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CIAO DATE: 08/05
Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects
Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho
2004
Abstract
This paper analyzes the dialogue process in the Sino-Tibetan dispute, examining the relationship between Beijing and the Dalai Lama from their initial engagement in the early post-Mao years through the protracted stalemate of the 1990s and on to the current experimentation with direct contacts. In addition to drawing on lessons from the past, the study surveys the major factors that are likely to impact the future dynamics of engagement. It thereby provides an assessment of the current prospects for dialogue and for settling the longstanding dispute.
The authors question the view that important opportunities for negotiations were missed in the 1980s. Rather, they argue that even when Beijing appeared most inclined to enter into dialogue, the gap between the parties was too wide for meaningful engagement. Thus, for example, Deng Xiaoping's historic gesture toward reconciliation in 1979 was made on the basis of strategic miscalculations of the political stakes. The PRC had assumed its position in Tibet to be secure, but the exiles' fact-finding missions exposed the nationalist sentiment among Tibetans in the region, causing Beijing to reassess its strategy toward both Tibet and the Dalai Lama. The formal talks of the early 1980s thus proved fruitless, and by 1984 the door to dialogue was no longer open. In September 1988, Beijing's interest in direct talks was rekindled following the Dalai Lama's success in raising the profile of Tibet in international forums. The Chinese openness to dialogue was indeed greater than it had been during the talks of 1984. However, internal Chinese politics undermined this initiative. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, those in Beijing who had been promoting talks were shut out of power.