CIAO DATE: 03/03

Two Elections: New Hopes and Old Frustrations

Mandavi Mehta and Teresita Schaffer

The South Asia Monitor
Number 52
November 1, 2002

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

The two recent elections on the subcontinent, in Pakistan and in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, were conducted in environments of skepticism and uncertainty. Both yielded upset victories. In Pakistan, a hung parliament and the unexpectedly strong showing of the religious parties raise questions about how the government will deal with a political force that is hostile to its ties with the United States and will push a hard line toward India. The Kashmir elections, on the other hand, are an opportunity for positive change in the state, though their ultimate results will depend on how willing the governments in Delhi and Islamabad are to create a real peace process. For the United States, the main message from the ballot box is that South Asia will remain volatile, but that the stakes for U.S. interests are higher than ever.

Pakistan: handicapped process, surprising results: The shifting and controversial ground rules of the Pakistani election produced a fragmented parliament. The Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-QA), favored by Musharraf, emerged on top, with 77 out of 268 directly elected seats. In second place is the Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), the electoral version of Benazir Bhutto's party. The surprise, however, was the performance of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six religious parties. Their 11 percent share of votes cast was in line with their best previous performance. But the first-past-the-post system and their disciplined approach earned them 45 seats, an unprecedented 18 percent of the National Assembly, plus control of one provincial government and participation in a second. This makes them a major political player rather than the marginal party they have been in the past.

The MMA campaigned against the U.S. war on terrorism and the U.S. presence in Pakistan. It dominated the voting in areas bordering Afghanistan, with a substantial Pashtun population deeply concerned about Afghanistan. The MMA accounts for 80 percent of the parliamentary seats from the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and will control that provincial government. In Baluchistan, the MMA will lead a provincial coalition government.

A fragile coalition? Three weeks after the election, Musharraf is still negotiating to form a government. His most likely options are a government based on the PML-QA or an alliance between them and the MMA. Either would involve cooperation between parties that do not see eye to eye, and would yield a fragile government and fractious National Assembly. Since the "King's Party" has no clear leader, Musharraf is also looking for a prime minister who will fit in with his own desire to maintain control. The likelihood of some kind of showdown within the new government or between the elected leaders and Musharraf within the next two years is high.

Policy impact in Pakistan: The elections pose little threat to Musharraf's dominance of decisionmaking. The main thrust of his economic reform policies will also survive, though soaring poverty rates and an elected parliament will bring new pressures for public spending. In other areas, the outlook is more troublesome. Whether or not the MMA joins the government, and even if it tones down its stridently anti-American campaign rhetoric, its members will do their best to soften government restraints on the country's Islamic militants and encourage continuing Pakistani support for the Kashmir insurgency. They will push Musharraf to restrict the role of U.S. law enforcement agencies in hunting down Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants, especially in areas where the MMA is in the provincial government. If the United States goes to war in Iraq, that will be a potent source of new opposition to U.S. policy extending well beyond the MMA.

This election will encourage Musharraf to try to revive the old alliance between the army and the religious right, at least in limited form. Such an effort may not eliminate the threat he faces from the most extreme militant elements, however. Violence against foreigners and Christians is likely to continue, and Pakistan's internal security will remain troubled.

Institutions and "checks and balances": Musharraf established the National Security Council (NSC) by decree before the election "to serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State; and the matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-provincial harmony." This institution is central to his and the army's strategy for keeping control over national security and foreign policy, and over major aspects of domestic politics. It is still unclear exactly what political parties will be represented among the eight civilian members of the NSC, but Musharraf and the four military commanders on the council are likely to have the decisive say.

The electoral results are not a promising backdrop for broader institutional reform. The platforms of most parties other than the MMA did not engage issues, but focused on running either with or against the army. The steady decline in voter turnout in the past decade is a depressing indication that few people have faith in the abilities of either the army or political representatives to address their needs. The parliament is unlikely to emerge as a strong institution. Its parties remain largely subservient to their individual leaders. The parties that form the MMA have deep sectarian differences. The reorganization of the country's local institutions, launched with such fanfare by Musharraf, is likely to take a back seat to building coalitions and managing a volatile policy environment.

A ray of hope in Kashmir: The run-up to the Kashmir elections, like the corresponding period in Pakistan, was far from auspicious. The leaders of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC), the umbrella group of political activists in the Valley of Kashmir, were imprisoned, and the group boycotted the elections. Election violence claimed over 700 lives, including 84 political workers and 2 candidates. Moderate Kashmiri leaders feared for their lives after the assassination of the widely respected politician Abdul Ghani Lone. Nonetheless, over 40 percent of the electorate turned out and voted to end a generation of rule by Farukh Abdullah's National Conference (NC), allied with the national government in Delhi led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

A move away from divisive politics: Most observers believe that the NC's loss of its majority reflected anti-incumbency sentiments and frustration over local issues. The NC-led government was known for corruption and high-handedness, and development in the state had been at a standstill. The state-run police had been a spoiler in previous peace initiatives between the Indian government and the Kashmiris.

The new government is a coalition headed by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's Popular Democratic Party (PDP), which won primarily in the Valley of Kashmir, the heart of the state and the heart of the dispute with Pakistan. The PDP's major partner is the Congress Party, which won heavily in the Hindu-majority Jammu area. The Congress showing was seen as a reaction against the BJP's communally divisive politics. This is the first time in six years that the Kashmir government has had a coalition partner connected with the opposition to the central government. This may complicate its dealings with Delhi.

Who speaks for the Kashmiris? Because the major separatist groups did not participate, the elections did not really resolve the question of who speaks for Kashmiris. The Hurriyet sees itself as the representative of the Kashmiris and has sought to represent them in dialogues with the center and Pakistan. It is also engaged in track-two efforts, such as the one with the Delhi-based Kashmir Committee headed by former minister Ram Jethmalani. The Hurriyet will press the new state government to include it in any future dialogue. The state government, for its part, wants to start direct talks with the central government on the state's future governance. If the central government impedes the ability of the state government to function, this will put the Hurriyet in the foreground once again. And the NC remains the largest party in the assembly. The role it chooses to play in the opposition will be critical.

The social and political agenda: The PDP-Congress "common minimum program" calls for the release of political prisoners, strengthening of protections for human rights, investigation of custodial killings, and the return of the Kashmiri Hindus forced out of their homes in the state, along with progress on a host of economic, development, and social issues. The Indian government has not blocked the state government's first moves, such as announcing the disbanding of special operations troops in the valley. Continued central-government help and funding will be crucial.

The trickiest issue, however, is shaping the future governance of the state-the relationship of Kashmir to Delhi and, behind it, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Movement on talks in the next six months is key, before the BJP becomes preoccupied with forthcoming state elections and the prospect of national elections in 2004. The concept underpinning the talks should be changing political relationships, not the map.

Starting a dialogue: Three levels of dialogue need to start. The first is between the various constituencies and political parties in Kashmir. The internal structure of this coalition should produce a long-needed dialogue among the different subregions within Kashmir. The chief minister has reached out to the Hurriyet, and this needs to continue. The second level is between the state and the central government. The state government will carry out this discussion at the official level, but there will be a continuing need for an unofficial channel, as a forum for candid and wide-ranging discussion. The third level involves Pakistan. The Kashmiris would like to be direct participants in this, though it remains unclear who in Kashmir would take the reins. The Hurriyet would like to be the bridge builder and an active participant. The national government, however, will insist on maintaining full control of any discussions with Pakistan.

Spoilers: Pakistan and the externally based militant groups have been alienated by the Kashmir elections. Neither will welcome progress in relations between the state and the government of India, and both will be tempted to play the spoiler's role. The political situation in Kashmir is very fragile, and the peace constituency is passive. These are factors that militant groups can easily exploit.

Impact on the United States: In Pakistan, the long-term interests of the United States are tied to long-term stability in the country, which in turn requires viable political institutions. The path to a more stable democracy may involve messy politics in the short-term. The United States needs to engage the elected representatives and the new government and formulate a farsighted policy toward Pakistan, keeping the interplay with India and Kashmir in mind.

In Kashmir, the United States will want to encourage India and Pakistan to create conditions in which dialogue can move forward. This will require creativity and restraint from both. The twin dangers that threaten this much-needed, quiet U.S. role are the looming war in Iraq, which will absorb Washington's entire attention, and the wild card represented by the MMA's strong showing in Pakistan.