

Structural Geopolitics in Europe
Constructing Geopolitical Subjectivity for the EU and Russia

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1. Introduction¹

This paper is designed to elucidate structural geopolitics in Europe. This entails mapping the main structural developments and processes in contemporary Europe in the sphere of spatially and geographically coloured politics, i.e. geopolitics.

I argue that the main structural processes in Europe are about the projects of constructing geopolitical subjectivity for the EU and Russia. These projects manifest themselves in the forms of integration efforts and great power politics. The two projects also encounter each other in an interesting way in the question of the Russian exclave/enclave of Kaliningrad. This region is becoming Russia's relatively impoverished and isolated exclave/enclave within the EU, with the neighbouring states Lithuania and Poland presumably becoming members of the Union during the course of the ongoing decade. Lithuania's and Poland's EU accession entails visa, transit and energy supply problems for the Kaliningraders, and several "soft" security issues that call for a display of geopolitical subjectivity both from the EU and Russia.

I make use of perspectives developed in the field of *critical geopolitics* in order to examine these issues. However, in the present paper I also wish to contribute to efforts of developing critical geopolitics perspectives further both in the theoretical and empirical senses. Critical geopolitics is an interdisciplinary field of research at the interface between IR (International Relations) and Political Geography. It is a very diverse field, varying from critical analyses of the International Political Economy (IPE) to largely discourse analytic studies on the conduct of spatially and geographically coloured foreign and security policy reasoning and its popular legitimation. Despite this diversity, I engage here mainly with Gerard Toal's (1999) critical geopolitics framework that ties

¹ This Working Paper is based on the research that I conducted as a COPRI Visiting Researcher in February-March 2001. The paper also represents my initial contribution to the project funded by the Academy of Finland 'Identity Politics, Security, and the Making of Geopolitical Order in the Baltic Region' (no 73115). The arguments in this Working Paper are very much preliminary, designed to raise questions rather than to provide complete answers. Therefore, critical comments are more than welcome for purposes of developing the presented arguments into more elaborate ones. For such comments and useful discussions so far, I wish to thank especially Pertti Joenniemi, Eiki Berg, Simon Dalby, Vilho Harle, Mika Luoma-aho, Sami Moisio, and Gerard Toal; however, they cannot be held responsible for any shortcomings in this paper.

quite nicely together the various threads in recent critical geopolitics writing.²

Toal's critical geopolitics framework puts forth the interesting notion of structural geopolitics and thus offers fruitful starting points for studies attempting to say something new about the construction of Europe. It provides a good basis for developing a coherent approach to the study of European geopolitics, thereby adding to the recent thought-provoking, geopolitically tuned accounts by Christiansen et al. (2000), Tunander (1997) and Wæver (1997). Naturally, as any geopolitical approach, Toal's framework continues to portray geopolitics as the interface between geography and politics. But crucially, in this framework the term geopolitics is surely not any more limited to being an interface between geography and the conduct of states' foreign policy, nor is it limited to the realist power struggle in the global agenda (Aalto and Berg, 2001). In short, it introduces a multifaceted understanding of the term geopolitics, dividing it into its analytically separable *structural*, *formal*, *practical* and *popular* components (Table 1).

² For a few key works in the field, see e.g. Agnew and Corbridge (1995); Paasi (1996); Toal (1996); Toal and Agnew (1992); Toal and Dalby (1998). See also the special issue of *Political Geography* 15(6/7). Note also that the label critical geopolitics must be dissociated from the so-called "new geopolitics" literature (e.g. Tuomi, 1998), which is in many senses continuing along the same lines as traditional geopolitics. "New geopolitics" does reject geographical determinism just as does critical geopolitics, but unfortunately, it remains rooted in an objectivist philosophy of science (Aalto and Berg, 2001). By contrast, critical geopolitics derives from critical theory, poststructuralism and constructionist perspectives (Aalto, 2001).

TABLE 1: Toal's Critical Geopolitics Framework (adapted from Toal [1999])

Type of Geopolitics	Object of Investigation	Problematic	Research Example
Structural Geopolitics	The contemporary geopolitical condition, modern and postmodern geopolitics	Global processes, tendencies, and contradictions	The effect of de/re-territorialisation in conditioning geopolitical practices in Europe
Formal Geopolitics	Geopolitical thought and the geopolitical tradition	Intellectuals, institutions, and their political and cultural context	Contemporary Russian geopoliticians and their ideas in the post-Soviet context
Practical Geopolitics	The everyday practice of statecraft	Practical geopolitical reasoning in the making of foreign and security policy	References to "East" and "West" as objective and clear-cut dividing lines in Europe
Popular Geopolitics	Popular culture, mass media, and everyday understandings of other peoples and places	National identity and the construction of images of other peoples and places	The role of the mass media in evoking fears of a large influx of immigrants from the "East" after EU enlargement

In the present paper, I engage particularly with Toal's (1999) notion of *structural geopolitics*, attempting to apply it into the European context. Thus, I attempt to elucidate some of the main geopolitical processes, tendencies and contradictions that agents in the European context are confronted with and have to deal with. But in taking up this task, in contradistinction to Toal's framework, I do not start from the structural level *per se*. My main argument in this paper is that there is import in starting from the lower-tier level of agents and their interaction, by studying the *formal* and *practical geopolitics* as practised by the major players in the European agenda -- the EU and Russia.³

Formal geopolitics refers to the geopolitical tradition à la Kjellén, Mackinder, Ratzel, Spykman, and others, running from the late

³ Due to space constraints, I bypass the important sphere of popular geopolitics in the present paper. It is about the active legitimation and reproduction of practical geopolitics in the mass media, popular culture, and schoolbooks, as well as everyday understandings and images of other peoples and places. To study these issues effectively, one should launch a series of case studies on various European polities. For such efforts, see for example Aalto and Berg (2001), Berg and Oras (2000), Dijkink (1996) and Paasi (1999).

nineteenth century until present. This tradition depicts geopolitics as the formal, materialistic, and highly specialised knowledge of supposed geographical determinants of history and political developments. It is still kept alive in today's Europe in places like NATO headquarters, European Military Staff (EMS),⁴ military academies, and various think tanks like the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISS). *Practical geopolitics*, by contrast, is about the tacit and unremarkable use of geopolitical terminology by political elites and intellectuals of statecraft, essentialising places, regions and identities, and putting forth such contested notions like the 'East' and 'West' as objective and clear-cut depictions of dividing lines in Europe. Compared to formal geopolitics, it is a universal phenomenon that can be found in foreign and security policy discourses practically anywhere in Europe, from the EU institutions and Russia to member-states, applicant countries and non-applicant countries alike.

That I start from the lower-tier of agents and their interaction, means that I attempt to portray structural geopolitics as a more agent-centric phenomenon than Toal does in his original framework. Concomitantly, I try to make sure that my understanding of structural geopolitics remains structural by its character. In fact, I simply try to devote more attention to the *construction* of structure, the main argument being that the discourses of formal and practical geopolitics by the EU and Russia are directed at constructing *new geopolitical subjectivities*, and that the emergence of these new subjectivities has major consequences at the structural level.

First, I discuss the *ordering* or *order construction* aspects in the EU's and Russia's projects. In this way, I aim to overcome two problems in Toal's structural geopolitics. These are the somewhat unnecessary dichotomy between modern and postmodern geopolitics, and the lack of room for agency and subjectivity. Second, I outline the basic issue sectors in the EU's and Russia's formal and practical geopolitics. My contribution to critical geopolitics in this analysis is the argument that although formal and practical geopolitics provide a good starting point of exploration,

⁴ The EMS is part of the institutional structure of the EU's new military capability. Its task is to conduct strategic planning under the direction of the European Military Committee that consists of European chiefs of defence (Rasmussen, 2000: 6).

more precise conceptual focus points that would be amenable for operationalisation and empirical research are needed, if one is to study how these activities translate to geopolitical subjectivity. To locate such conceptual focus points, I make use of recent advances in IR theory. The notion of *recognition* and the *politics of identity and interest* are particularly helpful in describing how the EU is turning into an emerging geopolitical subject,⁵ which is continuously tested and articulated in the context of a declining but not entirely fading geopolitical power of Russia.⁶ Third, I examine the Kaliningrad question in order to get a more precise idea of how the interaction between the EU and Russia in this question is influencing the structural level in Europe.

2. Structural Geopolitics: Order Construction through Formal and Practical Geopolitics

To study structural geopolitics, some critical geopolitics writers concentrate on pure IPE considerations. However, Toal concentrates on such widely debated notions as globalisation, informationalisation and technologisation. In a critical fashion, he portrays these as the most important processes in the present-day global agenda, arguing that they are leading to a tension between de- and re-territorialising tendencies. Each agent, for example the EU or Russia, should understand how these processes are contributing to the emergence of new geopolitical challenges. According to Toal, these challenges must be addressed in order not to erode the foundations of human existence any further (cf. Toal, 1998: 82; 1999; 122-3). The fact that established discourses and policies are now in question, indicates a shift from a *modern* towards a *postmodern* agenda of structural geopolitics (Toal, 1998).

In Toal's terms, this shift implies moves away from a Cartesian, panoptical god's eye view on global developments, away from the a-historical image of the world as consisting of essential geographical entities or various "pan-areas" competing with each other, and away from the realist thesis that nation-states are the

⁵ For a somewhat different view accentuating the EU's limited "political" role as opposed to its "economic" might, see Medrano (2000).

⁶ In this paper, I mainly exclude the role of the US in the articulation of the EU's geopolitical subjectivity. For this aspect, see for example Ham (2000).

irreducible basic units in this global rivalry. The coming postmodern geopolitical agenda implies new modes of surveillance through satellites and media companies like the CNN, the rise of new conservative forces especially in the US political circles, risk society types of threats and ever more complex and subtle forms of governance (Toal, 1997). In more explicit IR terms, Toal's argument could be re-phrased as simply connoting the coming of new units, the erosion of state sovereignty and the strict delineation of internal and external spaces, coupled with an increasing accent on the economic and societal sectors at the expense of politico-military considerations (cf. Buzan and Little, 1999).

From a critical but still policy-relevant point of view, it is of course important to study the way in which these large-scale processes are reflected in the European context or how various European agents are coping with the challenges that they pose. But, my purpose in this paper is slightly different. I think that the suggested shift from the modern to the postmodern agenda is as yet not quite complete, and that the two agendas in fact co-exist and compete with each other. This is because agents such as the EU and Russia engage willingly both with what can be called modern and postmodern practices. What is more, I am inclined to think that the accent in some of Toal's writings on technological change in global governance and its reflections for example in the functioning of the media (e.g. Toal, 1997), might persuade us to see a more pronounced shift towards the postmodern than is indisputably justified in the European context. In various parts of Europe, in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, and the post-Soviet space in particular, modern geopolitics is still as strong as ever. There are still strong desires towards the deliberate maintenance of state sovereignty, with its strict delineation of internal and external spaces. These modern geopolitical desires need to be examined and exposed. This, I think, will lay a good basis for the study of the pressing global problems identified by Toal (1999), Dalby (forthcoming) and writers such as Beck (1992).

In order to get a grasp of this multifaceted agenda in contemporary Europe, the simple, though telling division into modern and postmodern agendas or epochs is not the most adequate one. These two concepts are best conceived of not as certain historical periods with a beginning and an end, but as different *attitudes* or

states of mind (Pulkkinen, 1996). For Bauman (1995), the modern is about an attitude directed at the endless search for order, i.e., patterned and structured, and at the extreme, disciplined relations between things. For Lyotard (1984), the postmodern dismisses the idea of universal language games like those presupposed in modernist notions of order. On the whole, the postmodern can thus much better accommodate differences and disorder in the global agenda. But this does not connote the fading away of regional ordering games.

The somewhat unhelpful division into the modern and postmodern agendas is best overcome by considering the concept of *order*. This concept is capable of adding some new perspectives to critical geopolitics. That is, *irrespective of whether either modern or postmodern aspects dominate, the desire for order is still there*. In the modern, it is immanent and not that reflective, whereas in the postmodern, at issue is a more reflective search for order in a more complex environment. This search comes with a realisation that universal order is unattainable, and that even in the case of regional order, the maintenance and even promotion of differences may not be that detrimental to the very order being constructed. In other words, although the postmodern may connote the presence of more multifaceted and chaotic features, these same features do not make the desire for order any lesser as such.

The concept of order is most often not associated with regional developments, but rather with either international or world order. In Bull's (1977) well-known distinction, *international order* refers to patterns in the interface between states and international structure. It can take the form of either a system of states with mere contact and relations between them, or a society of states with shared interests, values, rules and institutions. *World order*, by contrast, refers to patterns in human activity that sustain the primary goals of social life among the humankind as a whole. Crucially, in both of Bull's formulations, order is understood as something more than simply "pattern", i.e., involving various *goals* as well. As McKinlay and Little (1986) put it:

The conceptualisation of order purely as pattern is inadequate once we focus on systems involving human intervention. The reason is that humans endow

their behaviour with purpose and meaning. Human behaviour is goal oriented and it is necessary to incorporate goal orientation into a conceptualisation of order.

This effectively means that whilst speaking of order, we should in fact speak of *ordering* (Rengger, 2000) or *order as construct* (Smith, 1999). There is no “order” existing on its own without the presence of active and goal-oriented agency. This point could be put more forcefully in Toal’s structural geopolitics, which, I think, is in need of more accent on *agency* and *subjectivity*. Especially, the focus on globalisation as the defining phenomenon of contemporary structural geopolitics, runs the risk of re-producing the usual account of globalisation as a faceless process without a subject, just existing “out there” on its own, yet affecting everybody and everything (Hay, 1999). Thus, rather than to simply speak of order without a subject to be found somewhere “out there”, we should speak of “ordering projects” by various regionally based agents. By this, I do not simply suggest that “regionality” is superseding sovereignty as an organising principle. Rather, the growing subjectivity of regions or regional formations is introducing more ambiguity into the geopolitical agenda than we have seen recently (cf. Joenniemi, 1995: 339-40).

The EU’s and Russia’s ordering projects can certainly be counted among factors contributing to regionalisation. Although they display *discourses* of formal and practical geopolitics, also *material* factors are involved. Of course, it is true that discursive factors always bear a close relationship to material reality, in the sense that discourses connote material factors in their social appearance. Discourses are always connected to social practices, institutions and policies, and with these to material reality (Neumann, 2001; cf. Wæver, 1998). Nevertheless, the distinction between discursive and material factors has analytical import. The EU is switching from the mere discursive side of putting forth identities aimed at true geopolitical subjectivity, into formulating more precise interests and putting these into material-institutional practice by allocating funds for new and ambitious policy instruments devised for ordering purposes. As for Russia, the distinction helps to trace the growing disparity between the evident discursive desires and the limits of

the possible in post-Soviet reality after Russia's long-run economic decline and its reflections in capabilities (see below).⁷

In this discursive and material-institutional “contest over order”, areas such as the Baltic region become very interesting meeting points for the two major projects. With the Baltic states perhaps slowly but steadily being integrated into the EU project with the progress in their ongoing membership negotiations,⁸ it looks like the Kaliningrad region is now taking the place of a true *liminar*. Kaliningrad, the former Königsberg or northern part of East Prussia that the Soviet Union obtained as a result of World War II, is a region that is highly dependent on external supplies of raw materials and consumer goods.⁹ It has a population of almost one million, and also, a decaying Russian military base as an additional geopolitical burden to live with. Although the base accommodates submarines and is suspected of storing tactical nuclear weapons, it is reported to have a smaller than 20,000 strength of ground forces. On the whole, the base is of declining (geo)strategic significance (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 12 January 2001; Moshes, 1999: 63).

Discourses of Kaliningrad's post-Cold War status evolved back and forth during the course of the 1990s. They ranged from proposals directed at keeping the region as militarised as it was during the Cold War, to proposals directed at developing it as a free trade area à la Singapore, and finally, to the recent suggestions on the EU's more extensive involvement in Kaliningrad's governance. Now, it looks like adventurous talk about “joint EU-Russian sovereignty over Kaliningrad” is not as likely a scenario as is “Kaliningrad as a pilot region” in EU-Russian relations. Nevertheless, it is clear that the mutually competing ordering projects by the EU and Russia must *both* tackle with and cooperate on the specific questions of Kaliningrad's future governance (Jakobson-Obolenski, 2000; Joenniemi et al., 2000).

⁷ I am not saying here that “discursive” equals “identity based” or that “material” equals “interest-based”. Rather, the conceptual distinctions made here are purely analytical. Identity issues are discursive, but they do have their material components. Likewise, interests must be grounded on material factors, but cannot be reduced to them (for more, see next section).

⁸ The Estonian government aims to conclude all chapters in the EU membership negotiations by mid-2002 (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 19 March 2001).

⁹ Kaliningrad imports about 90% of what it consumes, and about 80% of its electricity comes from Lithuania (Trenin, 2000: 46).

This is in fact taking place. Russia and the EU have agreed to place Kaliningrad as one of the items on the EU's Northern Dimension agenda. The EU-Russian Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) that came into force in 1997, offers an institutional channel for the practical conduct of this EU-Russian co-operation (Tuomioja, 2001).¹⁰

3. Constructing Geopolitical Subjectivity I: Recognition, Identity and Interest

Constructivism and the Notion of Recognition

To say that the EU and Russia practise both formal and practical geopolitics with consequences at the structural level, may naturally be of some empirical and theoretical import. Yet, such statements fall short of describing how the EU's and Russia's formal and practical geopolitics actually translate to geopolitical subjectivity. Therefore, I strongly think that more precise conceptual focus points are needed, if we are to elucidate the processes in formal and practical geopolitics pertaining to geopolitical subjectivity.

To begin with, *constructivist* perspectives suggest looking at the notion of *recognition*. That is, geopolitical subjects do not come into existence simply by means of discourses of formal and practical geopolitics. For example, the Kosovar Albanian community does not become a geopolitical subject simply by engaging in particular forms of formal and practical geopolitics. Neither do the Kaliningraders, who have to keep one eye on Moscow and increasingly the other one on Brussels. This is because one must be recognised by the other players, in the discourses of formal and practical geopolitics that *they* put forth. That is a crucial prerequisite for any form of geopolitical subjectivity.

Constructivism is manifested perhaps most prominently in the work of Katzenstein (1996) and Wendt (1992; 1994; 1995; 1999). In the field of European Studies, it is reflected for instance in the work of

¹⁰ One should also note here Lithuania's role. For example in February 2000, Russia and Lithuania issued the so called "NIDA-list" of joint policy proposals on the Kaliningrad question.

Christiansen et al. (1999). It is situated somewhat uneasily between rationalist approaches like realism, English School (ES) and liberalism, and reflectivist approaches like critical geopolitics. It is geared at studying the construction of international structure at the interface between state-agents and the states-system. And, in being a rationalist approach, it is capable of discussing with realism, ES, and liberalism that represent alternative solutions to the “problem of order” (Rengger, 2000; Smith, 2000). For example, Wendt’s often cited paper ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, gives us grounds to claim that what realists identify as anarchy, is in fact socially constructed by states’ agency and interaction with each other. This does not exclude the formation of a society of states, or institutions binding states together by the formation of a common identity. In a good constructivist fashion, structure can always be constructed differently (Wendt, 1994).

It is probably fair to say that at present the EU is neither simply an aggregate of nation-states struggling to realise their national interests as suggested by intergovernmentalism, nor a pure and well-institutionalised federal state in the making as suggested by neo-functionalism. The EU is rather an unfinished and continuing construction process that among other things is taking the form of a geopolitical subject. But it is a very peculiar sort of a subject, since its subjectivity does not seem to subsume totally that of the constituent parts, the nation-states making up the Union. Sometimes the Union has the upper hand and sometimes the most powerful nation-states within it. In this light, the advantage of constructivism is its ability to focus on the sometimes ambiguous and mutually contradictory processes of “making Europe”.

The fact that the EU is becoming a geopolitical subject, is in constructivist terms evident in the EU’s and Russia’s mutual recognition. They have adopted specific (geo)strategies vis-à-vis each other: the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia, and Russia’s Mid-Term Strategy for Developing Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000-2010) (see next section). But what forms does this mutual recognition take? How do the EU and

Russia construct their relationship? Is it about realist “balancing”, ES -influenced “society” or constructivist “institutions”?¹¹

For the moment at least, probably no one would dare to portray the EU’s and Russia’s projects as being simply in the realist sense about “balancing” away each other’s capabilities by means of alliance policy and military build-up. Balancing activities take place much more pronouncedly in NATO-Russian relations.¹² However, they might be entering more clearly into EU-Russian relations as well, if Russia is to view the Union’s efforts at building a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a military capability with more critical eyes than thus far. Most commentators depict Russian political elites still as relatively ignorant of the way in which economic integration within the EU is feeding into the politico-military processes (Trenin, 2000: 24; 35). However, it is clear that they are slowly awakening to the new European realities (e.g., Likhachev, 2000: 116; Pushkov, 2000: 12). In the words of the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (2000):

Going back to the Charter on European Security, I should like to point out that among other things, it lays down the rules for cooperation between international organizations in the OSCE area... In this context I cannot but note the contribution made by the European Union to their practical elaboration. I believe this is only natural given the high-profile role that the EU plays in world and European affairs. We regard all-round cooperation with the EU as one of the top priorities of our European policy. Partnership with the EU is Russia’s strategic choice... Today the EU to us is the largest trade and economic and investment partner (p. 106)

¹¹ I derive here from Rengger’s (2000) excellent discussion on the “problem of order” and the IR responses to it.

¹² The NATO enlargement issue and the Russian-Belarusian “Union state” project can surely be read as balancing activities. As for the Russian side, Dimitri Trenin (2000: 34) notes that the big Russian military exercise “Zapad-99” included practising a counter-offensive by Russian and Belarusian forces to repel an invasion from the West (see also Umbach, 2000: nt. 68). NATO enlargement, for its part, is at its simplest interpreted as an effort of filling the often noted “security vacuum” in the CEE area that emerged rapidly after the demise of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of Soviet troops from continental Europe. However, for a different reading on NATO enlargement accentuating the identity building and security community side in the process, see Williams and Neumann (2000). This reading opens up room for alternative interpretations. The “society of states” elements display themselves in the respect that Russia and NATO display towards each other’s external sovereignty -- for Russia as a state, and for NATO members as individual states -- and in the non-interference into each other’s internal affairs. NATO-Russian relations connote also “institutions”. The NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council was established in 1997 to appease Russia’s misgivings about NATO enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Russia cancelled the functioning of this institution during the Kosovo conflict. However, the activities of the Council are for now resumed.

“Society” elements, for their part, are not that much prevalent any more, as the identity gap between the Union and Russia is turning out to be bigger than thought of initially. Especially the fading away of the early 1990s Atlanticism in Russian foreign policy and the persistent problems in democratic “transition” have contributed to this. The Union, moreover, criticised sharply Russia’s military actions in Chechnia, putting economic sanctions in place. In Russia’s view, the Union violated the non-interference principle in the “society of states” thinking. Thereby, for some observers common interests rather than common identity provide a workable basis for EU-Russian relations (Haukkala, 2001). However, despite the alleged identity gap between the Union and Russia, the Union expresses genuine willingness to discuss with Russia:

Russia and the Union have strategic interests and exercise particular responsibilities in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe, and in other parts of the world. The Union considers Russia an essential partner in achieving that objective and is determined to cooperate with her (‘Common Strategy...).

There are also some common institutions. These operate within the PCA framework, in the form of consultation, summits and economic ties, the latter of which for both sides must count as significant.¹³ So put shortly, the two projects are partially constitutive of each other. Naturally, they also respond to several further phenomena like domestic political and economic pressures, identity building needs and global great power rivalry. In the final analysis, this interrelatedness of the EU and Russian projects originates in their role as parts of the *European security complex*. This connotes

a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from one another (Buzan et al., 1998: 201)

¹³ The share of FDI into the Russian economy by the EU was 64% in 1998 (Lichachev, 2000: 116). About 40% of Russia’s foreign trade is with the EU; with the Union enlarging into the CEE countries, this will rise to some 50%. By contrast, Russia’s trade with the CIS shrunk from 55% in 1991 to 22% in 1998 (Umbach, 2000: 110-1). The EU, for its part, is dependent on Russia’s supplies for much of the natural gas consumed within the Union (Trenin, 2000: 38). Russia provides 36% of the Union’s gas consumption and about 10% of its oil imports (Leshukov, 2000: 43). The loans granted to Russia by the Union and individual member states also connote relative economic interdependence. For example, the repercussions of Russia’s 1998 economic crisis in Germany were bigger than initially conceived of.

These mutual recognition practices are accompanied by the increasing recognition on the part of the other players in the European security complex. The dis-integrationist tendencies in the CIS notwithstanding, it is fair to say that Russia is clearly and still universally recognised as a geopolitical subject in Europe. The EU, for its part, is in the process of attracting more attention and pulling some former potential pretenders into its own orbit. Turkey, in Wæver's (1997) opinion the third great potential geopolitical pole of attraction within the European security complex, was finally granted the status of the EU's membership candidate in the 1999 Helsinki Summit, albeit with the very unambiguous condition that it must first display compliance with the Copenhagen criteria (see below). The sometimes speculated rise of a union of Turkic peoples uniting Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with Turkey, concomitantly seems to become a more and more unlikely prospect. Non-EU states like Switzerland and Norway are also in practice very much bound to the Union, not least because of the Schengen rules and the pull of the single currency. And the recent concerns by the US towards the EU's emerging military capability (Ham, 2000b), seem to give good grounds for arguing that a geopolitical subjectivity of a qualitatively different kind is being constructed in contemporary Europe.

Scholars are also taking note of these developments. For Wæver (1997: 86), the EU appears as a neo-medieval or even "neo-Sumerian" soft empire, and thereby as an entity transgressing the modern/postmodern dichotomy. For others, the present-day EU already displays clear geopolitical interests (Luoma-aho, 2000; Peters, 2000), being engaged in territorial and boundary-constructing activities in the enlargement issue in particular (Moisio, 2000; Tunander, 1997). This is evident in the emergence of the EU's own "near abroad" zones in the Baltic Region and the Mediterranean that are much more extensively governed than Russia's own "near abroad" within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the Former Soviet Union (FSU) (Christiansen et al., 2000: 392).

Indeed, Russia's ordering project is in the eyes of many observers in the process of relative dis-integration. Instead of the whole of the FSU, it is increasingly turning to the more limited context of the CIS. At the same time, the CIS is rapidly losing its initial "post-sovereign" elements. In 1993, Russia started to turn the

organisation into an instrument for maintaining its self-defined sphere of influence by trying to control the sovereignty of the other CIS members (Jonson, 1998: 118). Nevertheless, with Russian leadership often displaying inconsistency and lacking any clear ideas as to how to develop the CIS at a more practical plane, and with various economic problems interfering, results remain thin. Furthermore, the majority of the CIS member states -- with the somewhat different case of Belarus -- have more recently become interested in either maintaining their remaining degrees of sovereignty or going for alternative regional arrangements such as the GUUAM group consisting of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Moldova. Uzbekistan has withdrawn from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, and Georgia and Azerbaijan are even trying to approach NATO. Georgia is also requesting the withdrawal of Russian forces from its territory. The withdrawal of Russia's border guards that were initially forced into Georgia and many other CIS states is already underway (Kuzio, 2000; Umbach, 2000: 107-8). This all means that Russian leadership, especially under president Vladimir Putin, is now going for bilateral rather than multilateral arrangements in the pursuit of Russia's ordering ambitions (NUPI, 2000).

Constructivism and the Politics of Identity and Interests

Constructivism also suggests looking at the *politics of identity and interests*. This helps us to study in more detail the nature of the EU's and Russia's formal and practical geopolitics, and the way in which their activities are translating to geopolitical subjectivity. Unfortunately, for my purposes here, the problem in most constructivist writing remains the fairly static and essentialist conceptualisation of the identity/interests relationship.

Constructivists grant that during "critical junctures", identities are more likely to be subject to change than normally (e.g., Marcussen et al., 1999: 615-7). Such a "critical juncture" definitely applies now to the EU and Russia, both of which are undergoing crucial identity building processes. That this is the case, is evident in the vast amount of literature on topics such as "European identity" and "Russian idea". But, despite this promising tone in constructivism, it unfortunately ends up in an essentialist privileging of identity in relation to interests. This tendency is explicitly present in the earlier

work of Wendt (1994) and the research of Ringmar (1996) (cf. S. Smith, 2000: 162; Luoma-Aho, 2000).¹⁴

It is a persuasive argument to privilege identity. In his reflectivist criticism of Ringmar's work, Neumann (1997: 324) notes that "identity politics is always afoot. It may be more or less central, more or less overt, but it is always there". But for Neumann, identity and interests are mutually constituted. We do not only want what we are, but we also are what we want (p. 323). In his more recent work, Wendt (1999: 231) accepts, in spite of his ultimate privileging of identity in relation to interests, that identity and interests "play complementary explanatory roles, and so rather than define them as rivals we should explore how they work in tandem".

I suggest taking identity simply as a *relational* concept. It mediates the internal and external aspects of the social entity under examination. There is no need to postulate anything "intrinsic" in the identity/interests relationship. This helps us to see the *politics* in identity and interest construction. On the one hand, identity construction processes may become politicised and agents may end up invoking certain interests. On the other hand, processes of defining interests may be prior to identity considerations. The precise relationship between identity and interests is a matter of case-specific empirical study (cf. Marcussen et al. 1999: 617).

¹⁴ Wendt's theory concerns state-agents, and their identities and interests in the first place. Because it allows for the development of supranational identities and eventual formation of a "world state", his theory can also be applied into the EU context. Wendt makes a distinction between "corporate" and "social" aspects of state identity. *Corporate identity* is singular and refers to the "intrinsic, self-organising qualities that constitute actor individuality". It is rather stable and largely prior to interaction with other states. The satisfaction of the *corporate interests* that the corporate identity generates, is dependent on the state's *social identities*, i.e., how the state defines itself and what roles it plays in relation to others. Interests thus emerge as a meeting point between state's corporate and social identities (Wendt, 1994: 385). This model reproduces Ringmar's (1996) account of identities as being prior to interests. However, I think Wendt's distinction between "corporate" and "social" aspects of identity is counterintuitive. He remains rooted in rationalism in assuming a stable corporate identity resisting change in international interaction, whilst concomitantly allowing for multiple and open social identities. From the reflectivist, "constitutive" (S. Smith 2000: 690-1) or a "thick" identity political perspective that I employ here, corporate and social identities are analytical categories that are best conceived of not as different sides of the same coin, but, to borrow from Hay (1999), as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged.

With this conceptual understanding, I argue that the EU is starting to display identities and interests conducive for acting as a geopolitical subject in the areas adjacent to the Union. The formation of these identities and interests represents the result of bargaining and politics between supranational bodies like the Commission, member states, interest groups and influential individuals. This politics of identity and interests within the EU comes up in some occasions in the form of formal geopolitics, but is most often found in the guise of the more subtle and non-deliberate practical geopolitics.¹⁵ Thus, *the Union is increasingly recognised as a geopolitical subject in the European security complex because it is putting forth discourses that display identities and interests more conducive to such a role.* These identities and interests are manifested in the Copenhagen criteria, the Agenda 2000 process, the CFSP, the Common Strategy on Russia,¹⁶ the Northern Dimension (ND) initiative, the Schengen practices, the Barcelona process and the rapid reaction force Eurocorps.

The Copenhagen criteria for EU membership candidate status and the related Agenda 2000 process specify the EU's core *identity* practices with which it expects compliance from the applicants. Concomitantly, in putting forth these criteria the Union expresses an *interest* in maintaining its identity practices. The organising assumption is the Union's character as an association of "European" states. The specific criteria for membership candidate status include in "political" terms the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities. In "economic" terms, they include the existence of a functioning market economy capable of coping with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. The Union also expects the candidates to be able to take on the obligations of membership, including the aims of the political, economic and monetary Union (Löfgren and Herd, 2000: 20-1). Finally, the Union reserves the right to delay the enlargement

¹⁵ I delimit my analysis here only on the politics around identity and interests that leads to *officially* adopted and promoted discourses. I thus bypass alternative formal or practical geopolitics discourses. For the politics within the EU, see for example Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998); Christiansen and Joenniemi (1999); Joenniemi et al. (2000); see also the special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4). For Russian alternative ideas, the literature is extensive; see e.g. Browning (2001); Malachov (1997); Sergounin (1998).

¹⁶ The common strategies concept is not limited to Russia. The Union's intent is to devise such strategies also towards Ukraine, the Mediterranean and Western Balkans.

process until it itself possesses the necessary institutional capacity to absorb new members.

The CFSP, originally agreed on in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, received some new impetus after the decision of the 1996 Intergovernmental conference (IGC) to introduce common strategies to deal with regions where member states have common *interests*. The point in introducing this concept was that it would allow for the “smuggling” of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) into the implementation of the CFSP. This was desired in principle but was found difficult to realise in practice. The “catch” was that the strategies are agreed unanimously in the European Council and that member states can actually veto a QMV decision for the implementation of the strategies (Haukkala, 2000: 17-8).

This messy history behind the common strategies concept is accompanied by the critical comments that the EU's Common Strategy on Russia is a rather weak document (ibid.: 43-4). Despite these doubts, the document lists several ordering goals for the Union, related to the consolidation of Russian democracy and Russia's integration into “common European economic and social space”. But one should note that the tone changes into a slightly more cautious one when the document mentions common concerns in the field of security, stability and common challenges in the “soft” security field. However, it must taken into account that after the EU's failure to act decisively in the Kosovo conflict, these relative shortcomings in the CFSP and the common strategies concept are attracting some more serious attention (Wivel, 2000: 338). That might have the effect of turning the expressed interests into more effective policies than witnessed in practice so far.

The very same Kosovo conflict overshadowed the putting into practice of the ND initiative, which was originally suggested by Finland in 1997 and officially adopted by the EU in December 1998. The ND is centrally about engaging Russia with European level interaction and de-securitising some of the mutual fears and suspicions, but also about regional development issues, and about making use of the unrealisable economic potential and natural resources in Russia and the North of Europe. However, the ND suffered badly from the second war in Chechnia that Russia started in August 2000. Now, with the EU-Russian dialogue

restored,¹⁷ the ND still stands a chance of becoming a launchpad for major ordering practices in the North of Europe. This is because of the relatively undetermined and open character of the ND. For the moment, as Joenniemi (2000) notes, the ND is still best understood as an initiative introducing a new signifier “North” or “northernness” that is open and that can take various referents. It might also appeal to Russia, because it has a positive resonance with the Russian history of ideas, and because of its capacity to overcome the former thinking that has been tied to an “East/West” dichotomy (Joenniemi and Sergounin, 2000: 37-8). The ND can be interpreted as a means of “customising” the Union to suit *Finland’s* interests (Ojanen, 1999), or alternatively, as something that the *EU* has adopted due to its interest in conquering the North more firmly into its own orbit. If the latter is true, it naturally affects the identity of the EU as well. In the minimum, the ND is making the EU’s involvement in the European security complex much more extensive, although “hard” security issues remain outside the scope of the initiative. But, in connection to the Schengen borders question, the Action Plan for the initiative interestingly states that

Developing efficient and secure borders with neighbouring countries after enlargement should build on the EU *acquis* on border management (Schengen) while also learning from the experiences gained at the Fenno-Russian and the German-Polish borders... Kaliningrad’s capacity to take advantage of the opportunities presented by enlargement would require significant internal adjustment e.g. in the field of customs and border controls, fight against organised crime and corruption, structural reform, public administration and human resources (‘Action Plan...)

The idea that the EU is trying to order the North through instruments such as the ND, is most notably visible in the impact of the Schengen practices on regions such as Kaliningrad. The EU’s external borders have evolved and shifted eastwards on the basis of the logic of completing the single market, but more recently this basically expansionist idea has been confronted by the emerging “soft” security concerns expressed by the Union and member-states alike (‘Final Report...). They signify the spill-over of EU

¹⁷ Haukkala (2000: 40-2) mentions several reasons for this: the economic sanctions that were levelled at Russia, were not working, and member states were not acting consistently in line with their earlier decisions. There were also crucial *Realpolitik* motives involved. Moreover, the EU realised it could not do very much to stop the war and did not want to compromise the future relations with Russia. Finally, the EU wanted to give the new Russian president Vladimir Putin a chance to put his many warm words towards the EU into practice.

integration to the security sector that is traditionally related to great power politics. Several member states demand not only the early imposition of the Schengen practices on the Union's near future eastern borders, but also putting a moratorium on the free movement *acquis* after enlargement. Such a moratorium should apply until the new entrants are "Europeanised" enough, so as to avoid refugee and crime flows from the "East".¹⁸

Notwithstanding the largely imaginary nature of these concerns,¹⁹ they present regions like Kaliningrad with a *fait accompli* situation of having to adapt to the Union's new borders and border practices without having too much of a say in their evolution. But the paradox here is that at the same time the Union is setting limits for its *own* geopolitical subjectivity. That is, by requiring applicant countries like Lithuania to establish the Schengen regime on its border with Belarus and the Ukraine upon accession to the Union,²⁰ the EU is interfering into the existing co-operation between Lithuania and the Union's "eastern partners". Because Russian transit goes through Belarus, this intervention by the EU concerns also Russia. In the end, giving away a potentially valuable asset like the applicant countries' experiences of co-operation with non-applicant countries (Grabbe, 2000: 535), the Schengen policy sets unnecessary limits to the Union's future involvement and influence in the "East".

Similar issues invoking hard-core questions about the nature of the EU's geopolitical subjectivity do not arise in the Barcelona process (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). This initiative is far more limited in scope, being mainly about trade and migration issues. In the Baltic Region, the EU can rely on the already existing transnational

¹⁸ At present it looks the moratoriums will be from two to seven years dependent on each specific case (*Helsingin Sanomat*, 31 May 2001).

¹⁹ For example in Germany, in 1997, more foreigners left than entered the country. This was so despite the popular concerns of a large number of new immigrants waiting to enter the country. The big immigration waves that were predicted at the time of Portugal's and Spain's accession into the EU, also failed to materialise (Bort, 2000), just as did the Finnish concerns of 400,000 Russian immigrants waiting to enter Finland after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, a survey published in January 1999 and conducted in the "sender countries", suggested that although there is a substantial number of potential immigrants, the reality is that these people want to emigrate to North America, Australia and New Zealand rather than to continental Europe (*Ibid.*). In addition, Grabbe (2000: 521) argues that most of the potential immigrants are seeking for short-term jobs in the "West" rather than permanent residence.

²⁰ It is possible that not all of the regulations will apply from the date of accession, but from the moment when internal EU border controls are lifted from the new entrants ('Communication...').

networks and co-operation in using the ND for ordering purposes. Nevertheless, as said, at the same time it rather short-sightedly seems to foreclose some of these options deliberately. But in the Mediterranean, positive networks are mainly lacking. The lack of a positive regional identity thus makes the region less amenable for the EU's ordering ambitions (Christiansen et al., 2000: 409-10). And consequently, the pay-off for the Union here does not seem to be big enough to justify the display of more explicit interests.

Finally, the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis also contributed to the 1999 agreement on the establishment of the EU's own rapid reaction Eurocorps force with a permanent strength of some 50-60,000 troops. According to estimates, rapid deployability, however, means in practice that the additional pool of troops must be in the region of 150,000-200,000. Interestingly, this move means that the EU is adopting more explicit practices of formal geopolitical reasoning. The EMS of the Eurocorps force makes use of NATO's highly formal strategic planning resources, and this is effectively turning the Union into a parallel organisation to NATO (Rasmussen, 2000: 5). This is the case despite the EU's emerging formal geopolitical reasoning is clearly targeted at the European, not the transatlantic or global agenda (Ham, 2000: 215). Thus, one can say that the Eurocorps is important for the Union's identity as a European power, in preparation for future wars in which the Union might have a stake or in which it might have an interest in taming them (cf. Rasmussen, 2000).

In a stark contradistinction to the EU, Russia practices extensively both formal and practical geopolitics. The most important discursive tools indicating Russia's identity bid to participate in various ordering practices in the European security complex comprise the "near abroad" policy, National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept, the military doctrine, and more specific documents such as the Mid-Term Strategy for Developing Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010). At the same time, these documents naturally reflect the evolution of Russia's geopolitical interests. Russia's identities and interests are most pronouncedly directed at the CIS. But, the boundaries that it is setting for its sphere of influence are not always that clear. With the increasing accent on Europe, in some eyes they seem to clash with the boundaries of the Union.

The objective of the 1993 introduced “near abroad” policy is formally an identity goal: to protect the human rights of the 25 million Russian minority peoples in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Strategically, however, the policy displays an interest in attaining control over the FSU territory and delimit outsiders’ role in the FSU affairs (Jonson, 1998: 112-5). The gradual emergence of a coherent “near abroad” policy signified the attainment of a consensus on foreign and security policy matters among Russian elites in the early 1990s. Only the twelve members of the CIS are officially mentioned in the documents, but for instance a few Estonian scholars seem to suspect that the Baltic states are in fact treated within the same near abroad framework as well (Hallik, 1998; Velliste, 1994).

The 1997 National Security Concept gave justification to such a sphere of interest policy (Heikka, 1999: 35). The Foreign Policy Concept adopted in January 2000 continues along the same lines in speaking of “ensuring comprehensive protection of the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad” (‘Foreign...). The 1993 Russian military doctrine, moreover, considered “human rights violations” towards ethnic compatriots in the “near abroad” a sufficient cause for a just war (Salomaa, 1993: 146-7). However, one must note that the most recent versions of the National Security Concept and the military doctrine -- published in January and April 2000, respectively -- drop the formerly used term ethnic compatriots, electing to speak only of Russian citizens abroad (‘Kontseptsiia....; ‘Voennaia...). In particular, the new National Security Concept introduces an agenda dominated by economic concerns, internal problems and the CIS. Notwithstanding the several references to the importance of promoting multipolarity in global politics, one can trace a definite, new *selectivity* in the listing of Russian ambitions in the Putin era (cf. Melville, 2000).

The Mid-Term Strategy for Developing Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU represents one example of the increasing selectivity in Russia’s ordering project. The realisation that Russia -- as opposed to the Soviet Union -- cannot be present everywhere, is directing Russian political elites to consider strategic partnership with the EU that might help to bring about a more multipolar world. This would lift the geopolitical status of both the Union and Russia. However, the truly interesting point in Russia’s

document is that it sets clear limits to the expansion of the EU order project. It accentuates that EU enlargement *must not* compromise Russia's interests and that the EU should not try to interfere in the CIS affairs by agreeing any special relationships with any one of the CIS member states (Borko, 2001: 136-7; Likhachev, 2000: 123-4). In other words, Russia is intent on not giving up its own ordering project, which for the present encompasses the CIS, "Europe" and a limited global role (Borko, 2001: 117).

4. Constructing Geopolitical Subjectivity II: EU, Russia and the Kaliningrad Question

The EU's effort to construct geopolitical subjectivity encompasses several ongoing and constantly evolving processes. The character and strength of the EU's emerging subjectivity varies from one policy sector to another. Although the Union is still relatively weak in formal geopolitics and the particular politico-military issues that it connotes, its practical geopolitics displays increasing determination to order the Union's own territory and political space and those of the applicant countries. This determination does not, however, as yet extend to "hard" security issues in the applicant countries. And, the Union is even more hesitant to order regions set to remain non-members, such as Kaliningrad. In its communication to the Council, the Commission states explicitly that "Responsibility for Kaliningrad lies with Russia and the region itself". However, the Commission also comments that "...the EU and its future member states have an *interest* in helping to ensure that the changes required by accession are made smoothly..." ("Communication...; emphasis added).

This rather cautious approach uses very polite language to say that the Union identifies a number of "soft security" threats arising from Kaliningrad. The Union is willing to use its economic power to assist in *managing* these problems in Kaliningrad itself and their effects within the Union. But it is not necessarily prepared to *order* the sources of these problems that are inevitably tied up with Kaliningrad and its status as a Russian exclave/enclave within the future Union. And, as said, this unpreparedness is there despite the Schengen practices actually testify to the contrary. Therefore, the Union's official opinion is that deliberate ordering could take

place only in close co-operation with Russia and Kaliningrad itself. This cautiousness implies that the EU is still deliberating over the proper *scope* of its geopolitical subjectivity. In some sense, such prudence is striking for an agent producing 21% of the world's GDP (Klepatskii, 2000: 83). Also it is somewhat striking for an agent with an emerging military capability, although one that does not match Russia's operational strength. But in future, the EU's capability could be enhanced by the offer of France to assign its nuclear arsenal to EU use. It is also possible to point to the fact that by 2010-15, the combined nuclear capability of Britain and France will be larger than that of Russia, despite Russia's heavy spending for maintaining its strategic nuclear arsenal (Umbach, 2000: 105).

Russia's share of the world GDP is only 1,5%. In 1997, the output per capita was smaller than in Lebanon or Peru. The share of the black economy is estimated to be more than 50%. Coupled with the uncertainties in economic development, legislation and legal order at large, these factors mean that Russia is able to attract only one percent of worldwide foreign direct investment. Even if Russia were able to achieve annual growth rates of five percent after 2000, it would still take more than 15 years to return to the economic level of the late 1980s. And as for the military, only strength of some 200,000-300,000 soldiers is estimated to be well-equipped and operational at the moment (Umbach, 2000: 90-100).

The relationship between the EU and Russia is in economic terms clearly asymmetrical. The EU is capable of providing financial assistance and expertise that are badly needed by Russia in general, and Kaliningrad in particular, in adapting to the effects of EU enlargement. But although the EU and Russia recognise each other as legitimate subjects, and especially so in the Kaliningrad question, they do not display similar subjectivities. The EU's strengths in geo-economics do not automatically translate to strengths in geopolitics. Consequently, the EU is in a clearly weaker position. Of course, this is to a certain extent only natural in the Kaliningrad question. Kaliningrad is part of Russia and thus under formal Russian sovereignty. But for a comparison, one can look at the Baltic states. The Union is there relatively strong on all other aspects except identity and interests in the military sector. Russia is strong precisely in the military sector, having opposed NATO enlargement to the Baltic states rather successfully. Therefore, also in the case of a region in the process of being

included into the EU order, Russia still commands very substantial geopolitical subjectivity. The difference to the Union’s role in the Kaliningrad question is indeed striking.

The disparity in the EU’s and Russia’s geopolitical subjectivity in the Kaliningrad question becomes better comprehensible by summarising how the EU and Russia manifest the components of geopolitical subjectivity in this context (Table 2). As I argued, recognition by the relevant *agents*, and taking place in suitable recognition *practices*, is the basic prerequisite for any form of geopolitical subjectivity. But, recognition needs to be accompanied by discourses expressing suitable identities and interests. As for identities, I discriminate between the *time* and *space* aspects. As for interests, I discriminate between *geo-policy* and *geo-strategy*.

TABLE 2: The Construction of Geopolitical Subjectivity for the EU and Russia (Application to Kaliningrad)

Focus point in formal/practical geopolitics		EU	Russia
Recognition	Agents	Russia, relevant applicant countries (Lithuania, Poland) and EU members (those belonging to ND).	The EU, relevant applicant countries (Lithuania, Poland) and EU members (those belonging to ND).
	Practices	No “balancing”. Relatively weak “society”. Slowly developing “institutions”.	No “balancing”. Ambivalent “society”. Willingness to establish further “institutions”.
Identity	Time	Overcome the European past. Prevent conflicts and tackle with potential post-Soviet security problems like Kaliningrad before they threaten “European time”.	Overcome the present weakness. Strengthen great power status. Kaliningrad as a reminder of Russia’s heroic performance and conquests in WWII.
	Space	Core Europe (EU core), less integrated members, and constantly shifting boundaries of ‘greater Europe’ through enlargement and strategic partnerships. Kaliningrad subject to EU-Russian relations on the whole.	Core Russia (the contemporary Russian Federation), CIS/Eurasia, and selective Russian role/presence in the Baltics, Europe and world politics. Kaliningrad as an access to European space and geopolitics.

Interests	Geo-policy	No compromises on Schengen principles but small concessions possible on specific policies, e.g. visa practices in the interest of economic gains.	Strive for transit rights, economic opportunities and easing of the Schengen visa etc. practices.
	Geo-strategy	Make better use of resources in the European security complex but set limits for inclusion. Do not include regions like Kaliningrad until they are "Europeanised" enough.	Maintain territorial integrity and great power tradition. Use regions like Kaliningrad as bargaining chips for economic gains and for obtaining access to great power politics.

For the Union, a balanced assessment must conclude that the recognition aspect is still probably more important in the constitution of its geopolitical subjectivity than are the identity and interest aspects. This is despite the recent development trends towards stronger identities and interests. For Russia, the score on all aspects is rather high. On the whole, regardless of all the talk of Russia's search for its "true" identity and interests, it seems that at this plane it has not performed any worse than the EU.

The interest aspect nevertheless signals that this might not be the case for too long. It is true that the EU's identity is, if not a weak, then at least an ambiguous and a shifting goal. The EU on the whole is much more an unfinished identity project than the many nation-states presently comprising it. But the Union's current geo-policy and geo-strategy can together change the situation. The Union expresses a geo-policy of trying to manage the "soft security" risks emanating from Kaliningrad and excluding them outside the "cosmos" of the Union in a way that would not simultaneously compromise the prospects of economic gains. This is part of the Union's overall geo-strategy of trying to make better use than so far of the demographic, intellectual, technological, natural and financial resources in the North and the European security complex on the whole. But because the politics of identity and interests are interrelated, the Union's fairly well-defined and strong interests are bound to feed into the identity political side through time, thus strengthening the Union's identity. For now, in the Kaliningrad question, Russia confronts the EU's interests, but in future, it may yet confront an EU with a stronger identity as well.

5. Conclusion: Kaliningrad and Structural Geopolitics in Europe

From the point of view of structural geopolitics in Europe, the interesting aspect is that the EU's and Russia's projects display a degree of shared understanding of common challenges. Russia is willing to treat Kaliningrad as a special case, portraying the region as an active participant in regional and transborder co-operation. Kaliningrad is also the only Russian region that is specifically singled out in Russia's EU strategy (Borko, 2001: 139). The EU, for its part, seems to realise that it does not need to compromise on its Schengen-influenced geo-policy. The Union actually states that existing special arrangements permitted by the *acquis* can be used as a model for Kaliningrad. There is thus common interest ground as both subjects are serious with finding a good governance solution. This seems to give strong grounds for an eventual solution to the visa and transit of goods problems that are probably the most central ones from the point of view of geopolitical subjectivity.

Whether this common interest ground in the Kaliningrad question can lead to a more extensive, perhaps global strategic partnership between the two geopolitical subjects is an open issue. Through the Kaliningrad question, the EU is at least slightly raising its head, although somewhat hesitantly. Elsewhere in the European security complex, its project appears to be stronger than that of Russia, if not entirely overtaking it. The EU's emerging geopolitical subjectivity is indeed of a rather peculiar sort. It is neither quite modern nor postmodern, and it is still relatively thin in formal geopolitics. This lack of behaviour that is commonly associated with great power politics may yet prove to be its major strength. Geopolitical agency carried out by other means than formal reasoning might be potentially attractive for some of the smaller players in the European security complex. With the relative disintegration of the CIS, also others than the present EU applicants might orient increasingly towards the Union. With all likelihood, in the near future the Union turns out to be a bigger player than it is now. The Union, but also Russia, should prepare for this possibility. And, for regions such as Kaliningrad, this prospect should not materialise too late.

Finally, with a view on structural geopolitics in Europe, one thing is certain regardless of the future shape of the Union. The varying degrees of geopolitical subjectivity that the EU and Russia display in the Kaliningrad question, are lending new significance to territoriality in Europe just as are the violent developments in the Balkans. The focus in the EU's and Russia's ordering projects on Kaliningrad's problems thus contributes to re-territorialisation. Structural geopolitics in Europe becomes more territorialised than one might think of at first. De-territorialisation naturally remains a significant challenge to subjects such as the EU and Russia. But for the moment, they seem to be more concerned with fairly traditional territorial issues, rather than with the postmodern challenges. In the end, structural geopolitics, and the variation between de- and re-territorialisation within it, is what the geopolitical subjects make of it. Likewise, without geopolitical subjects, there is no structural geopolitics.

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