

Food Crisis in the Sahel

Five steps to break the hunger cycle in 2012



'The question is not whether there will be another food "crisis" in the Sahel in 2012, but to what extent' – EU Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva

Summary

Ever since the first warnings of drought and poor harvests in Africa's Sahel region emerged in late 2011, vulnerable communities in many areas of the region have been threatened by a looming food crisis. That crisis is now real, and 18.4 million people in nine countries are vulnerable to its impact. Food stocks have already run out for some communities, and are running dangerously low for others. Support to protect lives and livelihoods is urgently needed as the crisis becomes an emergency.

This briefing calls for urgent action to face up to five major challenges, built on a thorough analysis of the current situation in the Sahel and learning from the experience of previous crises in this region, as well as the recent catastrophic food crisis in the Horn of Africa, from which we know that the biggest risk is to wait.

Oxfam, ROPPA, RBM, APSS, POSCAO and WILDAF call on donors, governments in the region, regional bodies, NGOs and UN agencies to:

- Close the funding gap now, to ensure programmes are in place to respond to the peak of the crisis;
- Ensure assistance targets the most vulnerable people, including those affected by conflict in Mali;
- Keep regional markets open to help make food is available and affordable;
- Strengthen leadership and coordination to ensure an effective response;
- Invest in the long term to build resilience and break the hunger cycle.

If we act now, there is still time to protect many communities from the worst impacts of the food crisis. And by investing in the long term we can finally break the hunger cycle in the Sahel.

The Sahel in 2012: Long-term vulnerabilities exposed by poor harvests, low pastures, and high food prices

The causes of food crises in the Sahel are both long-term and short-term and require an understanding of why 300,000 children of this region die of malnutrition, even in a 'non-crisis' year. Cycles of drought combined with low levels of agricultural investment, environmental degradation, high population growth and acute levels of poverty contribute to a context of structural, chronic vulnerability. In this situation, even moderate external shocks can have major impacts,¹ while the recurrent nature of crises over the last ten years has meant that millions of people have not been able to recover assets in between shocks.

The region's vulnerability has been laid bare yet again by low and uneven rainfall combined with attacks on crops by birds, pests and locusts. Cereal production across the Sahel in autumn 2011 was 26 per cent lower than in 2010, creating a gross deficit of 2.7m tonnes. Some areas have fared worse, with production in The Gambia and Chad down over 50 per cent compared with 2010.²

Food prices have been dangerously high, having failed to come down after the harvests, and data from April shows that prices in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are again on the increase. In comparison with the five-year average, prices for millet are now 104% higher in Bamako, Mali, 91% higher in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and 28% and 47% higher respectively in Niamey and Maradi, Niger³. Given that 60 per cent of people in the Sahel buy their food in the market, and that food accounts for 80 per cent of the expenditure of the most vulnerable groups, this matters greatly. Many families are also no longer able to rely so much on alternative sources of income – a reduction in remittances from migrant workers previously sending money back from Libya and Nigeria, for example, has added further pressures on vulnerable families.

And while some coastal countries neighbouring the Sahel have produced more favourable harvests, there are unfortunately many doubts that the regional food market – which is functioning less well even than during the food crisis of 2010 - will be able to transfer enough food effectively to deficit areas (see page 4).

Further, whilst insecurity in northern Nigeria has limited market effectiveness, conflict in northern Mali has greatly increased humanitarian needs while at the same time limited humanitarian access, increased food prices, disrupted pastoralist migration routes and prevented people from migrating to search for employment and income.

The humanitarian impact: 18.4 million people affected in 2012

Some communities already find themselves in crisis, others see crisis on the horizon as an early lean season approaches and the annual ‘hunger gap’ lengthens. Overall, the lives and livelihoods of 18.4 million people are vulnerable to the food crisis, 6 million of whom are severely food insecure, while conflict in northern Mali has produced additional humanitarian needs through the displacement of more than 320,000 people since late January 2012.⁴ Those most likely to be affected include women, small livestock holders, poor households with limited access to productive means, households who used to rely on seasonal migration in conflict affected areas, and communities living in areas affected by insecurity.


The consequences are serious. According to an Oxfam survey in the Sahelian belt of Eastern Chad, for example, 63 per cent of households would be unable to cover their needs after February,⁵ while cereal stocks in eight of the 22 regions of Chad will on average have disappeared in March.⁶ There are already signs of extreme coping strategies, such as searching for grain in the earth that ants may have stored. In the Tillaberi region in western Niger, communities have seen their food stocks dwindle and their debts pile up, and many families are migrating to cities in search of food and jobs.

Table 1: People in the Sahel region vulnerable to food insecurity, March 2012

Country	Total numbers food insecure/in areas at risk ⁷
Mauritania	700,000 food insecure, of which 290,000 severely
Mali	4,600,000 food insecure, of which 3,600,000 severely
Niger	6,112,089 food insecure, of which 1,916,855 severely
Burkina Faso	2, 852, 280 food insecure
Chad	3,622,200 food insecure, of which 1,180,300 severely
Senegal	850,000 food insecure
The Gambia	713,433 in areas at risk

There are also clear signs that the situation is worsening significantly. According to a recent analysis by a range of regional stakeholders, by March (map on left) areas of Mauritania and northern Mali were already being classified as ‘extreme’ (IPC Phase 4). Projections for June show further areas of extreme food, while concerns are also being expressed about pockets of famine (IPC Phase 5) developing in northern Mali if nothing is done⁸.

Map1. Food Security in the Sahel: CILSS, FEWSNET, FAO, WFP, OXFAM, ACF, Save the Children



Without major interventions, livelihoods will be depleted and assets reduced as animals die or are sold for food (at a low price) and seeds are eaten, and people will not be able to engage in farming to prepare for the next harvest. Malnutrition rates will also rise significantly without preventive action. UNICEF estimates that more than one million children under five in the Sahel are threatened by severe acute malnutrition this year, rising to 1.5 million in the worst case scenario⁹. This will have long-term effects on child development and the creation of sustainable livelihoods, further entrenching poverty in the region.

The response to date and challenges ahead

The response to date has in some important ways been more positive than in previous crises in the region: the early warning systems functioned relatively well; governments in the region raised the alarm quickly; and some donors mobilised funds more quickly than in previous crises. However, there remain huge gaps to fill and areas to strengthen quickly if the humanitarian response is effectively to meet the needs of the most vulnerable communities.

This briefing outlines five major challenges that need to be faced and overcome in order to protect 18 million people from this year's food crisis and from crises in the future. If money can be mobilised quickly, if assistance can target and reach the most vulnerable people, if regional markets can keep food flowing, if leadership and coordination can be strengthened, and if investments can be made to build resilience in the long term, we can save lives and livelihoods in 2012, and we can start to break the hunger cycle in the Sahel.

1 Close the funding gap now, before the crisis hits its peak

By investing now in earlier and more cost-effective actions, vulnerable populations can be better protected at a much lower cost than if action is delayed until the crisis hits. Preventing malnutrition is far cheaper than treating it; keeping animal herds alive is many times less expensive than replacing them.

In 2005, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator Jan Egeland estimated that it cost \$1 per day to protect a child from malnutrition before that year's food crisis in Niger, and \$80 per day to save a child's life from severe malnutrition by the time the crisis had reached its peak.¹⁰


It is encouraging, therefore, that some donors mobilised funding at an early stage, even if the overall response remained too low. For example, in late 2011 ECHO had already committed additional funding to the region in anticipation of the crisis, and increased its support to €123.5m in January 2012. A range of other donors have also since provided funds to support the early response.

However, at the end of May 2012 a major gap in funding remains, with a number of donors yet to contribute, and others who need to do more to provide a fair share of the resources required.¹¹ The UN currently estimates that \$1.5 billion is needed for the regional appeal, a figure that is likely to rise to \$1.6 billion once the appeal for Mali is revised in early June.¹²

As of 31 May, the UN Financial Tracking System (FTS) reports that \$580 million of funding had been committed to the response, and an additional \$220 million available to projects outside the official appeal.¹³ This still leaves a funding gap of nearly \$800 million compared to the estimated needs.

Committing and disbursing the funding as early as possible is as important as the amount itself. In the 2011 Horn of Africa crisis, for example, few funds were released until a full famine was declared, many months after the first warnings. Figure 1 shows how late funding was mobilised in relation to the first warnings, and how it was thus unable to halt the ever-rising rates of malnutrition that built up towards famine levels over many months.

Figure 1: Early warnings and inadequate response to the Horn of Africa drought 2010–11



The huge influx of aid that was eventually committed did help save many lives and livelihoods, but many could have been protected at far less cost had this money been mobilised months earlier.¹⁴ Similarly, in the 2010 Sahel food crisis, the USA authorised \$50m in food aid for Niger from the US domestic market, but it took three to five months to arrive and one-third had not yet arrived by August – far too late for many.¹⁵ May 2012 will be a key month for the scale-up of funds to this crisis, if they are to be translated into action on the ground in time for the

peak of the crisis. A key opportunity for this mobilisation could include a high-level conference on the Sahel proposed by the African Union, when new and existing donors would be invited to increase their contributions.

Recommendations

- National governments and donors should immediately mobilise and speed up disbursement of sufficient funding to support national emergency response plans, in order to protect populations, ensuring that the emergency appeal currently being revised by the UN is fully financed.
- June's AU high-level conference on the Sahel should be used as a key moment to mobilise funds, with each country expected to pay its fair share of emergency needs, as well as support longer-term measures to build resilience. Efforts should be made to ensure high-level participation from both existing and potential new donors in order to galvanise a step-change in the crisis response.

2 Ensure the right assistance targets the most vulnerable, including those affected by conflict in Mali

While actors must intervene with sufficient speed, scale and resource, there must also be a strong focus on targeting the people who most need help, including women, small pastoralists and those affected by conflict.

Pastoral zones received too little support, too late in 2010, and in 2012, pastoralists are again among the most affected groups, with reduced pasture and water resources, as well as reduced availability and access to livestock food supplies. In addition, declining terms of trade between animal and food prices have reduced their ability to buy food. It takes at least three years to rebuild a small stock of sheep and goats, and up to ten years to build up cattle stocks. Supporting pastoralist communities to keep animal herds alive will be many times less expensive than replacing them, and given that pastoralists are affected earlier than other groups, early action is particularly important.

The specific needs of vulnerable women also require attention. In the poorest families, men often migrate to seek employment in other regions or countries, leaving women and children behind. When the search for employment fails, wives and children may have to leave as well and use precarious and destructive coping mechanisms such as selling assets, begging in towns or even prostitution. The impact of the crisis has revealed the weakness or absence of the rights of certain social groups, including women and children. It is crucial, therefore, that responses take into account these specific vulnerabilities, which requires a level of targeting that is able to respond to specific needs. This includes protecting children from malnutrition, strengthening their rights of women and by offering them greater economic opportunities to allow them to strengthen their resilience to future crises.

In order to protect children from these shocks, and from malnutrition, it is crucial to specifically target women so that they can meet their needs, look after their children and build their economic opportunities, which will also help build resilience for future crises.

The immediate need is to support access to essential food and non-food needs in order to prevent people selling their assets to buy food, in addition to ensuring access to safe water and promoting good hygiene practices at community level to reduce the risk of diarrhoeal diseases and malnutrition.

As the lean season progresses,¹⁶ there will be a need for increased food assistance, including through cash or vouchers where there is good availability and access to markets, and to ensure a good network of malnutrition treatment centres. Preparation to support productive activities is also crucial in advance of the first rains, expected before June, to help people recover. Producers need seeds, fertilizer, tools and food to be ready to start working in their fields, and pastoralists need to have maintained, vaccinated and de-wormed their animals in order for them to be fit enough for the start of the rainy season

It is important to provide assistance not only in areas of origins, or in areas of deficit, but also to meet the needs of those who have moved in search of income opportunities or food, or water and pasture for their animals, and who often gather in very precarious conditions.

Conflict in northern Mali provides a major challenge to the food crisis response, creating additional humanitarian burdens and greatly complicating efforts to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance.

Even before the coup d'état of 22nd March, 3.5 million people were threatened by the food crisis, a situation which has dramatically worsened. In the north of Mali, now controlled by a range of armed groups, many basic social services have ground to a halt, water and electricity is limited as fuel stocks run low, availability of food has been significantly reduced, and where food is available prices are significantly higher than pre-crisis levels. Insecurity has also meant that few humanitarian organisations have been able to provide assistance to vulnerable communities. As a result, the north of Mali is now classified as being in 'extreme' food insecurity, and concerns have been expressed by regional stakeholders that pockets of famine could develop current conditions persist¹⁷.

Given the lack of security and basic services, many families have moved from towns into villages, or have fled to neighbouring countries. In all OCHA estimates that over 340,000 people have been displaced since late January 2012,¹⁸ and assessments show that displaced people have urgent humanitarian needs, while the movement of populations to already food-insecure zones risks greatly aggravating food insecurity for host families.

Further knock-on effects include disruption of trade routes leading to higher food prices and lower availability, a major movement of pastoralists to areas where water and fodder is already extremely low, and people prevented from migrating to search for alternative employment and income to support their families.

As insecurity and political uncertainty continues, there is a clear need to ensure that the humanitarian needs of Malians affected by the security and food crises are fully considered in any resolution to the crisis in the north. Prioritising a military solution poses major risks. The combination of conflict, the peak of a severe food crisis in July/August and highly limited humanitarian access has the potential to be devastating for the people living in the North of Mali.


Recommendations

- All actors should ensure that humanitarian interventions reach the most vulnerable people with the right assistance, including by ensuring adequate targeting of women and pastoralists and strengthening interventions focused on community-level water, sanitation and hygiene.
- All authorities in all parts of Mali, supported by OCHA where needed, should uphold their responsibility to populations under their control and ensure that populations affected by conflict are able to access humanitarian assistance. This includes meeting the needs and rights of people displaced by conflict, those remaining in conflict zones, and host communities. Those with influence over these parties should ensure that free, unfettered and impartial access is prioritised.
- All national, regional and international actors should work towards a solution that provides the peace and stability necessary to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. Whilst diplomatic efforts to provide for a smooth transition are welcome, sanctions and freezes in bilateral assistance that threaten the livelihoods of vulnerable communities, the provision of basic services and assistance, the freedom of civilians to escape violence, or the functioning of regional food markets must not be imposed.

3 Keep markets open to keep food flowing and prices down

The efficient functioning of regional food markets are an essential element of transferring food at an affordable price from areas of surplus crop production, such as Nigeria, Ghana and Benin, to countries with crop deficits in the Sahel. There are strong signs, however, that the market is not functioning well, with the strongest sign of market failure being the continued high and volatile level of food prices. Prices failed to come down as expected during the harvest period, remain extremely high compared with the five-year average, and have already started to rise again in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali after a brief stabilisation. As well as problems of affordability, there are also problems of availability of cereals in a number of areas.

Graph 2: Prices of guiding cereals in April 2012 compared to the five-year average. Source FAO/GIEWS



A number of factors are impacting on the ability of the regional market to function effectively. The scattered distribution of deficit areas in comparison with previous crises makes it more difficult for food to reach these zones; high fuel costs have inflated prices; high prices in Sudan are diverting trade from areas of Chad; and high prices in coastal countries are reducing the amounts available for exportation at an affordable price. In Ghana, for example, high domestic demand has contributed to a doubling of the price of maize¹⁹.

Insecurity is a major and growing concern. Fear of violence in northern Nigeria is deterring both traders and migrants from Chad and Niger, reducing both importations and opportunities for seasonal migration. Harassment and corruption is increasing food transport costs,²⁰ while some border posts in Borno and Yobe states have been closed, and at other borders exports have been dramatically reduced. Before the coup d'état in Mali, insecurity was already disrupting markets in conflict-affected areas. The situation has since deteriorated significantly, limiting food availability and pushing prices up significantly.

Another significant risk is the introduction of legislative or administrative measures limiting the exportation of food. Burkina Faso has limited the exportation of cereals since December 2011, a measure disturbing its internal market, complicating the importation of food to severely food-insecure areas such as Tillabery in Niger, and also limiting the scope of WFP to purchase food for distribution across the region. In Mali, which also provides key exports to the

region, permits for exportation of cereals must now be done on a case-by-case basis, increasing the costs of bringing food to deficit zones²¹.

These measures not only ignore the lessons of previous crises, where export limitations significantly pushed up food prices in neighbouring countries, but contravene the Charter on Food Crisis Prevention and Management, an inter-governmental agreement signed by 17 Ministers of Agriculture from ECOWAS, Mauritania and Chad in November 2011 that aimed to ensure regional coordination and solidarity in the functioning of markets.

Recommendations

- The ECOWAS region, plus Mauritania and Chad, should coordinate effectively to ensure the full functioning of regional markets and population flows, facilitating trade and ensuring that no country introduces restrictions that could impact on the food security of others. Burkina Faso and Mali should remove recently introduced administrative measures limiting exports.
- In areas where markets are adequately provisioned but prices are unaffordable, priority should be given to support the purchasing power of vulnerable communities through cash transfers and programmes supporting the generation of incomes.
- In areas where food availability and animal feed is projected to be low, food stocks should be rapidly developed through regional and international food purchases, as well as supporting intermediary traders to provision deficit zones by facilitating access to credit and storage capacity.
- In the medium-term, a system of regional, national and community based food reserves should be developed and implemented, and ECOWAS should finalise its Common External Tariff to protect key agricultural products.

4 Strengthen leadership and coordination to ensure an effective response

Leadership and coordination are essential to the effective management of all stages of the response to food crises, from early warning to relief, recovery, and challenging the structural causes. The evaluation of the 2010 response by the Sahel Working Group outlines major challenges in coordination, even in countries where there were recognised and agreed frameworks, leading to a lack of information, delays in responses, duplication of efforts and unequal concentration of resources.²²

The role both of governments and UN agencies are crucial. Although exact roles depend on the context and the level of state capacity, key principles include ensuring the deployment of experienced leadership; the development of national plans that have the wide support of the humanitarian community, donors and governments; support to national capacity to deliver effective coordination; and support to civil society to hold governments to account.

In the context of the Sahel, a key framework which must be applied is the Charter for Food Crisis Prevention and Management, an agreement signed by 17 Ministers of Agriculture from ECOWAS, Mauritania and Chad in November 2011. This includes key commitments on early warning systems, coordination and information structures, and the creation of 'an operational food crisis management strategy framework' in times of crisis, among much else. Oxfam, ROPPA, RBM, APSS, POSCAO and WILDAF have been working with other civil society organisations since April 2012 to monitor the application of the Charter and to identify areas to be strengthened.

Among governments in the region, there have been positive aspects of the response to date. One of the most significant has been the effective functioning of national early warning systems in most countries. Further, almost all of the most affected governments had recognised the crisis and asked for international assistance by the end of 2011. Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have long developed emergency response plans and budgets;²³ Burkina Faso has itself provided \$16m for cereal purchases and counter-seasonal maize production; Chad subsidised sales of 20,000 tonnes of cereals from its stocks; Mali has bought 21,000 tonnes of maize and millet; and the Government of Mauritania has committed to finance 50 per cent of its national plan.

Among UN agencies too, there have been some positive signs, with all major agencies raising the alarm and beginning preparations before the end of 2011. There has also been an improvement in the quality of interventions by some agencies, in particular a greater consideration of cash-based responses when appropriate, particularly in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The recent appointment of a regional Humanitarian Coordinator and strengthening of OCHA's presence in Mali are welcome.

Yet there also remain many significant areas to strengthen. Chad, Senegal and The Gambia have yet to agree fully operational national plans that are able to effectively coordinate and drive the response, while the implementation of other plans has often been too slow. There is a need to reinforce coordination mechanisms at country level; to strengthen the food pipeline given the logistical challenges of bringing produce into the region; and an urgent need to provide greater clarity around financing needs and modalities to mobilise funding more effectively in support of national plans, modifying existing mechanisms where needed. The armed conflict in Mali also poses additional challenges and there is a need for OCHA to effectively coordinate interventions in this country to enable humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to vulnerable populations.

Recommendations

- All parties should fully apply the Charter on Food Crisis Prevention and Management. Critically, this should

ensure that every country has developed a comprehensive and operational national emergency plan, with financial needs clearly outlined and communicated, in coordination with UN agencies, NGOs, producers' organisations and civil society organisations.

- All actors should coordinate support around national plans; and interventions and coordination structures should seek to strengthen state capacity and leadership, as well as civil society's role in ensuring accountability.

5 Building resilience for the long-term to break the hunger cycle

Protecting communities from the current food crisis in the Sahel is crucial, but represents only part of the battle to exit the vicious cycle of crises in the region. As well as acting early and developing effective, targeted responses throughout the crisis, we need to act in the long term to reduce people's vulnerability and increase their resilience to recurrent crises.

There will undoubtedly be droughts again in the Sahel; the question is how well communities will be able to cope with them and how they are supported to do so. Whether the Sahel will remain in a cycle of under-investment, chronic vulnerability and late response to crises, or whether that cycle can be broken with more progressive and rational investments, is the challenge ahead.

In October 2011 the Sahel Working Group launched a report analysing the lessons learnt from the Sahel crises of 2005 and 2010, making specific and detailed recommendations focused on strengthening the resilience of populations and changing the approaches of humanitarian and development actors.²⁴ It outlines a range of priority interventions, as well as encouraging a conceptual shift away from the false dichotomy of 'development' and 'humanitarian' in order to invest more in the 'grey zones' that will help to prevent emergencies in regions like the Sahel and to make development gains sustainable.

Practically speaking, responding more effectively to crises will require strengthening early preparedness by applying the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (Improved Harmonised Framework) in a timely and consultative way, and ensuring that actors react decisively to early warning systems. Yet it will also require a range of longer-term investments to reduce vulnerability and build resilience.

Firstly, with food often available on the market but inaccessible due to high prices, developing food reserves in vulnerable regions will be critical not only in enhancing access to affordable stocks in order to rapidly respond to future crises, but also to help governments prevent and manage food price volatility. ECOWAS recently committed to defining a regulatory framework for the development of a regional system of food reserves, a process that should be supported by donors, including at the G20 meeting in June 2012.

Secondly, national policies and programmes promoting social protection measures and social safety nets are needed for the most vulnerable people and communities, especially children, pregnant and breastfeeding women and the elderly. This will increase the long-term resilience of households, improve the nutrition of children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, and lessen the impact of the future droughts. The meeting of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in Rome in October 2012 provides a key opportunity to promote and support these investments.

Thirdly, a change is needed to the system of producing and consuming food, moving away from a focus on investing in a limited range of export crops and towards investment in small-scale producers who can increase local food production and break the dependency on fragile and expensive international markets. This should include allocating at least 10 per cent of national budgets to agriculture, as promised in the 2003 African Union Maputo Declaration, but greater attention should also be given to ensure this assistance is targeted to small-scale farmers, particularly women.

Indeed, some of the most affected countries by the Sahel crisis, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal, have reached the target agreed in Maputo but investments have not prioritised food crops over cash crops, and have not sufficiently targeted small-scale food farmers and women. Governments should ensure a more equitable distribution of resources by adopting a comprehensive targeting system where poverty indicators and agriculture population forms the basis of resource allocation across geographic regions. Moreover, the FAO²⁵ estimates that if women benefited from the same access to productive resources as men, they could increase their agricultural yields by 20 to 30%, allowing 100 to 150 million people escape hunger. Therefore, it is important to emphasize women's' access to resources to break this hunger cycle.

Recommendations

All actors should invest in longer-term interventions that reduce the chronic vulnerability of people in the region to future crises, including:

- Investment of at least 10 per cent of national budgets in agriculture, ensuring a more equitable distribution of budgetary resources targeting small-scale food producers, especially women.
- The development of national, regional and community-based food reserves, including through support to the proposed ECOWAS framework at the G20 meeting in June 2012
- Greater investment in long term social protection and safety net programmes, and support for them at the CFS meeting in October 2012.

Notes

- ¹ Sahel Working Group, October 2011, *Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel* available at <http://bit.ly/w4Ew5P>
- ² Report of *Concertation Regionale sur la Situation Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest*, Abidjan, 13-15 March 2012. Cereal deficits compared to 2010 were reported as 56 per cent in The Gambia, 49 per cent in Chad, 36 per cent in Senegal, 31 per cent in Niger, and 20 per cent in Burkina Faso.
- ³ *Securite Alimentaire et Implications Humanitaires en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Sahel*, Note Conjointe FAO/WFP Avril 2012
- ⁴ 18.4 million people affected by the crisis and 320,000 displaced people both come from the OCHA Sahel Humanitarian Snapshot, 4th May 2012. The figure for 6 million people in severe food insecurity comes from the conclusions of the PREGEC meeting, March 2012.
- ⁵ Oxfam, *Surveillance de la sécurité alimentaire, Zone de Gozbeida et Koukou Angarana*, Newsletter 5 Octobre- Décembre 2011
- ⁶ Enquête Nationale Post Récoltes sur la Sécurité Alimentaire des Ménages Ruraux du Tchad, Ministère de l'agriculture/PAM/FAO, Novembre-Décembre 2011.
- ⁷ The figures for Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso come from the evaluation conducted by CILSS, FAO, WFP and Fewsnet in January 2012. The figures for Chad from the most recent government survey (see note 10) and the figures for Mali are from the Early Warning Systems in February 2012. The figures for Senegal are from the updated FAO/ WFP in January 2012. Figures for Mali, Senegal and the Gambia represent the number of people living in affected communes, but not necessarily the number of individuals directly affected.
- ⁸ CILSS-FEWSNET presentation to RPCA meeting, April 2012.
- ⁹ OCHA Sahel Snapshot, 4th May 2012.
- ¹⁰ Mousseau, F. *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger* p13.
- ¹¹ A country's 'fair share' could be considered as being proportional to its national wealth. Further analysis is to be developed on this.
- ¹² UN Financial Tracking Service, 31 May 2012
- ¹³ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, <http://fts.unocha.org/>, checked 31st May 2012.
- ¹⁴ A full evaluation of the international response to the Horn of Africa crisis can be found in a paper produced by Oxfam and Save the Children: *'Dangerous Delay: The Cost of Late Response to Early Warnings in the 2011 Drought in the Horn of Africa'*
- ¹⁵ Sahel Working Group, *Escaping the Hunger Cycle*
- ¹⁶ The earlier beginning of the lean season will vary across the region, but in general could now be expected for pastoralists in February/March and for agricultural communities in April/May. However, for some communities – for example in parts of Mauritania where food stocks are heavily depleted – this began as early as January.
- ¹⁷ CILSS-FEWSNET presentation to RPCA meeting, April 2012.
- ¹⁸ OCHA Sahel Humanitarian Snapshot, 22nd May 2012
- ¹⁹ WFP (January 2012). *The Coarse Grain Market in the Sahel : implications for the response to the 2012 food crisis.*
- ²⁰ FEWSNET, 19 March 2012
http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/West_marketreport_2012_03_fr_final.pdf
- ²¹ *Securite Alimentaire et Implications Humanitaires en Afrique de l'Ouest et au Sahel*, Note Conjointe FAO/WFP January 2012.
- ²² Sahel Working Group: <http://bit.ly/w4Ew5P>
- ²³ The national plans of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are budgeted at \$156m, \$222m, \$322m and \$141m respectively.
- ²⁴ 24 detailed recommendations are made in the report of the Sahel Working Group, *Escaping the Hunger Cycle: Pathways in the Sahel* available at <http://bit.ly/w4Ew5P>.
- ²⁵ Banque Mondiale, FAO, FIDA – Gender in Agriculture (2010)

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Oxfam

Oxfam is an international confederation of fifteen organizations working together in 92 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice. Oxfam is active in all the most affected countries of the Sahel, launching or scaling up programmes focussed on food security, livelihoods and access to safe water and good hygiene practices, to meet immediate needs as well as strengthen resilience. Oxfam aims to reach 1.2 million people with humanitarian assistance programmes in 2012.

Please write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org

ROPPA

The network of Peasant organizations and Producers in West Africa (ROPPA) was officially founded on July 2000 during a meeting in Cotonou. The network gathers 13 national farmers' organisations from West Africa and some associated members (Cap Verde and Nigeria). As a strategic actor on food sovereignty issues, ROPPA's attention was quickly raised by the first signs of a food crisis in West Africa. This commitment has been demonstrated by efforts done in monitoring the situation as well as interacting with key stakeholders and participating in forward thinking with regional partners on research tools for sustainable management of the structural causes of the crisis and its implications. www.roppa.info

Réseau Billital Maroobé

Réseau Billital Maroobe (RBM) brings together associations of pastoralists and breeders from 7 West African countries, and plays a role in monitoring the situation of pastoralists in zones affected by the food crisis. In 2010, RBM conducted a study that highlighted the shortcomings of mechanisms to support strategies of pastoralist communities, while in October 2011 the network drew the attention of governments and donors to the impending food and pastoral crisis in the Sahel. RBM has been highlighting the impact of the current crisis on pastoralist and is currently engaged in action research on access to food and livestock in vulnerable pastoralist households. www.maroobe.org

APSS

Association pour la Promotion de l'Elevage au Sahel et en Savane brings together livestock breeders from 9 countries in West Africa and 3 in Central Africa, including Chad. APSS works to modernise family farms to allow breeders to ensure their food security and increase their income. APSS was created in 1989 in Burkina Faso and reaches over 75,000 families across the countries it works in. APSS conducted a study in Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon on the strategies developed by live stock breeders to meet their family's food needs. This study showed that the integration between livestock and farming is better able to ensure food security. L'APSS will continue to encourage this strategy.

www.apessafrique.org

WILDAF

WILDAF West Africa (WILDAF/FeDDAF-AO) was created in April 1997. It is part of WILDAF's vast regional network created in 1990 in the goal of promoting and strengthening strategies which link the right to development with the emergence of a culture of the respect and realisation of the rights of women in West Africa. It is a network specialised in the promotion of women's rights as an integrated part of development. It covers 9 countries. Since January 2009 the network has committed to help rural women use the law as a tool to promote their autonomy and the development of the rural world. www.wildaf-ao.org