballot; whether or not an individual's opinion was consulted; and the act of placing the ballot in the ballot box.

Finally, the project team also gathered detailed information on other characteristics of individuals, their families and villages. Among other information, the survey collected data on the levels of the age, education and work status of each household member. There was also a comprehensive community-level survey with the leader of each village. From the community-level survey the enumerators obtained a number of village-level variables on each community's basic characteristics that are used in the paper—for example, net per capita debt, per capita land size, the share of the total village labor force that is engaged in migration or self-employed employment activities; the distance between the village and township seat and the distance between the two most remote small groups within each village.

In addition to the household-level survey, the survey team also convened 202 focus groups—two in each village. Six persons were randomly selected for each focus group; leaders of the village and their families were excluded. After a two hour joint session that collected a great deal of “qualitative data” on each village's election

procedure, each individual that was part of the focus group answered a series of survey-based questions about the nature of his/her participation in the two most recent elections. Following the household form, each respondent stated if they voted or not and if they did provided information on if they filled out their own ballot, if they were consulted or not and if they physically put the ballot in the ballot box. We believe that collecting a second set of data that includes the same variables from the individuals that were part of the focus groups could be instructive because it will allow us to see if the nature of the responses change after individuals were immersed in the intense discussion of village elections that occurred during the focus group itself. The focus group respondents also supplied information on his/her own age, education and work status.

Village Elections in China

Village elections are becoming a common feature of China's villages. Village elections in China are now into their sixth to eighth round in most villages, implying that there have been more than 5 million elections in rural China since the late-1980s. Beginning after the "Organic Law of Village Committees" was adopted in 1998, it is China's policy that villagers select the members of the village committee by popular vote. By the end of 2004, more than 600 thousand villages had village committees that were at least nominally elected (State Council, 2005).

Despite the widespread emergence of village elections, there is a lot of variation among communities in the way in which they implement the protocols of the elections. National laws and policies do not fix exact criteria for the selection of village leaders and they vary from place to place and from time to time (Morduch and Sicular, 2000). In fact,

when examining the empirical literature on China's local elections, it can be seen that there are large numbers of ways in which communities produce slates of candidates and election outcomes (Oi, 1989; Chan et al., 1992; Potter and Potter, 1990; Ho, 1994; Kelliher, 1997; Pastor and Tan, 2000:495). According to the literature and field observation, despite continual efforts to improve election processes, village elections are far from systematic even today. As a result, the procedures by which village leaders accede to their offices are heterogeneous.

Hence, despite the progress in holding village elections, no one has ever claimed that China's the selection of local leaders is perfect. Especially in the early years, in part due to weak protocols, some leaders were still appointed. Even today when elections are held, many outcomes are suspicious. Researchers have widely documented that election irregularities are commonplace and "up-to-standard" villages are still in a distinct minority (O'Brien, 1994).

Although there are problems, both the literature (e.g., O'Brien, 2001) and our data demonstrate that in many ways the quality of village elections has improved since the mid 1990s. In some villages election procedures have been shown to have improved markedly (O'Brien and Li, 2000). The percentage of villages that directly elect their leaders also is rising, increasing from 69 percent (1995-1997) to 83 percent (2002-2004—Luo et al., 2006). He (2000) has many anecdotes documenting novel and progressive ways that villages are improving their procedures.

Using measures from our data, there is progress as well. For example, the percentage of villages that only use roving ballot boxes (typically thought to be a poor election practice) has declined between 1998-2002 and 2002-2004 from 21 percent to 14

percent. During the same time period the reported use of more open nomination process also rose slightly.

Village elections, however, are still far from complete. According to our data, in the most recent round of election years (2002 to 2004) the participation by the current leadership of the village in the committee that organizes all village election activities is dominant. In 81 percent of the sample villages the party secretary is the leader of the village election committee. There also are few organized opportunities for candidates to openly discuss their views on village issues and plans if they were to be elected. In only 37 percent of our sample villages did candidates give campaign speeches.

Certainly in part due to such irregularities, the assessment of our survey teams after spending intensive spells of interviewing and doing surveys in the sample village is that most farmers hold a low opinion of the process of village elections and believe they are of only marginal importance. Specifically, our assessment is that in 71 percent of villages the elections protocols were weak enough to allow for manipulation. Villagers in only 51 percent of the sample villages believed their elections were legitimate. Perhaps due to the perceived problems with protocol, when asked whether or not their elections were important in selecting the village's leadership, only 25 percent said yes. In our most general measure of village election ("overall was it a good election that mattered"), only 22 percent of villages were thought to have good elections.

The Process of Voting

One source of incompleteness that heretofore has received little notice in the literature is the way that villagers are actually able to cast their ballot. In fact, in the few places in the literature that have raised this issue, it is found that the actual practice of

voting may deviate more from the mandated procedures (Pastor and Tan, 2000). In addition to concerns about roving ballot boxes, the process of casting proxy voting and secret individual ballots is discussed.

In fact, according to our data, the issue of casting a secret ballot is not a very important one. In our survey we asked whether or not an individual cast a secret ballot in the most recent round of elections. In the household survey, of the 2187 respondents that were eligible to vote, 95 percent said that when their ballot was being cast, they believe it was done “in secret.”

The issue of proxy balloting, specifically, and the entire process of casting a ballot from the time it is passed out to the voter until the time it is deposited into the ballot box, although receiving less attention in the literature, may be in need of closer scrutiny. Based on our data, nominal voting rates in China’s village elections are indeed high. Using either the household survey or the focus group data, nominal voting rates are about 90 percent (Table 1). They also are high in most provinces. Importantly nominal voting rates are found to be high for both men and women, although nominal voting rate for men is a bit higher than that for women. So, we see that our results are mostly consistent with the claims of China’s officials as well as other studies (Shi, 1999; Chen and Zhong, 2002).

As discussed above, however, a count of ballots may not be a good measure of true participation. We also should consider who really votes and if the person’s opinion is actually reflected on the ballot. According to our data, of all people that nominally voted, when asked if they “filled out their own ballot,” only about 80 percent said they actually did. The percentage falls for women, married women and especially for women migrants

(Table 2). Likewise, of those that did not fill out their own ballot, the share that were consulted about their opinion (while their ballot was being filled out by others) was only about 60 percent. The percentage of women migrants that were consulted when their ballot was filled out was only 30 percent. When asked if they “cast their own ballot” (i.e., physically put own ballot into ballot box), only 77 percent of respondents said “yes.” The number is even lower for women.

In order to measure the actual degree of participation of village elections with our data, we take the answers to the above questions and combine them and construct six distinct “voting patterns.” In other words, voting patterns are defined by four steps, which can be captured by a four digit code: $x_1-x_2-x_3-x_4$ (shown by four variables in the code). The first digit/variable in the code (x_1) stands for whether or not the individual voted nominally or not (1 = voted; 2 = did not vote); the second digit (x_2) stands for whether or not the individual filled out his/her own ballot (1 = filled ballot in by oneself; 2 = ballot filled in by others); the third digit (x_3) stands for whether or not the individual was consulted when the ballot was being filled out (1 = consulted/filled out by self), 2 = not consulted); and the fourth digit (x_4) stands for whether or not the individual casted ballot him/herself (1 = cast ballot by his- or herself; 2 = by others).

Using the coding system to create measures of voting patterns, we can create a number of measures of commonly observed ways of voting. For example, the code 1111 means that the individual voted completely by himself or herself. We can call this a “real” or “complete” vote. In contrast, the code 1222 means that individual only nominally voted (or no part of the opinion of the individual is embodied in the vote). When codes deviate from 1111, it does not necessarily mean that there was any misdeed. For example,

the code 1211 means that although the individual voted in almost all respects (e.g., s/he was consulted and physically put his/her own ballot into the ballot box), only the ballot was filled out by another person. Even outside China under strictly enforced election procedures voting patterns such as 1211 can be observed when the person is, for example, illiterate. We also found that in some cases we observe voting patterns characterized by the code 1112; in this case the individual prepared the ballot all by himself or herself and it only was physically cast by others.

When we examining our voting pattern codes, it is clear that although nominal voting rates are high, actual voting rates are lower (Table 3). In fact, of those that nominally voted, only 74 percent “completely participate” (that is, their voting pattern code is 1111). The rate of complete participation falls to 65 percent for women. The rates of complete participation for young women (46 percent) and illiterate women (38 percent) are even lower.

Even more worrisome, complete participation of all individuals in our sample is actually falling over time (Table 3 and Appendix 1). For example from 79 percent during the 3 year period 1998-2001 complete participation by all individuals in our sample fell to 74 percent during the three year period 2002-2004. In the case of young women, those with voting pattern codes of 1111 fell from 63 percent to 46 percent during the same time period. In other words between 2002 and 2004, less than half of the young women in our sample “voted completely.”

Our data also show that there were a significant number of individuals that only nominally voted (code=1222) and that this number is rising over time for some groups of individuals (Table 3 and Appendix 1). Overall 5 percent of the sample individuals voted

only nominally. The rate is higher for women (9 percent), young women (23 percent) and illiterate women (17 percent). The number of those only nominally voting also is rising over time. To the extent that individuals are not having their opinions reflected in their ballots and are not adhering to bonafide voting procedures, the process of voting in China appears to be undermining the usefulness of China's village committee elections.

Determinants of Voting Behavior

Because our analysis demonstrates that there are sharp differences among individuals and groups of individuals in their voting patterns, in this section we seek to identify the determinants of voting behavior. To do so, we conduct a multivariate analysis to explain *voting behavior* as a function of individual, household and village characteristics and especially as a function of a measure of the "nature of the village elections." In our analysis we specify four regressions to explain: a.) whether or not an individual voted (at least nominally) during the most recent election; b.) whether or not an individual voted completely by self; and c.) whether or not an individual only nominally voted (1222); and 4) whether or not an individual made his/er own decision.

To analyze the determinants of voting behavior we specify voting behavior as a function of the following variables and groups of variables:

- (1) Voting Behavior = f (Gender; Age; Education; Migration Status; Nature of Village Election; Other Individual, Household and Village Characteristics)

where Gender is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual is female and zero if male; Age is measured in years; and Education is measured in years of education attained. Migration status is measured as 1 if the individual was not present in the village during the election and 0 otherwise. And, the Nature of the Village Election is a variable that

measures the quality of the village election and is measured as discussed above.

In addition to some of main variable of interest we also control for a number of other factors. For example, Other Individual Characteristics include marriage status (1=married; 0 if not), self-employed (1=if works in own family business; 0 if not), wage earner (1=works for a wage; 0 if not). Other Household Characteristics include number of children, a dummy variable if any household member is a village cadre (1=yes; 0 if not), is any household member a party member (1=yes; 0 if not). Other Village Characteristics include net per capita income of the year, per capita debt, total population, percentage of minority population, per capita land, number of village-owned enterprises, percentage of migrant labors, proportion of self-employed households, the distance of the nearest road from the village seat, the farthest distance between two small groups within the village, the distance between village committee and township seat.

To enhance the identification of some of our key variables, we do two things. First, for most of our variables (all of those for which there was time varying information) we use observations on the 1997-level of the variable. In addition, in different subsets of our equations, we add county-level dummies to hold constant on county-level effects. In other sets of equations, we add village level dummies. Details of these variables are reported in Table 4.

Results of Multivariate Analysis

Results from regressions are consistent with the descriptive statistics (Table 5). Moreover, many of the results are reasonable and consistent with our expectations. For example, for all groups of villagers (regardless of gender or migrant status), education levels significantly increase the probability that individuals vote (by themselves and

according to their own decision). In addition, our results also show that party members and individuals that live in households in which a member is a cadre vote more. While this might seem ironic (one interpretation is Communist party members support democracy more), in fact, most likely since village elections are nationally condoned, party members most likely are more diligent in carrying out this responsibility.

Most importantly, everything else held equal, the regression results show that both women and migrants vote less than other groups in China's rural villages. While we do not know exactly why, it likely is that gender norms are still embedded in China's village life and men tend to make more of the decision making on certain community matters. In such a setting, if China wants all villagers to gain experience and have their voice heard, policies need to be made that seek to encourage women to exercise their vote. At the same time, the results show migrants also vote less. Certainly, in part this is a natural outcome, since they are out of the way of everyday life in the village. However, policy may be able to play a role by creating a set of proxy voting rules that could help keep migrants involved. Finally, when we interact women with migrants (not shown), this group has the worst voting record. Importantly, these results, which use the data from the household survey, are substantively the same when the same model is run with data from the focus groups (see Appendix 2).

Voting Procedures and Migrants

Although women have been shown to vote less, women migrants have been shown to be even "worse" in both the descriptive statistics and in the multivariate analysis. In this section we seek to answer the question: Is this a phenomenon of women

migrants? Of is it an effect of migrants more generally? Moreover, we also are interested in knowing if migrants do not vote because they are not at home (and it is hard or impossible to vote) or if it is because they just are not interested.

To answer this question, we not only looked at migrants voting process by gender, but also divided all migrants into two groups according to whether or not the individual migrant happened to be at home in the village during the time that the election was held or not. In fact, based on our household data, for migrants who were in the village, in fact, the rate of voting completely (1111) is higher than other groups of individuals in the village. Thus, assuming that migrants that are home are no different than those that just happen to be away during the election, it means that the low rate of migrant voting appears to be a protocol problem. In fact, of those that were not at home during the election was held, only about one third of them even knew that an election was being held. Hence, it is no wonder their vote tally is lower.

Protocols are also bad and may also exacerbate communications between the village and its migrant population. Of migrants that were away from the village during the election, more than a quarter of their votes were made without the migrant knowing anything about the election. Proxy voting appears to be abused in some villages. When counting both those that did know about the election and those that did not, more than 70 percent of the respondents claimed that someone beside the migrant had cast the migrant's vote (Tables 7 and 8). In summary, migrants who are away from home—both men and women—are being left out of the voting process and in some cases the proxy process is being abused.

Relationship Between “Quality of Elections” and “True Participation in Voting”

So why are there so many people that do not appear to take their voting privilege seriously? Although our data can provide only correlations and not causations, it does appear as if there is a relationship between election quality (2000/01/02) and voting procedures (2003/04/05). During the survey, we produced three measures of village election quality: a.) its strictness of compliance with election procedures; b.) its competitiveness; and c.) its fairness. When we look at these measures by quartile, that is, when we divide villages into villages in which the perception of the elections were least strict and most strict; least competitive and most competitive; and least fair and most fair, we see that the “rate of true participation in voting” (voting pattern 1111) was higher in villages that had “higher quality elections” (Table 9). In other words, part of the problem of poor turn out of those that vote completely may be a perception that the whole process is not meaningful. To rectify this problem, of course, village election protocols and procedures need to be greatly improved. It should be noted that these results also are mostly consistent with the regression analysis (Table 6).

Conclusions

It is hard to assess the progress in China’s village elections. Like in any country in which elections are just emerging, there are good ones. And, there are poor ones. In other work (Liu et al., 2006), it has been shown that good elections seem to matter in terms of stimulating new investment as well as general community development. Therefore, it is important to begin to understand what makes for good elections; the first step in that process is to begin to measure its process. This is what we are doing in this paper.

According to our analysis in which we assume that higher voting participation is meaningful in villages with both good and bad elections (as long as individuals are truly voting), we see that there are still gaps in coverage of groups of individuals in rural China. In other words, the process is not as good as it could be because certain groups of individual participate less than others. As our results show, this is especially true for certain groups: for women; for migrants; and for those with lower levels of education. We also show (even though these are correlations not causations) that there is relationship between election quality and the real participation in voting.

As a result, our analysis suggests that concrete steps need to be taken to get individuals in these under-represented groups participating better. This will happen if election procedures improve. But, it should be recalled that the low level of participation of women is a problem, holding the nature of the election constant. Therefore, to induce more women to vote, a campaign that urges women to vote and rules that make it more difficult for family members (e.g., husbands, fathers and father-in-laws) to vote for the women in the family. The same is true for migrants, in general, and women migrants, specifically. If this happens, even if elections in China are not perfect, they will be building a foundation for the future emergence of real democracy and civil participation.

Table 1. Nominal Voting Rates in Village Elections (the Most Recent Election) by Province in China (percent)

| | Total | | Jiangsu | | Sichuan | | Shaanxi | | Jilin | | Hebei | |
|-------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|------------|----------------|------------|----------------|------------|--------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | FG ^a data | HH ^a data | FG data | HH data | FG data | HH data | FG data | HH data | FG data | HH data | FG data | HH data |
| All | 92 | 87 | 96 | 92 | 89 | 85 | 98 | 88 | 99 | 89 | 77 | 78 |
| Women | 89 | 84 | 94 | 92 | 86 | 82 | 98 | 86 | 100 | 85 | 68 | 74 |
| Men | 95 | 90 | 97 | 93 | 92 | 89 | 98 | 89 | 98 | 93 | 87 | 83 |

Data Source: Authors' data (household and focus group data).

^a FG denotes data produced from the focus group sample. HH denotes statistics produced from the household survey data.

Table 2. Voting Procedures by Gender and Migrant Status in the Most Recent Elections in China's Villages (percent).

| Variables | Total | | Women | | Married women | | Migrants | | Women Migrants | |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|-------|------|---------------|----|----------|----|----------------|----|
| | FG ^a | HH ^a | FG | HH | FG | HH | FG | HH | FG | HH |
| Participate in election? | 92 | 87 | 89 | 83 | 89 | 84 | 89 | 79 | 75 | 74 |
| Did you fill out your own ballot? | 82 | 75 | 72 | 63 | 71 | 63 | 82 | 82 | 50 | 74 |
| If not, who filled ballot out for you? | | | | | | | | | | |
| Spouse | 67 | 48 | 76 | 58 | 76 | 61 | 83 | 45 | 100 | 71 |
| Child | 10 | 22 | 6 | 20 | 6 | 21 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Parent | 4 | 10 | 4 | 7.27 | 4 | 5 | 0 | 35 | 0 | 29 |
| Others ^b | 19 | 20 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 14 | 17 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Was your opinion elicited? | 64 | 56 | 61 | 56 | 61 | 56 | 50 | 52 | 33 | 38 |
| Did you place the ballot in the box yourself? | 77 | 72 | 70 | 62 | 70 | 62 | 86 | 76 | 67 | 71 |
| Did you put the ballot in the ballot box for someone else? | 42 | 34 | 33 | 24 | 31 | 24 | 41 | 24 | 25 | 6 |

Data source: Authors' data (household sample).

^a FG denotes data produced from the focus group sample. HH denotes statistics produced from the household survey data.

^b Other category includes the following: granddaughter; relatives; neighbor; election organizer; small group leader

Table 3. Voting Patterns of Different Groups in the Most Recent Election in China's Villages.

| Categories | | Total number of obs. | Code 1111 ^a | Code 1112 ^a | Code 1211 ^a | Code 1212 ^a | Code 1221 ^a | Code 1222 ^a |
|---------------------|-------------|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | | (number) | (percent) | | | | | |
| | Full Sample | 979 | 74.16 | 9.6 | 3.68 | 7.15 | 0.31 | 5.11 |
| by gender | Female | 475 | 64.63 | 7.37 | 6.74 | 11.79 | 0.21 | 9.26 |
| | Male | 504 | 83.13 | 11.71 | 0.79 | 2.78 | 0.4 | 1.19 |
| by female age | <26 | 13 | 46.15 | 7.69 | 0 | 23.08 | 0 | 23.08 |
| | 26—35 | 100 | 70 | 6 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 14 |
| | 36—45 | 179 | 69.83 | 8.94 | 2.79 | 11.17 | 0 | 7.26 |
| | 46-55 | 127 | 56.69 | 7.09 | 14.17 | 13.39 | 0.79 | 7.87 |
| | >55 | 56 | 60.71 | 5.36 | 14.29 | 12.5 | 0 | 7.14 |
| by male age | <26 | 7 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 26—35 | 40 | 92.5 | 5 | 0 | 2.5 | 0 | 0 |
| | 36—45 | 123 | 86.18 | 9.76 | 0 | 2.44 | 0 | 1.63 |
| | 46-55 | 168 | 81.55 | 12.5 | 0.6 | 2.98 | 0.6 | 1.79 |
| | >55 | 166 | 79.52 | 14.46 | 1.81 | 3.01 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| by female education | Illiteracy | 90 | 37.78 | 3.33 | 23.33 | 17.78 | 1.11 | 16.67 |
| | 1—6 | 218 | 65.6 | 8.72 | 3.67 | 10.55 | 0 | 11.47 |
| | 7—9 | 140 | 78.57 | 7.86 | 0.71 | 10 | 0 | 2.86 |
| | >10 | 27 | 74.07 | 7.41 | 7.41 | 11.11 | 0 | 0 |
| by male education | Illiteracy | 41 | 63.41 | 14.63 | 9.76 | 7.32 | 4.88 | 0 |
| | 1—6 | 213 | 84.04 | 12.21 | 0 | 3.29 | 0 | 0.47 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-----|-------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | 7—9 | 207 | 84.54 | 11.11 | 0 | 1.93 | 0 | 2.42 |
| | >10 | 43 | 90.7 | 9.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| by female marriage status | Single | 5 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 20 |
| | Married | 459 | 64.49 | 7.63 | 6.54 | 11.76 | 0.22 | 9.37 |
| | lose one's spouse | 10 | 70 | 0 | 20 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| | Divorce | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| by male marriage status | Single | 13 | 84.62 | 7.69 | 0 | 0 | 7.69 | 0 |
| | Married | 469 | 82.94 | 11.94 | 0.64 | 2.99 | 0.21 | 1.28 |
| | lose one's spouse | 19 | 84.21 | 10.53 | 5.26 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | Divorce | 3 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| by work status | Farmer | 810 | 72.84 | 10.25 | 4.2 | 7.41 | 0.37 | 4.94 |
| | Migrant | 67 | 85.07 | 2.99 | 1.49 | 2.99 | 0 | 7.46 |
| | self-employ | 44 | 81.82 | 6.82 | 0 | 9.09 | 0 | 2.27 |
| | Nothing | 29 | 62.07 | 17.24 | 3.45 | 6.9 | 0 | 10.34 |
| | Others | 28 | 89.29 | 3.57 | 0 | 7.14 | 0 | 0 |
| | Cadre | 1 | | | | | | 100 |

Data source: Authors' survey.

^a Codes describe different voting patterns. Digit positions in the four digit codes have the following meaning: First digit: 1 = vote; 2 = not vote. Second digit: 1 = filled in by self; 2 = filled in by others. Third digit: 1 = vote is own decision; 2 = not consulted. Fourth digit: 1 = placed into ballot box by self; 2 = placed into ballot box by others.

Appendix Table 1. Voting Patterns of Different Groups in the Most Recent Election in China's Villages.

| Categories | | Total number of obs. | Code 1111 ^a | Code 1112 ^a | Code 1211 ^a | Code 1212 ^a | Code 1221 ^a | Code 1222 ^a |
|------------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Full Sample | | 1,421 | 69.88 | 11.33 | 2.18 | 8.66 | 0.42 | 7.53 |
| By gender | Female | 682 | 59.53 | 10.85 | 2.79 | 14.08 | 0.88 | 11.88 |
| | Male | 739 | 79.43 | 11.77 | 1.62 | 3.65 | 0 | 3.52 |
| By female age | <26 | 41 | 56.1 | 17.07 | 0 | 7.32 | 0 | 19.51 |
| | 26—35 | 118 | 67.8 | 9.32 | 1.69 | 8.47 | 0.85 | 11.86 |
| | 36—45 | 174 | 71.26 | 12.07 | 2.3 | 9.77 | 0 | 4.6 |
| | 46-55 | 203 | 59.11 | 9.36 | 4.43 | 16.26 | 0.49 | 10.34 |
| | >55 | 146 | 40.41 | 10.96 | 2.74 | 22.6 | 2.74 | 20.55 |
| By male age | <26 | 32 | 68.75 | 15.63 | 0 | 3.13 | 0 | 12.5 |
| | 26—35 | 116 | 81.9 | 9.48 | 0.86 | 4.31 | 0 | 3.45 |
| | 36—45 | 165 | 81.82 | 11.52 | 0.61 | 4.24 | 0 | 1.82 |
| | 46-55 | 205 | 80.98 | 11.22 | 2.93 | 2.44 | 0 | 2.44 |
| | >55 | 221 | 76.47 | 13.12 | 1.81 | 4.07 | 0 | 4.52 |
| By female education | Illiteracy | 2 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 1—6 | 315 | 69.84 | 12.38 | 1.27 | 7.94 | 0.32 | 8.25 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----|-------|-------|------|-------|------|-------|
| | 7—9 | 157 | 59.24 | 15.29 | 0.64 | 15.29 | 0 | 9.55 |
| | >10 | 208 | 44.23 | 5.29 | 6.25 | 22.6 | 2.4 | 19.23 |
| By male education | Illiteracy | 1 | 100 | | | | | |
| | 1—6 | 385 | 82.08 | 12.47 | 1.04 | 2.08 | 0 | 2.34 |
| | 7—9 | 233 | 80.69 | 12.02 | 0 | 2.58 | 0 | 4.72 |
| | >10 | 120 | 68.33 | 9.17 | 6.67 | 10.83 | 0 | 5 |
| By female marige status | Single | 32 | 62.5 | 12.5 | 0 | 9.38 | 0 | 15.63 |
| | Married | 650 | 59.38 | 10.77 | 2.92 | 14.31 | 0.92 | 11.69 |
| By male marige status | Single | 101 | 74.26 | 10.89 | 0.99 | 5.94 | 0 | 7.92 |
| | Married | 638 | 80.25 | 11.91 | 1.72 | 3.29 | 0 | 2.82 |
| By work status | Farmer | 752 | 71.28 | 10.64 | 3.06 | 9.31 | 0.4 | 5.32 |
| | Migrant | 252 | 69.44 | 14.29 | 0.79 | 6.35 | 0 | 9.13 |
| | self-employ | 205 | 72.68 | 10.24 | 0.98 | 6.83 | 0 | 9.27 |
| | Nothing | 106 | 49.06 | 13.21 | 2.83 | 15.09 | 1.89 | 17.92 |
| | Others | 87 | 72.41 | 10.34 | 1.15 | 8.05 | 1.15 | 6.9 |
| | Cadre | 19 | 94.74 | 5.26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|
| cadre among family member? | Yes | 60 | 95 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | No | 1,359 | 68.87 | 11.48 | 2.28 | 9.05 | 0.44 | 7.87 |
| party member? | Yes | 104 | 84.62 | 8.65 | 0 | 3.85 | 0 | 2.88 |
| | No | 1,316 | 68.77 | 11.47 | 2.36 | 9.04 | 0.46 | 7.9 |

Data source: Authors' survey.

^a Codes describe different voting patterns. Digit positions in the four digit codes have the following meaning: First digit: 1 = vote; 2 = not vote. Second digit: 1 = filled in by self; 2 = filled in by others. Third digit: 1 = vote is own decision; 2 = not consulted. Fourth digit: 1 = placed into ballot box by self; 2 = placed into ballot box by others.

Table 4. Summary Statistics from the Period of the Most Recent Election in China's Villages.

| Variables | Focus Group Dataset | | Household Dataset | |
|--|---------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|
| | Mean | Std. Dev. | Mean | Std. Dev. |
| Voting Process Variables | | | | |
| Did you vote | 0.92 | 0.27 | 0.86 | 0.35 |
| Did you vote completely by yourself? | 0.82 | 0.38 | 0.79 | 0.41 |
| Nominally voted | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.48 |
| Make own decision | 0.94 | 0.23 | 0.92 | 0.27 |
| Individual Characteristics | | | | |
| Female | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 0.50 |
| Age (years) | 46.00 | 10.82 | 33.73 | 19.65 |
| Education attainment (years) | 5.75 | 3.35 | 5.08 | 4.11 |
| Marriage status (yes=1) | 0.94 | 0.25 | 0.60 | 0.49 |
| Self-employed (yes =1) | 0.04 | 0.20 | 0.10 | 0.30 |
| Wage earner (yes=1) | 0.09 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.41 |
| Presence during the election | 0.92 | 0.27 | 0.54 | 0.50 |
| Household Characteristics | | | | |
| No. of children | 2.15 | 1.14 | 0.66 | 0.96 |
| Village cadre (proportion) | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.02 | 0.14 |
| Party member (proportion) | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0.046 | 0.21 |
| Village Characteristics | | | | |
| Net per capita income (yuan) | 1446.09 | 780.19 | 1465.31 | 759.22 |
| Per capita debt (yuan) | 214.78 | 794.15 | 218.68 | 834.53 |
| Total population | 1305.88 | 726.38 | 1352.81 | 742.91 |
| Percentage of minority population | 4.40 | 14.58 | 4.38 | 15.26 |
| Per capita land (mu) | 2.17 | 1.94 | 2.05 | 1.89 |
| No. of village-owned enterprises | 0.32 | 0.78 | 0.30 | 0.75 |
| Percentage of migrant labors | 10.81 | 10.39 | 11.39 | 10.84 |
| Proportion of self-employed hhs | 3.22 | 5.27 | 3.30 | 5.60 |
| The distance of the nearest road from the village seat (km) | 5.94 | 11.27 | 5.70 | 10.77 |
| The furthest distance between two small groups within the village (km) | 2.53 | 2.64 | 2.57 | 2.65 |
| The distance between village committee and township seat (km) | 5.23 | 4.13 | 4.98 | 4.01 |

Nature of election

| | | | | |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Strictness (index) | 3.00 | 1.20 | 3.03 | 1.21 |
| Competitiveness (index) | 2.43 | 1.14 | 2.41 | 1.16 |
| Fairness (index) | 3.09 | 1.08 | 3.12 | 1.09 |
| Number of observations | 1397 | | 1622 | |

[make this table pretty ...

Table 5a. Probit Regression Results on the Determinants of Participation in Most Recent Elections in China.

| | Dependent Variable: Did you vote in the most recent election? | | | | | Dependent Variable: Did you completely vote by yourself? | | | | |
|---|---|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) |
| Independent variables | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) |
| female=1, male=0 | -0.400 | -0.409 | -0.468 | -0.388 | -0.405 | -0.963 | -0.917 | -1.030 | -0.891 | -0.883 |
| | (3.73)*** | (3.61)*** | (3.85)*** | (3.03)*** | (3.01)*** | (7.79)*** | (6.37)*** | (6.46)*** | (5.86)*** | (5.02)*** |
| age when the most recent election was held | 0.051 | 0.045 | 0.040 | 0.037 | 0.034 | 0.009 | 0.039 | 0.047 | 0.035 | 0.063 |
| | (2.20)** | (1.84)* | (1.53) | (1.31) | (1.16) | (0.34) | (1.23) | (1.31) | (1.10) | (1.66)* |
| age1sq | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.000 | -0.001 | -0.000 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (2.58)*** | (2.27)** | (2.02)** | (1.69)* | (1.61) | (1.22) | (1.69)* | (1.52) | (1.86)* | (1.89)* |
| education:0=illiteracy, 1--12=educated year before secondary school, 13=secondary | -0.038 | -0.058 | -0.012 | 0.068 | -0.009 | -0.330 | -0.037 | 0.154 | -0.340 | 0.082 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | (0.72) | (0.93) | (0.14) | (1.05) | (0.10) | (5.27)*** | (0.44) | (1.57) | (4.29)*** | (0.76) |
| Edusq | 0.002 | 0.003 | -0.001 | -0.005 | -0.000 | 0.020 | 0.004 | -0.008 | 0.021 | -0.002 |
| | (0.47) | (0.73) | (0.11) | (1.05) | (0.03) | (3.97)*** | (0.56) | (1.17) | (3.32)*** | (0.31) |
| marriage status:1=married, 0=no | 0.176 | 0.194 | 0.176 | 0.222 | 0.206 | 0.411 | 0.312 | 0.329 | 0.157 | 0.046 |
| | (0.91) | (0.97) | (0.80) | (0.94) | (0.82) | (1.86)* | (1.24) | (1.19) | (0.56) | (0.14) |
| Children | -0.010 | 0.028 | 0.073 | 0.047 | 0.041 | 0.130 | 0.108 | 0.043 | 0.109 | 0.012 |
| | (0.18) | (0.45) | (1.06) | (0.62) | (0.49) | (2.00)** | (1.47) | (0.53) | (1.37) | (0.12) |
| self-employed? 1=yes, 0=no | -0.196 | -0.256 | -0.255 | -0.136 | -0.156 | -0.368 | -0.324 | -0.269 | -0.429 | -0.484 |
| | (1.42) | (1.75)* | (1.61) | (0.77) | (0.84) | (2.42)** | (1.81)* | (1.36) | (2.27)** | (2.18)** |
| wage earner? 1=yes, 0=no | -0.009 | -0.085 | -0.163 | 0.017 | -0.058 | -0.337 | -0.126 | 0.004 | -0.252 | -0.070 |
| | (0.07) | (0.58) | (1.03) | (0.10) | (0.32) | (2.35)** | (0.71) | (0.02) | (1.38) | (0.32) |
| village cadre? 1=yes,2=no | 0.579 | 0.599 | 0.531 | | | | | | | |
| | (1.39) | (1.35) | (1.08) | | | | | | | |
| r u a CPC member?1=yes,2=n o | 0.504 | 0.522 | 0.583 | | | 0.626 | 0.608 | 0.675 | 0.579 | 0.856 |
| | (1.92)* | (1.90)* | (1.90)* | | | (2.37)** | (2.13)** | (2.09)** | (1.83)* | (2.20)** |
| presence=1 during the election, 0=absence | 1.720 | 1.656 | 1.732 | 1.800 | 1.910 | 1.164 | 1.434 | 1.757 | 1.329 | 2.456 |
| | (9.26)*** | (8.58)*** | (8.05)*** | (7.75)*** | (7.46)*** | (2.75)*** | (2.85)*** | (3.09)*** | (1.95)* | (2.26)** |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------|----------|--|--|--|-----------|--------|--|--|
| net per capita income of the year | | 0.000 | 0.001 | | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.07) | (2.07)** | | | | (0.30) | (0.24) | | |
| net per capita income square | | 0.000 | -0.000 | | | | -0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.67) | (2.04)** | | | | (0.50) | (0.46) | | |
| per capita debt | | -0.000 | -0.000 | | | | 0.002 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.34) | (1.62) | | | | (2.50)** | (0.84) | | |
| total population | | -0.000 | -0.000 | | | | -0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.13) | (0.70) | | | | (0.87) | (0.15) | | |
| percentage of minority population | | 0.003 | -0.004 | | | | 0.099 | 0.045 | | |
| | | (0.67) | (0.55) | | | | (3.13)*** | (0.87) | | |
| per capita land | | -0.078 | -0.118 | | | | 0.038 | -0.001 | | |
| | | (2.09)** | (1.57) | | | | (0.59) | (0.00) | | |
| percentage of effectively irrigated land | | -0.004 | -0.002 | | | | -0.004 | -0.002 | | |
| | | (2.20)** | (0.56) | | | | (1.91)* | (0.63) | | |
| % of hilly land over 25 degree in total land area in the village | | -0.001 | 0.000 | | | | 0.000 | 0.004 | | |
| | | (0.51) | (0.11) | | | | (0.13) | (0.72) | | |
| among these enterprises: how | | -0.002 | -0.149 | | | | -0.107 | -0.082 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--------|-----------|-------|-------|--|----------|--------|-------|-------|
| many village/group enterprise? | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.03) | (1.12) | | | | (0.80) | (0.29) | | |
| percentage of migrant labors | | -0.005 | -0.011 | | | | -0.018 | -0.019 | | |
| | | (0.88) | (1.14) | | | | (2.26)** | (1.20) | | |
| proportion of selfemployed households | | 0.001 | 0.040 | | | | 0.014 | 0.013 | | |
| | | (0.13) | (2.82)*** | | | | (1.03) | (0.76) | | |
| the distance of the nearest road from the village seat | | -0.001 | -0.009 | | | | 0.004 | 0.004 | | |
| | | (0.23) | (1.43) | | | | (0.56) | (0.45) | | |
| the farrest distance between two small groups within this village | | -0.012 | -0.008 | | | | 0.029 | -0.004 | | |
| | | (0.46) | (0.25) | | | | (0.90) | (0.10) | | |
| the distance between village committee and township seat | | 0.018 | 0.052 | | | | 0.000 | 0.009 | | |
| | | (1.14) | (2.29)** | | | | (0.01) | (0.32) | | |
| degree of strictness of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | 0.065 | 0.117 | | | | 0.127 | 0.058 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|--------|--------|----------|---------|---------|--------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | | | (0.74) | (0.95) | | | | (1.35) | (0.36) |
| degree of competition of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | 0.053 | 0.178 | | | | 0.130 | -0.073 |
| | | | | (0.92) | (1.90)* | | | | (2.27)** | (0.76) |
| degree of fair/just of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | 0.053 | 0.095 | | | | -0.063 | -0.096 |
| | | | | (0.56) | (0.73) | | | | (0.60) | (0.67) |
| Constant | -1.090 | -0.664 | 0.100 | -1.595 | -0.679 | 1.309 | -0.717 | -3.824 | 0.332 | -3.435 |
| | (2.19)** | (1.05) | (0.10) | (2.40)** | (0.76) | (1.88)* | (0.76) | (2.74)*** | (0.34) | (2.38)** |
| Observations | 1397 | 1266 | 1179 | 1016 | 959 | 977 | 875 | 681 | 741 | 547 |
| R-squared | | | | | | | | | | |
| Purdo R-squared | | | | | | | | | | |
| Village dummy | | | | | | | | | | |
| County dummy | | | | | | | | | | |

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5b. Probit Regression Results on the Determinants of Participation in Most Recent Elections in China.

| Independent Variables | Dependent Variable: Only nominally voted (yes/no) | | | | | Dependent Variable: Make your own decision (yes/no) | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------------------------|---|-----------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) |
| | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) |
| female=1, male=0 | 0.457 | 0.261 | 1.834 | 0.430 | -0.921 | -0.783 | -0.854 | -1.173 | -0.867 | -0.876 |
| | (1.68)* | (0.62) | (1.92)* | (1.12) | (1.36) | (5.08)*** | (4.34)*** | (4.67)*** | (3.91)*** | (3.31)*** |
| age when the most recent election was held | -0.066 | -0.276 | -0.203 | -0.202 | -0.161 | 0.054 | 0.117 | 0.117 | 0.121 | 0.144 |
| | (1.41) | (3.39)*** | (1.25) | (2.68)*** | (1.57) | (1.87)* | (3.12)*** | (2.49)** | (3.14)*** | (2.93)*** |
| age1sq | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.002 |
| | (1.77)* | (3.30)*** | (1.23) | (2.73)*** | (1.33) | (2.48)** | (3.31)*** | (2.58)*** | (3.57)*** | (3.07)*** |
| education:0=illiteracy,1--12=educated year before secondary school,13=secondary | 0.044 | -0.384 | -1.089 | 0.089 | -0.023 | -0.184 | 0.314 | 0.393 | -0.062 | 0.222 |
| | (0.36) | (1.96)* | (2.00)** | (0.53) | (0.09) | (2.44)** | (2.84)*** | (2.80)*** | (0.57) | (1.48) |
| Edusq | -0.002 | 0.023 | 0.073 | -0.006 | -0.007 | 0.010 | -0.019 | -0.024 | 0.003 | -0.011 |
| | (0.20) | (1.68)* | (2.04)** | (0.48) | (0.39) | (1.66)* | (2.44)** | (2.48)** | (0.41) | (1.03) |
| marriage status:1=married, 0=no | -0.227 | 0.308 | -2.324 | 0.171 | 1.454 | 0.189 | 0.150 | 0.508 | 0.004 | 0.131 |
| | (0.54) | (0.50) | (1.53) | (0.26) | (1.33) | (0.74) | (0.48) | (1.29) | (0.01) | (0.29) |
| Children | -0.237 | -0.224 | -2.076 | -0.059 | -0.309 | 0.188 | 0.193 | 0.120 | 0.088 | 0.028 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|----------|----------|----------|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | (1.62) | (1.06) | (2.36)** | (0.30) | (0.88) | (2.14)** | (1.82)* | (0.89) | (0.75) | (0.20) |
| self-employed? 1=yes, 0=no | 0.910 | 1.077 | 1.995 | 1.096 | 0.840 | -0.587 | -0.576 | -0.558 | -0.646 | -0.750 |
| | (2.89)*** | (2.39)** | (2.02)** | (2.43)** | (1.34) | (3.28)*** | (2.56)** | (1.97)** | (2.67)*** | (2.41)** |
| wage earner? 1=yes, 0=no | 0.513 | 0.616 | -1.893 | 0.891 | 0.118 | -0.494 | -0.380 | 0.020 | -0.418 | -0.254 |
| | (1.75)* | (1.37) | (1.23) | (2.14)** | (0.20) | (2.92)*** | (1.74)* | (0.07) | (1.78)* | (0.89) |
| Village cadre? 1=yes,2=no | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| is a CPC member?1=yes,2=no | 0.333 | 0.551 | 4.548 | | | 0.426 | 0.283 | 0.049 | 0.038 | -0.033 |
| | (0.50) | (0.76) | (2.46)** | | | (1.26) | (0.77) | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.08) |
| presence=1 during the election, 0=absence | | | | | | | | 2.626 | | |
| | | | | | | | | (3.85)*** | | |
| net per capita income of the year | | -0.001 | 0.041 | | | | -0.000 | -0.000 | | |
| | | (0.67) | (0.00) | | | | (0.44) | (0.14) | | |
| net per capita income square | | 0.000 | -0.000 | | | | -0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (1.37) | (0.00) | | | | (0.46) | (0.26) | | |
| per capita debt | | -0.001 | 0.468 | | | | 0.000 | -0.005 | | |
| | | (0.33) | (0.00) | | | | (0.90) | (1.10) | | |
| total population | | 0.000 | 0.001 | | | | 0.000 | -0.000 | | |
| | | (0.17) | (0.00) | | | | (0.46) | (0.26) | | |
| percentage of minority population | | -6.632 | -232.936 | | | | 4.238 | 9.404 | | |
| | | (2.00)** | (.) | | | | (2.68)*** | (1.83)* | | |
| per capita land | | 0.100 | -79.308 | | | | -0.036 | -0.234 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|----------|--------|--|--|--|---------|---------|--|--|
| | | (0.25) | (.) | | | | (0.30) | (0.27) | | |
| percentage of effectively irrigated land | | 0.005 | 0.008 | | | | -0.004 | -0.020 | | |
| | | (0.80) | (0.00) | | | | (1.42) | (1.34) | | |
| % of hilly land over 25 degree in total land area in the village | | 0.023 | -0.311 | | | | -0.004 | -0.014 | | |
| | | (2.12)** | (0.00) | | | | (0.86) | (1.25) | | |
| among these enterprises: how many village/group enterprise? | | -0.260 | 30.962 | | | | 0.158 | -0.340 | | |
| | | (0.68) | (0.00) | | | | (0.87) | (0.60) | | |
| percentage of migrant labors | | -0.034 | 0.563 | | | | 0.015 | -0.012 | | |
| | | (1.56) | (0.00) | | | | (1.55) | (0.43) | | |
| proportion of selfemployed households | | 0.073 | 1.968 | | | | -0.008 | -0.001 | | |
| | | (1.57) | (0.00) | | | | (0.51) | (0.04) | | |
| the distance of the nearest road from the village seat | | -0.080 | 0.081 | | | | 0.021 | 0.046 | | |
| | | (1.74)* | (0.00) | | | | (1.76)* | (1.88)* | | |
| the farrest distance between two small groups within this village | | -0.195 | -8.964 | | | | 0.072 | 0.076 | | |
| | | (1.25) | (0.00) | | | | (1.27) | (0.86) | | |
| the distance between village committee and township seat | | -0.005 | 15.053 | | | | 0.032 | -0.098 | | |
| | | (0.08) | (0.00) | | | | (1.24) | (1.35) | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|--------|-----------|----------|
| degree of strictness of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | -0.359 | 0.977 | | | | 0.262 | -0.102 |
| | | | | (1.81)* | (1.80)* | | | | (2.07)** | (0.43) |
| degree of competition of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | -0.312 | -0.152 | | | | 0.434 | 0.141 |
| | | | | (2.15)** | (0.39) | | | | (4.35)*** | (0.77) |
| degree of fair/just of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | -0.123 | -1.128 | | | | -0.185 | 0.131 |
| | | | | (0.53) | (2.26)** | | | | (1.38) | (0.66) |
| Constant | 0.318 | 6.390 | -8.404 | 4.855 | 4.941 | 1.722 | -1.494 | -4.529 | -0.780 | -2.946 |
| | (0.31) | (2.58)*** | (.) | (2.71)*** | (1.84)* | (2.73)*** | (1.46) | (1.24) | (0.83) | (2.26)** |
| Observations | 161 | 142 | 105 | 113 | 77 | 1115 | 998 | 473 | 860 | 368 |
| R-squared | | | | | | | | | | |
| Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6. Voting Protocol and Migrant Status in China's Villages.

| Variables | # of obs. | Total (%) | Woman migrants (%) | Man migrants (%) |
|--|------------------|------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| All migrants with right to vote | | | | |
| Have right to vote(i2101) | 384 | 80.84 | 76.25 | 83.12 |
| at home during election (i2102) | 107 | 27.86 | 23.77 | 29.89 |
| Migrants those were at home during the election was held (107 obs.) | | | | |
| Participate in the election?(i2103) | 107 | 78.52 | 74.29 | 80 |
| Filled out your own ballot?(i2104) | 107 | 82.24 | 74.07 | 85 |
| If not, who filled it out for you? (i2105) | 19 | | | |
| spouse | | 42.11 | 71.43 | 25 |
| child | | 10.53 | 0 | 16.67 |
| parents | | 36.84 | 0 | 41.67 |
| others | | 10.53 | 28.57 | 16.67 |
| Discussed with you?(i2106) | | 50 | 37.5 | 56.25 |
| Put the ballot in the box yourself? (i2107) | | 76 | 70.83 | 77.63 |
| Put the ballot in the box for someone else?(i2109) | | 24.66 | 6.25 | 29.82 |
| Voting patterns | | | | |
| 1111 | 72 | 76.6 | 73.91 | 77.46 |
| 1112 | 15 | 15.96 | 13.04 | 16.9 |
| 1211 | 1 | 1.06 | 0 | 1.41 |
| 1212 | 5 | 5.32 | 8.7 | 4.23 |
| 1221 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1222 | 1 | 1.06 | 4.35 | 0 |
| Migrants those were not at home during the election was held (277 obs.) | | | | |
| Did you know the election?(i2111) | 260 | 36.92 | 37.08 | 37.06 |
| Did someone vote for you?(i2112) | 189 | 72.69 | 74.16 | 71.76 |
| Did you authorize someone vote for you?(i2113) | 41 | 21.81 | 24.62 | 20.49 |

| | | | | |
|--|----|-------|-------|-------|
| How did you authorize? (i2114) | 41 | | | |
| by calling | 34 | 82.93 | 87.5 | 80 |
| signed an authorized document | 2 | 4.88 | 6.25 | 4 |
| others | 3 | 7.32 | 0 | 12 |
| by oral | 2 | 4.88 | 6.25 | 4 |
| Who cast a proxy vote for you?(i2115) | | | | |
| Spouse | | 12.5 | 13.33 | 12 |
| Son | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Daughter | | 2.5 | 0 | 4 |
| Father | | 70 | 66.67 | 72 |
| Mother | | 10 | 13.33 | 8 |
| Relatives | | 2.5 | 0 | 4 |
| Others | | 2.5 | 6.67 | 0 |
| Did he/she consulte with you?(i2116) | | 68.57 | 76.92 | 63.64 |

Data source: Authors' data, household survey.

Appendix Table XX. Voting Protocol and Migrants (Focus Group Data)

| Variables | # of obs. | Total (%) | Woman migrants (%) | Man migrants (%) |
|---|------------------|------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| All migrants with right to vote | | | | |
| at home during election (pra_b7) | 36 | 46.15 | 55.56 | 43.33 |
| Migrants those were at home during the election was held (36 obs.) | | | | |
| Participate in the election?(pra_c1) | 33 | 91.67 | 80 | 96.15 |
| Filled out your own ballot?(pra_c2) | | 82.35 | 50 | 92.31 |
| If not, who filled it out for you? (pra_c3) | | | | |
| spouse | | 83.33 | 100 | 50 |
| child | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| parents | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| others | | 16.67 | 0 | 50 |
| Discussed with you?(pra_c4) | | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Put the ballot in the box yourself? (pra_c5) | | 85.29 | 75 | 88.46 |
| Put the ballot in the box for someone else?(pra_c7) | | 42.86 | 16.67 | 50 |
| Voting patterns | | | | |
| 1111 | | 81.25 | 42.86 | 92 |
| 1112 | | 3.13 | | 4 |
| 1211 | | 6.25 | 28.57 | 0 |
| 1212 | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1221 | | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1222 | | 9.38 | 28.57 | 4 |
| Migrants those were not at home during the election was held (42 obs.) | | | | |
| Did you authorize someone vote for you?(pra_d1) | | 54.29 | 57.14 | 53.57 |
| How did you authorize? (pra_d2) | | | | |

| | | | | |
|--|----|-------|----|-------|
| by calling | 8 | 38.1 | 75 | 29.41 |
| signed an authorized document | 2 | 9.52 | 0 | 11.76 |
| oral | 5 | 23.81 | 25 | 23.53 |
| others | 6 | 28.57 | 0 | 35.29 |
| Who casted a proxy vote for you?(pra_d3) | | | | |
| Spouse | 14 | 70 | 50 | 75 |
| Son | 2 | 10 | 25 | 6.25 |
| Daughter | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Father | 1 | 5 | 0 | 6.25 |
| Mother | 1 | 5 | 0 | 6.25 |
| Relatives | 1 | 5 | 25 | 0 |
| Others | 1 | 5 | 0 | 6.25 |
| Did he/she consulte with you?(pra_d4) | 8 | 40 | 75 | 31.25 |

Table 9: Quality of Village Elections and Voting Behavior of Rural Individuals in China, 2004

| | Number of observations | Vote by self (ballot filled out and cast by self) | Ballot cast by others (but filled out by self) | Ballot filled out by others, with consultation (but cast by self) | Ballot filled out and cast by other, with consultation | Ballot filled out by others, cast by self, without consultation | No real vote (ballot filled and cast by others without consultation) ; |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|--|---|--|--|---|---|
| Full Sample | 979 | 74 | 10 | 4 | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| Strictness | | | | | | | |
| Quartile 1 (least strict) | 247 | 68 | 16 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 5 |
| Quartile 2 | 149 | 66 | 17 | 5 | 5 | 0 | 7 |
| Quartile 3 | 244 | 82 | 4 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| Quartile 4 (most strict) | 106 | 85 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| Competition | | | | | | | |
| Quartile1 (least competitive) | 209 | 70 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 9 |
| Quartile 2 | 150 | 73 | 13 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 4 |
| Quartile 3 | 247 | 79 | 9 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 3 |
| Quartile4 (most competitive) | 129 | 75 | 13 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| Fairness | | | | | | | |
| Quartile 1 (least fair) | 196 | 68 | 19 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| Quartile 2 | 170 | 67 | 16 | 4 | 9 | 0 | 4 |
| Quartile 3 | 302 | 81 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 5 |
| Quartile 4 (most fair) | 78 | 83 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 5 |

*note: Digit position:

First: 1 = vote; 2 = not vote **Second:** 1 = filled in by self; 2 = filled in by others
Third: 1 = vote is own decision; 2 = not consulted **Fourth:** 1 = filled into ballot box by self 2 = filled into ballot box by others

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Appendix1: Voting Patterns among Different Groups (the Previous Election)_FG Data

| | | # of obs | Vote | | | | | | Didn't vote |
|---------------------|------------|----------|-------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| For all | | 998 | 94.99 | | | | | | 5.01 |
| | | | | Code 1111 | Code 1112 | Code 1211 | Code 1212 | Code 1221 | Code 1222 |
| for all by route | | 934 | 78.59 | 8.14 | 3.32 | 6.21 | 0.43 | 3.32 | |
| by gender | Female | 459 | 69.06 | 6.75 | 6.1 | 11.11 | 0.65 | 6.32 | |
| | Male | 475 | 87.79 | 9.47 | 0.63 | 1.47 | 0.21 | 0.42 | |
| by female age | <26 | 19 | 63.16 | 5.26 | 0 | 21.05 | 0 | 10.53 | |
| | 26--35 | 135 | 76.3 | 7.41 | 0.74 | 9.63 | 0 | 5.93 | |
| | 36--45 | 166 | 70.48 | 7.23 | 5.42 | 11.45 | 0 | 5.42 | |
| | 46-55 | 109 | 56.88 | 6.42 | 12.84 | 12.84 | 2.75 | 8.26 | |
| | >55 | 30 | 76.67 | 3.33 | 13.33 | 3.33 | 0 | 3.33 | |
| by male age | <26 | 5 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| | 26--35 | 74 | 93.24 | 4.05 | 0 | 1.35 | 0 | 1.35 | |
| | 36--45 | 113 | 92.04 | 6.19 | 0 | 1.77 | 0 | 0 | |
| | 46-55 | 177 | 86.44 | 11.3 | 1.13 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0 | |
| | >55 | 106 | 81.13 | 14.15 | 0.94 | 2.83 | 0 | 0.94 | |
| by female education | illiteracy | 91 | 43.96 | 4.4 | 19.78 | 15.38 | 3.3 | 13.19 | |
| | 1--6 | 209 | 70.33 | 9.09 | 2.87 | 11 | 0 | 6.7 | |
| | 7--9 | 134 | 82.84 | 5.22 | 1.49 | 8.96 | 0 | 1.49 | |
| | >10 | 25 | 76 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 4 | |
| by male education | illiteracy | 38 | 71.05 | 13.16 | 7.89 | 5.26 | 2.63 | 0 | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|
| | 1--6 | 198 | 87.37 | 10.61 | 0 | 1.52 | 0 | 0.51 |
| | 7--9 | 198 | 89.9 | 9.09 | 0 | 0.51 | 0 | 0.51 |
| | >10 | 41 | 95.12 | 2.44 | 0 | 2.44 | 0 | 0 |
| by female marige status | single | 5 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 20 |
| | married | 444 | 69.37 | 6.98 | 5.86 | 10.81 | 0.68 | 6.31 |
| | lose one's spouse | 9 | 66.67 | 0 | 22.22 | 11.11 | 0 | 0 |
| | divorce | 1 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| by male marige status | single | 15 | 93.33 | 6.67 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | married | 437 | 87.64 | 9.61 | 0.46 | 1.6 | 0.23 | 0.46 |
| | lose one's spouse | 21 | 85.71 | 9.52 | 4.76 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | divorce | 2 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| by work status | farmer | 780 | 77.31 | 8.85 | 3.72 | 6.54 | 0.51 | 3.08 |
| | migrant | 66 | 86.36 | 1.52 | 1.52 | 3.03 | 0 | 7.58 |
| | self-employ | 36 | 86.11 | 2.78 | 0 | 11.11 | 0 | 0 |
| | nothing | 27 | 70.37 | 14.81 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 0 | 7.41 |
| | others | 23 | 95.65 | 4.35 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | cadre | 2 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

note:

*Digit position:

First: 1 = vote; 2 = not vote

Third: 1 = vote is own decision; 2 = not consulted

Second: 1 = filled in by self; 2 = filled in by others

Fourth: 1 = filed into ballot box by self

2 = filed into ballot box by others

Appendix 2: Regression Results (Focus Group Data)

| | Did you vote? (yes/no) | | | | | Did you completely vote yourself?(yes/no) | | | | |
|--|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) |
| Independent variable | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) |
| female=1, male=0 | -0.296 | -0.216 | -0.463 | -0.176 | -0.012 | -0.738 | -0.739 | -1.006 | -0.707 | -0.888 |
| | (2.15)** | (1.28) | (1.85)* | (0.88) | (0.05) | (5.80)*** | (5.24)*** | (5.97)*** | (4.46)*** | (4.82)*** |
| age when the most recent election was held | -0.010 | -0.013 | 0.064 | 0.003 | 0.063 | 0.002 | 0.014 | 0.042 | 0.007 | 0.047 |
| | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.86) | (0.06) | (0.84) | (0.06) | (0.35) | (0.94) | (0.16) | (0.93) |
| age1sq | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.001 | 0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | 0.000 | -0.000 |
| | (0.36) | (0.25) | (0.80) | (0.03) | (0.60) | (0.29) | (0.06) | (0.70) | (0.06) | (0.75) |
| education | 0.093 | 0.131 | 0.212 | 0.215 | 0.290 | 0.286 | 0.296 | 0.305 | 0.310 | 0.315 |
| | (1.85)* | (2.17)** | (2.58)*** | (3.02)*** | (3.22)*** | (5.83)*** | (5.47)*** | (4.76)*** | (5.19)*** | (4.47)*** |
| edusq | -0.007 | -0.010 | -0.016 | -0.016 | -0.020 | -0.017 | -0.018 | -0.016 | -0.019 | -0.015 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | (1.51) | (2.00)** | (2.36)** | (2.54)** | (2.56)** | (3.69)*** | (3.61)*** | (2.72)*** | (3.30)*** | (2.17)** |
| married? 1=yea, 0=no | 0.164 | 0.173 | 0.152 | 0.348 | 0.262 | -0.156 | -0.092 | -0.061 | 0.054 | 0.302 |
| | (0.60) | (0.58) | (0.33) | (0.98) | (0.52) | (0.56) | (0.33) | (0.20) | (0.18) | (0.89) |
| how many children | -0.137 | -0.004 | 0.052 | 0.065 | 0.060 | -0.112 | -0.119 | -0.049 | -0.121 | -0.056 |
| | (2.28)** | (0.05) | (0.41) | (0.67) | (0.42) | (1.90)* | (1.80)* | (0.62) | (1.65)* | (0.61) |
| self-emplo yed? 1=yes, 0=no | -0.043 | 0.079 | -1.087 | -0.331 | -0.917 | 0.037 | 0.066 | 0.242 | 0.034 | -0.142 |
| | (0.14) | (0.21) | (2.02)** | (0.95) | (2.04)** | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.59) | (0.10) | (0.36) |
| wage earner? 1=yes, 0=no | -0.120 | 0.244 | -0.593 | -0.062 | -0.444 | 0.012 | -0.048 | 0.084 | 0.145 | 0.265 |
| | (0.50) | (0.79) | (1.22) | (0.17) | (0.92) | (0.05) | (0.18) | (0.27) | (0.45) | (0.69) |
| any family memeber a cadre? 1=yes, 2=no | 0.542 | 0.055 | -0.120 | 0.379 | -0.069 | -0.107 | -0.178 | -0.037 | -0.304 | -0.272 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| | (1.29) | (0.13) | (0.20) | (0.86) | (0.12) | (0.43) | (0.66) | (0.13) | (1.11) | (0.94) |
| run a CPC member? 1=yes, 2=no | 1.044 | 1.238 | 1.076 | | | 0.538 | 0.735 | 0.629 | 0.992 | 0.998 |
| | (2.65)*** | (2.83)*** | (1.64) | | | (2.53)** | (3.08)*** | (2.41)** | (3.08)*** | (2.78)*** |
| presence=1 during the election, 0=absence | 1.249 | 1.565 | 3.242 | 1.509 | 2.536 | 1.287 | 1.523 | | 1.423 | |
| | (2.13)** | (2.53)** | (2.74)*** | (2.37)** | (2.44)** | (1.32) | (1.54) | | (1.45) | |
| net per capita income of the year | | 0.001 | 0.001 | | | | -0.001 | -0.001 | | |
| | | (1.65)* | (1.24) | | | | (2.18)** | (1.22) | | |
| net per capita income square | | -0.000 | -0.000 | | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.13) | (0.25) | | | | (1.84)* | (1.18) | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------|--------|--|--|--|-----------|---------|--|--|
| per capita debt | | 0.001 | 0.001 | | | | 0.000 | -0.000 | | |
| | | (1.77)* | (1.30) | | | | (1.75)* | (0.12) | | |
| total population | | -0.000 | -0.000 | | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.30) | (0.96) | | | | (2.59)*** | (1.93)* | | |
| percentage of minority population | | 0.022 | -0.007 | | | | -0.007 | 0.025 | | |
| | | (1.50) | (0.27) | | | | (1.48) | (1.70)* | | |
| per capita land | | 0.063 | 0.126 | | | | 0.039 | 0.067 | | |
| | | (1.11) | (0.48) | | | | (1.12) | (1.05) | | |
| percentage of effectively irrigated land | | -0.011 | -0.005 | | | | -0.005 | -0.003 | | |
| | | (3.87)*** | (0.71) | | | | (2.02)** | (0.66) | | |
| % of hilly land over 25 degree | | 0.001 | -0.018 | | | | 0.004 | 0.002 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----------|----------|--|--|--|---------|--------|--|--|
| in total land area in the village | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (0.17) | (2.30)** | | | | (1.43) | (0.31) | | |
| among these enterprise s: how many village/gro up enterprise ? | | -0.249 | -0.458 | | | | 0.119 | -0.110 | | |
| | | (2.29)** | (1.99)** | | | | (1.01) | (0.44) | | |
| percentag e of migrant labors | | 0.002 | 0.014 | | | | 0.013 | 0.017 | | |
| | | (0.26) | (0.72) | | | | (1.74)* | (1.17) | | |
| proportion of selfemploy | | -0.047 | -0.051 | | | | 0.060 | 0.068 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|----------------------|----------------------|--|--|
| ed household s | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (3.52) ^{***} | (1.90) [*] | | | | (2.56) ^{**} | (2.45) ^{**} | | |
| the distance of the nearest road from the village seat | | 0.020 | 0.021 | | | | 0.002 | -0.002 | | |
| | | (1.92) [*] | (1.13) | | | | (0.42) | (0.23) | | |
| the fareset distance between two small groups within this village | | 0.044 | 0.001 | | | | -0.047 | -0.090 | | |
| | | (1.17) | (0.01) | | | | (1.91) [*] | (2.41) ^{**} | | |
| the distance between | | -0.031 | 0.030 | | | | -0.031 | -0.050 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--------|--------|---------|--------|--|---------|---------|----------|--------|
| village committee and township seat | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (1.50) | (0.65) | | | | (1.91)* | (1.80)* | | |
| degree of strictness of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | -0.231 | -0.317 | | | | 0.229 | 0.111 |
| | | | | (1.84)* | (1.46) | | | | (2.48)** | (0.79) |
| degree of competition of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | -0.038 | 0.161 | | | | 0.065 | -0.061 |
| | | | | (0.47) | (1.00) | | | | (1.08) | (0.58) |
| degree of | | | | 0.500 | 0.185 | | | | -0.144 | -0.174 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|--------|-------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| fair/just of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | (3.64)*** | (0.59) | | | | (1.37) | (1.20) |
| Constant | 0.317 | -0.587 | 0.480 | -1.459 | 1.527 | -0.772 | -0.993 | -0.178 | -1.477 | -0.814 |
| | (0.29) | (0.46) | (.) | (0.97) | (.) | (0.62) | (0.74) | (0.13) | (1.06) | (0.60) |
| Observations | 1074 | 967 | 530 | 774 | 431 | 890 | 800 | 731 | 661 | 592 |
| R-squared | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.46 | 0.13 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.34 |
| Village dummy | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
| County dummy | N | N | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix 2: (Continue)

| | Only nominally vote? (yes/no) | | | | | Make your own decision (yes/no) | | | | |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) | (3) | (6) | (7) | (10) | (11) |
| | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) | (Probit Estimation) | (Probit Estimation with county dummy) |
| female=1, male=0 | 0.396 | 0.424 | -0.112 | 0.367 | 0.522 | -0.546 | -0.674 | -0.766 | -0.564 | -0.718 |
| | (1.14) | (0.95) | (0.16) | (0.92) | (1.13) | (2.96)*** | (3.30)*** | (3.27)*** | (2.60)*** | (2.87)*** |
| age when the most recent election was held | -0.110 | -0.055 | -0.821 | -0.042 | -0.084 | 0.047 | 0.033 | 0.055 | 0.028 | 0.063 |
| | (1.54) | (0.58) | (3.23)*** | (0.49) | (0.68) | (1.04) | (0.63) | (0.81) | (0.51) | (0.94) |
| age1sq | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.001 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 | -0.000 |
| | (0.99) | (0.25) | (3.00)*** | (0.12) | (0.52) | (0.39) | (0.25) | (0.48) | (0.10) | (0.63) |
| education | 0.192 | 0.196 | -0.112 | 0.192 | 0.205 | 0.109 | 0.124 | 0.111 | 0.145 | 0.113 |
| | (1.81)* | (1.38) | (0.36) | (1.54) | (1.30) | (1.63) | (1.70)* | (1.22) | (1.89)* | (1.23) |
| edusq | -0.019 | -0.022 | 0.005 | -0.016 | -0.023 | -0.002 | -0.004 | -0.001 | -0.006 | 0.000 |
| | (1.66)* | (1.35) | (0.16) | (1.18) | (1.39) | (0.29) | (0.58) | (0.10) | (0.79) | (0.00) |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|--------|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|---------|--------|
| married? 1=yea, 0=no | 0.175 | -0.012 | -1.247 | 0.447 | 0.539 | -0.051 | -0.116 | -0.199 | -0.012 | 0.015 |
| | (0.26) | (0.02) | (0.98) | (0.67) | (0.60) | (0.14) | (0.29) | (0.41) | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| how many children | 0.286 | 0.170 | 0.528 | 0.205 | 0.031 | -0.177 | -0.132 | -0.062 | -0.159 | -0.084 |
| | (2.42)** | (1.11) | (1.73)* | (1.43) | (0.16) | (2.29)** | (1.51) | (0.54) | (1.70)* | (0.69) |
| self-emplo yed? 1=yes, 0=no | -0.273 | 0.287 | 10.406 | -0.983 | 0.030 | 0.236 | 0.102 | 0.098 | 0.279 | 0.104 |
| | (0.37) | (0.34) | (0.00) | (1.23) | (0.03) | (0.52) | (0.21) | (0.16) | (0.56) | (0.19) |
| wage earner? 1=yes, 0=no | 0.594 | 0.294 | -1.080 | 0.656 | -0.197 | -0.291 | -0.199 | 0.143 | -0.156 | 0.077 |
| | (1.17) | (0.50) | (0.85) | (0.97) | (0.20) | (1.04) | (0.62) | (0.39) | (0.44) | (0.19) |
| any family memeber a cadre? 1=yes, 2=no | -0.446 | -0.560 | | | | 0.079 | 0.085 | 0.428 | 0.128 | 0.289 |
| | (0.79) | (0.78) | | | | (0.22) | (0.23) | (0.97) | (0.33) | (0.69) |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|----------|----------|--------|--|--|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| r u a CPC member? 1=yes, 2=no | 1.120 | 1.811 | | | | -0.090 | -0.044 | -0.057 | 0.045 | 0.011 |
| | (2.10)** | (2.48)** | | | | (0.35) | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.03) |
| presence= 1 during the election, 0=absence | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| net per capita income of the year | | -0.000 | -0.214 | | | | 0.000 | -0.001 | | |
| | | (0.10) | (0.04) | | | | (0.29) | (1.09) | | |
| net per capita income square | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | | | -0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.01) | (0.02) | | | | (0.43) | (1.17) | | |
| per capita debt | | -0.000 | -0.291 | | | | 0.001 | 0.000 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------|---------|--|--|--|----------|--------|--|--|
| | | (0.15) | (0.01) | | | | (1.14) | (0.10) | | |
| total population | | -0.000 | 0.182 | | | | 0.000 | 0.000 | | |
| | | (0.04) | (0.05) | | | | (1.29) | (0.46) | | |
| percentage of minority population | | -0.144 | -72.809 | | | | 0.032 | 0.199 | | |
| | | (2.02)** | (0.12) | | | | (1.42) | (0.74) | | |
| per capita land | | 0.218 | 30.543 | | | | -0.089 | -0.099 | | |
| | | (3.00)*** | (0.07) | | | | (2.15)** | (1.14) | | |
| percentage of effectively irrigated land | | 0.002 | 0.015 | | | | -0.002 | -0.010 | | |
| | | (0.30) | (0.00) | | | | (0.62) | (1.52) | | |
| % of hilly land over 25 degree in total land area | | 0.014 | 2.213 | | | | 0.002 | -0.026 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--------|--------|--|--|--|--------|----------|--|--|
| in the village | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (1.55) | (0.04) | | | | (0.54) | (2.50)** | | |
| among these enterprises : how many village/group enterprise ? | | 0.449 | 89.828 | | | | 0.084 | -0.426 | | |
| | | (1.02) | (0.01) | | | | (0.57) | (0.75) | | |
| percentage of migrant labors | | 0.017 | 1.317 | | | | 0.007 | -0.002 | | |
| | | (0.86) | (0.01) | | | | (0.74) | (0.11) | | |
| proportion of selfemployed household | | 0.122 | 17.167 | | | | 0.001 | 0.003 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----------|---------|--|--|--|--------|----------|--|--|
| s | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (1.49) | (0.05) | | | | (0.05) | (0.07) | | |
| the distance of the nearest road from the village seat | | 0.053 | 1.843 | | | | -0.008 | -0.043 | | |
| | | (2.51)** | (0.02) | | | | (1.19) | (2.14)** | | |
| the farest distance between two small groups within this village | | 0.010 | -6.694 | | | | -0.042 | -0.047 | | |
| | | (0.21) | (0.01) | | | | (1.46) | (0.91) | | |
| the distance between village committee | | -0.158 | -15.121 | | | | 0.047 | 0.082 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-----------------------|--------|--------|---------|--|---------|--------|--------|--------|
| and township seat | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | (2.96) ^{***} | (0.03) | | | | (1.90)* | (1.44) | | |
| degree of strictness of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | 0.298 | 0.585 | | | | 0.005 | -0.180 |
| | | | | (1.61) | (1.82)* | | | | (0.05) | (1.05) |
| degree of competition of the previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | -0.090 | -0.002 | | | | 0.126 | -0.011 |
| | | | | (0.73) | (0.01) | | | | (1.64) | (0.08) |
| degree of fair/just of the | | | | -0.477 | -0.655 | | | | 0.076 | 0.155 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|--------|---------|----------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| previous election, the highest score is 5 | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | (2.02)** | (2.07)** | | | | (0.61) | (0.85) |
| Constant | 1.287 | -0.133 | -23.990 | 0.594 | 0.901 | 0.268 | 0.442 | 1.938 | 0.159 | -0.269 |
| | (0.74) | (0.06) | (.) | (0.27) | (0.27) | (0.25) | (0.34) | (0.84) | (0.12) | (0.15) |
| Observations | 162 | 143 | 98 | 112 | 90 | 980 | 883 | 587 | 736 | 494 |
| R-squared | | | | | | | | | | |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.14 | 0.31 | 0.66 | 0.14 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.28 | 0.15 | 0.21 |
| Villiga dummy | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
| County dummy | N | N | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y | N | Y |

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%