Intrastate Conflicts, International Interventions and their Implications on Security Issues, Case of Kosovo[1]

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Introduction

Intra-state conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Since 1945 they have been more frequent and more violent than inter-state warfare (SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook, 1998: 13-25). With the end of the Cold War these tendencies exuberated following mostly in the lines of ethno-national and separatist-armed conflicts, bringing a significant shift in the perception of security issues and alternative approaches to it, especially in Europe. In particular, the changing dialogue of sovereignty, identity and security and international responsibility appears to be increasingly significant. Considering that the prepositions in IR depend on both empirical validity and logical soundness a theoretical exercise on the case of intra-state conflicts questions the validity of the traditional state developed concept of security. The path is open for new interpretations and understanding of normative, operational and structural issues in contemporary world politics.

Human and moral choices determined by the dialectics of intra-state conflicts revealed to be inherent features of both social and international order pressurizing upon the reorganization of the conceptual framework and epistemological principles in which security studies and conflict resolution processes are organized. Obviously we are witnessing the opening moves in international relations where the realist perspective of focusing on the security of a particular state and the intrusion of liberal principles such as the protection of fundamental human rights are part of the same process although their coexistence still remains ambiguous and controversial.

The paper will assess the inter-linkage between the intra-state conflicts and the international answer and intervention to such conflicts and its implication for the international relations and security issues. The paper will take a closer look to the case of Kosovo to find the applicability of the arguments raised on this paper. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to reveal the large-extended problematic, enumerate all circumstances and effecting factors relevant to the case, neither detail all means and strategies that can be used to resolve the cases. These limitations are done with the intention of avoiding bulky whilst preserving cohesion and consistency within the limits of a paper.

1. Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Post-Cold War Order

The lenient end of the Cold War raised the expectations for an "end of the history" of wars, especially in Europe (Fukujama 1990). The peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia cheered the expectations. The brutality of the events in Yugoslavia and other spots of the world brought the attention to intra-state security situations and their implications.

The lessons from intra-state conflicts revealed that the traditional schools of International Relations do not provide enough and satisfactory tools for the understanding of " the current status of war and peace in the international system" (Jung and Schlichte, 1999: 35). There is a tendency in the literature to cut up the reality in a way that correspond to the practice the international affairs are organized assuming states as actors acting in an anarchical ordering principle and subject of security. Focussed on the state centric view security remains a 'commodity concept' associated to power distribution and related legacy effects to the international system of states, while human and social dimension remain in a subordinating position (McSweeny, 1999). Facing the dynamics of intra-state conflict this fragmented analysis appears to be increasingly arbitrary and revealing anomalies to the present security studies where there is confusion as to the nature of the actors subject of security and the relevance of domestic structures in the relations between the states and to the security issues in the international system.

Coming from a quantitative generalization traditional approaches does not count for the peculiarities of war events (either it is bilateral or multilateral, general or regional, intra-state or inter-state) and consequently in the peace building process the effect of democratic norms on the strategic behavior of actors are overemphasized while culture, social identities and cognitive processes are ignored. (Maoz 1997) Going beyond traditional understanding of the prospects of war and peace these factors should be taken into account in the case of conflict understanding and peace building processes.

Intra-state conflicts revealed not to be any more a state affaire. The distinction between inter-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts is becoming less clear, and it depends from which point of view you are looking at the conflict. So, "if a province, an integrated portion of the state's territory or a fraction of the population, refuses to submit

to the centralized power and undertake an armed struggle, the conflict, though civil war will regard to international war, will be considered a foreign war by those who see the rebels as the expression of an existing or nascent nation" (Aron, 1981: 7). And not in few cases the state centric concept of authority and related practices and strategies revealed to be detrimental in the sense of scarifying other human values for those of sovereignty and territorial inviolability. State desisted to be the protector of its citizens instead turned into a security threat to them (Møller, 2000). Not always the state can be personified and identified with its own citizens or considered as the most optimal form of organization that in the best of way looks at its own interests and security and of its own citizens first and foremost. The state of citizenship…."is being jeopardized by the trend toward national, sub-national and ethnic re-territorialisation" (Hassner, 1993:129). The claims of different ethnic-groups for self-determination in the face of minority oppression, was transformed into conflicts involving disputes over autonomy and sovereignty. The existence of the state is at stage but the threat this time is not coming from hostile and enemy states but from within the state itself. The dichotomy of self-determination and sovereignty is perceived as the challenge of the post Cold War order.

The crisis and intra-state conflicts in the Balkans, in the last decade were an expression of erosion of the state's ability to deal with the problems of its own citizens and developments in its territory. The fierce break out of Yugoslavia and the continuation of the dissolution is part of this eroding process. Abhorrent utterance of extreme human rights violation as massive killings, ethnic cleansing, and deportation of populations purposed to the territorial dispossession were part of the process. The answers of the international society towards such developments have moved beyond traditional practices, bringing "humanitarian and human rights law closer to the forefront of modern conflict resolution processes" and "interventions as an important response option available to international society"(Ryan, 1997:77).

Solution and peace-building processes on the case of intra-state conflict tend towards cultural integrity rather than territorial integrity, promotion of the human rights versus self-determination in short term and regional integration in long terms. Actually the acting framework is not clear, an expression of such uncertainty is the coexistence of two perspectives in the international practice: the neo-realist perspective of focusing on the state as a central point of

authority and the liberal perspective based on liberal principles of universal respect for human rights and rights of self-determination, which are meant to coexist as parts of the same process especially in the peace building. In the 1992 *Agenda for Peace,* then Secretary General of the United Nations did frame as such this controversial existence: "respect for *state*[2] fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress" even "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty…. has passed; its theory was never matched by reality" (Butros-Ghali, 1992).

1.1. Intra-state conflict and the nature of threats to security

Intra-state conflicts speak out for tensions that exist in the internal realm of the state, while not all of them are a threat of security to the existence of the state. When a group's security spells insecurities for others, then it certainly constitute a serious 'societal security' problem that can be translated as a threat to "sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom"(Buzan, 1991: 19). This societal security dilemma may escalate as far as it can go, to the exhaustion of the resources or the elimination of one party through such abhorrent manifestations as ethnic cleansing up to genocide or through weakening enormously and especially causing irreparable damages on the participants. The objective of such manifestations is the elimination of the other's social existence, and that's why civilians, women, children and youth as the seeds of society continuation and generation are the preferred targets. The situation reveals "the collapse of the state monopoly on the use of force and recognised social relations which forces an ethnicization of society (Schoch, 2001:57). Under this considerations "society is not just a sector of state security, but a distinctive referent object along side it (Waever, 1993:26-27).

Nevertheless not all the internal conflicts even dissolution movements can break out into war. Intra-state conflicts erupt in a violent manner and become separatist movements, when they "involve an armed confrontation between a sovereign independent state and a regionally-based movement seeking to break away or seeking an extended form of internal territorial self-rule" (Heraclides, 1997: 682). In essence they witness the complexity of the security

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[2] The word in italic is added.

question as well as the linkage between state, social and human security (Møller 2000:33), where "the state is at most a mean but never an end in itself"(Møller, 1993:12)

Accordingly, social-security conflict threatens to become a political security problem affecting the state in question, if it is manifested in a struggle for secessionism challenging the fundamental principle of its existence, sovereignty. Obviously the events in one country would impact the other countries of the region if "[r]egional security define a group of states, whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from an other". From such perspective security is a complex concept, which implies the security at the three levels: individuals, states and the international system, complementarily "the security of each become in part, a condition for the security of all" (Buzan, 1991:26-27). To sum up, "individual and global security are the two sides of the same coin" (Møller, 1993:13).

1.2. Societal and Identity Security Dilemma

Intra-state conflicts jeopardise the societal relationships within a multiethnic state. Obviously societal security concerns relate with identity preservation as the process and practice that construct peoples and groups self-image and perpetuate their group existence. (McSweeney, 1999:69; Waever, 1993:25) Societal security dilemma in most of the cases is translated as an identity security dilemma. In Buzan terms, "societies are fundamentally about identity. They are about what enable a group of peoples to refer to themselves as 'we'... The defining modes of 'we', 'us' and 'them' are all challenged by the formation of new identities, and the movement of peoples carrying different identities" (Buzan, 1993: 5-6).

Identity is a social "process of constructive negotiating, manipulating or affirming a response to the demand -at times urgent, mostly absent-for collective image". (McSweeney, 1999:78). Societal identity is mainly defined in function of ethnicity and religion, which "have acquired prominence.... because of their historical association with the development of the modern state" (Waever, 1993:23).

Social identity speaks out differences depending on group "intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the 'distribution of knowledge' that constitute...conceptions of self and others"

(Wendt, 1992: 397). Spelling out collective differences do not self generate security problems. Differences can be a source of richness, dynamism and progress or vice versa depending on the negotiated interest and collective norms whereabouts understanding reveals the patterns of mutual responsiveness in the process of interaction. Identity procreates a security dilemma when it is used as a political leverage that reflects conflict of interests on the preservation of power dominance and structure of relationship. The conflictual interaction is manifests with the imposition of identity in egoistic manifestations rather then co-operative one, "with the ethnonational collective seen as the only guarantor of protection in an increasing climate of fear" (Schoch, 2001:58). The escalation of conflict leads to chain reaction effects, which promises fragmentation. At this point the process speaks out security concerns for the state since its sovereignty and territoriality are threaten.

The conflictual interaction is legitimised by a historically discourse that procures authority and legitimacy upon the applied argument that interprets identity in function of the effects of discourses of danger. Although the arguments are accurately selected, historical past overemphasise the dramas and features that will help national distinctiveness and will establish a culture of resistance towards the 'others' in order to reclaim and reinhabit the pretended land. Culture groups (i.e., ethnic, language and religious groups) in particularity pay a primordial importance to the territory since they are related to specific territories and habitats.

The net infusion of cultural factors with historical selective evidence raises the hostility levels while reducing the likelihood of non-violent conflict resolution opening the way ahead to war. (Singer, 1970:166). In most cases the cultural differences does not line belligerence but they can be exploited successfully by elites to mobilize support for war. Elite's can highly influence the redefinition of national interests, inclining them towards the 'common good' by using the authority of knowledge[3] and formal institutions (Haas,

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[3] Here important is to understand the way knowledge is generated and its discursive relationship with power, rather than its anonymous imposition of structural reason or presupposed modes of enunciation. Truth in knowledge is quite often dependent in power. See Foucoult, (1984, 1990) for the power-knowledge relationship. As an example can be the "Memorandum" issued by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science that provided the scientific guidelines for solving "the Srbian Question" (Anastastasijevic, 2000). This was the ideological platform that justified Milosevic actions.

1997)[4]. Each community is forced to believe that its well-being is conditioned by the disadvantages of the other communities and that they can make progress only at the others costs. Violence erupts because of the radicalisation of the internal fears and suspicions producing the counter-values of what previously existed, spelling out fragmentation and disunity. And that is exactly what happened in the case of Yugoslavia.

2. Internal Dimension of Kosovo conflicts

After the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo remained a simple province of Serbia, having lost its autonomous status in 1991. The internal fragile internal equilibrium that existed before the conflict is now in total jeopardy and the parallel administration that existed as a de facto partition has created ground for a de jure partition. The conflict that since long ago existed among the Serb and Albanian community turned into a real war. In Heraclides (1997) terms the causes that lead to this situation are attributed to too many factors. They are of a historical nature related with the drawing of the borders, of an ethnic nature regarding the definition of nationality and citizenship and thus the status of minorities and the status of autonomy, or of the internal changes that are particular to multinational, multiethnic or multi-religious states in the period of transition from a communist regime that suppressed by force such conflicts without finding a real solution to them. And in the case of Kosovo they all fomented the way to conflict.

Kosovo technically is a province within the legal framework of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Albanians and Serbs have divergent historical perceptions, each side claiming the primacy of its historic and cultural rights. The Albanians trace their origins back to the Illyrians that descended in the Balkans long before the Slavic populations. For the Serbs, Kosovo is the historical cradle of the Serbian nation and the center of the medieval Nemanja Empire. With the defeat of the Serb and other Balkan forces including the Albanians, by the Ottomans at the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the Serbian independence was lost.

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[4] In Haas vocabulary elite's are named 'epistemic communities' and their role is seen as positive. Here his argument is used in more generalist terms, implying both directions positive or negative, which ever is the predisposition.

The Balkan wars 1912-1913 were successful in over-throwing the Ottoman Empire almost completely from the Balkans. Serbia by wining the war against Bulgaria expanded its territory to the east including all of present day Macedonia and Kosova (Skendi 1967: 36-39). This configuration continued later in the successive Yugoslav entities. In retrospect, cultural differences that emerged from various religions proved to be an effective marker of national or ethnic identity, which in turn, created distinctive customs, rituals and beliefs that shaped the every day life of the citizens. This social variety would be later one of the incentives to encourage and revive Serbian nationalism, (Ledrer, 1963: 3-80) particular after the eighties. In fact, the deterioration in interethnic relations is also due to political, economic and social imbalances between the two communities.

Compared with other nations in Yugoslavia, the Albanians had a very different position. Little attempt was made to integrate Albanians into Yugoslav society. Kosovo remained the poorest region of former Yugoslavia, and has one of the highest birth rates in Europe (nearly 3 percent) and a very traditional social and familial pattern. Albanians had a second class position in the framework of the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1998: 66). Poor living conditions, repression and the second class position of the Albanians lead to the street demonstrations in the capital of Kosovo, Prishtina in the 1960s. After harsh repression of the Albanian demonstrations in the 1960s by the Yugoslav government, Kosovo was given the status of the autonomous province in 1969, under the terms of the 1974 Constitution it was given the status of autonomous region with its own institutions.

The constitution of 1974 gave more power to the units by decentralizing and delegating the power from the central authority of the federation to the republics, where republics were identified with the majority nation. This was the first step towards the new nationalism that resulted in a "constitutional nationalism" and later on completed the process of "ethnification" of communist policies that had started during the 1970s (Hayden, 1992: 654-673). The system prevented discussions on the national issues, suppressing the national question by appeals for unification based on communist ideology and dogmas, without taking into consideration all the great differences between the nations and cultural traditions, the level of economic development and patterns of social organization. The

granting of the autonomy created tensions being considered inadequate by both the Albanians and the Serbs.

Another important factor that arose from the tensions between the two communities was the economic crisis that swept the over-all structure of the Yugoslav self-management system during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. This deepened the already existing gap in the relations among the republics. In theory self-management was perceived as an appropriate instrument considering that the economic response was going to abate the political crises (Sekelj, 1993). Economic problems affected different regions and nations in different ways, providing a fertile soil for extremist movements. To sum up, economic disparities between the regions, self-management, decentralization reform and economic crises induced regional economic nationalism within Yugoslavia (Pleskovic and Dolenc, 1982). These features became exacerbated in the framework of the Serb republic, because to the economic crises was added a large increase in the Albanian population. The growing dissent as a result of the economic difficulties led to a massive exodus of the Serbs and Montenegrins towards Serbia and Montenegro proper. In 1981, large demonstrations of Albanians aimed at obtaining the status of Republic for Kosovo that ended, in 1989, in the annulment of the status of the autonomy and de facto imposition to the Albanians of direct Serbian rule. This act was followed by the proclamation of an Independent Republic of Kosovo in September 1991 following a referendum in which 90 percent of the population voted. The proclamation of the independence gave life to the parallel shadow government of Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova with his Gandhian-type policy, encouraged the parallel life, and created a society of Albanian with separated political, cultural, educational, health and media structures. This political move aimed at the avoidance of conflict with Serb authorities and gain support for the international recognition of independence. This was a strategy based upon the knowledge that forceful secessionist movements are not justifiable under the present practices of the international law, if the aim of international law is the preservation of the state. In nature this effort prevents de facto organic groups to be regarded as states (Aron, 1981:120). In practice in other cases, such as the one of the Biafra war the UN denied the request for secession.

Facing the dramatic changes in the framework of Yugoslavia and their repercussions on Serbia the interests of communities in the latter were generated in the process of reinforcing identity

separateness. Close analysis of the internal situation reveals that the perceptions in the Serbian side are affected not only by nostalgic considerations that perceive Kosovo as the heartland of Serb nationalism, the issue on which Milosevic came to power and the defeat caused his failure but also by fears that Kosovo could be the first step of a long chain of secessions. That fuelled insecurities for the future of the Serbian State and perspectives that would shrink it to ethnic borders, leaving Serbs alone within their national state.

With the dissolution of Yugoslavia the Serb interests received a great burst considering that "Yugoslav project and the Greater Serbia project were... complementary to each other". Although "Yugoslavia was never pro-Serbia, ... it provided two basic guarantees" important for Serbian nation: the protection of the Serb identity and safety under the Federation roof. This logic justify the dialectics of the situation " the more the Serbs insisted on living together if Yugoslavia disintegrated, the more the northern republics wanted to secede; ....more Serbians in the remaining Yugoslavia" more it spurred secession. (Wiberg, 1993: 100-101). This situation puts the question of Kosovo and Serbian perceptions in broader context. The secession of Kosovo could precipitate similar claims in Vojvodina and Sandjak by Hungary and Muslim minorities respectively. (Clement, 1997)

Conflict and related security issues are relational concepts, which not necessarily exclude power-based calculations on the side of the political elite's (McSweeney, 1999: 15). At least in one direction the dissolution of Yugoslavia paid on the favor of the Serbs. In the framework of legal dissolution the equal distribution of assets of the dissolving state by the successor states did not unfortunately apply to the Yugoslav National Army (INA). This reality gave to the Serbs the means to fight for their expansionist designs or at least to stop the chain of fragmentation within Serbia (Aybet, 2000). "For almost a decade the Serbian nationalist movement ... shoved it readiness to inflict death and human suffering in demonstration of that power". Hardly the conflict can be attributed to the clash between the Serb and Albanian nationalism, since Serbs hold full power over Kosovo territory for almost a decade. (Anastasijevic, 2000:58)

Rregional and international environment exert varying path-dependent effect on the dominance of competing definitions of ethnic community interests. Both sides in the conflict, Serbs and Albanians, include outside political factors in their calculation, a

further analysis of the external dimensions will be of help in better understanding the case.

3. Regional Dynamics

The correlation between internal conflicts, their regional dimensions and immediate environment is consequently an important variable that should not be neglected in any case of intra-state conflict understanding. In an amalgamate region as the Balkans, neighborhood has a particular importance due to the historic circumstances and sensibility towards minorities. Historically, the relations in the Balkans have been conflictual, shaped by historical border disputes, religious and ethnic differences. This situation is mostly due to the peculiarities of Balkan history. For a long period the Balkan nations were under overlapping occupation that made identity, culture and territoriality blurred realities

"The nations of the Balkans were not 'natural', in the sense that no nation was created by God on the sixth day. They were 'man-made' - invented, constructed, imagined at different times and in different circumstances. They evolved, they were imposed, they were rejected, they were discarded, they were lost, and they were revived. As they were difficult to define, they did all they could to become more readily definable. They resorted to accelerated cultural assimilation; they also resettled, expelled and eliminated. They needed roots, they relied myths; they sought territorial justifications in the past; historical rights clashed with self-determination" (Pavlowitch, 1999: 333).

In search for borders Balkan communities were supported by the Great Powers of Europe at that time that played an important role in shaping the map of the Balkans, but the new states were a "product of geopolitics and not ethnic considerations"(Danopoulos and Messas, 1997).

The Balkans remain the only region in Europe where the borders did not consider ethnicity. (Kissinger, 1994). In every Balkan country the population is composed of various ethnic groups. The treatment of ethnic groups that often have been characterised by maltreatment, have been always an issue and an esxusse for interfering in the territory of the others. A intra-conflict in the Balkans

easily can turn into a catalytic war involving the whole region following the legacy that domestic political unrests often result in involvment in militarised disputes (Russett, 1990). The evolution of the situation in Tirana, Athens, Sofia or Ankara is a determining factor for regional stability, since the policy towards, or even interference in the internal affairs of a country by their neighbours could be a multi-act tragedy.

In the near neighborhood, the emergence of the Kosovo question raised the Albanian question in the Balkans. An escalation of the war in Kosovo risked involving the entire Albanian nation possibly indicating unification. The intervention of NATO prevented the spread of the conflict in the region playing somehow Miloscievic's game that was for the preservation of the status-quo, the integrity of Yugoslavia, in contrast to the KLA who wanted to escalate the war in search for an indisputable independence of Kosovo.

How much grounded are the fears for a greater Albania? Historically since the Middle Ages, Albania has not constituted a geo-political entity, even by irony it is "one of the oldest-established populations in Europe. No people could be less 'alien' to the history of the Balkans"(Malcolm, 1998:12). From the 1470s until the early twentieth century, Albania remained under Ottoman administration, where the land populated by ethnic Albanians was divided into several Ottoman administrative units. In the period of 1881-1912, which constitute the last period before the establishment of the first Albanian state, the ethnic Albanians were split into the vilayets of Kosovo, Shkodra, Monastir, Ioannina, including within them other ethnic groups as Vlachs, Gypsies and Turks. Ottomans preferred this administrative approach of dividing ethnic groups into different and mixed administrative units as a way of reducing any risk of national state-formation within the Empire (Malcolm, 1998:30-1).

Albanian nationalism and self-distinctiveness awakened very late compared to the other nations of Southeast Europe due to its integration within the Ottoman Empire's life and commonly shared faith. Threats to the territories inhabited by the Albanians brought up an Albanian national movement that culminated with the creation of the Albanian League of Prizren in 10 June 1878. The immediate objective of the League was to prevent Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria from annexing parts of Albanian territories by virtue of the San Stefano treaty. Historically Albanians did not have "a common religion or geographic centre, language remained the main bond

between *Albanian*[5] peoples"(Ch&B Jelavich, 1977: 225). With the departure of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, the region was divided up among the Balkan states. In the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, Albanians were the last to establish their own nation-state. The first Albanian State was created in 1913 as a kingdom under the auspice of an heir of one the European dynasties. Its size was about the size of the today's Republic of Albania. The Albanian population that remained outside the state borders matched in size and importance that of Albania proper, and majority were spread in Kosovo and the rest in Macedonia, Montenegro and Northern Greece (Troebst, March 1997: 24-27). Since 1912 to the present day, Kosovo and its Albanian majority have been living under the harsh Serbian rule that can be compared with that of an apartheid regime (Roux, 1992).

The new Albanian independent state being small not only in size but also in economic importance, has faced during all its existence problems with its neighbors much bigger size and economic importance, that have maintained a constant threat towards its integrity. Accordingly, its policy towards the outside Albanian ethnic population has not played an important leading role in the direction of the unification of all Albanian population under the roof of a proper state. Today, while the Albanian government has recognized Kosovo's independence, de facto rather than de jure, the question of Kosovo is not a priority for Tirana, which is too weak economically, politically and militarily, and faced with a tough period of transition (Clement, 1997:23). The attitude of Tirana towards the Albanian question is more moderate than the Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians (Moore, 1993). In Secretary of State Albrights' evaluation "Albania is respected for its all-round support, for the efforts it is making in unison with the international community and the Contact Group, in particular to ensure that the criminal policy pursued, against the Kosovo people is condemned and denounced in the international arena, averting any act of provocation and re-establishing the Albanian governing institutions and national security in exemplary cooperation with the United States, the EU, NATO and the OSCE" (April 1998). Not only towards Kosovo but also FYR of Macedonia the new Albanian Government favors a policy of non-interference and moderation, which is received in different ways by the various tendencies within the Albanian movement in Kosovo and Macedonia and leads to

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[5] The world in italic is added.

divisions within each of them. According to the Albanian Socialist leader, Nano, the solution to the ethnic Albanians' problems in the Balkans is not to redraw borders but to "make them irrelevant" by "creating new ways of co-exsitance-- first of all among [ethnic Albanians]-- so that we are seen as emancipated, democratic, and a factor of stability in the Balkans… so no one will maltreat us as in the past or look down on us". The freedom of movement through the region is the best way to deflect nationalist calls for establishing a "greater Albania" (Nano, December 1999).

Beside the fact that the Albanian speaking population does not have any common experience in state building other factors are not in favor of a great Albania. There is a disparity in the economic development and standard of living among the different Albanian communities, for which all parts are conscious. Albanians in Macedonia are aware of being in better conditions that the other Albanians. Furthermore, the opening of the borders has made clear that the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania come form three different societies and political cultures, which will not be easily integrated into a common state and union in practical terms would mean power sharing that it is not that easily achievable (Moore, January 2001). And the Kosovars have made already clear time and again that they are interested only in independence (Balkan Report, 15 and 20 December 2000).

The voices that fueled the fears that a peaceful separation of Montenegro and the independence of Kosovo would somehow lead to a new Balkan anarchy and the formation of an 'inherently wicked Albania' were part of Milosevic propaganda machinery. But none of these have "happened". Even in a possible secession of Montenegro all the Yugoslav leaders Djukanovic, Kostunica, and the Serbian Prime Minister-designate Zoran Djindjic have all stressed that no force will be used if Montenegro chooses to go: This point was also made by army Chief of staff General Nebojsa Pavkovic (Moore, 2001).

The new era blowing over the Balkans with the new moderate leaders that replaced the ultra-nationalist generation of dictators spell out for optimism, need for change and for turning the black page consumed in the Balkans during the last decade of the last millennium.

4. Nature of humanitarian interventions and the implications in the Kososvo case

4.1. An empirical evidence of the Kosovo case

The forceful disintegration of Yugoslavia increased the fears that the conflicts will sweep through the region in waves of secessionist movements of an ethnic nature. The conflict in Kosovo was expected to have a catalytic effect, "threatening to involve Albania, fracture Macedonia, and possibly even pull Greece and Turkey into a war -- not that they don't already have their hands full over a new crisis brewing in Cyprus" (Garfinkle, 1998). Furthermore, the conflict could have other consequences. In Bill Clinton terms the Balkans is an explosive area "they touch other difficult areas and unless we can contain and ultimately defuse the ethnic hatreds in that region they can embroil us… in a much larger conflicts" (Clinton, 4 Feb. 1999). Such considerations right or wrong continue to affects the policies adopted by the West, both for the Balkans and the post-war peace-building process in Kosovo.

The break up of Yugoslavia and the international involvement for solutions of the Yugoslav crisis had negative implications for the independence of Kosovo. The "Conference on Yugoslavia" that was hosted by Lord Carrington in 1991 established the European Community Monitoring Mission that was embodied with the authority of negotiating solutions for Yugoslavia. Badinter Committee that was created in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia was set to resolve the problems coming out of the break up process of Yugoslavia. It decided that in case the majority of the constituent parts of the Federation wanted to withdraw from it, they had the right to do so and this was going to be considered an act of dissolution and the Republics had the right of sharing the assets. Badinter committee rejected the request of Kosovo for independence in the same process as the other republics because it was not endowed with sovereignty.[6]

The other issue that was resolved by the Badinter committee was the settlement of the borders. *Uti Possidetis* was applied as

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[6] The Kosovo Albanian leadership's argument that the representation on the collective federal Presidency made Kosovo a sovereign federal unit. Both Badinter Committee and the European Community ignored this argument. See on the argument: "Letter by the Government of the Republic of Kosovo to the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, 21 December 1991 at *The truth about Kosovo* (1993) edited by Academy of the Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History, Tirana: Encyclopedia Publishing House, p. 329

principle in border definition, based on the procedures used by the UN in the case of post-colonial settlements. Accordingly, the borderlines of the Republics in the framework of the Federation were preserved. This solution brought in attention the issue of ethnic and minority groups within the Republics, including the autonomous regions, such as Krajina in Croatia, and Voyvodina and Kosovo in Serbia. The group rights were going to be guaranteed by the constitution of each Republic under the provisions of ethnic and minority rights. So, Kosovo was left under the authority of the Republic of Serbia that was going to look at its own interests and security and of its own constituents first and foremost. When the Dayton Agreement was reached, it did not include any predisposition for Kosovo. Considering Kosovo as an internal matter of Serbia the concern for the Albanian rights was expressed at the "Outer Wall of Sanctions" document, preconditioning the lifting of the embargo with the respect of human rights in the remaining Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (UN.Doc.S/1995/999/1995).

This attitude of the international community led to the radicalization of the situation in Kosovo. On one hand, radical groups on the Albanian political circles believed that the peaceful policy of Rugova was not going to be led to independence - only violence could succeed in wining international recognition. Endless discussions of "preventive diplomacy" and "early mechanisms" did not solve any thing. This was the psychological basis for the emergence of the Kosovo Liberating Army (KLA). The KLA was the fuse that led to the explosion, especially among the rural areas. (Zajovic, 1997:11-14) On the other hand, the Serb authorities found in KLA a legitimate pretext for brutally unlawful measures. It was used by Milosevic to provoke widespread Albanian uprising and than to go on with the war and justify the ethnic cleansing and genocide at terrific dimensions. (Maliqi, April 1998). The massacre in Drenica, in the beginning of March 1998,where some 80 Albanians were killed, among them 25 women and children, foreordained for the seven months of open war.

4.2. Debating interventions on paper

The conflicts in the Balkans witnessed the complexity of the quest for security as well of the linkage between state, societal and human security. (Møller 2000:33) Accordingly human rights violations occurring within the borders of a sovereign state, "which

are large enough to warrant the attention of the international society, are *a priory* large enough to represent a threat to international peace and security" (Ryan, 1997:95). The UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar discusses this issue since 1991 in his annual report. He stated:

"It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be violated systematically with impunity… the case for impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty….includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or of forced exodus of civilian population in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection" (De Cuellar, 1991:5).

The danger of war widening and the memories of Bosnia promoted the governments of Western countries governments and the US reaction after a 10-years "patterns of neglect" (Kaplan, October 1998:747). Up to that moment neither the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) nor individual great powers had adopted or even formulated a strategy or policy for Kosovo. Instead they all kept repeating their deep concern for the violation of human right and what was happening in Kosovo (Troebst, 1999:51-52).

The international community tried to react against Milosevics regime first with negotiations and then with military intervention as a compelling mean believing that this will stop the policy of violence, but without result. Consequently, the NATO air campaign "Allied Force" began on 24 March 1999. In response to NATO intervention, the Serb genocide and expulsion of the population form the territory of Kosovo accelerated. Only after 77 days of an air campaign and strong diplomatic pressure, Miloscievic decided to withdraw Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. On 10 June the UN Security Council passed with a score of 14 in favor and one abstention (China) the resolution 1244, welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end of the violence and an immediate withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces. At the same time the Security Council decided to deploy international civil and security presence in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices.

Actually, Kosovo is technically a province within the legal framework of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "It is neither a self-governing state, nor currently being governed by the sovereign state" (Pugh, 2000: 15). The Serb and Kosovar Albanian point of view concerning the future of Kosovo seems to be too far apart to be bridged by any compromise solution. The reason for this is that ten years of repression culminating in a brutal conflict have convinced virtually all Kosovars that they cannot remain in the same state as the Serbs. Moderate Kosovars, including Rugova and publisher Veton Surroi, have pointed this out on more than one occasion. Many Serbs have drawn a similar conclusion (RFE/RL Balkan Report, 5 December 2000). However, the status of Kosovo is not explicitly defined in any international documents. Its final version is still pending on the tables of world diplomacy, shadowed by the reluctance over reconciling the principle of sovereignty with that of self-determination in international law and practice.

The whole complexity of circumstances that accumulated in the Kosovo case, moving from broad security dilemmas to human right infringement, made humanitarian intervention a necessity. Humanitarian Interventions can be defined as "the non consensual use of force to prevent or stop large scale killings contemplated or carried out by the government of targeted state against its own citizens or groups belonging to discernible authority in situations of near or total anarchy" (Andreopoulos, 2000). Interventions to protect civilians from acts of violence that shock the human conscience have been a subject since the ancient times. Nevertheless, such interventions are a subject of discussion attributed to the lack of well-defined criteria of legitimacy that are a reflection of the controversies between sovereignty and individuals and community rights defined in other terms as self-determination.

In the present UN Charter there is not any explicit provision that speaks out for the protection and the enforcement of the human rights. In Chapter 1, Article 1(3) of the UN charter international community of states is committed only for the promotion and encouragement of human and fundamental rights. In face to face confrontation between the individuals and the state, the state is the one that can be trusted all the time. Nevertheless, crimes against humanity that are not condemnable at the national level can be condemned at the international level. The Article 2(7) of the first Chapter and the Chapter VII of the Charter opens the way for international interventions of a humanitarian nature only with the

permission of the Security Council. This conditional closure in most of the cases prevented humanitarian intervention from taking place. Inherent internal state tensions remained silent after World War II, bi-polarity took care of their management. In the communist part, ideology replaced nationalism and the external threat strengthened the national cohesion. The end of the Cold War opened a new page in the history of humanitarian intervention. The Security Council Resolution 688 (dealing with the case of Iraq) opened the way for such interventions with out the permission of the targeted country. It reflects a mixture of legality and legitimacy by practice.

On the other hand, the aim of humanitarian intervention is not only to prevent the conflict but also to stop its reoccurrence. In such a case, it is a complex process that involves two stages: stop the fighting and return to normality. It is obvious that the intervention to stop the conflict is an important determinant on the success or the failure of the stabilizing processes in the aftermath of the conflict. In general terms, the nature of the international interventions is affected by the quest for legitimacy borrowed in the present time from the legitimization of democratic governance in the international realm that at the end shapes the last aim of these interventions when entering the stabilizing processes.

Intervention needs a strategy that should assure the accommodation of the international institutions and the cooperation of the parties directly involved in the peace building process. The cohesion of these factors is indispensable since the international community can propose but not impose, and even less substitute for them. For a successful outcome, the strategy of interventions warrants a balance between the goals of the parts involved in the conflict, and the requirements of the system and the means used to promote one's interests. Not rarely stabilizing processes are used as means instead of strategy. And some time they can return to strategy of corruption as the Bosnia case revealed recently. (Friedman, 2001)

The intervention in Kosovo was made in the name of human dignity. Nevertheless, the strategic goal of intervention is not clear, and there is reluctance in spelling out explicitly the future status of Kosovo. There is a Security Council Resolution 1144 that commits all "Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and reaffirm "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo" (1999). In first reading the resolution, it implies the reconstruction of Kosovo as

forever being part of Yugoslavia. In fact the usage of the terms "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity" should be judged in a large context implying the respect for human rights up to the international standards that does not take sides. The concept of sovereignty incorporates the peoples as sovereigns, which means that the state should respect the peoples rights to decide how should be governed and from whom. This dichotomy in interpretation is reflected as a disharmony between international community policy and Kosovar Albanians aspirations. As far as the international community is concerned, the concept of national sovereignty and territorial integrity takes precedence over the right to self-determination, which is interpreted loosely because of the difficulty in determining the principle to observe when there are many allegiances and positions difficult to reconcile. The reality of the post-Dayton situation has in Bosnia weakened the credibility of solutions based on the integration of broad multi-ethnic entities in favor of the principle of the separation of the communities on ethnic or religious bases such as the cases in Cyprus and Ireland (Clement, 1997:26). This reality seems to favor fragmentation versus integration, a concept which goes partly in line with the Kosovar demands, even if in the extreme case this leads to independence.

In practical terms this confusion brings misperceptions and deadlock situations expressed in the concerns of U.S. Ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke "In the interim, I can't imagine anybody walking away from a situation [in Kosovo] because otherwise you'd have a war again. But nobody wants to stay in the Balkans forever. We're looking for a way to phase out. We don't want another situation like Korea where 47 years later we still have 40,000 troops there." (15 December 2000).

5. Future prospects instead of conclusions

The end of the war in Kosovo will not automatically give way to a positive era. Without a comprehensive and fresh policy approach the best outcome will be stalemate and stagnation, and the worst outcome a continuous decent into renewed conflict, chaos and impoverishment (Declaration

adopted by "Europa South-East" on July 20, 1999).

If the West fails to follow through on a multi-year, focused effort to help Southeastern Europe reap the benefits of peace and democracy, we should not be surprised to see a new Milosevic arise, whether in Serbia or elsewhere in the region, exploiting people's fears and disappointment and unleashing yet another Balkan conflict. If that happens through our neglect, we will have only ourselves to blame (Moore, 15 October 2000).

5.1. Theoretical background on prospecting peace

The theoretical guiding framework on peace perspectives of intra-state conflicts reflects ambiguity in understand the changing nature of conflict and order in the Post-Cold Era, while defining the factors and actors that are at stage and their inter-relationship reveals to be more difficult. The understanding of societal security concept should serve as "a kind of analytical lens, able to give an insight into familiar problems. Like all lenses it gives a partial view, making some things clearer others into the background" (Buzan, 1993: 185).

Learning from the way the crisis in Central America were dealt, the problems that affect a region could be tackled on a regional bases and not on a country by country basis since the various countries' problems have common origins, which are often deeply rooted in their common history. Furthermore, the solutions to the region's problems should be considered inter-related. These issues include promoting democracy, advancing the causes of human rights and civil society, speeding economic recovery and development, and guaranteeing security. (Kissinger- quoted at RFE/RL Balkan Report, 8 June 1999)

Democratic regime theory offers a comprehensive approach in canalising causal factors such as national interest and power dominance through regulatory bodies that will modify the outcome in

the common interest with long-lasting effects. The case of the European Union supports the argument. In Krasner terms regimes constitute "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (1982:185). They represent well-defined guides to actors "actions or standards setting forth actions that members are expected to perform (or not to perform) under appropriate circumstances" (Young, 1982:334). The emphasis here is placed on the "persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal" (Keohane, 1990:732), that serve as guidelines for actors behaviour. For Keohane & Nye the existence of a regime in a given issue enhances cooperation among the parties because it provides "sets of governing arrangements" that "regularise behaviour and control its effects" (1977:19). Under such circumstances, the building of democratic institutions also have an important role to play on ensuring adherence to the rules by formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting, legitimating and adapting them (Bull, 1977:54). Regimes are applicable to all domains of international relations and the effectiveness of regimes depends on their internal characteristics and internal mechanisms that mitigate the concerns about the distribution of gains (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 2000:15-14).

By working in a regime based on democratic values states feel free in their identities and confident in their neighbors, that makes them more confident in providing more autonomy to the sub-national groups (Talbott, 2000). Furthermore, the main causes that lead to the creation of the European Union does not exist any more but the regime persists and states are willing to comply with it. The regime of norms and principles is customized and has gained legitimacy, and the interests of states are represented at the level of the Community (Deutch 1957). States "conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull, 1977:13). At this stage, regimes assume an independent power life of their own apart from the initial conditions that facilitated their creation and shaped the patterns of behavior. The continuation is the pursuit of the regime adjusting itself to the new conditions. In this regard it contributes to the consolidation of peace stability and prosperity based on the establishment of bonds of trust between individuals, social groups and countries in the region.

Creating the right democratic institution is considered as a step forwards towards peace building in torn out post war societies. International institutions are "relatively stable collections of communicative practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations of international life" (Risse-Kappen, 2000:14). There are two important moments for the institutions: rules and norms that establish the institutions in paper and being in life of the institution through practice processes that speaks for actors expectations convergence and affects their behavior. And societal actors preferences are at the starting point in explaining institution building (Moravscsik, 1997). Institutions do not just reduce transaction costs or provide rules of appropriate behavior. They also serve as discourse arenas enabling deliberative processes geared towards problem solving. They do it in part by establishing relationship of trust among actors, which are deemed crucial for processes of communicative persuasion and consensus seeking (Risse-Kappen, 2000). Institutions can pattern interactions between states and societies representing the wellspring of new normative structures, identities, and interests that are more collective and less particularistic if they consider precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies in the light of relationship combined with the 'structural' elements of power and ideas, and the 'process' elements of transactions, international organizations, and social learning. The dynamic, positive and reciprocal relationship between these variables leads to the development of trust and collective identity formation (Adler and Barnet, 1998).

Institutions and institutional change are dependent variables depending on knowledge and argumentative discourses. The question is which logic of interaction is likely to prevail in which situation and under what conditions. Institutions aim the status quo preservation in the international system neglecting distributional effects that affects the efficiency of the institutions in peace building processes. The questions is not if institutions matter but how do they matter? Under which conditions, promises theoretical, empirical and practical payoff. (Martin, 1997)

The interaction between international norms and institutions on the one hand and domestic politics on the other hand is not yet covered extensively by the literature. Domestic political factors and their effect on shaping state preferences and other dimensions of state policy towards institutions (Moravcsik, 1995; Goldstein, 1996)

offer a part of the understanding but does not transcend state lenses. There is more done on the direction of role of regimes on the domestic discourses (Muller, 1995) than vice versa.

The pacifying effects of democracy and its institutions are empirically strong but "it is long way from being perfect, and is in fact so modest in strength according to most of the techniques utilized to evaluate it that it is sometime of a minor miracle that it has yet to be eliminated by most of the 'controls' to which it has been introduced". (Ray, 1997:14) "The ontology of the regimes rest upon element of intersubjectivity" (Kratochvil and Ruggie, 1986:764) implying compliance of all agents involved, formalized or not. The concept is important because it transcends the state borders and focuses on the concept of group and purposeful cooperation. The concept includes the understanding of political culture as "the collective self-understanding of actors in a given society that are stable over time. It defines their collective identity as a nation and, thus, provides them with a repertoire of interpretations of a reality as well as appropriate behavior." (Risse-Kappen, 1995:21)

Accordingly, "peoples act not on the basis of objective reality but on the basis of perceived reality and of assumed cause-and-effect relationships operating in the world they perceive. And people act not only on the basis of objective needs but also on the basis of preferences reflecting their subjectively defined interests and normative convictions of how it is right or good or appropriate to act under the circumstances. International actions, in other words, cannot be described and explained without reference to the subjective 'meaning' that this action has for the actors in question". Intersubjectivity and cognition effect the question of choice and efficiency of institutions. (Scharpf, 1997, 19)

5.2 Prospects for the Balkans and Kosovo from an empirical perspective

Working out a regime based on democratic norms and values is considered as the best approach for the Balkans. This judgment is based in two arguments: first, the small units are not viable and second, drawing clear dividing lines based in ethnicity especially in the Balkans is practically impossible. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe represents the European Union's main mechanism for the stability and integration of the region into European structures. "Lasting peace and stability in South Eastern Europe will

only become possible when democratic principles and values, which are already actively promoted by many countries in the region, have taken root throughout, including in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"(Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 10 June 1999). Stress is placed in the creation of a sustainable regime based on democratic values, respect for human and minority rights and the development of multilateral and bilateral cooperation based on the convergence of the interests, and aiming to foster social inclusion and cohesion that will lead to regional integration.

The Stability Pact has no resources of its own; it merely keeps the region on the EU's agenda. Three working tables at regional level will carry out the whole endeavor, coordinated by a High Level Steering Group[7] that is working out a regional assistance strategy that will provide for economic reconstruction, stabilizing reform and development of the South-East European Region. The Pact is supposed to assumes the combination of three assumptions that are considered important for the maintenance of social order: exchange relations, threat system and image integration (Boulding, 1989). Exchange relations presume the development of a sustainable economic environment based on fostering economic and trade relations aiming at the convergence of economic interests. Threat system is based on an external soft deterrence related with financial aid and conditional integration in the EU and other Western institutions. Image integration will provide for the harmonization of the perceptions and interests based on the development of confidence, trust and security measures that are the result of an enhanced multi-dimensional intercourse environment.

The aftermath process in Kosovo is a mixture of different policies that at the end aim to provide a sustainable solution to the Kosovo question. First of all the international community is working for a consolidation of internal democratic balance in the region as a

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[7] The High Level Steering Group (HLSG) is co-chaired by Messrs Pedro Solbes, European commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and James D. Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank. Its membership includes the Finance ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Portugal (representing the Presidency of the European Union), as well the Managing Director of International Monetary Fund, the President of the European Investment Bank and the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact of South-Eastern Europe, and the Deputy-Secretary-General of the United Nations. In addition, a number of development Ministers, as well as the Finance Minister of the Netherlands and the representative of the UN Mission in Kosovo are associated to the deliberations of the HLSG.

legitimation, if not an additional guaranty for the credibility of the process. On the other hand with the arrival of moderate leaders in leadership, both in Kosovo and Serbia, a policy of rapprochement and dialogue is envisaged followed by policies that aim at reducing tensions and gradual confidence building. All these policies intend to moderate the request for self-determination as a precaution for avoiding fragmentation at a regional level. In the long –term an integration at the regional level supported by the adoption of strong measures to protect minority rights seems likely to solve the Balkans' problems.

The philosophy behind such a policy is based in the healing values of democracy. This is done in the belief that democracy has transformed the nature of the nation-state "giving way to a new system in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their neighbourhoods to make a virtue out of porous borders and intertwined economies and cultures"(Talbott, 2000:155). It has well-developed mechanisms for opening borders and societies, protecting minorities, empowering regions, pursuing trans-national cooperation, and promoting the principle that differences in language and culture can be a source of strength rather then of division. In this regard it contributes to the consolidation of peace stability and prosperity based on the establishment of bonds of trust between individuals, social groups and countries in the region.

The success of the politics based on those theoretical guidelines depends on many factors. First of all it depends on the willingness of the internal factors to cooperate and be flexible towards the recommendation. Another important incentive is the willingness of the international actors to maintain a sustained commitment on the region and not act only when a crisis blows up. Imposed frameworks have been characterised by Beatrice Pouligny as failing to capture, articulate or modify the routine communal and network negotiations that actually shape the societal concerns (Autumn 2000). Moreover, the international community's attention to, and investments in, "elections, repatriation and measurable macro economic stability projects on the one hand, stands in marked contrast to the limited investment in qualitative social and civil society programs on the other. Concepts of political accountability and representation have made little headway (Pugh, 2000:17) in the region and in Kosovo in particular. The main problem as identified by Garton Ash "is the sheer lack of political will-that we are prepared to spend $13 billion to fight the war in

Kosovo but we haven't been prepared to spent $2 billion to secure the peace (April 2000).

May be the time has come to give more space to the ignored voices and show the political courage to absorb all we have been going through during this conflict, to recognize all that has changed and to adapt to all that is about to change again. The breach between the Albanian and Serb communities is manifested as a struggle over power and identity that in turn acts as a critical intervening variable between external factors and internal formal-institutional outcomes. The interaction between the communities within Serbia and Kosovo as part of this struggle reveals a playing according to the imposed rules while advocating certain democratic commitments and practices while undermining many others according to the actors interests and preferences. Democracy matters when communities share the commitment to its values. Communities, Serb and Albanian, have accentuated the identity patterns of differentiation through processes and institutions. The last war accentuated ethnic identity and deepened hatred. Promoting a self-sustained democracy in such an environment is very difficult almost impossible at least in a lifetime. Democracy means the willingness to have your group to outvote and have power to go to the competing group or party. This needs trust and confidence that nothing threatening will come from a change in power. And this is hard to achieve after a war of attrition (Friedman, 2001).

The self-determination of Kosovo would help the democratization of Serbia that is in line with the international community's objectives. In this way the Serbs will be able to establish a state without national problems, national hatreds and Serbophobia. Serbs have to concentrate the country's energies on the immense tasks facing them at home and let the others do the same. Nations in the Balkans have to learn to live side by side with each other through creating, reproducing, and changing the culture of conflict by way of learning to appreciate and respect each other in the building of a common home for everyone.

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