

### Human Rights Watch Denounces Abuses in Ingushetia

On June 25, Human Rights Watch released a report stating that the situation in Ingushetia is starting to resemble that of Chechnya several years ago in terms of human rights abuses. The New York-based group stated in a summary of the report that the Chechen conflict “overflowed” into Ingushetia, bringing with it “grave conflict dynamics.” “For the past four years Russia has been fighting several militant groups in Ingushetia, which have a loose agenda to unseat the Ingush government, evict federal security and military forces based in the region, and promote Islamic rule in the North Caucasus,” the report’s summary stated. “Beginning in summer 2007, insurgents’ attacks on public officials, law enforcement and security personnel, and civilians rose sharply. Human Rights Watch condemns attacks on civilians and recognizes that the Russian government has a duty to pursue the perpetrators, prevent attacks, and bring those responsible to account. Attacks on civilians, public officials, and police and security forces are serious crimes. Russia, like any government, has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting such crimes and an obligation to do so while respecting Russian and international human rights law. Regrettably, Russia is failing to respect or to adhere to these laws. Law enforcement and security forces involved in counterinsurgency have committed dozens of extrajudicial executions, summary and arbitrary detentions, and acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”



According to Human Rights Watch, the abuses by law enforcement and security forces in Ingushetia “evoke, albeit on a far smaller scale, the thousands of enforced disappearances, killings, and acts of torture that plagued Chechnya for more than a decade,” and are “antagonizing local residents” and serving “to further destabilize the situation in Ingushetia and more widely in the North Caucasus.” The summary of the report added: “In order to prevent Ingushetia from turning into the full-blown human rights crisis that has characterized Chechnya, prompt and effective measures must be taken by the Russian government to end these human rights violations and hold accountable their perpetrators.”

Human Rights Watch noted that according to the Memorial human rights group, security personnel in Ingushetia were responsible for up to 40 extrajudicial executions of local residents in counterinsurgency operations in the republic in 2007 alone, including the killing of six-year-old Rakhim Amriev, who died during security forces raid on his parents’ home in the village of Chemulga, located in Ingushetia’s Sunzhensky district (Chechnya Weekly, November 15, 2007). “An investigation into his death is ongoing,” the summary of the report stated. “That investigation is exceptional, however, and can be explained only by Amriev’s young age, which precluded the authorities from alleging his involvement in insurgency. In most cases, the authorities do not investigate killings of alleged insurgents.”

Those detained by security and law-enforcement services in Ingushetia tend to be “young males suspected of involvement with illegal armed groups and terrorism,” the summary of the Human Rights Watch report stated. “Three categories of young men are especially vulnerable to such detention: individuals related to or acquainted with presumed insurgents or terrorism suspects; those previously detained and whose names are in police and security forces’ databases, regardless of whether they were charged with or cleared of any alleged wrongdoing; and strictly observant Muslims. Many of those so detained are also tortured, or disappear.”

The full Human Rights Watch report on Ingushetia can be read at: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-7FVA4X/\\$File/full\\_report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-7FVA4X/$File/full_report.pdf).

Kavkazky Uzel quoted Tatyana Lokshina, Human Rights Watch’s researcher for Russia, who took part in a presentation of the report in Moscow on June 25, as saying that until several years ago, Ingushetia was a zone of peace and tranquility compared with Chechnya. According to Lokshina, the situation “gradually” changed. “The first kidnappings in Ingushetia by members of the power structures began to take place in 2002,” she said. “But the outside audience interpreted this as a continuation of the Chechen conflict, because it mainly involved refugees from the Chechen Republic. As of 2003, inhabitants of Ingushetia were also among these kidnapped citizens.”

According to Lokshina, the situation began to change cardinaly in 2004, following the raids led by Chechen rebel field commander Shamil Basaev on the cities of Nazran and Karabulak. At that time, she said, the population of Ingushetia mobilized around the republic’s authorities and supported counter-terrorist measures. “Later on ... when the

population was continuously placed in jeopardy, when special operations essentially reminiscent of the zachistki and the targeted operations in Chechnya were conducted in the republic, during which people were beaten (and such cases are documented in our report) and suffered indignities, during which people disappeared, a monstrous antagonism was aroused among the population,” Lokshina said. She added that support for the rebels could only grow in such a situation. The Associated Press on June 25 quoted Lokshina as saying that “if Russia does not want Ingushetia to become a full-blown human rights crisis like Chechnya, it must stop these violations.”

According to Lokshina, one manifestation of the dissatisfaction of the population of Ingushetia over the abuses by security forces and the inability of the republic’s authorities to control them is the protest demonstrations—some of them spontaneous, others organized—that have taken place in Ingushetia over the last year.

Kavkazky Uzel reported that Ingushetia’s human rights ombudsman, Karim-Sultan Kokrukhaev, who attended the presentation of the Human Rights Watch report on Ingushetia in Moscow on June 25, did not agree with its authors’ conclusions, and that Shamsudin Mogushkov, a deputy in Ingushetia’s parliament and a member of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, compared members of Human Rights Watch to “fascists.” According to Kavkazky Uzel, Lokshina responded by saying “the state has the right to fight terrorism and crime, but it must do so legally.” AP quoted Mogushkov as calling the Human Rights Report on Ingushetia “90 percent biased” and Kokrukhaev as saying the report was designed to turn its readers into “zombies.” Kokrukhaev also claimed that there has not been “a single abduction or case of torture” in Ingushetia this year.

Kavkazky Uzel quoted Dick Marty, who is the rapporteur on the situation in the North Caucasus for the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as saying he agreed with Human Rights Watch’s assessment of the situation in Ingushetia and that the tension which previously characterized Chechnya has now spread to neighboring republics and warrants heightened attention.

On June 19, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission), the independent U.S. government agency set up by the U.S. Congress to monitor compliance with the human rights and fundamental freedoms agreement based on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, held a briefing in Washington entitled, “Ingushetia: The New Hot Spot in Russia’s North Caucasus.” Among those who spoke at the briefing were Magomed Mutsolgov, director of the Ingush human rights organization “Mashr,” Kavkazky Uzel editor-in-chief Grigory Shvedov and Eliza Musaeva, former director of Memorial’s Chechnya office.

On May 28, Amnesty International expressed particular concern over human rights violations in Chechnya and Ingushetia during a presentation in Moscow of its yearly report on human rights around the world.

Meanwhile, Interfax reported that the home of the three Kurbaev brothers in Yandyry, a village in Ingushetia’s Nazran district, was attacked in the early hours of June 26. A military source told the news agency that the attackers fired automatic weapons and grenade launchers at the home but that none of the family members were hurt. According to Interfax, two of the Kurbaev brothers are members of Ingushetia’s Interior Ministry while the third works in Ingushetia’s branch of the federal anti-narcotics service (FSKN).

#### Buinaksk Police Chief Murdered

Gunmen in Dagestan killed Colonel Magomedarip Aliev, chief of police of the town of Buinaksk, as he was driving through the republic’s capital Makhachkala on June 24. RIA Novosti quoted a source in the press service of Dagestan’s Interior Ministry as saying that unidentified gunmen fired on Aliev’s Mercedes as it was passing by and that Aliev died on the spot. Kommersant reported on June 25 that the attackers first blocked Aliev’s Mercedes at an intersection in the center of Makhachkala and that Aliev received multiple gunshot wounds in the head and chest.

According to Kommersant, Aliev had personally taken part in dozens of special operations targeting in the Buinaksk Jamaat and was the target of an assassination attempt in 2006, apparently after he was put on the jamaat’s hit list. In November 2007, Aliev was among the commanders of an operation in Makhachkala that targeted a group of “Buinaksk Wahhabis” who had killed six police in a July 2006 bombing at a school in Kizilyurt and were hiding in a residence on the outskirts of the Dagestani capital. Seven militants died when security forces, reportedly using armored personnel carriers and a tank, laid siege to the residence (Chechnya Weekly, November 15 and July 19, 2007).

At the same time, Kommersant quoted Dagestani police sources as saying that Aliev, who was known as a man of principle and for having “strict morals,” also had many enemies “among representatives of Dagestani organized crime

and big business” and was not on good terms with everyone inside his own police department. Still, an anonymous police investigator told the newspaper that Aliev’s conflict with the “Wahhabis” in Dagestan was personal, and that his “old enemy,” the local jamaat leader Bammatkhan Sheikov, aka Assadulla (the Lion of Allah), was behind all the threats and attempts on Aliev’s life. After the “backbone” of the Buinaksk Jamaat was broken last winter and Assadulla was captured by spetsnaz in a mopping up operation in the village of Gimry, Aliev, according to his colleagues, “somewhat relaxed his vigilance.”

Kommersant quoted police in Dagestan as saying that the choice of time and place for the attack on Aliev, which took place near a café where he had just eaten dinner, was somewhat atypical for the Buinaksk Jamaat, whose members typically ambush their victims either near their homes or while they are traveling. “Their actions are always demonstrative in character,” a member of the team investigating Aliev’s murder told the newspaper. “The Wahhabis typically abandon weapons and automobiles at the scene of the crime, not worrying about covering their tracks. There is simply no sense in that, since they openly—usually via the Internet—take responsibility not only for their own, but for the crimes of others carried out against members of the law-enforcement system.”

It should be noted that the rebel Kavkaz-Center website on June 24 posted a short report on the murder of Aliev, which simply cited an “occupation source in the capital of the vilayat of Dagestan, Shamilkala (the former Makhachkala)” as saying that the “murtad” (apostate) Aliev had been shot to death. There was no claim of responsibility.

Meanwhile, unknown attackers tried to blow up a vehicle carrying servicemen from the 102nd brigade of the Interior Ministry Internal Troops on a road between the villages of Gubden and Urma in Dagestan’s Gubden district on June 21. No one was hurt in the blast, which was apparently caused by an improvised explosive device.

On June 20, a police officer and a civilian were killed when unidentified gunmen fired at a pursuing policeman in Dagestan’s Suleiman-Stalsky region, Itar-Tass reported. According to the press service of Dagestan’s Interior Ministry, the incident took place at the entrance to the village of Svetskoye when unidentified persons in a VAZ-2106 automobile refused to stop at a police checkpoint and a police officer gave chase in a civilian car. Those inside the car that was being chase opened fire on their pursuers, killing the police officer and the car’s owner, who was behind the wheel.

The International Crisis Group issued a report on Dagestan earlier this month which concluded that that an unstable economic situation and corruption are the main reasons for the upsurge in terrorism in the republic (Chechnya Weekly, June 5).

**Find this article at:**

**<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374268>**

## North Caucasus Weekly

Volume 9, Issue 25 (June 26, 2008)

### Buinaksk Police Chief Murdered

Gunmen in Dagestan killed Colonel Magomedarip Aliev, chief of police of the town of Buinaksk, as he was driving through the republic's capital Makhachkala on June 24. RIA Novosti quoted a source in the press service of Dagestan's Interior Ministry as saying that unidentified gunmen fired on Aliev's Mercedes as it was passing by and that Aliev died on the spot. Kommersant reported on June 25 that the attackers first blocked Aliev's Mercedes at an intersection in the center of Makhachkala and that Aliev received multiple gunshot wounds in the head and chest.

According to Kommersant, Aliev had personally taken part in dozens of special operations targeting in the Buinaksk Jamaat and was the target of an assassination attempt in 2006, apparently after he was put on the jamaat's hit list. In November 2007, Aliev was among the commanders of an operation in Makhachkala that targeted a group of "Buinaksk Wahhabis" who had killed six police in a July 2006 bombing at a school in Kizilyurt and were hiding in a residence on the outskirts of the Dagestani capital. Seven militants died when security forces, reportedly using armored personnel carriers and a tank, laid siege to the residence (Chechnya Weekly, November 15 and July 19, 2007).

At the same time, Kommersant quoted Dagestani police sources as saying that Aliev, who was known as a man of principle and for having "strict morals," also had many enemies "among representatives of Dagestani organized crime and big business" and was not on good terms with everyone inside his own police department. Still, an anonymous police investigator told the newspaper that Aliev's conflict with the "Wahhabis" in Dagestan was personal, and that his "old enemy," the local jamaat leader Bammatkhan Sheikov, aka Assadulla (the Lion of Allah), was behind all the threats and attempts on Aliev's life. After the "backbone" of the Buinaksk Jamaat was broken last winter and Assadulla was captured by spetsnaz in a mopping up operation in the village of Gimry, Aliev, according to his colleagues, "somewhat relaxed his vigilance."

Kommersant quoted police in Dagestan as saying that the choice of time and place for the attack on Aliev, which took place near a café where he had just eaten dinner, was somewhat atypical for the Buinaksk Jamaat, whose members typically ambush their victims either near their homes or while they are traveling. "Their actions are always demonstrative in character," a member of the team investigating Aliev's murder told the newspaper. "The Wahhabis typically abandon weapons and automobiles at the scene of the crime, not worrying about covering their tracks. There is simply no sense in that, since they openly—usually via the Internet—take responsibility not only for their own, but for the crimes of others carried out against members of the law-enforcement system."

It should be noted that the rebel Kavkaz-Center website on June 24 posted a short report on the murder of Aliev, which simply cited an "occupation source in the capital of the vilayat of Dagestan, Shamilkala (the former Makhachkala)" as saying that the "murtad" (apostate) Aliev had been shot to death. There was no claim of responsibility.

Meanwhile, unknown attackers tried to blow up a vehicle carrying servicemen from the 102nd brigade of the Interior Ministry Internal Troops on a road between the villages of Gubden and Urma in Dagestan's Gubden district on June 21. No one was hurt in the blast, which was apparently caused by an improvised explosive device.

On June 20, a police officer and a civilian were killed when unidentified gunmen fired at a pursuing policeman in Dagestan's Suleiman-Stalsky region, Itar-Tass reported. According to the press service of Dagestan's Interior Ministry, the incident took place at the entrance to the village of Svetskoye when unidentified persons in a VAZ-2106 automobile refused to stop at a police checkpoint and a police officer gave chase in a civilian car. Those inside the car that was being chase opened fire on their pursuers, killing the police officer and the car's owner, who was behind the wheel.

The International Crisis Group issued a report on Dagestan earlier this month which concluded that that an unstable economic situation and corruption are the main reasons for the upsurge in terrorism in the republic (Chechnya Weekly, June 5).



Magomedarip Aliev

**Find this article at:**

**<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374269>**

## North Caucasus Weekly

Volume 9, Issue 25 (June 26, 2008)

### Vostok and Zapad Battalions' Staff will be Cut by 30 Percent

General Vladimir Shamanov, who heads the Russian Armed Forces' Main Directorate for Combat Training and Service, told *Krasnaya Zvezda* that the Defense Ministry has decided to cut the size of its Chechen-manned battalions.

In an interview posted June 24 on the military newspaper's website, *Redstar.ru*, Shamanov was asked about the fate of the Vostok (East) and Zapad (West) battalions, both of which are subordinated to the Defense Ministry's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). The Vostok battalion has come into conflict with forces loyal to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, who has demanded that it be disbanded (*North Caucasus Weekly*, June 19; *Chechnya Weekly*, April 17 and 24; May 1, 8, 16, 22 and 29; June 5 and 12).

Shamanov responded: "Fulfilling the tasks of the command of the Unified Group of Forces, these battalions, formed from local inhabitants, carried out dozens of successful operations during eight years of existence, destroying a lot of militants. However, having received ample independence, Vostok and Zapad truly resembled army units less and less in recent years." According to Shamanov, a Defense Ministry probe of the Vostok and Zapad battalion launched following Kadyrov's complaints about the units found "a number of violations in the process of military training and organizing daily activities." As a result, said Shamanov, "the Minister of Defense [Anatoly Serdyukov] made the decision to carry out a recertification of the command and personnel of both units and reduce their numbers by 30 percent and not send any more conscripts to them."

Shamanov said that those who are still members of the units will undergo "systematic training" in a number of areas but that both battalions will remain part of the Defense Ministry's 42nd Division. Given the rebel attack on the village of Benoi-Vedeno on June 13, the Vostok and Zapad battalions have "enough work" to do, Shamanov said, adding that that they are also currently carrying out "peacekeeping tasks" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Meanwhile, *Kommersant* reported on June 25 that the Vostok battalion may be purged of those members who have aroused the ire of the Chechen authorities, and also of those who left the unit after its conflict with forces loyal to Kadyrov broke out in April. Still, *Kommersant*, which also interviewed Shamanov, said he refused to comment on reports that Sulim Yamadaev had been removed as Vostok commander—something that Kadyrov had asserted publicly. "Personnel appointments in the North Caucasus Military District are outside the competence of the Main Directorate for Combat Training," Shamanov told *Kommersant*.

Sulim Yamadaev's older brother, former State Duma deputy Ruslan Yamadaev, told *Kommersant* that he and his brother support the Defense Ministry's decision to reduce the size of its units in Chechnya. "There is a huge [Chechen] MVD, and, according to the Chechen authorities, it is successfully battling against the militants," Ruslan Yamadaev told the newspaper. He added that his brother is waiting for a decision from the Russian military command about a new assignment. "A decision about Sulim's transfer was taken a long time ago, even before the conflict with President Ramzan Kadyrov," Ruslan Yamadaev told *Kommersant*.

Find this article at:

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374270>

### Kadyrov Calls for a Joint Military Operation Against the Rebels

In the wake of a series of rebel attacks in Chechnya, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov on June 18 called on federal and Chechen units to conduct a “joint military operation” against the militants, the newspaper Severny Kavkaz reported on its website on June 19. “It is necessary to carry out a joint military operation,” the Chechen presidential press service quoted Kadyrov as saying during a meeting with representatives of the republic’s power structures in Grozny on June 18. “Together with units of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Sever [North] and Yug [South] battalions, and also the A. [Akhmad] Kadyrov regiment, must be put into action. With joint actions, we must put an end to these crimes.” During the same meeting, Kadyrov promised that if necessary, he would put on camouflage, take an assault rifle and go to the mountains to fight the rebels by himself (North Caucasus Weekly, June 19).



Kadyrov’s comments, which seem to be a frantic reaction to the recent series of rebel attacks, are worth noting against the backdrop of the comments he made at the start of the year, when he vowed that all of the rebels located in Chechnya would be eliminated by the end of the winter. At that time, he insisted that 99 percent of the militants had already been killed or put down their weapons in the course of the republic’s amnesty and that only “several dozens” of rebels, who had “stained themselves with blood and cut themselves off from the path to return to a peaceful life,” were still “running around the mountains” (Chechnya Weekly, January 24).

On June 23, the press service of the Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that members of the FSB’s Alpha and Vypfel spetsnaz commando units, together with Chechen law-enforcement personnel, had killed three fighters from remnants of the rebel group headed by “Wahhabi” leader Muslim Gakaev (aka Dungo), a majority of whose members were killed in special operation in 2005, during which five Alpha and Vypfel members were also killed. According to Interfax, the FSB’s press service reported that on this occasion, the Alpha and Vypfel commandos had come across the rebel fighters while carrying out a special operation together with Chechen law-enforcement personnel in a wooded area on the outskirts of the village of Makhkety in Chechnya’s Vedeno district. According to the FSB, the bodies of the three rebels were discovered following a shootout. The dead militants were identified as Mavsur Bolatov, a resident of Dagestan, and Islam Temishev and Yusup Dichilaev, both residents of Makhkety. All three, according to the FSB, had been involved in attacks on law-enforcement personnel in Chechnya and Dagestan, the murder of federal servicemen and the kidnapping-for-ransom of civilians.

Newsru.com reported on June 22 that two servicemen with the federal Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops and a serviceman with an OMON special police unit from Kamchatka Krai were wounded in a shootout that took place when they were attacked by as many as nine rebel fighters on the outskirts of Makhkety. One of the rebels reportedly died in the gun battle.

Also on June 22, a serviceman with the federal Interior Ministry died when a convoy of five vehicles carrying Interior Ministry servicemen from Adygea was fired on by militants near the village of Mekenskaya in Chechnya’s Naursk district. According to RIA Novosti, the servicemen were traveling from the Russian military base at Khankala, outside Grozny, to Mozdok, North Ossetia, from where they were to travel home to Adygea.

Find this article at:

<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374271>

## North Caucasus Weekly

Volume 9, Issue 25 (June 26, 2008)

### Briefs

#### Six Wounded in Kabardino-Balkaria Attack

Six people in the city of Tyrnyauz in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, among them four law-enforcement officers, were injured on June 22 when unidentified gunmen shot up an apartment in the city and tossed a grenade through its window. Newsru.com reported on June 23 that six people who were inside the apartment at the time of the attack were hospitalized with shrapnel wounds. Kavkazky Uzel reported on June 24 that three of the six victims were policemen, one was an officer with the local branch of the federal anti-narcotics service (FSKN) and two were civilians. According to "unofficial" information, a birthday party was going on inside the first-floor apartment at the time of the attack. However, according to the republican FSKN's press service, the FSKN officer who was in the apartment at the time of the attack had collected information on persons involved in narcotics trafficking and was sharing it with the policemen who were also in the apartment at the time of the attack.

#### Locusts Swarm Northern Chechnya

Locusts in northern Chechnya are threatening the republic's agricultural land, the Chechen president's press service reported on June 24. Itar-Tass quoted the presidential press service as saying that the hardest hit areas were the Shelkov and Naursk districts, where some 65,000 hectares of land were under a "solid wall" of locusts. The press service reported that a total of 85,000 hectares across the entire republic had been infested by the locusts, but that the swarm had thus far affected mainly "wild plants."

**Find this article at:**

**<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374272>**



### Increase in Chechen Attacks Linked to Broader North Caucasus Strategy

By Mairbek Vatchagaev

We wrote back in April that the Chechen militants' renewed combat operations needed to be viewed with a certain degree of caution (Chechnya Weekly, April 3). The reasons for such caution had to do with the two-year reduction in such activities related to the deaths of prominent political leaders of the Chechen resistance movement, including Aslan Maskhadov, Abdul-Khalim Saidulaev, Shamil Basaev and a number of high- and mid-level field commanders, which had significant impact on the military organization of the North Caucasian resistance movement in general. Many even rushed to "bury" the Chechen resistance movement, as they were convinced that the blow to its leadership was fatal.

Such analysts did not take into account the fact that the death of this or that leader cannot remove from the political scene a force that has been forged as a military brotherhood and has undergone a considerable ideological transformation. Today, the North Caucasian resistance movement, including the Chechen factor that represents its foundation, functions as a political party with a specific agenda. Each resistance fighter knows the overall objectives and is ready for possible leadership loss at any moment. Thus, the movement learned lessons from its past. This new political force is capable of carrying out a war of attrition that will be costly and exhaustive for the authorities. Such a modus operandi will also allow it to constantly replenish its ranks with new and young people, who aspire to achieve independence and build a sovereign state.

According to various estimates, several dozen militants participated in the recent military operation led by Amir Osman (Uthman Muntsigov), who commands the Dargin Sector of the Eastern Front of the Armed Forces of the Caucasian Emirate ([www.echo.msk.ru/news/520695-echo.html](http://www.echo.msk.ru/news/520695-echo.html); Chechnya Weekly, June 19). It should be noted here that the aforementioned military operation took place in an area where several military structures are deployed, including a military intelligence base in the vicinity of the Benoi settlement (not to be confused with Benoi-Vedeno, but geographically adjacent). That is why Ramzan Kadyrov immediately criticized the military for their inaction ([www.ng.ru/regions/2008-06-19/7\\_grozniy.html](http://www.ng.ru/regions/2008-06-19/7_grozniy.html)). There are also several thousand police officers present in that area, according to a simple principle—one police station for every village. This is in sharp contrast to the Soviet period, when one local police officer was assigned to each village, while a police station was more often located in the district center.

The aforementioned military action clearly demonstrated that no one from the so-called "Chechen police" wanted to risk his life by venturing at night into the districts seized by the militants. The police itself admitted the fact of the seizure by militants, but decided to intervene only in the morning, thereby leaving their colleagues and government officials in the village to fend for themselves. The Chechen police units' first combat encounter is usually sufficient to significantly diminish their loyalty to the Russian flag. Left face-to-face with the militants, their attitude to law enforcement service changes drastically and they begin to "serve" both sides, which is something that we witnessed in Chechnya during the first military campaign (1994-1996) and at the beginning of the second military campaign, when it was not clear yet who would prevail—the Chechens or the Russians. This means that each combat incident of this kind will systematically undermine the authority of Ramzan Kadyrov, who seems to think that his well-stocked coffers serve the best guarantee of the Chechen law-enforcers loyalty to the new authorities. In practice, however, each police officer is much closer to his family, and this will prompt him to "not notice" movements by militants and in some cases even to assist them by giving them advance information about planned operations or by hiding them right under the noses of those who are looking for them. In the meantime, the militants are targeting not so much personnel as property, burning down the houses of those who work for the pro-Russian administration. This is done for intimidation purposes as well as to demonstrate that it is very easy to inflict harm on those who may believe that the militants will never return. This operation will make many think about the role and place of militants.

The attack on a motorcade in the Argun Gorge, which took place in broad daylight on the road Grozny-Shatoi-Itum-Kale just 500 meters from the settlement of Chishki in Grozny district ([www.vz.ru/news/2008/6/16/177898.html](http://www.vz.ru/news/2008/6/16/177898.html); Chechnya Weekly, June 19), would have been left unnoticed were it not for the fact that it claimed the lives of three members of the border guards unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), including two officers, and was carried out entirely by the newly recruited militants.

Resistance information sources quoted the statement by the Emir of Chechnya's Urus Martan district, Abdul Malik, which presented the aforementioned military operation as the first combat experience of the young members of the Argun Jamaat under the leadership of Emir Asad (Chechencenter.com, June 17). There is, of course, an element of propaganda in this, but the fact that the operation took place was confirmed by the Russian sources as well.

Little attention was paid to the attack by the militants on the police in the vicinity of Agish-Batoi in Chechnya's Vedeno district (RIA Novosti, June 16; Chechnya Weekly, June 19). This village is located close to the route taken by Ramzan Kadyrov during his regular pilgrimage to the holy places associated with the name of the Sufi saint Kunta-Haji (Ramzan Kadyrov considers himself an adherent of Kunta-Haji). The attack there raises questions about the level of militant activities in the entire mountainous part of Chechnya, which undoubtedly worries the military command and the pro-Russian administration in Chechnya. The latter is trying to do its utmost to suppress news reports about militant activities, as is Ramzan Kadyrov, who during a meeting with law enforcement representatives urged the media to devote more attention to the film festival that was taking place in Chechnya at the time (www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=188744).

Other military operations carried out by the Chechen militants are evidence of their stepped-up activities around the republic but go virtually unnoticed. Examples include an attack on police in Grozny on June 16, which claimed the lives of two police officers (www.rian.ru/incidents/20080616/110596282.html), and an attack on an armored personnel carrier close to Bamut (Chechnya Weekly, June 19). These sorts of incidents have become routine in Chechnya.

Such actions are also interesting from a broader perspective, given that Chechnya for a long time has not been the site of large-scale rebel operations, with militant attacks concentrated primarily in the neighboring regions of Ingushetia and Dagestan. The authorities are at present compelled to maintain force levels and special operations units in Chechnya, which requires a redistribution of military forces across the entire North Caucasus. In 2005 the departure of Chechens and Karachays from the military arena (in terms of their respective levels of activity) had a negative impact on the rest of the jamaats, while the present situation is self-correcting in favor of the overall resistance line, which leaves vulnerable only the jamaats in Adygea and Karachaevo-Cherkessia (after suffering losses, the Karachay jamaat was merged into a unified jamaat of Kabarda, Balkaria and Karachay under the leadership of Anzor Astemirov, aka Emir Seifullah). All the other regions—from the Caspian Sea in the east to the Cossack lands of the Black Sea coast in the west—are areas where elements of the North Caucasian resistance movement are actively present. This will have a negative impact on Russia, where the more active the militants are, the greater is the likelihood is that the youth will gravitate towards them, given that the militants are romanticized as Robin Hood-like fighters against the Russian system in the North Caucasus.

**Find this article at:**

**<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374273>**

### Moscow Increases Financial Support for the Chechen Government

By Andrei Smirnov

Against the background of increasing rebel attacks in Chechnya and the political standoff between the Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and his rivals, the Yamadaev brothers, the Russian government approved a new program for developing the Chechen economy. Unlike previous programs, this one will focus not only on the reconstruction of buildings but also on the rebuilding of factories to provide jobs for ordinary Chechens.

It became clear this year that reconstruction of Chechen settlements, mainly the regional capital Grozny, alone had not achieved the most important goal of Russian economic policy towards the region: despite the construction boom, Chechens did not stop supporting the local rebels.

Late in May, Vladimir Ustinov, the newly appointed Russian presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District, visited Chechnya, where he declared that "a lot of things have been done by now, but one should do more to restore all industries that can provide new job opportunities in Chechnya" (Regnum, May 30).

On June 23, a Russian cabinet session chaired by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin approved a \$4.7 billion (120 billion ruble) program to rebuild Chechnya over the next four years. That is roughly twice the amount spent by the federal government on the Chechen economy over the previous six years (RIA Novosti, June 23).

"Thousands of jobs will be created in Chechnya for the next four years, and efforts will be made to double economic growth and to improve considerably the social and transportation infrastructure," Putin said at the session. According to Putin, the program, which will run from 2008 through 2011, also aims at financing the construction of roads, colleges and institutes, as well as hospitals and broadcasting facilities (Itar-Tass, June 23).

According to Regional Development Minister Dmitry Kozak, the new federal spending program should decrease Chechnya's dependence on the federal budget by 25 percent in 2012 (the Chechen Republic is now 95 percent dependent on grants from the Russian government). Kozak declared after the cabinet session that tax revenues in Chechnya should more than double by 2012, private investment should grow tenfold and jobs will increase to more than 90,000. He also said that 1800 regional and 145 federal facilities in the republic should be modernized under the new program (Itar-Tass, June 23).

Every time Russian authorities announce a new plan to reconstruct Chechnya, the question arises: who will guarantee that the plan is successfully implemented? The previous federal spending program on Chechnya adopted in 2002 was closed in summer 2007 because it proved to be ineffective. In September 2006, the federal Audit Chamber issued a report analyzing expenditures made to restore the Chechen economy and the social sphere between January and June 2006, which concluded that they "did not produce any significant result." In 2007, the program for rebuilding Chechnya was called the most ineffective of six federal spending programs and was shut down by Mikhail Fradkov, who was Russia's Prime Minister (Vedomosti, July 5, 2007).

So, what do the federal ministers plan to do now to make the new spending program work? As before, the main problem for such programs is corruption and theft. In the language of Russian officialdom, the stealing of money from the budget is called "no-purpose expenditure." The level of such "no-purpose expenditures" in Chechnya is still very high.

Dmitry Kozak, who is the author of the new financial program for Chechnya and the man responsible for its success, said that out of the 120 billion rubles (about \$5.1 billion) allocated to finance the program, 110 billion (around \$4.68 billion) will be allocated from the federal budget and 10 billion (around \$425 million) will be private investments that can be controlled more easily. However, 10 billion rubles is only 12 percent of the whole amount, and it should be noted that so-called "private investments" are also indirect government investments. Most of the companies who invest in the Chechen economy are in fact state-owned operations like the Rosneft state oil company), and the genuinely private companies that invest in Chechnya do it for political rather than economic reasons at the request of the Kremlin. Still, there is no proof that private infusions could be any more effectively controlled in Chechnya than

allocations from the budget.

Another new mechanism to control spending in Chechnya is to work out specific sub-programs to see where exactly the money will go. According to Kozak's plan, sub-programs will be checked every year, and if the spending is deemed to have been ineffective, there will be no money for the sub-program the following year (Itar-Tass, May 23).

There is nothing new in this control mechanism and there is no guarantee that all the money will be spent properly. Nevertheless, the amount to be allocated is very large, so that even given the level of corruption in Chechnya there is still hope that at least some of the money will be spent for good purposes. This is what the Kremlin hopes to see by the end of 2011.

Whether the Chechen insurgency will be defeated by then is another question.

**Find this article at:**

**<http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374274>**