WSC 5: Protecting People, Economies, and Infrastructure

Summary Report for the EastWest Institute's Fifth Worldwide Security Conference

Devon Tucker Michael Harvey Christine Lynch
Jacqueline McLaren Miller (Editor)

EastWest Institute
Forging Collective Action for a Safer and Better World

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The EastWest Institute is an international, non-partisan, not-for-profit policy organization focused solely on confronting critical challenges that endanger peace. EWI was established in 1980 as a catalyst to build trust, develop leadership, and promote collaboration for positive change. The institute has offices in New York, Brussels, and Moscow.

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Cover photo: Jerry Lampen/REUTERS. An Israeli man recites a short prayer as plumes of smoke rise above the northern Gaza Strip January 11, 2009

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IN COOPERATION WITH

WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION MONDIALE DES DOUANES

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

EWI's fifth worldwide security conference

EWI's Worldwide Security Conference (WSC) began in 2003 as a response to global concerns about the need to develop a more comprehensive and collaborative counter-terrorism effort. Today, the Conference is global event bringing together participants from all over the world to foster greater cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

In organizing the 5th Worldwide Security Conference, EWI partnered again with the World Customs Organization, the only intergovernmental organization competent on customs issues and world's referent in the protection and administration of trade. The WCO hosts the annual Worldwide Security Conference and facilitates the logistical aspects of the conference.

WSC5 was held in Brussels on February 19-21, 2008. Seven hundred registered participants from all over the world took part in three days of intense discussions at WSC5. The conference received coverage from global media outlets—that coverage and the scope of the participants and depth of their expertise are telling indicators of the relevance of this event for those concerned about counter-terrorism.

Mr. Cemil Çiçek, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, delivered the keynote address, followed by the opening speeches of General Ehsan Ul Haq and Ambassador Akio Suda. Other speakers included Anatoly Safonov, Gilles de Kerchove, Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, Sadig Al Mahdi, and Jeroen van der Veer. Workshops discussed individual issues relevant to the security of people, economies, and infrastructure. Some of these discussions have continued after the conference as working groups within EWI's Worldwide Security Network.

Day 3 of the conference was an innovative "horizon-thinking" exercise, where the participants in Brussels contributed to a set of global seminars on topics such as the weaponization of science, energy security, and religion and human security. This session constructed a vision of "a day in the future," identifying channels to overcome political obstacles, mistrust, and differing perceptions.

In addition to strong representation from the EU, Russia, China, and the United States—who have formed the core of previous conferences—participants were drawn from areas as diverse as Morocco, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Indonesia, Australia, Japan, and Israel. Participants and speakers were from government, business, and civil society. For the third time, the G8 presidency holder played an active role at the conference. Following the support given to the WSC by the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2006, and the German Foreign Ministry in 2007, this year Japan (holder of the 2008 G8 presidency) endorsed EWI's WSC and praised EWI's efforts to make the world a safer place.

Executive summary

Drawing on a diverse array of opinions from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America, the EastWest Institute's Fifth Worldwide Security Conference brought together specialists from the spheres of policy, academia, and civil society. Participants addressed a variety of issues on the contemporary global security landscape. These ranged from specific security threats (whether illicit trade, the targeting of critical infrastructure or cyber crime) to the role of interested actors (such as business, NGOs, and media), as well as a focus on potential strategies to counter terrorism and extremism (either in terms of constructing global cooperative architectures or, more controversially, the possibility of opening dialogue with the terrorists). A variety of policy recommendations emerged from each session—detailed in the main body of the report—but there were several recurring themes binding the debate together and animating the core arguments of proceedings as a whole. These policy recommendations were not necessarily consensus recommendations but reflected a wide range of debated policy prescriptions.

The first of these recognizes that when dealing with worldwide security issues language and discourse matters. This is both true when trying to develop a conceptual understanding of contemporary security issues, but also in deciding how best to formulate solutions to counter the threat in practice. Indeed, it is only by capturing the intricacy and nuance of the challenges facing the international community that efforts to design and then implement suitable counter strategies can really begin. The need to avoid generalizations and to be context-specific is particularly important in the contemporary landscape, especially given the central position occupied in the debate by the contentious issues of religion and ethnicity. Language is perhaps the most fundamental prism through which people engage in such discussions, shaping initial perceptions and conditioning narratives accordingly. Addressing the issue in the short-term, before misconceptions have the chance to become embedded, is therefore imperative. Indeed, choosing words carefully is both of the utmost importance but also, surely, represents a responsibility incumbent on anyone choosing to engage in such issues.

A second core theme to emerge, and one that follows from the first point, concerns the role of education in the context of worldwide security. This is important in two senses. Its primary (and longer-run) importance is in fostering a deeper understanding between different peoples, cultures, and faiths. Indeed, it is often out of ignorance that common misconceptions persist and over time become entrenched. In this respect, educating the younger generation is of vital importance. Secondly (and attainable in the short-term) is education in the sense of awareness—that is, sharing information and knowledge about the nature of current threats, as well as methods of prevention, whether this sharing is inter-governmental, within the private sector, media, or simply among citizens. Education is fundamental, offering a means of deepening and broadening the scope of security while also increasing its effectiveness over the longer-term.

Another key theme permeating discussion recognized that, when attempting to develop strategies to counter extremism and terrorism, on the whole the necessary structures already exist. Indeed, whether in terms of human capital or in the technical, legal, and diplomatic spheres, basic frameworks are already in place but need to be utilized more effectively. Certainly, they provide a useful foundation that can be built upon when attempting to keep pace with the continually changing nature of the threat. Rather than engaging in efforts to develop entirely new global structures therefore—a process that would likely lead to much wasteful overlap and duplication—it is toward the issues of implementation and improving coordination that attention would most usefully be directed.

The fourth key theme, and following from the point above, is the understanding that nation-states must take the lead in efforts to maintain worldwide security. Despite the growing importance of non-state actors, states form the main unit of organization in world politics, as well as acting as the ultimate guarantors of the rights of the citizen. As such, it is only through the structures of national government that it is possible to overcome prevailing inertia and mobilize the political will necessary to build consensus and implement meaningful strategic change on a global level. The actions of national governments alone, however, are not enough. Indeed, in order for efforts to uphold worldwide security to be effective, a comprehensive outlook is needed that engages with the full spectrum of actors on the global stage. This means drawing on the expertise of business and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as galvanizing individuals to participate in collective and concerted action.

A final and more general theme to emerge from the conference that dovetails neatly with the above is centered on the wider role of society in upholding security and stemming the spread of extremism and terrorism. Indeed, security threats are best viewed from the broader perspective of society in general rather than attempting rigidly to compartmentalize them. Extremism and terrorism have the potential to affect every aspect of society and this should be reflected when developing counter strategies. Closely linked to this is the notion of responsibility—at the individual, sectoral, and collective levels—not only to be aware of the current threats but to engage actively in efforts to maintain security. This raises interesting questions about identity, specifically the values that inform self-perceptions and condition action, not to mention the influence that they have on the impressions of those looking in. The way that governments and their citizens respond to contemporary security threats (and indeed to actual terrorist attacks) provides a useful insight into the principles that underpin a particular society as well as perhaps saying something very important about the kind of international community that is aspired to. This is something that the international community should not lose sight of.

Compared with the conclusions of EWI's Fourth Worldwide Security Conference, held in February 2007, the general tenor of debate was seemingly less apprehensive. While it is clear that the international community and the actors that compose it are at the beginning of what will no doubt be a long struggle, the stirrings of progress can clearly be detected—whether in terms of emerging cooperation at the regional or international level or more generally with regard to a growing collective awareness about the scope and severity of the threat and therefore about the complexity of the solutions that are required. In short, the international community is waking from its dormant state, increasingly coming to recognize the acute realities of the contemporary security landscape. The challenge now lies in galvanizing the disparate and varied actors into action—implementing policy solutions that are consistent, coordinated, and comprehensive—while ensuring that these are both effective in the short-term and sustainable over the longer-term.

EWI's Fifth Worldwide Security Conference
Program and speakers

OPENING SESSION

John Edwin MROZ, President and CEO, EastWest Institute
Michel DANET, Secretary General, World Customs Organization

HOW GOOD HAVE WE BEEN AT PROTECTING PEOPLE, ECONOMIES, AND INFRASTRUCTURE FROM TERRORISM? WHERE IS THE THREAT GOING? HOW DO WE COUNTER IT?

Akio SUDA, Ambassador in Charge of International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, Japan (G8 presidency holder)
Amrullah SALEH, Director, National Intelligence Service, Afghanistan
NIU Qingbao, Deputy Director General, Department of External Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China
Anatoly SAFONOV, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime
Henry A. CRUMPTON, Distinguished Fellow, EastWest Institute; Former State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, USA
Chair: John Edwin MROZ, President and CEO, EastWest Institute

HOW GOOD HAVE WE BEEN AT COUNTERING EXTREMISM? HOW IS THE THREAT CHANGING?

Jean-Louis BRUGUIERE, Judge, Ministry of Justice, France
D'ai BACHTIAR, Professor General, Chairman, Indonesian Crime Prevention Foundation (LCKI); Former Head of the Indonesian National Police
Ghazi SALAHUDDIN ATABANI, Adviser to the President of Sudan on Peace Affairs
Gijs de VRIES, Senior Researcher, Clingendael Institute; Former EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
Chair: Francis FINLAY, Co-chair, Executive Committee, EastWest Institute; Chairman and CEO, Clay Finlay Inc.

ILLICIT TRADE

Albert SELIN, Department Head, Complex Analysis and Research, JSC MMC Norilsk Nickel, Russia
Hassan NASSER, CAMS and COO Financial Compliance Director, Dubai Multi Commodities Centre
Michael SCHMITZ, Director for Compliance and Facilitation, World Customs Organization
John CUSACK, Head, Money Laundering Prevention; Deputy Head, Group Compliance, UBS
James ROUEN, Managing Director, Markets and Banking AML Compliance Global Head, Citigroup, USA
Chair: Maria Livanos CATTAUI, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; Member, Board of Directors, Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland; Former Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Magnus OVILIUS, Head of Sector, Preparedness and Crisis Management, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission
Raj NANAVATI, Partner, International Biometric Group
Thomas KUNERT, Director of Public Security, EMEA, SAP
Chair: Jamie SHEA, Director, Policy Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO

CYBER CRIME

Mathieu GORGE, Managing Director, VigiTrust, Ireland
Auke HUISTRA, Project Manager, Dutch National Infrastructure against CyberCrime (NICC)
Richard COX, Chief Information Officer, The Spamhaus Project
Chair: Ahmet Mucahid ÖREN, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; CEO, Ihlas Holdings, Turkey

MEASURES TO CHANNEL SUPPORT AWAY FROM EXTREMIST GROUPS

Nasra HASSAN, Director, UN Information Service, Vienna
Amy ZALMAN, Honorary Fellow, EastWest Institute; Senior Strategist,
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Ghassan SHABANEH, Assistant Professor of International Studies, Marymount Manhattan College
Mohammed MOHAMMED ALI, Sheikh, Dr; President, Forum 2020; Iraqi Reconstruction Group, UK-Iraq
Chair: Maria Livanos CATTAUI, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; Member, Board of Directors,
Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland; Former Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce

BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE TO COUNTER VIOLENT RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION

Muhadi SUGIONO, Head, Center for Security and Peace Studies, Indonesia
Vadim LUKOV, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Belgium
Chair: Ahmet Mucahid ÖREN, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; CEO, Ihlas Holdings, Turkey

THE ROLE OF BUSINESS

Stacy Reiter NEAL, Associate Director, External Affairs, The Jebsen Centre for Counter-Terrorism Studies, USA
Nadeeka WITHANA, Research Analyst, International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Singapore
Eduard EMDE, Member of the Board, ASIS International
Lindsey BARR, Manager, International Association of Public Transport (UITP)
Chair: Maria Livanos CATTAUI, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; Member, Board of Directors,
Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland; Former Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce

BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME

WEI Ouyang, Senior Colonel; Director, Non-Traditional Security Center, Institute
for Strategic Studies, National Defense University of China
Robert VERRUE, Director General, DG Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
Irka KULESHNYK, Senior Terrorism Prevention Officer, Terrorism Prevention
Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Boaz GANOR, Founder and Executive Director, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Israel
Chair: Maria Livanos CATTAUI, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; Member, Board of Directors,
Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland; Former Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce

TALKING TO TERRORISTS?

Sadig AL MAHDI, President, Umma National Party; Former Prime Minister, Sudan
Claudia ROSETT, Journalist in Residence, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, USA
Walid PHARES, Senior Fellow, European Foundation for Democracy
Richard DALTON, Director General, Libyan British Business Council;
Former Ambassador of the United Kingdom to the Islamic Republic of Iran
Chair: Greg AUSTIN, Vice-President, Head of the Global Security
Program and Policy Innovation, EastWest Institute

THE ROLE OF NGOS

Steven MONBLATT, Co-Executive Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
Alistair MILLAR, Director, Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, USA
Chair: Mel WASHINGTON, Vice President and COO/CFO, EastWest Institute

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

Ahmet Mucahid ÖREN, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; CEO, Ihlas Holdings, Turkey
Yonah ALEXANDER, Director, International Center for Terrorism Studies and Senior
Fellow, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, USA
Bill SILCOCK, Assistant Professor, Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication, USA
Chair: Mark GERZON, Distinguished Fellow for Leadership;
Special Assistant to the President and CEO, EastWest Institute

DAY 3: IMAGINING A DAY IN THE FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

John Edwin MROZ, President & CEO, EastWest Institute

KEYNOTE SPEECH
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Jeroen van der VEER, Chief Executive, Royal Dutch Shell plc

MAKING SENSE OF THE FUTURE: SCENARIOS AND AMBITIONS

Cho KHONG, Chief Political Analyst, Scenario Team, Royal Dutch Shell plc
Leland RUSSELL, President, GEO Group Strategic Services

WEAPONIZATION OF SCIENCE:
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND PANDEMIC THREATS—ASYMMETRIES OF SCIENCE AND POWER

Brahma CHELLANEY, Professor of Strategic Studies, Centre for Policy Research, India
Peter ZIMMERMAN, Emeritus Professor of Science and Security,
Department of War Studies, Kings College London
Mark CHANDLER, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute;
Chairman and CEO, Biophysical Corporation, USA
Chair: Greg AUSTIN, Vice-President, Head of the Global Security Program and Policy Innovation, EastWest Institute

ENERGY AND TRUST - ACTING WITH GREATER URGENCY

Ben TWODO, Commissioner of Petroleum Supply, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Uganda
Greg AUSTIN, Vice-President, Head of the Global Security Program and Policy Innovation, EastWest Institute
Danila BOCHKAREV, Project Manager, EastWest Institute
Angelica AUSTIN, Associate, EastWest Institute
John KIGYAGI, Member; Vice Chairperson, Natural Resources Committee, Parliament of Uganda
Chair: Maria Livanos CATTAUI, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; Member, Board of Directors, Petroplus Holdings, Switzerland; Former Secretary General, International Chamber of Commerce

HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE MEDIA: A CROSS-BOUNDARY STRATEGY

Bill SILCOCK, Assistant Professor, Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication, USA
Mark GERZON, Distinguished Fellow for Leadership; Special Assistant to the President and CEO, EastWest Institute

PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS

Mike RYAN, Director, Department for Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response, World Health Organization
Mark CHANDLER, Member, Board of Directors, EastWest Institute; Chairman and CEO, Biophysical Corporation, USA
Moderator: Dan SHARP, President and CEO, Royal Institution World Science Assembly

ASYMMETRIES OF SCIENCE AND POWER

Manpreet SETHI, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, India
Hassan MASHHADI, Former Head, Department of Assistance and Protection, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Moderator: Greg AUSTIN, Vice-President, Head of the Global Security Program and Policy Innovation, EastWest Institute

RELIGION, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Irshad MANJI, Senior Fellow, European Foundation for Democracy
Ameen JAN, Managing Director, Jan Consulting Ltd, UK
Stephen TANKEL, Research Fellow, ICSR; Davis Peace and Security Fellow, EastWest Institute
Jon MROZ, Manager, Countering Violent Extremism Initiative, EastWest Institute
Mohammed MOHAMMED ALI, Sheikh, Dr; President, Forum 2020
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A day in the future: accelerating solutions to security threats

Opening session[1]

The opening session of the EastWest Institute's Fifth Worldwide Security Conference (WSC5) highlighted the complex and existential nature of the terrorist threat and provided the framework for the next three days of dialogue at the conference. Informed by the diverse experiences of Turkey, Pakistan, and the current holder of the Group of 8 (G8) Presidency (Japan) the opening remarks set out some of the central cleavages animating contemporary debate on counter-terrorism policy. These included:

- a recognition of the need for a comprehensive multilateral response to global terrorism;
- the importance of achieving balance between the necessity of addressing the immediate threat and longer-term efforts to counter extremism and the process of radicalization from which terrorism initially spawns; and
- an awareness of the different domestic contexts (each with their own unique historical and cultural identity) in which transnational terrorism operates.

The nature of the terrorist threat

The keynote speaker,[2] Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek, gave an important reminder about the stark nature of the contemporary threat. Terrorism, Çiçek stated, has come to represent "one of the primary threats to international peace and security, to democracy, to fundamental human rights and to the supremacy of law." It is truly global in scope, respecting neither traditional conceptions of sovereignty nor personal identifiers of religion or ethnicity. A similar understanding was reflected in each of the speakers' comments, with a particular emphasis placed on the importance of not automatically conflating terrorism with any one religion—the example of Islam being obvious in the post-9/11 climate. The session concluded with Çiçek's emphatic reminder that terrorist acts can serve no legitimate purpose and cannot be justified under any circumstance—a sentiment that was mirrored throughout the conference.

Going beyond a "security-centric" strategy

While some progress has clearly been made in developing a strategy to counter international terrorism since September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11), there is considerable unease in the wider international community about the form and scope that this strategy has taken. General Ul Haq of Pakistan noted that the approach of the U.S.-led coalition has been predominantly "security-centric" in nature, combining military intervention abroad (Afghanistan and Iraq) with heavy-handed security measures at home. This strategy, he argued, has so far largely failed to yield marked progress and has fallen short in terms of delivering the type of traditional military victory that was originally envisaged. Arguably, rather than acting as the type of rallying call for the sharing of values that was hoped for, such an approach has done more to undermine the authority of the leading states within the international community. As General Ul Haq stated bluntly, al-Qaeda and its associated groups still exist and moreover are 'increasing in numbers, geographic dispersion and adapting to counter terrorism efforts'.

Consequently, it is clear that a significant reassessment is needed on the part of the international community—taking into account the experience of the last six years and reflecting on the specific nature of the threat, how it is changing and what better can be done to tackle its various aspects more comprehensively. As Ambassador Akio Suda of the G8 stressed, a greater focus is needed on prevention—both in the short-term with regard to stopping terrorist acts on the immediate horizon, but also over the longer-run in terms of addressing the spread of extremism and the process of radicalization from which violence ultimately stems. Indeed, with particular reference to this latter point, it is clear that the international community needs to develop a broader range of instruments in the global fight against terrorism, specifically focusing attention on those strategies that most successfully address the root causes of the problem. Recognizing the necessity of engaging in a "war of ideas," General Ul Haq highlighted the importance of fostering greater understanding and tolerance with Muslim communities on the basis of the sharing of fundamental values. Such an approach, he suggested, could provide the foundation of a long-term "strategic rapprochement" between Islam and the West.

1 This summary is based on the texts of the speeches by Deputy Prime Minister Çiçek, General Ul Haq, and Ambassador Suda.

2 Full text of the keynote speech by Cemil Çiçek, Deputy Prime Minister, Republic of Turkey, is available online at www.ewi.info.

A UN-led multilateral approach

Recognizing the need for a coordinated and overarching approach to the global terrorist threat, Deputy Prime Minister Çiçek emphatically argued that this would best be achieved through the United Nations. Indeed, he suggested that it would only be by pursuing a multilateral path representative of the diverse make-up of the international community that counter-terrorism efforts would have the necessary legitimacy and meaningful resonance when deployed in practice.

It was noted that some progress has been made in UN fora—with the agreement of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy[3], as well as UN resolutions 1373, 1566, and 1624[4] representing a useful foundation on which future cooperation can be built. On a more pessimistic note, however, and highlighting present realities, Çiçek pointed to the stalling of the process due to ongoing definitional wrangling, as well as the problems of implementation and duplication that will likely continue to hamper progress. For instance, the example of the existence of approximately seventy multilateral networks addressing counter-terrorism (twenty-four of which operate under the auspices of the UN) was given, highlighting the scale of the problem.

Central to overcoming such obstacles is the ability to mobilize the requisite political will—challenging the inertia that has persisted for so long and working together to bring about meaningful cooperation. This is the challenge that the international community currently faces and must rise to in the future. In many ways, therefore, the coming years have the potential to mark a turning point in global counter-terrorism—the outcome of which, either positive or negative, is likely to depend on the determination of the international community.

The role of the G8

Accepting that a UN-led approach to counter-terrorism represents the preferred means of moving forward, there is an important role for the G8. Indeed, the G8 and the authority that its member states can harness provides a useful way of addressing many of the practical issues found at the vanguard of any counter-terrorism effort.

Examples of the practical measures that the G8 has implemented include the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI)—announced at the Sea Island Summit in 2004 (under the U.S. G8 Presidency)—which promotes cooperation in the area of transport security.[5] The G8 Rome/Lyon Group was also cited, given its work with international organizations (such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization and the World Customs Organization) to encourage the implementation of initiatives agreed at G8 summits—with smart-chip passports, biometric checks, and advanced passenger information among the many initiatives that were cited.

Perhaps more importantly, the main responsibility of the G8 in this area seems to be found in the supporting and coordinating role that it can play alongside the UN and its emerging international framework on counter-terrorism. As the Ambassador emphasized, the G8 has an important part to play in capacity building efforts. The Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG)—set up under the French presidency in July 2003—is crucial in this respect. CTAG's main role is found in supporting the UN's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), specifically in building political will and coordinating capacity building; for example in terms of assisting countries in implementing UN resolution 1373.[6] As such, the G8 is aiming to ensure that the fight against terrorism is not limited to those countries that already possess the specific expertise and resources to mount such an effort but that it is extended to those who are in need of help and are often the most vulnerable, thereby attempting to promote an approach that is truly worldwide in scope. Such work seems set to continue under the Japanese presidency in 2008, with a series of CTAG meetings taking place throughout the year, both in Tokyo and across the world.

The Turkish example

Participants were reminded that Turkey has been fighting terrorism, in its various manifestations, for the past three decades. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey perhaps represents a more traditional form of terrorism when compared to post-9/11 manifestations, motivated as it is by specific domestic grievances and concerns of nationalism. Nevertheless, as Deputy Prime Minister Çiçek highlighted, the consequences for Turkey have been just as grave—both with regard to the cost in terms of human life, but also economically in the form of the opportunity cost of redirecting valuable resources away from Turkish growth and towards counter-terrorism efforts.

3 The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by Member States on September 8, 2006: http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml.

4 The text of UN resolutions can be found at: http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.

5 For details of SAFTI, see: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040609-51.html.

6 On the Counter-Terrorism Action Group's role, see: http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/building_international_political_will_and_capacity_to_combat_terrorism_-_a_g8_action_plan.html.

The importance of recognizing the cross-cutting nature of such terrorism was also stressed. Financed by transnational organized crime and often spilling over into neighboring countries and surrounding regions, transnational terrorism can be a threat to any country. Indeed, the idea that there is a rigid disconnect between so-called international and domestic forms of terrorism is simply an illusion. In moving forward with a comprehensive global strategy, therefore, there is a pressing need to raise awareness about such forms of terrorism—understanding the seriousness of the domestic consequences but also the problem this poses to the international community as a whole. Indeed, it is only by viewing terrorism—in whatever form and irrespective of the country it may directly target—as a collective problem that the international community will be able formulate suitable counter strategies and so offer support where most needed, when most needed.

The Pakistani experience

Expressing a similar sentiment about the acute nature of the problem, General Ul Haq emphasized how in Pakistan terrorism is also a long-established phenomenon—something rooted in the proxy conflicts of the Cold War but that continues unabated post-9/11 with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Indeed, as the audience was reminded, there has been a significant human cost—both in terms of civilian casualties as well as security forces and the military and political leadership.[7] As General Ul Haq tellingly stated, although the struggle against terrorism the struggle against terrorism is of undoubted importance to the wider international community, it is truly "a life and death issue for Pakistan."

In response to the pressing threat in Pakistan, Ul Haq noted the Pakistani "holistic approach" that draws together a diverse range of tactics in an attempt to counter terrorism as well as the extremism that precedes it. At a traditional level, this involves military force targeting those who continue to perpetrate acts of violence. The importance of providing security and decreasing fragmentation in tribal and border areas (particularly those with Afghanistan) was also stressed. Combined with this, General Ul Haq emphasized the importance of addressing the initial process of radicalization—both in terms of strategies attempting reverse it and in regards to creating favorable conditions so individuals do not feel the need to turn to extremism in the first place. Examples highlighted in this respect included increasing provision for education and jobs, the reforming of madrasahs and, more generally, widening participation so that people feel they have a meaningful stake in the political process.

As suggested above, Pakistan finds itself in the crucible of the global fight against terrorism—a predicament that has obvious implications for domestic society but also the potential for wider consequences internationally. Just as with the case of Turkey, therefore, it is fundamental that the international community recognize this and take concerted action to engage the threat at the domestic level as well. As General Ul Haq suggested, terrorism and extremism threaten to undermine the idea at the core of Pakistan's founding—that is, that the country may come to represent a "moderate, progressive Islamic State." Ensuring that this dream remains an achievable reality is surely in the interests of international community as a whole, particularly in the context of the wider ideological struggle.

A view from Japan[8]

In addition to its responsibilities as a member (and current presidency holder) of the G8, the Japanese government deploys an active counter-terrorism effort. As Ambassador Suda outlined, this comprises an allocation of 7 billion yen (USD $65 million) per year devoted to funding counter-terrorism capacity building in developing countries. This sits alongside efforts, mentioned earlier, to develop capacity building under the auspices of the G8 leadership, with the Japanese planning further meetings of the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG). Another important element highlighted in the national approach centered on raising awareness through education—something pursued by running seminars on topics such as port security, biometric technology, and legislative training.

7 The most recent and high profile example of this was the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), on December 27, 2007.

8 For more information on Japan's counter-terrorism effort, see the following overviews from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 'Japan's International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation (October 2007):http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/coop0710.html. 'Japan's Counter-Terrorism Assistance, 2004-2007 (October 2007): http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/assist0710.html. And the policy document: 'Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism (December 2004):http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/action.pdf.

How good have we been at protecting people, economies, and infrastructure from terrorism?

In the first plenary session, dialogue was structured on the basis of three key questions designed to bring the big picture into focus:

- How good have we been at protecting people, economies, and infrastructure from terrorism?
- Where is the threat going?"
- How do we counter it?

The remarks of the panelists reflected a general satisfaction that the international community is working actively on a number of levels to counter the global threat of terrorism. Speakers, however, were cautious not to overemphasize the early successes of these efforts and warned that as terrorists continue to adapt their methods and targets to the broader security environment, counter-terrorism methods must evolve tactically in tandem with a long-term strategy for addressing the underlying causes of radicalization.

How good have we been?

In the last year, not a single large-scale attack on an airline or airport was carried out successfully. Terrorist plots were uncovered, and lives were saved in Germany, Denmark, and Spain. Libya has renounced its support of terrorism and been brought back into the international mainstream. In both Russia and Indonesia, the tide appears to have turned against terrorism—most of the leaders of terrorist groups have been either captured or eliminated, the number of attacks has decreased sharply, and terrorists there enjoy little or no popular sympathy for their movements.

While it is fundamentally difficult to show the degree to which counter-terrorism policies are directly responsible for these positive developments, it would be unfair not to concede that they made at least some causal contribution. In Indonesia, the authorities pursued a strategy of isolating terrorists, confining them, and severing their links to international movements and funding. At the same time, international cooperation between governments has become more comprehensive. The UN has adopted its global strategy to counter terrorism. The G8, EU, ASEAN, OSCE, as well as NATO and the SCO, have all stepped up their counter-terror efforts in the form of joint exercises and multilateral agreements on legal terminology and procedure and intelligence sharing.

Disagreements remain. Debates on legal versus military counter-measures, unilateral versus multilateral action, and comprehensive versus risk-based approaches continue to frustrate trans-Atlantic efforts, but the general consensus on the importance of these issues continues to be firm.

The benefits of cooperating with the private sector on security issues, once a marginal topic, have been borne out by positive experience. A constructive relationship between the private and public sectors is quickly becoming an essential component of national and international security policies. With cooperative counter-terrorism measures being actively developed at the international level, many are turning their focus to the national and sub-national levels of the security terrain. States remain the primary guarantors of security to their populations, yet for a number of political and economic reasons, there is still a great deal of disparity with regards to the implementation of security measures in different countries. At this level, the international proclamations often clash with a complex and diverse set of local factors.

Where is it heading?

The international security threat level remains high, and the threats themselves continue to evolve. Panelists observed a number of key trends:

The emergence of "leaderless jihad" that is inspired, but not directed, by international terrorist organizations and is much harder to detect and counter;

The threat of foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan returning home and spreading the fight beyond today's war zones;

Terrorists continue to use the Internet as a sophisticated tool for recruitment, incitement, collaboration, and acts of cyber-terror;

Al-Qaeda has strengthened its presence in North Africa and it is thriving on political instability in the region;

The threat of a terrorist chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear attack remains very high.

As efforts to secure air transportation are strengthened, targeting land and sea transport could become increasingly attractive unless existing security at these places is improved.

How do we counter in the short term?

Suggestions to counter the global terrorist threat in the short term included:

Begin efforts immediately to utilize the UN Comprehensive Convention on Counter-terrorism as a legal framework upon which a true multilateral counter-terror architecture can be built.

Improving the infrastructure of developing countries can have a real, positive affect on the security climate there and in the world at large. Investment and capacity building in these countries should be an immediate priority for policymakers.

Work on improving intelligence sharing and secure creating databases with more detailed information. Cooperation, e.g. data-sharing, must be improved but must be underpinned by a common, robust system of data security and mutual trust.

Consolidate the success of recent, private-public security initiatives.

Governments and media leaders must acknowledge the enormous influence they exert on the security climate through their choice of language. Careful rhetoric should eliminate the "glamorization" of terror, emphasize its criminality, and refrain from making statements that inadvertently bolster support for causes that terrorists and extremists exploit for support.

A frontal assault on terrorists is effective at dispersing them, but not separating them. Isolation and desegregation should be the main tactical objective. The less that terrorists are able to fuse support from disparate geographic, historical, and cultural theaters, the harder it will be for them to survive. Only a multi-pronged attack, on all of these fronts, can successfully dismember and incapacitate a terrorist operation.

How do we counter in the long term?

The panelists warned against hesitation and uncertainty in efforts to combat violent extremism. The message from the international community must be unified and must be timely in order to have a significant impact. Delays or hesitation show uncertainty and sends the wrong message—that of being defeated. The international community does not have a great deal of experience in facing the global threat of terrorism and the rise of violent extremism—both in volatile regions and within western countries themselves. This must be kept in mind and while violent extremism will be extraordinarily difficult to prevent, coordinated efforts must be made now to minimize the phenomenon.

Panelists paid particular attention to three concerns and in particular and their likely influence on measures to combat violent extremism: structural causes, balancing security and liberty, and the need for global actors and global action.

Acknowledging and addressing the root causes of sympathy for terrorists is crucial to a long term counter-terror strategy. Terrorists can be killed and acts prevented, but the underlying structural factors must be addressed through economic, political, and social means. Economic development is an important precondition for political stability and panelists counseled the importance of addressing the structural contributors to terrorism and extremism rather than focusing efforts solely on those already radicalized.

The concern was also raised of the importance of finding the right and ethical balance between strengthening national security measures while at the same time protecting civil rights. This is a particular concern of the European parliament, where members have continually aired their concerns over the prospect of creating a kind of de facto global surveillance society. Without an equitable resolution to the world's ongoing regional conflicts and disputes, lasting international security is unlikely to be achieved. We must stick to our values and respect and promote our fundamental human rights. Any violation of human rights undermines the very principles that western powers rally behind, and allows violent extremists to justify their actions by accusing the west of double standards.

Counter-terrorism efforts should be based on a common ideology shared by all governments and private and public actors. Civil society has a crucial role to play. It was also suggested that the role of the United Nations in an international counter-terrorism and extremism campaign should be strengthened so that it could play the role of leader and coordinator of global efforts.

A panelist proposed that more attention should be given to the role of the public. The public, it was emphasized, also needs to be made a partner in the fight against terrorism, and encouraged to become a voluntary and active participator in the process. One strategy is to mobilize the public by having governments and non-state actors highlight the harm of terrorism, that it is not just a local phenomenon—its effects are global. A second area where the public must be involved is in promoting greater dialogue and understanding between peoples and religions. It was emphasized that terrorism not be associated with particular cultures or religions—and there are, of course, numerous examples across the globe of religions being associated with violent extremism when it is never more than a small number of extremists who are responsible for violent actions done in the name of—but against the principles of—a particular religion.

Panelists also expressed the urgent need for multilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism measures, where communications of intelligence and best practices be shared for mutual benefit.

There was agreement that without an equitable resolution to the world's ongoing regional conflicts and disputes, lasting international security is unlikely to be achieved. The international community must respect and promote fundamental human rights in its campaign against violent extremism. Any violation of human rights undermines the very principles that western powers rally behind, and allows violent extremists to attempt to justify their actions by accusing the West of double standards.

How good have we been at countering extremism? How is the threat changing?

This session focusing on the second core them of the conference—countering extremism—provided an assessment of the success of current efforts while also attempting to gauge how the threat is changing as we look to the future. In the opening remarks, participants were reminded that while it is clearly important to distinguish extremism from terrorism, they are nevertheless intimately linked, with each having a motivating effect on the other. The relationship between extremism and identity was also highlighted, particularly in terms of the appeal of radical thought, which helps to engender a sense of purpose that potential extremists may feel that they cannot find elsewhere. The challenge of countering extremism, therefore, is clearly a complex one, benefiting both from a conceptual and a practical approach, as well as engagement at the individual, national, regional, and global levels. Indeed, while significant progress has been made over the past few years, there is still much to do.

On the nature of violent extremism

The precise causes of extremism is a topic that engenders significant debate—much of which is contentious given the range of strongly held beliefs on matters of religion, ethnicity, and politics. Indeed, opinions that challenge the nature of individual identity are likely to bring about defensive and sometimes hostile responses, so an awareness of perceptions is crucial. Violent extremism is a complex phenomenon, motivated by a range of factors and manifesting itself in multiple forms—depending on the prevailing social, political, and economic conditions, as well as the particular grievances held by its perpetrators. It is vitally important, therefore, to be specific about definitions when engaging in such debates rather than simply adopting a broad canvas that may be left open to (mis)interpretation.

A measured and proportionate response

Faced with the reality of acts of violent extremism, support was expressed by one panelist for a calm and collected reaction from domestic societies, governments, and citizens. Informed by the experiences of Britain and Spain in recent years, a reasoned and proportionate response clearly has an important role to play in strategies to counter terrorism and extremism. Indeed, it sets the tone for the debate surrounding the threat—helping to shape a positive narrative, not to mention reflecting very deeply the character of a people and the principles underpinning a particular society.

The same panelist noted that by responding in such a way, national governments and the general public have effectively denied terrorists one of their main tactics—the ability to create a climate of fear that then becomes self-perpetuating. Participants were also reminded that attempts to provoke a specific reaction–or, more specifically, overreaction—have also yet to meet with success in countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Algeria where, in general, moderate Muslim voices have prevailed.

It is clearly important that those targeted by terrorists continue to respond in such a manner, remaining true to the very ideals and freedoms that underpin society and that terrorists seek to diminish. Viewing and responding to acts or threats of terrorism with a sense of proportion and maintaining resolve in challenging circumstances, as difficult as that may be, is an important step societies and governments can undertake to deny success to terrorist movements.

The international and domestic contexts:a need for reform

While the nature of the reactive and short-term responses to terrorist acts have been encouraging, there was agreement among the panel that fundamental change—both in the international and the domestic spheres—is needed, especially if efforts to counter violent extremism are to be lasting and sustainable.

At the international level, one panelist stressed the importance of working within a comprehensive legal framework—for it is only through adhering to interna-

tional law that states can begin to profess respect for the core values around which any developed society revolves. As was suggested by two panelists, cases such as Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and extraordinary rendition serve only to undermine the values on which the international community is founded, eroding its legitimacy and that of the states that compose it. Concerns were also raised about the current state of the international order, dominated as it is by a few leading powers and their political interests. Redressing this imbalance and broadening meaningful participation across both the developed and developing world could have positive consequences for countering violent extremism. The recent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Darfur, as well the more protracted situation between the Israelis and Palestinians were also highlighted as areas where greater effort is needed to achieve resolution, particularly in light of the wider resonance that these conflicts have—a phenomenon that is heightened in an era of worldwide communications. Such conflicts have the potential to fuel the flames of radicalism and violent extremism in domestic society. This situation is often further exacerbated in countries with weak internal political structures. The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London (in 2004 and 2005, respectively), however, are stark reminders that "established" states are not immune to the spread of radicalism and violent extremism.

In this era of globalization and interdependence, the international and the domestic spheres are more intimately related than before and, as such, instituting meaningful reform in one has the potential to have a profound effect on the other. Focusing on the domestic sphere, one panelist highlighted the need to better facilitate the integration of Muslim communities into European society—a process that requires both greater tolerance and openness from the host country, but also an increased willingness among the minority group to assimilate and contribute to the national culture. Indeed, it was noted that the experience of free elections in Muslim countries such as Indonesia proves that Islam and democracy can be entirely compatible. Simply stated, a greater degree of accommodation is required in both the domestic and international levels.

Countering extremism in Sudan:a distinctive approach

The case of Sudan provides an interesting example of how efforts to counter extremism have faired in practice. Besides implementing many of the same strategies and encountering many of the same problems as other states, the Sudanese government has designed an approach tailored to the specific circumstances prevailing in the country, but one that also speaks to the underlying causes motivating extremism.

Speaking about Sudan, one panelist argued that the Sudanese government recognizes the importance of having a strong domestic political system with political parties providing a meaningful and often much sought outlet for political expression. Parties, it was offered, provide a means of drawing together individuals from otherwise disparate backgrounds and uniting them behind common beliefs in support of a common cause. Indeed, it was noted that the deterioration of the Sudanese political system in recent years was a contributory factor in increasing levels of radicalization. Consequently, as one panelist suggested, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 2005)—in which 'political reform' is a central element—offers the foundation and hope from which such a destructive trend can begin to be reversed.

This has been combined with what the same panelist termed a "non-conventional conciliatory approach," which aims to engage with those who have turned to extremism: firstly, through scholars bringing the extremists into dialogue concerning their religious motivations and secondly, by encouraging their families to exert a positive influence on them. It was noted that such a distinctive two-pronged approach has so far yielded positive results and has proved successful in the long-term too. Indeed, it indicates how engaging with extremists can form an important component in any counter strategy and is perhaps a valuable experience that other countries facing a similar struggle could learn from.[9]

Video and cyberspace:conduits of extremism

Drawing on a recent EWI publication,[10] the role of video and the Internet in spreading extremist propaganda was highlighted. In this era of rapid technological change—both in developing as well as developed states—violent extremists are highly adept at utilizing new media for a variety of purposes, whether to provoke and incite violence, to amplify and reinforce beliefs, or to recruit. That said, and with reference to U.S. intelligence estimates, 'physical indoctrination' is usually necessary before extremism will actually manifest itself in violence. Indeed, cyberspace represents a neutral vehicle that, in and of itself, is rarely sufficient to galvanize terrorist ac-

9 For further discussion of this issue refer to the breakout session on 'Talking to terrorists?'

10 J. Rami Mroz, Countering Violent Extremism: Videopower and Cyberspace, Policy paper 1/2008, EastWest Institute. For more detail and a range of specific policy recommendations the report can be accessed at: http://www.ewi.info/announcements/publications/index.cfm?title=Publications&view=detail&nid=560&aid=6892.

tion. Rather, it represents one of several instruments that violent extremists will use to achieve their objectives.

Given the very nature of video and cyberspace, it is imperative that the international community begin to engage with these new media more—reaching out to the same audiences as the extremists and starting to counter their message of hatred with one of tolerance and freedom.[11] Crucially, it is vital that such efforts take place on a global scale—integrating strategies deployed nationally and regionally with those at the community and individual level. As one panelist stated with a degree of optimism, "[t]here is no reason why a call for violence cannot be turned on its head and be used for pluralism and positive change."

Illicit trade

A lack of information

The extent of global illicit trade is difficult to assess with accuracy, whether it involves the smuggling of goods or value transfers through the hawala banking system. One panelist went as far as to say that there were "no numbers—no one has any clue what the numbers are." With global trade amounting to approximately USD 9 trillion on goods and USD 2 trillion on services, hunting for the unknown amount of illicit trade is akin to looking for a needle in a haystack. For example, a major source of funds sent outside the banking system comes from those working abroad sending funds back to their families. These small amounts of money add up, with an estimate being put forward that 30-50 percent of net inflows into some countries come from this source. Obviously, most are legitimate, but they use the same route as terrorist and criminal financing—either a hawala system or the physical transit of cash—therefore making the task of distinguishing what is illicit from what is not all the more difficult.

Following this, it is hard to assess the exact linkages between criminal activity and terrorist activity—and the panelists varied widely in their estimations. The opinion was expressed that this is not so important—if there is a source of funds both the terrorists and the criminals will try to exploit it; therefore plugging the gap will inevitably fulfill a counter-terrorist objective. Panelists were in agreement that illicit trade is a real threat to national security, with one pointing out choosing to point out the particular risk facing developing countries.

A reoccurring issue mentioned by all panelists as a useful first step was the need for better information exchange—not only between national governments but also among different government agencies, particularly those involved in enforcement and intelligence work. Organized crime was compared to disorganized law enforcement—alluding to the fact that the information exists, but often the methodology for sharing it simply does not. One panelist, drawing on his experiences, mentioned the desirability of setting up a single government body to oversee this. A contributor from the floor, however, questioned whether information sharing is really that effective, citing an example of a massive fraud committed against a major government where information sharing would not have made up for the bad design of the customs systems.

The contributions that the private sector can make to information sharing were also raised, particularly with regard to the example of a project countering the use of precious metals to fund terrorism and organized crime. Sharing information does, however, create significant commercial privacy concerns—though one panelist suggested that a way round this problem would be to agree first on the need for sharing and then work on privacy safeguards as an important next step.

Cross border management and physical security: the shape of illicit trade

One panelist provided a thorough list of materials popular for illicit trade: weapons of mass effect, drugs, counterfeit merchandise, dual-use chemicals, precious metals, small arms, undeclared merchandise, currency, cultural property, and hazardous waste. This was expanded by a comment that illicit trade does not just have to involve goods. Two of the panelists focused on precious metals and stones, highlighting the fact that they are of high value, high liquidity, and small volume and are often untraceable. According to one panelist, terrorists and criminal organizations favor goods with such characteristics when moving from 'agitated' areas to 'safe' areas in order to preserve wealth, make profit or exchange for arms or drugs. He also pointed to the role of goods with these characteristics in performing the value exchanges necessary for hawala banking, and suggested that, since they are used in a form akin to currency, they should be included in cash declarations at customs.

Another panelist pointed to an additional form of illicit trade—under/over invoicing the value of otherwise legitimate shipments. From the perspective of the banking sector representatives, countering this is difficult, especially given that the bank has a relationship with the exporter but not necessarily with the importer—a

11 For further discussion of this issue refer to the breakout session on 'The role of the media'

problem that worsens when goods are moved through a third party or some form of transshipment. Just as customs officials are faced with an impossible task to know the details of all forms of cargo, a banker cannot identify all forms of illicit trade. Nevertheless, one must try and the view was expressed that financial fraud profiling is effective.

Frameworks for public-private and international cooperation

Several different areas of emphasis for the development of frameworks for public-private and international cooperation were put forward and discussed. One suggestion with regard to countering the use of precious metals for terrorist financing was the necessity of establishing international cooperation at the highest level, for example through the framework of the G8. The potential for the bodies of the UN to render advice and technical services was also offered for consideration.

With regard to financial flows, it was noted that whilst the international banking system has been under considerable scrutiny for decades, money service bureaus are subject to varying amounts of attention and hawaladas to none whatsoever. It would be necessary to pool information on financial flows from different companies at a national level.

The limitations of the private sector were also put forward. The prevailing view was that large businesses accept social responsibilities but often lack the capability or the legal grounds to combat directly illicit trade and thus requires government assistance. Nevertheless, the ability of the private sector to analyze the threat and identify vulnerabilities in national systems through tried and tested risk management practices was praised. Understanding the limitations of the private sector, there are three things that the banks cannot do by themselves—know the customer of the customer (that is, the importer), verify the prices of the goods, and verify whether the goods shipped are the actual ones specified.

Actions to confront illicit trade could well have unintended consequences. For example, imposing sanctions on a country or tightening the international laws on money laundering have both been shown to divert financial flows to unregulated systems such as smuggled goods or hawala banking systems, which makes tracing them even more difficult. Customs regimes and international trade standards need to balance facilitation of legitimate trade with security and control of illicit trade.

Policy recommendations

Rely on actionable intelligence and profiling in preference to catch-all searching.

Provide better information sharing arrangements at national and international levels—two particular areas of interest being value transfers through banks and the establishment of national databases on precious metal compositions.

Establish governmental cooperation at the highest level through the G8 framework.

Increase the standardization of regulation across the financial sector, in an attempt to provide better coverage of money service bureaus and hawala networks.

A revisiting and rewriting of the WCO coding system focused on platinum group metals.

Critical infrastructure protection

Critical infrastructure represents the assets, networks, and systems (for example energy, transport, or telecommunications) that form the fabric of daily life. Measures for their protection are therefore of the utmost importance. Indeed, recognizing the potential consequences of a successful attack and the pervasive nature of the threat is imperative. A proactive and coordinated effort that spans industry sectors, crosses national borders, and engages both the public and private sectors to ensure preparedness is crucial. Responding after a crisis (to the extent possible) is far less effective than heading off a crisis before it turns critical. Add to this the importance of finding solutions that balance being practical with being affordable over the long-term and the scale of the challenge becomes apparent.

The role of technology

There is widespread consensus that technology—whether in biometrics, closed-circuit TV, or broader IT systems—has a significant role to play in critical infrastructure protection. Recent examples in the field of transportation security include fingerprint technology and the use of biometric visas and passports at security checkpoints and border crossings. Indeed, biometrics provide a useful way of linking different pieces of data that previously

lacked a means of comparison and as such were rendered of little use. Biometric technology, however, does not offer a universal security panacea, instead working best when part of a wider toolbox of instruments.

Turning to the role of IT systems more generally, there are important efficiency gains to be made by implementing new technologies, particularly given the number of different actors now involved in critical infrastructure systems and the sheer volume of data to be processed. Crucially, however, it is important that we see beyond existing protection measures and fundamentally redesign the security processes themselves. For example, instead of implementing biometric technology for use at existing passport control, why not integrate it with the ticket when a trip is first booked and then coordinate this with information databases at the airport? Combining IT systems with this type of lateral thinking has an integral role to play in the future protection of critical infrastructure.

The potential benefits of technology aside, however, several concerns persist. In particular, there is the sentiment that we should not implement new technology simply for technology's sake. Just because we have the capability does not mean that arbitrarily deploying it will produce effective outcomes. Linked to this are the obvious concerns surrounding the proliferation of information databases and the implications of this for personal privacy and more generally for the type of society we live in. The overriding message, therefore, is that while new technology certainly has an increasingly important role to play in critical infrastructure protection, it is by no means a cure-all and should be used with due thought and consideration.

Public-private engagement: assessing the vulnerabilities

There is consensus, within the regional European context in particular, that no new structures are needed to engage the public and the private sectors. Rather, there needs to be a framework that better coordinates existing structures with one another, fostering dialogue to understand where the vulnerabilities lie. As one panelist highlighted, a holistic approach is needed to coordinate a "system of systems" within a network, especially given that each individual company owning part of the infrastructure is likely to be dependent on all others for its security. Better cooperation between the public and private sector, for example in transnational information networks and energy pipelines, is therefore essential.

There is, however, an understandable difference in opinion concerning the willingness of the private sector to engage in such coordinated efforts at critical infrastructure protection. One view holds that business involvement will be proactive in nature, motivated by a desire to maintain an individual piece of the network and not appear as the weakest link. Another more skeptical opinion, however, highlights the apprehension among industry actors to disclose sensitive and perhaps commercially important information about vulnerabilities to competitors, especially if they are yet to be convinced of the nature of the threat. There is clearly a delicate balance to strike here. In such a situation, building relationships between public and private sector actors that are based on trust is crucial, thereby ensuring that cooperation is as forthcoming as possible and any potential vulnerabilities are fully disclosed.

Regulatory environment: enforcing protection measures

There was again widespread agreement from both the public and private sector representatives that new regulatory structures are not needed. Emphasis was placed on the need to implement already existing conventions and to use the authority already established at the national level to ensure the necessary protection measures are in place. Informed by the Polish example, it was suggested that governments have an important role to play in enforcing national laws, raising awareness of the problem within the private sector, and building on existing local structures.

The idea of a European audit was raised as a potential means of ensuring such measures were in place. Such an audit would hold private firms accountable through an inspection regime. While the European Commission already has the power to audit the security of airports, port facilities, and nuclear installations, extending this to individual firms may add an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. Instead it was suggested that the national authorities holding existing jurisdiction should take the initiative, inspecting and holding to account those private firms within their borders. There is a potential role for the EU in coordinating across an entire industry sector, reflecting the "system of systems" approach already mentioned. Most importantly of all, as one panelist noted, is that the approach adopted should be flexible and context-specific in nature, operating by country and by industry sector, so as best to meet requirements proportionately and avoid unnecessary costs. As a participant from the floor noted, it is important not to lose sight of the broader global dimension to security. Indeed, the failure of other countries and regions to learn from such practices may lead to an uneven distribution of protection and the existence of pockets of security and insecurity across the world.[12]

12 See the European Commission initiative for a public-private dialogue on critical infrastructure protection at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/experts/funding_experts_en.htm.

Governments have an important role to play in stimulating private sector innovation. Indeed, they can often be decisive in initiating research and development in the private sector, helping to provide investment that otherwise would not be forthcoming and promoting growth in a fledgling industry. This was, for example, the case with fingerprint technology in the United States a decade and half ago. In addition, the public sector can also offer guidance about the situations in which the technology will be used, therefore specifying requirements and ensuring that the final product is tailored to the task and the specific threat at hand. The importance was noted, however, of not extending the long arm of regulation too far, so as to ensure innovation is not stifled.

Policy recommendations

A proportionate, balanced, and pragmatic response to actual violence or potential threats is required—weighing necessity with affordability to ensure resilience. Acting out of fear alone is likely to lead to unnecessary disruption and excessive economic cost. Context-specificity, by industry sector and by country, is therefore crucial.

Update the robustness of existing national structures to cope with the threats facing us in the twenty-first century, rather than those they were perhaps originally designed for.

Fundamentally reshape processes rather than relying exclusively on new technology to deliver improved outcomes.

Build trust—this is imperative in relations between the public and private sectors, especially when the sharing of sensitive information is a necessity.

Institute the proper awareness and audit mechanisms (at the national level) in order to ensure that private sector companies have assessed vulnerabilities and have the necessary measures in place should critical infrastructure be targeted.

Governments should play (or continue to play in some cases) a supporting role in the research and development of new security technologies that are directed at the critical infrastructure protection effort.

EWI policy paper: *Protect! The security of Pakistan's nuclear facilities*

A presentation on the recently published EWI policy paper—Protect!: The Security of Pakistan's Nuclear Facilities—launched the session into a discussion of the elections that took place in the country just the previous day [February 18, 2008] and the complex factors that will determine Pakistan's domestic stability, the security of its nuclear program, and the state of regional and global nonproliferation and arms control efforts.

Securing Pakistan's nuclear program

For many years, the international community was confident in President Pervez Musharraf's ability to keep Pakistan's WMDs safe. More recently, however, there has been genuine concern about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear program. This concern was illustrated most prominently by the recent comment by Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that he felt 'anxiety" over the security of Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Threat scenarios in Pakistan include a terrorist takeover of a facility or the rise of an extremist Islamic state that would assume control of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

There was general agreement that Pakistan is doing a relatively good job today of keeping its weapons under control. There is now a built-in code in all weapons similar to those found in countries with a more advanced nuclear weapons program. Command lines over the weapons also have been significantly strengthened.

It was broadly accepted that having the physical control of the weapons is in the hands of the military is a positive aspect of Pakistan's nuclear program. It was the opinion of several South Asian experts that the military is probably the most stable institution in Pakistani society. Despite rising international concern, there has never been any indication in all of the turmoil of the last four years that any of the nuclear facilities were in serious danger. The major threat is a political one, and maintaining Pakistan's political stability is crucial to maintaining the security of its nuclear facilities. It can reasonably be expected that some of the command and control authority over the facilities will be placed back in the hands of a civilian government, but the exact makeup of this civilian government remains unclear.

The program

Pakistani nuclear facilities are under the guard of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA includes the prime minister and foreign minister, with these officials being handpicked by General Musharraf. The day-to-day operation of the facilities is carried out by the Strategic Command Division, which is run by a senior military officer. Pakistan's nuclear complex ranges from the mining of low quality uranium and the production of heavy water to the milling and processing of yellow cake, uranium enrichment, and weaponization—all of which occurs within Pakistan. However, Pakistan's uranium resources are of relatively low quality and are limited in size. Therefore its ability to expand the program with domestic supplies is limited. Pakistan is estimated to have about 60 nuclear weapons and 500kg of plutonium, although it was observed that these figures should be regarded with the utmost caution. There is still suspicion that, for all their public rhetoric, some Pakistani authorities are trying to obtain nuclear materials from clandestine sources. Questions also linger over the true state of the AQ Khan network.

Pakistan's facilities and the international system

Pakistan has a highly developed missile industry capable of delivering a nuclear weapon almost anywhere within India. Neither Pakistan nor India is party to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, and it was observed that the treaty is being severely undermined by the behavior of the two countries. In addition, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty cannot be ratified without the signatures of India and Pakistan (they are not, however, the only countries that have yet to sign). There have been attempts to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty to stop the production of materials needed for nuclear weapons. But the U.S. declaration of its opposition to a verification scheme for such a treaty has complicated these efforts. There have also been efforts to set up international nuclear fuel banks that countries seeking an energy program could go to for fuel (given acceptance of International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) monitoring). Pakistan is an IAEA member and some of its reactors operate under IAEA safeguards.

Assisting Pakistan

Pakistan assumes a heavy risk by refusing foreign personnel access to its facilities, particularly when Pakistani authorities have already expressed concern with and a desire to beef up their security. One obstacle to greater cooperation is that most Western states have a variety of restrictions on what they can do to assist Pakistan. The United States has congressional bans on any kind of assistance to the Pakistani nuclear program in the aftermath of Pakistan's nuclear tests and the AQ Khan scandal. Still, there are areas for the international community to help Pakistan keep its facilities secure. One such area would be improving the security of Pakistan's major transportation hubs and ports. Another area where assistance could avoid stringent restrictions would be ensuring the financial security of outgoing nuclear personnel. In addition, the Pakistani Inter-service Intelligence Agency and other national intelligence agencies could work more closely together to keep track of nuclear personnel while they are abroad. Overall, it was felt that the international community should seize the return of civilian rule to Pakistan as an opportunity to increase security cooperation.

Policy recommendations

Bolster efforts to set up international banks of fissile material for countries seeking an energy program.

Accelerate efforts to assist Pakistan with security matters and, in light of its return to civilian governance, to avoid measures that threaten its internal stability.

Priorities include:

- improving the policing of the major transportation hubs in Pakistan;
- ensuring that Pakistani nuclear personnel are secure; and
- lifting restrictions on assisting Pakistan in securing its nuclear program.

Reassess measures that will tempt Pakistan to expand its program or seek resources from clandestine forces. International agreements with India should take this risk into account.

Cyber crime

Cyber crime—crime perpetrated through the Internet—is by its very nature global in outlook. It respects neither sovereign borders nor physical geography, and possesses the capacity to target government authorities, private business, and the individual citizen. Though less conspicuous than conventional organized crime and terrorism, cyber crime nonetheless represents a significant and growing threat on the worldwide security landscape. Relatively simple and cheap to undertake, with potentially devastating consequences, and difficult to detect, let alone prosecute, it is therefore highly appealing to the perpetrators.

While originally driven by a desire for fun and personal renown, the primary motivations for hackers are now mainly financial in character as well as potentially subversive. Indeed, the gap between cyber crime and cyber terrorism is increasingly narrow, with both the criminals and the terrorists employing similar tactics and similar expertise to achieve their aims. Given the continually evolving and pervasive nature of the threat, the challenge is not so much finding a solution—the search for which represents, at best, an elusive chimera in the short-term due to the rapid pace of technological development—but rather instituting the means of mitigating the problem and its consequences.

The nature of the threat: characteristics and targets

Given the platform upon which cyber crime is dependant—that of the Internet and networked information technology—the nature of the threat is continually evolving, shifting as the technology itself develops. Moreover, the manipulation of the technology is open to anyone with a degree of expertise and the necessary connectivity. As such, the cyber criminals are generally able to stay one step ahead of the citizen, and, perhaps more importantly from their perspective, one step ahead of the governments and the legislative processes tasked with stopping them.

At present, there are several ways that cyber crime and cyber terrorism can pose a threat. Perhaps the most widespread of these concerns is "micro crime"—fraud targeting individual users on an apparently small scale. This is primarily perpetrated through spam, commonly disseminated by "botnets" (networks of hundreds or thousands of hijacked personal computers). The perpetrators—whether through selling fake goods and services or tricking victims into divulging personal bank details (phishing attacks)—steal small amounts, thereby making the cost of investigation and prosecution of an individual case out of proportion to the crime. This form of cyber crime is systematically automated by computer, allowing easy replication with little human effort. Given the failure of authorities or even victims to take individual cases seriously, the true scale of the problem is unknown. Importantly, it does have the potential to provide a rich source of financing for terrorist networks—but until more attention is paid to micro crime, there is simply no good way to assess how much this potential is actually being realized.

Switching to the more subversive end of the spectrum, cyber terrorists have the capacity to target critical infrastructure[13]—whether mass transit systems, telecommunications networks, financial infrastructure, or utilities such as electricity and gas—all of which require Internet connectivity if they are to function. Given the vital part such infrastructure plays in our daily lives, a cyber attack has the potential to impact virtually any and every individual. As one panelist cautioned, the next stage of the threat may involve the combination of a conventional physical terrorist attack and a cyber attack, occurring either closely before or after. This nexus is something that authorities are not yet adequately addressing and consequently such an attack would likely result in unprecedented disruption.

Owing to the similarity in tactics and expertise used by the perpetrators of cyber crime and cyber terrorism, the methods of mitigating both are relatively similar and fall into three broad categories—educating users, promoting public-private sector information sharing, and improving cross-boundary legal coordination.

Educating users

General users, rather than the hardware or software, are most often the vulnerable link in networks. The process of education and raising awareness among both employees and private individuals is thus imperative. It is important to note that cyber crime from micro crime attacks on multinational banks tend to rely on social engineering rather than technical skills. Raising such awareness is particularly important among the younger generation, for whom a presence in the cyber world and online connectivity form an integral part of life (both at home and at work), conditioning interaction and communication on a daily basis.

At the regional level, ENISA (the European Network and Information Security Agency) plays an important role, raising awareness and providing assistance to safe-

13 For further discussion on this issue refer to the breakout session on 'Critical infrastructure protection'

guard Europe's electronic communication and information networks, which traverse both the member states and the public and private sectors. There is also scope for national activityactivity. One panelist referenced the Irish experience and noted the role of private business in organizing free programs to inform citizens, while also highlighting the government-organized Make IT Secure initiative, which flags dangers in the cyber world and educates about the importance of online security.[14]

Public-private information sharing

Another important area (both in terms of prevention and mitigation) where more work is required focuses on information sharing between the public and private sectors. It is only through exchanging experiences and knowledge of cyber crime that it is possible to understand the nature of the threat as it evolves, and therefore assess potential vulnerabilities and develop effective solutions. Given the range of potential targets it is important to bring together all of the key stakeholders—whether in critical infrastructure, the intelligence services, law enforcement, or wider industry—and to do so in a coordinated way that avoids unnecessary duplication, something that has resulted from many informal arrangements currently in place.

Drawing on the experience of the Netherlands, one panelist highlighted how public-private information sharing can prove successful if instituted at the national level. The Dutch National Infrastructure against Cyber Crime (NICC) program provides a facilitating structure, pulling together the various interested public and private actors into a cooperative forum where they can then share their expertise. Crucially, this arrangement is founded on a platform of trust, with a mechanism—known as the "traffic light protocol"—defining how sensitive information that is shared among participants can be used. This ensures that the most important information is forthcoming, as well as fostering a sense of reciprocity so that those offering information also receive something of help in return.

Cross-boundary legal coordination

Another important mitigating measure centers on achieving better legal coordination across the jurisdictions in which any single act of cyber crime may be perpetrated. One of the defining characteristics of cyber crime is that it is multi-location in character—that is, the criminal and the victim can easily be on different continents. Operating on the Internet, the criminals are shrouded by a cloak of anonymity confident of the fact that they can slip through the tangled legal net. The solution to this would be to achieve cross-jurisdictional agreement that individual acts of cyber crime do not need to be treated in their entirety, but instead can be broken down into constituent parts which can then be prosecuted separately.

Policy recommendations

Educate users on security issues in the cyber world, since it is they rather than the hardware or the software that is generally the most vulnerable link.

Ensure preparedness for the next stage of the threat, specifically a scenario where a cyber attack is combined with a conventional physical terrorist attack.

Create an effective reporting mechanism to record cases of cyber crime at the micro level.

Promote information sharing and exchange between the public and private sector in forums built on trust.

Promote consistency and coordination across legal jurisdictions, specifically so that a crime can be viewed in its constituent parts rather than in its entirety, thereby enabling successful prosecutions.

Provide support and incentives for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to cooperate with authorities in targeting cyber criminals. Currently, ISPs are often less than forthcoming given their role as neutral carriers—not wanting to examine the traffic of all users and then define what is criminal or terrorist activity, with the associated debates on free speech and the responsibility for piracy to contend with.

14 For more information, refer to: http://www.makeitsecure.ie/ .

Building a new global architecture to counter violent religious extremism and radicalization

Extremist movements have arisen from a number of disparate socio-political contexts, yet their cumulative effect is that of a global threat. The challenge now is that of uniting localities, international organizations, and civil society to build a global architecture with the capacity to deal both with the local factors and the cumulative security threat. Winning the hearts and minds of individuals and building trust and camaraderie between states is essential to formulating this response. Doing so, however, will necessitate calm diplomacy and the agile traversing of political and religious pitfalls.

Religious rhetoric and political agendas

To counter effectively the threat of violent religious extremism, we must first logically examine our own misconceptions and then utilize the same standard to expose the weaknesses and contradictions of the extremist rhetoric and agenda. The notion of extremism and radicalization having the legitimate justification of religion must be dispelled, as should an exclusive association between extremism and one particular religion. It is useful to remember that extremism can almost always be traced back to a specific socio-political context; most extremists are homegrown. The architects of a global response to extremism must be well-acquainted with the local backgrounds of the extremist threat.

It is equally important to avoid being consumed by debates over culture and religion, as often these are merely tools used by extremists for political ends. The exact balance of these political agendas and religious rhetoric varies, but they are a formidable pair. The example of Somalia illustrates how the emergence of a religious dimension within the context of a local political struggle can be deleterious not only for the country or region but for the world, as the complete breakdown of authority there has brought amnesty for terrorists and increased radicalization.

International architecture

The integrity of the architecture being proposed will be determined by the nature of the political relations between its architects, the degree to which multilateral institutions and civil society organizations can contribute, and the legal instruments, and operational resources that have been devoted to it. There are large differences of opinion within and between countries as to the nature and legitimacy of extremism. To eliminate double standards and facilitate what will surely be a lengthy process of political bargaining, the role of apolitical civil society organizations cannot be overemphasized.

The EastWest Institute is drawing together a proposal to establish a Global Action Platform that draws people together from different countries, groups of society, and religious groups to address the worldwide demand for action. Work is already underway to build an online community to mobilize these groups. But it is not necessary to build the global response entirely from scratch. The UN has already adopted a sizable body of legislation that brings strength and legitimacy to the global response, and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism—which covers education, culture, the mass media, and NGOs—is a forward-looking document with the potential to be an effective tool in fighting the crimes of violent and religious extremist movements. In addition, NATO, the G8, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization offer their member countries the chance to strengthen relations and align their cooperative efforts to counter extremism. Indeed, many components of the global architecture are already in place, but it is the relations between its architects that will determine the degree to which they can engineer a coherent and comprehensive counter-extremist structure.

A key test of this coherence will be whether these participants can effectively prioritize the components of response. The debate over language and terminology, the historical parallels between religious extremism and totalitarianism, and the subjective, gradational nature of the extremist threat are all sensitive issues with the potential to stall or derail the negotiation process.

The foundation: hearts and minds

Too often, the fight against extremism is conceptualized exclusively in national and international terms, but in many ways it is a job of reaching out to people at the local level. Admittedly, there are few successful precedents that can be turned to for guidance. The factors motivating radicalization must be better understood and behavior that augments moderating forces must be promoted. On this front, the international community is starting

from a considerably lower level of development. It might first be useful to acknowledge the reciprocal nature of our actions; hypocrisy at the international level will only encourage cynicism at the local level. A broad disparity between action and intent at the international level will only bolster radical and extremist forces. Likewise, the degree to which governments and international institutions can find solidarity of thought and action with moderate communities and individuals will determine their own relative strengths. Local and international debates exert reciprocal influences on one another.

The potential for religious groups to play a positive moderating role should not be ignored by governments looking for allies in the fight against violent religious extremism. Another potential ally for countering violent extremism is media—no group of actors plays a larger role in shaping and framing perceptions than the mass media, the involvement of whom will be crucial in forging a common identity among those who are opposed to extremism.

Policy recommendations

Governments must pay attention to glaring gaps between stated intent and action, keeping in mind that their words and actions—even if aimed at a local constituency—play to a global audience.

On the basis of the UN resolution against violent propaganda, build a jointly supported international databank on those disseminating violent propaganda. The databank could, in turn, be used to establish an early warning system to identify threats on the horizon.

Develop and implement a recommended set of best practices for governments in fighting violent and religious extremism.

The role of business

The private sector—whether large multinational corporations (MNCs), medium-sized enterprises, or small businesses—clearly has an important role in developing strategies to counter terrorism and extremism, since it represents a significant constituency in any developed or developing society. Indeed, businesses are often targets of terrorist attacks—whether because they are involved in particularly susceptible industries (for example, tourism) or because they own part of a critical infrastructure network. More generally, given the globalized and interdependent environment in which modern business operates, companies are also likely to be affected by the uncertainty and disruption that an attack inflicts on the economy as a whole.

It is also important to remember that business can act (passively or otherwise) as a facilitator of terrorism by financing such activity or providing the networks and systems through which an attack may be delivered. As such, it is in the interests of business itself, as well as government, to ensure an awareness of the threat and the widest possible engagement in counter-terrorism efforts.

There are several ways that the private sector may be involved in such efforts. The first of these—a primary interest of any company—is likely to be the protection of their own infrastructure, both physical (offices and factories) and in terms of human capital (employees). More generally, businesses can also choose to take a proactive and longer-term approach aimed at creating the conditions in which terrorism and extremism find it hard to flourish—for example, by encouraging awareness locally and clamping down on sources of terrorist funding—though the matter of incentives for business engagement in this latter sense is an issue.

Working with the public sector

As suggested above, a vital aspect of the private sector's role in counterterrorism concerns the relationship it develops with government and whether the two coordinate to ensure the most effective response. This is particularly important given the high degree of private ownership of critical national infrastructure, but also more generally given the role of business as a major and necessary stakeholder in society. There are perhaps two broad areas where business can play a role in this respect.

First, the private sector can be a valuable source of conceptual and theoretical understanding, that, when translated into counter-terrorism strategies, provides useful insight into the actions and development of terrorist networks. It was suggested that business and manage-

ment theory has much to offer in this respect, with the cycle of technology development providing a useful parallel insight into the emergence of new terrorist tactics. Indeed, recognizing such tactics at an early stage would mean that governments may be better able to counter them before they became embedded practice. The tactic of suicide bombing was raised by one panelist as a prime example—used by Hezbollah in Beirut in the 1983 Marine barracks attack, it has since been widely adopted by terrorists the world over and is extensively used by al-Qaeda. Recognizing a tactic such as this in its early stages of development may help to provide an understanding of how terrorist organizations think, offering a chance to stifle their innovation before it is put to devastating effect.

Second, business has an important cooperative role with the public sector concerning grassroots intelligence and information sharing. As one panelist suggested, business can be the "eyes and ears" of society—a role it is particularly well placed to fulfill given its interaction with citizens, customers and other businesses on a daily basis. Such vigilance and awareness is something that is particularly important on public transport networks and in small communities, for example, but it can also apply to the selling of "'dual use'" items that may have both harmless and subversive applications. There are obvious privacy concerns, depending on the type of information sought. This, of course, depends on the type of information sought. Nevertheless business can clearly make a significant difference, helping in areas that the surveillance services would otherwise not have the resources to cover or would not deem sufficiently high-risk.

This important role for business notwithstanding, there was widespread agreement that it is government that should take the lead in counter-terrorism efforts—providing the overall framework within which the private sector has a clearly defined role. Indeed, measures to promote certainty and decrease ambiguity are likely to achieve the best response from business, especially given prevailing concerns over strategic planning and future investment. As one panelist argued with reference to the longer-term, however, it is the government that ultimately has (and should have) the responsibility for extirpating the underlying causes of extremism and radicalization from which terrorism may emerge.

Voluntary versus compelled participation: the issue of incentives

Prescriptions about what the role of business should be aside, there still remains an issue about how one ensures the participation of the private sector—in effect, how does one incentivize counter-terrorism and counter-extremism in a business model? This is a particular issue in relation to information sharing, mentioned above, especially given the frequently sensitive nature of the material and the issues of confidentiality that arise. Understandably, there is much debate on this point and strong opinions emerge.

One view holds that, as long as the type of information sought is specified, government can legitimately compel business to cooperate. Indeed, in matters of national security strong government leadership is imperative and this should trump the concerns of the private sector. As one participant from the floor noted, a lack of business participation would simply lead to a higher degree of uncertainty in counter-terrorism strategies and likely create problems for other sections of society tasked with dealing with the consequences. An alternative view, however, argues that private sector cooperation will only prove effective if it remains largely voluntary. To suggest otherwise and burden business with excessive regulation and statutory participation would likely lead to antagonism rather than the culture of trust that is needed.

There is obviously a delicate balance to strike between these competing views, with majority opinion seemingly in favor of a more voluntary approach. That being the case, there still remains the problem of incentivizing participation in a way that takes into account the profit, efficiency, and stability motives of business. This is a particular issue when addressing the private sector's broader proactive engagement in efforts to counter terrorism, rather than any specific threat an individual company may face. It was suggested that, in terms of information sharing, the government should establish a feedback mechanism providing businesses with more detail about where the information shared has been used and the role it has played. Government would also do well to provide businesses with reciprocal information in return for their cooperation, thereby helping future planning and investment decisions.

Assuming individual and collective responsibility

Dovetailing neatly with the discussion on incentives, a consistent theme to emerge throughout centered on the issue of responsibility in society and how this relates to business. Indeed, while the matter of incentives poses a difficult challenge to overcome in the long term, it is important to remember the indiscriminate nature of the terrorism threat—something from which the private sector is not immune. As one participant from the floor suggested, a 'collegiate duty' exists in society to address terrorism, and business is very much a part of this.

Business represents an important stakeholder in so-

ciety, no matter how large or small individual businesses may be, often employing local people and forming part of the fabric of interaction between individuals in daily life. This is particularly true of small businesses. Indeed, as members of local communities they assume the rights of such, but they should also recognize the attendant responsibility (both at the individual and collective levels) to be aware of local issues and the activities of citizens. Only with awareness will we recognize extremism before it has a chance to become entrenched, to flourish, and ultimately to become violent. In this sense, the degree to which business chooses to engage with counter-terrorism efforts perhaps reflects the expectations that we, as citizens and employees, currently hold, as well as saying something about the kind of society that we aspire to.

Policy recommendations

Define exactly what role the public sector expects business to play in counter-terrorism.

Find a way to "incentivize" counter-terrorism strategies that takes into account the private sector motivations of profit, efficiency, and stability.

Establish a feedback and reciprocity mechanism to aid information-sharing between the public and private sector.

Develop a large tool set to understand better nascent terrorist tactics and how they may evolve—including reaching into non-traditional areas such as business and management theory.

Businesses can adopt a more 'human' approach to counter-terrorism that sees valuable investment in microcredit schemes in poverty-stricken countries, as well as the provision of jobs for disaffected youth who otherwise might turn to extremism.

Building a new global architecture to combat terrorism and organized crime

Recognizing the highly complex and amorphous nature of contemporary terrorist and organized crime networks, this session focused on the necessity of developing a similarly complex worldwide counter-terrorism framework—a global architecture—to effectively address the threat. What specific issues should this global architecture be concerned with and what should its constituent elements include? Who, if anyone, holds the authority to design this global framework? And indeed, while perhaps conceptually lucid, is such an architecture desirable in practice and sustainable over the long-term, or do we need to look at the situation from a different angle? These were some central issues animating discussion.

Understanding the nature of the threat

A theme running throughout the conference, and of particular importance in this session, concerned reaching agreement on a common definition of "terrorism"—a topic which continues to engender much discussion and often heated debate. One view expressed holds that, while clearly important, definitional issues essentially deflect time, resources and attention away from what really matters—reaching consensus on the policies needed to actually counter the threat. Another opinion, however, contended that it is only when a common accepted definition of 'terrorism' is agreed that the international community will be able to build a suitable architecture to effectively counter the threat. The definitional issue is one that continues to elude consensus at the UN and understandably seems likely to animate (or divert) debate for some time to come.

That issue aside, it is nevertheless important that the international community understands the fundamental character of terrorist organizations, analyses the constituent parts of the threat and forms counter-terrorism policy accordingly. As one panelist stressed, terrorism can be reduced to two basic components: "motivations" driving the terrorist cause and the "operational capability" to plan, prepare, and deploy acts of indiscriminate violence. Currently, most states focus their counter-terrorism resources on only one of these factors—something that is certainly true of the UN's sixteen Universal Anti-Terrorist Instruments, which concentrate on operational capabil-

ity—attempting to provide a comprehensive framework of the acts that terrorists may perpetrate, rather than focusing on their underlying causes. As was suggested, future counter-terrorism efforts should attempt to combine a counter-motivational approach with a counter-operational one.

Learning the lessons of domestic and regional architectures

Another important element in constructing a global architecture concerns learning from the experience of national and regional efforts to counter terrorism and organized crime. Indeed, the transfer of such knowledge has the potential to provide useful input when designing a global framework.

Focusing on the national level, and taking the Chinese experience as an example, one panelist suggested that the lessons of instituting interagency cooperation in large cities could prove highly instructive. The challenge of integrating the police, intelligence services, relevant NGOs, and the military to deal with crisis response situations certainly raises some important questions, including issues of leadership and authority. One speaker stressed that it should be the civilian sphere that takes command in place of the traditional military element (except in situations where a crisis may considerably worsen). Another significant issue concerned the need for constant, active information sharing between different government agencies. Central to both of the above is the challenge of overcoming the entrenched and insular practices of individual agencies—effectively breaking down institutional cultures—which may act as barriers to cooperation at many levels.

The European Union's customs and trade policies are good examples of the same issues addressed in a broader regional setting. Coordinated and effective information sharing was raised again, this time in the context of national customs administrations, with information technology seen as the basis for cross border security networks. Such networks work best when they are inclusive in nature and founded on the principle of feedback, thereby ensuring that the different actors involved see themselves as integral and meaningful parts of the architecture as it is constructed.

Implementing already-existing structures

While there are clearly important lessons to be learned from domestic and regional experiences when creating global structures, it is important also to recognize that many international conventions already exist. As one panelist emphasized, the real challenge comes in implementing these across a broad swathe of countries.

From a legal perspective, this is true of the UN's sixteen universal anti-terrorist instruments. More generally, it also applies to the UN's global counter-terrorism strategy. (One panelist regarded the fact that a common agreement was reached at all to be a significant milestone in and of itself.)Widespread implementation would, however, mark an important step forward in both these cases. Indeed, as was suggested, finding the "political will" to overcome the inertia currently pervading national governments seemingly unconvinced as to the urgency of the threat represents a significant challenge, but one that potentially fosters the beginnings of a collective basis on which a global architecture could be built..

Promoting 'viral networks' in place of a global architecture

Offering an alternate perspective and in light of the amorphous and continually evolving nature of modern terrorist networks, it was suggested that efforts to create an ordered and rigid global architecture may perhaps be misjudged. Rather, it may be better to approach the problem through what may be termed viral networks—that is, focusing on the diverse range of structures and expertise already in place and trying to connect and relate these in new ways.

As the panelist suggested, the concept of responsibility—both at the collective and individual levels—is of central importance in this context. At one level, intergovernmental and international structures, as well as global and regional actors (such as businesses and NGOs) have a vital role to play. Equally important in viral networks, however, are the less formal structures. These operate at the level of local communities and individuals recognizing the fact that it is often at the grassroots where extremist ideas that may gradually turn to violent embed. Individuals and communities clearly have an important role to play in fostering tolerance and awareness, and extirpating any emerging extremism. It is only by recognizing the duty incumbent upon us at a variety of levels that the international community may begin to address effectively the threat facing it, in a manner that is both global but also comprehensive in nature.

Policy recommendations

Recognizing the importance of both the "motivational" and "operational capability" aspects of counter-terrorism policy—this is, as one panelist stressed, the only way to ensure a comprehensive approach.

Any global network must have the necessary legal structure in place as a foundation. Having a technological structure in place is also an important component, particularly in facilitating information sharing.

From the perspective of businesses, some thought needs to be given as to what are the incentives for increased collaboration in a global framework.

The focus perhaps should be around building on and expanding viral networks rather than constructing a new and ordered global architecture per se.

Talking to terrorists?

There is deep disagreement over whether, how, and why to talk to terrorists. There is broad support, however, for reaching out and talking to communities from which terrorists purport to derive legitimacy. There is also agreement that those who choose to pursue their political goals through violence do so calculatingly and consciously and are neither insane nor illogical; but how to proceed from this agreement is much debated, just as the agreement on separating tactics and causes has produced little consensus. "Talking" can be understood in different ways. In a broad sense, it involves media and international debates and dialogue. In a narrower sense, it can mean negotiations between governments and terrorist organizations. The answer to the question of whether or not to "talk" to terrorists is highly dependent on the scope and context of any given situation. There is near consensus that we must talk to victims, ex-terrorists, and democratic and pluralistic forces.

Legitimacy

Strong differences over the question of legitimacy highlight the difficulties that the international community faces in developing a unified counter-extremist strategy. Basing the concept purely on democratic values can be problematic. For example, Hamas was elected, Hezbollah has been providing social services for 20 years, and the Taliban administered an entire country and enjoyed broad international legitimacy during its war with the Soviet forces. For some, the notion that these groups will become legitimized through negotiations with a national government is irrational, because of the legitimacy they already enjoy at home. For proponents of this definition, legitimization is really in the eyes of the people concerned, and the real focus of discussion should be the communities responsible for conferring this legitimacy.

The opposing view is that talking to terrorists confers de facto legitimacy. For this school, loyalty to democratic values is paramount, and any processes that might risk legitimizing groups that gained or wield power through violence or terrorism should be avoided. This school does not believe that because a leader was elected he or she necessarily deserves to take a seat with the mature democracies of the world. The problem that those opposed to "talking to terrorists" anticipate is that the legitimacy that terrorists derive through being invited to negotiate with the world democratic powers will provide a precedent and an incentive for future acts of terrorism.

There is also a more pragmatic approach that sees no alternative to dialogue. According to this line of thought, exploratory dialogue in which the two sides do not have to abandon ties to their parties but in which both can discover their commonalities does not legitimize the tactics of the terrorist organization. Negotiated outcomes are possible, even after years of failure and exacerbation. Libya is an interesting example of a successful negotiating strategy that was rooted in international law and contained both economic incentives and political deterrents. Iron-fist, no-dialogue policies, by contrast, have not been successful in defeating terrorism. In fact, some terrorists have stated that condemnation and reprisals from the world's powers is the ultimate test of legitimacy.

Talks are already taking place

Despite the ongoing debate over the wisdom and preferred framework of negotiating with terrorists and their leaders, the truth is that talks have already taken place on numerous occasions and dialogue continues today. Many feel that there are times when the only way to advance a situation is to bring all sides into the fold and that, all ethical and moral judgment aside, meaningful talks are difficult without a critical mass of power present.

One should not discount the volume of dialogue already taking place within the Arab and Muslim worlds through the rapidly growing media enterprises that are facilitating discussions between ideologues on both sides (those who promote terrorism and those who reject it). In Iraq, working with former extremists has become a key part of the U.S. strategy to reconcile the country's internal discord. Likewise, the EU, Russia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia have strategies for deal-

ing with terrorists that often contain a negotiation component and some of the world's major peace processes have been set up through secret talks and exploratory dialogues with former terrorist organizations.

Lessons from dialogue

The amount of dialogue that has and is taking place gives us a number of examples of both successful and failing tactics. Talks will surely fail if they are diverted by debates over which side committed the worst atrocities, or if the system of trust on which democratic societies rely is betrayed by one party. Talking to terrorists is asymmetric; they do not have a democratic obligation and do not have to operate under the same constraints as democratic governments. It is here that Track 2 and unofficial dialogue can play critical roles behind the scenes.

As in most topics related to countering extremism and fighting terrorism, language plays an important role in the debate over talking to terrorists. In what was referred to by one panelist as a "double dichotomy," both sides of the negotiating process often refer to their counterparts as terrorists, making the subjective nature of the term particularly obstructive. There is strong support for transcending the definition of terrorism as opposition to national interests, and for finding a substantive change in strategy to deal with basic, underlying grievances in order to bring meaningful change. There is a need for concentration of minds to develop further this alternative strategy.

One of the major challenges facing negotiations is finding a forum and framework that would be mutually acceptable to both parties. While there are some movements that, upon achieving their stated goals, can integrate into international society, there are others that reject the very foundation of the international system. This has led some to conclude that there are some differences that are simply not bridgeable by dialogue.

Policy recommendations

Stringent ground rules and requirements are necessary for negotiations to proceed constructively: All parties must have the authority to implement what they agree to during talks; any group that has been practicing violence must cease doing so as a precondition for talks; and, in general, parties must have clear objectives from the outset of the talks.

The careful balancing of economic incentives and strict adherence to international law can make a positive outcome to talks significantly more likely.

The role of NGOS

Civil society and NGOs can make a positive contribution to countering terrorism and extremism. Whether in the field of development, human rights, or security there is room for greater cooperation with governments and across disciplines, but it is important not to undervalue independence, as this can be an NGO's greatest asset.

The threats of terrorism and extremism are dynamic and involve many people in many countries. Governments, however, are restrained by the rule of law, which will always lag behind the actions of the terrorists themselves. Governments are also faced with the fact that, by and large, they enjoy less credibility than the people who put them there. Several governments have undertaken illegal acts against their own people in the name of counter-terrorism; therefore it is important to have NGOs on the ground to monitor these actions and to ensure that humanitarian law and human rights are not subsumed. NGOs bring a voice to marginalized people and provide a constructive outlet for redressed grievances. Political grievances, real or perceived, can lead people toward an expression of political violence. NGOs provide a way to address these grievances. NGOs can be early warning lights, means of communication and mobilization, and they often enjoy more credibility than governments.

Development and security

NGOs working with development, humanitarian, and security issues are exceptionally well-positioned to support counter-extremism initiatives. But each of these groups comes to the security debate with its own perspective. Human rights NGOs, while very active, are historically wary of governments. This then tends to limits their participation and cooperation with states. The approach of the development community differs in this respect, but it is generally hesitant to reappraise its activities from a security perspective. For example, one view defines a farmer who cannot plough because of landmines as a development issue and a businessman afraid of doing business because of the risk of getting kidnapped as a security issue. Finding an agreeable boundary between these two NGO communities has proved a difficult task.

Working with governments

NGOs can strictly define their activities and areas of operation, but some organizations defy such categorization. In East Africa, for example, there is a growing awareness of the need for more community-policing activities

to give a voice to communities where outsiders and the police are often not trusted. Sometimes, the police can work with NGOs but for the most part NGOs work as independent actors. It is important for governments to acknowledge that NGOs require space to be effective and government financing can actually damage an NGO's activities and its credibility. Some governments have expressed a desire for clearer boundaries between the activities of governments and NGOs, citing examples of NGOs complicating security situations by working with groups that the government considers terrorists.

A network

The UN global strategy to counter terrorism provides a context for NGOs. The strategy suggests a variety of ways that NGOs can work on counter-terrorism without necessarily labeling it as such. The UN is particularly good at providing legitimacy and setting norms and standards. NGOs can help disseminate this work. NGOs have demonstrated a strong ability to organize when there is a clear call for action (e.g. the non-proliferation campaign). NGOs must take it upon themselves to identify organizations with sufficient capacity that can be situated within their network.

EWI has undertaken an initiative to gather NGOs through an electronic forum. Successful models for such an initiative exist. Maintaining the initiative and keeping the network focused on security issues will be particularly challenging. But past experience shows that this challenge will subside as the initiative gains traction. This focus, however, must not come at the expense of diversity. The initiative must span both disciplines and geography to connect those constituencies most affected by threats of terrorism and extremism.

Financing and the private sector

The amount of money governments give NGOs is miniscule compared to the amount spent on government directed counter-terrorism initiatives. In addition, more work needs to be done to efficiently allocate resources and to identify overlap between different organizations. There is not enough involvement by the private sector in contrast to the need and the space for an increase in private sector efforts. When partnering with businesses, profit motives and the importance of the bottom line must be kept in mind regardless of whether or not they partner with NGOs.

Policy recommendations

Find areas for collaboration between development and security NGOs to build foundations of trust between the two communities.

NGOs should agree on a form of accreditation.

NGOs must take it upon themselves to create a network to pool their collective talents. Individual organizations can act as nodes, situated according to their strengths and affinities, within the broader network.

The role of media

Media—whether television, radio, the press, or the Internet—has an important role in issues of worldwide security, but its scope and purpose are far from clear. Journalists have the ability to inform perceptions and create narratives that shape public discourse. But there is no single "media entity"—media outlets are fragmented by nature and influenced by the specific context of audience and geographical area. Media outlets act as listeners, reflectors, stimulators, and educators in the societies that they serve. Particularly relevant in regards to the spread of extremism and violence, media outlets have the potential (unwittingly or otherwise) to assume the role of facilitator—a means through which political ends are achieved. Journalists will unlikely respond well to policymakers dictating the role of media. Instead, a definition must come from within, through debate and dialogue between journalists and mainstream media outlets.

Media and violence: informer and 'educator'

In terms of ability to influence and educate, it is important to assess the potential impact (both positive and negative) that media outlets have on promoting and countering acts of violence. One view sees the media exerting a positive impact, decreasing incidences of violence by highlighting their brutality and exposing their perpetrators. A highlighted example was the murder of the Japanese journalist Kenji Nagai by a Burmese soldier in September 2007 during anti-government protests. This incident, captured on video and beamed around the world, arguably led the Burmese authorities to step down their level of violence. The Burmese authorities were uncertain as to the control they exercised over media and wary of the international condemnation that further exposure would bring.

A contradictory view is that the media fuels the cycle of violence by exposing audiences on a daily basis to sights, sounds, and print that are graphic in nature and intended to shock. Continually repeating the same story may desensitize the audience, creating societal acceptance of or indifference to violence. Moreover, this kind of repetition has the potential to shape perceptions and reinforce prejudices that have the capacity to engender anger and even hatred.

A balance needs to be struck between reporting legitimate news and controversial sensationalism. The mainstream media has the responsibility to recognize both appropriate content and the nature of its audience.

Facilitating the struggle between ideologies

Terrorists have been particularly savvy about using media as an instrument to disseminate propaganda and engender fear. As one panelist noted, citing the example of Adam Yahiye Gadahn (a U.S. citizen who converted to Islam and is now a media spokesman for al-Qaeda), terrorist groups often have sophisticated communications frameworks in place. They are aware that the propaganda war is just as important, if not more so, than physical violence. In this sense, media are used as facilitators and manipulated to achieve political ends.

Recognizing the media afford legitimate actors the opportunity to reach the same audience as terrorists should lie at the core of any counter-terrorism strategy. Concerns about censorship notwithstanding, this should lead to a more open and continuous dialogue between the media and government authorities. This dialogue should address media's role in inciting violence and the importance of exercising restraint in certain circumstances, particularly in instances of crisis response. Media, law enforcement, and security services need to better coordinate in preparing for and responding to an attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. Better understanding the ramifications of unfettered broadcast of acts of terrorism needs to be developed. This should not be construed as an excuse for censorship but as an appeal for consideration of the ways media may unintentionally provide a larger platform for violent extremists. Those in the front lines against terrorism, especially first responders, need training to deal with media under the pressure of crisis situations.

The way forward: educating the facilitators

Panelists agreed educating journalists was of the utmost importance to address the threat from violent extremists in an effective and reasoned manner. Only through a deep knowledge and understanding of the people, cultures, and religions in question will media be able to communicate accurately the nuances and subtleties of reality. Particular emphasis should be placed on learning the history and language of countries in which a journalist works. Accepting education as a long term objective, short term goals need to be established. As one member of the audience commented, an important step in the short term would be to provide seminars and workshops for journalists before being posted to foreign countries.

Panelists suggested the media have a duty to better reflect the complexity of terrorism as a violent phenomenon. This means not only focusing on the vivid acts of violence that result from a terrorist attack (the images of 9/11 being the most telling example here), but also focusing on the underlying causes and the nature of the political grievances behind such an attack. Only by conveying a deep and comprehensive understanding of the threats confronting us at the beginning of the twenty-first century can the international community begin to expose the weaknesses of our position and advance the strength of collective convictions.

Policy recommendations

Develop a media 'code of ethics' bringing journalists together and promoting dialogue. This code should address the role of media in the event of a major terrorist incident, specifically the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Given their role on the frontline of security issues, particularly terrorism, journalists should be protected by an international convention, similar to that which safeguards the rights of diplomats.

Civil society has a responsibility to pressure governments to ban incitements to violence that are aired by media outlets.

Policy conclusions: countering violent extremism and terrorism

At the end of the second day of the conference, participants met to collect the key policy recommendations that had been proposed up to that point and to highlight the main shifts that had occurred since the previous year.

Counter-Terrorism Scorecard summary

The conclusions session began with a summary of the 2008 Counter-Terrorism Scorecard, a survey distributed to participants at the beginning of the conference. Comparing the results to those of the Fourth Worldwide Security Conference in 2007, there was a noticeable lessening of the sense of insecurity on the part of the attendees and a feeling of stabilization. Opinions on the effectiveness of the international community were somewhat less convincing, with only a slight change. Together, these results suggest the efforts of the international community are not necessarily the cause behind feelings of increased security. Like last year, participants felt the private sector received increasing attention—but it is often perceived as a negative rather than a positive actor. There was less disagreement than in 2007 regarding executive powers' ability to infringe on citizens' rights for security reasons. The results also indicated those surveyed were more concerned about terrorists from other countries than from their own. Lastly, there was a marked decline in confidence in national security services and their abilities. Though a shift toward a stabilization of the security situation was perceived, national and inter-governmental efforts were not considered responsible.

Days one and two: key observations and proposals

The international community must understand that a terrorist threat in one part of the world is often barely felt in other parts of the world. This gives rise to imbalances, as some countries feel more vulnerable than others.

When it comes to addressing the causes and consequences of radicalization and to reaching out to youth, the international community has a long way to go.

The word terrorism can be used by corrupt governments to quell internal opposition. Governments should not be able to do this unchallenged.

The need to work locally is of maximum importance; most extremists are actually home grown. There is a need for a more aggressive, bottom-up approach to counter this.

Action must be taken to prevent the deterioration of the international system. Western debates do not always reflect where world trends are going.

Terrorists are going for softer targets and there is a greater degree of trans-national mobilization among terrorist organizations.

The role of governments in countering terrorism is limited by nature; therefore the role of the private sector and civil society will continue to be crucial.

The level of flexibility and understanding that was on display throughout WSC5 must be sustained and transferred to the real world.

While countering terrorism we must not dilute our commitment to human rights.

We have yet to formulate an effective, collaborative strategy to deal with the threat of cyber-terrorism.

Extremism must not be associated with one single religion; the potential for extremism can be found in all forms of belief.

The fight against extremism cannot be fully successful until political relations between key participants in the struggle have been straightened out.

A vital element in strengthening the anti-terrorist coalition is the rejection of double standards in assessing and dealing with violence and religious extremism.

An early warning mechanism is needed for populations at risk from radicalization. Cooperation between intergovernmental institutions and civil society will be critical to its successful implementation.

The security picture is dynamic. Any static architecture or pillar will be irrelevant within the near future. The complexity of our counter-terrorism tools must match the complexity of the problem.

It should not be taken for granted that we have come a long way. We have begun to counter the easy means of terrorism and extremism.

The groups and individuals mobilized to counter terror are not working within one, uncomplicated global system. Sometimes they are on a global scale, sometimes regional, and perhaps most importantly, often on the community and individual level.

No extremist exists in a void; there is always some sort of support. The fear factor, the charisma factor, the glamorization of extremism, all must be discredited and stripped away.

NGOs play a critical role. There is a pronounced demand for a network of NGOs that includes development organizations, human rights organizations, security NGOs, and others to focus on specific issues and best practices. The network must be geographically diverse and should have both a regional and thematic focus.

We need a deeper discussion on how various media can play a more positive role. The creation of a global code of ethics that would, at a minimum, require journalists to be educated in the ways of the region in which they work, would be a constructive step forward on this front, but consideration must be made for journalists' resistance to outside pressure.

We must use the instruments that we already have in place. The 16 UN global anti-terror instruments, and the global anti-terror strategy, must be implemented. Greater investment is needed to keep this momentum.

A day in the future: accelerating solutions to security threats

Imagining a day in the future

On day three of WSC5 participants embarked on an exercise in horizon thinking. A Day in the Future: Accelerating Solutions to Security Threats was designed to shed light on the future of global security, giving equal consideration to both threats and aspirations. The concept of "accelerating solutions" is premised on the idea that the sooner the world can get past the "shock" phase of new ideas and experiences, the sooner our security structures can be upgraded and adapted to meet such changes. Each breakout group was given the task of mapping one emerging security threat.

Making Sense of the Future: scenarios and ambitions

Cho Khong, Chief Political Analyst for the Royal Dutch Shell scenario team, helped to initiate participants in the difficult and often uncomfortable exercise of scenario mapping. He stressed that how we see the future depends heavily on how we see the present. The many, varying perspectives on the present must be taken into account when creating a future scenario, and the process by which a scenario comes into being is rarely linear. Rather, it is the "conversation" between different perspectives that is of chief importance. A number of factors affect the likelihood that any given sketch will become reality. First, managers and decision-makers must have some stake in the scenario; they must be "owners, whose individual interests are tied to the outcome of the scenario. Ownership is crucial to the scenario's ultimate usefulness as it mobilizes individuals capable of meaningful action. The potential for collective action among the "owners" is also a crucial element of success in scenario mapping. Timely, actionable scenario mapping is a powerful tool for policymakers of all fields, but its effectiveness depends on our ability to see the present from a maximum number of angles.

A second introductory speaker, Leland Russell, President of GEO Group Strategic Services, stressed the importance of mental agility, noting that it is fundamentally difficult for people to imagine a future that is different from the present. Thought processes can succumb to inertia and, during the course of horizon thinking exercises, participants often fail to take into account what

they could know. Mr. Russell urged the participants to consider an ideal outcome and to review the possibilities optimistically before crafting a succinct statement and a list of metrics for gauging success in achieving the desired outcome.

John Mroz, President and CEO of the EastWest Institute, capped off the day's introductory remarks by describing the extent to which our vision of the future is constrained by present, often impermanent, circumstances. In the early days of the EastWest Institute, Mr. Mroz noted, the biggest obstacle to bringing Americans and Soviets together for dialogue was the fact that neither party was able to conceive of a post-Cold War world. Mr. Mroz emphasized that it was precisely the moment when world leaders began to consider the possibility of a post-Cold War era that their perspectives on the present also began changing, and proposals that had at first seemed far-fetched were received with greater enthusiasm by both sides.

Science and security

History is rich with examples of individuals who saw a different kind of future than the circumstances of the present would seem to have foreshadowed. Such disparate thinkers as Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., H.G. Wells, and George Orwell all reconceptualized the desired future by not being constrained by the present situation in which they were acting. The use of innovative means such as non-violent struggle and social causes and new analytical frameworks such as personal-power and science-power relationships was essential to the success of these individuals in progressing towards their desired scenarios and/or warning others of the advent of scenarios that were undesirable. Whether the subject is the weaponization of science, pandemic threats, or asymmetries of science and power, security specialists must display mental agility and a willingness to envision scenarios that are radically different from the present.

Weaponization of science

The weaponization of science proceeds in the context of both a shifting global distribution of power and a rapid increase in the pace of technological progress. The dramatic rise of Asian power brings new possibilities and greater uncertainty. Historical precedents suggest that such a shift will be difficult for the rest of the world to accommodate. The rise of Asia, however, is rooted in its rapid economic development, rather than military growth, and thus it remains difficult to predict how the distribution of global power will be affected. That the mechanism of Asia's rise is a historical peculiarity should be understood before it is compared to other regions that have rapidly gained economic and military power.

Equally unprecedented is the speed with which technology in general--and military technology in particular--is evolving. A recent UNESCO study found that the world has accumulated more knowledge in the past 60 years than it had in the previous 5,000. The effect of this rapid advancement on an already shifting configuration of global power will be highly complex. Scientific advances and breakthroughs in military technology are phenomena that we are not in a position to prevent. We can, however, reduce the security threat from certain technologies. For example, the disarmament process, though currently stalled, can quantitatively reduce the threat of nuclear annihilation. But new possibilities such as space-based weapons systems and weaponized nanotechnology will make the task of nuclear disarmament only one challenge among many. As the weaponization of science accelerates, both the lethality and availability of weaponry will increase, with dramatic consequences for the global power configuration.

Nuclear, biological, and pandemic threats

Until now, the prospect of a nuclear attack on a major city has been so daunting to contemplate that the specifics of an actual response strategy remain under-examined. However, it seems certain that a strategy for dealing with the aftermath of such an attack is a real necessity. The political fallout of a nuclear attack would be incalculably more transformative than the changes that took place in the aftermath of 9/11. The international system, which has not yet seen a non-state nuclear actor, would face an existential threat. We have been hesitant to consider the specifics of an attack, but there are terrorist groups working actively to perpetrate just such an act.

Preventative measures include denying terrorists access to material by securing all nuclear material, perhaps through the creation of a nuclear database; a treaty that does not presume the innocence of its members; and interdiction at borders. Cumulatively, these steps could form the basis of preventative action, but they do not erase the threat of a nuclear attack completely. Efforts to prevent a nuclear attack should be given top priority, in proportion to the devastation that such a scenario would entail.

Bio-terror

The scenario of a bio-terror attack that most people envision is markedly different from the realities of such an event. A popular misconception involves the widespread dispersal of a pathogen over a large population centre. In reality, however, the technology to do this is very sophisticated and probably too complex and costly for any actor except a large advanced state. In reality, the first sign of a bio-attack will be unexpected numbers of people showing up to hospitals with unusual symptoms.

Another factor preventing the likelihood of biological warfare in the past has been the "level of repugnance," of such an attack. Such moral restraint, however, rarely is a consideration for terrorists and thus it does little to reduce the fear of such an attack.

To date, machines to detect bio-weapons have been impractical and ineffective for a host of reasons, including:

- detection capabilities are limited to a few pathogens and are limited to air-borne agents
- a limited geographic range of effectiveness
- the length of the detection-to-alert interval.

In addition, vaccines have proven problematic: the risk of an attack must be included in the assessment of the risks of developing and deploying a vaccine. For example, the U.S. government put its contract for an anthrax vaccine on hold because it was too hard to develop a safe one.

Energy and trust: acting with greater urgency

This session sought to address the issues of energy security and trust, reflecting on some of the problems that the world is likely to encounter and proposing potential solutions. Energy is an issue of the utmost strategic importance to all states, regardless of their level of development. A country's access to, and use of, energy and resources represents the foundation of its standard of living and its potential for economic growth. Energy issues are also central to the challenges presented by global poverty and climate change.

Currently, increasing demand, driven by demographic trends such as urbanization and population growth and a reliance on depleting supplies of fossil fuels have caused some fear the world is entering a permanent energy deficit. Additionally, national political concerns often cloud global energy issues, adding another layer of complexity to the problem of global energy distribution. Energy security and trust are therefore intimately linked, and it is the interplay between the two that is likely to have a strong role in determining shared global outcomes (positive or otherwise) in the future.

A nuclear future?

Nuclear energy, touted by its supporters as a clean, relatively cheap, and low emission alternative to fossil fuels occupies a central place in debates on the global energy future. Obvious unease persists about the nature of the technology and its potential for proliferation and military uses. The nuclear issue captures the essence of the debate about energy security and trust. The use of nuclear energy has significant potential benefits if it is developed and applied with international cooperation, but its development is shrouded in concerns about the intentions of individual nations and their potential for belligerent self-interest.

One panelist flagged the ongoing U.S.-Russia initiative to institute an international nuclear fuel bank as a potential solution. Operating under the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency, this bank would provide global access to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, with the reprocessing taking place at an international facility, thereby allaying fears about weapons development and proliferation.

International energy mechanisms

In addition to the fuel bank proposal, several other mechanisms were suggested to foster international energy cooperation. Among these were proposals for an international organization that would promote the use of cleaner and more efficient forms of energy in place of fossil fuels, with a particular emphasis on disseminating such technology to developing countries that otherwise would not have access to it. Such a body would also have an important role in diversifying the supply of energy by developing new technologies.

Despite widespread acceptance of the need for international cooperation on future energy issues, there was recognition that an individual overarching organization was unlikely to address sufficiently the looming challenges. Rather, as one panelist noted, drawing on the experience of a conference pre-meeting in Moscow on "Energy Security," a more workable objective is likely to take the form of an "international energy regime," similar to those international regimes that have governed non-proliferation and human rights. Such an arrangement would revolve around a set of core values, international con-

ventions, and treaties that would not be rigidly binding in nature, but would rather offer a framework on which consensus could be built over the long term[15]. Crucially this regime would be flexible in nature, continually evolving to accommodate the different levels of political will among states, and therefore less likely to stall on points of minor disagreement.

Africa and energy: the Ugandan experience

Participants were reminded that the implications of a future energy crisis are likely to be felt disproportionately in certain parts of the world, particularly in Africa. In countries like Uganda, energy represents a fundamental component in achieving and sustaining a basic standard of living, and is essential in driving economic development and fulfilling aspirations such as the reduction of poverty. Therefore having a consistent and reliable energy supply is in many ways a matter of survival. However, a consistent energy supply is difficult to maintain: it is often adversely affected by extreme weather (for example, droughts prevent the generation of hydroelectric power), and the various dangerous, war-torn zones on the continent can hamper access to natural resources.

At the same time, however, particularly given the recent discovery of oil reserves in Uganda, energy can bring prosperity, especially with rising global fossil fuel demand. Indeed, in the last few years it was noted that approximately $20 billion has been invested in the country by the developed world and by multi-national oil companies, a trend that looks set to continue over the coming decade.

The influx of petrodollars of course has its own potential problems. Several such issues include the possibility of corruption among national political elites, fluctuations in currency values that may adversely impact traditional export industries such as agriculture, and broader social implications stemming from the influence of capital from the developed world. Perhaps the major concern raised centered on the relationship between government and international oil companies, and the implications of this relationship for the Ugandan population. Distinct concern was voiced over the government's relative inexperience in negotiating with oil companies and the perception, especially among the domestic population, that the developed world is taking undue advantage of countries like Uganda. The challenge for the future is to develop a comprehensive, effective, and responsible national energy policy designed to meet the energy demands of the Ugandan population, while also securing a fair return on the country's natural resources.

There is a general acceptance that significant challenges lay ahead for global energy, and that these require an active and cooperative response from the international community. At the same time, however, local engagement at the level of the individual citizen is also likely to play a role, especially in holding governments accountable and implementing change at a grassroots level. Undoubtedly, fostering trust in a number of spheres—whether intergovernmental, within the private sector, or among citizens—should lie at the heart of the approach to the global energy future, especially if the challenges are to be addressed in an effective and timely manner.

15 On the nature of international regimes, see the seminal work by Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables', International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 185-205. Krasner suggests that an 'international regime' represents the 'principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area'

Harnessing the power of media: a cross-boundary strategy

Media's obligation

Many of the goals put forth at WSC5 will be unachievable without a positive contribution from media. There remain a number of pervasive stereotypes of both the West and the Muslim world within their respective media, and these reinforce negative perceptions. Journalists strive for accuracy but feel strongly it is not their job to heal. While it might not be a journalist's job to change what they show, it is their obligation to do no harm. Stereotyping in media outlets around the world is commonplace, but it should be recognized as a harmful practice, and efforts should be made to avoid it.

The Summit

The TV News Summit is a partnership between the EastWest Institute and journalism schools both in the West and the Middle East. The project aims to bring media professionals with different perspectives together. The stakeholders in this project include victims of terrorist acts, terrorists themselves, and global leaders.

The project will be in two parts:

Looking inside the news room: watching the decision-making processes of editors and other managers in charge of content.

Focusing on the frontlines: reporters, photographers, and field producers. The project should examine how tough ethical decisions are made in the field, and how much control reporters have after their reports are sent to producers at home. The goal is to create a sense of professional ethics so that journalists ask themselves to raise quality.

Key observations and proposals

Viewing habits differ from region to region; this should be taken into account when media professionals are producing coverage.

Often it comes down to what owners, not editors, say, and they should be part of any cooperative effort.

The rise of citizen journalism has the potential to change the dynamics of the media industry and redistribute influence.

National news services remain the primary news source for a significant portion of the world's population. These networks' reliance on wire services gives the wires extraordinary reach.

In the field, and especially in conflict zones, people lose control of information and it is easily distorted or doctored.

Media is not usually "free." In most cases, it is funded by states, businesses, emirs, or individuals with personal, political, or professional agendas.

In the Arab world many still get their news from newspapers and television because they are cheap and easy to access.

We need a collective system of information values. A global journalism code of ethics should be a top priority.

Keynote address: Shell scenarios for the 21st century[16]

Starting with an assessment of current dilemmas and future trend projections, Jeroen van der Veer, Chief Executive, Royal Dutch Shell plc, mapped out possible scenarios for the global energy future. This launched a lively discussion covering issues as diverse as the role of states in energy policy, the debate about diversifying into alternative fuels (such as nuclear power and renewables), and the role of energy companies in the developing world.

Scenario planning

Focusing on the outlook for fossil fuels in the future, Mr. van der Veer suggested that one of the main concerns is the impending imbalance in demand and supply between now and 2050. Indeed, Shell's projections illustrate a likely doubling in demand for fossil fuels in this timeframe, driven by both a global population increase (estimated to rise from 6 billion to 9 billion by 2050) and by economic growth in currently underdeveloped and developing states. On the supply side, concerns are being raised over the depletion of "easy access" fossil fuels—those which currently require relatively low capital investment per unit extracted. With depletion of current sources of fossil fuels, extraction prices are likely to rise, forcing the price of oil and gas up. There are several problems relating to renewable fuels, as well—mostly their high economic cost and the long term nature of development—both of which cast doubt over their ability to reduce global reliance on oil and gas.

Given this less than optimistic background, Mr. van der Veer then proposed two possible scenarios for future global energy planning. The first and more pessimistic perspective—termed the "scramble scenario"—envisaged national governments adopting an isolationist stance, concentrating rigidly on their national interests and eschewing multilateral cooperation in dealing with the issues surrounding demand, supply, and renewable sourc-

16 The following summary draws on the keynote address delivered by Mr van der Veer entitled 'Shell Scenarios for the 21st Century'.

Further information can be found in an article published by Mr van der Veer in the The Times (London) newspaper, 'High hopes and hard truths dictate the future: Efforts to fight global warming will be wasted unless we concentrate on energy efficiency', 25th June 2007. http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/natural_resources/article1980585.ece.

es. An alternative perspective, the "blueprint scenario," recognized that while international cooperation may be slow, it is nevertheless forthcoming—with the creation of common standards in the larger energy markets representing the most positive way of moving forward.

The role of the market mechanism

It was clear from the session that, whatever the prospects for global energy, the market has an important role in the areas of innovation, capital investment, and resource allocation. The extent and character of this role was far from certain, however, as it will be determined by future contexts. What is clear, as Mr. van der Veer suggested, is that governments will have an important role in providing the necessary structures and regulations within which the market will be able to deliver positive outcomes for the global energy future. It was felt that, left to its own devices, the free market mechanism would not produce such outcomes. In addition, responding to concerns about energy nationalism and resource allocation, Mr. van der Veer allayed fears by suggesting that an "automatic interdependency" in energy existed between countries because no single state has the ability to be completely self-sufficient.

It is difficult to find good examples of productive investment in new energy technologies. The (currently) prohibitive cost of most renewable energy technologies is clearly a barrier to achieving diversification of supply, as well as to reducing carbon emissions. Again, the engagement of the private sector in future global energy issues would certainly be beneficial, and promoting the meaningful and lucrative involvement of the private sector is an important concern. The lack of investment in carbon capture and storage technology was highlighted as an example slow progress due to unprofitable technology. Therefore finding alternative economic models to incentivize such technologies is clearly an important challenge to address, particularly if we are to provide the outcomes needed for a positive energy future.

Energy and development

Another theme raised was the relationship between energy companies and national governments, and the implications of this for local communities, particularly in developing countries. One important concern is that tax revenues paid by energy companies fail to find their way to the grassroots (for example, in the form of new infrastructure and provision of public services), and will instead be diverted for personal use by corrupt local elites.

Such corruption represents an important challenge for energy companies. It is something that they attempt to fight actively by promoting transparency and awareness—for example, through support for the work of Transparency International[17] and for the Partnering Against Corruption Initiative[18]. Perhaps the best strategy for energy companies is to present a united front to governments on these issues. That way common and accepted practices relating to the use of energy tax revenue are likely to develop.

Local communities in resource rich states also have a role in using the information garnered from greater transparency to hold their own governments accountable concerning the use of energy revenues. It seems the solution is to be found in fostering a fair and open relationship between energy companies, national governments, and grassroots communities.

Pandemic preparedness

Horizon thinking

The panel was in agreement that the potential impacts of a pandemic are severe in the extreme. As was suggested, a pandemic is likely between now and 2020, with the effects being much like "having a Hurricane Katrina in every city at the same time." Fatalities would be an incidental factor compared to the disruption caused by concurrent mass severe illness, even if the illness were a temporary phenomenon. The after-effects of a pandemic will likely last far longer than the outbreak itself.

The nature of the threat was subject to more debate—of particular interest was the general conclusion that a pandemic is essentially a human-driven event, caused by changes in our lifestyle such as urbanization and rapid intercontinental travel.

The implications of a pandemic are wide reaching for global security. First, all economic and organizational sectors, including critical infrastructure that would be necessary for civil contingency plans, are at risk from the removal of key personnel. There would also be a risk of social upheaval, possibly violent change.

The group managed to produce four concrete goals to achieve by 2020. The first was the construction of a global network of information reporting systems designed to detect a pandemic. This network could decrease response time to disease outbreaks. The second was an increase in the flexible production capacity of influenza vaccines to one unit per person on the planet per year.

17 http://www.transparency.org.uk/.

18 http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/paci/index.htm.

The third was a transfer of technologies related to disease control, especially vaccine production, to less developed countries. The purpose of sharing this technology would be to decentralize the biotech and vaccine industries to allow for more rapid response and limiting opportunities to play "realpolitik" with vaccine supplies. The fourth goal was an improvement in the education of the general population, particularly those dealing with the so-called "animal-human interface."

Action agendas

The group identified several collaborative and leadership actions toward achieving the so-called 2020 aspirations. It was agreed that decision-makers should increase their knowledge of the risk of pandemics. Policy outcomes would include public-private partnerships to facilitate a response, information sharing agreements between governments, increased general health investment, and stronger legal regimes (for example, regulating fake drugs and the animal-human interface). States should also increase their transparency with each other, as well as with the World Health Organization.

With regard to the principle obstacles facing the 2020 aspirations there was no firm consensus. Obstacles presented included simple denial of the threat, the difficulty of quantifying the risk, political short-termism, the lack of a catalytic incident, and structural blocks in a security policy environment tailored to dealing with armed conflict.

There were four levels for action. As individuals, and within families and local communities, people can follow the Centre for Disease Control and World Health Organization advice concerning preparation to withstand the unavailability of all resources for a period. Organizations and businesses can work to become resilient so that it is possible to anticipate, to respond, and to stay in business. On a national level, information about the threat should be disseminated responsibly—not via mass publicity, but via targeted information to key decision-makers. The suggestion was put forward that a new approach on the fourth and highest level for action would be for the business community—through roundtables, Rotary Clubs, and forums like Davos—to mobilize alongside advocacy partners and lobby on the issue.

Not all states can respond equally to a pandemic, yet health in developed countries is dependent on that in less developed countries, especially given the extent of intercontinental travel. Global collaboration is required to protect ourselves as well as the rest of the world.

Asymmetries of science and power

Horizon thinking

Asymmetries of science and power pose both short and long term security threats to the international system and its constituents. In the short term, states that are at a disadvantage in terms of science and technology face a developmental handicap that strains the domestic political situation and prevents countries from fulfilling their economic potential. In addition, attempts to circumvent international energy and environmental norms for the sake of jumpstarting development can bring condemnation and punitive measures from the international community that can deepen the country's political and economic isolation. In the long term, states will ultimately fail when they can no longer provide basic services to their populations, fulfill international obligations, and enforce the law within their own territory. The power vacuum created by this failure presents an opportunity for criminal and terrorist organizations to step in, further weakening the country and posing a threat to domestic and regional security.

Action agendas

To formulate an action agenda addressing the threat of asymmetries of science and power the breakout group split into two subgroups. The subgroup focusing on asymmetries of science focused first on the nightmare scenarios that could be provoked by prolonged asymmetry. Such scenarios included the monopolization of space by one power, electronic and cyber attacks, and the unchecked proliferation of dual-use nuclear technology. Taking the nuclear issue as the most urgent among these, the following two goals were put forward:

To establish an apolitical, international nuclear fuel bank subject to safeguards.

To achieve a "nuclear arms-free world" declaration from the international community. This declaration should follow the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank, which would build confidence in the idea of a nuclear arms-free world.

The biggest obstacles to achieving these two goals are certain provisions to the NPT treaty, the mindsets of many of the world's leaders, and concerns about technology and nuclear waste.

Pathways for overcoming these obstacles will involve institutional and psychological changes at the international level. The nuclear fuel bank proposal should be seen not as a rich nation club of nuclear enriching states providing fuel to poorer countries, because this view furthers the perception of asymmetry. Instead, a new set of relationships should be defined. Providers and consumers of fuel and storers of waste would all be investors in a single institution. Likewise, many of the obstacles to creating the fuel bank could be overcome through the decoupling of the bank from broader financial and economic development issues. Encouragingly, an initiative to set up such an institution is already underway, but more funding is needed.

Obstacles to a nuclear-arms free world declaration are more strategic, and mostly stem from the lack of trust between nations as certain actors continue to fortify their militaries and keep them on hair-trigger alert. A nuclear arms-free world declaration would call for the delegitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons and the detargeting and de-alerting of countries' arsenals. The initiative will require significant leadership by NGOs, and their close cooperation with governments. Two or three "key states" such as Norway or Switzerland could lead the effort and catalyze the necessary shift in world opinion.

The second subgroup focused on asymmetries of power, specifically between developed and failing states. The basic premise is that the continued proliferation of failed states will lead to increased asymmetry, and thus new threats to stability and security at the regional and global levels. As states begin to falter, the global strength and influence of criminal and terrorist organizations increases. Neighbors of failed states are often the first to suffer, as their domestic stability comes under threat from mass migration and a failing economy across the border.

It was proposed that, by 2020, the number of failed and failing states should be reduced significantly. To achieve this, an early warning system should be implemented, based on a set of clearly defined indicators of the proper functioning of states at risk. Quality of governance, provision of medical and educational services, and the pace, scale, and distribution of economic development were all mentioned as critical factors.

Regional and mid-level actors must take the lead in such an initiative, as they are often the first ones to be affected by the failure of neighboring states. Regional structure-building is an important venue for such states to take a proactive approach in maintaining stability in their own backyard. A key obstacle to such initiatives is the extent to which local and broader agendas diverge. Opportunities for progress have often been lost when one side focuses exclusively on political issues while the other is set on discussing economic development. A more synchronized approach to economic development and regional security will stem largely from the recognition that political and economic development are inextricably linked.

Religion, identity politics and violent extremism

Horizon thinking

There was widespread consensus among the panel that issues such as identity and violent extremism are often deeply embedded in the fabric of a particular community and integral to the way of life of individuals in that community. Consequently, there was an acceptance that solutions to such problems are likely to be long term in nature, requiring a consistent level of engagement and resolve over a sustained period of time.

It was also noted by two panelists that religion and identity are intimately related to the process of globalization; Beliefs and grievances can be aired easily and quickly across the world, and this process has intensified over the last decade, drawing some cultures closer together but at the same time exacerbating latent tensions between others. In this sense, the threat of violent extremism is truly global in scope. Context is still important, though, and a potential solution to any threat of violent extremism will have to take into account specific prevailing conditions on a case-by-case basis. No single solution is practicable worldwide.

Regarding the particular nature of the threat, one panelist noted that resulting violence is likely to be unconventional in nature, committed by non-state actors who may be linked by common beliefs, but lack a traditional organizational structure. The challenge for the international community, therefore, is recognizing such trends while advancing a set of beliefs to counter them.

Turning to the specific role of religion in the contemporary context, there was heated debate among panelists concerning the extent to which interpretations of Islam serve to motivate those perpetrating violent extremism. One panelist stated passionately that while clearly a misrepresentation of mainstream

opinion, radical readings of Islam have the power to fuel extremism. The fact that terrorists themselves frequently invoke religion when voicing their grievances dictates that we address religion's uses in terrorism. Emphatically disagreeing with such an assessment, however, another panelist argued that religion and extremism are simply not related, with the Muslim faith and its core texts having no mention of the phenomenon to which it supposedly gives rise. Citing of religious motivations then merely serves to overshadow those deeper societal and cultural factors that are really thought to be to blame. Clearly, this is a debate that inspires strong views, but a unified interpretation and approach is necessary to tackle the threat of violent extremism.

Dilemmas arising from issues of religion and identity politics are likely to require strategies implemented over several decades, particularly if the international community is to witness lasting and meaningful reform. Nevertheless, two related aspirations were highlighted for attention over a shorter time period. The first of these, raised by several panelists, concerned the importance of language in debates about religion, identity, and extremism, with an emphasis placed on developing common terms to prevent the extremists exploiting differences in terminology. A second aspiration referred to what one panelist termed "mapping the field"—that is, assessing the current state of the activity conducted in different areas by different actors and then drawing together these disparate strands into an overarching framework, thereby sharing valuable experiences and potentially reducing wasteful overlap. Ultimately better coordination of available resources will further understanding of, and the ability to respond to, violent extremism.

Action agendas

In terms of achieving such aspirations by 2020, the breakout group highlighted a number of collaborative and leadership actions. The central recommendation focused on the need to develop common frameworks—bringing together existing resources, but also drawing together leaders. It was agreed also that there needs to be a forum to encourage active dialogue between religions. The main obstacles to progress were thought to be a lack of political will among interested actors, often motivated by short term thinking.

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