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CIAO DATE: 10/5/2006
Upping the Ante - The North Korean Nuclear Deterrent
Martin Rdbro
July 2006
Abstract
A party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1985, North Korea in 2003 admitted that the country had nuclear weapons1; a message that stunned the world. The announcement was made following a long conflict with the International Community (IC) where first the North Korean regime had limited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in 1992 and since had been playing a dangerous tit-for-tat game with the IC over its nuclear program.
Finally in late 2002, the remaining IAEA-inspectors were expelled from North Korea and the country announced in early 2003 that it would withdraw from the NPT, the central international agreement to limit nuclear weapons proliferation and ultimately get the nuclear genie back into the bottle.2The crucial question is the extent to which the North Korean claim to possess nuclear weapons is correct. Much uncertainty exists over this issue, particularly as the very organisation tasked with – among other things – controlling nuclear proliferation, the IAEA, was not and still is not empowered sufficiently to carry out the task. This is not and has not been the case when it comes to North Korea and is not the case presently when it comes to Iran. Basically a discussion of intent versus capacity, this uncertainty has worked in North Korea’s favour as the increasing likelihood of a North Korean nuclear deterrent has made North Korean nuclear disarmament an entirely different ballgame. This DIIS-brief will first describe the international effort to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including IAEA measures to control nuclear proliferation, which were not and can not be brought sufficiently to bear on the North Korean nuclear issue. Secondly, based on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the brief discusses the country’s claim that it actually does have a nuclear deterrent by attempting to outline the North Korean capability to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material.