From the CIAO Atlas Map of Middle East 

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CIAO DATE: 01/04


Economics of Iraqi Security (Part II): Assessing the Value of Security Spending

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

By Michael Knights

PolicyWatch #796
October 21, 2003

Expanding the size of Iraqi government security forces will be key to reducing the amount of international troops in the country, including U.S. forces. On October 19, the Washington Post reported a U.S. plan to reduce its military presence in Iraq from the current level of 130,000 troops to 100,000 by summer 2004, and to as little as 50,000 by mid-2005. Whether such reductions are possible will depend in large part on how quickly Iraqi security forces fill the gap, especially in light of uncertainty over the number of international peacekeepers that will replace U.S. forces.

Increasing the size and scope of Iraqi security forces will require extra funding. In 2004, various Iraqi security sectors will be allocated a total of $4.8 billion from several different sources. In cost-benefit terms, such expenditures could reap major savings for the United States in terms of both blood and treasure (assuming that the Iraqi forces in question are loyal and efficient). Moreover, the development of security structures such as police forces will have beneficial effects on Iraqi society, reducing the endemic levels of crime that impede economic recovery and complicate the process of reconstruction.

 

Direct or Hard Security Spending

The 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) budget for Iraq, financed by Iraqi resources such as oil exports, allocates funds for a variety of hard security items (i.e., items directly related to security):

 

Indirect or Soft Security Spending

Under the 2004 CPA budget, the Iraqi Ministry of Finance is slated to pay $250 million in stipends to demobilized soldiers. The stipends will reportedly be distributed to 320,000 former soldiers, giving them an average of $780 for the year; in contrast, the average government workers salary in 2004 will be $2,000. Although the stipend will provide demobilized soldiers with money, it will not occupy their time, giving them ample opportunity to get into trouble (e.g., join the resistance). Former soldiers will need real jobs as well as short-term social safety-net support. Expanding local security forces may help absorb some of the disgruntled former military personnel who could prove troublesome to the CPA if left unemployed.

Even so, there is a troubling gap between the reported 320,000 scheduled to receive stipends and the 440,000 soldiers and security personnel that were demobilized on May 23, 2003. The 120,000 presumably unsuccessful claimants may become doubly aggrieved once the new budget takes effect. On October 11, an estimated 14,000 former soldiers and security personnel took part in violent demonstrations in Baghdad, with one protestor killed.

Extensive government employment may also help ease social tension. As many as 2 million government jobs have been budgeted for 2004 (although many of these jobs will be disguised unemployment, giving employees a wage but little actual work to do). Central government salary expenditures will be $2.8 billion, not including the salary component of the $500 million allocated for state enterprises and the $745 million allocated for local and regional governments. The CPA will also continue the public distribution system begun under the UN oil-for-food program, allocating $3.5 billion to it for 2004, or $130 per Iraqi. The CPA projects that it will increase funding for the system to $4.9 billion in 2005, with no plans to phase it out until after 2006.

 

Implications

The United States is serving its own interests by investing in Iraqs security forces. By the end of 2004, the CPA plans to have nearly 140,000 Iraqi police, military, and paramilitary forces under arms at a cost of around $2.2 billion (including a variety of start-up costs). These forces will thereafter be relatively cheap to maintain in the field. Even the initial annual cost of $2.2 billion will seem like a bargain, averaging out to about $43 per day per Iraqi soldier/policeman. In comparison, maintaining U.S. forces in Iraq currently costs $3.9 billion per month for 130,000 troops, which works out to $1,000 per day per soldier, not including salaries. To be sure, the CPA need not choose between Iraqi and U.S. forces. Ideally, the two would be mixed: Iraqis would undertake law enforcement as well as static and border defense, with smaller U.S. forces responsible for proactive counterinsurgency operations.

Small financial sacrifices now could well reap big rewards in the long term. For example, if 120,000 former soldiers are not in fact given demobilization stipends, the maximum savings will be relatively small (less than $100 million per year). Moreover, these savings could be more than offset if a considerable number of these soldiers cooperate with the resistance. Counterinsurgency is very expensive, and much of it is directed against active resistance elements that may number fewer than 5,000 fighters. The CPA would be well advised to use such cost-benefit analyses to determine how economic and employment issues affect its security program.

Michael Knights is the Mendelow defense fellow at The Washington Institute.