From the CIAO Atlas Map of Europe 

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CIAO DATE: 03/01

Moldova — Communist Government

Caspar Fithin

In Perspective©
The Oxford Analytica Weekly Column
March 8, 2001

Oxford Analytica

The Party of Moldovan Communists (PCM) has won full control over parliament following the February 25 general election. The decisive result has broken the country's political stalemate and allows the PCM to select the president, premier and parliamentary speaker without needing to form a coalition in the chamber. However, uncertainties over the PCM's economic policy and political priorities persist. While the PCM has a monopoly on power, this could be undermined by continued economic decline, internal party splits and a nationalist backlash against its pro-Russian orientation. The PCM will seek allies in domestic politics, and will seek to find the external partner, whether Russia or the IFIs, best able to assist in the long-term revival of the economy.

In December 2000, following a constitutional change, parliament sought to elect a president. The outcome was a stalemate between the Party of Moldovan Communists (PCM) and a fractious centre-right coalition. After several rounds of inconclusive voting, the Constitutional Court ruled that President Petru Lucinschi could dissolve the parliament and call fresh elections. The vote was held on February 25, after a 30-day campaign. Only three parties passed the 6% threshold required to enter parliament: the PCM, with 50.07% of the vote; the Braghis Alliance (AB), led by outgoing premier Dumitru Braghis, with 13.42%; and the Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD) with 8.24%. These parties respectively represented the left, centre and right of the political spectrum.

Several major parties failed to enter parliament: former president Mircea Snegur's Party of Moldovan Revival and Reconciliation (PRCM), which polled 5.79%; outgoing parliamentary speaker Dumitru Diacov's Democratic Party (PD), with 5.02%; and Valeriu Matei's Party of Democratic Forces, with just 1.22%. All three had been key members of the reformist coalition which ruled in 1998-99.

OSCE observers confirmed that no serious violations or fraud marred the conduct of the poll. One minor incident came in the breakaway region of Transnistria, where the authorities temporarily detained a bus taking residents to vote outside Transnistria. The high turnout -- 67.52% from an electorate of 2.38 million -- was based on increased participation from communist strongholds in the northern and southern districts.

PCM dominance. The PCM now holds 71 seats in the 101-member legislature, while the AB has 19 seats and the PPCD 11. As a result, the PCM is able singlehandedly to elect the president (for which it needs 61 votes) and amend the constitution (68 votes). The AB has announced that it will act as a constructive opposition, while the PPCD has indicated that it will fiercely criticise the new government and carry its opposition beyond the parliamentary sphere.

The chamber meets to appoint key personnel -- the president, premier and parliamentary speaker -- on March 25. At its plenary meeting on March 3, the PCM discussed these appointments openly:

Economic agenda. The PCM has promised to prioritise a "renewal of the national economy" through the collectivisation of agricultural land, reviving industry and re-establishing cooperation with the CIS. The PCM is willing to engage in privatisation or nationalisation, according to calculations of the national interest. Its electorate, largely pensioners, will expect the PCM to deliver on promises of higher salaries and pensions, and the indexation of bank savings to prevent a repetition of the effects of hyperinflation in the early 1990s. However, the parlous state of the economy does not provide a sufficient basis to implement such pledges. Efforts to boost state revenues are on balance unlikely to appeal to the international financial institutions (IFIs):

Transnistria dispute. Voronin, a native of Transnistria, has committed the PCM to achieving reunification with the breakaway region and has threatened to move against the Tiraspol regime if it fails to cooperate. Before the election, the PCM seemed to favour former Russian premier Yevgenii Primakov's plan for a common state (which in many ways would treat Moldova and Transnistria as coequals), but has since indicated support for OSCE and Council of Europe alternatives. The breakaway authorities in Tiraspol enjoyed Moscow's backing throughout the 1990s, but now face a threat from Chisinau's new, pro-Russian parliamentary majority, which appears prepared to accept federalisation and granting Russian the status of a state language, in exchange for closer economic ties with the CIS.

Russian can only become an official language through a referendum. Some national minorities would strongly support this. The autonomous Gagauz region has already requested that official correspondence with Chisinau be conducted in two languages, while Moscow has declared an interest in supplying Russian-language books to Moldovan schools and offering scholarships to Moldovan students to attend Russian universities -- moves in line with President Vladimir Putin's insistence on increased support for Russian-speakers in the CIS.

Foreign policy orientation. Voronin insists that a balanced foreign policy, with equal attention devoted to East, West and the IFIs, will be maintained. The PCM seeks to make Russia a 'strategic partner', while placing a priority on relations with neighbours Romania and Ukraine. It has retreated somewhat from a campaign pledge to join the Russia-Belarus Union, by insisting that this must be discussed throughout society. Public opinion shows stronger support for integration with Europe than the CIS (by 51% to 43% according to a recent poll), while the country's neutral status can only be changed by referendum.

Russia has repeatedly pressed for a permanent, legal military base in eastern Moldova, despite its pledge at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit to withdraw from Transnistria. Romania, currently president of the OSCE, has pledged to pursue troop withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia as a priority. The fate of the Russian garrison will be a key indication of Chisinau's foreign policy direction, with continued stalemate a strong possibility. Chisinau will only willingly grant Russia a permanent military base in return for significant economic concessions and probably a favourable resolution of the Transnistria dispute.

Outlook. The PCM will dominate parliamentary activity, with the opposition either being coopted or marginalised. The main parties excluded from parliament -- the PRCM, the PD and the Social Democratic Party -- have started talks to create a centre-right, pro-Western alternative to the PCM. The PCM has indicated that it will not move on its most controversial campaign pledges, such as joining the Russia-Belarus Union and making Russian the second official language, in the absence of referenda. It is held in check by the need to stabilise the economy, internal splits between pro-Russian elements and those favouring a multi-vectored approach to maximise potential economic advantages, and the potential for a more general nationalist backlash. These factors could undermine the stability of the government and return the country to the political stalemate of recent years.

In the short term, the PCM-led government's priorities will be those of ensuring political and economic stability:

Beyond the short term, the PCM will seek to identify the external partner most likely to assist in delivering stable, long-term growth -- the PCM's only guarantee of remaining in power.