CIAO DATE: 01/03

After The Hijacking

The South Asia Monitor
Number 18
February 1, 2000

The Center for Strategic and International Studies

 

The eight-day hijacking of an Indian Airlines jet on Christmas Eve by militants concerned about Kashmir put the spotlight back on the deteriorating relations between India and Pakistan. The event and its aftermath left Indo-Pak ties at an almost 30 year low. The obstacles to serious dialogue are higher than they have been since the nuclear tests. Neither government wants to bring about a military confrontation, but the defensiveness and frustration on both sides increase the risk of an escalating spiral.

Why the hijacking? The hijacking was apparently carried out by members of the Harakat ul Mujahideen, a militant group based in Pakistan and dedicated to supporting the insurgency in Kashmir. The principal prisoner released after the hijacking is associated with this group, and earlier operations carried out by this group and its predecessor, the Harakat ul Ansar, have also sought his release. The Indian government has argued that the Pakistan government was involved in the operation, releasing in early January the purported names and photographs of the hijackers and the names of some of their alleged accomplices arrested in Mumbai, which it asserted proved Pakistan’s responsibility for the operation. Other governments, including the U.S., have not found the evidence for direct Pakistan involvement compelling.

Managing the crisis: None of the participants distinguished themselves in handling the crisis. In India, mobilization of the crisis management team was slow, and the Indian government seemed caught off guard by the vehemence of the reaction by the hijacked passengers’ relatives. India’s hand would have been strengthened had it been able to keep the plane in Amritsar, the Indian city where it landed early in the crisis. It is hard to say whether this would have been feasible with quicker mobilization, but certainly the slow organizing of the government made it impossible.

In Pakistan, the government’s early statements stoutly condemned the hijacking and were well received internationally. However, the Pakistan government’s early statement blaming Indian intelligence services for the hijacking did not contribute to a solution.

The Afghan Taliban, under whose supervision the drama finally played out, was the only party that ended the crisis looking better than it had at the start. However, that is a fairly low standard, and disturbing stories circulated after the passengers’ release suggesting that there might have been collusion between the Taliban and the hijackers. The unanswerable question is whether the Indian government could have avoided releasing three high-profile prisoners to end the crisis. A precedent had already been set in several earlier Kashmir-related hijackings. Just 10 years ago, the daughter of the then-home minister, himself a Kashmiri muslim, had been kidnapped by Kashmiri militants, and several jailed Kashmiris were freed in exchange for her release. With one airline passenger already dead and distraught relatives storming government offices in Delhi, the government evidently felt it had no choice. The government now faces a storm of controversy. It is never easy to draw that line.

The aftermath – Pakistan focused on Kashmir: Once the passengers were freed, two of the released militants headed for Pakistan, where they made high-profile appearances in mosques and meeting places around the country calling for the liberation of Kashmir. The Pakistan government, bitterly resentful that India blamed it for the hijacking, mounted another major effort to focus international attention on Kashmir. An interview by Chief Executive General Musharraf in an Indian newspaper came back relentlessly to that same theme, underlining Musharraf’s personal preoccupation with the subject as well as his disinclination to deal with other India-Pakistan problems unless a serious dialogue started on Kashmir.

Violence in Kashmir: At the same time, violence has been intensifying in the Valley of Kashmir – the part of the state that arouses the strongest feelings. Before the May fighting in the Kargil sector of Kashmir, there had been a period of reduced violence within Kashmir, and much of the violence was directed against “soft” civilian targets. Following Kargil, the pace and boldness of incidents rose markedly. Increasingly, the militants attacked military and Border Security Force units and facilities. Indian officials said that most of these operations were carried out by groups infiltrating from Pakistan, a charge generally corroborated by Kashmiri sources and by claims of responsibility from some of the Pakistan-based guerrilla groups.

Hostility in India: Animosity toward Pakistan reached a new high in India. The government, having decided soon after the military coup to try to isolate Pakistan’s new military ruler, continues to be cool toward Indo-Pak dialogue. Indeed, official statements are now insisting that talks cannot be held unless cross-border violence ceases – a perceptible hardening of India’s official stance. Since the hijacking, there have been insistent Indian calls for the United States to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism.

In response to the violence in Kashmir, the government has announced a new, more aggressive security stance in Kashmir, including the formation of new counterinsurgency units. This will mean a more oppressive regime in the Kashmir Valley – which, ironically, is probably the most effective way to reignite the insurgency. One now hears reports that residents of the Valley are once again joining insurgent groups, reversing recent trends. One hears little discussion of how to lay the political foundation for a better relationship between Delhi and Kashmiris. More ominously, India’s traditional policy favoring a stable Pakistan is now being publicly challenged.

The Pakistan militant scene: Perhaps a couple of dozen militant groups operate openly in Pakistan. Many were initially active in Afghanistan; some are involved in sectarian strife within Pakistan; some are active in Kashmir (sometimes in addition to other activities). Some of the most prominent include:

• The Harakat ul Mujahideen, apparently responsible for the hijacking, which was formally designated a terrorist organization under U.S. law in October 1997. An affiliate of this group is believed to have kidnapped five foreigners, including one American, in Kashmir in 1995. One of these victims was beheaded, one escaped, and three have been missing now for four and a half years.
• The Lashkar e Tayyaba, a militant Sunni group that has attacked Shias within Pakistan. It has claimed responsibility for at least one of the attacks on an Indian Border Security Force installation in Kashmir, and has made broad threats against Americans.
• The Lashkar e Jangvi, another militant Sunni group with a profile similar to Lashkar e Tayyaba.

The Pakistan government’s support for the Afghan resistance in the 1980s and its support for the Taliban in recent years have been carried out by Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which is part of the military but answers to the head of government. There is constant speculation about how well ISI can be controlled, though General Musharraf is in a strong position if he wishes to do so.

The big obstacle to eliminating the destructive activities of these groups, however, is political. Kashmir is the one issue that unites Pakistanis. Following the Pakistan government’s decision to withdraw from Kargil in July, militant organizations joined large demonstrations to discourage the government from weakening its support for the Kashmiri cause. General Musharraf, moreover, feels passionately about Kashmir. He sought Prime Minister Sharif’s authorization for the Kargil incursion last year, and appears to accept the thesis that anything which makes life uncomfortable for India in Kashmir is to Pakistan’s benefit.

The U.S. acknowledgment of the Harakat ul Mujahideen’s involvement in the hijacking will again raise the question of Pakistan’s possible designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. In the past, the U.S. government has found the evidence too weak to warrant a drastic action that would also sharply reduce American ability to engage Pakistan on important policy issues.

Other trouble spots: Pakistan’s smaller provinces all have organizations that combine militancy and political activism aimed at a greater voice in national politics. Some are explicitly separatist, and several have a history of violence. In the past, the Pakistan government has alleged that India is supporting these groups. In mid-January, the Pakistan government expelled an Indian diplomat whom they said they had caught delivering explosives to a terrorist.

Within Kashmir, people resent both India and militant-led violence. The line between militant groups and political organizations is blurry, and made more so by the way local elections have been manipulated during most of the past 50 years. The two best known groups are:

• The All Parties Hurriyet Conference, an umbrella organization including a variety of political and militant groups. Their spokesman, Mirwaiz Omar Farooq, is the scion of a family of traditional spiritual-political leaders, whose father was assassinated early in the Kashmir insurgency. They receive financial support from Pakistan and claim broader representation than other groups, but have never tested their standing in an election. Most of their leadership is in jail.
• The Hizbul Mujahideen, which retains important ties with the Kashmiri branch of the Jamaat e Islami, an Islamist political party with branches in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

A dangerous spiral? In the aftermath of the hijacking, India-Pakistan relations boast a potentially combustible mix. Both governments feel on the defensive. India, seeing the Pakistan hand in both Kargil and the hijacking, is bent on isolating Pakistan and maintaining a tough security policy. Pakistan seems increasingly desperate to highlight Kashmir. The militants apparently feel they can get Pakistan government support when they need it. The most immediate danger is that stepped-up operations in the Kashmir Valley will revive the insurgency. They could also lead the Indians to consider a policy of hot pursuit or destabilization, with great danger for the region. The Indian government has not reached that conclusion, and apparently continues to believe that restraint has gained it valuable international support. Neither side wants a nuclear confrontation. But emotions are high, and the consensus behind the policy of restraint is shakier than it was six months ago.