US Policy Toward Iraq: The Calculations of Governments in the Middle East

Shibley Telhami

University of Maryland
December, 2002


As the debate over US policy toward continues two questions are important: Why do so many among the US allies in the 1991 war to compel Iraq out of Kuwait now oppose a new war? And what will the consequences of a US-led war against Iraq be for the Arab world? In addressing both questions, the role of public opinion in the region, and the extent to which public opinion really matters in affecting the policies of authoritarian governments are central issues in the debate.

Let me begin by addressing the regional calculations about American policy toward Iraq.  Even aside from public sentiments, one should not underestimate the strategic reluctance of states in the Gulf to support an American-led war on Iraq for two reasons: They fear above all the possible disintegration of Iraq, or continued instability emanating from Iraq, and they do not believe that American assurances to the contrary are credible; they see the task of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and preventing meddling by other states to be potentially overwhelming.  On the other hand, even if the United States commits to a sustained presence in Iraq and to the deployment of the necessary military, political, and economic resources to assure Iraq's stability, many of Iraq's neighbors, and others in the region, fear a possible American military/political dominance that would then include Iraq in a way that alters the strategic picture to their disadvantage.

Governments in the region generally favor preventing Iraq from becoming a nuclear power, especially under Saddam Hussein. Even Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates, who fear Iran more than they fear Iraq and who worry about weakening Iraq too much, support measures to limit Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including reinstating international monitors. But some states also worry about overwhelming American power in the region. Their calculations are thus more complex: They don't want to see Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, but they also fear American dominance, (and in Syria's case, Israeli strategic dominance), especially a scenario of a sustained American military presence in Iraq.

Ultimately, however, most states in the region do not see Iraq as now posing a serious threat to them that warrants a war that could significantly alter the regional environment and presents them with hard choices internally and externally. They don't see the status quo as being especially dangerous, and they don't see hard new evidence to convince them otherwise. Certainly not all of Iraq's neighbors have the same calculations, and the interests of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council are different from those of Jordan, Turkey, Syria and Iran, and there are differences even within the GCC.  Most, however, see American policy on this issue as being driven by either domestic politics, or by strategic designs to consolidate American dominance, and thus do not see an intended good for them. The real issue is whether they have to accommodate the US, because otherwise they will be in even worse shape if they don't, and therefore whether or not they should find some way to benefit if the American decision to go to war with Iraq became unavoidable.

 

One of the biggest reasons for regional reluctance to support an American military effort to topple Iraq's government is concern for public opinion. Although states in the region remain very powerful in their domestic control, no state can fully ignore the public sentiment in the era of the information revolution. Certainly one of the major barriers to getting the support of Arab governments for a war option is public pressure. But much of the public in the Arab world is sympathetic to Iraq's efforts in general; today, they see Iraq as victim, not as aggressor. It is important thus to understand how the public in the region, including the elites, views this issue. First, most don't understand that the basis of the policy to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMD is UN resolutions, so they see the policy as a strategy intended to prevent only Arab states from acquiring such weapons. Second, those who understand the role of UN resolutions raise the question about "double standards" in applying UN resolutions, always with examples from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and they ask in any case, why it is that the US, not the UN, should make the ultimate decision authorizing a war. Third, while some almost wish for an Arab deterrent, even if possessed by Saddam Hussein, most don't believe that it is likely in any case, see Iraq to be helpless, and see the entire focus on this issue as tactical, intended to justify keeping Iraq in a box, or intended to justify a possible war on it. This has become even more so in recent months, with the public in the region increasingly resentful of American policy, and seeing the US as dominating the decisions at the UN.  Fourth, there is continued empathy with the suffering of Iraq's population and a prevailing assumption that the sanctions, not the Iraqi regime, are ultimately to blame for this suffering.

In our limited public debate about Iraq policy, one prevailing view is that we needn't trouble ourselves much with public opinion in the region, or even with the current opposition to war by the region's governments.  The logic of this argument is that in non-democratic systems of government, public sentiment is unlikely to alter the ultimate calculations of governments, and that these governments will have no choice but to jump on the American bandwagon because they can't afford to be on the losing side.  It is true that the record of governments in the region justifies the belief in their ability to contain public discontent.  Certainly in 1991 these governments were very effective in limiting the impact of public resentment, but it is important to note that both the resentment of the US and the sympathy with Iraq at the public level are greater today than they were in 1991.  And it is also the case that government control is more limited at least in the area of information flow, and thus governments are less able to shape public perceptions. 

This is not to say that states do not remain capable of containing public anger; they remain central players in Middle East politics, as is the case globally.  What it means is that they are less certain today about their capabilities, that they face more anger than before, and that we should have no illusions about how they will ultimately contain anger: only through more repression.  So aside from the consequence for Iraq itself, it is likely that one outcome of war with Iraq and possible Arab governments' cooperation in that war is that there will be more repression, despite the best of our intentions.  As in our policy toward Pakistan today, we will be more willing to overlook measures of repression if governments will lend their support for what will be our urgent strategic priorities in bringing about a favorable outcome in Iraq. 

We should also not take it for granted that all governments will swallow hard and jump on our bandwagon once a decision is made.  This will be true for some, but not for all those who joined the coalition in 1991, in part because some fear both the failure of the war and also its success.  The trade-off for them between facing the anger of their publics on the one hand, and facing the anger of the US on the other, have also changed since 1991.  Ultimately, governments will make their decisions on realpolitik calculations, but many of them are uncertain today where these calculations will lead them. 

In the end, it is clear that if the US puts enough resources into play, it will succeed in overthrowing the government of Saddam Hussein.  But we have to remember that that specific objective is an instrument for the broader American objective of reducing the danger of terrorism and protecting American interests in the Middle East.  An American military success could in fact have a short-term strategic benefit, assuming that the US is willing to sustain the effort for an extended period beyond government change.  But the consequence on regional psychology is likely to be different from the one that prevailed in 1991.  Radicals in the region who wanted to see a change in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War pinned their hope on the prospect that Iraq would be a powerful state and that Saddam Hussein would be a new Bismarck who would overcome the pervasive sense of Arab weakness–in the same way that even more people pinned their hope on Gamal abd al-Nasser of Egypt in the 1950s and 60s.  And moderates in the region envisioned that an inevitable Pax Americana could possibly help them transform the regional environment, especially in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, improve prospects of economic prosperity, and begin a process of political liberalization.  At the end of the 1991 war, the defeat of Saddam Hussein certainly led to a sense of resignation by radicals pinning their hopes on Arab leaders and states.  And moderates gathered momentum in support of an American-backed process that was centered on peaceful efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and constructing a moderate coalition in the region.  That coalition crashed with the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in July 2000, and the realization that neither economic prosperity nor political liberalization materialized.   Today, there is a sense of utter mistrust, not only of the US, but of states and international organizations.  And there is a sense of pervasive humiliation in the region at the public's inability to affect any change, both internally and externally.  This, unfortunately, has led many to find inspiration in non-state militant groups, perfect recruits for terrorism.  The source of inspiration for them is no longer states like Iraq, as most people see it today as a helpless victim. Unlike the radicals in 1991, who had some doubt about America's ability to defeat Iraq, today a motivating factor for the radicals is that the US is too powerful and dominating in the region–not that it is weak, or that it lacks the will to exercise power.  The net outcome of a successful scenario, of overthrowing the Iraqi regime and securing an American-backed new Iraqi government, will be to increase the anger, and thus the motivation, that terrorists readily exploit.  It is good to remind ourselves that most of the terrorists coming from the region in the 1990s, including those who committed the horror of 9/11, did not come from Iraq, even though Iraq may have been a factor in their motivation. 

As such, it is not clear that even a success of a military campaign in Iraq will reduce the terrorist threat, and it may even have the consequence of increasing it.   Thus, we must ask the question about the ultimate strategic aim of a campaign, beyond the overthrow of Iraq's government.  Certainly, the central argument in the public debate has been about Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.  A war option would eliminate Iraq's nuclear potential, although one wonders whether other states may not conclude that they should accelerate their own efforts to develop nuclear weapons as a way to deter perceived American unilateralism.   Although some aspiring nuclear states may be deterred initially by the Iraqi example, the likelihood that American resources will be thinly stretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in the global war on terrorism, will make it less likely that the US will contemplate other major wars barring an urgent threat to American interests.

It is also important to consider why states that should fear Iraq most, its neighbors, are less troubled in the short term by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.  There are two areas of difference: most of them do not believe that Iraq has serious nuclear potential, and therefore would need to see significant evidence to accept the proposition.  Second, most believe that Saddam Hussein is a ruthless risk-taker, but not suicidal, and see him as being sensitive to deterrence.  The latter point is especially important, because of the psychology in the region which goes like this: In the unlikely event that Iraq should develop nuclear weapons under the sanctions regime, it will refrain from using them because the consequences will be self-destruction; While Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons before, he has done so against weaker parties who could not seriously threaten him.

These differing views of Saddam Hussein also explain some of our own policy ambivalence.  If we consider that our aim is not merely to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction, but also an active campaign to change the regime in Baghdad, then it is hard to see how we put ourselves on any course but one that which preempts Iraq's nuclear potential, since it will be more difficult to overthrow the government once Iraq is a nuclear state.  But it should be clear to us that what would be driving such a course is not weapons of mass destruction as such, but overthrowing the regime. 

To the extent that weapons of mass destruction remain an important issue, the pursuit of this objective could lead us to contemplate a number of other possible tracks that should become part of our national debate.  One such track is the continued containment policy coupled with the reintroduction of a more vigorous international inspection regime in Iraq.  It is clear that Saddam Hussein has put many obstacles before the international inspectors in the past and he refuses to allow them back.  This may indicate that the same tactics will be pursued by him in the future.   But it is also clear that he has been operating under the assumption that our objective is ultimately to topple him, in addition to limiting his capabilities in the meanwhile.  The only way a strategy to get his full cooperation could have a chance of success is if his overthrow no longer becomes the objective; He will always choose his survival over all else.   As such, the debate over Iraq policy should consider how important regime change is as an objective, and whether it is worth the risks of a military option even if there is a chance that a non-military solution could be found.