CIAO DATE: 01/03

India and Pakistan: Can Crisis Become Opportunity?

Mandavi Mehta and Teresita C. Schaffer

The South Asia Monitor
Number 42
February 1, 2002

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

The terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on December 13 brought India and Pakistan to the verge of a war with nuclear overtones within a matter of days. The rapid escalation of the conflict took many by surprise, and reflects the changed dynamics of relationships in South Asia since September 11. After the attack, India mobilized its military, but also moved quickly to make terrorist groups based in Pakistan a target of the U.S. war on terrorism. The attack effectively ruined Pakistan's efforts to prevent activities in Kashmir from being lumped together with anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, and pushed President Pervez Musharraf into major policy changes.

The United States became deeply involved in trying to reverse India's and Pakistan's escalatory moves, and pushed Pakistan hard to clamp down on violent militant groups. As a result, the anti-terrorism campaign has broadened its character and the United States is likely to continue a major diplomatic role in South Asia. It should now try to turn this crisis into an opportunity to put India-Pakistan relations on a path toward a settlement.

Eyeball to eyeball: Although the threat of imminent war between India and Pakistan has dissipated in recent weeks, tension remains high. Close to a million troops are facing each other on high alert. A bomb blast near the American Center in Calcutta this past week, India's testing of a medium-range ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to major Pakistani cities, and talk of a possible Pakistani missile test are all reminders that only one more high-profile incident could reignite concerns about war.

India accused two major Pakistan-based militant groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, of carrying out the attack on the Indian parliament. The accusation is plausible; both had claimed responsibility for spectacular acts of violence in the past, including the suicide bombing at the state assembly in Srinagar only two months earlier. With one eye on Pakistan and the other on the United States, India initiated a major military mobilization, including the unusual step of moving some troops away from stations on the border with China. It also suspended overflights and direct transportation links with Pakistan, and demanded that Pakistan cut the size of its India-based diplomatic staff in half. India demands two things in order to de-escalate-that Pakistan end cross-border terrorism and turn over 20 alleged terrorists to India, 14 of them apparently Indian nationals.

In Pakistan, Musharraf condemned the attack on the parliament, but the attack put Pakistan at a fork in the road. It can no longer maintain a firewall between the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan and its continuing support for insurgency in Kashmir-a strategy that had served it well when Musharraf initially justified his government's support of U.S. action in Afghanistan.

On January 12, under intense pressure from the United States and other countries, Musharraf made a dramatic speech condemning the damage militant organizations had done to Pakistan's internal peace and international reputation. The speech is historic for its introspection: “Have we ever thought of waging jihad against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness, and hunger? . . . The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to become a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic Islamic welfare state?” Musharraf outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and several other organizations involved in sectarian violence within Pakistan, and froze their bank accounts. Mainstream politicians and much of Pakistan's economic elite hailed his speech, but it drew predictable condemnation from Pakistan's religious parties.

The speech had an impact in Washington, where President George W. Bush praised it while urging full and prompt implementation of its promises. The news that the Pakistani government had for the first time also arrested some 1,500 militant leaders was particularly gratifying. In Delhi, the government said that it was waiting for concrete action to follow the courageous words. Specifically, the focus is on the level of violence coming across the border and Line of Control and on the 20 names on India's list. The speech drew a distinction between the six Pakistanis on the list of terrorists demanded by India, whom it said Pakistan “would never hand over,” and the non-Pakistanis, but it is not clear what action is likely-or possible, because the people on the list may well have left Pakistan.

Washington engaged: What really distinguishes this crisis from prior ones, however, is the U.S. role. Both parties have been playing to the United States as much as to one another, and Washington has responded with unprecedented high-level attention. In a series of high-profile visits in Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as through intensive telephone-diplomacy, the United States has urged the two countries to move their troops back from the border, and has tried to reframe the conflict as one over terrorism, not territory (Kashmir). Pakistan's interest in engaging outsiders in the India-Pakistan dispute is nothing new, but for India, the apparent eagerness to enlist U.S. support and diplomatic involvement is a major change.

The desire to avert a possible nuclear confrontation resulting from miscommunication and rapid escalation between the two countries is the primary factor galvanizing the United States into action. Secretary of State Colin Powell articulated the United States' goal as bringing levels of tension below a hair-trigger point. The United States also recognizes, however, that the India-Pakistan crisis threatens its war on terrorism. First, Pakistan will be unable to maintain its focus on the Afghan theater of operations if war with India looms. Second, the possibility of militants fresh from Afghanistan, including some with Al Qaeda connections, turning their attentions to Kashmir and India would undercut the success of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.

An opportunity: The events since September 11, and again since December 13, present a unique opportunity to reshape India-Pakistan relations for the future, despite their potential dangers.

National regeneration in Pakistan: Pakistan has been forced to make a drastic break with its past, creating the opportunity for a national revival, with new aid resources made possible by the changed international situation. Musharraf's crackdown on the militant groups could be the key to this transformation. To succeed, however, Musharraf must concentrate on rebuilding national institutions and strengthening domestic consensus in favor of this policy turn. Although many see his speech as having voiced the priorities of the “silent moderate majority” in Pakistan, this majority will remain silent unless it is empowered by a popular mandate. Musharraf has announced that Pakistan will return to democracy later this year, with elections planned for October.

The strength of this revival will in turn depend on creating a measure of internal and external stability. In practice, this means that India must help craft a peace process on Kashmir and the rest of the India-Pakistan agenda that is robust enough to survive crises and substantive enough to keep Pakistan engaged. The United States can encourage India to be more flexible and creative. Musharraf cannot afford to be seen as selling out to India, particularly on the Kashmir issue.

For India, a chance to craft healthy ties with its neighbors: India, however, needs to take seriously the need for a new approach to Pakistan and to Kashmir. If the level of violence decreases, the temptation will be strong to declare the Kashmir problem “solved.” On the contrary, a reduction in violence must lead quickly to a serious dialogue with the Kashmiris aimed at changing the way Kashmir is governed, and to a real discussion with Pakistan aimed at finding an arrangement with which Indians, Pakistanis, and Kashmiris all can live. Otherwise, any fall in violence will only be temporary, and will soon give way to a renewal of the cycle that has already cost tens of thousands of lives in Kashmir in the past decade.

India is enjoying the benefits of a strong relationship with the United States, but it must be wary of overplaying its hand. The new Indo-U.S. relationship relies on a range of common interests, many of which have nothing to do with Pakistan. Unless India is seen to be serious about resolving the problems with Pakistan, however, the new ties will stay well below their potential.

Those who see peace as a threat represent a particular challenge. Pakistan fears that the end of violence in Kashmir will simply perpetuate the status quo, an outcome that would suit India, but not Pakistan or the Kashmiris. The Kashmiris fear that an Indo-Pakistan dialogue will marginalize them. India, the status quo power, fears that a change in the status quo will be to its disadvantage. Any workable arrangement must deal realistically with both the perceived dangers of peace and its unquestioned benefits.

For the United States, South Asia needs to stay on the “short list” of diplomatic priorities. The events of September 11 have made the United States a direct participant in the affairs of South Asia. For the first time, the United States enjoys vigorous relations with both Pakistan and India, and a good measure of influence in both countries. For the first time too, both countries in practice welcome U.S. involvement in the region, though India still would not wish to refer to this role as “mediation” or see it given too high a profile.

In addressing this most recent India-Pakistan crisis, the United States set a short-term agenda: managing the crisis and reducing tension. This strategy worked in the short-term. The United States and other outside powers put intense pressure on Pakistan to curb the militant organizations that are active in Kashmir, and Pakistan has begun to do this. But the underlying issues have not been addressed. Crafting a durable peace between India and Pakistan will only become more difficult with time. Addressing the substance of the Kashmir dispute, and working on an arms control framework for nuclear issues, are key priorities. U.S. diplomacy contained this crisis, but without a sustained peace process, backed by a quiet but determined and sophisticated U.S. effort to nurture it, there will be others.