The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center
Working Paper Series

Paper No. 6 May 2002

Democracy and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Chile: An Exercise in Historical Comparison

Felipe Agüero

www.miami.edu/nsc/pages/WorkIPCpapers.html

The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

Democracy and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in Chile: An Exercise in Historical Comparison

Felipe Agüero

The Dante B. Fascell
North-South Center
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
1500 Monza Avenue, Coral Gables,
Florida 33146-3027

DANTE B. FASCELL NORTH-SOUTH CENTER WORKING PAPER NUMBER SIX

The following is a Working Paper of The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida. As this paper is a work-in-progress, the author(s) and the North-South Center welcome comments and critiques from colleagues and students of security studies, environmental issues, and civil society participation. Comments may be e-mailed to the author(s) using the e-mail link at the bottom of page one.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), not The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, which is a nonpartisan public policy and research institution.

Inquiries and submissions to the North-South Center Working Papers may be sent to Jeffrey Stark, Director of Research and Studies, via e-mail attachment to stark@miami.edu, including author's name, title, affiliation, and e-mail address.

ISBN 1-57454-120-X
May 2002

DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CHILE: AN EXERCISE IN HISTORICAL COMPARISON

Felipe Agüero

The years since the return of democracy in Chile in 1990 have been quite stressful in the area of civil-military relations. How will these relations develop in the future, and how will they affect the quality of Chilean democracy? While it is safe to say that tension in these relations will eventually subside, the manner in which this happens and the specific path that these relations take will heavily influence the nature of Chile's democratic regime. To address this question, I propose to focus on trends that emerged before the disquieting circumstances of the past decade and the immediate present. I submit that, in the domain of civil-military relations, an approach grounded in historical comparison is the proper strategy for a sound assessment of future trends.

Below, I indicate the terms of the proposed comparison and discuss its connection with other forms of comparison more commonly found in the literature. I then briefly describe the troubled nature of civil-military relations in the 1990s and follow with a presentation of the previous cases — historical junctures and processes — for this comparative exercise. First, an overview of the period of military professionalization allows a focus on the contradictory manner of insertion of the Chilean military in the political process that ended in the coup of 1924. I then present the period that followed the return to civilian rule in 1932, highlighting the relevant features that provide clues about the unexpected force with which the military rose to power in the coup of 1973. Next, the paper addresses the manner of transition from military authoritarian rule, followed by a section on the ensuing democratic period. The final section compares all these periods with a view toward ascertaining future trends.

Historical Comparison

The suggested comparison points to two periods in Chilean history. Both may be seen as critical periods in the formation of long-term trends in the dynamics of civil-military relations. The first period started right after the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) and covered the first real effort at military professionalization in the final years of the nineteenth century. The second period began with the return of civilian government in 1932 and covered the following decades. Both those periods ended in military coups: the coup of 1924 and the more violent and bloody military coup of 1973.

The current post-military regime period, which started in 1990, also will be critical in determining trends for a long time into the future and is comparable to those two earlier periods that culminated in the coups of 1924 and 1973, respectively. The critical question then becomes the following: What are the similarities and differences of those periods when contrasted with the current post-military period? Will the current period be seen, decades from now, as the incubator of long-lasting trends that contributed to the first coup of the twenty-first century in Chile or to some other form of violent resolution of political or civil-military conflict? Alternatively, are there significant differences that may allow us to

Felipe Agüero is a political scientist and associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami. His main research interests are the politics of democratization, the military and its relations with the state and society, party politics, and the political and social dimensions of corporate philanthropy.

E-mail comments to: faguero@miami.edu

think of the current period as more promising for the future of democracy? These questions and their answers form the substance of this paper.

My preliminary answer tilts toward the optimistic side. The first two periods or cases were characterized by an early bifurcation of civilian and military elites, which took separate paths. Subsequent developments only increased their bifurcation. The military interventions of 1924 and 1973 were preceded by periods in which military and civilian elites went in different directions. Modernization and professionalization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries set the military on unsupervised pathways — with the military developing autonomously, free from close monitoring by government officials — which led it to criticize political elites, parties, and parliamentary government. This criticism was simultaneously an expression of the crisis in oligarchic rule and a cause of its demise. The 1924 coup and the military-influenced period that followed closed the civilian-military gap, but did so in a perverse way.

The end of military rule at the turn of the decade of the 1920s found the armed forces isolated and chastised by the resurgent conservative forces of democratic restoration, and soon they were ignored by the political leadership of the emergent popular sectors. The military and the elites of the post-oligarchic state developed in quite different directions, the former ignored by the latter. This disconnect was reinforced later by the elites' abandonment of the Chilean military to the unmonitored influence of the inter-American system inspired by the Cold War. This again resulted in military criticism of politics, of democracy and, this time specifically, of radical reform parties. The threshold for intervention had risen; no intervention could occur without the convergence of deep political and military crisis.[1] Once the intervention did occur in 1973, it unleashed a violent and long-lasting repressive reaction. The military interventions of 1924 and 1973 were crude ways of closing the breach between the state and its military.

In light of those experiences, it is very pertinent to ask if the military's exit in 1990 bears any resemblance to that of the 1930s or to the previous historical juncture that led to a civil-military separation. Will the recent military exit lead to another cycle of separation that may need a future resolution? The situation in the 1990s contained features that paradoxically kept both state and military elites and society as a whole engaged, preventing the kind of separation that had occurred earlier. Somewhat counterintuitively, the intensity of civil-military conflict impeded separation. In addition, the present period also has developed in a different international context. Still, for these differences to allow optimistic predictions, numerous other factors must be present. This idea will be developed toward the end of this paper.

The historical comparison advanced here highlights the feature of engagement/separation between elites and the state and its military, which is not present in cross-national comparisons of civil-military relations made in the context of democratic transition studies. These studies generally have underscored institutional features of the relative empowerment of civilians and the military or have focused on military attitudes or on goals and interests.[2] In the case of Chile, comparative democratization studies have yielded relatively negative conclusions: In the area of civil-military relations, a relatively stronger military imposed authoritarian institutions that the successor regime inherited. In none of the other Latin American cases did the military remain as formally empowered as in Chile.[3] For Chile, then, the possibility of progress rests with institutional changes and with the partisan and congressional politics of constitutional reform. The historical comparison advanced here does not reject the comparative democratization approach; the two perspectives are in fact complementary. This exercise in historical comparison does underscore an aspect that is often overlooked: the engagement or separation of the military and civilian-led state institutions and elites. While institutional reform eventually may be attained, it will not yield the expected democratic results unless accompanied by policies and structures that prevent separation or bifurcation.

Troubled Civil-Military Relations in the 1990s

In Chile, relations between the military, the government, and society during the past decade certainly have been strained. After stepping down from the headship of government in 1990, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte remained as head of the army for the explicit purpose of preventing attempts to reverse the legacy of the military regime and keeping the military off limits to the government and the courts. A clash of prerogatives, rooted in the constitution inherited from the Pinochet regime, took place between the new president and the military. The first years of the new democracy were filled with conflicts over appointments, judicial investigations of corruption and of human rights violations, the prosecution of

former National Intelligence Agency (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional — DINA) chief General Manuel Contreras, the investigation of obscure financial deals involving the Pinochet family, and other issues. The military, especially the army, reacted in corporate defense by mounting pseudo-military operations in protest, overtly violating norms established by the Constitution itself. Under Pinochet, the army operated as a separate power, with minimal political supervision. While there was no real threat that the military actually would depose the new democracy, the military remained autonomous, defiant, and confrontational.

The second democratic administration developed much less strenuous civil-military relations, fundamentally by appeasing the military. No major acts of indiscipline took place, except for the important episodes of military discontent associated with the enforcement of the sentence against General Contreras. This period of appeasement ended exogenously, however, as a result of the detention of Pinochet in London in 1998, only seven months after he left the top post in the army and took a lifetime seat in the Senate. Pinochet's London affair initiated a cathartic process in the Chilean polity, fueled by more active courts that started pursuing human rights cases more aggressively. High-level military officers began to suffer the consequences of more assertive courts. The removal of Pinochet's senatorial immunity and the instigation of a case that led a Chilean prosecuting judge to charge Pinochet with murder and kidnapping followed Pinochet's return to Chile in 2000. The army had no choice but to abide by the law and accept the process, but not without significant tensions with the government and within the army.

Developments following the detention of Pinochet, however, also led to instances of cooperation that helped advance a major shift in the manner in which the military had previously dealt with the human rights problems. The Mesa de Diálogo (Dialogue Roundtable) became the most important of such instances. It brought together human rights lawyers and representatives of the top military chiefs and others, and it was charged with producing information on the disappeared (people who had disappeared during the rule of Pinochet). The military provided information to the president in January 2001, marking a remarkable recognition by the military of the gross human rights violations that had occurred under the military regime. However, the military's gesture also was disappointing because the information covered only a fraction of the unsolved cases.

Following the inauguration of President Ricardo Lagos in March 2000, civil-military relations approached a state of "normalcy" after the president's insistence on letting each state power do its job, for example, by not interfering with the courts' handling of human rights cases, including that of Pinochet. Still, the continuation of civil cases and other legal actions against Pinochet as the former president and head of the army, even after the appeals court found him mentally unfit to stand trial and dismissed the indictment against him, will continue to be a source of tension. The inherently open-ended nature of pending human rights cases also will cause tension. Meanwhile, all these events are taking place in the context of an unreformed constitution that empowers the military in the National Security Council (NSC) and denies the president the power to remove the top military chiefs.

These sources of tension ultimately are based on the uneven development of Chilean institutions since the resumption of democracy. Economic institutions and political society have asserted themselves in very stable terms. The former have allowed for the best economic performance in the region, and the latter has ensured a stable manner of channeling electoral and political preferences through the most well-established party system in the region. However, institutions for the mediation of state-military relations lag behind, captive to the authoritarian enclaves, which leads scholars and observers to depict the Chilean situation as one of incomplete transition or imperfect democracy.

Questions about the future of civil-military relations and the institutional context in which they belong are fully pertinent for an assessment of the future of Chilean democracy. These questions can best be addressed via historical comparison.

State Formation, Professionalization, and Military Intervention

During the nineteenth century, the military integrated itself within an oligarchic democratic regime that gradually became consolidated and played a central role in the constitutional crisis and civil war of 1891. The nature of the military's political role was affected significantly, however, by the drive toward modernization and professionalization that began after the War of the Pacific. While the military

modernized and strengthened, social tensions emerged from the strains of development and the travails of a fluctuating export economy. These tensions led the elite to intensify the repressive uses of the military while ignoring its professional demands and remaining ignorant of its expanded institutional views. The military had in fact acquired features that set it in conflict with the oligarchy and its manner of facing social tension arising from a changing social structure. The military distanced itself from oligarchic political leadership and developed a growing critique of this leadership and its political practices. Providing early historical material to refute Huntington's thesis on the connection between military professionalism and political abstention,[4] the newly professionalized Chilean military intervened to help quell social conflict by decreeing weighty social and political reforms.

Armed militias actively participated in state-formation activities throughout the nineteenth century.[5] These activities included the war against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation in 1836-1839; the defeat of rebellions staged from southern and northern parts of the territory in 1851 and 1859, respectively; and the dramatic, long, and consequential War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia in 1879-1883. The consolidation and expansion of the territory to which these wars gave rise led to an important role for armed forces in the colonization of the frontier, both north and south, and in the war against the indigenous resistance that had carried over since colonial times.[6]

Modern professionalization of a Chilean army did not begin in earnest, however, until after the military's crucial participation in Chilean state formation. Following the victorious conclusion of the War of the Pacific, the government decided to initiate a profound professionalization of the army. Cognizant of the flaws displayed by the military during the war, Chilean leaders intended that military professionalization should answer the defense needs of a vastly expanded territory containing large mineral riches and should overcome the chaotic organization that had resulted from overextension of the army, which for several years had occupied a large part of Peru. Falling prey to the allure of the prestigious Prussian army, the Chilean government in 1885 contracted the services of Prussian Colonel Emil Körner, who came with more than 20 officers to initiate changes in organization, structure, procedures, and training. The most important features and organs of the modern Chilean army, such as the War Academy, the Revista Militar, and the General Staff, were set in place during this period. The work of the German mission continued until 1914, at which time important reorganization had been accomplished along with significant importation of modern weaponry from Germany and other European countries.[7] Chilean military academies played host to Latin American military officers, and Chilean officers traveled to Germany for training and to other Latin American countries to provide instruction.[8] An important consequence of military professionalization and modernization was that soon the army acquired a new institutional identity and a distinct view of its role as a modern army.

Entering the early decades of the twentieth century, and as a result of its professionalization process, the Chilean army began to experience an intense contradiction. On one hand, it was strongly influenced by the outlook of a foreign army that based its clout and prestige on the central role it had played in German national unification. The Chilean army acquired the self-image of an entity central to the nation's development. At the same time, the Chilean army was trained in modern notions of "total war," which prescribed that war effort belongs to the nation as a whole, supported by all its constituent "fronts," all coexisting in harmony, and in which the military plays a central role. Just as in the European countries from which its outlook was borrowed, the Chilean military understood that modern total war required the development of a strong national industry. Army officers, in the first two decades of the twentieth century, were strong proponents of industrialization, more so than any other elite group in Chilean society. The self-image of a strong army at the center of the nation's development — an army prepared, with its advanced modern training and weaponry, to advance the nation's interests militarily — required, however, a sound economic and military foundation standing on a strong industrial sector. The possibility of actualizing such a self-image could be entertained on the basis of the impressive economic growth that territorial expansion had made possible by allowing the development of the nitrate industry.[9] On the other hand, despite the illusion fostered by the bonanza of nitrate exports, this rosy image collided with the dull reality of an economically and socially backward country with no industry and in which social conflict emerged rampantly to foster a repressive role for its army.[10]

This contradiction came to a head as a result of the gradual collapse of Chile's nitrate export economy following the end of World War I. This decline of the export economy occurred at a time when the social structure was undergoing deep changes. The country's rate of urbanization had expanded dramatically, and new social layers from the middle sectors — teachers, professionals, public employees — and

an expanding working class added to the complexity of the social structure, all of which resulted in increased social demands.[11] Social mobilization combined with expanded union activism to create a dangerous scenario for the ruling oligarchy. The changing social context and the resistance of the oligarchy to opening the political system to the new groups inevitably locked the military into a coercive posture that was at odds with its self-image as the backbone of a grand nation in need of a strong national defense.

A widening gap had developed between the military's self-image and the reality of a ruling class that misused the state through the parliamentary form of government that had been established to share the spoils of the booming export economy. The social strains created by this growth and particularly by the subsequent economic decline caught the military between its imagined country and the real one. The real country was one in which the ruling elites assigned the military repressive roles against workers' mobilization and ceased giving attention to the military's demand for a continuous increase in professionalization, modernization, and expansion. The military began to show signs of discontent because of the repressive uses assigned to it and the lack of government leadership in promoting the desired industrialization.[12]

The military's discontent was channeled through a discourse that criticized politicians and the parliamentary form of government.[13] The military criticized the particularistic concerns of politicians, which in its view led them to shortsighted responses to crisis. By contrast, the military saw itself concerned with "grand politics," a concern thwarted by the shortsighted and repressive views of politicians. In this context, in the midst of the so-called "social question," segments of the military began to plot against the parliament's opposition to social reforms. Finally, in 1924, the military intervened to oust President Arturo Alessandri after his failure to overcome parliamentary opposition to his platform of social reforms.[14] In the rather chaotic and unstable period that followed, during which power resided more or less directly with the army's reformist echelon, many important reforms were passed. Led by middle-level officers, the military did away with a congress controlled by conservative oligarchic forces and passed social legislation, incorporated labor organizations into the political system, expanded public services, created the national police, and significantly advanced the promotion of national industry. Through various degrees of participation in government, the military continued its intervention until democratic politics fully resumed in 1932.

From Insulation to Inter-Americanism, National Security, and Military Coup

Despite the social reforms it promoted and its leading role in reshaping the political system toward a more inclusionary regime,[15] the military came out of the pre-1932 period badly wounded. Having alienated much of the political class, and weakened by factionalism, the military could count on little support when the government headed by Colonel Carlos Ibáñez was hit by the world economic crisis of 1930. The military left in defeat, despised by angry civilians who empowered themselves with civilian-led militias.[16] This civilian-inspired reaction had two basic consequences. The first was that civilian administrations kept the military weak and poorly funded, and they paid it little attention. The second was that the military hunkered down and did not contest the civilianist reaction. A newly appointed military leadership strongly supported and enforced military subordination. At the same time, military officers desperately tried to give the armed services legitimacy in the eyes of civilian elites by attuning the armed forces to the new statist ethos of industrialization and expansion of the public sector.[17] For 15 years following the resumption of democracy in 1932, through three administrations (those of Arturo Alessandri, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, and Juan Esteban Montero), the military lived in isolation, neglected by the political elite.

The outbreak of World War II, and especially the new Cold War order that emerged after its end, rescued the Chilean military from its state of forced lethargy and isolation. The start of the Cold War, the 1947 Inter-American (Rio) Treaty, and the Mutual Aid Pact with the United States gradually helped bring the military back closer to center stage. By acquiring a new sense of mission — the defense of the West from its enemies from within and without — the military now felt a consistent justification for promoting its institutional importance in the domestic arena. The military profession slowly began to gain in prestige again or, at least, to lose the sense of social ostracism that plagued it after the civilian reaction of the 1930s.

The anticommunist Cold War ideological tenets that quickly began to permeate the inter-American scene struck a chord with the military's old and new doctrinal definitions. The old definitions combined the teachings of nineteenth-century schools of geopolitics with various notions of total war. The new definitions, which could be integrated easily with the previous ones, came from U.S. versions of international relations theory and its materialization in state policy and organization, epitomized in the notion of national security.[18] In many Latin American countries, Chile included, the concept of national security became the military's leitmotiv in claiming stronger participation in national affairs. The old conceptual framework of societies and nations as harmonious bio-organisms was joined with the anticommunist ideological structure developed by the inter-American alliance, and all of it was cemented together to form the national security doctrine.[19]

By the 1950s — during the civilian, democratically elected administration of Colonel Ibáñez — the military's doctrinal views concerning national security had cohered to the point of conceiving and submitting national security and national mobilization bills to the Ministry of Defense, which submitted them to Congress. These bills contemplated the organization of the state sector in ways that facilitated the logistics and control of information for purposes of war preparation. The proposed legislation envisioned national security capacities at all levels of the Chilean state, with the military playing a crucial role in their central coordination. The bills were criticized severely by the opposition and the media, and the executive withdrew them from Congress once it became convinced that they would not be passed.[20] Despite this setback, the initiatives accurately reflected the new professional-political mindset that had gained ascendancy in the military. The inspiration for the bills included earlier views of total war, to which were added more contemporary views of national security and a national security system.

This episode — the formulation, presentation, and withdrawal of the national security bills — was quite indicative of underlying processes in civil-military relations of the time. At bottom, it reflected the divergent paths taken by the civilian political leadership and the military. The latter had reawakened from its lethargy empowered with new doctrines and a new international scenario that highlighted its hemispheric and domestic political importance. However, the civilian elites of the right and left continued to undervalue the military institution and paid little attention to it despite the fact that the hemispheric dynamics unleashed by the Cold War had influenced the political elite significantly. Cold War-inspired ideological trends in the military found a strong correlate, for instance, in the domestic political process. After the start of the Cold War, President Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952) extricated himself from the center-left coalition that had brought him (and two previous presidents) to power, expelled communists from cabinet posts, made the Communist Party illegal, and exiled its leaders. This situation lasted through the next administration, headed by Ibáñez.

However, all civilian elites, including those who shared anticommunist stances with the military, abdicated leadership responsibility in the military and defense fields. By embracing the inter-American alliance in 1947 and its accompanying military institutions, political leaders in fact transferred substantial defense leadership responsibility to international, U.S.-dominated agencies. The gap between the civilian political world and the military appeared clearly in the contrast between Chile's pluralistic political system, which included a strong leftist pole well represented in Congress and occasionally in the executive, and Chile's military, which turned, unmonitored, toward the ideological dynamics of the Cold War.

While the democratic features of the Chilean political process maintained the military's formal subordination to political authority, the gap actually widened between civilian and military officials. For all practical purposes, the military was veiled in irrelevance for most sectors of the political elite because of their ignorance of doctrinal developments in the armed forces. Behind the veil, the military nurtured a deep resentment of the political leadership, which was aggravated by the harsh economic conditions under which military personnel lived.

The first visible and dramatic manifestations of the widening civilian-military gap surfaced in 1968, when the whole class of military academy graduates simultaneously submitted individual letters of resignation citing harsh economic and professional conditions. This action led to the removal of the minister of defense and the army chief and to the unusual appointment of a retired general to the ministerial post, with promises to fix the economic problems highlighted in the graduates' letters. This first overt act of military discontent was followed up a year later, toward the end of the administration of President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), when a top army general, Roberto Viaux, and a group of officers rebelled, staging not a coup attempt, but a "protest demonstration" from within the powerful Tacna garri-

son close to downtown Santiago. This was a forceful expression of resentment from a large group within an institution whose members felt ill-treated and abandoned by the political elite. The underlying message, widely supported within the army, was the military's demand to have its status upgraded to the level of its own self-image as the critical institutional mainstay of national security. The negotiations leading to a settlement that included the removal and retirement of General Viaux were a long-overdue attempt to bridge a gap now so wide that it could only be approached only under duress.[21]

Political Polarization and the Road to the 1973 Coup d' État

The civilian-military gap had been expanding against a background of rising political tension and polarization. The political process initiated with the resumption of democracy in 1932 was organized around multiparty, polarized competition, with strong parties on the right, center, and left of the political spectrum. While this process functioned smoothly around coalitions organized by the major center party (the Radical Party), at least until the González Videla administration banned the Communist Party, it became much more rigid and competitive in the 1950s and 1960s. The administration of Colonel Ibáñez (1952-1958) was superseded by that of Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964), who with the support of the right had defeated Salvador Allende, the candidate of the left, by just a few thousand votes. The reformist policies of the Christian Democratic administration that followed, which was led by President Frei Montalva, further animated social mobilization and political polarization. An ideologically reformist and rigid center, now monopolized by the Christian Democratic Party, added to the institutional difficulties of a presidential system in a multiparty context.[22] Alone in government, the Christian Democrats were flanked aggressively by Marxist parties on the left, and, on the right, by the new National Party, which assumed a far more authoritarian stance than the traditional conservative parties it had replaced. A politicized and polarized scenario, in the context of sluggish economic growth that reflected the loss of dynamism of the inward-oriented development model, served as the background for the expanding gap between political leaders and the military.

The election of the socialist-communist coalition led by Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970 greatly heightened political tensions. As with the earlier contest between Jorge Alessandri and Allende in 1958, the tallies in 1970 gave the winner (this time Allende over Alessandri) a very bare plurality. Because the winner was a Marxist, the possibility that Congress might exercise its prerogative of selecting the runner-up as president became very real. All kinds of political maneuvering developed thereafter, and in the short two-month transition period between Frei Montalva and Allende, the army was brought ever-closer to political prominence.

The army's increasing political influence resulted from at least three important developments. First was the attempt by a small group of disenchanted elements ousted from the military and led by General Viaux, jointly with emerging extreme right-wing organizations and with the support of U.S. intelligence agencies, to prevent the ascent of Salvador Allende to the presidency. The plan consisted of kidnapping the army's chief, General René Schneider, with the hope of unleashing the army's intervention and stopping the constitutional process. The plot failed because Schneider resisted the kidnapping attempt and was mortally wounded.

The next development was the army's advancement of the so-called Schneider Doctrine, named after General Schneider, who had been the army's top commander since the shake-up that followed General Viaux's rebellion the previous year. Schneider had simply restated explicitly the role that the Constitution mandated in the case of a presidential election in which no candidate obtained an absolute majority. The Constitution affirmed that in such a case a plenary session of Congress would elect the winner from the two largest pluralities. The Schneider Doctrine was presented as a democratic military doctrine because it reaffirmed the constitutional route, signaling that the army would not interfere with Congress should it ratify Allende's plurality. However, the Schneider Doctrine contained another element that added an ominous afterthought to this constitutional reaffirmation. General Schneider had made it clear that the army owed obedience to the permanent institutions of the nation, while governments were considered only transitory. Thus, the Schneider Doctrine contained two elements: a restatement of a part of the Constitution and a statement about the difference between the nation and the state or government, which made explicit a specific way of operationalizing "national security" views that had been developing in the military.[23]

Yet another development was the set of pressures on the army put forth by political groups from various quarters. The very fact that the army had to brandish the Constitution to signal its position meant that political polarization already had advanced to the point that significant segments of the civilian elite sought to break the rules of the game. Faced with an undesired electoral outcome, these elite segments overtly reached out for the army. These overtures came from various quarters, not only from small extremist right-wing groups or from U.S. government agencies. They came from the mainstream political right, which had been reorganized around nationalistic-authoritarian tenets. They came also from influential circles within the Christian Democratic administration, close to President Frei Montalva himself. The overtures helped create situations conceived to provoke action by the military. The military, in turn, resisted the overtures with the shield of the Constitution and counterargued that the situations demanded political, not military decisions.[24]

These trends signaled that the gap between civilian and military elites that had developed through the previous decades would be bridged via the convergence of a "national security"-inspired military on one hand, and a political right wing reorganized under a nationalistic and authoritarian-leaning leadership on the other. Political polarization, which developed to extreme levels under Allende's presidency, further advanced this process. Allende's policy of bringing military officers into his cabinet at several points to weaken right-wing offensives based on disrupting public order stood on mistaken assumptions. In fact, Allende thought the civilian-military gap could be bridged in a national-popular direction that would counter the authoritarian rhetoric of the right-wing elite, which began to find an echo among military chiefs. However, the assumptions behind the president's policies ignored the aforementioned national-security ideological developments within the military and helped to increase the speed at which the military politicized and came closer to the positions of the coup-plotting right.

The military's decision to oust President Allende was not made until it was determined that several ingredients for a successful coup were in place, a fact that points to the high threshold for intervention in a professional military. These ingredients were as follows: 1) unification of all the opposition under the actual leadership of its most right-wing segment, the National Party; 2) a statement declaring the illegitimacy of the Allende government, issued by Congress' opposition majority; 3) social turmoil, accompanied by economic disarray and chaos, promoted by the opposition and by U.S. agencies under President Richard Nixon's leadership and worsened as a result of the government coalition's fractious and ineffective policies; and 4) the resignation of chief army commander General Carlos Prats and a few of his fellow generals, all Allende supporters, which was advocated by the majority of the generals. Allende's appointment of General Pinochet to the top army post opened the way for an institutional military coup. Rather than let the most active conspirators in the army lead the coup, the military waited until its legitimate top leadership was ready to make the move to intervene. Only at this point did the military, propelled by the navy's leadership, decide to unleash the coup with massive force.

Military Exit, Confined Transition, and Civil-Military Dynamics

The military exit in the 1990s differed substantially from the transition of the 1930s. This time, the military exited while leaving a solid institutional legacy that empowered it to resist retribution and tinkering with its expanded prerogatives. This powerful legacy combined with a reinvigorated political party life and conflicts that guaranteed that the military would not fall into the isolation and separation of the previous period. In this section, I describe the main aspects of the transition and the military legacy.

The coalition cemented during the authoritarian regime brought together all those institutions and groups that contributed to its success: the military, businesses, and civilian leaders from the former National Party and the technocratic groups that led the economy and the regime's institutionalization process. From these civilian groups sprang the parties heir to the authoritarian legacy: the National Renovation Party and the Independent Democratic Union. On the opposite side stood the groups and organizations that fought the regime and promoted a return to democracy: the former parties at the center and the left of the political spectrum, the Catholic Church, most remaining labor unions, and some professional associations that had shifted sides in the course of the struggle for democratization.[25] The dynamics of civil-military relations in the ensuing post-authoritarian period proceeded from the opposition and interaction of these various groups and developed in the context of the democratization process, framed by the new institutional background advanced by the transition.

Despite the electoral defeat that pushed the military out of government, the armed forces exited the authoritarian regime in good standing and with significant social and political support. In contrast to many other cases in the region and elsewhere, the Chilean military did not alienate its original social and political allies. It left government buoyed by recognition for its success in overhauling the economy and forging a new era in the nation's development. To the social and economic bases of success, the Constitution had added institutional protection and monitoring roles. Compared to the transition of 1932, this was a vastly more successful exit.

However comparatively successful, this was an exit nonetheless and an undesired one at that. The immediate cause for exit was the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988 referendum. The Constitution approved in the 1980 referendum envisioned a transitional period of eight years, after which the Constitution would enter into full effect. It would inaugurate a reinforced presidential system with vast monitoring powers for the military and a much-diminished Congress. The Constitution was, in fact, tailor-made for the continuity of Pinochet's rule. However, a transitional clause contemplated a referendum to be held in 1988 to decide who would assume the presidency for a renewable eight-year period. When in 1980 Pinochet reluctantly agreed to accept this clause, he anticipated no problems with a referendum that would be held far into the future. He felt confident that the economy would continue to perform and that he would easily add one more to the series of plebiscites that already had succeeded in rejecting the United Nations' condemnation of Chile's human rights situation. Defeat in 1988 came as a huge surprise for Pinochet. The "No" vote against the military junta's proposal of Pinochet for president prevailed, with 57 per cent of the vote. Pinochet attempted to invalidate the referendum the very night the results came in, but the junta members decided otherwise and the outcome held.[26] As contemplated in the transitional clauses of the Constitution, this led to competitive elections in 1989, which allowed the center-left coalition candidate, Patricio Aylwin, to assume power in 1990.

The military exit, determined by defeat at the ballot box, was evidently the result of failure. The clearest expression of failure was the full resumption of party activity, which negated the anti-party goal of the coup's original intent. Opposition parties resumed activity in full force to organize the "No" campaign for the referendum, and rightist parties organized to prepare for elections. Although affected by the new electoral system defined by the departing regime, the new parties significantly resembled those that existed prior to the coup, and many of their leaders, those who had survived the regime's brutal repression, had been active in the pre-coup d'état democracy. Opposition party activity reemerged after a decade of intense repression as a consequence of the opportunities created by the 1982-1983 economic crisis, during which GNP precipitously declined by 12 percentage points. Massive protests and mobilization against the regime at that time overcame the repression-imposed fear and apathy of the population and gave sustenance to the rebirth of overt party-led opposition. The crucial component of the politics of military "anti-politics" had failed. From that time, the military had to contend once again with the politics of parties and politicians.[27]

Failure also was evident in the dark side of economic restructuring, namely, enormous social costs and inequality and a significant expansion in the proportion of the population living below the poverty line.[28] Perhaps the most enduring expression of failure was the legacy of massive human rights violations and state terrorism.[29] The military's exit thus combined elements of success and failure that simultaneously strengthened and confined its power. These features determined the contradictory nature of the Chilean transition to democracy and influenced the dynamics of civil-military relations in the successor government of Aylwin.

The comparatively high level of institutionalization attained through the Constitution allowed the military regime to set the terms of the transition (even if the outcome was not fully the one envisioned). The opposition had in fact wanted an earlier transition than the Constitution allowed and also an entirely different set of institutional rules than those bestowed by the Constitution.[30] While the opposition succeeded in contesting the referendum whose defeat mandated the exit of Pinochet from government, it could not do away with the institutional edifice created by the military. The successor government would have to coexist with Pinochet at the helm of the army for eight more years, with a National Security Council that included military members holding the same voting powers as the president, and with several other troublesome institutional legacies.

The institutional edifice arranged for the successor government left things tied up in much stronger terms than the dictator Generalissimo Francisco Franco's dictum had managed for his own legacy in Spain. Whereas in Spain it took only a law to set in motion the institutional and electoral machinery for

the demolition of Franquism's institutional legacy, in Chile the Pinochet regime did effectively tie things up tightly.[31] Nonelected senators, an electoral system that initially favored disproportionate power for Pinochet allies in Congress, and very high requirements for constitutional reforms made it impossible to reform the Constitution without the consent of the parties of the right.[32] These parties, in the decade after democratization, refused to vote for a reform of the Constitution.

In spite of its authoritarian origins and many features strongly disliked by the anti-Pinochet forces, the Constitution turned out for the most part to be no major obstacle for the effective functioning of democracy after 1990. The one exception concerned the powers of elected officials over the military and the prerogatives reserved for the latter, where significant restrictions on democracy prevailed. If democratization remains incomplete in Chile, it is due primarily to the permanence of these features in the Constitution.

Among the constitutional features favoring the military, two are of utmost importance. The first feature is the National Security Council (NSC), composed on the civilian side by the president, the president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Senate, and the Comptroller General, and on the military side by the commanders-in-chief of each of the four armed services.[33] The NSC has the power to "state its views to the President of the Republic, Congress or the Constitutional Court with regard to events, acts, or matters which [sic] severely undermine the institutional bases or compromise national security."[34] The NSC may be convened by the president or by two of its members, requires a quorum of five of its members, and passes resolutions by absolute majority. The NSC appoints four members of the Senate from among former commanders-in-chief of each of the armed services and appoints two of the seven members of the Constitutional Court. The other important constitutional feature favoring the military is the restriction of the president's choices in appointing commanders-in-chief to only the five most senior generals or admirals of each military branch, and the top posts are held for fixed four-year terms. The president may dismiss the commanders-in-chief only in extraordinary circumstances, and then only with the consent of the National Security Council.[35] In addition, the organic law of the armed forces (Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas) restricts presidential powers of appointment and dismissal of general officers in the armed forces and subjects these powers to the initiative of the respective commanders-in-chief. This law also sets a fixed floor for the military budget and supplements it with a fixed percentage of profits from copper exports.[36]

Under this legal framework, the top military chiefs may oppose appointments by various means, as they have done on several occasions, without fear of punitive action by elected officials. Furthermore, they may convoke the National Security Council and censure elected officials, and they may overturn the president's choices in the selection of senators and court members. The National Security Council has been convoked several times, and numerous episodes of military challenges to appointments have occurred with impunity.[37] All these military prerogatives have largely determined the dynamics of civil-military relations since 1990.

The resumption of democracy makes constitutionally established powers subject to reform, leaving the responsibility to civilian political forces in Congress. If those forces were to decide on constitutional reform and substantial reduction in military prerogatives, the military would have to abide by their decision. Thus, a substantial part of military politics must be understood in the context of cleavages existing within the political elites. Clearly, a substantial cleavage has divided political leaders and the electorate as well — an authoritarian/democratic cleavage that expresses itself in differing views on constitutional reform and up to now has prevented all change. This cleavage specifically relates to different views about what the role of the military ought to be.[38] To reform the military clauses of the Constitution would amount to completion of the democratization of the political system; to oppose those reforms amounts to support for the Pinochet-imposed Constitution and the tutelary role for the armed forces. This dilemma, along with the problematic human rights legacy, has kept civilian leaders and the military engaged and at odds.

Confrontation, Appeasement, and Catharsis in the New Democracy

In the decade since democratization, civil-military relations have gone through roughly three stages. The first stage, 1990-1994, coincides with the first successor administration of Aylwin and may be characterized as a stage of confrontation. The second stage, appeasement or accommodation, started in 1994 with the administration of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000).[39] The third stage, catharsis, start-

ed in October 1998 with Pinochet's arrest in London and continued with the inauguration of socialist Ricardo Lagos (2000-). Whether this stage may lead to a fourth stage, settlement, remains an open question.

Government has been, during the entire decade of the 1990s and beyond, in the hands of a center-left coalition — the Coalition of Parties for Democracy — made up of political forces that had converged earlier to oppose the military regime. Paramount in all three stages has been the question of accountability for past human rights crimes. This reality and factors related to the realm of the judiciary and electoral dynamics account for the main features of civil-military relations during the 1990s.

The stated goal of the first post-military administration, that of Aylwin, was to make possible the affirmation of democracy, and hence it was called a transitional administration. This feature was reinforced by a reform passed by the coalition, which established a four-year tenure for the first administration, half the regular duration of the presidential term established in the Constitution.[40] A primary goal of Aylwin's government was the reform of the most restrictive features of the Constitution. In addition, this government faced the former dictator as commander-in-chief of the army, a position that Pinochet fully resumed for eight years according to the legal framework he had imposed. Pinochet had stated clearly that he would stay on "so that my men are not touched." These elements clearly set the tone for the confrontational mode of civil-military relations during the early years of post-authoritarianism.

During the first period, the new institutions combining elected officials with authoritarian holdovers had to be tested. The gray areas left in laws and regulations created for another scenario had to be clarified in practice. An important occasion arose with Pinochet's first proposal of the list of generals for promotion, which had to be signed by President Aylwin. The president refused to authorize the promotion of a general who carried an especially negative background on human rights. Pinochet took the dispute to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the president was obligated to promulgate the requisite decree. The court ruled in favor of the president. This, then, clearly established limits to the enormous power of the commanders-in-chief of the armed services and restored a minimum bargaining resource for the president.

Against the army's wishes, the president also succeeded in creating a Commission on Truth and Reconciliation that would investigate the most egregious crimes committed under Pinochet's rule.[41] The Commission, formed by personalities and lawyers from all parts of the political spectrum, produced a lengthy and detailed report after months of investigation during which statements by thousands of individuals were taken privately. Despite having no military collaboration, the Commission nonetheless was able to report thousands of killings and disappearances. It did not delve, however, into other violations such as illegal detentions, torture, and exile. Although the report had no necessary judicial consequences, it was an attempt to acknowledge the atrocities publicly. In a public address to the nation in March 1991, President Aylwin used the report to apologize on behalf of the state for crimes committed during the Pinochet regime.[42]

Several other areas of confrontation opened in relation to the investigation of past abuses. The new democracy inherited an amnesty law passed by the junta in 1978, which cleared the military of responsibility for crimes up to that date. However, the law expressly left out anything related to the assassination of former Allende minister Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. by DINA agents. Investigations of this case and of other post-1978 crimes, as well as investigations of pre-1978 crimes, began to hit the military. Investigations of pre-1978 crimes proceeded under the interpretation put forth by both the government and many judges, who argued that a crime had to be established before amnesty could be applied. Investigations in Congress of corruption cases affecting the military, and particularly one that targeted Pinochet's son, added to the consternation of the military. Under attack by Congress and the judiciary, the military also felt overt hostility from the administration. However powerful it may have been, the military needed the government for budget requests, the administrative flow of its programs, and the continuation or activation of international connections for training and weapons maintenance and acquisition. The top military leadership felt the government was not very cooperative because the government processed military demands slowly as a way of exerting leverage in dealing with the military. In addition, in the face of all the problems confronting the army, Aylwin's tough Defense Minister, Patricio Rojas, was correctly perceived as maneuvering to pressure for the resignation of Pinochet.[43]

The army reacted to the perceived hostile environment by staging acts of protest in defiance of civilian authority, thus forcing concessions from the government. These hostile acts, which were supported

by the other armed services, consisted of unannounced military exercises with full billeting of the forces in a public display of defiance.[44] The government negotiated, bypassing the minister of defense, reassuring the military on budgetary and other concerns, and definitively shelving investigations on the dubious financial connections of Pinochet's son with the army.[45]

During this period, the opposition did not consent to any of the major constitutional reforms proposed by the executive. The government could not rid itself of Pinochet, and little progress could be shown on the assertion of civilian political supremacy. Nevertheless, the government did assert its powers, however feeble, on military promotions, and it kept alive the possibility of furthering investigations on human rights. Importantly, it made much progress in solving most of the remaining border disputes with Argentina, taking away from the military an important source of empowerment. The ruling coalition came out of the first post-military administration solidified by its excellent management of the market economy inherited from the previous regime, having taken the economy to higher levels of growth while attempting to confront the extreme legacy of inequality.

Benefiting from this solidity, Frei Ruiz-Tagle came to the presidency in 1994 empowered by a strong electoral mandate of 58 percent (with another 10 percent voting for candidates of the left) against a combined 30 percent obtained by the two right-wing candidates. However, Frei Ruiz-Tagle's administration tried to distinguish itself from the previous "transitional" administration by adopting a post-transition platform focused on new modernization tasks. Even if the tasks for ending the transition had in fact not been accomplished, the administration operated as if the transition were over, granting itself freedom to focus on modernization issues. Accordingly, in regard to the military, the government sought appeasement by not confronting Pinochet and by de-emphasizing the human rights issues and all other bothersome investigations. Constitutional reforms were pursued only symbolically since votes were lacking in Congress to overcome the high thresholds set for approval. As a result, during its first five years, the Frei Ruiz-Tagle administration did not face the kind of pseudo-revolts that had troubled the previous one.

Nonetheless, a difficult episode was presented by the initial refusal of General Contreras, the former DINA chief, to comply with the seven-year sentence imposed in 1995 by the Supreme Court for his intellectual authorship of the assassination of Orlando Letelier. After remaining in hiding for a week with the support of army and navy units, Contreras turned himself in, but then only to a special, comfortable prison built for him and under the surveillance of army guards. This episode was followed by a public demonstration of support outside the prison facility by army officers dressed in civilian clothes.[46] Despite these episodes, Frei Ruiz-Tagle's minister of defense, Edmundo Pérez Yoma, developed excellent relations with Pinochet, so much so that Pinochet rated him the best minister in the cabinet. Pinochet awarded Pérez Yoma an official army decoration in a special ceremony. The cost of the policy of appeasement, however, was the maintenance of the status quo on practically all fronts in the civil-military domain.

Contentment with the policy of appeasement began to fade when Pinochet decided to take up the lifetime Senate seat that the Constitution assured him at the end of his career in the army in March 1998. Pinochet appeared positioned to assume the leadership of the right in the new Congress elected in 1997. The elections yielded an invigorated right that included a significant number of former hard-line officials in the Pinochet regime, while higher levels of voter abstention expressed disappointment with the government.[47] Not long after the swearing-in ceremony, in which Pinochet was greeted by pictures of the disappeared carried by center-left senators, a group of deputies presented a constitutional accusation against the former dictator. However, in an extension of the appeasement period, the majority in the center-left coalition did not allow the accusation to succeed.

In many ways, Pinochet began to thrive in the Senate, and he was able to agree with the Senate's president on a motion to eliminate the 11th of September as a holiday commemorating the coup of 1973. However, Pinochet's blooming image as a respectable elderly former statesman, developed among many in the country and abroad, wilted precipitously with his arrest in London in October 1998. His arrest was the start of the phase of catharsis in civil-military relations. The atrocities committed under Pinochet's rule were reiterated internationally via denunciations in the British House of Lords and respectable foreign tribunals. These developments helped to reopen the channels for expression inside Chile of long-suppressed frustration with the military's impunity for alleged crimes. Language that had been suppressed by the "political psychology" of a transition that yoked the powerful former dictator and his sup-

porters to opposition elected officials fully resurfaced to label crimes crimes, torture torture, assassination assassination, and so on.[48]

The arrest of Pinochet in London had several repercussions in Chile. It manifestly revived the authoritarian-democratic split pervading the political elites and the electorate, which so clearly showed itself around the figure of Pinochet. It also inspired diverse views about the legal position to adopt on Pinochet's detention.[49] The Chilean government rejected the right of foreign courts to handle a domestic issue involving a former head of state and senator. The military and the right, who nonetheless wanted stronger and quicker action, supported the government's position. The left portion of the center-left coalition gave only lukewarm support to its government on this issue and emphasized the need to prosecute Pinochet effectively in Chile, should he return. At the same time, lawsuits against Pinochet piled up on top of the ones a judge already was investigating.[50]

Pinochet's arrest intensified a divisive scenario, but it also generated unprecedented recognition by many people across the political spectrum of the atrocities committed under military rule. For the first time, representatives of the right uttered unthinkable words such as "disappeared" in a respectful manner and gave thought to ways of addressing the pending human rights issues. In addition, the Chilean courts' view that all crimes should be investigated before applying amnesty gained momentum. Most importantly, the Supreme Court validated the view that crimes related to disappearances could not fall under the amnesty law and that they should be viewed as ongoing crimes, at least until the remains of victims were found. Even then, amnesty was not to be applicable immediately because it would not be possible to determine whether the deaths resulted from pre-1978 actions.

Debate over Pinochet's situation in London began to lag behind the greater immediacy of cases pending before the Chilean courts. At the same time, the dynamics of the presidential election scheduled for December 1999 began to take center stage, exercising great influence over the course of civil-military relations. The main impact came from the candidate of the right, Joaquín Lavín, the successful mayor of a Santiago municipality, who had acquired enormous personal popularity and thus could gain autonomy from the more hard-line leadership of his own party (UDI). Lavín, contrary to previous presidential candidates of the right, saw the possibility of capitalizing on his popularity to stage a confident electoral campaign for the presidency. His electoral strategy was aimed at centrist voters and was designed to reach out to supporters of the Christian Democratic Party in the center-left coalition, exploiting the eventual trepidation of some of these voters about supporting the coalition's socialist nominee. This strategy demanded that Lavín distance himself from the right's more hard-line pro-Pinochet positions, a feat that he ultimately accomplished, thanks to the actual physical remoteness of Pinochet. Lavín, for instance, met with the organization of relatives of the disappeared and eschewed during the campaign any mention of connections with the Pinochet regime. His buoyant, successful run for office landed him only a few decimal points short of a plurality, and he was defeated by only a few percentage points in the second round in January 2000.

The combined results of Pinochet's detention in London led to a radically changed situation for the army. Two solid bases of support that had sustained the military during the transition were no longer there: the judiciary and the right. The judiciary, which had consented obsequiously to all violations of law during the dictatorship, began gradually in the 1990s to take a decidedly more assertive role in the prosecution of those crimes. The courts grew more sensitive to the democratically expressed public mood on the subject. At the same time, the new presidents began to alter the composition of the courts, promoting more democratically minded judges. At the same time, influential sectors on the right, influenced by electoral considerations, moved away from the overt, staunch, and homogenous defense of Pinochet, which had previously characterized the right. Moreover, the center-left felt invigorated to push more assertively for solution of human rights cases, and so did individuals who began to use the courts for the same purpose.

Facing more investigations affecting active-duty officers, and without its previous sources of support, the army felt isolated. The new commander-in-chief, General Ricardo Izurieta, sought to lead the army out of its situation of isolation and rid it as quickly as possible of the pernicious human rights legacy of the military regime in order to focus on modernization plans. Izurieta, appointed by president Frei Ruiz-Tagle in March 1998, belonged to a generation entirely different from that of the coup clique. He had no history of involvement in any atrocities, and he came from a family of distinguished army officers. However, Izurieta's attempt to concentrate on a program of modernization for the army was

derailed by the Pinochet affair. He was therefore eager to maneuver the army out of its cornered position by pursuing a more cooperative attitude regarding human rights cases.

An important sign of this new attitude was General Izurieta's willingness to provide the courts with the names of all army officers working in the former National Intelligence Bureau (Central Nacional de Inteligencia — CNI). But perhaps the most important shift in the military's position came from its acceptance of Defense Minister Pérez Yoma's proposal to join a Mesa de Diálogo (Dialogue Roundtable) with human rights lawyers and other personalities, with the goal of producing information on the fate of the disappeared. This acceptance entailed the unprecedented recognition of the validity of the claims of the human rights lobby, which heretofore had been derided consistently by the top military chiefs. The Mesa de Diálogo was able to survive despite the domestic fallout from the Pinochet case, and it succeeded in laboriously producing a joint statement on the circumstances leading to the human rights violations. Ultimately, the military committed itself to seek information about the fate of the disappeared, guaranteeing secrecy to informants. Much of the earlier optimism about this enterprise faded as a result of the deterrent effect that progress by courts in prosecuting human rights cases presumably was having on potential informants. Another signal of army cooperation came when the army ordered General Ramírez Hald to resign his commission upon his indictment for responsibility in the 1982 assassination of a major union leader. In January 2001, the military chiefs officially delivered their report on the disappeared. The report was both remarkable and disappointing. It was remarkable because it signified an enormous change in the position of the armed forces, in stark contrast to their overt rejection of the Rettig report issued in 1991.[51] At the same time, it was disappointing because information was provided only on some 200 of the nearly 1,000 pending cases and because the report confirmed that most remains actually would never be found.

Cooperation was tested on many occasions related to the evolution of the Pinochet case. So far, the military had accepted President Lagos' firm stance on letting the judiciary work without interference. It accepted, albeit reluctantly, the Supreme Court's decision to divest Pinochet of immunity from prosecution. However, the indictment and order to arrest Pinochet on charges of kidnapping and homicide, issued by a Chilean investigating judge on December 1, 2000, caused great dissatisfaction. The four military commanders-in-chief urged the president to call a meeting of the National Security Council, with the clear implication that they would call the meeting if the president did not. The president did call the meeting, albeit while voicing disagreement with the existence of the NSC and insisting that discussion of judicial decisions should not be part of the NSC's agenda. The meeting took place without much consequence and only after the Supreme Court decided against repealing the order to arrest Pinochet.

The cathartic impact of Pinochet's arrest in London affected all major players in the Chilean political process. The army, in particular, was impelled to shift its position significantly and start seeking accommodation and cooperation. Despite ups and downs in relations between the military and the executive resulting from the evolution of the Pinochet case and other legal cases, the military seemed eager to rid itself of its baggage of human rights violations and concentrate on professional modernization plans.[52] It is possible that the cooperation attained in the context of the catharsis phase may lead to a final settlement.[53] Positive signs already have surfaced. A new army chief, General Emilio Cheyre, who is the second chief since Pinochet's departure, has been appointed recently, and he represents a new generation of officers untarnished by the coup and its atrocities. On the civilian side, a female minister of defense took over in January 2002, the first woman ever to hold the top defense post in a Latin American nation. Minister Michelle Bachelet is the daughter of an air force general who died after harsh treatment in Pinochet's jails shortly after the coup of 1973. However, a lasting resolution of the situation will require additional steps, including a widely accepted solution for most of the pending and most pressing human rights cases and the cooperation of the right in the reform of those aspects of the Constitution that deal with military and presidential powers.

The Military and the Future of Chilean Democracy

This paper started by proposing historical comparison as the proper ground for predictions of the future. Past junctures that ended in military coups — in 1924 and 1973 — featured the development of a stark separation between military and political elites. My argument has been that these elites took very different routes in terms of their goals, their aspirations, and their views of the major problems facing

Chilean society. Their divergent paths led to serious tension, which, aided by specific political conditions, led ultimately to regime breakdown by military force.

I conclude that the latest juncture, initiated with the new democracy of the 1990s, is different. It started with severe tension between democratizing elites and the military, but this tension prevented disengagement and separation. While political leaders and the military overtly stood apart on substantial issues, they were unable to ignore each other. They did not have that choice and therefore remained instead deeply engaged, if for no other reason than to try to bargain successfully for their competing interests. In contrast to previous junctures, this time the military was not neglected by political elites. The ominous separation that developed in the early decades of the twentieth century and after the return to democracy in the 1930s was not present in the 1990s and at the start of the new century. This important difference may reasonably inspire hope for the future, albeit only a conditional hope, as I will explain below. First, however, I must account for the difference between the present situation and the earlier junctures.

The military came out of the most recent round of authoritarian rule with much more power than it had in the earlier junctures. Having imposed the conditions for the transition, the military was able to retain vast prerogatives for itself. This resulted partly from the relative success of its authoritarian tenure, which left the military with significant popular support and the backing of the same elites that had accompanied it to power. This guaranteed a clear-cut contrast with the earlier junctures. Because of the nature of the military regime and the transition, the military occupied important positions in the new institutions of the 1990s. These positions inevitably placed it at the center of disputes about the very nature of post-authoritarian institutions. The military was forced to participate in these disputes because many of them centered around Pinochet, who until 1997 was the top military chief, and because the Constitution mandated military participation, for example, through voting in the NSC for senators to represent the military. In addition, its horrendous human rights legacy was bound to haunt the military and keep alive another source of public involvement. There was no chance, as in earlier junctures, of oblivion for the military or for the wrongs committed. This time, the military could not be ignored.

The contrasts with the other junctures yielded a partially, and temporarily, positive result, if only because early divergent paths from which civilian and military elites could have disregarded each other did not open up. Behind this view lies a critical assessment of Huntington's well-entrenched model of objective control. The modes of civil-military relations that prevailed during the military modernization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and during the democratic period stretching between 1932 and 1973 may be said to conform to Huntington's model of objective civilian control. The military had a separate sphere and little contact with civilian elites except what was established through formal constitutional mechanisms. Just as in the model, military autonomy was allowed to develop, which turned into a civil-military chasm. In this chasm, as in the model, there was too much of objectivity, but very little in the way of actual control.[54] This became evident only when the entire model collapsed through a military coup.

During the 1990s, on the other hand, intense civil-military interaction took place because of the institutional setting and the human rights legacy. This interaction often developed in a context of no real civilian control, given the constitutional constraints on the power of political authorities. While the interaction prevented mutual disregard, it was not compatible with the aspiration of political officials for complete democratization of the political system. For the promise of a difference between this and earlier junctures to be fulfilled, decisive steps must be taken to transform competitive and confrontational engagement into substantive engagement within the context of fully democratic institutions. Substantive cooperation has taken place around professional issues, such as modernization plans and purchases, and around human rights and other issues, especially in the last third of the 1990s. Democratic development has remained hampered, however, by the absence of a proper constitutional and legal framework that would place that cooperation under unmistakable civilian political leadership.

Constitutional reform has been a constant demand of democratizing leaders, in part as a result of the kind of interaction maintained throughout the decade of the 1990s. Signs indicate that reforms blocked thus far by the opposition rightist parties actually may begin to find support across the political spectrum, including reforms specific to the military sector. The right's recent electoral successes were based on moderation on the issue of reform, and it is reasonable to assume that the right would benefit from ending the military's tutelary role if it won the 2006 presidential election. In addition, in contrast with previous historical junctures, no political quarter poses any threat to the dominant social and economic

order which would, in the right's view, necessitate a tutelary military. It is possible that constitutional reforms may remain blocked as a result of enduring tactical differences at the negotiating table.[55] Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that chances of reform may be invigorated in 2002, in the calmer post-electoral climate following the December 2001 congressional elections.

Two reforms are the most important in structuring civil-military interaction. One reform affects the composition and functions of the National Security Council, if not its total elimination. Another council already exists which could perfectly well exercise the top advisory functions on national defense issues. However, the current debate seems inclined not to expunge the NSC legacy of the Pinochet constitution, but instead to reform the council's composition and functions. Regarding functions, the NSC should only provide advice on request and certainly should not select senators or members of the Constitutional Court. Regarding composition, the current debate seeks to expand civilian membership in order to break the existing civilian-military tie. However, this debate also should contemplate more substantial changes in membership, along with modernization goals. Technical or political advice on national defense does not require the participation of the head of the Supreme Court or the comptroller general, who were placed on the NSC in accordance with the original goal of political control. Instead, for instance, the minister of defense and other civilian officials should become full members, and the minister of defense should preside over the council, instead of the nation's president, who should be the recipient of the council's advice.

The other reform involves the organic law of the armed forces, which currently prevents the president from removing top military officers. The president's ability to remove officers is the quintessential mechanism of civilian control. Without that power, there is no civilian control; therefore, reforms ought to reinstate the presidential power of removal. In the current debate, proposals circulate that would have the president share this power with the Senate. This would be inconvenient for two reasons. One is that in military matters, the principle of singular, unipersonal command should prevail at all levels, especially at the top. The other reason is that such shared power would run counter to the goal of depoliticization of the armed forces and of the civil-military interaction. If a top commander saw his relations with the president worsen, he could initiate preemptive contacts in the senate. Alternatively, senators could use their shared power of removal as a bargaining chip with the president. All this would be detrimental to the goal of keeping the military professional, neutral, and depoliticized.

If and when these reforms are passed, their enactment must not be followed by a period of civilian lethargy and contentment. This would only result in an undesirable lapse into the kind of mutual disregard and separation that characterized previous junctures. A broader and more in-depth debate about the proper ways to integrate the military into the democratic state and to assert civilian political supremacy will be desirable. Active engagement of the military in the democratic state, from the angle of its own professional mission and under continuous and effective civilian leadership through well-established institutions and mechanisms, is of the essence. An alternative to Huntington's models of civilian control must inspire these processes. Active interaction within a framework of assertive mechanisms of civilian control should substitute for the old models.[56]

The process of fully integrating the military into the democratic state must include action to counter any trends toward cultural-ideological separation between the military and the political-cultural sectors that opposed the military regime. Recent episodes have encouraged this separation, which is detrimental to the democratic view that the armed forces of the state belong to society as a whole.[57] This process of integration is long-term and must take place in the context of larger societal dynamics. Changes in this dimension of civil-military relations can go only as far as changes in society as a whole. The modernization of all political sectors, in terms of full adherence to democratic principles and acceptance of internationally recognized standards in the promotion and protection of human rights, is a condition that is needed for progress in this aspect of civil-military relations. [58]

Positive future trends also will require progress in the solution of pending human rights problems. An optimistic view assumes that most players in the Chilean polity have an interest in solving these problems. The government and its supporting coalition are interested because of their views on society and democracy and because of their constituency. The judiciary is interested because solutions will allow it to atone for its obsequious behavior under the dictatorship. The military is interested as well because solving the human rights question will give it with the opportunity to restore links with all of society and concentrate on professional modernization. Parties of the right have developed an interest because of their need to capture the center vote. However, obstructive hurdles are found in each of these

quarters as well. Members of the dictatorship's security agencies appear to have formed a protective circle from which no cooperation is to be expected. Some members of the judiciary and the government coalition would rather see an end to all human rights cases. The political right's concern may be deemed too opportunistic. As these hurdles demonstrate, the course of civil-military relations greatly depends upon contextual, political, and societal conditions and upon their interactions with each other.

Finally, international factors have played important roles in all three historical cases reviewed here. Both the modernization drive at the previous turn of the century and the ups and downs of the nitrate economy were international in character and decisively helped to shape the dynamics of the first period. The international Cold War dynamics of the second period examined here were equally decisive. In the latest transition, the end of those Cold War dynamics and their replacement by the democratization ethos and the globalization of human rights institutions will continue to exert a direct impact on Chilean democratization.

A positive condition for progress in the democratic integration of the military in Chile is the favorable development of dynamically changing political and economic regional and international scenarios. These changing scenarios demand great cohesiveness in state policies and outlooks. Economic expansion and regional integration, under the prevailing market economy, demand cooperation among all sectors, including the state, societal organizations, and business.[59] If Chile's military, under civilian political supervision, is made a part of this integrated outlook, then separation between civilians and the military will not develop. By cooperation and integration, I do not mean military involvement in developmental tasks. I mean, rather, that the political and economic scenarios in today's globalized world demand coherent responses that include military interests, instead of the kind of state policies that prevailed in the previous periods of Chilean history analyzed in this chapter, during which the military was allowed to drift autonomously.

NOTES

1. The threshold for intervention would rise with greater levels of military institutionalization (organizational resources, strength, and coherence). See Abraham Lowenthal, 1986, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier).

2. For a presentation of different analytical perspectives, see David Pion-Berlin, ed. 2001. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press).

3. See, for instance, Felipe Agüero, 1998b, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42: 2 (November).

4. Samuel P. Huntington, 1957, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Vintage Books); J. Samuel Fitch, 1986, "Armies and Politics in Latin America, 1975-1985," in Armies and Politics in Latin America, eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier).

5. For a pioneering study on the military's place in state formation in Latin America, see Fernando López-Alves, 2001, *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press). This work, however, does not include the case of Chile. For other work in this field, see also Miguel Centeno, 1998, "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-century Latin America," *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (6).

6. See Leopoldo Castedo and Francisco Encina, 1985, *Historia de Chile,* 15th edition (Santiago: Editorial Zig-Zag); Francisco Antonio Encina, 1984, *Historia de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Ercilla); Hernán Ramírez Necochea, 1985, *Fuerzas Armadas y Política en Chile, 1810-1970* (Havana: Casa de las Américas); Brian Loveman, 1988, *Chile: the Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press); Simon Collier, 1993, "From Independence to the War of the Pacific," in *Chile since Independence,* ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and Sergio Villalobos, Osvaldo Silva, Fernando Silva, and Patricio Estelle, 1974, *Historia de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria).

7. Alain Joxe, 1970, *Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria), 48-51.

8. See Brian Loveman, 1999, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc.), 80-81; Frederick Nunn, 1976, *The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810-1973* (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press); Frederick Nunn, 1970, "Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920," *Hispanic American Historical Review* (May). The navy also acquired great strength with the purchase of powerful battleships and with the organizational development of the service, which followed British rather than German inspiration. The navy reached its strongest point right around 1900. See Carlos López Urrutia, 1969, *Historia de la Marina de Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello).

9. On the powerful impact of the mining sector on the growth of the export-based economy, see Carlos Hurtado, 1966, *Concentración de Población y Desarrollo Económico* (Santiago: Instituto de Economía de la Universidad de Chile), and Oscar Muñoz, 1977, "Estado e Industrialización en el ciclo de Expansión del Salitre," CIEPLAN 6 (January).

10. See Augusto Varas, Felipe Agüero, and Fernando Bustamante, 1980, *Chile, Democracia, Fuerzas Armadas* (Santiago: Flacso). In Joxe's words: "With its spiked helmets, its monocles, and its moustaches, but without heavy industry and without foreign markets to conquer, the military could no more than mimic Prussia." See Joxe 1970, 50-51. Translated by Felipe Agüero.

11. Guillermo Geisse, 1983, *Economía y Política de la Concentración Urbana en Chile* (Mexico: Pispal-El Colegio de México).

12. Geisse 1983, 42-46; Loveman 1988, 191-193; Loveman 1999, 80-85; Joxe 1970.

13. See H.E. Bicheno, 1972, "Antiparliamentary Themes in Chilean History," *Government and Opposition* 7 (3); and Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davis, Jr. eds., 1997, *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc.).

14. Claudio Orrego Vicuña, 1979, *Siete Ensayos sobre Arturo Alessandri Palma* (Santiago: Instituto Chileno

de Estudios Humanísticos).

15. José Nun, 1986, "The Middle-Class Military Coup Revisited," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier).

16. *The milicias republicanas* (Republican Militias). See Gonzalo García P. and Juan Esteban Montes I., 1994, *Subordinación Democrática de los Militares: Exitos y Fracasos en Chile* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo). These Republican Militias, supported by the right and center parties, maintained a full-fledged organization and a mass of volunteers that totaled about 80,000 people, far more than the army. These groups finally were dissolved in 1937.

17. For instance, the new Labor Military Corps offered to provide training and help enhance skills for the labor force in industry and agriculture. See Varas et al. 1980. In the 1930s and especially in the 1940s, the Chilean state turned decisively towards the promotion of industrialization, with the active support of expanding public agencies. This development model — known as inward-oriented industrialization — was adopted during that time by many South American countries and by Mexico.

18. Latin American countries had far less institutional experience and capability in subjecting the military to civilian control; hence, the application of imported notions of national security to domestic contexts in turmoil naturally would have very different and detrimental consequences. Latin American versions of national security also were influenced by French doctrines. See Joseph Comblin, 1979, *La Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional* (Santiago: Vicaría de la Solidaridad).

19. Augusto Varas and Felipe Agüero, 1984, *El Proyecto Político Militar* (Santiago: Flacso). See also Genaro Arriagada, 1986, *El Pensamiento Político de los Militares* (Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua); and Jorge Chateau, 1977, "Antecedentes Teóricos para el estudio de la Geopolítica y Doctrinas Castrenses: Notas para una Investigación," working paper (Santiago: FLACSO).

20. Varas et al. 1980, 108-111. The second administration of Ibáñez represented a reaction against party dominance, and the enhancement of military roles made sense in it.

21. Varas et al. 1980, 171-77; García and Montes 1994, 331-342.

22. Arturo Valenzuela, 1994, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government," in *The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. 2, The Case of Latin America,* eds. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Arturo Valenzuela, 1978, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

23. Felipe Agüero, 1988, "La Autonomía de las Fuerzas Armadas," in *Chile en el Umbral de los Noventa,* ed. Jaime Gazmuri (Santiago: Editorial Planeta).

24. These situations were very well documented by, among others, General Carlos Prats, the head of the army's general staff, who had succeeded Schneider as army chief of staff following Schneider's assassination, and Nathaniel Davis, at the time the U.S. ambassador in Chile. See Carlos Prats, 1985, *Memorias: Testimonio de un Soldado* (Santiago: Pehuén Editores); and Nathaniel Davis, 1985, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende.* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press).

25. Manuel Antonio Garretón, 1987, *Reconstruir la Política: Transición y Consolidación Democrática en Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Andante).

26. Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, 1991, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet* (New York: Norton), 309.

27. Timothy R. Scully, 1995, "Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile," in *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America,* eds. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press); and Felipe Agüero, Eugenio Tironi, Eduardo Valenzuela, and Guillermo Sunkel, 1998, "Votantes, Partidos e Información Política: La Frágil Intermediación Política en el Chile Posautoritario," *Revista de Ciencia Política* (Santiago) 19 (2).

28. Eugenio Tironi, 1988, *Los Silencios de la Revolución* (Santiago: Puerta Abierta).

29. Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, 1999, *The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

30. In "Legacies of Transitions" (Agüero 1998b), I have comparatively analyzed the level of institutionalization of Pinochet's regime and the consequences this had for the transition. It was fortunate for the regime that the Constitution already had been passed when the political-economic crisis of 1982-1983 opened the way for mobilization of the opposition. The level of institutionalization that the Constitution gave the regime empowered it with enough bargaining strength to resist political pressures for rapid democratization. See also Manuel Antonio Garretón, 1986, "Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile 1973-1980," in *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions*, eds. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

31. In Spain, it was the Law for Political Reform submitted by Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez and for approval by legislators and then by referendum during the government of the monarchy. See Felipe Agüero, 1995, *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

32. In the interim between Pinochet's defeat and the contested elections a year later, government and opposition did agree, however, to reform the consitution partially in order to make the transition viable. Important, although very limited, reforms were made, which softened somewhat the more extreme authoritarian controls originally envisioned and allowed for total pluralism by eliminating the prohibition on the Communist Party. This constitutional reform, as mandated by law, was approved by referendum with the support of government and opposition.

33. Originally, the military had a majority. A constitutional reform later balanced the number of civilian and military members. A few government ministers may attend the meetings, but without having any voting power.

34. Francisco Geisse and José Antonio Ramírez Arrayas, 1989, *La Reforma Constitucional* (Santiago: CESOC-Ediciones Chile-América), 139. Translated by Felipe Agüero.

35. *Constitución Política de la República de Chile,*1998 ed. (Santiago: Ediciones Publiley).

36. It should be noted that the Constitution retains the traditional clause shared by most constitutions in Latin America that assign the military the role of guarantor of the constitution and the political order. See Brian Loveman, 1995, *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America* (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press).

37. Never has the National Security Council met as a result of the military's calling the meeting. However, many times the president has had to call a meeting in order to preempt the military from calling it first and forcing the president to attend. A recent meeting had to be called by President Ricardo Lagos only to preempt a military move in that direction. The military wanted to discuss the indictment of General Pinochet by a local judge in December 2000.

38. On the authoritarian/democratic cleavage, see Eugenio Tironi and Felipe Agüero, 1999, "Chili: Quel Avenir pour le Nouveau Paysage Politique?" *Problemes d'Amérique Latine* (Paris) 35 (October-December), and specifically on the differences within the civilian elites on military issues, see Felipe Agüero, 1998c, "Brechas en la Democratización: Las Visiones de la Elite Política sobre las Fuerzas Armadas" (Santiago: Flacso-Chile; Nueva Serie Flacso).

39. For a similar approach to this period, see Fuentes 2000, "After Pinochet."

40. A constitutional reform passed toward the end of Aylwin's administration adopted a six-year presidential term.

41. Hugh O'Shaughnessy, 2000, *Pinochet: The Politics of Torture* (New York: New York University Press); and Alexandra Barahona de Brito, 1997, *Human Rights and Democratisation in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

42. See *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation* (translated by Phillip E. Berryman; introduction by José Zalaquett), 1993 (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press).

43. Fuentes 2000.

44. See Felipe Agüero, 1993, "Chile: South America's Success Story?" *Current History* 92: 572 (March).

45. Agüero 1993.

46. Fuentes 2000.

47. Felipe Agüero, 1998a, "Chile's Lingering Authoritarian Legacy," *Current History* 97: 616 (February).

48. Patricio Silva, 1999, "Collective Memories, Fears, and Consensus: The Political Psychology of the Chilean Democratic Transition," in *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence, and Terror in Latin America,* eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (London: Zed Books).

49. Manuel Antonio Garretón, 1999, "Chile 1997-1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democratization," *International Affairs* 75 (2).

50. As of this writing, 197 lawsuits had been filed against Pinochet.

51. *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation* 1993.

52. On military modernization plans during this period, see Francisco Rojas and Claudio Fuentes, 1998, "Civil-Military Relations in Chile's Geopolitical Transition," in *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe,* ed. David Mares (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press); Claudio Fuentes, 1997, "Militares en Chile: Ni Completa Autonomía ni Total Subordinación," *Chile 96: Análisis y Opiniones* (Santiago: Nueva Serie Flacso); and Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, 1994, *Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990-1994: Modernización y Desarrollo* (Santiago: Flacso).

53. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, 1992, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes," in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,* eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1992).

54. For a critique of the model, see Peter Feaver, 1996, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23: 2 (Winter); and Felipe Agüero, 1997, "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies,* eds. Larry Diamond, Marc. F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press). Earlier critiques are found in Guillermo O'Donnell, 1979, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California); Alfred Stepan, 1986, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (New York: Holmes & Meier); and Fitch 1986.

55. Allamand, Andrés, 2000, "Chile: La Transición Empantanada," in *Chile-México: Dos Transiciones Frente a Frente,* eds. Carlos Elizondo and Luis Maira (México: Grijalbo), and Felipe Agüero, forthcoming 2002, "Chile: Unfinished Transition and Increased Political Competition," in *Constructing Democratic Governance*, eds. Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

56. Agüero 1995; Feaver 1996; and J. Samuel Fitch, 1998, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).

57. Admiral Arancibia, head of the Navy, on June 13, 2001, announced at the same time his resignation, which would take effect several weeks later, and his candidacy for a Senate seat on the UDI's slate. This highlights the awkward situation in which the president is impeded from forcing the resignation of armed forces top chiefs, a measure said to prevent politicization, while these chiefs may in fact resign precisely in order to pursue politics. In addition, the Senate already includes several former military chiefs elected as candidates for the opposition parties of the right and other ex-military chiefs appointed as senators who vote consistently with the opposition. See *Que Pasa,* June 17, 2001. Cultural-ideological separation is a trend that also has been noted in other countries, including the United States. See, for instance, Ole R. Holsti, 1998-1999, "A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996," *International Security* 23: 3 (Winter).

58. Already, for instance, the military has introduced courses on human rights at its academies.

59. Rojas and Fuentes 1998.

REFERENCES

Agüero, Felipe. 1988. "La Autonomía de las Fuerzas Armadas." In *Chile en el Umbral de los Noventa,* ed. Jaime Gazmuri. Santiago: Editorial Planeta.

Agüero, Felipe. 1993. "Chile: South America's Success Story?" *Current History* 92: 572 (March).

Agüero, Felipe. 1995. *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Agüero, Felipe. 1997. "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America." In *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies,* eds. Larry Diamond, Marc. F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Agüero, Felipe. 1998a. "Chile's Lingering Authoritarian Legacy." *Current History* 97: 616 (February).

Agüero, Felipe. 1998b. "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America." *Mershon International Studies Review* 42 (2-November).

Agüero, Felipe. 1998c. "Brechas en la Democratización: Las Visiones de la Elite Política sobre las Fuerzas Armadas." *Nueva Serie Flacso*. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile.

Agüero, Felipe. Forthcoming 2002. "A Political Army in Chile: Historical Assessment and Prospects for the New Democracy." In *Political Armies: Military, Politics, and Nation-building in Comparative Perspective,* eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. London: Zed Books.

Agüero, Felipe. Forthcoming 2002. "Chile: Unfinished Transition and Increased Political Competition." In *Constructing Democratic Governance,* eds. Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Agüero, Felipe, Eugenio Tironi, Eduardo Valenzuela, and Guillermo Sunkel. 1998. "Votantes, Partidos e Información Política: La Frágil Intermediación Política en el Chile Posautoritario." *Revista de Ciencia Política* (Santiago) 19 (2).

Allamand, Andrés. 2000. "Chile: La Transición Empantanada." In *Chile-México: Dos Transiciones Frente a Frente,* eds. Carlos Elizondo and Luis Maira. México: Grijalbo.

Anderson, Jon Lee. 1998. "The Dictator." *The New Yorker,* October 19.

Arriagada, Genaro. 1985. "The Legal and Institutional Framework of the Armed Forces in Chile." In *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions,* eds. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Arriagada, Genaro. 1985. *La Política Militar de Pinochet.* Santiago: Salesiansos.

Arriagada, Genaro. 1986. *El Pensamiento Político de los Militares.* Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua.

Barahona de Brito, Alexandra. 1997. *Human Rights and Democratisation in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barros, Robert. 2001. "Personalization and Institutional Constraints: Pinochet, the Military Junta, and the 1980 Constitution." *Latin American Politics and Society* 43 (1-Spring).

Bicheno, H.E. 1972. "Antiparliamentary Themes in Chilean History." *Government and Opposition* 7 (3).

Burton, Michael, Richard Gunther, and John Higley. 1992. "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes." In *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe,* eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1992.

Castedo, Leopoldo, and Francisco Encina. 1985. *Historia de Chile.* 15th ed. Santiago: Editorial Zig-Zag.

Centeno, Miguel Ángel. 1998. "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America." *American Journal of Sociology* 102 (6).

Chateau, Jorge. 1977. "Antecedentes Teóricos para el estudio de la Geopolítica y Doctrinas Castrenses: Notas para una Investigación." Working Paper. Santiago: FLACSO.

Collier, Simon. 1993. “From Independence to the War of the Pacific.” In *Chile since Independence,* ed. Leslie Bethell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Comblin, Joseph. 1979. *La Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional.* Santiago: Vicaría de la Solidaridad.

Constable, Pamela, and Arturo Valenzuela. 1991. *A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet.* New York: Norton.

Constitución Política de la República de Chile. 1998. Santiago: Ediciones Publiley.

Davis, Nathaniel. 1985. *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Encina, Francisco Antonio. 1984. Historia de Chile. Santiago: Editorial Ercilla.

Feaver, Peter. 1996. “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control.” *Armed Forces and Society* 23: 2 (Winter).

Fitch, J. Samuel. 1998. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Fitch, J. Samuel. 1986. “Armies and Politics in Latin America, 1975-1985.” In *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Fuentes, Claudio. 1997. “Militares en Chile: Ni Completa Autonomía ni Total Subordinación.” *Chile 96: Análisis y Opiniones.* Santiago: Nueva Serie Flacso.

Fuentes, Claudio. 2000. “After Pinochet: Civilian Policies toward the Military in the 1990s Chilean Democracy.” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42 (3-Fall).

García P., Gonzalo, and Juan Esteban Montes I. 1994. *Subordinación Democrática de los Militares: Exitos y Fracasos en Chile.* Santiago: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo.

Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1982. “Modelo y Proyecto Político del Régimen Militar Chileno.” *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 44 (2).

Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1986. “Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime: The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile 1973-1980.” In *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions,* eds. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1987. *Reconstruir la Política: Transición y Consolidación Democrática en Chile.* Santiago: Editorial Andante.

Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1999. “Chile 1997-1998: The Revenge of Incomplete Democratization.” *International Affairs* 75 (2).

Geisse, Francisco, and José Antonio Ramírez Arrayas. 1989. *La Reforma Constitucional.* Santiago: CESOC-Ediciones Chile-América.

Geisse, Guillermo. 1983. *Economía y Política de la Concentración Urbana en Chile.* Mexico: Pispal-El Colegio de México.

Holsti, Ole R. 1998-1999. “A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996.” *International Security* 23: 3 (Winter).

Huneeus, Carlos. 1998. “Tecnócratas y Políticos en un Régimen Autoritario: Los ‘ODEPLAN Boys’ y los ‘Gremialistas’ en el Chile de Pinochet.” *Revista de Ciencia Política* (Santiago de Chile) 19 (2).

Huneeus, Carlos, and Jorge Olave. 1987. “La partecipazione dei militari nei nuovi auoritarismi: Il Cile in una prospettiva comparata.” *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica* 17: 1 (April).

Huntington, Samuel P. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* New York: Vintage Books.

Hurtado, Carlos. 1966. *Concentración de Población y Desarrollo Económico.* Santiago: Instituto de Economía de la Universidad de Chile.

Joxe, Alain. 1970. *Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político de Chile.* Santiago: Editorial Universitaria.

Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt, eds. Forthcoming 2002. *Political Armies: Military, Politics, and Nation-building in Comparative Perspective.* London: Zed Books.

López-Alves, Fernando. 2001. *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

López Urrutia, Carlos. 1969. *Historia de la Marina de Chile.* Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello.

Loveman, Brian. 1988. *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Loveman, Brian. 1995. *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America.* Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Loveman, Brian. 1999. *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America.* Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc.

Loveman, Brian, and Thomas M. Davis, Jr., eds. 1997. *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America.* Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc.

Martínez, Javier, and Alvaro Díaz. 1996. *Chile: The Great Transformation.* Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and The Brookings Institution.

Muñoz, Oscar. 1977. "Estado e Industrialización en el ciclo de Expansión del Salitre." *CIEPLAN* 6 (January).

Nun, José. 1986. "The Middle-Class Military Coup Revisited." In *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Nunn, Frederick. 1970. "Emil Körner and the Prussianization of the Chilean Army: Origins, Process, and Consequences, 1885-1920." *Hispanic American Historical Review* (May).

Nunn, Frederick. 1976. *The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810-1973.* Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1979. *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism.* Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1986. "Modernization and Military Coups: Theory, Comparison, and the Argentine Case." In *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Orrego Vicuña, Claudio. 1979. *Siete Ensayos sobre Arturo Alessandri Palma.* Santiago: Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos.

O'Shaughnessy, Hugh. 2000. *Pinochet: The Politics of Torture.* New York: New York University Press.

Philip, George. 1985. *The Military in South American Politics.* London: Croom Helm.

Pion-Berlin, David, ed. 2001. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives.* Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.

Prats, Carlos. 1985. *Memorias: Testimonio de un Soldado.* Santiago: Pehuén Editores.

Ramírez Necochea, Hernán. 1985. *Fuerzas Armadas y Política en Chile, 1810-1970.* Havana: Casa de las Américas.

Remmer, Karen. 1989. *Military Rule in Latin America.* Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. (translated by Phillip E. Berryman; introduction by José Zalaquett). 1993. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Rojas, Francisco, and Claudio Fuentes. 1998. "Civil-Military Relations in Chile's Geopolitical Transition." In *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe,* ed. David Mares. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Roniger, Luis, and Mario Sznajder. 1999. *The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rouquié, Alain. 1987. *The Military and the State in Latin America.* Translation. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.

Scully, Timothy R. 1995. "Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile." In *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America,* eds. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Silva, Patricio. 1999. "Collective Memories, Fears, and Consensus: The Political Psychology of the Chilean Democratic Transition." In *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence, and Terror in Latin America,* eds. Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt. London: Zed Books.

Stepan, Alfred. 1986. "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion." In *Armies and Politics in Latin America,* eds. Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Stepan, Alfred. 1989. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Tironi, Eugenio. 1988. *Los Silencios de la Revolución.* Santiago: Puerta Abierta.

Tironi, Eugenio, and Felipe Agüero. 1999. "Chili: Quel Avenir pour le Nouveau Paysage Politique?" *Problemes d'Amérique Latine* (Paris) 35 (October-December).

Valdés, Juan Gabriel. 1995. *Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Valenzuela, Arturo. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile.* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Valenzuela, Arturo. 1991. "The Military in Power: The Consolidation of One-man Rule." In *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990,* eds. Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press.

Valenzuela, Arturo. 1994. "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government." In *The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Vol. 2, The Case of Latin America,* eds. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

Valenzuela, Arturo. 1999. "Chile: Origins and Consolidation of a Latin American Democracy." In *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America,* 2nd ed., eds. Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Varas, Augusto. 1987. *Los Militares en el Poder: Régimen y Gobierno Militar en Chile, 1973-1986.* Santiago: Pehuén-Flacso.

Varas, Augusto. 1991. "The Crisis of Legitimacy of Military Rule in the 1980s." In *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990*, eds. Paul W. Drake and Iván Jaksic. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press.

Varas, Augusto, Felipe Agüero, and Fernando Bustamante. 1980. *Chile, Democracia, Fuerzas Armadas.* Santiago: Flacso.

Varas, Augusto, and Felipe Agüero. 1984. *El Proyecto Político Militar.* Santiago: Flacso.

Varas, Augusto, and Claudio Fuentes. 1994. *Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990-1994: Modernización y Desarrollo.* Santiago: FLACSO.

Villalobos, Sergio, Osvaldo Silva, Fernando Silva, and Patricio Estelle. 1974. *Historia de Chile.* Santiago: Editorial Universitaria.