Inspections in Iraq?

Is the third time really the charm? Twice before the United States has tabled draft resolutions for the Security Council’s consideration, only to be stonewalled by other members seeking to constrain Washington’s intentions. A third effort, submitted today, will probably overcome these objections and it seems likely that U.N. weapons inspectors will return to Iraq. Their return will signal a new phase in the confrontation with Saddam Hussein. But it remains far from clear whether the inspection process will result in the disarmament of Iraq or an invasion to overthrow Saddam.

If the resolution passes this week or next, it will be almost two full months to the day since President George W. Bush challenged the U.N. Security Council to once again exert its authority in Iraq and seek out that country’s banned weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the meantime, the United States has engaged in a good deal of high-level diplomatic wrangling with the other veto wielding members of the Security Council, as well as its non-permanent members. The stumbling block has been France and Russia’s reluctance to sanction an automatic mechanism that would allow for military action, meaning an American invasion to overthrow the regime, should Saddam replay games of hide and seek with U.N. inspectors. France and Russia both sought a two track approach: one resolution compelling Iraq to comply with past orders to disarm under the supervision of inspectors, and another to follow sanctioning the use of force by the Security Council as a whole in the event of Iraqi noncompliance. This raised the possibility of future disputes within the Council if its members could not agree on whether or not Saddam was cooperating fully, an eventuality the United States was anxious to avoid.

The new U.S.-British sponsored resolution incorporates some conciliatory language designed to address French and Russian concerns. Hans Blix, head of the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC), will report Iraqi violations to the Security Council “for assessment.” Earlier drafts of the resolution called upon the U.N. to use “all necessary means” to disarm Iraq, a phrase that was generally agreed to mean military force. The new resolution simply alludes to a former resolution, 687 (1990) that authorized member states to use “all necessary means” to implement other relevant resolutions. Hence the language in the new draft is non-binding. Nevertheless, the resolution preserves the credible threat of force that is seen by Washington as fundamentally necessary in order to compel Iraqi compliance with arms inspections. The document does not place limits on an American response to further Iraqi obstructionism and decides “to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” Thus the bottom line of the U.S. position remains seemingly intact.

It remains to be seen if this compromise language is enough to guarantee success in the Security Council, but passage of the resolution seems likely. Other members on the Council harbor few illusions regarding the American commitment to disarm Iraq one way or another. Passage of the resolution would allow France, China, and Russia, the three other permanent members to exert some influence on the matter and look after their interests. But even if the resolution escapes a veto, it will still have to be approved by nine of the 15 members on the Council, some of which continue to voice doubts.

Still, the likely passage of the resolution by Security Council marks a new phase in the international community’s confrontation with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as well as the U.S. approach. For the time being at least, Washington seems to be limiting its rhetoric regarding regime change, and focusing on the more multilateral priority of disarming Iraq. Recent statements by the administration suggest that, if Iraq can be verifiably disarmed through the United Nation, then its requirements will have been met. But there is no shortage of skepticism in the administration about whether the inspections process will yield adequate results. Inspectors have not been in Iraq since 1998, and U.S. officials contend that Baghdad has had plenty of time to hide its illicit weapons and WMD programs. Moreover, the onus remains on the Iraqis to destroy their own banned weapons, and abolish the development programs for WMD and their delivery systems. It is the job of UNMOVIC and inspectors form the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that this has been accomplished.

The new resolution set a high bar for Iraqi compliance and mandates a far more intrusive inspections regime than in the past. It empowers arms inspectors to access any sites they choose, including presidential sites previously off limits. It also eliminates old procedures that hampered inspector’s access to suspected weapons facilities. Inspectors can move freely throughout the country, employ aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, and use foreign intelligence information to guide their searches. Though UNMOVIC personnel will not be accompanied by U.N. security guards, as proposed by Washington earlier, the draft allows inspectors to “freeze” sites, effectively excluding ground and air movement around sites of interest. Inspectors will also have the power to remove Iraqi arms experts and their families to safe havens for interrogation.

Whether Saddam’s commitment to his WMD programs will override his interest in cooperating with the Security Council remains an open question. He may view these weapons as fundamental to the prestige and survival of his regime. On the other hand, Saddam is a survivor, and is likely to do whatever it takes to avoid providing a pretext for a war that would surly end his regime altogether. His worst fear is that inspections will lead both to his disarmament and his overthrow if Washington allows them to proceed only so far as to supply a casus belli. Washington’s fears are exactly the opposite: the return of inspectors will bring neither the full disarmament of Iraq nor a war to end the regime. Levels of American military equipment and personnel in the Persian Gulf are climbing, and Washington is intent on having the requisite force positioned for a move on Iraq should that time come. But it is not here yet and, for now, Saddam’s room to maneuver seems increasingly constrained. Still, if inspections drag out beyond the winter weather window Pentagon planners prefer for an invasion of Iraq, Washington will have its own difficult choices to make. Ironically, whether or not the United States goes to War in Iraq may now be in the hands of Hans Blix.