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CIAO DATE: 04/03
Brazil Alert: Lula v. Serra-Coming Down to the Crunch
William Barr *
Hemisphere Focus: 2001-2002
October 15, 2002
Overview
In the long-anticipated Brazilian election of October 6, presidential front-runner Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva turned in an impressive performance, his 46 percent of the valid vote doubling that of government candidate José Serra’s 23 percent. The two other principal candidates, Anthony Garotinho and Ciro Gomes, polled 17.9 percent and 12 percent respectively. Because none of the candidates gained the 50 percent plus one vote necessary to win the election outright, a second round between the two highest vote getters on October 27 will decide who will govern from the Planalto Palace.
All 27 state governments and the 513 seats in the House of Representatives were up for grabs as well as the presidency, along with 54 of the federal senate’s 81 places and a host of local positions in Brazil’s most extensive display of democratic activity in more than 500 years.
The Workers’ Party (PT) made a stronger-than-expected showing in gubernatorial races. It won state houses outright in 2 poor and sparsely populated states, Piauí and Acre, and will be contesting 8 of the 15 races that will have a second round; the PT currently holds 4 states. The PT also made major advances in Congress. In the Senate, it gained 6 new seats for a total of 14. (The Liberal Front Party [PFL] gained 1, for 19 seats, while the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party [PMDB] lost 3 seats to end with 19. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party [PSDB] of departing president Fernando Henrique Cardoso and candidate José Serra, likewise dropped 3, to 11 seats.) In the lower house, the PT will become the largest single party represented, with 90 seats. Overall, the principal (current) opposition parties grew from 134 to 187 federal deputies.
Beyond the obvious huge tactical advantage for Lula going into the second round, it is difficult to assess what this means. But plenty of people are trying. Lula says that the strong showing of his party represents a repudiation of the current economic model. A few say “Cardoso fatigue” accounts for the results. Some argue that while Cardoso did little-at least overtly-on behalf of Serra, several of his public statements helped Lula. Others argue that the Serra campaign did a poor job of highlighting the very real accomplishments of the Cardoso administration. Still others say that the results were more a question of image. Serra’s perceived preference for confrontation and inability to find the keys to connecting with the Brazilian people contrasted with Lula’s generally successful tactics of remaining above the fray and conveying an image of newfound moderation and serenity. Unquestionably, the current global economic conjuncture and its effects on Brazil also played a role, both in themselves and in their similarity to the bad financial times of the 1980s. This frustration was only intensified by the more recent happy memories engendered by the early years of the Real Plan. The juxtaposition invariably worked to the detriment of Serra and the advantage of Lula.
An Increasingly Frenetic Tempo
The second round is likely to be a whole new ball game, with a number of players in new positions. The first step, already under way, is to develop and expand alliances. Only then will voters hear more about how the candidates plan to implement their platform positions. Lula is courting both Ciro Gomes and Anthony Garotinho. The former has already announced his “unrestricted and enthusiastic” support for Lula; the latter is more reluctant. Garotinho, who sees himself down the road as the “authentic” representative of the left, earlier said he would support Lula if Lula jettisoned his rightist supporters-presumably including senators Antonio Carlos Magalhães and José Sarney. Exactly what he expected Lula to do about his running mate, conservative businessman and senator José Alencar, is unclear. But Lula can ill afford to repudiate the powerful northeasterners on his side, because he will need their help in Congress if he wins. Serra was reportedly also seeking Garotinho’s endorsement (although that has been denied), but in any case the latter’s public “slicing and dicing” of the PSDB candidate minimized the chances of their reaching a support deal.
In the event, Garotinho has withdrawn his conditions and now says, in the most lukewarm of terms, that he will vote for Lula. But he wants clarification of PT positions on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and a possible new IMF agreement, as well as consideration of outright rejection of the Alcântara accord that languishes in Congress. And, while Brazilian Socialist Party’s (PSB) president Miguel Arraes promises to deliver the party for Lula, this is by no means assured.
Ciro Gomes quarreled during the campaign with a number of the key politicians-including Popular Socialist Party’s (PPS) president Roberto Freire-who had supported him and has almost no independent power base apart from that conferred by his personality. But he and Freire have apparently concluded that their best (and perhaps only) route lies in supporting the PT-this despite Freire’s intense criticism of Lula’s apparent accommodation with rightist politicians and abandonment of pure socialist positions. PDT founder Lionel Brizola has likewise opted for Lula, but whether the rank and file of the PPS and PDT follow their leaders remains to be seen.
Serra’s campaign is undergoing internal alterations designed to reestablish what it can of the PSDB-PMDB-PFL-PPB coalition that held together during much of the Cardoso administration. Chairman João Pimenta da Veiga resigned the day after the first round, saying he had exhausted his effectiveness. He exhorted northeasterners like former vice president (and senator-elect) Marco Maciel and reelected governor Jarbas Vasconcellos to play important conciliating roles now that their own campaigns had concluded, and they have agreed to do so. President Cardoso says he will do what he can within the limits of the law for Serra but will not mount a platform with the candidate. As well, the campaign is expecting heavyweight support from governor-elect Aécio Neves and from Tasso Jereissati, who says he has returned to the PSDB fold now that Ciro’s campaign has concluded. Optimally, the Maciel-Vasconcellos-Jereissati axis will advance Serra in the northeast, which is one key to his hopes. Aécio, who won a thundering victory in Minas Gerais, can help significantly both there and at the national level if the campaign convinces him to commit fully to its candidate. The Serra campaign will also, according to political insiders, be inclined to go “underneath” across-the-board party alliances to recruit politicians on a state-by-state basis, including those who lost but maintain significant influence (one interesting development is the endorsement of PFL president Jorge Bornhausen, indicative of a fissure in that party’s ranks); reach out to regional religious and other leaders; and offer support to candidates who would welcome help in their second-round campaigns. Particular attention will be given to those in the latter category who outpolled Serra in their states.
The Bottom Line is Wavy
A two-to-one lead and subsequent endorsements from other opposition party leaders are powerful indications and cannot be underestimated. But a number of PT members and supporters admit privately to disappointment and concern that Lula did not take the election in the first round. The October 6 results do not mean that the numbers Lula gained then are set in concrete. Indeed, relying on them as a firm support base would be an extremely dangerous tactic. Some voters will jump on the Lula bandwagon in the hope of being linked with the winning candidate. Others will migrate to Serra to the degree that the strategy of deploying regional and state heavyweights, and the present and future resources they represent, prospers. Serra will pressure Lula to participate in mano-a-mano debates in order to show his preparation, familiarity with the issues, history of defending Brazil’s interests, and readiness to propose concrete solutions to problems. The PT will resist this gambit and prefer putting Lula in more controlled and less dangerous venues. Alliance building will proceed, as will fishing for endorsements from influential individuals, and party discipline-and its lack-will be increasingly important to the second-round strategies of both candidates.
Endnotes
Note *: William Barr is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, he was in Mexico during the NAFTA debates and passage, Panama when civilian government was restored, and Nairobi when Al Qaeda blew up the U.S. Embassy. He served twice in Brazil, as press attaché and counselor for political affairs. Mr. Barr is now a consultant and resides in Brasília. Back.
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