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2011—A Testing Year for Turkish Foreign Policy

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INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

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Abstract

2011 was undoubtedly a year that witnessed the beginning of grand transformations which will continue in the years ahead. The popular movements under the name of the Arab Spring started in Tunisia and spread quickly to the rest of the region, sparking the process of political transformation. In another part of the world, the economic crisis which began in Greece and then engulfed the whole eurozone took the European Union to a difficult test regarding its future.

Both events, one lying to the south of Turkey and the other to its west, interact directly with our country and therefore its zone of interest. Ankara inevitably stands in the epicenter of these two transformations of which the effects will certainly continue for a long period. Consequently, rising as a stable focus of power with its growing economy and its expanding democracy, Turkey has tried to respond to historically important developments throughout the year.

In light of these realities and developments, this study will focus on the performance of Turkish foreign policy with regard to global and regional transformations which took place during 2011.

2011—A Testing Year for Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkish foreign policy displayed a giddy performance in 2011. Ankara is situated at the epicenter of the global and regional transformations and it strove to respond to historically important developments with policies based on stability and peace.

As far as Turkish foreign policy was concerned 2011 was a year in which the world grew rapidly more complicated and crisis management and solution became much more difficult in its region.

There was hardly a single day in 2011 when we did not read about important events in the newspapers which had a bearing on foreign policy. So, Turkish foreign policy was conducted at a high tempo throughout the year. This is closely related to developments along two axes. As far as bilateral relations were concerned, Turkey expanded its contacts with many countries. As for multilateral relations, 2011

was an extraordinary year for all the world's countries. The global economic crisis and the Arab Spring more or less forced foreign policy makers to follow a crisis-based foreign policy. In short, as far as Turkish foreign policy was concerned 2011 was a year in which the world grew rapidly more complicated and crisis management and solution became much more difficult in its region.

Turkey and the Arab Spring

The best place to start is to look at developments in Turkish foreign policy in the context of the Arab Spring. The popular movements we call the Arab Spring led Turkey to make a speedy assessment and conclude that both in terms of what it believed in and in terms of its real interests, the right thing to do was to support the legitimate demands of the people.

This analysis was based on the belief that the popular movements which had erupted were irresistible and irreversible, and that legitimate governments with popular support would be better for Turkey to deal with. Turkey could see that such a radical transformation would not be easy and that it contained risks and uncertainties. But it believed that acting timidly in the past in the name of stability had not gained anything and that this time it would be unhelpful, so it gave its support to popular demands.

But Ankara also tried at the same time to proceed sensitively to ensure that the process took a peaceful form and that it did not open the way for new rifts. For this reason, in the case of both Libya and Syria it initially tried to persuade the existing regimes and their leaders. However, when it saw that its efforts would not produce any results and that its good intentions were being exploited, it resorted to force and took care to act jointly with the international community. Consequently, it can be said that Turkey has followed a consistent and ethical policy from the onset of the

Arab Spring until the present, responding to the particular characteristics of each country and their variations of nuance and style. Turkey's historical links with the region and the growing political and economic role it is shaping for itself in foreign affairs all oblige Ankara to pursue an active policy in the region. The majority of the peoples of the region view Turkey as a model or source of inspiration for their expectations and this imposes additional responsibility upon Turkey. But this situation has not pushed Turkey into carelessly taking the fore by itself. Turkey has been rather careful to act in unison with the Arab League and international community. In other words, realism has not been forsaken.

So now, when one reflects on where we were at the start of the process, it is more correct to say that the steps taken have been in the right direction rather than talk about success or failure. It must not be forgotten that in the final analysis success lies in the hands of the people of the region and that Turkey is a minor actor in the process. Considering this, what we

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have experienced shows us at the same time that although Turkey's prestige with the peoples of the region has grown and despite the growth in relations in the last few years, we in Turkey do not have the strength needed to have a decisive effect on regimes which act on the basis of a survival reflex.

Rather than showing the errors and shortcomings of Turkish policies, this observation confirms the realities of the region. Because, just as they have not secured legitimacy for the regimes, the relations these countries are developing with Turkey have also not relegated their people to the background. Events such as the abolition of visas and the lifting of restrictions

on the showing of Turkish TV soap operas have increased the impact and prestige of Turkey on the people of these countries, and made it easier for them to see what the outside world is like.

In this respect, Turkey must continue in the period ahead to develop its relations with the countries of the region. With regard to their demands for democracy, it should not try to usurp the place of their people and try and impose it from the outside, but it should also not remain insensitive to legitimate and peaceful demands coming from the people. It should also not give up trying to make positive use, albeit it limited, of the influence that closer relations are generating,

The Fate of the Zero Problems Paradigm

Quite naturally, the Arab Spring has led to intense debate about the fate of the “zero problems with close neighbors” approach which has put its mark on Turkish foreign policy over the last decade.

There are even some specialists who say that 2011 was the year that this policy broke down. Such inflexible judgments stem from an imperfect understanding of the zero problems policy. The zero problems policy never implied solving all problems at once or claiming to be able to do so. Its argument was that Turkey would benefit far more from good relations than allowing the problems to continue, and that it should therefore make active efforts to that end.

Certainly Turkey’s democratic and economic strength and potential make it possible for it to pursue a self-confident foreign policy and bring it to a condition where, instead of perceiving things through the prism of threats, it is more logical and useful to approach things within a perspective of potential opportunities. As such, “zero problems” is not very different from the principle “Peace at Home and Peace Abroad.” It is simply that in the last decade the number of instruments for applying it has increased enormously.

Because of that, the policy we are discussing has not lost its functionality. It is a style of approaching things and for this reason it will continue. But it is also a fact that in the face of recent developments, it

has become rather more difficult for this policy to yield concrete results vis-a-vis certain countries. For example, relations with Syria have entered a difficult period. In addition, there are difficulties with Iran in some areas. But on both topics, Turkey has not adopted an approach which involves creating problems or remaining inactive in the face of problems. On the contrary, it is making a realistic analysis of the situation which has arisen because of the attitudes of these countries and it is pursuing a decisive policy aimed at resolving these problems in light of it.

A resolution of the problems is ultimately not dependent on simply the position that Ankara takes up: The other sides involved must be able to display the same willpower. Relations with Israel and Armenians constitute two clear examples of this deficiency. Nevertheless, it is plain that Turkey does not envisage making concessions in areas which affect its national interests simply in order to have zero problems no matter what the cost of a solution may be, or just for the sake of good relations with its neighbors. An approach of this kind would not get popular support nor would it produce lasting results in the long run.

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Turkey must assess the problems we face within a framework of a realistic will to solve them and one that is in accord with its principles. So pressuring Syria into making reforms and supporting a period of transition in that country is an active policy to get rid of the problems which stem from the Assad regime, with which normal relations can no longer be carried on. Apart from the debate losing its meaning, if a regime came to power in Syria which had popular support it would

mark the greatest expansion of the zero problems policy.

A similar situation is also valid for Iran. Turkey is reading Iran-related developments in the region correctly and making great efforts to avoid making mistakes. It is still too early to say whether those efforts have been empty or unsuccessful. On the other hand, Turkey's relations with many of its neighbors, like Greece, Russia and Georgia are better today than at any time in the past.

Syria: Relations That Improve and Deteriorate Rapidly

Because of their importance, we have to look more closely at the Syrian dossier. It has to be said again that Turkey's relations with Syria entered their present plight because Syria used violence against its own people, and the international community with the Arab world at its head did not abandon them.

There was no question of Turkey being able to carry on with its relations with such a regime as if nothing had happened. But here there arises the question of how such good relations could have been developed over the last decade with the same Assad regime. Turkey certainly was aware over the last decade that Syria was not governed by a democratic regime. And although it did express its expectations about reform in private contacts, it never voiced them loudly in public or made them a precondition for developing closer relations. But this did not arise from lack of concern for the position of the Syrian people or simply considering Turkey's own economic and political advantages. It would have been neither right nor effective for Turkey to put itself in the place of the Syrian people and start preaching democracy. Everyone knows what happened when the U.S. attempted to impose democracy from the outside. Moreover, when Assad was advised that he had to take steps toward reform and the advantages of doing

so were explained, the replies that Turkey received were always positive—but they were never followed up with actions.

When the people of Syria began to struggle openly for democracy and the Assad regime responded to these demands with a shrug, Turkey fell on the side of the people and opposed the Assad regime which until now it had strongly supported in several areas. As it did so, right up until the last moment it still tried to persuade Assad to take the right steps and when it realized that this was not producing results, it stepped up the pressure. Turkey's aim and expectation is that Syria make a transition to democracy in conformity with the demands of its people and that peace and tranquility be obtained for the country. It is certain that Turkey will continue to work for this goal. When this transition has been achieved, there will be much more rapid progress in relations than ever before and the two countries will truly become good neighbors.

Iran: A Game Changer

Relations with Iran posed another area in which Turkey was tested in 2011. It is no secret that in all periods of history Turkish-Iranian relations have always had an aspect of difficulty.

the installation of a radar shield at Kürecik as part of a NATO missile defense system is, as far as Turkey is concerned, less of a move against Iran and more an attempt to defend itself against potential danger, and also to fulfill its obligations within the alliance.

But whatever their differences, the two countries have also succeeded throughout modern history in not allowing things to reach the point of a hot conflict. In particular, Turkey in recent years has believed that the policy of isolating Iran and forcing it into a corner is more likely to increase this country's potential for causing instability, and so has tried to engage in regional efforts to produce stability. Perhaps it cannot be said that these efforts were very successful, but they were of use in so far as they sent the necessary messages.

However, Iran has recently begun to feel more isolated and distrustful because of developments in Syria and its nuclear program, and the effect of this has been that it has tried to open up a belt of sectarian support for itself from Iraq to Lebanon. All these developments cut across the policies which Turkey is following. But Turkey has not allowed this to create overt tension; rather it has taken care to engage in dialogue to convey its thoughts on the matter to Iran. In this context, the installation of a radar shield at Kürecik as part of a NATO missile defense system is, as far as

Turkey is concerned, less of a move against Iran and more an attempt to defend itself against potential danger, and also to fulfill its obligations within the alliance. Although Iran has attempted to present this as a hostile move against itself, Turkey is in the process of making the relevant clarifications and guarantees that its territory will not be used for an attack on Iran. In return, it expects that Iran will not launch a damaging campaign against Turkey.

The subsequent course of events will in large measure be determined by Iran's policies in the Middle East region. If Iran blindly supports the regime which is oppressing its own people in Syria and gives its support to the violence, and if, for the sake of its own narrow self-interest, it incites sectarian clashes in the region, then it will not be possible to achieve the desired level in Turkish-Iran relations or even to carry on with relations at their present level. But Turkey's main desire is for close consulting with Iran and for Iran to become not just a part of the problems, but part of the solutions.

Israel: Relations Hit a Low

Turkey's trickiest foreign policy issue in 2011 was Israel. There is no doubt that Turkey is not happy with the point at which Turkish-Israeli relations have now reached.

It believes that the present situation reduces Turkey's capacity to play a constructive role in the region and has the potential to create problems in U.S.-Turkish relations. But Turkish diplomacy believes that it has fulfilled its duties to the full in this respect.

It is abundantly clear that at the present any normalization of relations is dependent on Israel taking the steps expected of it. Given the composition of the present government in Israel, Turkey may not be very optimistic about this, but it appears ready to respond to every step taken in this direction. The measures which Turkey has announced regarding Israel are reasonable precautions within the boundaries of international law. What Ankara has to say about freedom of navigation, a point frequently stressed, amounts in essence to a refusal to tolerate practices which breach international law. Consequently, what needs to be stressed is not this point but the fact that unease is felt about it. No country is above the law and violation of the law must not be permitted, particularly at a time when the region is going through a sensitive period.

Despite this, it is equally clear that Israel has set out along an utterly mistaken and dangerous path by looking for ways to make Turkey uncomfortable rather than trying to normalize relations with it. Its demarcation of maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean and its work on

prospecting for natural gas are particularly striking. It is not just that Israel should not take an initiative in this area: It should also take care to avoid falling into a Greek Cypriot trap and not allow itself to become a part of the intricacies of the Cyprus problem. It will be understood that Turkey's intention is not to stir up unnecessary conflict but to ensure that its rights under international law are protected. In doing this it does not have the intention of raising mutual tensions but of involving international platforms. A practical example of this is the proposal which it presented to the U.N. Secretary General regarding the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus's (TRNC) proposal about the Greek Cypriots' prospecting for natural gas, a proposal which the Greek Cypriots rejected.

The attitude that the Greek Cypriots are taking, both with regard to the timing of their initiatives and the form they take, depends as it has long done on blocking progress toward a settlement by creating unnecessary new crises and then making sure that Turkey takes all the responsibility for them. Christofias is currently going through a difficult period in his domestic political issues and so is casting around for ways to reach his target, and it has become very obvious how, just like his predecessors, he does not see the Turkish side as an equal.

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EU-Turkish Relations Caught Up in the Cyprus Problem

The Cyprus problem and the Greek Cypriots find their reflection in EU-Turkish relations. It must be stated at the outset that Turkey has not deviated from its aim of full membership in the European Union.

Membership is still a strategic goal. The work done by the government in the past year and in particular the establishment of the European Union Ministry were the clearest indications during 2011 of Turkey's determination.

But the EU has not fulfilled its obligations toward Turkey within the accession process because it is effectively mortgaged by certain of its members, and this is hampering the speed and nature of the process. Everyone should recognize the difficulty involved in a candidate state making some of the reforms required of it when a clear perspective of eventual full membership is not available. Although the Turkish people still support EU membership, the belief that it will actually happen is declining and support for various difficult steps needed for membership is running at low ebb.

Furthermore, although Turkey has taken the steps expected of it on the visa issue, the EU continues to resist the lifting of visa requirements and this is having a negative effect on Turkish public opinion while also preventing the creation of suitable circumstances which would end certain mistaken perceptions in EU public opinion. Meanwhile, the EU is far from

presenting a constructive position on Cyprus and is not assisting in finding a solution for the problem. The Greek Cypriot administration in Southern Cyprus will assume the rotating presidency of the EU for the second half of 2012, and this is something which will further strain relations and make progress on Cyprus harder—another challenge which Turkish foreign policy has to face in 2012.

So to sum things up, it is clear that 2011 was a lost year as far as the EU accession process was concerned. The Turkish government did take the initiative in taking various steps and enacting reforms, but if the expression is appropriate, 2011 was a year in which Turkey continued to live on capital. Turkey does not claim that it has carried out all the obligations for membership. Naturally, there are shortcomings and these have to be resolved. But accession is a path which Turkey should not have to travel on its own: It ought to be happening with mutual cooperation and dialogue.

Turkey and Turkish public opinion suggest that the EU should produce a more healthy policy toward Turkey from now on and that it should not be shaped on the basis of short-term interests, but

with the aim of getting the accession process back on the rails in light of a strategic vision. The EU Commission's proposal for a "positive agenda" is an initiative along the right lines but it is not sufficient. Turkey is ready and enthusiastic to take the negotiation process further. But because of the economic crisis that we are passing through and the elections in the larger countries there is virtually no one in Turkey who feels much optimism about the EU being able to do anything of this kind.

Could the Arab Spring Reignite Turkish-EU Relations?

The Arab Spring is the main development that could lead to a paradigm shift in Turkey-EU relations in 2012. Virtually everyone accepts that there is a global shift of power toward the east and south, something that is half certain.

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To maintain a vantage point in these unfolding new circumstances, perhaps more than ever before the EU has to act in unison. This is because the Arab Spring began a period full of both risks and opportunities for the EU. The Union has both a serious responsibility and a duty to steer the process in the right direction.

But whether because of the current economic crisis or a shortage of strategic thinking, the EU has been unable to do what might have been hoped for in either area. Turkish membership in the EU would bring both richness and strength to it, economically and in terms of its strategic depth. The countries caught up in the Arab Spring have great potential with regard to Turkey and EU coming together. The impact of aid given to the Arab countries within the context of Turkish-EU cooperation will certainly be much greater than that which might be given by

the two sides separately. But another important aspect is that joint support would testify to the universality of democratic values and thus inculcate a stronger spirit of confidence about the future into the Arab street. Turkish-EU cooperation is thus very important for the countries living through these developments. Turkey is ready to go ahead with this idea, indeed it is ready and willing, but at present no moves can be made in this direction because of the institutional limitations of the European Union and its shortcomings in its processes for taking strategic decisions. A stark illustration of this came when Turkish Foreign Minister Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu could not be invited to the recent meeting of the EU Foreign Relations Council at which Syria was to be discussed, though even both France and Germany would have liked this to happen.

Turkey and the Turkic Republics: Relations in the Shadows

One of the least unsettled areas of Turkish foreign policy in 2011 was relations between Turkey and the Turkic republics. The Turkic world has travelled a long way over the last twenty years.

Bilateral relations have had their ups and downs during this period, but they have now matured and have stabilized with their feet firmly on the ground. But with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, all these countries are still under “one man” forms of government and as a result it is still difficult to make long-term forecasts for relations with them.

Doubtless, it is the natural resources of these countries, principally their energy resources, which stimulate the interest of the great powers in them. Russia’s policies toward them in particular impede the transition to democracy. But we should not completely exclude the prediction that Central Asia will be the next stop for the democratization process after the Arab Spring.

At the same time, Turkey will continue to develop relations with the Turkic world at all levels both because of its ethnic and historical affinities with these brother countries, and also because of the strategic importance of the region. It will continue to follow a policy of extracting maximum benefit from the Turkic Cooperation Council established last year and endeavor to institutionalize the closeness that Turkic countries feel for each other culturally,

alongside economic cooperation including cooperation over energy and political dialogue.

For Turkish foreign policy, 2011 was a year when things were not just talked about: sails were unfurled for new horizons. Turkey’s Africa policy ceased to be just a policy of taking initiatives and became a priority of Turkish foreign policy. This initiative, apart from gaining access to imports of raw materials for Turkey, also won a new export market for small and medium-sized Turkish firms who find saturated Western markets increasingly difficult to penetrate. It provided the potential to gain votes in international organizations and in neighboring areas, as well as a new scope for action and influence.

The countries of Africa have responded extremely positively to Turkey’s initiative. In many African countries today, Turkey is compared to China and in Muslim regions in particular it is seen as a partner which offers more high-quality and better services than China. Its businessmen and its schools have changed perceptions of Turkey in a very positive fashion.

As a result of this, Turkey’s Africa initiative has been securely located in a strategic frame in the last few years and areas

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of mutual cooperation have been specified within the context of an action plan. Turkey and the countries of Africa meet at the summit level and follow this plan systematically at ministerial and lower levels. Three years ago, Turkey had just 12 em-

bassies in the continent, but by the end of 2012 this will have risen to 34. The number of African embassies in Ankara will have risen to 14 and 10 other countries from the continent are engaged in work to set up embassies.

The United States: Lion's Share of Turkish foreign Policy

The lion's share of Turkish foreign policy-making in 2011 however undoubtedly was devoted to the United States. In recent years, Turkish-U.S. relations have had their ups and downs.

Turkey's relations with Iran and Israel were the subject of serious concern in the American administration. The Arab Spring and particularly developments in missile defense mean that this has been replaced by mutual cooperation and solidarity. Iraq and Afghanistan have also now also taken their places as issues on which work is carried out with common goals in mind.

The basic reason for the ups and downs I mentioned is that the U.S. had some difficulty adjusting to the fact that Turkey was now following an independent foreign policy in the region, and that for a long time it viewed Turkey within the perspective of the former relationship the two had previously had within the alliance. But as the Obama administration went on, the view began to prevail that although Turkey was no longer the kind of ally it had been, one which carried out what it was told without question, it was now a reliable partner with which America could work on an equal basis when common advantages permitted.

Today, the point has been reached where the two countries cooperate closely on a lot of topics and there is a mutual desire to take the relationship further. Cooperation against the PKK is included in this. The U.S. is pursuing an effective position in this field though on the condition

that its difficulties and limitations in Iraq remain concealed.

This change in Turkish-American relations was rendered necessary by Turkey's increased aspirations and area of operations. A transformation somewhere was inevitable. Though Turkey displayed some differences of tactics in many areas, such as Syria, it convinced the American administration that it shared common values with it in regard to the ultimate objectives. Put another way, Turkey's growing power and larger sphere of independent action would do no harm to the U.S., on the contrary in certain areas it was securing benefits. Relations with Israel may appear to be an exception to this. On this, the U.S. administration's approach concedes that we in Turkey have our justification. A different view is known to prevail in Congress.

Beyond that, the U.S. knows that it is no longer the sole determining force in the world that it once was and that it must engage in close cooperation with its friends and partners. The fact that its interest is steadily turning to the Asia Pacific region and that consequently it is more inclined to share its leadership in the Middle East region where Turkey is located may also have played a part. As a result, it may be said today that relations are now of a more balanced nature. This has come about in a

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relatively problem-free way, which shows that relations between the two countries are now stronger and have achieved a certain maturity. Today they are conducted within a model spirit of partnership agree-

ment. Nevertheless the economic aspect of relations has lagged behind this and it is a fact that this especially is in need of development.

Turkish Foreign Policy in 2012: Possibilities and Difficulties

2011 was undoubtedly a year that will take up a lot of space in the history books, having witnessed the beginning of grand transformations which will continue in the years ahead.

The development which put its stamp on the year began when a street salesman in Tunis set himself on fire in order to have his demand for a better life heard, and thus started the popular movements which spread quickly to other countries of the region under the name of the Arab Spring and triggered the process of political transformation. Another event which took up much time on the world's agenda in 2011 was the economic crisis, which began in Greece and then spread throughout the whole euro zone and is currently providing the European Union with a stiff test in regard to its future.

Both events, one lying to the south of Turkey and the other to its west, interact directly with our country and therefore its zone of interest. Ankara stands in the middle of the line on which these two transformations lie, and it is clear that their effects will continue for a long period. Consequently, it is rising as a stable focus of power with its economy that gets stronger each day and its deepening democracy.

In this respect, Turkey's relevance is demonstrated both with regard to contributing to the establishment of peace, stability, and security in its region and also in possessing the foreign policy vision to build upon this. Quite definitely, where democracy and the development

of liberties are concerned, no country can ever be satisfied with the particular stage it has reached. A government of a serious country can never declare "I have now reached my goals for democracy and freedoms and from now on there is no need to take freedoms further in my country." Turkey still has some distance to cover on basic rights, and particularly in the areas of freedom of expression and the press. Turkey is currently at work preparing a new constitution which will close these gaps. If it succeeds in this, it will above all have responded to the wishes and expectations of its own people, but also at the same time its contribution to helping the developments in the Arab world turn out positively will have substantially increased.

Certainly, it was one of Turkey's most important priorities throughout 2011 to give backing to the Arab peoples as they went through a historical change and transformation. From the start, Turkey assumed a stand in the face of the stirrings in the Middle East which made principles and universal values its priority. It thus took its place alongside the peoples of the region who were voicing their legitimate demands.

During 2011, representatives of the Turkish government and Turkish diplomats engaged in contacts, as was widely

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reported in the world press, both at the ministerial level and at the technical level. They devoted an important part of their message to an exchange of views on ways in which to minimize the negative consequences of the economic crisis in Europe. They tried to explain what Turkey could contribute in light of its experience in managing past crises and its increasingly strong economy, and what is more, what Turkey could do as a member of the European Union. Thanks to work now being done and the measures it has taken, Europe will very probably demonstrate that it has the capacity to leave this economic and financial crisis behind it despite all the uncertainties and difficulties. This expectation is not simply in line with the performance of the EU in the past in crisis management, but it also symbolizes the necessity for it to succeed because of the vital position which the EU has both for the world economy and for Turkey.

Both for the welfare of its member states and that of countries of a much wider area, the EU must be rescued from this crisis into which it has fallen because of mistakes it made in the past and measures which it did not have the courage to take. What it needs to do is more or less obvious. Turkey will undoubtedly strive to contribute in any way it can. Just as the events which humanity experienced at the outset of the twentieth century deter-

mined its subsequent course, the political upsurge in the Middle East and the economic upsurge in Europe are of sufficient importance to determine the outlook for the present century. The countries which are at the center of the political transformation and economic crisis must prepare themselves for the future by making correct long-term choices and strategic engagement. Turkey has spent much effort to help ensure that the transformation and economic crisis are both overcome in the healthiest fashion possible. The same determination and the same activeness will be expected to continue in 2012.

The perspective on the future shaping of Turkish foreign policy must of course be focused less on 2012 than 2023. The basic goal of the Turkish Republic on its hundredth anniversary must be to have achieved the highest levels of women's, social, and basic rights and freedoms for its people and to play an active role on the global political and economic scene. Indeed the goal must be for Turkey to become a country whose contribution to the solving of global twenty-first century problems—such as international peace, stability and security, and at the same time climate change and the environment—is felt more than ever.

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The Director of USAK is Ambassador (R) Özdem Sanberk

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