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CIAO DATE: 03/01

Ukraine — Kuchma Cornered

Caspar Fithin

In Perspective©
The Oxford Analytica Weekly Column
February 8, 2001

Oxford Analytica

Opposition deputies, led by former justice minister Serhiy Holovatiy, have called on President Leonid Kuchma to resign over his alleged involvement in the murder of a journalist. The scandal has provoked popular protests and divided Kuchma's non-left majority in parliament, although the work of the reformist government has not been adversely affected. The case has highlighted the absence of the rule of law and the executive's control over supposedly independent state organs. Kuchma's fate depends on his ability to retain the support of oligarchic interests, some of which have already defected. His departure would enable the popular Yushchenko to campaign for the presidency while enjoying the benefits of incumbency, albeit in a temporary capacity.

In mid-September, Georgii Gongadze, the editor of an internet-based newspaper critical of the executive, disappeared. His decapitated body was discovered in early November. At the end of that month, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz released taped recordings, allegedly featuring President Leonid Kuchma, Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko and presidential administration head Yuriy Lytvyn, which strongly suggested that the three had arranged Gongadze's abduction. The source of the tapes was Mykola Melnychenko, formerly a bodyguard of Moroz (during the latter's tenure as parliamentary chairman) and subsequently an officer in the presidential guard of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). Melnychenko is currently in hiding in Western Europe.

Melnychenko has now released to parliament 300 hours of recordings made during the period August-October. Several deputies have vouched for their authenticity, having recognised their own voices in conversation with Kuchma. Last week, Kuchma reportedly admitted to opposition deputy Serhiy Holovatiy, a former justice minister, that the voice on the tape was his. Holovatiy and other opposition deputies have now made several demands: that Kuchma admit on national television that the tapes are genuine; that Kuchma resign, as he is no longer morally fit to rule; and that Kuchma dismiss Prosecutor General Mykhailo Potebenko for his conduct of the investigation. While the anti-Kuchma sentiment in parliament is strong, the legislature lacks the ability to impeach the president and there is not a majority in the chamber sufficient to amend the constitution and establish such a mechanism.

Competing explanations. Kuchma insists that he was not involved in Gongadze's disappearance, and blames unnamed foreign intelligence services for organising a "provocation". Some accept this, believing that the executive had the ability to ensure that Gongadze's body would never be found. Thus, it is argued, another party heard the tapes and then arranged Gongadze's murder -- and the discovery of his corpse -- in order to embarrass Kuchma. Four parties have been mentioned: a Western intelligence service, eager to weaken Kuchma and bolster the reformist and pro-Western premier, Viktor Yushchenko; Ukrainian oligarchs, who blame Kuchma for failing to protect them from energy reforms initiated by then deputy premier Yulia Tymoshenko; former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, charged with corruption and currently fighting extradition in the United States; and Russian interests, eager to ensure that Kyiv's rapprochement with Moscow continues, by ruining Kuchma's standing in Western eyes.

Negative consequences. The scandal has undermined the country domestically and internationally:

  1. Parliamentary realignment. Last year, for the first time in Ukraine's post-Soviet history, leftist forces lost their parliamentary majority. That bloc had long been regarded as a key impediment to government reforms. However, the current scandal has now divided the non-left majority in its attitude towards the president:

    • Kuchma's support has been reduced to the oligarchic centrist factions -- Labour Ukraine, the United Social Democrats and Regional Revival. The Greens defected on February 2.

    • The centre-right, which supports the Yushchenko government, has voted with the left on a number of issues.

    As a consequence, Kuchma's hopes for constitutional reforms to establish a presidential republic have been dashed. Kuchma secured support for the changes in a plebiscite last April, and has made implementation his priority for this year. He has even threatened new elections if parliament does not deliver the constitutional changes. However, Kuchma has no legal power to dissolve the chamber, and such a step would provoke a constitutional crisis. The stand-off has been exacerbated by Melnychenko, who claims to have evidence that the referendum result was falsified.

    However, the parliamentary realignment has not undermined the government's work. The anti-Kuchma element of the non-left majority continues to support Yushchenko, while the president has apparently instructed the oligarchs to desist from attacking the prime minister (particularly since their key objective, the dismissal of Tymoshenko, was secured on January 19). Neither is the moderate left, led by Moroz, hostile to the premier, although the Communists are strongly opposed.

  2. Undemocratic governance. The handling of the Gongadze case has been strongly criticised by the Council of Europe and by NGOs such as Reporters Without Frontiers. Although Gongadze's body was discovered in early January, the prosecutor general did not reveal until January 10 that DNA testing showed, with 99.6% certainty, that the body was Gongadze's. Potebenko has persisted in denying the authenticity of the tapes, although the credibility of this assertion was fatally undermined by the statements of Holovatiy, other deputies and Kuchma himself last week. A parliamentary vote of no-confidence in Potebenko narrowly failed on January 10, because some Communists abstained.

    More generally, the scandal has highlighted the absence of the rule of law and the executive's control over the procuracy, judiciary, tax police, interior ministry and intelligence services. Through these institutions, the executive is moving slowly in the direction of creating an authoritarian state. Despite mounting concerns about the restrictions on press freedom and independence in Russia under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian press is freer and more critical of the executive than its Ukrainian counterpart.

  3. Further scandals? Melnychenko has suggested executive involvement in two other suspicious deaths:

    • He claims that the death in March 1999 of oppositionist Viacheslav Chornovil, a leader of the Rukh movement who refused to support Kuchma's re-election bid, was organised by a special unit of the interior ministry.

    • Following the release of the tapes, two men held on suspicion of attempting to assassinate Progressive Socialists leader Natalia Vitrenko, who challenged Kuchma for the presidency in 1999, now claim that their confessions were extracted by torture. They had previously claimed that they were operating under instructions from Moroz, who insists that the incident was engineered to scupper his poll chances.

Popular protests. Popular demonstrations calling for Kuchma to step down began in December and were re-launched last month. Gongadze's forthcoming funeral is likely to spark an intensification in the level of popular activity. The executive has responded by initiating a campaign of popular demonstrations in support of the president, although there are strong indications of coercive practices -- students have apparently been threatened with expulsion from university, and workers have been threatened with dismissal.

Tymoshenko has helped to establish a 'right-wing' bloc opposed to Kuchma, embracing her party, Fatherland, which is based in eastern Ukraine and is a successor to Lazarenko's 'Hromada', and most of the centre-right. The executive has responded by re-launching the 'Zlahoda' bloc that was used in the 1999 election and unites centrist oligarchic parties.

Outlook. In connection with the scandal, Yushchenko in December reportedly asked the 'power ministers' (with responsibility for internal affairs, the security service and the tax police) to resign. He has since maintained a diplomatic silence, in part because he would be dismissed if he openly opposed Kuchma. Staying in office allows Yushchenko to continue with reformist policies and enables him to become acting head of state if Kuchma departs office. Yushchenko's hopes of gaining the presidency would diminish markedly if he was consigned to the ranks of the opposition.

The oligarchs hold the key to Kuchma's fate, and they have begun to quarrel among themselves. They are economically tied to the president, but resent the interference of the power ministers around him and the country's growing international isolation caused by the scandal. Moreover, the tapes indicate that the executive ordered the phone-tapping of the oligarchs. Some are considering withdrawing their support for Kuchma; his predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk of the United Social Democrats, has openly voiced his disgust at the executive's conduct. The defection of the Greens demonstrates that the pro-presidential grouping is beginning to splinter, and a battle for oligarch loyalties is now underway: