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Map of Asia |
CIAO DATE: 03/03
Nepal Update
Mandavi Mehta and Nisala Rodrigo
The South Asia Monitor
Number 53
December 01, 2002
In the year and one-half since most of the Nepalese royal family was gunned down in a palace massacre, Nepal has waged a battle for survival with Maoist rebels against the background of acute political instability. The Maoists broke a four-month cease-fire with the government in November 2001, and the aftermath has been unprecedented violence. The crisis has intensified disputes between political leaders. The increasingly assertive position of the new king, Gyanendra, is changing the relationship between the monarchy and Nepal's fragile multi-party democratic system. The danger is that Nepal's deepening instability will affect areas beyond its borders, especially India's troubled northeast.
The Royal Family: The Nepalese royal family is still recovering from the devastating palace massacre on June 1, 2001, when the crown prince shot and killed his parents King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya, along with eight other members of the family, before turning the gun on himself. The dead king's brother, Gyanendra, succeeded him to the monarchy, but has not been the unifying figure his late brother was. Clouds of rumor still swirl around the palace massacre. More significant, Gyandendra's son, Prince Paras Bikram Shah, the new crown prince, is deeply unpopular and has an unsavory reputation.
King Gyanendra has been a more assertive presence than his brother. As commander in chief of the army, he supported the deployment of the Nepalese military to fight the Maoists after the cease-fire fell through. Although there remains constitutional ambiguity about who controls the army in Nepal, the army has always been loyal to the king. Gyanendra says he supports the post-1990 democratization of Nepal and the multi-party system, but the balance of power has shifted sharply in favor of the king in the past few months. If the insurgency continues, this trend is likely to continue.
Political Instability: Nepal's first decade of elected government has been marked by bitter disputes between and within political parties. Nepal has had 11 governments in as many years, with power rotating between the Nepali Congress (NC) party and the leftist parties, as well as between opponents within NC. The insurgency and the palace shooting placed increased stress on this fragile political system.
The latest change in government took place in July 2001, soon after the palace massacre, when Sher Bahadur Deuba succeeded Girija Prasad Koirala as prime minister. Deuba announced a cease-fire with the Maoist insurgents in July 2001. In November, after four months of uneasy truce and unsuccessful peace talks, the Maoists launched coordinated attacks on army and police posts nationwide. In response, the government declared a state of emergency. The next six months saw spreading clashes between the Nepalese army and the Maoists. In February 2002, the Maoists killed over 120 people in a single weekend and, two months later, brought the country to a virtual halt by calling for a strike.
In May 2002, the rebels declared a one-month cease-fire, but a skeptical government refused. The former prime minister, Koirala, who was still president of the NC, expelled Prime Minister Deuba from the party for refusing to withdraw a bill to extend the state of emergency. In turn, Deuba dissolved Parliament and called for early elections, remaining the head of the interim government. His supporters within NC expelled Koirala and elected Deuba as the new party president, splitting the party.
Consolidating Leftist Opposition: While the NC was fragmenting, the leftist parties-the Nepal Communist Party, United Marxist-Leninists (UML), and the Marxist-Leninists (ML)-merged into a united Communist opposition in February 2002. The Communist parties, however, support the monarchy and constitutional government, and have therefore also been targeted by the Maoists. In previous years, fractures in the NC have benefited the Communists.
The King Steps In: In October, Deuba requested that the elections be delayed for another year, as Maoist violence jeopardized them. King Gyanendra thereupon dismissed Deuba and his cabinet, and assumed full executive powers for the first time since 1990. Gyanendra installed an interim government headed by Lokendra Bahadur Chand, to rule until elections take place. Chand, a palace loyalist and the head of the Rashtriya Prajatantrik Party, who has twice served as prime minister, unsuccessfully encouraged other parties to join his government.
It is not clear where these moves leave Nepal's Constitution. The constitutional validity of the king's dismissal of Deuba's government is questionable, and there is no provision for an unelected prime minister. Chand has announced that elections would take place once peace is restored, whereas the Constitution requires the king to schedule new elections to take place within six months of the dissolution of Parliament. The major political parties have called for a constituent assembly to assess the monarch's role and are contemplating street demonstrations against him. Because the Maoists are far from being defeated, politicians fear that the new government will remain in place indefinitely under the guidance of the king, and the 1990 democratization of the country will be reversed. This uncertainty plays into the Maoists' hands, giving strength to their argument that the monarchy is autocratic and needs to be overthrown.
The Maoist Advance: Under the leadership of Comrade Prachanda, the Maoists have been growing rapidly in strength. Once a small, localized movement, they have now become more united and have expanded to 68 of Nepal's 75 districts. In addition, the Maoists have formed provisional revolutionary district governments in a few districts. According to most estimates, they control about one-third of the country. Prime Minister Chand has called for unconditional peace talks with the Maoists, and has vowed to end the insurgency peacefully. The Maoists, for their part, have refused to enter into talks with Chand's government, which they consider unconstitutional.
The Maoists have inspired both fear and support in the countryside; many of Nepal's rural poor see them as latter-day Robin Hoods. They have benefited tremendously from Nepal's crisis in governance, and the government's ineffectiveness and widespread reputation for corruption. The Maoist goal of ridding Nepal of the monarchy and "oppressive feudal structures," and turning it into a people's republic therefore has some resonance.olitical player rather than the marginal party they have been in the past.
The government's efforts to fight the Maoists militarily and to wean away the support of the people have had mixed results. The Maoists operate mainly in rural areas, though in recent months, they have targeted the capital, Kathmandu, with bomb attacks. Nepal's mountainous terrain-deeply forested and inaccessible in parts-and its poor transport and communications infrastructure make decisive military operations against the Maoists almost impossible. The security forces' task is made even tougher by lack of cooperation from local people in the countryside, due either to fear of reprisals or to a desire to protect the Maoists. The army has become increasingly unpopular because of its poor human rights record during counterinsurgency operations. In many of Nepal's remote villages, the presence of the government is negligible, and government efforts to sponsor development activity in Maoist strongholds have been unsuccessful.
The Maoist forces are highly skilled at guerrilla warfare, and both men and women serve in their troops. Nepalese military officials believe that there is an elite core of well-trained Maoists whose numbers range from 2-4,000. 10-14,000 irregulars supplement this number. The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) numbers 53,000, but only half this number is currently assigned to fight the rebels, and they lack experience in guerrilla warfare. The security forces-the RNA, the Armed Police Force, and the regular police forces-have suffered huge casualties at the hands of the Maoists and lack the structure and motivation to respond effectively.
Economic Crisis: With a per capita income of U.S.$220 per annum, Nepal is the twelfth-poorest country in world and the poorest in South Asia. Foreign aid finances some 55 percent of the country's development expenditures and accounts for 25-30 percent of total government expenditure, or 5-6 percent of GDP. The costs of fighting the Maoists, the security crisis, and the slowdown of the global economy, have stalled Nepal's faltering economy. Projected GDP growth for 2002 was revised downward from 5.5 percent to only 3 percent. This growth is overwhelmingly in urban areas. Although exports to India-Nepal's primary trading partner-have increased, international demand for garments and wool carpets, Nepal's two main exports, fell by 39 percent in the first 9 months of this fiscal year. In 2002, there has been a 70 percent drop in tourism earnings, from the approximate $160 million earned annually. The government's ability to kick-start the economy and to make an effective difference in the lives of the rural poor will be a decisive factor in redressing Nepal's current woes.
The Foreign Response: After September 11, the Nepalese government embarked on an international campaign to raise foreign assistance for their war on terror. The response from the United States has been to expand its economic assistance and to begin, for the first time ever, a program of support for the military's counterinsurgency work. U.S. aid to Nepal, administered through USAID, was $27.5 million in fiscal year 2002, and the administration has requested over $37 million for 2003. For the first time, the U.S. government allocated an additional $12 million to military financing. Great Britain also extended 6.5 million pounds for Nepal to buy military hardware.
India, traditionally Nepal's most important foreign friend, has provided military equipment and is helping to train RNA counterinsurgency groups. India is the country with the most to lose from the Maoist threat. It is concerned about anything that could bring Nepal into closer relations with China. In addition, instability in Nepal is already aggravating the security crisis in India's northeast. Maoist collusion with insurgents across the porous Indo-Nepal border, as well as the assistance they receive from India's large Nepali population, make it even more difficult to act effectively against them. India's involvement in Nepal's domestic affairs, however, is a deeply divisive issue in Nepal and, so far, India has stuck to a non-intrusive policy.
Looking Ahead: It is unlikely that Nepal's security forces can conclusively defeat the Maoists-with or without military assistance-and, therefore, the only sustainable solution lies in a negotiated settlement. Today Nepal is on the verge of being a failed state, exporting instability and economic refugees to its neighborhood. The prospect of a confrontation between the king and major political parties while the Maoist insurgency continues is a dangerous one. The United States has been trying to encourage dialogue among all the antagonists in this drama and to support the Nepali government's efforts to become more effective. This is a tall order.
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