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CIAO DATE: 04/03
Brazil Alert: More U-turns in the Course of Brazil’s Presidential Election Campaign
William Perry *
Hemisphere Focus: 2001-2002
September 5, 2002
Overview
Competitive presidential races under Brazil’s New Republic have been characterized by dramatic reversals of fortune for candidates (as in 1989 and 1994, but not in 1998). This year’s campaign has certainly confirmed that pattern. We have already witnessed four quite distinct phases-each appearing to point toward different outcomes-and now, it seems to have entered a fifth, which is not necessarily the final form this 2002 contest will assume.
The devaluation crisis of January 1999 and the recession that followed broke President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s previously dominant standing with Brazil’s electorate. One consequence was that pre-candidates from his leftist opposition-Workers’ Party (PT) candidate Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, the Popular Socialist Party’s (PPS) Ciro Gomes, renegade Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) Minas Gerais governor Itamar Franco, (and, in lesser measure, the now Brazilian Socialist Party’s (PSB) Rio de Janeiro governor Anthony Garotinho)-together registered about 70 percent of voter preferences in all public opinion surveys for nearly the following three years.
In late 2001, however, the first contender from a component of the Cardoso coalition, the Liberal Front Party’s (PFL) Roseana Sarney, then-governor of Maranhão, began her meteoric rise. Within a few short months, her numbers came to rival those of the front-runner, still Lula, while Gomes and Franco faded in corresponding measure. But a police raid on her husband’s offices, which uncovered an embarrassingly large amount of difficult-to-explain cash, obliged Sarney to withdraw from the race in April 2002. Meanwhile, Health Minister José Serra had resigned from that post in anticipation of his nomination by President Cardoso’s own Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). At that point, Serra moved from the mid-single digits to nearly 20 percent in the polls. It then seemed to many that the contest would promptly narrow down to Serra and Lula, as had been the case between Cardoso and Lula in 1994.
Despite the fact that José Serra did manage to secure the PSDB nomination in June and consummate an alliance with the PMDB (which had served as the third main pillar of the Cardoso coalition), his effort seemed to falter at the starting line. During July and August, his public support declined to the low teens. Meanwhile, Ciro Gomes vaulted into second place, with poll numbers in the mid-high 20s, only behind the long front-running Lula, who registered in the mid-30s. In fact, Gomes was actually then besting the PT standard-bearer in hypothetical runoffs between them.
But the wheel has turned again during more recent weeks. Ciro Gomes was subjected to a heavy barrage of negative news coverage as his new standing in the polls became evident, reflecting a certain bias by the major media against his candidacy. And since the period of obligatory TV spots began on August 20-in which Serra enjoys a substantial time advantage as nominee of both the PSDB and PMDB (with candidates allocated minutes based on the past vote of the parties they represent)-he has recovered significantly at Gomes’s expense. Indeed, polls released at the beginning of September show these two individuals virtually tied near the 20 percent mark yet again-with Lula running in the mid-high 30s and Garotinho at about 10 percent. Moreover, according to these surveys, Lula is beating all comers in head-to-head simulations once again.
These developments reflect the continuing volatility and unpredictability of this race as it enters its final month. Almost the sole element of consistency here, from the beginning, has been Lula’s performance, and it is hard to see him failing to qualify on October 6 for the practically inevitable October 27 runoff. But who his rival will be in the latter contest and how the balance of power between them ultimately takes shape remains impossible to predict with any assurance.
Ciro Gomes has now twice closed on Lula’s inherent first-round advantage in a way that could conceivably take him to final victory. But his candidacy possesses a number of evident weaknesses, and he has also twice receded to a position where he might not even make the October 6 cut. José Serra, on the other hand, enjoys various natural advantages as Lula’s logical rival-some only theoretical so far-and has recently demonstrated considerable recuperative power. But throughout the course of the campaign to date, he has yet to show an ability to beat the PT standard-bearer in a runoff, even if his numbers during the first round should get him there. In other words, Ciro Gomes and José Serra now face each other in a bitter contest of uncertain outcome, four short weeks before October 6. They both face a decidedly uphill struggle to prevail on that day in a way that would permit the forging of a potentially winning coalition against Lula on October 27.
Meanwhile, sometimes indicative of governors’ races across the country (as well as those for seats in the federal Senate and Chamber of Deputies), this election seems to be on a course that ensures even greater fragmentation of power among Brazil’s overly numerous political parties. Serra’s PSDB appears to be doing relatively well, which means it might end up controlling five or six of twenty-seven state houses at the end of the day. But this is also the case for the PFL, which has increasingly linked itself to the candidacy of Ciro Gomes. It also looks like Anthony Garotinho’s PSB, Leonel Brizola’s PTD (part of Gomes’ Frente Trabalhista), and Gomes’ own PPS will have a relatively good year by their more modest standards. On the other hand, the PT and PMDB seem doomed to notably poor performances at the gubernatorial level in 2002. Thus, the signs on this front are at least as confusing as those from the presidential contest. If this campaign season has any lesson so far, it is that we will have to wait until we more closely approach the initial balloting before attempting any credible forecast of the ultimate outcome.
Endnotes
Note *: William Perry is a senior associate of the CSIS Americas Program and president of the Institute for the Study of the Americas and William Perry and Associates. Mr. Perry has an extensive track record of involvement in Colombian, Venezuelan, Argentine, Brazilian, and Southern Cone affairs, and the analysis of elections there and in other Latin American countries. He has also served as a senior Latin American specialist for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as director of Latin American affairs at the National Security Council. Back.
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