CIAO DATE: 8/99

Iran — Protest Aftermath

In Perspective©
The Weekly Column from Oxford Analytica
July 21, 1999

Oxford Analytica

 

Despite last week’s crackdown on pro-reform demonstrations, there is still considerable momentum behind President Mohamed Khatami’s political liberalisation drive. While the democratisation movement may have suffered a short-term setback and is likely to encounter further opposition from right-wing clerics, Khatami’s reform coalition remains in place and is still likely to be buoyed by next year’s parliamentary election results. Nonetheless, the president needs quickly to reassert his commitment to change in the run-up to the election.

The student protests, which erupted on July 9 after security officials and Ansar-e Hezbollah vigilantes attacked student dormitories, greatly alarmed the regime. The protests continued for six days, despite a ban on unlicensed meetings issued by the interior ministry, and spread from Tehran to a dozen major provincial cities, including Tabriz, Isfahan and Mashad. The students called for sweeping changes, notably with respect to control of the police and the judiciary. The slogans propagated by the students also broke established taboos by attacking the Supreme Leader. One slogan, for example, called on Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to surrender his powers; another charged him with supporting the vigilante elements deployed against the students.

Nevertheless, the protests were initially peaceful, and the students received much sympathy. Khamenei himself described the violation of the student dormitories as unacceptable and urged his supporters not to interfere with protestors. However, clashes between the students and police escalated, and, at the height of the protests on July 12, 24 senior Revolutionary Guard commanders published a letter addressed to Khatami. This warned that the revolution and the Islamic order were threatened, and urged the president to act. The National Security Council approved a crackdown that same day. Arrests were widespread, with the student leaders later claiming that 1,400 people had been detained.

At a unity rally convened by the regime two days later, the secretary of the National Security Council echoed the Revolutionary Guards commanders’ view that the demonstrations had sought to undermine the pillars of the state. He blamed the violence on “thugs, mercenaries and agents of foreign powers,” including the United States. His themes of foreign involvement and domestic plots, threats to the foundations of the system, the need for vigilance, unity behind the leader, emphasis on the central role of the security agencies were repeated by the minister of interior, the minister of defence and several high officials, and became the regime’s definition of the demonstrations. By July 15, order had returned to the capital and other cities, but a sense of unease prevailed.

The official portrayal of the protests is being challenged by a number of reformist elements. The pro-Khatami press has suggested that the disorder was the work of right-wing trouble-makers and has blamed the violence on non-student instigators. Newspapers like ‘Neshat’, ‘Hamshahri’ and ‘Sobh-e Emruz’ believe that the disturbances were part of a plot to undermine the reform movement and influence the outcome of the parliamentary elections, due to be held in March 2000. The Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, a pro-Khatami political faction, has even suggested that the president’s enemies were responsible for an “orchestrated crisis” aimed at facilitating “a political and military coup d’etat”.

Other pro-reform political organisations and personalities have also offered their support for the president. Four of the major pro-Khatami political organisations issued declarations reprimanding the Revolutionary Guards commanders for the tone of their July 12 letter to the president, suggesting that the publication of a confidential document was both illegal and designed to rekindle social unrest. Similarly, over 200 intellectuals and public personalities signed a letter to the president warning against any attempt to reimpose controls on the press or to suppress political freedom.

Despite the clampdown on their protests, the students have not withdrawn their demands for change. Key amongst these are the dismissal of the chief of police, the suppression of vigilante groups, the rescindment of the ban on the newspaper ‘Salaam’ and other publications, and the transfer of police powers from the supreme leader to the president. The students are also pressing for the handover of the bodies of students killed in the demonstrations; this is a particularly sensitive point because they disagree with the number officially killed during the protests.

An umbrella council that represents various student organisations has postponed further action pending discussions with the authorities, which began with representatives of the National Security Council on July 20. The students have also called for meeting with former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami. One student leader, Ali Afshari, has warned that if the conservatives block Khatami’s reform programme “future generations will turn to non-peaceful means to achieve their goals”. While no more than about one-fifth of university students are politically active, the student movement — represented primarily by Islamic associations that proliferate on campuses — can be quickly mobilised for protests.

Throughout the protests, Khatami had to balance concerns that the demonstrations might spiral out of control with the danger of alienating his student supporters if he criticised the protestors. On July 12, he released a nuanced statement that strongly defended the students and their legitimate demands, while calling for restraint and adherence to the law. However the next day, perhaps in response to the spreading disorder and the warning from the Guards commanders, he joined other officials in condemning deviation and attacks on the pillars of the system. He has subsequently tried to distinguish between genuine student protesters and troublemakers. This stance has disappointed many of his young supporters, but he has not yet lost their backing.

Since the demonstrations ended, Khatami has kept his own counsel (for instance, his letter of response to the Revolutionary Guards has not been published). However, he has on previous occasions appeared publicly silent and inactive whilst working assiduously behind the scenes. For instance, after the assassinations of dissidents in late 1998, his public pronouncements were very cautious, but he quietly insisted on a full investigation. The information ministry eventually admitted its own agents were responsible for the killings.

The president will need to show quickly that he has not abandoned his reform agenda and that he can prevent the hard-liners from mounting a renewed campaign of repression. To do so, arrested students will have to be released, reasonable student demands met, show trials prevented and freedoms protected or restored. If he is to achieve these aims, Khatami will need the full support of the reformist alliance that he has nurtured. The larger political space the president has created for the press and political associations is already paying dividends in this respect. Despite the recent clampdown, the mainstream student organisations continue to support him fully and the reformist press is finding creative ways to put the hard-liners on the defensive. Khatami also continues to enjoy strong public support.

Last week’s warning letter from the Guards commanders to the president highlights the one serious danger that Khatami faces — intervention by the military. However, such a threat does not appear imminent. The commanders lack the authority to interfere significantly in political life; they have also been publicly rebuked by the press and reformist politicians for even publishing their correspondence with the president.

In many respects, last week’s events foreshadow the political battles that will rage during the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The conservatives are anxious to prevent the election of a pro-Khatami majority to the majles, despite the fact that this still appears likely. Furthermore, any attempt by the hard-liners to undermine the president via extra-constitutional means will be difficult, as recent events illustrate. With the momentum behind reform likely to be only temporarily slowed by recent events, conservatives will find it difficult to prevent pro-Khatami candidates from running. The most optimistic scenario the conservatives can hope for is probably a parliament in which neither they nor the reformers have a majority, and in which both factions will compete for the vote of a sizeable bloc of independent deputies.