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AEI

A Nation at War, An Administration in Retreat

An Assessment
of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
and the FY 2011 Defense Budget



QDR & 2011 Budget: Bottom Line Up Front

QDR fails to answer ‘How much is enough?’

QDR substitutes ‘risk management’ for victory

QDR freezes force size, defers modernization

QDR puts budgets before strategy

Budget reflects ‘unanticipated’ war costs

Budget holds defense at historic lows

Debt and deficit reflect entitlements, not defense costs



How Much Is Enough?

1993 'Bottom-Up' Review: Fight and win two near-simultaneous 'major regional conflicts'

1997 QDR: Win two 'overlapping...major theater wars,' conduct 'multiple smaller-scale contingencies'

2001 QDR: 'Swiftly defeat' attacks in 'any two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes,'

2006 QDR: Meet 'steady-state' and 'surge' requirements for homeland defense, winning the GWOT, and 'conventional campaigns'

2010 QDR: 'Four Ps'



The 'Four Ps' Philosophy

Prevail: Multiple theaters: Iraq, Afghan, GWOT

Prevent: Deterrence 'in all domains,' engage allies, build partners

Prepare: Range of operations in multiple theaters (including domestic); deter, defeat 'WMD-capable adversaries with advanced space, cyber, anti-access capabilities;' stability operations on OIF scale

Preserve: 'Prepare' to reduce dwell time, strive for 'sustainable rotations,' accept risk in preventative efforts



‘Risk Management’ versus Victory

Operational risks: Lack of ‘enabling’ forces, lack of allies or ‘partners,’ lack of cyberspace capabilities

Force management risks: Shortfalls in support for Iraq, Afghanistan; providing health care; proper active and reserve component mix

Institutional risk: Acquisition reform, accelerating IT application; maintain defense industrial base

Future challenges risk: Failure to respond to long-term threats, maintain technological edge

Strategic, military, political risk: ‘Successfully balanced’ or continuing ends-means gap?



Frozen Forces, Deferred Modernization

Army Strength

1990: 780,000 active-duty soldiers; 18 divisions; equipped with M1 Abrams, M2/3 Bradley combat vehicles; Patriot missile; AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk and CH-47 Chinook helicopters

2010: 547,000 soldiers; 45 brigade combat teams; equipped with M1 tank, M2/3 Bradley, Stryker combat vehicles; Patriot missile; AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk and Chinook helicopters

Navy Strength

1990: 546 battle-force ships, 15 aircraft carriers, F-14 and F-18 fighters

2010: 287 battle-force ships, 10-11 aircraft carriers, F-18 fighters


Air Force Strength

1990: 24 fighter wings; 228 bombers; 1000 ICBMs


2010: 6 'air-superiority wing equivalents', 10-11 'theater strike wing equivalents;' 5 long-range strike wings




The Current QDR: Budgets Drive Planning




The QDR Process: How It Worked




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
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


The QDR Process: How It Worked




Defense Spending

as a Percentage of GDP
1947-2015



The Costs of War 2001-2011



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Questions?

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