CIAO DATE: 09/2008

Iraq’s Interior Ministry: Frustrating Reform

May 2008

United States Institute of Peace

Abstract

In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group reported that the Iraqi Interior Ministry (MOI) was confronted by corruption, infiltrated by militia and unable to control the Iraqi police. In July 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that Iraq’s MOI had become a "federation of oligarchs" where various floors of the building were controlled by rival militia groups and organized criminal gangs. The report described the MOI as an eleven-story powder keg of factions where power struggles were settled by assassinations in the parking lot. In its September 2007 report, the congressionally mandated Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq described Iraq’s MOI as a ministry in name only, dysfunctional, sectarian and suffering from ineffective leadership. Even Iraq’s Interior Minister, Jawad al-Boulani, has called for the comprehensive reform of his ministry.

Despite its problems, Iraq’s MOI is responsible for providing policy guidance, training and administrative support for Iraq’s four civilian security services:

• The Iraqi Police Service: A 275,300-member force, controlled at the provincial level, which provides basic police services throughout the country.
• The Iraqi National Police: A 32,389-member gendarmerie that is deployed in Baghdad and other parts of the country to assist U.S. and Iraqi military forces in counter insurgency operations.
• The Iraqi Border Enforcement Service: A 38,205-member force stationed at strong points along Iraq’s borders that is charged with preventing infiltration, smuggling and illicit trafficking.
• The Facilities Protection Service (FPS): A 150,000-member force of largely autonomous units that is responsible for protecting government ministries.

In total, MOI is responsible for an armed force of nearly 500,000 members—roughly three times as large as the new Iraqi army, navy and air force combined. It is also responsible for assorted civil functions such as nationality, passports, immigration control and regulation of private security companies. How did this severely troubled, but extremely critical institution come into being?

The history of Iraq’s MOI in the post-Saddam era and the U.S.-led effort for institutional reform were discussed by two distinguished experts at a USIP forum on April 7, 2008 titled "Fixing the Interior Ministry and Police in Iraq." The principal speakers were Andrew Rathmell, director of the UK’s Iraq MOI Reform Project, and Matthew Sherman, former advisor to Iraq’s interior minister. Robert Perito, senior program officer in the USIP Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations moderated the session. Following is a summary of the views expressed by the speakers and the audience.

Resource link: Iraq’s Interior Ministry: Frustrating Reform [PDF] - 71K