CIAO DATE: 01/03

President Clinton’s South Asia Trip: Beginning of a Long Road

The South Asia Monitor
Number 21
April 14, 2000

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

President Bill Clinton’s long-awaited trip to South Asia heralded India’s centrality to U.S. policy in South Asia, and a new economic emphasis in U.S.-Indian relations. For the region, Clinton’s message was one of continuing interest, underlined by the first-ever presidential visit to Bangladesh, and concern, emphasized by the sober visit to Pakistan.

If India emerged as the key player in U.S. policy toward South Asia, Pakistan is a key problem. Although much of the trip deliberately focused on other issues, the first measure of its success will be whether India and Pakistan can reduce tensions in the next few months. The second test will come in January, when the next U.S. administration decides how to continue the new policy.

Reorienting U.S. relations: India and the United States sought a revitalized friendship between the world’s most powerful and largest democracies. Indians also hope for early lifting of sanctions imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests that restrict U.S. high technology exports and lending to India from international financial institutions. President Clinton wanted to address nuclear proliferation and Indo-Pakistan tension, though he expected no major breakthrough in either area. India preferred to downplay these issues.

India: defining shared interests: As expected, the trip had few “deliverables”—no major issues were resolved—and stressed setting directions. President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee announced plans for Indo-U.S. relations in a vision statement that underlined their broad philosophical agreement while pledging candor and consultation on their differing perspectives on nuclear proliferation. A companion document marked out a detailed program of regular consultations, from the head of government level down to the working level. Economics, the environment, science and technology, as well as nonproliferation figured in the consultation program. President Clinton’s address to a joint session of the Indian Parliament, a stirring recital of common values and challenges, was interrupted several times by thunderous applause and was followed by a classic “working of the crowd” by the visiting president.

President Clinton’s official program in Delhi also addressed the fragile India-Pakistan relationship. Indeed, sustaining the new agenda will depend in part on improving the regional security picture. The killing of a group of Sikh residents of Kashmir on the first day of his visit set the tone. On regional issues and nuclear proliferation, he presented a consistent message to India and Pakistan. Indians were pleased, and Pakistanis distressed, with his strong admonitions to “respect the line of control” in Kashmir and his rejection of a mediating role. Behind closed doors, Clinton appealed to his hosts to resume dialogue with Pakistan and to reduce tensions within Kashmir. This subject generated the only jarring note of the visit. President K. R. Narayanan, in his speech at the state dinner for President Clinton, took sharp exception to the latter’s earlier description of the subcontinent as the “most dangerous place in the world.”

Once President Clinton left Delhi, his program concentrated on the “new agenda,” with events devoted to sustaining global economic growth, the environment, and public heath, including the fight against AIDS. The most dramatic pictures came from a meeting with village women in Rajasthan. Information technology generated the greatest business excitement. About 65 percent of the software requirements of the United States come from India or Indians, and some 30 percent of the world’s software engineers are of Indian origin. The president’s visit to Hyderabad—India’s newest “Silicon Valley,” dubbed “Cyberabad” by its enthusiastic chief minister, Chandrababu Naidu—cast the United States and India as joint discoverers of a bright future.

Some voices on the political left argued that a closer relationship would draw India too closely into the perceived U.S. imperialist agenda. But this negative note was almost drowned out as the Indian press and public celebrated the promise of economic and political benefits for both countries. India’s color, diversity, beauty, and talents formed a spectacular backdrop for a five-day love feast.

Bangladesh: being there was the main message: Clinton’s one day visit to Bangladesh featured support for a struggling democracy, economic development, and the potential boon of natural gas for a very poor country. His presence provided a boost to Sheikh Hasina’s government. His well-publicized conversation with the leader of the opposition, on the other hand, underscored the U.S. view that the opposition has a legitimate role to play-a neuralgic point in that confrontational political system. President Clinton announced a debt-for-nature swap to help regenerate lost forests, and saluted Bangladesh’s world-renowned microcredit programs. Several commercial agreements were signed, though last-minute efforts to have the president witness two contract signings for gas concessions were deflected. The prime minister announced that Bangladesh would consider natural gas exports only if it could be sure of fifty years’ continuing supply for its own market, but that Bangladesh might export electric power made with Bangladeshi gas. This was nominally a liberalization of current policy, but whether it is a liberalizing move in practice will depend on updating Bangladeshi gas reserve estimates. At present, a U.S. offer of help in this area is stalled in the Bangladesh government.

Security problems forced the president to cancel his planned trips to Bangladesh’s national war memorial and to a village. This disappointing development was a relatively minor blemish on an otherwise historic visit. The existing tenor of U.S.-Bangladeshi relations, already focused on the issues that dominated the trip, was ratified and is not likely to change.

Pakistan: the shadow of security: The somber tone of President Clinton’s five-hour stop in Pakistan was set well before he arrived. The White House repeatedly stated at high levels that the visit would not confer “legitimacy” on the military government headed by General Pervez Musharraf. The president arrived in an unmarked jet, surrounded by several U.S. Air Force decoy planes. All aspects of his schedule were marked by intrusive security measures. The setting of the meetings was formal; there was no separate “photo op” with the general.

In his speech on Pakistan television, President Clinton stressed that he spoke as a friend trying to help Pakistan. His carefully crafted speech, with respectful references to Pakistan’s founder, sought to portray U.S. concerns with as much sympathy as possible for the people of Pakistan. Nonetheless, many Pakistanis were stung by Clinton’s criticisms and the staging of the visit. The contrast with the Indian extravaganza was devastating.

President Clinton’s statement that he would not mediate between Pakistan and India came as no surprise, but disappointed his Pakistani hosts. His public and private warnings that Pakistan would face even more drastic isolation if it facilitated violent actions by militant groups across the line of control in Kashmir came through clearly. The long term policy impact may not be clear for some time.

The road ahead: Although the stress everywhere but in Pakistan was on economic issues, the first test of the president’s impact will come in India-Pakistan relations. The early signs are mixed. On March 29, the Pakistan government formalized its earlier public request for talks with India, and on April 2, the Indian government released three Kashmiri leaders imprisoned for militant activities. Pakistan’s foreign minister in early April talked of placing some controls on infiltration into Kashmir by militants. These could be the first moves toward resuming bilateral talks. On the other hand, high level Indian spokesmen reiterate that conditions are not yet right for talks, and incidents within Kashmir continue.

The longer-term outlook depends on whether India and Pakistan inject some new substance into their hitherto sterile bilateral dialogue. It also depends on whether the Pakistan government is willing or able to discipline militant groups. If it cannot or will not, prospects for U.S.-Pakistan relations and for regional stability are poor. Pakistan’s sense of betrayal by the United States, its former Cold War ally, is fresh and raw, but geography still drives its government toward strong relationships with powerful countries from outside the region. Time will tell whether Kashmir or geopolitics will carry the day and where the United States fits into that picture.

On the economic agenda, the key question is follow-up. Over the next year, The United States and India should make a strong start on high level consultations before handing over to the new administration. With Bangladesh, the next moves are up to their government. The hope is that the presidential visit will inspire some key decisions on energy contracts and development policy before the approach of next year’s election freezes decision-making.