Egypt's Parliamentary Elections:
The Political Implications of Electoral Transition

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for Science and International Affairs

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December 2011

INTRODUCTION

This policy brief analyzes Egypt's electoral framework in light of legal and political changes following the popular revolt that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Over the course of a three and a half month period, Egyptians will elect representatives to lower and upper houses of Parliament: the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, respectively. Once both houses convene in March 2012, a 100-member constituent assembly will be selected to draft a new constitution.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM BEFORE MUBARAK

Egypt's current constitution was first enacted in 1971 under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat. The document facilitated Sadat's command of institutional rivals and reconfigured the state's ideology. According to Brown (2011):

> The result was a document that promised a little bit to everybody – but everything to the president. The constitution contained guarantees for individual freedoms, democratic procedures, and judicial independence. It made nods toward socialism and Islam. But for every commitment, there was also a trap door; for every liberty, there was a loophole that ultimately did little to rein in the power of the president or the country's determined security apparatus.[1]

Upon its enactment, the constitution did not dramatically change the structure of parliament, known as the People's Assembly (PA). Under the new constitution, the Assembly was charged with exercising legislative power, approving the general policies of the state, putting forth social and economic policies, and managing the budget. The law further stipulated that the PA should consist of at least 350 members, half of which must be workers and farmers.[2] Members would be elected by direct secret public balloting; once the election was complete, the President could appoint an additional ten members to the body.

In Law Number 38 (1972) and subsequent amendments, the rules and regulations governing elections to the PA were codified. The Assembly would consist of 444 members, at least half of which must consist of workers and farmers. As stipulated in the Constitution, the President would also appoint an additional ten members. The country would be divided into 222 districts, each of which was responsible for electing two members. A 2009 amendment that set a quota for female members created an additional 64 seats (across 32 districts) for women in the PA. The changes took effect in PA elections the following year.

In Law Number 120 (1980), an upper house, known as the Shura Council, was created to more directly bring the Egyptian press under the state's control. The Council was given 51% ownership of the national press, and tasked with appointing the leadership of several national newspapers. The Council would consist of 264 members: one-third of which would be appointed by the President. The remaining 176 would be elected just as they were in the PA: 88 districts would each elect two members.

THE REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

The popular uprising that led to the overthrow of President Mubarak led to sweeping legal changes and a new electoral framework. The changes can be observed chronologically, beginning in February 2011.

The Constitutional Referendum

Two days after Mubarak's resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) filled the political vacuum caused by the president's departure. In a statement, SCAF asserted its "historical and constitutional responsibility to protect the country" and announced the following:

- The constitution would be suspended immediately;
- SCAF would temporarily administer the affairs of the country for a period of six months or until PA, Shura Council, and presidential elections are held;
- SCAF Chairman Mohammad Hussein Tantawi would represent Egypt internally and externally (making him the de facto head of state);
- The PA and Shura Council would be dissolved;
- SCAF would issue laws during the transitional period;
- A Constitutional Drafting Committee would be convened, followed by a popular referendum to ratify the new constitution.[3]

The Constitutional Drafting Committee was charged with establishing a process for drafting and adopting a new constitution, creating free and fair elections, and limiting the state's violation of individual freedoms. On February 26, the committee submitted eleven amendments, which included: the imposition of term limits and checks on presidential power, judicial supervision of elections, and limitations on the executive's ability to declare a state of emergency.[4] In a nationwide referendum held on March 19, 77% of voters approved the Committee's proposals.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION

Soon after, on March 30, SCAF introduced a "Constitutional Declaration" following the public's approval of the amendments.[5] The document would henceforth serve as Egypt's provisional constitution. It included the approved amendments, other articles from the 1971 document, and some completely new provisions.

More importantly, the declaration effectively created a legal basis for SCAF's rule. Though SCAF had asserted its constitutional obligation to stabilize the country following Mubarak's departure, it now had a legal foundation to do so under the direction of a provisional constitution. The Declaration also adjusted the timetable for elections and for the convening of a constituent assembly to draft the constitution:

> The members of the first People's Assembly and Shura Council (except the appointed members) will meet in a joint session following an invitation from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces within 6 months of their election to elect a provisional assembly composed of 100 members which will prepare a new draft constitution for the country to be completed within 6 months of the formation of this assembly. The draft constitution will be presented within 15 days of its preparation to the people who will vote in a referendum on the matter. The constitution will take effect from the date on which the people approve the referendum.

The article did not specify how the 100 members would be chosen, nor did it explicitly state when presidential elections would be held.

Subsequent SCAF changes[6]

Now that SCAF had the authority to legislate, it made several modifications to the country's laws and electoral framework. On May 30, SCAF formally proposed rules governing elections to Parliament. Under the proposal, one-third of PA and Shura Council seats would be elected by a party list, proportional (PR) voting scheme, with two-thirds elected under the previous individual candidate system. Political parties and groups opposed the proposal, claiming that it robbed political parties of power and would encourage former NDP officials to run as individual candidates.[7]

On July 20, 2011, SCAF again changed the law, proposing an even split between party list and individual candidate seats. SCAF further complicated the electoral formula by creating two separate sets of districts for the two types of votes. 126 districts would elect 252 individual candidates, and 58 districts would elect an additional 252 members

from lists, bringing the number of members to 504. Each Egyptian citizen became a member of four districts: one party list district and one individual candidate district for both the PA and Shura Council.[8] Political parties were open to the change, though pressure on SCAF to use an entirely list system still mounted.

On September 25, SCAF changed the law once more, this time in the form of an amendment to the Constitutional Declaration. Now, two-thirds of all members would be elected by party lists and only one-third elected as individual candidates. Subsequent SCAF decrees would delineate the number of districts for each system. For the PA, the country would be divided into 46 list districts and 83 individual candidate districts. The list districts would elect 332 PA members, while the individual candidate districts would elect 166. For the Shura Council, the country would be divided into 30 districts for both list and individual candidates. Each district would elect four members from the list system and two members from the individual candidate system. Elections to the PA would be held from November 28 to January 10, and elections for the Shura Council would be held from January 29 to March 11.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

By October 1, SCAF had solidified Egypt's mixed-member majoritarian electoral system. Candidates were invited to register, and lists and candidate rolls would be released as the elections progressed. This section delves deeper into Egypt's electoral system, with particular attention to the electoral formula and certain political phenomena likely to influence the election's outcome.

Election Timetable

Egyptians are electing representatives over the course of a three-and-a-half month period, which began on November 28. The PA elections will run from November 28 to January 10, with Shura Council elections running from January 29 to March 11. For each body, voting will take place over six different time periods, including optional runoff elections. Figure 1 provides a timeline of each election period, in chronological order.

Figure 1. Elections timeline

Each of Egypt's 27 governorates is assigned a particular phase, or time period, in which it will vote. Phase 1 includes Cairo, Port Said, Damietta, Kafr el-Sheikh, Alexandria, Fayoum, Asyut, Luxor and Red Sea; Phase 2 includes Giza, Bani Suef, Sohag, Aswan, Suez, Ismailiya, Sharqiya, Monufiya, and Beheira; and Phase 3 includes North Sinai, South Sinai, Daqahliya, Gharbiya, Qalyubia, Matruh, Minya, New Valley, and Qena. Figure 2 provides a visualization of the governorates and the phases they have been assigned.

Figure 2. **Governorates and voting phases**

DISTRICTING

To add to the electoral system's complexity, different sets of districts correspond to different voting systems and different houses of Parliament. For PA elections, the country is divided into two sets of districts: one for the party list (PR) system, and one for the individual candidate (IC) system. The country's 27 governorates are divided into 46 party list districts, which will elect 332 members, or two-thirds of Parliament (for an average district magnitude of 7.2). For the individual candidate system, these districts are further divided to form 83 districts, which will elect 166 members, or one-third of Parliament. When each Egyptian voter goes to the polls, he or she will select two individual candidates and one party list.

Figure 3 below illustrates the breakdown of PA districts for each system. A more expansive list including the magnitude of each party list multi-member district can be found in Appendix A.

Figure 3. PA districts for PR and IC seats[9]

Governorate	Population (thousands)	Population (%)	PR districts (#)	PR seats (#)	IC districts (#)	IC seats (#)	Total seats	Total seats (%)
Alexandria	4,438	5.6%	2	16	4	8	24	4.8%
Aswan	1,292	1.6%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Asyut	3,800	4.8%	2	16	4	8	24	4.8%
Bani Suef	2,540	3.2%	2	12	3	6	18	3.6%
Beheira	5,206	6.5%	2	20	5	10	30	6.0%
Cairo	9,168	11.5%	4	36	9	18	54	10.8%
Damietta	1,211	1.5%	1	8	2	4	12	2.4%
Daqahliya	5,440	6.8%	3	24	6	12	36	7.2%
Fayoum	2,803	3.5%	2	12	3	6	18	3.6%
Gharbiya	4,347	5.5%	2	20	5	10	30	6.0%
Giza	6,210	7.8%	2	20	5	10	30	6.0%
Ismailiya	1,057	1.3%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Kafr el-Sheikh	2,875	3.6%	2	12	3	6	18	3.6%
Luxor	1,043	1.3%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Matruh	372	0.5%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Minya	4,607	5.8%	2	16	4	8	24	4.8%
Monufiya	3,580	4.5%	2	16	4	8	24	4.8%
New Valley	204	0.3%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
North Sinai	385	0.5%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Port Said	617	0.8%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Qalyubia	4,636	5.8%	2	12	3	6	18	3.6%
Qena	2,738	3.4%	2	12	3	6	18	3.6%
Red Sea	313	0.4%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Sharqiya	5,876	7.4%	2	20	5	10	30	6.0%
Sohag	4,124	5.2%	2	20	5	10	30	6.0%
South Sinai	157	0.2%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Suez	563	0.7%	1	4	1	2	6	1.2%
Totals	**79,602**		**46**	**332**	**83**	**166**	**498**	

District lines for the Shura Council are far less complicated, as the country is divided into 30 districts for both the party list and individual candidate systems. Each of the country's 27 governorates will elect two individual candidates, and four members through party lists. Cairo, Giza, and Dahaklia, however, are each divided in half, thus doubling the number of members they elect. As such, 120 members will be elected through lists, and 60 members will be elected as individual candidates. For a more expansive list of seat allocation in Shura Council districts, see Appendix B.

Vote Distribution

Once the ballots are counted, seats will be apportioned according to two different systems for both the party list and individual candidate formulas.

For the party list system, Egypt has adopted the *largest remainder* method to apportion seats. According to Article 15 of the amended Law Number 38 (1972):

> Representatives of each constituency of the closed lists shall be elected by giving each list a number of the constituency seats by the number of valid votes the list obtained to the total number of valid votes of voters that the parties' lists had obtained in the constituency, adhering to the order on each list, and the remaining seats shall be distributed to the lists according to the sequence of the highest remaining votes for each list.

Egypt will use the Hare quota formula to assign the remaining votes. The Hare quota is obtained by dividing the number of votes cast in a district by the number of total seats. The example below describes the use of the Hare quota as it applies to Luxor's only PA party list district. Assuming all of Luxor's eligible voters (approximately 675,000 people) participate in the elections, we could envision the following scenario, using hypothetical vote counts:

Party	Total votes	Total votes (%)	Total quotas (#)	Seats assigned	Remainder	Additional seats	Total seats
Party A	234,097	34.7%	**1.388**	1	0.388	0	1
Party B	116,711	17.3%	0.692	0	**0.692**	1	1
Party C	86,353	12.8%	0.512	0	**0.512**	1	1
Party D	75,559	11.2%	0.448	0	**0.448**	1	1
Party E	39,803	5.9%	0.236	0	0.236	0	0
Party F	34,406	5.1%	0.204	0	0.204	0	0
Party G	26,985	4.0%	0.16	0	0.16	0	0
Party H	26,311	3.9%	0.156	0	0.156	0	0
Party I	14,842	2.2%	0.088	0	0.088	0	0
Party J	10,119	1.5%	0.06	0	0.06	0	0
Party K	5,397	0.8%	0.032	0	0.032	0	0
Party L	4,048	0.6%	0.024	0	0.024	0	0
Totals	674,631	100.0%	4	1	3	3	4

The Hare quota in this district is 168,657 (one-quarter the total number of votes, since there are four seats available). According to the hypothetical above, Party A receives nearly 35% of the popular vote, despite only winning one seat. The three parties with the next highest remainders, Parties B, C, and D, each receive one seat though none of them earned a quota. It should also be noted that there is a very low national threshold of 0.5%. If a party or party coalition fails to gain 0.5% of the national popular vote, it cannot be represented in Parliament.

In order to ensure that half of each PR district consists of workers and farmers, the following formula will be used in the event of an imbalance: coefficient = total number of valid list voters divided by number of seats won by the list. The list with the smallest coefficient must elevate a worker or farmer to the top of its list.[10]

For the individual candidate system, there are few changes to the mechanisms by which individuals are elected, though they are still complex. At the polls, voters cast their votes for two individuals who may or may not be affiliated with a party. They can vote either for one professional and one worker/farmer, two professionals, or two worker/farmers. The two candidates who receive an absolute majority are declared winners, provided at least one of them is a worker or farmer. If only one professional receives a majority, he or she is declared elected, and a runoff is held a week later between the top two worker/farmers. If only one worker/farmer receives an absolute majority, a runoff is also held between the next two candidates. If two professionals secure absolute majorities, the

one with the higher vote count wins and a runoff is held between the highest-ranking worker/farmers.

If no candidate secures an absolute majority, a runoff will be held between the four highest vote getters—half of whom must belong to the worker/farmer category. The two highest vote getters win seats, again provided at least one is a worker or farmer.

PARTIES AND ELECTORAL BLOCS

After Mubarak's resignation in February, dozens of political parties rushed to register, recruit and train candidates, and mobilize voters. This section highlights some of the more notable parties, coalitions, and other political groups likely to influence the composition of Parliament.

The Freedom and Justice Party and the Democratic Alliance

With the dissolution of the NDP, the Muslim Brotherhood and its associated political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), has emerged as the most organized political force contesting seats in Parliament. The Brotherhood announced its intention to form an independent party days after Mubarak's resignation. Though it is largely shaped by the Brotherhood's religious frame of reference, the party's leadership is distinct from that of the Brotherhood. By and large, however, the party has espoused the Brotherhood's ideology.

Not surprisingly, some analysts have categorized the FJP as an "Islamist" party aiming to subvert the secular character of the Egyptian state. Generally, the Brotherhood believes that "freedom must be bounded by respect for God's law. Most members emphasize judicial independence, but they also believe in 'erecting a value system in society that is derived from Islamic law, and that is hegemonic over the judicial system and the legislative and executive branches.'"[11] Some members of the Muslim Brotherhood may not advocate on behalf of core democratic values, but they undoubtedly see themselves as the prime beneficiaries of democratic procedures.

Despite the Brotherhood's history and reputation as a religious party, the FJP has committed to a democratic, civil state and to free market capitalism in its platform and official declaration. The party leads the Democratic Alliance, a coalition of several small parties who are running as a single list.[12] The coalition was initially formed in June, when nearly 30 parties and candidates aimed to form a broad coalition including primarily religious and nationalist parties. That coalition eventually dissolved amidst claims that the FJP would not compromise over the placement of FJP candidates on party lists, though.

The Egyptian Bloc and New Liberal Parties

The Egyptian Bloc consists of the Free Egyptians Party (FEP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and Tagammu, a socialist-leaning unionist party formed in 1976. The FEP and the SDP dominate the Bloc's lists, accounting for roughly 90% of its candidates. Both parties emerged in the aftermath of the revolution in light of perceived threats to the civil, secular character of the state. The FEP was created by telecom tycoon Naguib Sawiris and other liberal elites dissatisfied with the ability of other liberal parties to credibly compete against the FJP. Similarly, the SDP brought university professors and other left-leaning liberals together to bridge the divide between liberal elites and grassroots leftist activists.

It should be noted, however, that the Bloc's members have different ideologies. The FEP is market-oriented and pro-business, while Tagammu has historically advocated against privatization. Although the coalition opened its doors to religious groups early on, most Egyptians believe the Bloc is organized primarily around its opposition to the FJP. The Bloc will submit lists for each PR district, and about half of all individual candidate districts.

The Revolution Continues Alliance (RCA) and Other Leftist Groups

Following the 2010 parliamentary elections, several high-ranking members of Tagammu quit the party, alleging its closeness to the regime and its complicity in fixing the elections. Many of those leaders formed the Popular Socialist Alliance Party, the dominant force behind the movement and the only recognized party permitted to form lists from among the coalition members. The alliance includes leftists, younger students involved in the revolution, and religious offshoots of the FJP. It was formed hastily before candidate registration deadlines, and though many RCA members and affiliates are well known in opposition circles, their critics cite their disorganization and inexperience as likely to hurt their election prospects.

Other alliance members include the Egyptian Current Party, Amr Hamzawy's Freedom Egypt Party, members of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, and the Egyptian Socialist Party.

Salafi Parties and the "Alliance for Egypt"

More commonly referred to as the "Islamist Alliance," the Alliance for Egypt consists of three Salafi parties who abandoned the Democratic Alliance days before candidates were required to register. The alliance is led by the Al Nour (Light) Party, an Alexandria-based party with origins in the Salafi group Al Daawa Al Salafiya, ("the Salafist Call").

The coalition also includes the Al Asala and Building and Development parties, and is slated to perform particularly well in coastal districts, and others in Upper Egypt.

Many analysts have given considerable attention to Salafi movements, given their previous associations with militants and their positions with regard to the role of women. Generally, however, Salafi parties accept the democratic process and remain confident in their broad appeal. The coalition will field female candidates, even amidst accusations from rivals that Salafis will attempt to limit women's rights once elected.

Al Wafd

Egypt's oldest liberal party, the Wafd, is expected to win a number of seats despite their limited popularity. The party was heavily criticized before and during the revolution for their closeness to the regime and their willingness to side against activists and protestors when convenient. The Wafd's popularity further declined after the Party announced its intent to form lists with the FJP in the summer, although this never materialized.

The Wafd has always advocated for a liberal democratic conception of political life, guaranteed by open markets, limited public sector provisions, and robust political liberties. In recent history, the Wafd has advocated specifically for an end to emergency rule, multi-party governance, and reform of undemocratic institutions. Even despite declining influence and appeal, the party is well organized and will likely compete in most districts.

Al Wasat (Center) Party

Al Wasat was the first post-revolutionary party to obtain legal recognition, though it applied for a license in 1996. The party was founded in the 1990s, primarily in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, key features of the party's activities involve opposing both the rigid organizational structure and ideological inflexibility of the Brotherhood movement, and several co-founders were former Brotherhood officials. Al Wasat was instrumental in forming the Kefaya (Enough) movement, one of the first movements to call for Mubarak's resignation during the Revolution.

The party is generally perceived to be a moderate alternative to the FJP, though its official policies are similar. Al Wasat emphasizes the balance between the civil character of the Egyptian state and the religious conservatism of Egyptians, though they admit their policies have an Islamic frame of reference. Additionally, party leaders advocate for open markets and minimal state intervention. Both Coptic Christians and women will run on the party's lists.

The National Democratic Party and "Remnants"

Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), though dissolved and banned, is still likely to affect the trajectory of the elections process. Many former NDP officials have joined party lists, and several have come together to form entirely new parties, such as the Freedom Party, the Citizen Party, the Conservative Party, and the National Party, among others. The individuals running with these parties have varying degrees of affiliation with the former regime. Some served as high-ranking members very close to the former President, while others include local leaders co-opted by the party. Egyptians have generally responded negatively to efforts by former NDP officials to contest seats. Most Egyptians colloquially refer to them as *feloul*, or "remnants." One website, *Emsek Feloul* (literally "Catch the Remnants" in Arabic), aims to publically identify NDP partisans participating in the elections.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A Fractured Parliament?

The electoral system favors small parties at the expense of legislative effectiveness. The system's use of the Hare quota will likely lead to a less proportionally representative Parliament, perhaps catapulting parties to seats despite their unpopularity. In the example above, Party D captures one out of four seats in a list district—despite receiving only 11.2% of the overall vote. As a result, the system generally advantages party underperformance: small- to mid-sized parties might perform better than their national appeal would suggest. Combined with the presence of individual list winners who might not be affiliated with a party, and the sheer number of parties contesting seats, the emergence of a multi-party coalition seems unlikely.

This might not be the case if established parties, such as the FJP, perform exceptionally well. If the FJP is able to form a majority coalition, the prospects for the emergence of a legitimate "opposition" bloc seem limited, for the reasons mentioned above. Opposition parties will have little legitimacy to begin with, since they could enter Parliament without ever having attained a district quota.

Egypt's low electoral threshold will also adversely impact Parliamentary efficacy. In Israel, for example, a 2% threshold is required for parties to be seated in Parliament. As a result, small parties abound, and Parliamentary coalitions are occasionally held hostage to the demands of peripheral parties. Egypt's electoral threshold is even lower. At 0.5%, Egypt's threshold is one of the lowest in the world. The amended rules governing party

registration have generally discouraged the formation of local parties capable of securing list seats without national appeal, but the low threshold seems intentionally designed to permit it.

The Constituent Assembly

The primary mandate of the newly elected Parliament will be the drafting of a new constitution. This process will begin once both houses are elected, though there are considerable ambiguities in the process. Originally, SCAF announced that not only would it select the assembly's members, it would also need to approve any draft document. Only then would the constitution be subject to approval by referendum. The assembly had six months to develop a document, after which presidential elections would be held.

Over the past few months, however, political parties have become concerned with the military's agenda and perceived efforts to manipulate the constitutional process to its advantage. Parties succeeded in forcing the military to relinquish its claim to select assembly members, but tensions again erupted a few weeks prior to the elections with the caretaker cabinet's introduction of a document consisting of "supraconstitutional" principles. The move was widely criticized by political parties who believed that the military was interfering in the elections process, and protests erupted in defiance of SCAF's efforts to subvert the constitutional process just before the elections. The debate over the selection and composition of the Constituent Assembly has again emerged in light of FJP and Al Nour's success in the first phase of PA elections.

Moving forward, parties and political groups are thinking about how to structure the new constitution. Political forces will have to agree on the rights of citizens and minorities, the role of Islam in public life, and the extent to which Parliament is involved in foreign and security policy decisions. Political groups will also need to manage the balance between presidential and parliamentary powers. Some political groups have favored the creation of a pure parliamentary system, but SCAF's recent decision to hold presidential elections no later than June have made such a proposition increasingly unrealistic.

Populist Pressures on Egyptian Foreign Policy

In the short run, SCAF will continue to capitalize on popular frustration with Mubarak-era foreign policy priorities. Since Mubarak's resignation, SCAF has signaled a symbolic willingness to align Egyptian foreign policy with popular opinion. This is particularly apparent in two domains: relations with Israel, and development assistance from the international community.

In early September, protesters broke into the Israeli embassy following an incident in Sinai that left five Egyptian police officers dead after an attack by militants in Eilat. The incident, exacerbated by the deterioration of the security situation in Sinai, was believed by some to have been encouraged by SCAF in order to distract Egyptians from the military's response to the police officers' deaths. SCAF's handling of the incident, its response to the embassy attack, and its imposition of the emergency law brought it under heavy criticism from most political groups.

Most political parties, however, have not advocated for sweeping changes to relations with Israel or the Camp David Accords. Some groups have advocated for a reopening of dialogue between Egypt and Israel, but there is little reason to believe that any new government will move to abrogate the agreement. Most groups do not oppose peace with Israel, though parties have emphasized the importance of public scrutiny (and parliamentary approval) in the development of future agreements and treaty obligations.

With respect to development assistance, SCAF has also attempted to play on popular contempt for foreign influence and financial conditionalities. Although SCAF has generally refrained from economic restructuring and reform, it has also turned down loans from financial institutions, turning instead to loans from Gulf states. Throughout the summer, SCAF declined to accept an IMF loan, citing distrust and the IMF's supposed support for Mubarak's economic policies. Successive governments have gone back and forth over the need to accept the loan, but SCAF has maintained its position, despite a grim growth outlook, collapsing foreign reserves, and a decline in direct foreign investment.

CONCLUSION

Egypt's transition to democracy has been challenging. The electoral system seems almost purposely designed to confuse, divide, and polarize voters over the course of a three and a half month period. The sheer length of the elections timeline could adversely affect the constitutional process, further delaying the transition and enabling continued military rule. For its part, the military has recently shown some willingness to form a national salvation government and transfer power to a civilian authority. Its detention of activists and continued attempts to influence the constitutional process, however, will likely continue to frustrate Egyptians, many of whom are beginning to lose faith in the transition itself.

APPENDIX A: NUMBER OF SEATS IN EACH PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY PR DISTRICT

Governorate	PR seats (#)	PR district magnitudes (list sizes)			
		1	2	3	4
Alexandria	16	6	10		
Aswan	4	4			
Asyut	16	8	8		
Bani Suef	12	8	4		
Beheira	20	12	8		
Cairo	36	10	8	8	10
Damietta	8	8			
Daqahliya	24	8	8	8	
Fayoum	12	8	4		
Gharbiya	20	10	10		
Giza	20	10	10		
Ismailiya	4	4			
Kafr el-Sheikh	12	8	4		
Luxor	4	4			
Matruh	4	4			
Minya	16	8	8		
Monufiya	16	8	8		
New Valley	4	4			
North Sinai	4	4			
Port Said	4	4			
Qalyubia	12	4	8		
Qena	12	4	8		
Red Sea	4	4			
Sharqiya	20	10	10		
Sohag	20	12	8		
South Sinai	4	4			
Suez	4	4			
Totals	332				

APPENDIX B: SHURA COUNCIL DISTRICTS FOR PR AND IC SEATS

Governorate	Population (thousands)	Population (%)	PR districts (#)	PR seats (#)	IC districts (#)	IC seats (#)	Total seats	Total seats (%)
Alexandria	4,438	5.6%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
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Cairo	9,168	11.5%	2	8	2	4	12	6.7%
Damietta	1,211	1.5%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Daqahliya	5,440	6.8%	2	8	2	4	12	6.7%
Fayoum	2,803	3.5%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Gharbiya	4,347	5.5%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Giza	6,210	7.8%	2	8	2	4	12	6.7%
Ismailiya	1,057	1.3%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Kafr el-Sheikh	2,875	3.6%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Luxor	1,043	1.3%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Matruh	372	0.5%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Minya	4,607	5.8%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Monufiya	3,580	4.5%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
New Valley	204	0.3%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
North Sinai	385	0.5%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Port Said	617	0.8%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Qalyubia	4,636	5.8%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Qena	2,738	3.4%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Red Sea	313	0.4%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Sharqiya	5,876	7.4%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Sohag	4,124	5.2%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
South Sinai	157	0.2%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Suez	563	0.7%	1	4	1	2	6	3.3%
Totals	79,602		30	120	30	60	180	

ENDNOTES

1   Nathan J. Brown, "Egypt's Constitutional Ghosts: Deciding the Terms of Cairo's Democratic Transition," *Foreign Affairs* (15 February 2011). Available online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67453/nathan-j-brown/egypts-constitutional-ghosts.

2   The "workers and farmers" quota was established in 1964, during the height of Nasser's presidency and the broader Arab nationalist movement. The law was designed to empower laborers and ensure broad representation in Parliament. Over time, however, it became an added layer of bureaucracy designed to filter candidates. The state decided who was eligible for the designation through its control of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation. For a more thorough analysis of the current implications of the quota, see Jano Charbel "Eye on elections: Does the workers and farmers quota help workers and farmers?" Al Masry Al Youm (27 November 2011). Available online at http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/520876.

3   "The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: Constitutional Proclamation," Egyptian State Information Service. Available online at http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=53709.

4   For more information on the approved amendments, see Nathan J. Brown and Michele Dunne, "Egypt's Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise Others," The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1 March 2011). Available online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/01/egypt-s-draft-constitutional-amendments-answer-some-questions-and-raise-others/fr.

5   "Constitutional Declaration 2011," Egyptian Government Services Portal. Available online at http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.aspx.

6   The following sections rely on legal amendments and SCAF decrees, specifically: Law Number 38 (1972), Law Number 120 (1980), SCAF Decrees 120, 121, 122, 123, 199, and 200. For more information and full text translations, see "Elections in Egypt: Analysis of the 2011 Parliamentary Electoral System," International Foundation for Electoral Systems (November 2011). Available online at: http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Analysis_of_Egypts_2011_Parliamentary_Electoral_System.pdf.

7   Daniel L. Tavana, "Party proliferation and electoral transition in post-Mubarak Egypt," Journal of North African Studies 16.4 (2011): forthcoming.

8   Ibid.

9   Population estimates taken from "Population Estimates by Sex and Governorate 1/1/2011," Egyptian State Information Service. Available online at: http://www.sis.gov.eg/VR/egyptinfigures/Tables/1-%20السكان/4.pdf.

10   "Elections in Egypt: Analysis of the 2011 Parliamentary Electoral System," International Foundation for Electoral Systems (November 2011). Available online at: http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Analysis_of_Egypts_2011_Parliamentary_Electoral_System.pdf.

11   Tarek Masoud, "Liberty, democracy, and discord in Egypt," The Washington Quarterly 34.3 (2011): 125.

12   The coalition also includes the Karama (Dignity) Party, Tomorrow (Ghad) Party, Labor Party, Reform and Renaissance Party, and the Democratic Generation (Geel) Party, among others.

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